ÿWPCR …# VU>a %Ÿ 0í¥UB’ 4Ô è n­÷ ¤ w@¬ 01ì 0D 0Ja 0T« 0^ÿ 0h] 0rÅ 0|7 0†³ 09 1uÉU,> 0dj BÎU,ëU6 D3MU.€U*® 0@ØB)DCA AM„~ÑfO§µv~\vÓÚ AO­Æü 0D D/ B5˜HP LaserJet 4Si/4SiMX PS 600dpiPSCRIPTÀÌÀääÀÀÌ0 <èÀ( 9Z &Courier RegularX(ÅÕÐ$¡¡Ñ  ÑÑ7€'CXXdÈXXdÈ7ÑÑ  ÑÓ  ÓÓiU°X` ¸ hÀpÈ xÐ (#€%Ø'0*ˆ,à.813è5@8˜:ð<H? A°œXiÓ<þ6X9`(*Courier 12pt10cpi÷}± 3|x5«<þ6X9`(*Courier 12pt10cpiXXxþ6X@ÉJQX@ !V"D#D$a%D&P'D(E)a*Ó€(á(3Œ5$¤¤Ý ƒÕÐ!ÝÑ  ÑÑ7€ÎXXdÈdÈ7ÑÑ  ÑÓ  ÓÓiU°X` ¸ hÀpÈ xÐ (#€%Ø'0*ˆ,à.813è5@8˜:ð<H? A°œXiÓÝ  Ýà ` àòòÚ  Ú0Ú  Úóó(#Ã$òòÚ  Ú0Ú  Úóó2 ÿÿ0Indent1Ô2ÔÔ3  Ô2" ÿÿ0Indent2à0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2, ÿÿ0Indent3à0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô26 ÿÿ0Indent4à0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2@ ÿÿ0Indent5à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2J ÿÿ0Indent6à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2T ÿÿ0Indent7à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2^ ÿÿ0Indent8à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô ÿÿ?AGMSYaioIndent0I.A.1.a.(1)(a)i)a)< Œ 9p`(ModernP ÿÿ8Mac DefaultMac DefaultÓ ` °šXÓ d< Œ 9p`(Monaco< Œ 9p`(Courier New""""'ÿÿdxd< Œ 9p`(Courier< Œ 9p`(Arial("ÿÿ$££Ò  ÒÒ  Ò% Line 7 d....7Border 1dd€-/Cþÿ << Gÿÿ tÝ ƒ!ÝÑ  ÑÑ#€d#ÑÔ€ÔÔ€)ÔÑ  ÑÑ#€d#ÑÑ  ÑÓ` °˜XÓÝ  ÝÔ€,ÔÔ€,ÔÓ  ÓÔ YYY ÔFILEDÔ€,XÔÌÌò òMay€21,€1996ÌÌCecil€Crowson,€Jr.ÌÔ€,ôÔAppellate€Court€Clerkó ó \Ñ\R AØ'\Ñ Ý ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€ÔÔ€)ÔÑ  ÑÑ#€d#ÑÑ  ÑÓ` °˜XÓÝ  ÝÝ ƒ$Ýà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  ÝÔ€,ÔÔ€,ôÔ€The€petitionerððs€other€trial€attorney€was€deceased€at€the€time€of€the€post„conviction€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€Ïhearing.ÌPtPtHHÚ(ÿáÿâùFG(üHHÚ(d'@Styl{WP}01•ÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃà Ãà Ãà Ãà Ãà ÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÐ ÐÐHHÐÐ  ÐÐ2ÐÐÿÿ¸æ$ÿÐÐHHÐÐÐÐÐÐÐÐ  ÐÐ ÐÐ ÐÑÑÑGenevaÑÑ ÑÑ € ÑÑ<Px–ÈÑÒÒÒ443!#4ÒÒ$ *$ÒÒ$*$ÒÒ ÿKK ÒÒ  Geneva ÒÒ  Geneva ÒÓ.,ÓÓÓÓ6ÓÓ ÓßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßÑMonacoÑÑ ÑÒ  BA Op Monaco ÒÒ  BA Op Monaco Ò€-‚ƒCþÿ<< CÿÿƒLevel 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5($$””ò òÚ  Ú1Ú  Úó ó„„'÷ÿ dxdüÿP PdÝ ƒ!ÝÔ . ÔÔ€ÔÓ&€((X„d&ÓÑ#€((Xd#ÑÔ€)ÔÑ  ÑÑ#€++Xd#ÑÑ#€++Xd#ÑÑ  ÑÓ` °˜XÓÝ  ÝÒ  ÒÒ X ÒÙ€€ÙÑ  ÑÑ Ü ÑÓÓÔ€,ÔÑ\R AØ'\Ñ›œßL€01/;+'h|` Å `€€Lß›€€€à8 àà@ àIN€THE€COURT€OF€CRIMINALÏAPPEALS€OF€TENNESSEEÌà@ àAT€KNOXVILLEà@ à€€€€€€€€€Ìà àà à€€€€€€€€€€€€JANUARY€1993€SESSIONÌÌÓÓEDWARD€JEROME€HARBISON,à àœà à)›à àÌ€à àà àà àà àà à)Ìà àAppellant,à àà àà à)à àNo.€03C01„9204„CR„00125Ìà à€€€€€à àà à€€à àà à)Ìà àà àà àà àà à)à àHamilton€CountyÌv.à àà àà àà àà à)€€€€€€€€€Ìà àà àà àà àà à)à à€Hon.€Joseph€F.€Dirisio,€Judge€€€€€Ìà àà àà àà àà à)ÌSTATE€OF€TENNESSEE,€€€€€à àà à)à à€(Post„Conviction)Ìà àà àà àà àà à)€€€€€€€€Ìà àAppellee.à àà àà à)Ìà àà àà àà àÌÌòòFor€the€Appellantóó:à àà àà àà àòòFor€the€Appelleeóó:ÌÌW.€Gerald€Tidwell,€Jr.à àà àà àCharles€W.€BursonÌ736€Georgia€Avenueà àà àà àAttorney€General€of€TennesseeÌChattanooga,€TN€37402à àà àà àà àandÌ€€€€€€€€€€€à àà àà àà àà àGordon€SmithÌJohn€œMcClarty›à àà àà àà àAssistant€Attorney€General€of€TennesseeÌ18€Patten€Parkwayà àà àà àà à450€James€Robertson€Parkwayà àà àÌChattanooga,€TN€37402€€€€€€€€€€€€€€à àà àNashville,€TN€37243„0493Ì€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€Ì€€€€€€€€€€à àà àà àà àà àGary€D.€GerbitzÌà àà àà àà àà àDistrict€Attorney€GeneralÌ€€€€à àà àà àà àà àà àand€€€€€€€€€€€€€€à àà àà àà àÌ€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€à àà àà àà àà àStanley€J.€LanzoÌ€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€à àà àà àH.€C.€BrightÌ€€€€€€€€€€€à àà àà àà àà àAssistant€District€Attorneys€GeneralÌà àà àà àà àà àHamilton€County€Justice€Bldg.Ìà àà àà àà àà àChattanooga,€TN€37402ÌÌÌÌOPINION€œFILED:____________________ÌÌ›ÌÌAFFIRMEDÌÌPER€CURIAM€€€€€ÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÓÓà@ àòòò òO€P€I€N€I€O€Nóóó óÌÌà àFollowing€a€jury€trial€in€1984,€the€petitioner,€Edward€Jerome€Harbison,Ïwas€convicted€of€first€degree€murder€and€sentenced€to€death.€€On€direct€appeal,€theÏTennessee€Supreme€Court€affirmed€his€conviction.€€òòState€v.€Harbisonóó,€704€S.W.2dÏ314€(Tenn.1986).€€The€United€States€Supreme€Court€denied€certiorari.€€òòState€v.ÏHarbisonóó,€€476€U.S.€1153,€106€S.€Ct.€2261,€90€L.Ed.2d€705€(1986).€€The€petitioner€thenÏfiled€a€petition€for€post„conviction€relief€raising€an€abundance€of€issues.€€After€anÏevidentiary€hearing,€the€trial€court€dismissed€the€application€for€post„conviction€relief€inÏpart€on€the€grounds€of€waiver€and/or€previous€determination€under€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ððÍ40„30„112€[repealed]€and€in€part€on€the€merits.€€The€petitioner€now€appeals€as€of€rightÏfrom€this€denial€of€post„conviction€relief.ÌÌà àIt€has€long€been€established€that€the€trial€court's€findings€of€fact€andÏconclusions€of€law€in€post„conviction€suits€are€afforded€the€weight€of€a€jury€verdict.€ÏòòSeeóó,€òòe.góó.,€òòCaruthers€v.€Stateóó,€814€S.W.2d€64,€67€€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.€1991).€€"In€post„conviction€relief€proceedings€the€petitioner€has€the€burden€of€proving€the€allegations€inÏhis€petition€by€a€preponderance€of€the€evidence."€€òòMcBee€v.€Stateóó,€655€S.W.2d€191,Ï195€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.€1983).€€Furthermore,€the€factual€findings€of€the€trial€court€areÏconclusive€on€appeal€unless€the€appellate€court€finds€that€the€evidence€preponderatesÏagainst€the€findings.€€òòButler€v.€€Stateóó,€789€S.W.2d€898,€899€€(Tenn.€1990).€ÌÌÓ  Óòòò òSUFFICIENCY€OF€THE€EVIDENCEó óóóà àÌÓ  Óà àThe€€petitioner's€first€contention€is€that€the€evidence€adduced€at€his€trialÏwas€insufficient€to€sustain€a€conviction€of€premeditated€and€deliberate€first€degreeÏmurder.