ÿWPC …# VUNa %¯ 0(µbÝw@å4% 9 U.H v 0l~ 0Dê 0J. 0Tx 0^Ì 0h* 0r’ 0| 0†€ 0 1u– 0d U>oB)­DCÖ AMfw D3– BÉv~æ 0@dvÓ¤ AOwÆÆ 0DŒ D/Ð Bÿ˜HP LaserJet 4Si/4SiMX PS 600dpiPSCRIPTÀÌÀääÀÀÌ0 (ÖÃ9 Z ‹6Times New Roman RegularX($¡¡- ù- Ú Û Ü Ý DÞ ß Eà á Eâ ã Ó€Ô¡¨ 3|xì %ä2¼A`ArialTT((3üÝ$¤¤Ý ƒ!ÝÝ  Ýà  àòòÚ  Ú0Ú  Úóó(#Ã$òòÚ  Ú0Ú  Úóó2 ÿÿ0Indent1Ô2ÔÔ3  Ô2" ÿÿ0Indent2à0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2, ÿÿ0Indent3à0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô26 ÿÿ0Indent4à0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2@ ÿÿ0Indent5à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2J ÿÿ0Indent6à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2T ÿÿ0Indent7à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2^ ÿÿ0Indent8à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô ÿÿ?AGMSYaioIndent0I.A.1.a.(1)(a)i)a)P ÿÿ8Mac DefaultMac DefaultÓ ` °šXÓ< Œ 9p`(&Times New Roman% Line 7 d%%%%7Border 1dd€-&Cþÿ << Gÿÿ Ý ƒ!ÝÑ  ÑÑ#€d#ÑÔ€$ÔÝ  ÝÔ€ ÔÔ€ ÔÓ  Óò òÔ YYY ÔFILEDÔ€ XÔÌÌDecember€13,€1996ÌÌCecil€W.€CrowsonÌAppellate€Court€ClerkÔ  Ôó ó Ý ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€$ÔÝ  ÝÝ ƒ $Ýà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  ÝÔ€ ÔÔ€ ôÔ€€ð ðððRecklessðð€refers€to€a€person€who€acts€recklessly€with€respect€to€circumstances€surrounding€the€à0 àconduct€or€the€result€of€the€conduct€when€the€person€is€aware€of€but€consciously€disregards€a€substantialÏand€unjustifiable€risk€that€the€circumstances€exist€or€the€result€will€occur.ðð€€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€39„11„106(a)(31).Ì++++'ÿÿdxd dPtPtHHÚ(ÿáÿâùFG(üHHÚ(d'h("ÿÿ$££Ò  ÒÒ  ÒStyl{WP}01•ÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃà Ãà Ãà Ãà Ãà ÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÐ ÐÐHHÐÐ  ÐÐ2ÐÐÿÿ¸æ$ÿÐÐHHÐÐÐÐÐÐÐÐ  ÐÐ ÐÐ ÐÑÑÑGenevaÑÑ ÑÑ € ÑÑ<Px–ÈÑÒÒÒ443!#4ÒÒ$ *$ÒÒ$*$ÒÒ ÿKK ÒÒ  Geneva ÒÒ  Geneva ÒÓ.,ÓÓÓÓ6ÓÓ ÓßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßÑGenevaÑÑ ÑÒ  h HD: Geneva ÒÒ  h HD: Geneva Ò€-‚ƒCþÿ<< CÿÿƒLevel 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5($$””ò òÚ  Ú1Ú  Úó ó„„'÷ÿ dxdüÿP PdÝ ƒ!ÝÔ . ÔÔ€$ÔÝ  ÝÑ ` ÑÒ  ÒÒ ° ÒÒ  ÒÒ „ ÒÑ\R AØ'\ÑÔ€$ŠÔÔ€ ÔÑ\R AØ'\ÑÑ€ÑÑ7€†TXXdìdÈ7ÑÑ  ÑÑ  ÑÓ  Óò òÙ€€ÙßR€'(&A1-j|` ç `€€@ÿRß›Þ ÞÌIN€THE€COURT€OF€CRIMINAL€APPEALS€OF€TENNESSEEÌÌAT€œNASHVILLE›ÌÌœAUGUST›€SESSION,€œ1996›ÌÌÌÓ  ÓœSTATE€OF€TENNESSEE,›à à)à àC.C.A.€NO.€œ01C01„9601„CC„00012›Ìà àà àà àà àà à)ó óÌà àœAppellee,›à àà àà àò ò)Ìà àà àà àà àà à)Ìà àà àà àà àà à)à àœPUTNAM›€COUNTYÌVS.à àà àà àà àà à)à àÌà àà àà àà àà à)à àHON.€œLEON€BURNS,€JR.ó ó›Ìœò òMARTHA€JEAN€FRAZIER,ó ó›à àò ò)à àJUDGEó óÌà àà àà àà àà àò ò)ó óÌà àœAppellant.›à àà àà àò ò)à àœó ó(Pretrial€Diversion)ò ò›Ìó óÌÌò òÓ  ÓON€APPEAL€FROM€THE€JUDGMENT€OF€THEÌœCRIMINAL›€COURT€OF€œPUTNAM€COUNTY›ó óÌÌÌòòÓ  ÓFOR€THE€APPELLANTóó:à àà àà àòòFOR€THE€APPELLEEóó:ÌÌœRANDALL€A.€YORK›à àà àà àœCHARLES€W.€BURSONÌP.O.€Box€3549à àà àà àà àAttorney€General€and€ReporterÌCrossville,€TN€38557Ìà àà àà àà àà àà àTIMOTHY€F.€BEHANÌà àà àà àà àà àà àAssistant€Attorney€GeneralÌà àà àà àà àà àà à450€James€Robertson€ParkwayÌà àà àà àà àà àà àNashville,€TN€37243„0493ÌÌà àà àà àà àà àà àBILL€GIBSONà àÌà àà àà àà àà àà àDistrict€Attorney€GeneralÌÌà àà àà àà àà àà àLILLIE€ANN€SELLSÌà àà àà àà àà àà àAssistant€District€Attorney€GeneralÌà àà àà àà àà àà à145€S.€Jefferson€AvenueÌà àà àà àà àà àà àCookeville,€TN€38501›ÌÌÌÌOPINION€FILED€________________________ÌÌœAFFIRMED›ÌÌDAVID€H.