ÿWPC¯ 9Ÿ»QÐ;rdmÓh'…­ºæxJq¹_hgÉÈŠòRŒg׎?€1¥³üÝ?B†×úŒÍ¤ÞÑGÕzÌ5T†”Ùqeµ¬]QžYÊøë¢'™æ¨ ³B3"¬A \$Àé\Ä)ëˆÚeë€'&õ¤5$²GŽ÷”ŠåJgâ]BŠÌò9Ц¬vîÕéSšÇt(«AI ³˜Yßþ*ß+£hk^éÔØFÀÿ¯$FWÊz} Ë~çnXêú‰H*WÃØÏ¯äûj%ºŒÒÆ*t³Ò)U÷y퇢¾¡SWT’"ì¨îôGÊ€E¶Ç$ì'=¹bM¶˜•@“@Uí1wÓžL}" &­ÓTiý')Þ  Ðcorrection.€€The€offer€was€conditioned€on€the€defense€waiving€anyÐ 6*Ö ! Ðfiled€motions€and€would€be€held€open€for€only€10€days.€€The€letterÐ .+Î!" Ðincluded€a€notation€stating€that€if€the€offer€was€rejected€defenseÐ &,Æ"# Ðcounsel€should€schedule€a€motion€hearing€with€the€trial€court.€€OnÐ -¾#$ Ð24€February€1988€the€Attorney€General€was€notified€that€defenseÐ .¶$% Ðcounsel€had€scheduled€a€motion€hearing€and€the€prosecutionÐ /®%& Ðregarded€the€scheduling€of€these€motions€as€a€rejection€of€the€pleaÐ 0¦&' Ðoffer.€€Defense€counsel€testified€at€the€post„conviction€hearing€thatÐ þ0ž'( Ðhe€received€the€prosecutionððs€plea€offer€on€the€17òòthóó€or€18òòthóó€day€ofÐ ö1–() ÐFebruary.€€He€endeavored€to€inform€petitioner€of€the€offer€throughÐ î2Ž)* Ðhis€parents,€but€did€not€communicate€with€him€directly€concerningÐ æ3†*+ Ðthe€matter€until€later€in€March€1988,€after€the€expiration€of€the€offer.ÐÞ4~+,` ü!` ü! ÐÌà8 ` àà ¸ àOn€29€February€1988€the€Assistant€District€Attorney€GeneralÐ Î6n-. Ðinformed€defense€counsel€that€since€no€response€had€beenÐ Æ7f./ Ðforthcoming€within€the€allotted€10€days€the€plea€bargain€offer€was€noÐ ¾8^/0 Ðlonger€valid€and€no€further€offers€would€be€made.€€On€the€same€dateÐ ¶9V01 ÐStateððs€counsel€filed€notice€informing€the€trial€court€and€defenseÐ `  Ðcounsel€that€the€State€intended€to€seek€Range€II€sentencing€at€trial.ÐX ø` ü!` ü! ÐÌà8 ` àà ¸ àDefendant€went€to€trial€without€any€knowledge€of€the€pleaÐ H è Ðoffer€by€the€State€and€was€found€guilty€at€trial.Ð@ à` ü!` ü! ÐÌÓsÓòòHarris€v.€Stateóó,€875€S.W.2d€662,€663€(Tenn.€1994).€€The€supreme€court€foundÐ 0Ð Ðthat€trial€counsel€was€ineffective€in€failing€to€relay€the€plea€offer€to€the€DefendantÐ  À Ðand€remanded€the€case€to€the€trial€court€with€instructions€for€the€State€toÐ °  Ðð ðreinstate€its€original€guilty€plea€offer€and€negotiate€in€good€faith.ðð€€òòId.óó€at€667.€€IfÐ    Ðthe€Defendant€accepted€the€offer,€the€supreme€court€directed€the€trial€court€toÐ ð  Ðð ðutilize€its€discretion€to€accept€or€reject€this€or€any€other€plea€agreement€whichÐ à€ Ðmay€be€negotiated.€€Otherwise,€the€case€will€stand€for€trial€in€due€course.ðð€€òòId.ó󀀀РÐp Ѐ€ÌÌà ` àUpon€remand,€the€Defendant€accepted€the€five„year€plea€offer,€but€the€trialÐ   @ Ðcourt€rejected€it.€€The€Defendant€was€then€again€tried€and€convicted€in€NovemberÐ "0 Ð1995€of€assault€with€intent€to€commit€first€degree€murder.