ÿWPC …# VUNa %¯ 0(µw@Ý4 1 @ H 0lP 0D¼ 0J 0TJ 0^ž 0hü 0rd 0|Ö 0†R 0Ø 1uh 0dÝ BAU>^U*œ D3ÆB)ùDC" 0@e AM¥ò›b£ v~vÓŒ AO_Æ® 0Dt D/¸ Bç˜HP LaserJet 4SiHPPCL5MS,ü,,,,,ü0nLhÎ(ÈhH  Z ‹6Times New Roman RegularX($¡¡ z[{[|[}[~[[€[‚DƒÓ€R¦"3|xŽ((3üÝ$¤¤Ý ƒ!ÝÝ  Ýà  àòòÚ  Ú0Ú  Úóó(#Ã$òòÚ  Ú0Ú  Úóó2 ÿÿ0Indent1Ô2ÔÔ3  Ô2" ÿÿ0Indent2à0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2, ÿÿ0Indent3à0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô26 ÿÿ0Indent4à0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2@ ÿÿ0Indent5à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2J ÿÿ0Indent6à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2T ÿÿ0Indent7à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2^ ÿÿ0Indent8à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô ÿÿ?AGMSYaioIndent0I.A.1.a.(1)(a)i)a)P ÿÿ8Mac DefaultMac DefaultÓ ` °šXÓ d< Œ 9p`(&Times New Roman< Œ 9p`(Arial""""'ÿÿdxd% Line 7 d++++7Border 1dd("ÿÿ$££Ò  ÒÒ  Ò€-,Cþÿ << Gÿÿ Ý ƒ!ÝÑ  ÑÑ#€d#ÑÔ€(ÔÝ  ÝÔ€)ÔÔ€)ÔÓ  ÓÔ YYY ÔFILEDÔ€)XÔÌÌò òJune€4,€1997ÌÌCecil€Crowson,€Jr.ÌÔ€)ôÔAppellate€Court€Clerkó ó ‘Ý ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€(ÔÝ  ÝÝ ƒ $Ýà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  ÝÒ  ÒÒ ° ÒÔ€)Ôà àWhile€òòMossóó€was€decided€under€the€1982€sentencing€law,€the€courtÏin€òòAshbyóó€€commented€upon€the€Tennessee€Criminal€Sentencing€Reform€Act€ofÏ1989€that€is€controlling€in€the€case€now€before€us.Ì XÝ ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€(ÔÝ  ÝÝ ƒ $Ýà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  ÝÒ  ÒÒ ° Òà àÔ€)Ô€In€òòMcKinzie€Monroe€Blackóó,€we€found€the€circumstances€were€notÏappropriate€to€require€the€trial€court€to€apply€ð ðdouble€mitigation.ððÌ ÿÝ ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€(ÔÝ  ÝÝ ƒ $Ýà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  ÝÒ  ÒÒ ° ÒÔ€)ÔÓ  Óà àThe€òòTravisóó€qualifiers€are€stated€in€the€disjunctive,€and€evidenceÏthat€only€one€applies€is€sufficient€to€support€denial€of€probation€based€upon€theÏnature€and€circumstances€of€the€offense.€€òòSee€State€v.€Kyteóó,€874€S.W.2d€631,Ï633€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.),€òòperm.€app.€deniedóó€(Tenn.€1993).€ÌPtPtHHÚ(ÿáÿâùFG(üHHÚ(d'hStyl{WP}01•ÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃà Ãà Ãà Ãà Ãà ÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÐ ÐÐHHÐÐ  ÐÐ2ÐÐÿÿ¸æ$ÿÐÐHHÐÐÐÐÐÐÐÐ  ÐÐ ÐÐ ÐÑÑÑGenevaÑÑ ÑÑ € ÑÑ<Px–ÈÑÒÒÒ443!#4ÒÒ$ *$ÒÒ$*$ÒÒ ÿKK ÒÒ  Geneva ÒÒ  Geneva ÒÓ.,ÓÓÓÓ6ÓÓ ÓßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßÑGenevaÑÑ ÑÒ  h HD: Geneva ÒÒ  h HD: Geneva Ò€-‚ƒCþÿ<< CÿÿƒLevel 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5($$””ò òÚ  Ú1Ú  Úó ó„„'÷ÿ dxdüÿP PdÝ ƒ!ÝÔ . ÔÔ€(ÔÝ  ÝÒ  ÒÒ ° ÒØØÙ  ÙÑ\R AØ'\Ñò òÓ  ÓÔ€)ÔÑ\R AØ'\ÑÑ7€µjXXdìdÈ7ÑÑ  Ñ›Þ ÞÌÌòŒòIN€THE€COURT€OF€CRIMINAL€APPEALS€OF€TENNESSEE̜ـ€ÙßR€./,A1-j|` Å `€€@ÿRß›ÌAT€KNOXVILLEÌÌJANUARY€SESSION,€1997ÌÌÌÓ  ÓÌóŒóó óSTATE€OF€TENNESSEE,à àò òà àó ó)Ìà àà àà àà àà à)à àNo.€03C01„9602„CR„00084Ìà àà àAppellee,à àà à)à àÌà àà àà àà àà à)à àKNOX€COUNTYÌà àà àà àà àà à)Ìv.à àà àà àà àà à)à àHON.€RICHARD€BAUMGARTNER,Ìà àà àà àà àà à)à àJUDGEò òÌó óMICHAEL€D.€FRAZIER,à àà à)Ìà àà àà àà àà à)à à(Attempt€to€commit€voluntaryÌà àà àAppellant.à àà à)€€€€€€€€€€manslaughter)Ìà àà àà àò òÌÌÌó óFOR€THE€APPELLANT:à àà àà àFOR€THE€APPELLEE:ÌÌGREGORY€P.€ISAACSà àà àà àJOHN€KNOX€WALKUPÌ1€Centre€Squareà àà àà àà àAttorney€General€and€ReporterÌSecond€Floorà àà àà àà àÌKnoxville,€TN€37902à àà àà àTIMOTHY€F.€BEHANÌà àà àà àà àà àà àAssistant€Attorney€GeneralÌRONALD€A.€RAYSONà àà àà à450€James€Robertson€ParkwayÌ1€Centre€Squareà àà àà àà àNashville,€TN€37243„0493ÌSecond€Floorà àà àà àà àÌKnoxville,€TN€37902à àà àà àRANDALL€E.€NICHOLSÌà àà àà àà àà àà àDistrict€Attorney€GeneralÌÌà àà àà àà àà àà àWILLIAM€H.