€€The€petitioner's€brief€points€out€that€the€only€evidence€of€the€manner€in€whichÏthe€murder€occurred€was€in€the€petitioner's€confession.€€In€this€statement€he€made€toÏthe€police,€he€said€that€the€victim€surprised€him€and€his€codefendant€while€they€wereÏburglarizing€the€victim's€home.€€The€petitioner€knew€the€victim€and€was€aware€that€sheÏcarried€a€gun.€€When€she€reached€into€her€purse,€he€panicked,€grabbed€a€marble€vaseÏthat€was€in€the€house,€and€struck€her.€€There€was€also€evidence€from€a€policeÍinvestigator€that€there€were€signs€of€struggle€and€there€were€photographs€presented€toÏthe€jury€of€the€victim's€very€badly€disfigured€face€indicating€multiple€blows.ÌÌà àThe€gist€of€the€petitioner's€argument€is€that€deliberation€was€not€shown€inÏlight€of€òòState€v.€Brownóó,€836€S.W.2d€530,€543€(Tenn.€1992).€€Tennessee€courts€haveÏindeed€reviewed€pre„òòBrownóó€cases€for€sufficiency€applying€the€refined€analyses€ofÏòòBrownóó.€€òòSeeóó,€òòe.g.óó,€òòState€v.€Brimmeróó,€876€S.W.2d€75,€81€(Tenn.€1994);€òòState€v.€Gentryóó,Ï881€S.W.2d€1,€4€€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.€1994).€€Though€meritorious€on€direct€appeal,€theÏpetitioner's€argument€cannot€be€addressed€in€this€post„conviction€proceeding.€€TheÏsufficiency€issue€was€previously€determined.€€"A€ground€for€relief€is€'previouslyÏdetermined'€if€a€court€of€competent€jurisdiction€has€ruled€on€the€merits€after€a€full€andÏfair€hearing."€€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€40„30„112(a)€(1990)€[repealed].€€On€appeal,€theÏTennessee€Supreme€Court€affirmed€the€petitioner's€conviction,€addressing€as€its€firstÏissue€whether€there€was€sufficient€proof€to€sustain€the€convictions.€òòHarbisonóó,€€704ÏS.W.2d€at€317.€€The€court€did€not€dwell€specifically€on€the€issues€of€deliberation€andÏpremeditation,€but€did€state€that€the€proof€was€"clearly€sufficient."€€òòId.óó€at€319.€€There€canÏbe€absolutely€no€doubt€that€the€Supreme€Court€of€Tennessee,€our€highest€judicialÏtribunal€is€a€"court€of€competent€jurisdiction"€and€is€the€same€court€which€decidedÏòòBrownóó.€€This€issue€has€no€merit.òòò òÓ  ÓÌœÌÌJURY›€INSTRUCTION€REGARDING€PREMEDITATIONÌÓ  Óó óóóà àThe€petitioner's€second€contention€is€also€based€upon€òòBrownóó,€836ÏS.W.2d€at€543,€and€its€rejection€of€the€jury€instruction€that€"premeditation€may€beÏformed€in€an€instant."€€He€argues€that€òòBrownóó€should€be€applied€retrospectively€toÏinvalidate€the€jury€instruction€given€at€his€trial€and€thereby€overturn€his€conviction.€ÏHowever,€both€the€language€and€the€context€of€òòBrownóó€do€not€support€its€retrospectiveÏapplication.€€First,€the€decision€in€òòBrownóó€was€based€on€sufficiency€of€the€evidence€andÏnot€on€the€erroneous€jury€instruction.€€Secondly,€the€language€in€the€opinion€indicatesÏan€intent€by€the€court€that€the€instructional€portion€be€prospective:€€"we€conclude€that€itÏis€prudent€to€abandon€[the]€instruction."€€òòId.óó€€This€court€has€already€addressed€theÏretroactivity€of€òòBrownóó€and€concluded€that€it€does€not€"require€invalidation€of€every€firstÏdegree€murder€case€wherein€the€jury€has€been€instructed€.€.€.€that€premeditation€mayÏbe€formed€in€an€instant."€€òòState€v.€David€Lee€Richardsóó,€No.€03C01„9207„CR„230,ÏHamilton€Co.,€1993€WL€80536€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.€Mar.€23,€1993),€òòappóó.€òòdeniedóó€(Tenn.ÏJuly€6,€1993);€€òòState€v.€William€Paul€Robersonóó,€No.€01C01„9206„CC„00200,€PutnamÏCo.,€1993€WL€48850€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.€Feb.€25,€1993),€òòappóó.€òòdeniedóó€(Tenn.€June€1,Ï1993);€òòState€v.€Willie€Bacon€Jr.óó,€No.€1164,€Hamilton€Co.,€Slip€Op.€at€11,€1992€WLÏ183534€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.€Aug.€4,€1992),€òòappóó.€òòdeniedóó€(Tenn.€Dec.€14,€1992).€€As€thisÏcourt€has€pointed€out,€abandonment€of€a€confusing€jury€instruction€does€notÏnecessarily€mean€that€its€previous€use€amounted€to€a€due€process€violation.€€In€otherÏwords,€there€may€be€trial€errors€which€result€in€a€reversal€on€direct€appeal€but€do€notÍimplicate€the€fundamental€constitutional€rights€which€are€pertinent€to€a€post„convictionÏhearing.€€òòJohn€Wayne€Slate€v.€Stateóó,€No.€03C01„9201„CR„00014,€Sevier€Co.,€WLÏ149170€at€*4€(Tenn.€Crim€App.€Apr.€27,1994),€òòappóó.€òòdeniedóó€(Tenn.€Oct.€24,€1994)Ï(concurring€in€results€only).€€ÌÌÓ  Óòòò òœÇINEFFECTIVE›€ASSISTANCE€OF€COUNSELó óóóÌÓ  Óà àA€large€portion€of€the€petitioner's€brief€concentrates€on€his€claim€that€hisÏtrial€counsel€was€ineffective.€€On€direct€appeal,€a€general€allegation€of€ineffectiveÏassistance€was€made€consisting€of€three€specific€grounds.€€The€Tennessee€SupremeÏCourt€€considered€the€trial€counsel's€alleged€failures€to€investigate€potential€alibiÏwitnesses,€to€effectively€try€the€case,€and€to€interpose€motions€for€a€judgment€ofÏacquittal€at€the€proper€times.€€òòHarbisonóó,€704€S.W.2d€at€319.€€The€court€found€that€theÏpetitioner's€attorneys€rendered€effective€assistance€under€the€standard€of€òòBaxter€v.ÏRoseóó,€523€S.W.2d€930,€936€Tenn.€1974).ÌÌà àAccepting€the€state's€argument,€the€trial€judge€in€this€post„convictionÏproceeding€found€that€the€earlier€determination€on€the€issue€of€ineffective€assistanceÏwas€a€bar€to€attempts€to€relitigate€the€issue€even€when€raising€different€instances€ofÏcounsel's€incompetence€or€ineffectiveness.€€The€post„conviction€statute€permits€post„conviction€petitions€on€all€grounds€"except€those€grounds€which€the€court€finds€shouldÏbe€excluded€because€they€have€been€waived€or€previously€determined."€€Tenn.€CodeÏAnn.€ðð€40„30„111€(1990)€[repealed].€€As€discussed€above,€a€ground€is€previouslyÏdetermined€"if€a€court€of€competent€jurisdiction€has€ruled€on€the€merits€after€a€full€andÏfair€hearing."