€€He€was€sentenced€asÐ €$  Ða€Range€I€standard€offender€under€the€Criminal€Sentencing€Reform€Act€of€1989Ð p& Ðto€twenty„three€years€incarceration.€€He€appealed€his€conviction€and€sentence€toÐ `(  Ðthis€Court,€which€upheld€the€conviction,€but€remanded€for€resentencing.€€òòState€v.Ð P*ð " ÐHarrisóó,€978€S.W.2d€109,€118€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.€1997).€€Because€the€crime€wasÐ @,à"$ Ðcommitted€in€1987,€before€the€effective€date€of€the€current€sentencing€statute,€theÐ 0.Ð$& Ðtrial€court€was€required€to€calculate€the€appropriate€sentence€under€both€theÐ  0À&( ÐCriminal€Sentencing€Reform€Act€of€1989€and€the€Criminal€Sentencing€Reform€ActÐ 2°(* Ðof€1982€and€then€impose€the€lesser€sentence€of€the€two.€€òòState€v.€Pearsonóó,€858Ð 4 *, ÐS.W.2d€879,€884€(Tenn.€1993).€€Because€the€trial€court€did€not€calculate€theÐ ð5,. Ðappropriate€sentence€under€both€statutes€and€then€impose€the€lesser€sentence,€Ð  à7€.0 Ðthe€case€was€remanded€for€the€trial€court€to€perform€this€task.€€òòHarrisóó,€978Ð `  ÐS.W.2d€at€116.€Ð P ð ÐÌà ` àAt€the€new€sentencing€hearing€on€November€5,€1998,€the€trial€courtÐ 0Ð Ðcalculated€the€sentence€under€both€the€1989€statute€and€the€1982€statute.€€UnderÐ  À Ðthe€1982€statute,€the€trial€court€found€that€the€Defendant€was€a€Range€II€offenderÐ °  Ðbecause€he€had€committed€an€especially€aggravated€offense€and€that€theÐ    Ðminimum€sentence€for€the€crime€in€Range€II€was€thirty„two€and€a€half€years.€€òòSeeóóÐ ð  ÐTenn.€Code€Ann.€ðððð€40„35„107(2),€(7),€40„35„109(b)€(repealed€1989).€€Under€theÐ à€ Ð1989€statute,€the€trial€court€found€that€the€Defendant€was€a€Range€I€standardÐ Ðp Ðoffender€and€that€the€sentence€range€was€fifteen€to€twenty„five€years.€€òòSeeóó€òòid.óó€ððÐ À` Ð40„35„112.€€Because€the€minimum€sentence€in€Range€II€under€the€1982€statuteÐ °P Ðwas€greater€than€the€maximum€sentence€in€Range€I€under€the€1989€statute,€theÐ   @ Ðtrial€court€determined€that€it€should€sentence€the€Defendant€under€the€1989Ð "0 Ðstatute.€€òòóóIt€then€applied€enhancement€and€mitigating€factors€and€determined€thatÐ €$  Ðthe€appropriate€sentence€was€twenty„three€years.€€Accordingly,€the€trial€courtÐ p& Ðimposed€a€twenty„three€year€sentence.€€It€is€from€this€sentence€that€theÐ `(  ÐDefendant€now€appeals,€arguing€that€the€trial€court€erred€in€using€Range€IIÐ P*ð " Ðsentencing€considerations€in€calculating€the€appropriate€sentence€under€the€1982Ð @,à"$ Ðstatute€because€the€State€sought€Range€II€sentencing€due€to€vindictiveÐ 0.Ð$& Ðprosecution€caused€by€the€Defendantððs€original€trial€counselððs€ineffectiveÐ  0À&( Ðrepresentation.