€CRABTREEÌà àà àà àà àà àà àAssistant€District€AttorneyÌà àà àà àà àà àà àCity„County€BuildingÌà àà àà àà àà àà àKnoxville,€TN€37902ÌÌà àà àà àà àà àà àSALLY€JO€HELMÌà àà àà àà àà àà àAssistant€District€AttorneyÌà àà àà àà àà àà àCity„County€BuildingÌà àà àà àà àà àà àKnoxville,€TN€37902ÌÌÌOPINION€FILED:€_______________Ìò òÌòŒòAFFIRMEDóŒóÌÌó óCURWOOD€WITT,€œJUDGEò òÌÇ›ØØÙ  ÙÓÓÓ  Óà àœOPINION›Ìó óà àà àÌÒ € ÒÒ ° ÒÓ  Óà àà àThe€appellant,€Michael€Frazier,€appeals€from€the€sentencingÏjudgment€of€the€Criminal€Court€of€Knox€County.€€He€was€tried€for€attempt€toÏcommit€murder€in€the€first€degree€and€was€convicted€of€attempt€to€commit€Ïvoluntary€manslaughter,€a€Class€D€felony.€€The€appellant€received€a€sentenceÏof€four€years€as€a€standard€(Range€I)€offender.€€On€appeal€the€following€issuesÏare€raised:€(1)€sentencing€at€the€maximum€time€within€the€range€and€(2)€theÏdenial€of€probation.ÌÌà àà àFor€reasons€explained€below,€the€judgment€of€the€trial€court€isÏaffirmed.ÌÌà àà àThe€appellant€was€tried€before€a€jury€for€the€attempted€first„degree€murder€of€Robert€Whedbee.€€The€appellant€testified€he€was€in€love€withÏWhedbeeððs€wife,€Lisa€Whedbee,€and€fearing€she€was€being€brutalized€by€herÏhusband,€he€entered€the€Whedbee€home€in€the€early€evening€hours€of€June€7,Ï1994,€planning€to€kill€Robert€Whedbee.€€Armed€with€a€knife,€he€hid€within€aÏcloset€for€several€hours.€€€In€the€early€hours€of€June€8,€with€knife€in€hand€heÏentered€the€room€where€Mr.€Whedbee€slept.€€Mr.€Whedbee€awoke,€and€aÏscuffle€ensued.€€The€defendant€testified€that€before€he€began€any€assault€heÏdecided€to€abandon€the€plan€and€retreat€from€the€house.€€He€testified€thatÏRobert€Whedbee€awoke€as€the€appellant€was€leaving€the€bedroom.€€Mr.ÍWhedbee,€however,€testified€he€awoke€and€found€the€appellant€standing€overÏhim,€making€a€downward€motion.€€The€struggle€resulted,€according€to€Mr.ÏWhedbee,€when€he€tried€to€fend€off€the€blow€and€subdue€the€attacker.€€Mr.ÏWhedbee€received€very€minor€wounds€to€his€ear€and€throat€and€a€moreÏserious€cut€on€his€thumb.€€This€latter€injury€occurred€when€Mr.€WhedbeeÏgrabbed€the€knife€during€the€struggle.€€The€appellant€was€acquitted€of€attemptÏto€commit€murder€in€both€the€first€and€second€degrees€but€was€convicted€ofÏattempt€to€commit€€voluntary€manslaughter.ÌÌà àà àAt€the€sentencing€hearing,€the€appellant€requested€probationÏand€minimal€sentencing,€citing€his€lack€of€criminal€record€and€his€state€ofÏmental€despair€at€the€time€of€the€offense.€€Dr.€Diana€McCoy,€a€clinicalÏpsychologist,€testified€for€the€defense€that€violence€was€out€of€character€for€theÏappellant,€that€he€was€depressed,€and€that€at€the€time€of€the€offense,€hisÏmental€state€was€impaired€due€to€his€anxiety€over€the€safety€of€Lisa€Whedbee.€ÏIn€her€opinion€incarceration€was€inappropriate€for€the€appellant.€€She€furtherÏstated,€however,€that€the€appellant€went€to€the€Whedbee€home€ð ðfor€theÏpurpose€of€killing€Rob€Whedbee.€€That€was€his€point€in€going€there€at€thatÏtime.ðð€€She€stated€that€later€he€realized€he€couldnððt€go€through€with€the€crimeÏand€intended€to€withdraw.€€The€appellant€did€not€testify€at€the€sentencingÏhearing.€€The€presentence€report€reflects€the€appellant€has€no€prior€criminalÏrecord.€€The€trial€court€set€the€sentence€at€four€years,€the€maximum€in€theÏrange,€and€denied€the€appellantððs€request€for€probation.ÌÌò òÓ  ÓI.€€òòStandard€of€Reviewó óóóÌÓ  Óà àà àà àà àÌÓ  Óà àà àWhen€there€is€a€challenge€to€the€length,€range,€or€manner€ofÏservice€of€a€sentence,€it€is€the€duty€of€this€Court€to€conduct€a€òòde€novoóó€reviewÏon€the€record€with€a€presumption€that€the€determinations€made€by€the€trialÏcourt€are€correct.€€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€40„35„401(d)€(1990).€€This€presumptionÏis€ð ðconditioned€upon€the€affirmative€showing€in€the€record€that€the€trial€courtÏconsidered€the€sentencing€principles€and€all€relevant€facts€andÏcircumstances.ðð€€òòState€v.