€WELLES,€JUDGEÇò òòòÓ  ÓÔ€ °ÔOPINIONóóó óÔ€ ŠÔÌÌÌÌÓÓÓ  Óà àThis€is€an€interlocutory€appeal€pursuant€to€Rule€œ9€of€the›€TennesseeÏRules€of€Appellate€Procedure.€€The€Defendant€appeals€from€the€trial€courtððsÏdetermination€that€the€District€Attorney€General€did€not€abuse€his€discretion€byÏdenying€pretrial€diversion.€€We€affirm€the€judgment€of€the€trial€court.ÌÌà àThe€Defendant,€Martha€Jean€Frasier,€was€indicted€in€œJanuary€of€1995›€onÏone€count€of€accessory€after€the€fact,€a€Class€E€felony.€€The€indictment€chargedÏher€with€knowingly€aiding€her€Co„defendant,€Richard€Lynn€Hutson,€in€avoidingÏarrest€and€punishment€for€aggravated€child€abuse.€€The€incident€of€child€abuseÏoccurred€on€February€18,€1994.€€At€that€time,€the€Defendant€was€living€with€herÏboyfriend,€Richard€Lynn€Hutson€and€two€children€from€her€marriage€to€JeffÏFrasier.€€Also€living€in€the€home€was€the€Defendantððs€two„year„old€daughter.€ÏThe€identity€of€the€father€of€that€child€is€not€certain,€but€the€Defendant€œhas€statedÏthat€the€father€is€the€brother€of€the€President€of€the€United€States.€€€This€two„year„old€child€is€the€victim€in€this€case.€€The€Defendant€was€separated€from€herÏhusband€and€was€going€through€a€bitter€divorce€and€custody€fight.ÌÌà àOn€the€day€of€the€incident,€the€Defendant€went€to€work€and€left€the€Co„defendant€at€home€with€her€two„year„old€daughter.€€The€Defendant€spoke€withÏher€boyfriend€on€the€telephone€around€noon€and€heard€the€child€crying€in€theÏbackground.€€Her€boyfriend€explained€that€the€child€was€riding€a€toy€tractor€andÏhad€ridden€down€the€steps€of€their€trailer€and€hit€her€head.€€When€the€DefendantÏcame€home€from€work,€she€saw€the€childððs€injuries€and€asked€her€co„worker,€aÏnurse,€to€look€at€them.€€The€nurse€advised€her€to€take€the€child€to€the€emergencyÏroom€for€treatment.€€The€Defendant€was€concerned€about€the€impact€the€injuriesÏwould€have€on€her€chances€of€keeping€custody€of€her€children.ÌÌà àThe€child€had€two€black€eyes,€bruising€of€and€bleeding€from€her€ears,€andÏbruising€on€the€back€of€her€head.€€The€Defendant€told€the€emergency€roomÏpersonnel€that€she€was€present€when€the€child€fell€down€the€steps.€€TheÏexamining€physician€determined€that€the€injuries€the€child€received€wereÏinconsistent€with€a€fall,€and€the€incident€was€reported€as€child€abuse€to€theÏDepartment€of€Human€Services.€€During€an€investigative€interview€by€the€policeÏand€a€Department€of€Human€Services€worker,€the€Defendant€maintained€herÏstory€until€the€investigator€confronted€her€with€information€that€she€was€known€toÏhave€been€at€work€at€the€time€the€injuries€occurred.€€Throughout€the€interview,Ïthe€Defendant€resisted€admitting€to€the€investigators€or€to€herself€that€herÏboyfriend€abused€her€child.ÌÌà àThe€Defendant€applied€for€pretrial€diversion€pursuant€to€Tennessee€CodeÏAnnotated€section€40„15„105.€€The€District€Attorney€denied€the€DefendantððsÏapplication,€enumerating€the€reasons€for€denial€in€a€letter€dated€May€31,€1995.€ÏThe€Defendant€submitted€a€petition€for€writ€of€certiorari€to€the€Circuit€Court€inÏPutnam€County,€asserting€that€the€District€Attorney€abused€his€discretion€byÏdenying€the€Defendant€pretrial€diversion.€€After€a€hearing,€the€trial€court€upheldÏthe€denial€of€pretrial€diversion.