€€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€40„30„112(a)€(1990)€[repealed].€€Thus,€a€petitioner€isÏnot€entitled€to€relitigate€issues€raised€on€direct€appeal€or€in€previous€petitions€for€post„conviction€relief.€€òòSeeóó€òòState€v.€McClintockóó,€732€S.W.2d€268,€272€(Tenn.€1987).€€AÍground€is€waived€if€"the€petitioner€knowingly€and€understandingly€failed€to€present€itÏfor€determination€in€any€proceeding€before€a€court€of€competent€jurisdiction€in€whichÏthe€ground€could€have€been€presented."€€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€40„30„112(b)€(1990)Ï[repealed].€€A€ground€not€raised€in€prior€proceedings€is€rebuttably€presumed€to€beÏwaived.€€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€40„30„112(b)(2)€(1990)€[repealed].ÌÌà àSeveral€panels€of€this€court€have€struggled€with€the€issues€of€previousÏdetermination€and€waiver€in€the€context€of€various€incidents€of€ineffective€assistance€ofÏcounsel.€€When€raising€this€Sixth€Amendment€claim,€one€panel€of€the€court€found€thatÏthe€failure€to€include€certain€incidents€of€ineffectiveness€may€bar€their€presentation€at€aÏlater€proceeding.€€òòJohn€L.€Bates€v.€Stateóó,€No.€03C01„9208„CR„„00279,€Hamilton€Co.,Ï1993€WL€144618€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.€May€6,€1993),€òòapp.€deniedóó,€(Tenn.€Nov.€1,€1993)Ï(concurring€in€results€only);€òòWilliam€Edward€Blake€v.€Stateóó,€No.€03C01„9212„CR„00444,€Knox€Co.,€1993€WL€310700€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.€Aug.€17,€1993).€€However,€inÏòòHouse€v.€Stateóó,€911€S.W.2d€705,€714€(Tenn.€1995),€our€supreme€court€stated:ÌÓ  ÓÓÓà8 àà àWe€conclude€that€a€ð ðfull€and€fair€hearingðð€sufficient€toÏsupport€a€finding€of€previous€determination€occurs€if€aÏpetitioner€is€given€the€opportunity€to€present€proof€andÏargument€on€the€petition€for€post„conviction€relief.€€WeÏfurther€conclude€that€the€rebuttable€presumption€of€waiver€isÏnot€overcome€by€an€allegation€that€the€petitioner€did€notÏpersonally€and€therefore,€ð ðknowingly€and€understandingly,ððÏwaive€a€ground€for€relief.€€Instead,€waiver€is€to€[be]Ïdetermined€by€an€objective€standard€under€which€aÏpetitioner€is€bound€by€the€action€or€inaction€of€his€attorney.ÌÌÓ  ÓÓÓThis€means€that€regardless€of€whether€we€view€different€factual€claims€regardingÏineffective€assistance€of€counsel€as€separate€grounds€for€relief€for€post„convictionÏpurposes,€the€petitioner€would€be€barred€from€raising€them€as€grounds€for€relief€at€thisÏtime.€€Therefore,€we€conclude€that€the€petitionerððs€claims€of€ineffective€assistance€ofÏcounsel€relative€to€his€trial€attorneys€are€waived.€€T.C.A.€ðð€40„30„112(b)(2)€(1990)Ï[repealed].€€€€ÌÌà àHowever,€what€actually€remains€viable€are€the€petitionerððs€claims€relatingÏto€his€substitute€counselððs€acts€and€omissions€while€representing€the€petitioner€fromÏthe€time€of€his€motion€for€new€trial€through€the€direct€appeal.€€It€was€this€counsel€whoÏpresented€the€ineffective€assistance€of€trial€counsel€in€that€appeal.€€Because€dueÏprocess€entitled€the€petitioner€to€the€effective€assistance€of€counsel€in€that€appeal,€òòseeóóÑ€2ÑÇòòEvitts€v.€Luceyóó,€469€U.S.€387,€105€S.€Ct.€830,€83€L.€Ed.2d€821€(1985),€the€petitionerððsÏclaims€would€still€need€to€be€addressed€in€terms€of€substitute€counselððs€effectivenessÏin€failing€to€raise€the€various€issues€that€have€otherwise€been€deemed€waived€orÏpreviously€determined.€€Thus,€the€petitionerððs€ineffective€assistance€of€counsel€claimsÏmust€still€be€addressed€in€that€context.€€ÌÌà àWhen€the€claim€involves€the€effective€assistance€of€counsel,€this€courtÏmust€determine€whether€the€advice€given€or€services€rendered€by€the€attorney€areÏð ðwithin€the€range€of€competence€demanded€of€attorneys€in€criminal€cases.ðð€€òòBaxter€v.ÏRoseóó,€523€S.W.2d€at€936.€€To€prevail€on€a€claim€of€ineffective€assistance€of€counsel,€aÏpetitioner€must€show€that€counselððs€representation€fell€below€the€objective€standard€ofÏòòBaxteróó€and,€additionally,€that€this€representation€prejudiced€the€defense.€€òòSeeóóÏòòStrickland€v.€Washingtonóó,€466€U.S.€668,€687,€104€S.€Ct.€2052,€2064,€80€L.€Ed.2d€674Ï(1984).€€ð ðThis€requires€showing€that€counselððs€errors€were€so€serious€as€to€deprive€theÏdefendant€of€a€fair€trial,€a€trial€whose€result€is€reliable.ðð€€òòState€v.€Melsonóó,€772€S.W.2dÏ417,€419€(Tenn.€1989);€òòStricklandóó,€466€U.S.€at€686,€104€S.€Ct.€at€2064.ÌÌà àInitially,€we€note€that€a€proper€approach€to€this€issue€need€not€begin€withÏan€analysis€of€an€attorney's€conduct.€€If€prejudice€is€not€shown,€it€is€unnecessary€toÏdetermine€the€validity€of€the€allegations€regarding€deficient€performance.€€œòòStricklandóó,›Ï466€U.S.€at€697,€104€S.€Ct.€at€2069.ÌÌà àThe€petitioner's€first€alleged€incident€of€ineffectiveness€is€that€trialÏcounsel€failed€to€obtain€adequate€expert€assistance.€€He€claims€that€it€was€essentialÏthat€a€psychological€examination€be€conducted.€€The€post„conviction€hearing€was€theÏearliest€time€at€which€certain€information€regarding€the€petitioner's€past€surfaced.€ÏWhen€he€was€about€eight€years€old,€he€had€a€fourteen„year„old€sister€who€murderedÏher€two€young€children€and€then€soon€afterwards€hanged€herself€in€a€state€mentalÏfacility.€€Apparently,€as€a€result€of€this€incident,€another€sister€developed€mentalÏproblems€that€have€been€the€cause€of€intermittent€hospitalization€since€that€time.€ÏAlthough€the€petitioner€testified€at€the€post„conviction€hearing€that€these€tragic€eventsÏaffected€him,€he€was€unable€to€say€how.€€In€fact,€there€was€no€evidence€presented€atÏthe€post„conviction€hearing€suggesting€that€he€was€mentally€unstable€either€at€the€timeÏof€the€hearing€or€at€any€time€in€the€past.ÌÌà àA€clinical€psychologist€who€interviewed€the€petitioner€in€1990,€someÏseven€years€after€the€offense,€testified€that€the€petitioner€was€below€average€inÏintelligence.