Ð 2°(* ÐÌà ` àThe€statute€under€which€the€Defendant€was€twice€convicted€provides€asÐ ð5,. Ðfollows:Ð à7€.0 ÐÓÓà8 ` àÐ Ð9p02` ü!` ü! Ðà ` àòòAssault€with€intent€to€murderóó.€„€(a)€Whoever€shall€feloniously€and€withÐ `  Ðmalice€aforethought€assault€any€person,€with€intent€to€commit€murder€in€the€firstÐ X ø Ðdegree,€or€shall€administer€or€attempt€to€give€any€poison€for€that€purpose,€thoughÐ P ð Ðdeath€shall€not€ensue,€shall,€on€conviction,€be€imprisoned€in€the€state€penitentiaryÐ H è Ðfor€not€less€than€five€(5)€nor€more€than€twenty„five€(25)€years.Ð @ à Ðà8 ` àà ¸ àà  à(b)€If€bodily€injury€to€the€victim€occurs€as€a€result€ofÐ 8Ø Ðsuch€an€assault€in€violation€of€subsection€(a),€the€punishment€shallÐ 0Ð Ðbe€a€determinate€sentence€of€confinement€in€the€state€penitentiaryÐ (È Ðfor€life€or€for€a€period€of€not€less€than€five€(5)€years.Ð À` ü!` ü! Ðà8 ` àà ¸ à(c)€In€the€case€of€bodily€injury€to€the€victim,€the€offenseÐ ¸  Ðdefined€in€subsection€(b)€of€this€section€is€a€Class€X€felony.а ` ü!` ü! ÐÌÓü/ÓòòId.óó€ðð€39„2„103€(repealed€1989).€€The€evidence€at€trial€revealed€that€following€aÐ    Ðhearing€in€relation€to€the€Defendantððs€divorce€from€Linda€Harris,€the€DefendantÐ ð  Ðwent€to€his€former€wifeððs€place€of€employment€at€the€offices€of€a€pediatric€dentist.€Ð à€ ÐWhile€Linda€Harris€was€preparing€to€treat€a€five„year€old€girl€who€was€seated€inÐ Ðp Ðthe€dental€chair,€the€Defendant€entered€the€area€and€attacked€Ms.€Harris€with€aÐ À` Ðknife.€€He€cut€Ms.€Harrisðð€neck€with€the€knife,€causing€a€wound€approximately€fiveÐ °P Ðinches€long€and€at€least€an€inch€deep,€which€barely€missed€Ms.€Harrisðð€carotidÐ   @ Ðartery€and€which€left€a€permanent€scar.€€He€also€cut€tendons€in€two€of€Ms.€HarrisððÐ "0 Ðfingers.€€One€of€Ms.€Harrisðð€fingers€remains€impaired.€€Thus,€under€the€statute,Ð €$  Ðthe€Defendant€caused€bodily€injury€in€the€commission€of€the€crime€and€wasÐ p& Ðsubject€to€a€sentence€of€five€years€to€life€imprisonment.€€òòSeeóó€òòid.óó€ðð€39„2„103(b)Ð `(  Ð(repealed€1989).€€Ð P*ð " ÐÌà ` àAlso,€under€the€1982€Act,€an€offense€is€an€ð ðespecially€aggravated€offenseððÐ 0.Ð$& Ðif€the€offense€is€a€ð ðfelony€during€the€commission€of€which€the€defendant€willfullyÐ  0À&( Ðinflicted€serious€bodily€injury€upon€another€person.ðð€€òòId.óó€ðð€40„35„107(2)€(repealedÐ 2°(* Ð1989).€€ð ðððSerious€bodily€injuryðð€includes€bodily€injury€which€involves€a€substantialÐ 4 *, Ðrisk€of€death;€unconsciousness;€extreme€physical€pain;€protracted€and€obviousÐ ð5,. Ðdisfigurement;€or€protracted€loss€or€impairment€of€the€function€of€a€bodily€memberÐ à7€.0 Ðor€organ.ðð€€òòId.óó€ðð€40„35„107(5)(B)€(repealed€1989).