€€ÌÌà àThe€Defendant€appeals€to€this€court€with€two€issues:€(1)€That€the€trialÏcourt€erred€in€upholding€the€District€Attorneyððs€denial€of€pretrial€diversion€and€(2)Ïthat€the€trial€court€erred€by€refusing€to€examine€all€the€documents€that€the€DistrictÏAttorney€relied€upon€in€making€the€decision€to€deny€pretrial€diversion.ÌÌà àThe€Pretrial€Diversion€Act€provides€a€means€of€avoiding€theÏconsequences€of€a€public€prosecution€for€those€who€have€the€potential€to€beÏrehabilitated€and€avoid€future€criminal€charges.€€òòSeeóó€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€40„15„105.€€Pretrial€diversion€is€extraordinary€relief€for€which€the€Defendant€bears€theÏburden€of€proof.€€òòState€v.€Baxteróó,€868€S.W.2d€679,€681€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.€1993);ÏòòState€v.€Poplaróó,€612€S.W.2d€498,€501€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.€1980).€€ÌÌà àThe€district€attorney€is€vested€with€the€discretion€to€approve€or€denyÏpretrial€diversion.€€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€40„15„105(b)(3).€€€A€Defendant€whoÏapplies€for€and€is€denied€pretrial€diversion€may€ð ðpetition€for€a€writ€of€certiorari€toÏthe€trial€court€for€an€abuse€of€prosecutorial€discretion.ðð€€€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€40„15„105(b)(3).€€The€trial€court€may€review€the€district€attorneyððs€decision€from€theÏrecord,€or€in€addition,€conduct€a€hearing.€€The€trial€court€judge€cannot€substituteÏhis€judgment€for€that€of€the€district€attorney€when€reviewing€a€denial€of€pretrialÏdiversion.€€òòState€v.€Watkinsóó,€607€S.W.2d€486,€488€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.€1980).€ÏThe€district€attorney's€decision€is€viewed€as€"presumptively€correct"€and€will€notÏbe€set€aside€unless€there€is€a€finding€of€gross€and€patent€abuse€of€discretion.€ÏòòState€v.€Hammersleyóó,€650€S.W.2d€352,€356€(Tenn.€1983).€€ÌÌà à€The€trial€courtððs€scope€of€review€is€limited€to€the€information€provided€inÏthe€record€upon€which€the€district€attorney€based€the€decision.€€òòState€v.€Carróó,Ï861€S.W.2d€850,€855€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.€1993);€òòState€v.€Poplaróó,€612€S.W.2d€atÏ500€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.€1980).€€We€note€that€the€propriety€of€even€conducting€€anÏevidentiary€hearing€has€been€questioned.€€òòSeeóó€òòCarróó,€861€S.W.2d€at€856.€€ð ðInÏview€of€this€evidentiary€restriction,€an€evidentiary€hearing€would€seem€unneededÏin€the€usual€case.€€However,€a€hearing€may€be€useful€to€clarify€matters€alreadyÏin€the€record€about€which€there€may€be€some€dispute.ðð€€òòState€v.€Winsettóó,€882ÍS.W.2d€806,€810€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.1993),€òòperm€to€appeal€deniedóó,€òòid.óó€(Tenn.Ï1994).€ÌÌà à€In€cases€in€which€the€facts€are€undisputed,€as€they€generally€are€in€thisÏcase,€the€issue€primarily€becomes€a€question€of€law,€and€this€court€therefore€isÏnot€bound€by€the€lower€court's€decision.€€òòCarróó,€861€S.W.2d€at€856.€€In€such€aÏcase,€the€underlying€issue€is€whether,€as€a€matter€of€law,€the€district€attorneyÏgeneral€abused€his€or€her€discretion.€€òòIdóó.€€Our€review€focuses€on€whether€thereÏis€substantial€evidence€in€the€record€to€support€the€District€Attorney's€refusal€toÏdivert.€€In€a€close€case,€if€the€record€supports€the€decision€to€grant€or€denyÏpretrial€diversion,€ð ðit€cannot€be€an€abuse€of€discretion€to€decide€the€case€eitherÏway.ðð€€€€òòCarr,óó€€861€S.W.2d€at€856€(òòquotingóó€òòState€v.