€Ashbyóó,€823€S.W.€2d€166,€169€(Tenn.€1991).€€ð ðTheÏburden€of€showing€that€the€sentence€is€improper€is€upon€the€appellant.ðð€€òòId.óó€€InÏthe€event€the€record€fails€to€demonstrate€the€required€consideration€by€the€trialÏcourt,€review€of€the€sentence€is€purely€òòde€novoóó.€€òòIdóó.€€If€appellate€review€reflectsÏthe€trial€court€properly€considered€all€relevant€factors€and€its€findings€of€factÏare€adequately€supported€by€the€record,€this€court€must€œaffirm€Çthe›€sentence,€ð ðeven€if€we€would€have€preferred€a€different€result.ðð€€òòState€v.ÏFletcheróó,€805€S.W.2d€785,€789€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.€1991).ÌÌà àà àIn€making€its€sentencing€determination,€the€trial€court,€at€theÏconclusion€of€the€sentencing€hearing,€determines€the€range€of€sentence€andÏthen€determines€the€specific€sentence€and€the€propriety€of€sentencingÏalternatives€by€considering€(1)€the€evidence,€if€any,€received€at€the€trial€andÏthe€sentencing€hearing;€(2)€the€presentence€report;€(3)€the€principles€ofÏsentencing€and€arguments€as€to€sentencing€alternatives;€(4)€the€nature€andÏcharacteristics€of€the€criminal€conduct€involved;€(5)€evidence€and€informationÏoffered€by€the€parties€on€the€enhancement€and€mitigation€factors;€(6)€anyÏstatement€the€defendant€wishes€to€make€in€the€defendantððs€behalf€aboutÏsentencing;€and€(7)€the€potential€for€rehabilitation€or€treatment.€€Tenn.€CodeÏAnn.€ðð€40„35„210(b)€(Supp.€1996);€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€40„35„103(5)€œ(1990);ÏòòState€v.›€Hollandóó,€860€S.W.€2d€53,€60€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.€1993).ÌÌà àà àIn€òòAshbyóó,€our€supreme€court€said:ÌÒ ¸ ÒÒ ° ÒÒ ¸ ÒÒ ` ÒÓÓœð ð[A]›€case„by„case€approach€to€sentencing€underliesÏthis€Act€as€a€fundamental€policy.€€An€individualÏcriminal€is€sentenced€based€on€the€nature€of€theÏoffense€and€the€totality€of€the€circumstances€in€whichÏit€was€committed,€including€the€defendantððsÏbackground€....€Any€case„by„case€approach€willÏembody€discretion,€since€all€of€the€appropriateÏfactors€and€circumstances€must€be€weighed€andÏconsidered€as€a€whole€for€the€disposition€of€eachÍœcase.ðð›× ƒ0 ××  ×€€œòòÌÌÒ € ÒÒ ` ÒÒ € ÒÒ ° ÒÓÓState›€v.€Ashbyóó,€823€S.W.2d€166,€168€(Tenn.€1991)€(quoting€òòState€v.€Mossóó,€727ÏS.W.2d€229,€235€(Tenn.€œ1986)).›ÌœÌÓ  ÓÇ›à àà àò òII.€€òòLength€of€Sentence.óóÌÓ  ÓÌà àà àó óThe€record€affirmatively€reflects€that€the€trial€court€considered€theÏelements€enumerated€in€òòAshbyóó€and€in€the€above„cited€statutes.€€Accordingly,Ïour€review€is€accompanied€by€the€presumption€of€correctness.€€Given€thisÏpresumption€œ€there›€is€ample€support€in€the€record€for€the€trial€courtððsÏdetermination€of€the€sentence.ÌÌà àà àThe€trial€judge€considered€the€evidence€presented€at€trial€andÏsaid€he€had€a€ð ðvery€clear€recollection€of€the€facts€of€this€case.ðð€€After€hearingÏtestimony€at€the€sentencing€hearing,€€the€trial€court€referred€to€hisÏconsideration€of€the€presentence€report€and€admitted€it€into€evidence.€€€AfterÏhearing€arguments€concerning€enhancement€and€mitigation€factors,€the€courtÏrecessed€for€a€brief€interval€to€reflect€upon€the€sentencing€determination,€andÏthen€the€trial€judge€announced€he€had€considered€the€evidence€at€trial,€theÏevidence€presented€at€the€sentencing€hearing,€the€presentence€report,€theÏarguments€of€counsel,€and€the€principles€of€sentencing.€€The€court€added,€ð ð[A]sÏalways,€again,€the€nature€and€character€of€the€criminal€conduct€involved€in€theÏparticular€case€are€a€major€factor€for€the€courtððs€consideration.ðð€€The€court€citedÏthe€necessity€of€appropriateness€of€the€sentence€in€view€of€the€ð ðnature€of€theÏdefendant€and€his€background€history,€and€conduct€during€this€particularÏincident.