€€The€victim€spent€three€daysÐ Ð9p02 Ðin€the€hospital€for€a€neck€wound€that€barely€missed€her€carotid€artery,€she€has€aÐ `  Ðpermanent€scar€on€her€neck,€and€she€suffers€impairment€of€the€function€of€one€Ð P ð Ðof€her€fingers.€€Thus,€it€is€apparent€that€she€suffered€ð ðserious€bodily€injuryðð€underÐ @ à Ðthe€statute€and€the€crime€could€be€considered€an€ð ðespecially€aggravated€offense.ðð€Ð 0Ð ÐThe€trial€court€below€found€that€to€be€the€case,€and€the€Defendant€does€notÐ  À Ðchallenge€that€finding.Ð °  ÐÌà ` àIn€addition€to€providing€that€an€offense€may€be€considered€an€ð ðespeciallyÐ ð  Ðaggravated€offense,ðð€the€statute€provides€that€ð ð[i]f€the€district€attorney€generalÐ à€ Ðbelieves€that€a€defendant€should€be€sentenced€.€.€.€for€an€especially€aggravatedÐ Ðp Ðoffense€.€.€.€he€shall€file€a€statement€thereof€with€the€court€and€defense€counselÐ À` Ðbefore€trial€or€acceptance€of€a€guilty€plea€on€the€primary€offense.ðð€€òòId.óó€ðð€40„35„Ð °P Ð202(a)€(repealed€1989).€€When€sentencing€a€defendant,€the€trial€court€must€baseÐ   @ Ðthe€sentence€ð ðon€the€evidence€in€the€record€of€the€trial,€the€sentencing€hearing,Ð "0 Ðthe€pre„sentence€report,€and€in€the€case€of€an€especially€aggravated€offense€orÐ €$  Ða€persistent€offender,€the€statement€filed€by€the€district€attorney€general€with€theÐ p& Ðcourt€as€required€by€ðð€40„35„202.ðð€€òòId.óó€ðð€40„35„210(d)€(repealed€1989).€€Thus,Ð `(  Ðbefore€a€court€may€sentence€a€defendant€for€an€especially€aggravated€offense,Ð P*ð " Ðthe€prosecution€must€request€such€a€sentence.€€If,€after€such€a€request,€the€courtÐ @,à"$ Ðfinds€beyond€a€reasonable€doubt€that€the€defendant€committed€an€especiallyÐ 0.Ð$& Ðaggravated€offense,€then€the€defendant€is€to€be€sentenced€within€Range€II.€€òòSeeóóÐ  0À&( Ðòòid.óó€ðð€40„35„107(7)€(repealed€1989).€€A€Range€II€sentence€is€a€sentence€ð ðnot€lessÐ 2°(* Ðthan€the€minimum€sentence€plus€one„half€of€the€difference€between€the€maximumÐ 4 *, Ðsentence€and€the€minimum€sentence,€and€not€more€than€the€maximum€sentenceÐ ð5,. Ðas€provided€by€law,ðð€which€in€this€case€would€be€a€sentence€of€thirty„two€and€aÐ à7€.0 Ðhalf€years€to€life.€€òòSeeóó€òòid.óó€ðð€40„35„109(b)€(repealed€1989).Ð Ð9p02 Їà ` àAs€noted€by€the€supreme€court€in€the€appeal€from€post„conviction€relief,€onÐ `  Ðthe€same€day€that€she€informed€defense€counsel€that€the€plea€bargain€offer€wasÐ P ð Ðno€longer€valid€and€no€further€offers€would€be€made,€the€assistant€district€attorneyÐ @ à Ðgeneral€filed€a€notice€informing€the€trial€court€and€defense€counsel€of€the€StateððsÐ 0Ð Ðintent€to€seek€Range€II€sentencing€at€trial€because€the€Defendant€had€committedÐ  À Ðan€especially€aggravated€offense.