€Grearóó,€568€S.W.2d€285,€286Ï(Tenn.€1978)).€€In€an€appeal€from€the€denial€of€pretrial€diversion,€if€the€facts€areÏdisputed€and€the€trial€court€conducts€an€evidentiary€hearing€to€resolve€the€factualÏissues,€the€findings€of€fact€made€by€the€trial€court€are€binding€upon€this€court.€ÏòòState€v.€Helmsóó,€720€S.W.2d€474,€476€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.€1986).€€In€such€a€case,Ïthere€can€be€no€reversal€by€this€court€based€upon€the€facts€unless€theÏpreponderance€of€the€evidence€is€contrary€to€the€trial€judge's€factual€findings.€òòIdóó.€€ÏIf€the€district€attorneyððs€denial€of€pretrial€diversion€was€based€on€erroneous€facts,Ïthe€district€attorneyððs€exercise€of€discretion€must€then€be€reviewed€in€light€of€theÏcorrect€factual€determinations.€€We€emphasize€that€the€underlying€issue€remainsÍwhether€the€district€attorney€abused€his€or€her€discretion€in€denying€pretrialÏdiversion.€€ÌÌà àWe€now€turn€to€the€case€òòsubóó€òòjudiceóó,€in€which€the€Defendant€€challenged€Ïthe€District€Attorneyððs€decision,€claiming€that€there€was€not€substantial€evidenceÏto€support€the€denial€of€pretrial€diversion.€€A€certiorari€hearing€was€held€duringÏwhich€the€Defendant€called€the€probation€officer€who€prepared€the€investigationÏreport€supplied€to€the€District€Attorney.€€The€Defendant€did€not€contest€the€factsÏin€the€report.€€The€Defendant€also€called€the€Assistant€District€Attorney€as€aÏwitness,€questioning€the€basis€for€items€enumerated€in€the€letter€of€denial.€€ÏFinally,€the€State€and€the€Defendant€presented€arguments.€€The€trial€court€foundÏthat€the€District€Attorney€did€not€abuse€his€discretion€in€denying€pretrial€diversion.€ÏThere€was€no€resolution€of€disputed€facts€reflected€in€the€trial€courtððs€decision.€ÏThus,€we€review€the€District€Attorneyððs€decision€to€determine€whether€there€wasÏan€abuse€of€discretion.€ÌÌà àWhen€a€pretrial€diversion€request€is€denied,€the€district€attorney€must€stateÏthe€specific€reasons€for€denial€in€the€record€to€preserve€those€reasons€forÏmeaningful€appellate€review.€òòState€v.€Herronóó,€767€S.W.2d€151,€156€(Tenn.Ï1989).€€The€following€factors€should€be€considered€to€determine€whether€pretrialÏdiversion€should€be€granted:€ÌÌÒ  ÒÒ  ÒÒ ` ÒÒ  ÒÓÓ[the]€circumstances€of€the€offense;€the€criminal€record,€socialÏhistory€and€present€condition€of€the€defendant,€including€hisÏmental€and€physical€conditions€where€appropriate;€the€deterrentÏeffect€of€punishment€upon€other€criminal€activity;€defendantððsÏamenability€to€correction;€the€likelihood€that€pretrial€diversion€willÏserve€the€ends€of€justice€and€the€best€interests€of€both€theÏpublic€and€the€defendant;€and€the€applicantððs€attitude,€behaviorÏsince€arrest,€prior€record,€home€environment,€current€drug€usage,Ïemotional€stability,€past€employment,€general€reputation,€maritalÏstability,€family€responsibility€and€attitude€of€law€enforcement.ÌÒ  ÒÒ  ÒÓÓÒ  ÒÒ „ ÒÌòòState€v.€Washingtonóó,€866€S.W.2d€950,€951€(Tenn.€1993)(òòquotingóó€òòState€v.ÏMarkhamóó,€755€S.W.2d€850,€852„53€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.€1988)).€€ÌÌà àDeterrence,€of€both€the€defendant€and€others,€is€a€factor€the€importance€ofÏwhich€varies€according€to€the€individual€circumstances€of€each€case.€ÏòòHammersleyóó,€650,€S.W.2d€at€354.€The€circumstances€of€the€crime€and€the€needÏfor€deterrence€may,€in€the€appropriate€case,€outweigh€the€other€relevant€factorsÏand€justify€a€denial€of€pretrial€diversion.