€€He€said€that€the€petitioner€would€not€have€met€the€grounds€for€insanity€forÏthe€trial,€but€that€he€did€have€concerns€about€the€petitionerððs€competence€to€stand€trialÏdue€to€the€difficulty€the€petitioner€would€have€interacting€with€his€attorneys€andÏparticipating€in€his€defense.€€Ultimately,€though,€he€testified€that€he€could€not€say€thatÏthe€petitioner€was€incompetent€to€stand€trial€at€the€time€of€the€prosecution.€€€ÌÌà àOne€of€the€petitionerððs€two€trial€attorneys€testified€that€they€found€him€toÏbe€sane€and€quite€capable€of€conferring€with€them€about€the€case.œ× ƒ3 ××  ×›€€Additionally,€theÏevidence€showed€that€the€petitioner€had€worked€steadily€in€several€jobs€prior€to€theÏcrime€and€that€he€had€obtained€a€large€amount€of€legal€knowledge€by€the€time€of€theÏpost„conviction€hearing.€€This€is€indicative€of€the€ability€to€comprehend€fairly€complexÏconcepts.€€We€conclude€that€the€evidence€does€not€preponderate€against€the€trialÏcourtððs€finding€that€counsel€was€not€ineffective€in€failing€to€obtain€a€psychologicalÏevaluation€to€determine€sanity€and€competency.€ÌÌà àSecond,€the€petitioner€asserts€that€his€counsel€should€have€procured€anÏexpert€mineralogist€to€verify€the€results€of€the€state's€expert€regarding€the€origins€ofÏœvacuumings›€found€in€his€car.€€The€petitioner€has€failed€to€show€how€he€was€œprejudicedÏby›€counsel's€alleged€error.€€There€is€no€evidence€that€another€mineralogist€would€haveÏconcluded€differently€as€to€the€particles€found€in€the€car€or,€if€so,€that€such€evidenceÏwould€have€affected€the€result€of€the€trial.€€We€conclude€that€this€issue€has€no€merit.€€ÌÌà à€€Third,€the€petitioner€contends€that€his€trial€attorney€failed€œto›€prepare€andÏœinvestigate€for›€the€œmotion›€to€œsuppress›€regarding€the€confession€he€had€given.€€TheÍpetitioner,€who€was€questioned€on€two€occasions,€fully€confessed€during€the€secondÏquestioning.€€He€contends€that€there€was€evidence€that€the€police€would€not€allow€himÏto€contact€an€attorney€and€that€they€pressured€him€with€the€threat€of€all„nightÏquestioning€if€he€did€not€confess.€€Though€the€petitioner€testified€at€the€post„convictionÏhearing€that€he€was€held€against€his€will€and€not€allowed€to€talk€to€an€attorney,€thisÏtestimony€was€refuted€by€a€detective€who€was€present€during€both€of€the€œquestionings›.€ÏAdditionally,€the€petitioner€signed€two€òòMirandaóó€waiver€forms€and€stated€in€hisÏconfession€that€his€rights€had€been€read€to€him,€that€he€understood€them,€and€that€noÏone€had€threatened€him€or€promised€him€anything.€€It€is€doubtful€that€his€trial€counsel'sÏpreparation€for€the€œmotion›€to€œsuppress›€fell€below€the€objective€level€of€reasonableÏcompetence€that€our€courts€demand,€but€even€if€it€did,€we€find€that€no€prejudiceÏoccurred.€€Other€than€the€petitioner's€testimony,€the€evidence€supports€the€trial€courtððsÏfinding€that€the€petitionerððs€confession€was€given€freely€and€voluntarily€and€that€his€trialÏcounsel€rendered€effective€assistance.ÌÌà àThe€petitioner's€fourth€allegation€of€ineffectiveness€relates€to€hisÏattorneys'€€lack€of€communication€with€him.€€He€contends€that€his€attorneys€failed€toÏdiscuss€his€theories€of€defense,€particularly€that€his€alibi€defense€was€inconsistent€withÏhis€confession.€€He€also€asserts€that€they€did€not€inform€him€of€the€strategic€risks€ofÏasserting€one's€innocence€and€then€later€trying€to€argue€that€the€jury€should€notÏimpose€the€death€penalty€on€a€defendant€who,€in€the€jury's€eyes,€lied€to€them.€€OneÍtrial€attorney€testified€that€he€and€his€co„counsel€did€recognize€the€inconsistencies€inÏthe€case€and€that€they€were€aware€of€the€potential€conflict€in€the€defense€theory€at€trialÏand€then€later€at€the€sentencing€hearing.€€However,€he€felt€that€his€job€as€a€lawyer€wasÏonly€to€tell€the€petitioner€that€the€defense€was€not€a€strong€one,€and,€should€it€fail,€theÏpetitioner€may€well€lose€his€credibility€for€the€sentencing€phase.€€At€the€post„convictionÏhearing,€the€trial€court€pointed€out€that€the€petitioner€maintained€that€his€alibi€was€trueÏeven€at€the€post„conviction€proceedings€and€commented€that€it€was€certainly€not€theÏattorneys'€duty€or€right€to€create€a€more€desirable€and€appropriate€defense.€€WeÏconclude€that€counsel€rendered€effective€assistance.€€ÌÌà àFifth,€the€petitioner€asserts€that€his€attorneys€failed€to€make€severalÏimportant€objections.€€He€claims€that€his€counsel€should€have€objected€to€the€presenceÏof€exhibits€which€sat€in€the€courtroom€throughout€the€entire€trial€and€were€neverÏidentified€as€coming€from€the€victim's€home.€€There€was€no€testimony€at€the€post„conviction€hearing€on€this€issue.€€Because€most€of€the€exhibits€were€properly€identifiedÏand€because€we€can€find€no€evidence€that€the€petitioner's€case€was€prejudiced€by€theÏpresence€of€those€which€were€not,€we€conclude€that€this€issue€is€without€merit.ÌÌà àThe€petitioner€claims€that€his€defense€counsel€should€have€objected€toÏcertain€evidence€and€argument€showing€victim€impact.€€He€refers€specifically€toÏtestimony€from€the€victim's€husband€that€he€auctioned€off€his€home€with€everything€in€itÍthirty€days€after€the€murder.€€He€also€points€to€the€prosecutor's€closing€argument€whichÏmentions€the€victim's€loving€friends,€her€husband€left€to€spend€his€last€days€alone,€andÏthe€brutal€nature€of€the€murder€which€caused€the€victim's€brains€to€splatter€on€a€wallÏtwelve€feet€away€from€her€body.€€The€petitioner€cited€òòBooth€v.€Marylandóó,€482€U.S.€496,Ï107€S.€Ct.€2529,€96€L.€Ed.€œ2d›€440€(1987),€which€was€decided€the€year€after€his€caseÏwas€affirmed€by€the€Tennessee€Supreme€Court€and€certiorari€was€denied€by€theÏUnited€States€Supreme€Court.€€Four€years€later,€however,€òòBoothóó€was€overruled€byÏòòPayne€v.