ðð€€The€court€acknowledged€the€appellant€had€no€prior€felonyÏconvictions€but€€reflected€that€the€jury€verdict€was€in€his€view€ð ðkindðð€to€theÍappellant,€giving€him€ð ðthe€benefit€of€the€doubt€in€this€caseðð€in€finding€him€guiltyÏð ðof€the€least€offensive€criminal€conduct€of€which€they€were€given€a€choice.ðð€ÏThe€trial€judge€expressed€his€view€that€there€was€sufficient€proof€to€support€aÏfinding€of€an€attempt€to€commit€first€or€second„degree€murder.€€ÌÌà àà àThe€court€stated,€ð ð[W]e€start€with€presumptive€minimumÏsentencingðð€and€then€reviewed€the€enhancement€factors€set€forth€inÏTennessee€Code€Annotated€Section€40„35„114,€determining€that€factors€(2),Ï(4),€(5),€(7)€and€(16)€did€not€apply.€€The€court€found€factor€(9),€the€use€of€aÏdeadly€weapon,€and€factor€(12),€a€willful€œinfliction›€of€bodily€injury,€were€theÏonly€applicable€enhancement€factors.€As€to€mitigating€factors€underÏTennessee€Code€Annotated€Section€40„35„113,€the€court€found€the€presenceÏof€factor€(8),€a€mental€condition€that€reduced€the€defendantððs€culpability,€andÏrejected€factors€(2),€(3),€(11)€and€(12).ÌÌÓ  Ó(a)€Enhancement€factors€selected.ÌÌÓ  Óà àà àThe€court€applied€two€enhancement€factors€in€its€sentencingÏdetermination.€The€factors€the€court€found€applicable€are:ÌÒ ` ÒÒ ° ÒÒ ` ÒÒ  ÒÓÓ(9)€€The€defendant€possessed€or€employed€a€firearm,€explosiveÏdevice€or€other€deadly€weapon€during€the€commission€of€theÏoffense;€[and]ÌÌ(12)€€During€the€commission€of€the€felony,€the€defendant€willfullyÏinflicted€bodily€injury€upon€another€person,€or€the€actions€of€theÏdefendant€resulted€in€the€death€of€or€serious€bodily€injury€to€aÍvictim€or€person€other€than€the€intended€œvictim[.]ÌÌÒ  ÒÒ  ÒÒ  ÒÒ ° ÒÓÓTenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€40„35„114€(9),€(12)€(Supp.€1996).€The€application€of€factorÏ(9)€was€conceded€by€the€appellant€and€is€supported€without€contradiction€in€theÏrecord.€€The€application€of€factor€(12)€is€likewise€supported€by€the€record.€ÏFactor€(12)€is€appropriate€where€the€defendant€has€òòeither€óó€willfully€inflictedÏbodily€injury€òòoróó€the€defendantððs€actions€have€resulted€in€serious€bodily€injury€(orÏdeath).€€Although€the€injury€to€Mr.€Whedbeeððs€thumb€may€not€have€been€willfullyÏinflicted,€the€court€found€the€wound€to€the€victimððs€ear€and€the€scratch€wound€toÏhis€neck€to€be€willfully€inflicted€bodily€injuries.€€The€court€correctly€appliedÏenhancement€factors€(9)€and€(12).ÌÓ  ÓÌ(b)€Mitigating€factors€rejected.ÌÓ  ÓÌà àà àThe€court€declined€to€apply€the€following€mitigating€factors:ÌÌÒ ` ÒÒ ° ÒÒ ` ÒÒ  ÒÓÓ(2)€The€defendant€acted€under€strong€provocation;ÌÌ(3)€Substantial€grounds€exist€tending€to€excuse€the€defendantððsÏcriminal€conduct,€though›€failing€to€establish€a€defense;ÌÌ(11)€The€defendant,€although€guilty€of€the€crime,€committed€theÏoffense€under€such€unusual€circumstances€that€it€is€unlikely€that€aÏsustained€intent€to€violate€the€law€motivated€his€conduct;€[and]ÌÌ(12)€The€defendant€acted€under€duress€or€under€the€domination€ofÏanother€person,€even€though€the€duress€or€the€domination€ofÏanother€person€is€not€sufficient€to€constitute€a€defense€to€the€crimeÏœ[.]›ÌÌÒ  ÒÒ  ÒÒ  ÒÒ ° ÒÓÓœTenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€40„35„113€(2),€(3),€(11),€(12)€(1990).›ÌœÌ›à àà àòòFactors€(2)€and€(3)óó.€€In€rejecting€these€factors,€€the€trial€courtÏreferred€to€the€juryððs€decision€to€acquit€the€appellant€of€attempt€to€commitÏmurder€and€convict€him€only€of€attempt€to€commit€voluntary€manslaughter.€€ItÏfound€the€jury€relied€upon€provocation€to€reduce€the€grade€of€the€offense€andÏfound€that€the€appellant€had€already€received€the€benefit€of€a€finding€ofÏprovocation€through€the€juryððs€verdict.ÌÌà àà àThis€court€reviewed€a€€similar€situation€in€òòState€v.€McKinzieÏMonroe€Blackóó,€No.€01C01„9401„CC„00006€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.,€Nashville,€JulyÏ14,€1995),€in€which€the€trial€court€cited€the€juryððs€application€of€ð ðstrongÏprovocationðð€to€reduce€the€offense€from€murder€to€voluntary€manslaughter,Ïfinding€it€œð ðinappropriate›€that€the€same€factor€be€used€as€a€mitigating€œfactor.