€€òòCarróó,€861€S.W.2d€at€855.€ÌÌà àDue€to€the€limited€scope€of€certiorari€review,€a€formal€written€response€isÏrequired€to€demonstrate€that€the€district€attorney€considered€all€the€relevantÏfactors€and€explain€why€certain€factors€outweigh€others.€€The€narrow€scope€ofÏreview€has€made€the€district€attorneyððs€letter€of€primary€importance.€€Indeed,€in€aÏreview€in€which€no€hearing€is€held,€the€letter€is€the€only€concrete€record€fromÍwhich€to€evaluate€whether€an€abuse€of€discretion€has€occurred.€€In€thisÏenvironment,€it€is€almost€imperative€that€district€attorneys€general€draft€letters€ofÏdenial€that€clearly€explain€how€the€appropriate€factors€have€been€consideredÏand€evaluated€and€why€the€decision€was€made€to€deny€diversion.ÌÌà àIn€òòWinsettóó,€this€court€set€forth€the€necessary€elements€for€an€appropriateÏand€proper€pretrial€diversion€denial€letter.€€òòWinsettóó,€882€S.W.2d€at€810.€€ÌÒ ` ÒÒ „ ÒÒ ` ÒÒ  ÒÓÓð ðIt€should€include:Ì€€Ì1.€€An€enumeration€of€all€the€evidence€considered;€€ÌÌ2.€€The€reason€for€denial:€that€is,€an€enumeration€of€the€factorsÏconsidered€and€how€some€factor(s)€controlled€the€decision€andÏsome€explanation€of€why€certain€factors€outweighed€others;Ïand€€ÌÌ3.€€An€identification€of€any€disputed€issue€of€fact.ððÌÌÒ  ÒÒ  ÒÒ  ÒÒ „ ÒÓÓòòId.óó€€We€agree€that€these€are€necessary€elements€for€the€district€attorney€toÏinclude€in€a€response.€€We€also€note€that€one€district€attorneyððs€letter,€reprinted€inÏan€appendix€in€òòCarróó,€is€an€excellent€illustration€of€an€effective€letter€containingÏthese€elements.€€In€the€òòCarróó€letter,€there€was€an€enumeration€of€reasons€forÏdenial,€each€supported€by€some€facts,€and€an€explanation€of€positive€factorsÏand€why€those€factors€were€insufficient€to€support€pretrial€diversion.€€òòCarróó,€861ÏS.W.2d€at€859„60.€€Such€explanations€need€not€be€lengthy,€but€shouldÏdemonstrate€that€appropriate€consideration€was€given€to€all€applicable€factors.€ÍFor€purposes€of€certiorari€review€and€appeal,€€this€insures€that€the€districtÏattorneyððs€position€is€clearly€understood€in€determining€whether€he€or€she€hasÏexercised€discretion€properly.ÌÌà àWhile€not€discounting€the€importance€of€the€contents€of€a€denial€letter,€weÏalso€note€that€the€letter€does€not€work€as€an€estoppel,€such€that€only€the€qualityÏof€the€letter€determines€whether€or€not€there€has€been€an€abuse€of€discretion.€€IfÏthe€trial€court€reviews€for€abuse€of€discretion€from€the€record€when€a€hearing€isÏnot€conducted,€the€letter€may€be€the€only€tangible€evidence€to€reflect€the€attorneyÏgeneralððs€decision€making€process.€€Naturally,€a€denial€letter€in€this€context€hasÏgreat€significance.€€However,€if€a€certiorari€hearing€has€been€conducted€andÏevidence€admitted,€the€record€available€for€review€is€expanded€to€include€theseÏproceedings.€ÌÌà àThrough€an€evidentiary€hearing€to€resolve€factual€questions€or€in€hearingÏarguments€of€counsel,€this€process€may€reveal€more€about€the€prosecutorððsÏdecision€than€what€is€memorialized€in€the€four€corners€of€the€denial€letter.€ÏIndeed,€information€made€available€at€the€hearing€may€cure€apparentÏdeficiencies€in€the€letter.€€Such€a€cure€may€be€accomplished€even€with€theÏcaution€that€the€scope€of€the€hearing€must€remain€extremely€narrow€and€that€itÏmay€not€be€used€as€a€substitute€for€clearly€insufficient€or€conclusory€letters€withÍrationales€created€after€the€fact.