€Tennesseeóó,€501€U.S.€808,€111€S.€Ct.€2597,€2611,€115€L.€Ed.€œ2d›€720€(1991),Ïwhere€the€Court€held€that€the€Eighth€Amendment€erects€no€òòperóó€òòœse›óó€bar€to€the€admissionÏof€victim€impact€evidence.€€Furthermore,€those€cases€address€the€introduction€of€suchÏevidence€in€the€sentencing€phase€of€a€capital€case.€€Here,€the€testimony€and€argumentÏcomplained€of€occurred€in€the€guilt€phase€of€the€proceedings.€€òòSeeóó€òòState€v.€œCazes›óó,Ï875€S.W.2d€253,€262€(Tenn.€1994)€(pointing€to€the€fact€that€victim€impact€proofÏoccurred€during€the€guilt€phase€of€the€proceedings€as€one€basis€for€its€admissibility).€ÏFinally,€in€light€of€the€overwhelming€proof€adduced€at€trial,€we€find€that€the€statementsÏdid€not€prejudice€the€defense€even€if€somehow€they€were€wrongfully€considered€by€theÏjury.ÌÌà àThe€petitioner€also€argues€that€òòCaldwell€v.€Mississippióó,€472€U.S.€320,€105ÏS.€Ct.€2633,€86€L.€Ed.€œ2d›€231(1985),€was€violated€when€defense€counsel€failed€toÏobject€to€the€prosecution's€statements€œthat›€tended€to€diminish€the€jury's€responsibilityÍin€imposing€the€death€sentenceòòò ò.ó óóó€€The€holding€in€òòCaldwellóó€is€not€retroactivelyÏapplicable€on€collateral€review.€€òòSawyer€v.€Smithóó,€497€U.S.€227,€110€S.€Ct.€2822,Ï2833,€111€L.€Ed.€œ2d›€93€(1990);€ò ò€ó óòòJohnson€v.€Stateóó,€797€S.W.2d€578,€580€(Tenn.€1990).€ÏMoreover,€the€petitioner€is€only€complaining€about€a€few€statements€made€during€theÏclosing€argument.€€Even€if€they€were€improper,€we€find€that€€the€statements€in€theirÏcontext€could€not€have€led€the€jury€to€believe€that€the€responsibility€for€determining€theÏappropriateness€of€defendant's€sentence€lay€elsewhere.€€òòSeeóó,€òòe.g.óó,€òòState€v.€Westóó,€767ÏS.W.2d€387,€398„99€(Tenn.€1989).ÌÌà àThe€petitioner's€sixth€and€final€claim€of€ineffective€assistance€of€counselÏinvolves€the€sentencing€phase€of€the€trial.€€He€contends€that€his€trial€attorneys€œfailedÏadequately›€to€œinvestigate›€and€present€evidence€of€his€troubled€background.€€HeÏargues€that€had€his€attorneys€properly€investigated€his€background,€they€would€haveÏseen€a€need€for€psychological€evaluation€for€mitigation€purposes.€€The€petitioner'sÏmother€was€the€only€witness€at€the€sentencing€phase€of€the€petitionerððs€trial€and€herÏtestimony€focused€on€her€view€of€the€petitioner€as€a€good€son€and€a€hard€worker.€€InÏclosing€argument,€the€petitionerððs€attorney€referred€to€the€petitionerððs€lack€of€any€priorÏcriminal€history€and€his€child„like€demeanor.€€He€also€mentioned€the€fact€that€theÏpetitioner€did€not€take€a€weapon€into€the€victim's€home,€suggesting€that€the€murderÏwas€not€planned€by€the€petitioner.ÌÌà àœBefore›€the€post„conviction€hearing,€counsel€requested€and€was€grantedÏa€psychological€evaluation€of€the€petitioner€in€order€to€assist€the€petitioner€in€showingÏhow€he€was€prejudiced€by€trial€counselððs€ineffectiveness.€€However,€the€trial€courtÏlimited€the€evaluation€to€the€petitionerððs€competency€to€stand€trial€and€sanity€at€the€timeÏof€the€offense.€€At€the€post„conviction€hearing,€the€evaluating€psychologist€testified€thatÏthe€petitioner€did€not€meet€the€requirements€of€an€insanity€defense€and€was€competentÏto€stand€trial.€€He€stated€that€he€was€familiar€œwith€what€was€referred€to€as›€mitigationÏœanalysis,›€but€added€that€none€was€performed€because€of€the€trial€courtððs€limitation€ofÏhis€œevaluation.€€However,€he€did€not€explain€what€it€entailed€or€what€relevance€it€wouldÏhave€to€the€petitionerððs€sentencing.€€In€any€event,›€he€concluded€to€a€reasonableÏdegree€of€psychological€certainty€that€the€petitioner€is€a€follower€rather€than€a€leaderÏand€that€it€is€unlikely€that€the€petitioner€would€have€instigated€the€offense.€€He€alsoÏcommented€that€the€petitioner€has€difficulty€understanding€the€long„rangeÏconsequences€of€his€actions.€€€ÌÌà àAt€the€post„conviction€hearing,€trial€counsel€admitted€that€he€did€notÏquestion€the€petitioner€regarding€the€petitionerððs€psychological€background€or€theÏpsychological€history€of€the€petitionerððs€family.€€He€admitted€that€had€he€known€that€theÏpetitionerððs€sister€killed€her€two€children€and€subsequently€hanged€herself€in€a€stateÏmental€facility,€he€would€have€requested€a€psychological€evaluation€for€use€at€theÏsentencing€phase.€€However,€he€added€that€there€was€never€any€indication€that€theÍpetitioner€was€suffering€from€any€mental€defect€that€would€have€warranted€his€inquiryÏinto€the€petitionerððs€background.€€Similarly,€the€petitionerððs€appellate€counselÏcommented€that€the€petitioner€was€difficult€to€deal€with€at€times€and€was€distrustful,€butÏthat€there€was€never€any€mention€of€any€history€of€mental€illness€in€the€petitionerððsÏfamily€nor€was€there€ever€any€indication€that€the€petitioner€suffered€from€a€mentalÏillness€himself.€ÌÌà àIn€òòState€v.€Cooperóó,€847€S.W.2d€521,€532„33€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.€1992),€thisÏcourt€upheld€a€trial€court's€post„conviction€remand€of€a€death€penalty€case€forÏœresentencing›€due€to€counsel's€ineffective€assistance€in€the€presentation€of€mitigatingÏevidence€concerning€the€petitionerððs€psychological€background.€€In€òòCooperóó,€a€clinicalÏpsychologist€and€a€psychiatrist€evaluated€the€petitioner€before€the€trial€and€bothÏconcluded€that€the€petitioner€was€not€legally€insane.€€However,€the€psychiatristÏdiagnosed€the€petitioner€as€suffering€from€intermittent€explosive€disorder€and€theÏpsychologist€testified€that€the€petitioner€had€an€affective€disorder€that€related€toÏrecurrent€major€depression€over€a€long€period€of€time.€€There€was€also€evidence€thatÏthe€petitioner€was€under€the€influence€of€extreme€mental€or€emotional€disturbance€andÏthat€he€had€attempted€suicide€numerous€times.