ðð›€SlipÏop.€œat›€7„8.€€This€court€observed€that,€although€œð ðessential›€elements€of€theÏœoffenseðð›€cannot€also€serve€as€enhancement€factors,€there€is€no€prohibitionÏagainst€œð ðdouble›€œmitigation,ðð›€and€it€is€permissible€to€use€provocation€as€aÏmitigator€in€appropriate€voluntary€manslaughter€cases.× ƒ1 ××  ×€€We€need€not€assessÏthe€propriety€of€the€trial€courtððs€rationale€in€the€case€before€us,€however,Ïbecause€the€record€does€not€support€the€use€of€provocation€as€a€mitigationÏconsideration.€€The€appellant€secreted€himself€in€the€victimððs€house€€for€severalÏhours€before€the€attack.€€He€had€ample€opportunity€to€reflect€in€solitude€aboutÍthe€actions€he€would€take.€€There€were€no€intervening€stimuli€that€caused€orÏrenewed€the€provocation,€and€the€appellant€approached€his€selected€victim,€notÏwhile€the€latter€was€engaged€in€any€menacing€conduct,€but€while€he€wasÏasleep.€€On€these€facts,€provocation€did€not€exist,€and€the€trial€court€correctlyÏrejected€mitigating€factors€(2)€and€(3).ÌÌà àà àòòFactor€(11)óó.€€In€rejecting€this€factor,€the€trial€court€relied€upon€theÏproof€at€trial€which€showed€the€appellant€prepared€for€his€assault€upon€theÏvictim€by€obtaining€a€weapon,€buying€surgical€gloves,€then€going€to€the€victimððsÏhome€around€five€oððclock€p.m.€to€lie€in€wait,€and€significantly,€that€he€laid€in€waitÏfor€approximately€seven€hours€until€the€intended€victim€was€asleep.€€PointingÏout€that€the€juryððs€verdict€necessarily€repudiates€the€defense€of€renunciation€ofÏthe€crime,€the€trial€judge€stated€he€was€ð ðsatisfied€that€the€jury€was€convinced,€asÏam€I,€that€when€Mr.€Frazier€entered€the€bedroom€his€intent€was€to€kill€Mr.ÏWhedbee,€and€that€he€„„€he€followed€through€with€that€intent€until€he€wasÏstopped€by€Mr.€Whedbee€in€this€matter.ðð€€The€trial€court€was€justified€in€findingÏthese€facts€demonstrated€a€sustained€intent€to€violate€the€law.ÌÌà àà àòòFactor€(12)óó.€€€The€record€supports€the€trial€courtððs€conclusion€thatÏthere€was€no€proof€to€support€the€use€of€this€mitigation€factor.€€The€court€notedÏthat€according€to€€appellantððs€€testimony€at€trial€€Lisa€Whedbee€did€not€dominateÏhim€nor€cause€him€to€attack€Mr.€Whedbee.Ó  ÓÌ(c)€Weight€of€the€factors.ÌÓ  ÓÌÓ  Óà àà àThe€court€again€referred€to€the€presumptive€sentence€€andÏobserved€that€the€enhancing€factors€ð ðfar€outweighðð€the€mitigating€factor.€€TheÏappellant,€however,€cites€the€following€comment€made€by€the€trial€judge:ÌÒ ¸ ÒÒ ° ÒÒ ¸ ÒÒ ` ÒÓÓAnytime€an€individual€attempts€to€take€the€life€ofÏanother€person€and€engages€in€that€type€of€conduct,Ïuses€a€deadly€weapon€to€commit€that€offense,€it€isÏclear€in€my€mind€that€those€factors€outweigh€the€factÏthat€he€„„€that€he€has€some€emotional€or€mentalÏproblem€at€that€particular€point€in€time.ÌÒ  ÒÒ ` ÒÓÓÌÒ  ÒÒ ° ÒThe€appellant€asserts€the€first€clause€in€the€passage€evinces€arbitrariness€suchÏthat€the€court€below€has€ð ðfailed€to€adhere€to€the€principles€of€presumedÏminimum€sentencing€as€required.ðð€€We€do€not€agree.€The€trial€judgeððs€languageÏas€cited€is€contextually€insignificant.€€A€fair€reading€of€the€record€demonstratesÏthe€court€embarked€upon€a€particularized€evaluation€process€and€endeavoredÏto€take€the€ð ðcase„by„caseðð€approach€authorized€by€the€supreme€court.ÌÌà àà àAccordingly,€the€appellant€has€failed€to€rebut€the€presumption€ofÏthe€correctness€of€the€trial€courtððs€determination€of€the€sentence.ÌÌò òòòÓ  ÓIII.€€Probation.ÌÌÓ  Óó óóóà àà àIn€determining€the€manner€of€service€of€the€sentence,€€the€courtÏreferred€to€the€sentencing€purposes€and€considerations,€and€afterÏacknowledging€the€appellant€was€eligible€for€alternative€sentencing,€the€courtÍstated:€€ÌÒ ¸ ÒÒ ° ÒÒ ¸ ÒÒ ` ÒÓÓÓ  ÓNow,€when€you€deal€with€homicide€thereððs€anotherÏfactor€clearly€established€in€the€case€law.