€€Conscientiously€drafted€denial€letters€reflectingÏconsideration€of€the€factors€established€in€òòHammersleyóó€and€its€progeny€mustÏremain€of€paramount€importance€in€reviewing€an€attorney€generalððs€denial€ofÏpretrial€diversion.ÌÌà àIn€the€case€òòsubóó€òòjudiceóó,€the€District€Attorney€listed€seven€reasons€to€denyÏpretrial€diversion.€€These€included€the€circumstances€of€the€offense€andÏdeterrence.€€The€Defendant€challenges€several€of€the€reasons,€arguing€that€thereÏis€no€evidence€to€support€them.€€The€factors€stated€to€be€considered€by€theÏDistrict€Attorney€were:Ì(1)€The€circumstances€of€the€crime;Ì(2)€the€Defendant€jeopardized€the€life€of€her€child€to€protect€the€co„defendant;Ì(3)€crimes€of€this€nature€(child€abuse)€are€a€serious€problem;Ì(4)€granting€diversion€would€depreciate€the€deterrent€effect€on€the€defendant€andÏthe€community;Ì(5)€the€Defendant€continues€to€deny€guilt€and€blames€her€co„worker;Ì(6)€the€crime€violates€a€position€of€trust€and€is€reckless€and€wanton€conduct;Ì(7)€the€Defendant€is€an€educated,€employed,€twenty„nine„year„old€mother€ofÏthree€who€has€sufficient€age€and€education€to€appreciate€the€wrongfulness€ofÏher€acts.ÌThe€letter€concluded€that€ð ð[i]t€is€my€opinion€that€the€considerations€listed€hereinÏoutweigh€any€positive€factors€of€the€defendantððs€application.ððÌÌà àWe€note€that€letters€containing€bald€assertions€have€resulted€inÏdiscounting€those€factors€when€considering€a€district€attorneyððs€decision.€€òòSeeóóÏòòState€v.€Kirkóó,€868€S.W.2d€739,€743€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.€1993).€€However,€theÏfocus€must€remain€on€determining€whether€the€Defendant€is€amenable€toÏcorrection€and€not€likely€to€commit€further€criminal€acts.€€òòSeeóó€òòMarkhamóó,€755ÏS.W.2d€at€853.€ÌÌà àThe€Defendant€takes€issue€with€every€one€of€the€factors€enumerated€€byÏthe€District€Attorney.€€In€particular,€she€contests:€factor€(2),€that€she€jeopardizedÏthe€life€of€her€child,€because€there€was€no€evidence€that€her€failure€to€discloseÏhad€this€effect;€factor€(3),€that€child€abuse€is€a€problem,€because€the€crime€sheÏhas€been€charged€with€is€accessory€after€the€fact€and€not€child€abuse;€factorÏ(5)€that€she€denies€guilt€and€blames€her€co„worker,€citing€that€she€did€admit€theÏcover„up€to€the€police€investigator;€and€factor€(6),€that€she€violated€a€position€ofÏtrust€and€behaved€recklessly€or€wantonly.€€ÌÌà àThe€District€Attorneyððs€factors€(2)€and€(3),€€that€the€Defendant€endangeredÏher€child€and€that€child€abuse€is€a€problem€may€be€somewhat€speculative,€butÍreflect€the€overriding€concern€that€her€course›€of€action,€if€œundetected,€could›€haveÏsubjected€her€child€to€future€child€abuse.€We€agree€that€the€record€does€notÏœstrongly€support›€every€factor€listed€in€the€letter.€€Even€if€some€inappropriateÏfactors€were€considered,€if€there€is€substantial€evidence€to€support€the€DistrictÏAttorneyððs€decision,€no€patent€or€gross€abuse€of€discretion€has€occurred.€€òòSeeóóÏòòCarróó,€861€S.W.2d€at€857.€€ÌÌà à€As€for€factor€(5),€the€Defendant€submitted€a€statement€with€her€pretrialÏdiversion€application€that€the€nurse€she€first€consulted€told€her€to€lie.€€ð ðKim€statedÏthat€due€to€how€my€divorce€was€going€that€I€should€state€that€I€was€there€ifÏanyone€asked€so€I€did.ðð€€Factor€(6),€that€the€behavior€was€a€violation€of€trustÏand€that€it€was€reckless,€is€supported€by€the€Defendantððs€assertion€that€sheÏwas€motivated€œprimarily€by€her›€divorce.