€€Nevertheless,€the€trial€attorney€did€notÏpursue€further€investigation€or€analysis€of€the€petitionerððs€mental€state€for€use€asÏmitigation€at€the€sentencing€phase€of€the€trial.€€This€court€affirmed€the€post„convictionÏcourtððs€finding€that€ð ðthe€trial€attorneyððs€investigation€and€preparation€for€the€penaltyÍphase€did€not€meet€the€standard€required€by€òòBaxter€v.€Roseóó.ðð€€òòIdóó.€at€532;€òòseeóó€œòòalsoóó›€òòStateÏv.€œAdkins›óó,€911€S.W.2d€334,€335€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.€1994),€òòappóó.€òòdeniedóó€(Tenn.€1995)Ï(counsel€ineffective€when€failed€to€investigate€or€pursue€information€relating€to€capitalÏdefendantððs€abuse€as€child€at€hands€of€alcoholic€father).€€€ÌÌà àHowever,€in€this€case,€the€trial€attorneys€had€no€œindication›€that€theÏpetitioner€was€œmentally€ill›€at€the€time€of€the€offense€or€incompetent€to€stand€trial€and,Ïtherefore,€a€psychological€evaluation€was€not€performed.€€The€attorneys€had€noÏknowledge€that€the€petitioner€or€his€family€had€any€history€of€mental€œillness.€€ð ðThere€isÏno€constitutional€basis€for€a€rule€that€would€require€a€psychiatric€evaluation€in€anyÏcapital€case.ðð€€òòClanton€v.€Bairóó,€826€S.W.€F.2d€1354,€1358€(4th€Cir.€1987),€òòcertóó.€òòdeniedóóÏ484€U.S.€1036,€108€S.€Ct.€762€(1988).›€€In€this€respect,€this€case€differs€greatly€fromÏòòCooperóó,€because€the€attorneys€never€had€any€œinformation›€which€they€failed€to€pursueÏor€investigate€adequately.€€Also€different€from€òòCooperóó€is€the€fact€that,€in€this€case,€theÏinformation€of€mental€illness€relates€solely€to€the€petitionerððs€family€and€not€directly€toÏthe€petitioner€himself.€€In€fact,€the€petitionerððs€testimony€at€the€post„conviction€hearingÏreflects€a€difficulty€remembering€his€age€at€the€time€his€sister€killed€her€children€andÏhanged€herself.€€Also,€the€petitioner€œadmitted›€that€he€did€not€know€œwhat›€œeffect,€if€any,›Ïhis€familyððs€history€of€mental€illness€may€have€had€on€him.€€€Furthermore,€œpetitionerððs›Ïappellate€attorney€recalled€that€the€petitioner€was€difficult€to€deal€with€at€œtimes,›€butÏnever€gave€him€any€indication€of€a€history€of€mental€illness€precipitating€anyÍinvestigation€into€the€petitionerððs€background€for€appeal€œpurposes.€€Finally,€it€is›Ïœsignificant›€œthat›€after€having€been€granted€œsome›€psychological€evaluation,€theÏpetitioner€presented€no€evidence€œthrough€the€psychologist€about›€what€mitigationÏanalysis€œcould›€œshow›€had€it€been€performed€in€this€case.€€Therefore,€we€conclude€thatÏcounselððs€actions€at€the€sentencing€phase€did€not€fall€below€the€objective€standard€ofÏcompetency€announced€in€òòBaxteróó.€ÌÌà àHaving€found€that€trial€counsel€rendered€effective€assistance€relating€toÏthe€petitionerððs€allegations,€we€conclude€that€petitioner€has€not€been€prejudiced€byÏappellate€counselððs€failure€to€raise€any€of€these€allegations€on€direct€appeal.€ÏTherefore,€appellate€counsel€was€not€ineffective.€€ÌÌÓ  Óòòò òœRIGHT›€TO€EXTENSIVE€PSYCHOLOGICAL€EXAMINATION€ó óóóÓ  Óà àTheÏpetitioner's€next€ground€for€post„conviction€relief€involves€the€trial€court's€denial€of€anÏextensive€psychological€examination€at€the€post„conviction€stage.€€He€argues€thatÏsuch€an€examination€was€necessary€so€that€he€could€show€prejudice€on€the€issue€ofÏmitigation.€€In€òòœTeague›€v.€Stateóó,€772€S.W.2d€915,€927€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.€1988),€thisÏcourt€was€confronted€with€a€claim€for€investigative€services€in€a€post„conviction€case,Ïand€concluded€that€Tennessee€Supreme€Court€Rule€œ13,€ðð€2.B›(10)€and€Tenn.€CodeÏAnn.€ðð€40„14„207(b),€dealing€with€the€provision€of€investigative€and€expert€services€inÏcapital€cases,€apply€only€to€the€trial€of€an€accused€in€a€capital€case€and€not€toÍpost„conviction€cases.€€However,€in€òòOwens€v.€Stateóó,€908€S.W.2d€923€(Tenn.€1995),€theÏTennessee€Supreme€Court€œoverruled€òòTeague›óó€relative€to€the€availability€of€expertÏservices€at€the€post„conviction€stage€in€capital€cases.€€In€doing€so,€the€court€stated:€ÌÓ  ÓÓÓœ›à8 àà àConsidering€the€background€and€historicalÏdevelopment€of€the€various€statutes€at€issue,€we€think€thatÏwhen€the€Legislature€adopted€subsection€(b)€of€Tenn.€CodeÏAnn.€ðð€40„14„207€in€1984,€it€intended€for€that€provision€toÏapply€to€post„conviction€capital€cases.€.€.€.€There€is€noÏspecific€limiting€language€within€subsection€(b)€evidencingÏa€legislative€intent€to€limit€its€applicability€to€direct€trialÏproceedings.€€Moreover,€the€provision€was€included€withinÏa€statute€dealing€specifically€with€compensation€andÏreimbursement€of€counsel.€.€.€.€It€follows€that€the€LegislatureÏintended€for€the€provision€to€apply€to€post„conviction€capitalÏcases.€€Otherwise,€the€provision€would€not€have€beenÏincluded€in€a€statute€pertaining€to€a€subject€that€wasÏspecifically€incorporated€by€reference€into€the€post„conviction€statute€„€reimbursement€of€counsel.ÌÌòòOwensóó,€908€S.W.2d€at€927„928.ÌÓ  ÓÓÓœ›à àAs€stated€earlier,€the€trial€court€granted€the€petitionerððs€òòexóó€òòparteóó€requestÏfor€a€psychological€evaluation€at€the€post„conviction€stage€but€limited€the€evaluation€toÏthe€petitionerððs€competency€to€stand€trial€and€sanity€at€the€time€of€the€offense€relative€toÏthe€guilt€phase.€€As€a€result,€a€clinical€psychologist€testified€that€the€petitioner€wouldÏnot€have€met€the€requirements€for€an€insanity€defense€and€was€competent€at€the€timeÏof€the€trial.€€However,€a€mitigation€analysis€was€not€performed.ÌÌà àIn€òòOwensóó,€the€supreme€court€warned€that€the€application€of€T.€C.€A.€ðð€40„14„207(b)€to€post„conviction€capital€cases€ð ðshould€not€be€interpreted€as€a€ððblankÍcheckðð€requiring€trial€judges€to€hold€òòexóó€òòparteóó€hearings€and€authorize€funds€in€everyÏcaseðð€and€stated€that€Supreme€Court€Rule€13,€€ðð€œ2.B(10)›€outlines€the€proper€procedureÏfor€a€request€for€expert€services.€€òòIdóó.€at€928.