€€òòSeeóó€òòHarrisóó,€875€S.W.2d€at€663,€665.€€In€aÐ °  Ðfootnote,€the€supreme€court€stated,€ð ðThere€is€some€indication€in€the€record€at€thisÐ    Ðpoint€evidencing€a€developing€friction€between€counsel.ðð€€òòId.óó€at€665€n.2.€€FromÐ ð  Ðthese€notations€in€an€opinion€by€our€supreme€court,€the€Defendant€now€asks€usÐ à€ Ðto€presume,€without€further€proof,€that€the€assistant€district€attorney€general€filedÐ Ðp Ðthe€notice€due€to€prosecutorial€vindictiveness€caused€by€original€trial€counselððsÐ À` Ðineffectiveness€in€failing€to€communicate€the€plea€to€the€Defendant€and€inÐ °P Ðnegotiating€with€the€State.Ð   @ ÐÌà ` àIn€our€judicial€system,€Ð €$  ÐÓÓà8 ` àso€long€as€the€prosecutor€has€probable€cause€to€believe€that€theÐ p& Ðaccused€committed€an€offense€defined€by€statute,€the€decisionÐ h' Ðwhether€or€not€to€prosecute,€and€what€charge€to€file€or€bring€beforeÐ `(  Ða€grand€jury,€generally€rests€entirely€in€his€discretion.€€Within€theÐ X)ø! Ðlimits€set€by€the€legislatureððs€constitutionally€valid€definition€ofÐ P*ð " Ðchargeable€offenses,€ð ðthe€conscious€exercise€of€some€selectivity€inÐ H+è!# Ðenforcement€is€not€in€itself€a€federal€constitutional€violationðð€so€longÐ @,à"$ Ðas€ð ðthe€selection€was€[not]€deliberately€based€upon€an€unjustifiableÐ 8-Ø#% Ðstandard€such€as€race,€religion,€or€other€arbitrary€classification.ððÐ0.Ð$&` ü!` ü! ÐÌÓUKÓòòBordenkircher€v.€Hayesóó,€434€U.S.€357,€364€(1978)€(quoting€òòOyler€v.€Bolesóó,€368Ð  0À&( ÐU.S.€448,€456€(1962)).€€Also,€the€original€indictment,€which€often€begins€pleaÐ 2°(* Ðnegotiations,€ð ðdoes€not€necessarily€define€the€extent€of€the€legitimate€interest€inÐ 4 *, Ðprosecution.€€For€just€as€a€prosecutor€may€forgo€legitimate€charges€alreadyÐ ð5,. Ðbrought€in€an€effort€to€save€the€time€and€expense€of€trial,€a€prosecutor€may€fileÐ à7€.0 Ðadditional€charges€if€an€initial€expectation€that€a€defendant€would€plead€guilty€toÐ Ð9p02 Ðlesser€charges€proves€unfounded.ðð€€òòUnited€States€v.€Goodwinóó,€457€U.S.€368,€380Ð `  Ð(1982).€€While€the€prosecutor€no€doubt€had€the€discretion€to€seek€enhancedÐ P ð Ðpunishment€because€the€facts€clearly€support€the€finding€that€the€DefendantÐ @ à Ðcommitted€an€especially€aggravated€offense,€the€Defendant€asks€us€to€find€thatÐ 0Ð Ðthe€prosecutor€exercised€that€discretion€out€of€vindictiveness.€Ð  À ÐÌà ` àIn€the€case€of€òòNorth€Carolina€v.€Pearceóó,€395€U.S.€711,€724„25€(1969),€theÐ    ÐUnited€States€Supreme€Court€held€that€it€is€a€violation€of€basic€due€process€toÐ ð  Ðpunish€a€person€because€he€has€done€what€the€law€plainly€allows.