€€Concealing€child€abuse€for€this€motive,Ïor€to€protect€the€Co„defendant,€indicates€a€subordination€of€her€childððs€need€forÏprotection€to€guard€her€own€interests.œ× ƒ) ××  ×›ÌÌà à€The€Defendant€had€the€opportunity€to€challenge€the€factors€at€theÏcertiorari€hearing.€€€At€that€hearing,€the€Defendant€presented€her€challenge€to€theÏœcontents€of€the€letter.›€€The€Defendantððs€counsel€highlighted€her€positive€factors:Íseveral€letters€recommending€her€for€pretrial€diversion,€the€fact€that€she€earned€aÏG.E.D.€and€attended€a€trade€school,€her€lack€of€prior€offenses,€and€her€œhistory€ofÏsteady›€employment.€€The€Defendant€called€the€Assistant€District€Attorney€toÏtestify€to€explain€how€she€substantiated€each€factor€and€whether€sheÏconsidered€any€positive€factors.€The€testimony€revealed€that€the€prosecutor€hadÏœgenerally€considered›€all€of€the€applicable€positive€and€negative€factors.ÌÌà àWe€œrecognize›€that€the€Defendant€does€have€a€number€of€favorableÏfactors€that€€suggest€she€is€a€credible€candidate€for€pretrial€diversion.€€There€isÏœno€substantial›€previous€history€of€criminal€behavior,€although€she€admits€toÏsome€prior€drug€use.€€She€has€earned€a€trade€school€degree€and€hasÏmaintained€steady€employment.€€She€also€has€support€from€friends€andÏemployers,€as€evidenced€by€the€character€letters€she€submitted.ÌÌà àRegarding€the€negative€factors,€the€record€œreflects€that›€the€Defendant€œwasÏuntruthful›€to€the€hospital€personnel€about€the€cause€of€her€childððs€injuries.€€WhatÏis€more€œtroubling,€and›€œapparently€the›€primary€factor€upon€which€the€DistrictÏAttorney€relied,€is€that€the€Defendant€has€maintained€an€unwillingness€orÏinability€to€admit€that€the€abuse€occurred.€€€Although€it€is€difficult€for€any€œparent›€toÏadmit€that€œher›€significant€other€has€abused€her€child,€such€œa€denial›€is€preciselyÏwhat€undermines€oneððs€amenability€to€correction.€€She€œargues€that›€she€wasÍmotivated€by€her€divorce€and€custody€battle.€€€This€motive€does€not€dilute€theÏimpact€of€covering€up€for€the€Co„defendant€nor€justify€exposing€her€child€to€futureÏharm.€Ìà àÌà àRegardless€of€the€motive,€it€does€not€appear€from€the€record€that€theÏDefendant€œdemonstrated€an›€understanding€of€the€consequences€of€her€actionsÏnor€œclearly€expressed›€remorse.€€There€is€evidence€that€œshe€has›€œmaintained›Ïsome€contact€with€her€Co„defendant.€The€record€also€reflects€that€the€generalÏtruthfulness€of€the€Defendant€is€questionable.€The€District€Attorney€could€haveÏreasonably€found€that€the€circumstances€of€the€crime€and€deterrence€wereÏœimportant€and›€controlling€factors€if€the€Defendant€was€likely€to€re„offend€and€putÏher€children€at€risk€of€future€child€abuse.€€€After€reviewing€the€record,€and€inÏdeferring€to€the€presumption€of€correctness€of€the€District€Attorneyððs€decision,€weÏconclude€that€there€was€substantial€evidence€in€the€record€to€support€theÏdecision€to€deny€pretrial€diversion.€€Although€there€were€significant€positiveÏfactors,€œwe€simply›€cannot€say€that€the€District€Attorney€abused€his€discretion€inÏdeciding€against€diversion.ÌÌà àThe€Defendant€also€argues€that€the€trial€court€erred€by€not€examining€theÏentire€record€upon€which€the€District€Attorney€based€œhis›€decision€to€deny€pretrialÍdiversion.€€She€asserts€that€in€order€for€the€trial€court€to€conduct€a€meaningfulÏreview,€all€documents€must€be€examined.