€€We€note€that,€at€the€time€of€the€petitionerððsÏpost„conviction€hearing,€he€would€not€have€been€entitled€to€the€appointment€of€expertÏservices€œunder›€òòœTeague›óó.€€Furthermore,€the€petitionerððs€motion€for€expert€services€doesÏnot€comply€with€Supreme€Court€Rule€13,€€ðð€œ2.B(10),›€because€it€fails€to€include:€(1)€how,Ïwhen€or€where€the€examination€is€to€be€conducted,€(2)€the€cost€of€the€evaluation€andÏreport€and€(3)€the€cost€of€any€other€necessary€services.€€òòSeeóó€Supreme€Court€Rule€13,Ïðð€œ2.B(10)(b)„(d).›€€Compliance€with€Rule€13,€€ðð€œ2.B(10)›€is€a€prerequisite€to€the€trial€courtÏgranting€an€òòexóó€òòparteóó€œhearing.€€òòOwensóó,€908€S.W.2d€at€928.›€€Nevertheless,€the€trial€courtÏin€this€case€granted€the€petitioner€an€òòexóó€òòparteóó€hearing€and€determined€that€theÏpetitioner€was€entitled€to€expert€assistance€limited€to€the€petitionerððs€sanity€andÏcompetency.ÌÌà àTherefore,€we€must€now€address€whether€the€trial€court€abused€itsÏdiscretion€in€denying€the€petitionerððs€request€for€expert€assistance€relative€toÏmitigation.€€In€order€to€receive€expert€services,€the€petitioner€must€demonstrate€that€theÏð ðservices€are€necessary€to€ensure€the€protection€of€the€petitionerððs€constitutionalÏrights.ðð€€òòOwensóó,€908€S.W.2d€at€928.€€As€òòOwensóó€explains,€ð ða€petitioner€mustÏdemonstrate€by€specific€factual€proof€that€the€services€of€an€expert€or€an€investigatorÏare€necessary€to€establish€a€ground€for€post„conviction€relief,€and€that€the€petitioner€isÍunable€to€establish€that€ground€for€post„conviction€relief€by€other€available€evidence.ððÏòòIdóó.ÌÌà àThe€decision€to€grant€a€request€for€expert€services€rests€within€theÏdiscretion€of€the€trial€court€and€will€not€be€reversed€on€appeal€unless€there€is€a€clearÏshowing€of€an€abuse€of€that€discretion.€€œòòCazes›óó,€875€S.W.2d€œat›€261.€€However,€we€areÏprecluded€from€addressing€this€issue€due€to€the€petitionerððs€failure€to€include€aÏtranscript€of€the€òòexóó€òòparteóó€proceedings€and€the€subsequent€motion€hearing€in€the€recordÏon€appeal.€€It€is€the€duty€of€the€petitioner€to€prepare€a€fair,€accurate€and€completeÏrecord€on€appeal€to€enable€meaningful€appellate€review.€€T.R.A.P.€24.€€In€the€absenceÏof€such€a€record,€this€issue€is€waived.€€òòState€v.€œOody›óó,€823€S.W.2d€554,€559€(Tenn.ÏCrim.€App.€1991).€€œFurthermore,›€we€conclude€œthat›€because€the€petitioner€has€failed€toÏshow€that€either€trial€or€appellate€counselððs€representation€fell€below€the€objectiveÏstandard€of€competency€œprovided›€in€òòBaxteróó,€any€error€that€the€post„conviction€courtÏmay€have€committed€in€denying€the€petitioner€an€extensive€evaluation€is€harmless.€€ÌÓ  Óòòò òÌJURY€INSTRUCTIONSÌÓ  Óó óóóà àThe€petitioner€raises€several€issues€concerning€jury€instructions.€€HeÏcontends€that€the€trial€court€erred€in€instructing€the€jury€not€to€consider€sympathy€in€theÏsentencing€decision.€€Our€œsupreme›€œcourt›€has€upheld€the€"no„sympathy"€instructionÍagainst€constitutional€attack€on€numerous€occasions.€€òòSeeóó€òòœCazes›óó,€875€S.W.2d€at€268;ÏòòState€v.€Smithóó,€857€S.W.2d€1,€21€(Tenn.€1992).€€There€is€no€merit€to€this€issue.€€ÌÌà àThe€petitioner€also€contends€that€the€trial€court€instructed€the€jury€not€toÏconsider€evidence€of€the€circumstances€under€which€his€confession€was€obtained€inÏviolation€of€òòCrane€v.€Kentuckyóó,€476€U.S.€683,€106€S.€Ct.€2142,€2147,€90€L.€Ed.€œ2d›€636Ï(1986).€€In€òòCraneóó,€the€court€held€that€trial€testimony€regarding€the€circumstancesÏsurrounding€a€defendant's€confession€could€not€be€excluded€on€the€ground€that€theÏtestimony€pertained€solely€to€the€issue€of€voluntariness€which€had€been€previouslyÏresolved€against€the€defendant€in€a€pretrial€ruling.€€òòIdóó.€€We€agree€with€the€state€that€theÏrecord€does€not€support€the€petitioner's€contention.ÌÌà àUnder€the€heading€of€"[œa]dmissions›€[œa]gainst›€[œi]nterest›€and€[œc]onfessions›",Ïthe€judge€first€charged€the€jury,€"[œi]t›€is€also€your€duty€to€judge€the€truth€of€any€suchÏadmission€against€interest€or€confession.€€In€so€judging,€òòyou€should€consider€theÏcircumstances€under€which€the€statement€was€obtainedóó€.€.€."€(emphasis€added).€ÏSeveral€sentences€later,€under€the€heading€of€€"[œc]onstitutional›€rights,"€the€judge€said,Ï"[œt]he›€jury€will€not€endeavor€to€determine€or€consider€whether€constitutional€rights€wereÏadhered€to,€or€followed€by€police€procedures,€in€the€obtaining€of€any€confession,€orÏphysical€evidence."€€When€read€together,€these€two€instructions€do€not€violate€theÏholding€in€òòCraneóó€in€which€the€U.S.€Supreme€Court€recognized:ÌÓ  ÓÓÓà8 à(T)hat€the€€circumstances€surrounding€the€taking€of€aÏconfession€can€be€highly€relevant€to€two€separate€inquiries,Ïone€legal€and€one€factual.€€The€manner€in€which€aÏstatement€was€extracted€is,€of€course,€relevant€to€the€purelyÏlegal€question€of€its€voluntariness,€a€question€most,€but€notÏall,€States€assign€to€the€trial€judge€alone€to€resolve.€But€theÏphysical€and€psychological€environment€that€yielded€theÏconfession€can€also€be€of€substantial€relevance€to€theÏultimate€factual€issue€of€the€defendant's€guilt€or€innocence.ÌÌÓ  ÓÓÓòòCraneóó,€106€S.€Ct.€at€2145„46€(citations€omitted).€€€Our€œsupreme›€œcourt›€has€held€that€"theÏadmissibility€of€a€confession€is€not€a€proper€matter€for€submission€to€the€jury,€however,Ïonce€admitted,€the€weight€to€be€given€a€confession€does€become€a€matter€for€the€jury'sÏconsideration."€€òòState€v.€œPursley›óó,€550€S.W.2d€949,€950€(Tenn.€1977).€€The€juryÏinstructions€given€acknowledge€that€there€are€two€distinct€questions,€one€of€which€theÏjury€must€answer€by€considering€the€circumstances€surrounding€the€petitioner'sÏconfession.€€This€issue€is€without€merit.ÌÓ  Óòòò òÌCONSTITUTIONAL€CHALLENGESó óóóÓ  Óà àThe€€petitioner€advances€severalÏarguments€involving€the€constitutionality€of€Tennessee's€statutory€scheme.