€€And€that€isÏthat€when€the€death€of€an€individual€is€involved€or€inÏthis€case€the€attempted€homicide€of€an€individual€isÏinvolved,€that€presumption€of€probation€is€removed.€ÏAnd,€indeed,€it€is€the€overwhelming€obligation€in€thatÏcase€for€the€defendant€to€convince€the€court€that,€inÏfact,€probation€should€be€imposed€as€opposed€toÏincarceration.Ìà àÌItððs€always€this€courtððs€objective€and€the€sentencingÏguidelines€objective€to€treat€defendants€fairly€andÏjustly€and€equally.€€And€I€attempt€to€do€thatÏthroughout€any€time€I€serve€up€here€on€the€bench.ÌÌÒ  ÒÒ ` ÒÒ  ÒÒ ° ÒÓÓÌà àà àThe€appellant€is€clearly€eligible€for€alternative€sentencing€inÏgeneral,€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€40„35„102(5),€(6)€(Supp.€1996),€and€he€is€eligibleÏfor€probation€as€a€particular€alternative€to€confinement.€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€40„35„303(a)€(Supp.€1996).€€Moreover,€he€is€presumed€to€be€a€favorable€candidateÏfor€alternative€sentencing,€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€40„35„102(6)€(Supp.€1996),€andÏthe€trial€court€œis€required›€to€automatically€consider€probation€as€a€ð ðpart€of€itsÏsentencing€determination€at€the€conclusion€of€the€sentencing€hearing.ðð€€ðð€40„35„303(b).€€The€presumption€of€suitability€for€alternatives€to€confinement€may€beÏovercome€by€evidence€to€the€contrary,€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€40„35„102(6)€(Supp.Ï1996),€and€furthermore,€the€appellant€has€the€burden€of€establishing€suitabilityÏfor€probation.€€ðð€40„35„303(b)€(Supp.€1996).€ÌÌà àà àœOur›€analysis€includes€the€considerations€enumerated€inÍTennessee€Code€Annotated€Sections€40„35„210(b)€and€103(5).€€One€of€theseÏconsiderations€is€the€ð ðnature€and€characteristics€of€the€criminal€conductÏinvolved.ðð€€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€40„35„210(b)(4)€(Supp.€1996).€€òòAshbyóó,€823ÏS.W.2d€at€169.€€In€addition€we€€utilize€the€considerations€for€orderingÏconfinement€that€appear€in€Code€Section€40„35„103(1).€€The€only€one€of€theseÏwhich€was€cited€by€the€trial€court€is€found€in€Section€103(1)(B):€ð ðConfinement€isÏnecessary€to€avoid€depreciating€the€seriousness€of€the€offense€or€confinementÏis€particularly€suited€to€provide€an€effective€deterrent€to€€others€likely€to€commitÏsimilar€œoffenses.ð𛀀Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€40„35„103(1)(B)€(1990).€€Of€course,€asÏnoted€above,€the€trial€court€referred€also€to€the€ð ðnature€and€character€of€theÏcriminal€conduct€involved.ððÌÌÓ  Ó(a)€Deterrence.ÌÌÓ  Óà àà àThe€trial€court€based€its€denial€of€probation€in€part€upon€theÏdeterrence€clause€of€Section€103(1)(B).€€This€consideration€is€not€operativeÏwhere,€as€here,€no€evidence€was€presented€to€support€the€need€for€deterrence.€ÏòòState€v.€œDavisóó,€940€S.W.2d€559,›€œ(Tenn.›€1997);€òòState€v.€Hartleyóó,€818€S.W.2d€œ370,Ï375›€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.),€òòperm.€app.€deniedóó€(1991).€€Therefore,€the€denial€ofÏprobation€based€on€deterrence€is€not€justified.€€ÌÌÓ  Ó(b)€Confinement€necessary€to€avoid€depreciatingÌ€the€seriousness€of€the€offense.ÌÌÓ  Óà àà àWith€the€elimination€of€deterrence€as€a€basis€for€denyingÏprobation,€the€first€clause€of€Section€103(1)(B)€stands€as€the€only€other€basisÏused€by€the€trial€court€for€denying€probation.€€After€reviewing€the€record,€we€findÏno€other€basis€and€conclude€that,€if€the€trial€courtððs€denial€of€probation€is€to€beÏsustained,€it€must€rest€€solely€upon€the€determination€that€confinement€wasÏnecessary€to€avoid€depreciating€the€seriousness€of€the€œoffense.€€Tenn.€CodeÏAnn.€ðð›€40„35„103(1)(B).ÌÌà àà àIn€Tennessee€there€is€a€well„recognized€nexus€between€theÏð ðnature€and€characteristicsðð€of€the€offense€and€sentencing€to€avoid€depreciatingÏthe€seriousness€of€the€offense.