ÌÌà àThe€State€argues€that€the€trial€court€must€ð ðconfine€its€review€to€theÏreasons€given€by€the€prosecutor€for€denialðð€and€cites€òòState€v.€Brownóó,€700ÏS.W.2d€568€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.€1985).€€We€believe€that€the€State€misreads€theÏholding€in€òòBrownóó.€€In€that€case,€the€prosecutor€attempted€to€add€œadditionalÏreasons›€for€the€denial€of€pretrial€diversion€that€came€to€his€attention€after€heÏsubmitted€his€denial.€He€presented€them€at€the€certiorari€hearing€œin€order€to›Ïbolster€his€position.€€òòId.óó€at€569.€€òòBrownóó€holds€that€the€trial€judge€may€consider€allÏof€the€factors€as€long€as€they€are€based€on€evidence€available€to€the€districtÏattorney€at€the€time€of€the€denial,€but€that€the€reasons€for€denial€under€reviewÏmust€be€limited€to€those€formalized€when€the€letter€was€issued,€not€those€whichÏcome€to€light€after€that€time.€€òòId.óó€€This€is€not€designed€to€substitute€œfor€the›€districtÏattorneyððs€judgment,€but€to€adequately€assess€whether€his€or€her€decision€wasÏa€patent€or€gross€abuse€of€discretion€in€light€of€the€applicable€factors€to€beÏconsidered.ÌÌà àIn€assessing€pretrial€diversion€decisions€ð ð[t]he€trial€judge€must€also€adhereÏto€the€same€balancing€procedure,€which€must€be€followed€on€a€case„by„caseÏbasis,€assigning€the€significance€to€all€relevant€factors,€and€set€out€in€findings€ofÍfact€and/or€his€order€affirming€or€reversing€the€prosecutors€decision.ðð€€òòHerronóó,€767ÏS.W.2d€at€156.€€Nothing€specifies€that€a€trial€judge€must€examine€everyÏdocument€relied€upon€by€the€district€attorney,€nor€does€it€foreclose€that€possibility.€ÏThe€trial€judge€should€consider€evidence€such€that€he€may€fairly€determineÏwhether€the€prosecutor€abused€her€discretion.€€In€a€case€in€which€no€certiorariÏhearing€is€conducted,€it€is€incumbent€upon€the€trial€judge€to€review€the€record.€ÏYet,€if€there€has€been€a€hearing,€if€the€evidence€and/or€arguments€presentedÏfully€reflect€the€factors€that€were€considered€by€the€district€attorney,€the€trial€courtÏis€warranted€in€ruling€based€on€that€hearing.ÌÌœ›à àThe€trial€court€must€review€the€prosecutorððs€decision€to€determine€onlyÏwhether€there€has€been€a€patent€or€gross€abuse€of€discretion.€The€DefendantÏargued€at€the€hearing€that€there€was€not€substantial€evidence€to€support€theÏDistrict€Attorneyððs€decision.€€€€The€court€heard€testimony€œconcerning€every›€factorÏlisted€in€the€denial€œletter.›€€œDefendantððs›€counsel€presented€evidence€of€theÏpositive€factors€pertaining€to€her€application.€€The€court€also€determined€that€theÏDistrict€Attorney€had€considered€all€the€positive€factors€about€the€Defendant.€ÏThe€trial€court€was€presented€with€sufficient€evidence€to€support€its€decision,Ïtherefore,€the€trial€court€did€not€err€by€failing€to€review€all€of€the€submittedÏdocuments.€ÌÌà àWe€find€that€the€District€Attorney€did€not€abuse€his€discretion€by€denyingÏthe€Defendantððs€application€for€pretrial€diversion.€€Also,€the€trial€court€did€not€errÏby€reviewing€the€District€Attorneyððs€decision€based€on€the€evidence€andÏarguments€presented€at€the€certiorari€hearing.€€Accordingly,€the€judgment€of€theÏtrial€court€is€affirmed.ÌÌœ›ÓÓà àà àà àà àà à____________________________________Ìà àà àà àà àà àDAVID€H.€WELLES,€JUDGEÌÌÌÌCONCUR:ÌÌÌÌ___________________________________ÌœJOHN€H.€PEAY,€JUDGE›ÌÌÌ___________________________________ÌœJOSEPH€M.€TIPTON,€JUDGE›