€€His€firstÏsuch€assertion€is€that€the€felony€murder€statute,€by€eliminating€the€traditional€commonÏlaw€and€statutory€elements€of€murder,€is€violative€of€his€due€process€rights€and€theÏprohibition€against€cruel€and€unusual€punishment.€€Our€œsupreme›€œcourt›€recentlyÏaffirmed€the€constitutionality€of€our€felony€murder€statute€and€therefore,€the€petitioner'sÏcomplaint€is€without€merit.€€òòState€v.€œMiddlebrooks›óó,€840€S.W.2d€317,€337€(Tenn.€1992).ÌÌà àThe€petitioner's€remaining€issues€relate€to€the€constitutionality€of€theÏTennessee€death€penalty€statute.€€All€of€the€arguments€advanced€by€the€petitionerÏhave€been€repeatedly€rejected€by€our€supreme€court.€€In€a€recent€case,€the€supremeÏcourt€found€that€it€was€unnecessary€to€elaborate€as€it€addressed€the€constitutionalÏissues€raised€by€a€defendant€which€had€been€previously€rejected€by€the€court.€ÏFollowing€this€example,€we€find€that€it€is€unnecessary€to€discuss€in€detail€the€rationaleÏbehind€those€holdings€as€we€are€bound€by€the€holdings€of€our€supreme€court.€òòSeeóóÏòòœCazes›óó,€875€S.W.2d€at€268„69.ÌÌà àThe€petitioner's€argument€that€the€Tennessee€statute€provides€no€specificÏguidance€as€to€which€party€has€the€burden€of€proving€whether€the€mitigationÏoutweighs€the€aggravation€was€rejected€in€òòState€v.€Boydóó,€797€S.W.2d€589,€€595„96,Ï(Tenn.€1990),€where€the€court€said€the€statute,"clearly€outlines€where€the€burden€ofÏproof€lies."€€òòSee€alsoóó€òòState€v.€Thompsonóó,€768€S.W.2d€239,€251„52€(Tenn.1989).€€TheÏsupreme€court€has€also€rejected€the€argument€that€the€statute€does€not€sufficiently€limitÏthe€exercise€of€the€jury's€discretion€once€matters€in€aggravation€are€found,€òòSmithóó,€857ÏS.W.2d€at€22„23.€€Likewise,€the€supreme€court€found€no€merit€in€the€argument€thatÏTennessee's€statute€does€not€give€the€jury€enough€discretion€by€mandatorily€requiringÏits€members€to€impose€the€death€penalty€if€they€find€that€the€aggravatingÏcircumstances€outweigh€the€mitigating€ones.€€òòBoydóó,€797€S.W.2d€at€596„97.€€In€òòSmithóó,Ïthe€court€also€addressed€the€petitioner's€complaint€that€there€is€no€requirement€in€theÍTennessee€statute€that€the€jury€make€findings€of€fact€as€to€the€presence€or€absence€ofÏmitigating€circumstances.€€Citing€òòState€v.€œMelson›óó,€638€S.W.2d€342,€368€(Tenn.€1982),Ïthey€disagreed€with€the€contention€that€this€asserted€shortcoming€prevents€effectiveÏappellate€review.€€òòSmithóó,€857€S.W.2d€at€22.ÌÌà àNext,€the€petitioner€raises€several€issues€relating€to€what€capital€juriesÏshould€be€told€in€the€charge€to€the€jury.€€He€points€out€that€there€is€no€requirement€thatÏthe€jury€be€instructed€as€to€non„statutory€mitigating€circumstances.€€This,€he€contends,Ïprevents€the€jury€from€giving€the€proper€weight€to€those€factors€which€are€notÏspecifically€enumerated€in€the€statute.€€The€supreme€court€has€repeatedly€held€that:ÌÓ  ÓÓÓà8 àthe€only€mandatory€instructions€with€respect€to€mitigatingÏcircumstances€are€that€those€statutory€circumstances€whichÏare€raised€by€the€evidence€shall€be€expressly€charged,€andÏthe€jury€must€be€told€that€they€shall€weigh€and€consider€anyÏother€facts€or€circumstances€that€are€raised€by€the€evidenceÏthat€they€find€to€be€mitigating€circumstances,€in€making€theÏdetermination€of€which€circumstances,€aggravating€orÏmitigating,€outweigh€the€other.€€ÌÌòòSmithóó,€857€S.W.2d€at€15,€òòquotingóó€òòState€v.€Hartmanóó,€703€S.W.2d€106,€118€(Tenn.Ï1985).€€ÌÌÓ  ÓÓÓà àThe€petitioner's€next€argument€is€that€the€jury€should€be€told€the€effect€ofÏfailing€to€reach€a€unanimous€verdict.€€This€has€been€addressed€and€repeatedlyÏrejected€by€the€œsupreme›€œcourt.›€€òòSeeóó€€òòœBrimmer›óó,€876€S.W.2d€at€87;€òòœCazes›óó,€875€S.W.2dÏat€268.€€Lastly,€the€petitioner€argues€that€the€statute's€failure€to€inform€the€jury€of€itsÍability€to€Ñ ° Ñœimpose›€a€life€sentence€out€of€mercy€is€a€violation€of€the€United€StatesÏConstitution.€€That€contention€has€also€been€rejected.€€òòSmithóó,€857€S.W.2d€at€22.€ÌÌà àIn€€òòState€v.€œNichols›óó,€877€S.W.2d€722,€737€(Tenn.€1994),€our€supremeÏcourt€most€recently€rejected€the€petitioner's€assertion€that€the€imposition€of€the€deathÏpenalty€is€cruel€and€unusual€punishment€in€violation€of€the€Eighth€and€FourteenthÏAmendments.€€òòSeeóó€œòòalsoóó›€òòState€v.€Blackóó,€815€S.W.2d€166,€190„91€(Tenn.€1991).€€TheÏnext€argument€„„€that€the€proportionality€and€arbitrariness€review€conducted€by€theÏTennessee€Supreme€Court€is€constitutionally€deficient€„„€was€decided€against€theÏpetitioner€in€òòState€v.€œGroseclose›óó,€615€S.W.2d€142,€150€(Tenn.€1981).€€ÌÌà àHis€final€contention€is€that€Tennessee's€statute€does€not€sufficientlyÏnarrow€the€population€of€defendants€who€are€eligible€for€capital€punishment.€€As€anÏexample,€the€petitioner€refers€to€the€situation€where€a€defendant€convicted€of€firstÏdegree€felony€murder€can€receive€the€death€penalty€with€the€underlying€felony€as€theÏonly€aggravating€circumstance.€€However,€òòœMiddlebrooks›óó,€840€S.W.2d€at€346,Ïaddressed€that€situation€finding€that€the€felony€murder€œaggravator›€cannot€be€used€inÏthat€instance.€€Here,€the€jury€found€the€petitioner€guilty€of€premeditated€and€deliberateÏfirst„degree€murder€as€well€as€felony€murder.€€Therefore,€as€long€as€the€premeditatedÏand€deliberate€first€degree€murder€conviction€stands,€there€is€no€constitutional€barrierÏto€the€imposition€of€the€death€penalty.ÌÌà àIn€conclusion,€the€petitioner€has€œnot€shown€that€the€evidenceÏpreponderates€against€the€trial€courtððs€findings€and€resulting€determinations.€€TheÏjudgment€of€the›€trial€court€is€affirmed.Ìœà à›à àÓÓà àà àà àà àà àœPER›€CURIAMÌà àœà à›à àà àà àà àà àœ(Scott,›€œP.J.,€and›€œTipton,€J.)Ìà àà àà àà àà àà àà à(White,›€œJ.,€not€participating)›Ì