€€The€nature€and€characteristics,€orÏcircumstances,€of€the€offense€have€long€been€recognized€as€grounds€forÏdenying€probation.€€òòStiller€v.€Stateóó,€516€S.W.2d€617,€621€(Tenn.€1974);€òòPowersÏv.€Stateóó,€577€S.W.2d€684,€685„86€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.€1978);€òòMattino€v.€Stateóó,€539ÏS.W.2d€824,€828€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.€1976).€€The€courts€have€used€this€rationaleÏfor€denying€probation€often€in€cases€of€homicide€or€in€other€cases€in€which€theÏoffense€was€violent.€€òòSee€Kilgore€v.€Stateóó,€588€S.W.2d€567€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.Ï1979).€€òòSee€also€Powersóó,€577€S.W.2d€at€685„86;€òòMattinoóó,€539€S.W.2d€at€828.€ÏHowever,€our€supreme€court€established€a€rule€whereby€the€nature€andÏcircumstances€of€the€offense€could€justify€a€denial€of€probation€in€cases€notÏnecessarily€involving€homicides€or€violent€acts.€€This€rule€provides€that€theÏnature€and€circumstances€of€the€offense€may€serve€as€the€sole€basis€forÍdenying€probation€when€they€are€ð ðespecially€violent,€horrifying,€shocking,Ïreprehensible,€offensive,€or€otherwise€of€an€excessive€or€exaggerated€degree;Ïand€it€would€have€to€be€clear€that,€therefore,€the€nature€of€the€offense,€asÏœcommitted,€outweighed›€all€other€factors...€which€might€be€favorable€to€a€grant€ofÏœprobation.€ððòòState›€v.€Travisóó,€622€S.W.2d€529,€534€(Tenn.€1981).€€òòSee€also€StateÏv.€Cleavoróó,€691€S.W.2d€541,€543€(Tenn.€1985).€€Significantly,€ð ð[t]his€standardÏhas€essentially€been€codified€in€the€first€part€of€T.C.A.€Section€40„35„103(1)(B)Ïwhich€provides€for€confinement€if€it€ððis€necessary€to€avoid€depreciating€theÏseriousness€of€the€offense.ðððð€òòState€v.€Hartleyóó,€818€S.W.2d€370,€375€(Tenn.€Crim.ÏApp.),€òòperm.€app.€deniedóó€(Tenn.€1991).€€Thus,€in€a€proper€case,€probation€mayÏbe€denied€solely€on€the€basis€of€Code€Section€40„35„210(b)(4)€(when€theÏnature€and€characteristics€of€the€offense€outweigh€all€factors€that€supportÏprobation)€òòoróó€under€Section€103(1)(B)€(when€they€€justify€confinement€to€avoidÏdepreciating€the€seriousness€of€the€offense),€provided€that,€under€eitherÏapproach,€one€of€the€òòTravisóó€qualifiers€is€present.× ƒ2 ××  ×ÌÌà àà àSince€the€trial€court€is€required€to€consider€the€evidence€adducedÏat€trial,€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€40„35„211(b)(1)€(Supp.€1996),€the€courtððsÏdetermination€that€the€jury€acted€with€exceptional€leniency€is€a€reasonableÏinfluence€upon€the€court€in€making€its€finding€that€confinement€is€necessaryÍunder€Section€103(1)(B).€€òòSee€State€v.€Fredrick€Dona€Blackóó,€No.€03C01„9404„CR„00139,€slip€op.€at€3„4€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.,€Knoxville,€April€6,1995).€€òòSee€alsoÏState€v.€Nealy€Walter€Perryóó,€No.€89„133„III,€slip€op.€at€4„5€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.,ÏNashville,€August€29,€1990),€òòperm.€app.€€deniedóó€(Tenn.€1990),€Dwyer€J.,Ïconcurring€and€dissenting.€€Although€the€trial€court€did€not€expressly€mentionÏthe€òòTravisóó€qualifiers€in€the€case€now€before€us,€the€basis€for€applying€one€orÏmore€of€these€qualifiers€appears€in€the€record.€€We€may€look€to€the€record€to€seeÏif€it€sufficiently€reflects€the€apparent€reasons€for€the€lower€courtððs€action€so€as€toÏallow€for€meaningful€appellate€review.€€òòState€v.€Swansonóó,€680€S.W.2d€487,€489Ï(Tenn.€Crim.€App.€1984).€€òòSee€also€Johnny€Eugene€Johnson€v.€Stateóó,€No.Ï01C01„9508„CC„00247€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.,€Nashville,€October€10,€1996),€òòperm.Ïapp.€deniedóó€(Tenn.€1997).€The€record€in€this€case€demonstrates€a€basis€forÏconcluding€that€the€nature€of€the€offense,€as€committed,€is€especiallyÏreprehensible€or€offensive.€€Assuming,€arguendo,€as€appellant€contends,€theÏcircumstances€are€not€especially€violent,€horrifying,€or€shocking,€theÏcircumstances€are€nevertheless€grave€enough€to€support€a€finding€that€they€areÏespecially€reprehensible€and/or€offensive.ÌÌà àà àThe€appellant€asserts€that€the€trial€court€acted€arbitrarily€in€denyingÏprobation€merely€because€this€is€a€case€in€which€homicide€was€attempted.€€TheÏtrial€court€commented€that€it€is€ð ðclearly€established€in€the€case€lawðð€that€inÏhomicide€cases€the€presumption€of€probation€is€œinappropriate.€€Although›€it€hasÏbeen€held€that€ð ðexceptional€circumstances€must€be€shown€in€order€to€supportÍprobation€in€a€case€involving€the€death€of€another€person,ðð€òòKilgore€v.€Stateóó,€588ÏS.W.2d€567,€568€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.),€òòperm.€app.€deniedóó€(Tenn.€1979),€theÏlegislature€has€altered€the€rule€for€offenses,€such€as€the€one€now€before€us,€inÏwhich€probation€is€available.€€ð ð[R]eliance€upon€the€mere€fact€that€a€violent€crimeÏwas€committed€in€order€to€deny€probation€is€ordinarily€insufficient€to€justify€totalÏdenial€of€probation.ðð€€òòState€v.€Howard€Martin€Adamsóó,€No.€03C01„9403„CR„00123,€slip€op.€at€18€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.,€Knoxville,€January€11,€1995).€€Indeed,Ïð ðwhen€the€legislature€provides€probation€eligibility€for€an€inherently€violentÏoffense,€the€mere€fact€that€the€offense€was€committed€is€an€insufficient€basis€toÏdeny€probation.ðð€€òòIdóó.€òòSee€also€Travisóó,€622€S.W.2d€at€533„34;€òòHartleyóó,€818ÏS.W.2d€at€374.€€Therefore,€if€the€trial€judge€denied€probation€merely€becauseÏthis€probation„eligible€offense€was€committed,€the€denial€of€probation€for€suchÏreason€alone€would€be€œunjustified.€ÌÌ›à àà àIn€view€of€the€record€as€a€whole,€however,€we€find€this€locution€ofÏthe€trial€court,€if€imprecise,€to€be€again€contextually€insignificant.€€The€courtÏexpressly€grounded€the€denial€of€probation€in€the€evidence€and€the€statutoryÏconsiderations€and€principles€of€sentencing,€focusing€upon€the€need€to€avoidÏdepreciating€the€seriousness€of€the€offense.€€He€expressly€referred€to€the€natureÏand€characteristics€of€the€offense€and€found€this€consideration€to€far€outweighÏthe€factors€favoring€probation.€€The€basis€for€this€determination€is€apparent€inÏthe€record€in€that€the€nature€of€the€offense€committed€is€at€least€especiallyÏreprehensible€and/or€offensive.ÌÌà àà àAlternative€sentencing€issues€must€be€determined€by€the€facts€andÏcircumstances€of€the€individual€case.€€òòState€v.€Mossóó,€727€S.W.2d€229,€235Ï(Tenn.€1986).€€If€the€trial€court€has€considered€the€relevant€facts€and€the€findingsÏare€adequately€supported€in€the€record,€the€trial€court€has€the€discretion€toÏresolve€these€issues,€bottoming€the€case€upon€its€own€facts.€€òòState€v.€Tayloróó,Ï744€S.W.2d€919,€922€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.€1987).€€òòSee€Ashbyóó,€823€S.W.2d€at€168;ÏòòFletcheróó,€805€S.W.2d€at€789.ÌÌà àà àWe€hold€(1)€the€presumption€of€correctness€attends€this€aspect€ofÏthe€sentencing€determination,€and€(2)€the€appellant€has€failed€to€overcome€it.€ÏMoreover,€were€we€to€strip€away€the€presumption€of€correctness€because€of€theÏchallenged€phrasing,€we€would€nevertheless€find€support€for€a€òòde€novoóóÏdetermination€that€the€circumstances€are€especially€reprehensible€and/orÏoffensive,€such€that€confinement€is€necessary€to€avoid€depreciating€theÏseriousness€of€the€offense,€thereby€arriving€at€the€same€result€reached€by€theÏtrial€court.Ì€€Ìòòò òÓ  ÓIV.€€Conclusion.ÌÌÓ  Óó óóóà àà àThe€appellant€has€failed€to€overcome€the€presumption€ofÏcorrectness€of€the€trial€courtððs€judgment€that€(1)€the€sentence€shall€be€set€at€fourÏyears€and€(2)€the€request€for€probation€is€denied.€€Therefore,€the€judgment€isÍœaffirmed.Ì›œÌ›ÌÓÓà àà àà àà àà àà à_________________________Ìà àà àà àà àà àà àCurwood€Witt,€œJudgeÌÌÌCONCUR:Ì›ÌÌœÌÌ________________________›ÌGary€R.€Wade,€JudgeÌÌœÌÌ________________________›ÌJoseph€M.€Tipton,€œJudge›