€€TheÐ à€ Ðdefendant€in€òòPierceóó€successfully€appealed€his€conviction€and€then€received€aÐ Ðp Ðgreater€sentence€on€retrial.€€While€concluding€that€the€Constitution€does€not€barÐ À` Ðthe€imposition€of€a€more€severe€sentence€after€retrial,€the€Court€held€that€the€DueÐ °P ÐProcess€Clause€of€the€Fourteenth€Amendment€prevents€increased€sentencesÐ   @ Ðwhich€are€actually€or€likely€motivated€by€a€vindictive€desire€to€punish€a€defendantÐ "0 Ðfor€the€exercise€of€a€statutory€or€procedural€right.€€òòId.óó€at€723„24.€€To€preventÐ €$  Ðactual€vindictiveness€and€the€fear€of€vindictiveness€on€the€part€of€a€defendant,€theÐ p& ÐSupreme€Court€established€the€rule€thatÐ `(  ÐÓÓà8 ` àwhenever€a€judge€imposes€a€more€severe€sentence€upon€aÐ P*ð " Ðdefendant€after€a€new€trial,€the€reasons€for€his€doing€so€mustÐ H+è!# Ðaffirmatively€appear.€€Those€reasons€must€be€based€upon€objectiveÐ @,à"$ Ðinformation€concerning€identifiable€conduct€on€the€part€of€theÐ 8-Ø#% Ðdefendant€occurring€after€the€time€of€the€original€sentencingÐ 0.Ð$& Ðproceeding.€€And€the€factual€data€upon€which€the€increasedÐ (/È%' Ðsentence€is€based€must€be€made€part€of€the€record,€so€that€theÐ  0À&( Ðconstitutional€legitimacy€of€the€increased€sentence€may€be€fullyÐ 1¸') Ðreviewed€on€appeal.Ð2°(*` ü!` ü! ÐÌÓBWÓòòId.óó€at€726.€€The€Supreme€Court€later€interpreted€this€rule€as€applying€aÐ 4 *, Ðpresumption€of€vindictiveness€which€may€be€overcome€only€by€objectiveÐ ð5,. Ðinformation€in€the€record€justifying€the€increased€sentence.€€òòGoodwinóó,€457€U.S.Ð à7€.0 Ðat€374.Ð Ð9p02 Їà ` àIn€òòBlackledge€v.€Perryóó,€417€U.S.€21,€27„28€(1974),€the€Supreme€CourtÐ `  Ðextended€the€presumption€of€vindictiveness€to€post„trial€prosecutorial€conductÐ P ð Ðwhich€could€be€motivated€by€vindictiveness.€€In€that€case,€the€defendant€wasÐ @ à Ðconvicted€of€assault€in€a€court€having€exclusive€jurisdiction€for€the€trial€ofÐ 0Ð Ðmisdemeanors,€and€when€he€appealed€his€conviction€and€requested€a€trial€òòdeÐ  À Ðnovoóó€in€the€Superior€Court,€the€prosecutor€obtained€a€felony€indictment€chargingÐ °  Ðthe€defendant€with€assault€with€a€deadly€weapon.€€The€Court€determined€thatÐ    Ðsuch€a€situation€posed€ð ða€realistic€likelihood€of€ððvindictivenessðððð€and€explained€itsÐ ð  Ðreasoning€for€extending€the€presumption€of€vindictiveness€as€follows:Ð à€ ÐÓÓà8 ` àA€prosecutor€clearly€has€a€considerable€stake€in€discouragingÐ Ðp Ðconvicted€misdemeanants€from€appealing€and€thus€obtaining€a€trialÐ Èh Ðòòde€novoóó€in€the€Superior€Court,€since€such€an€appeal€will€clearlyÐ À` Ðrequire€increased€expenditures€of€prosecutorial€resources€before€theÐ ¸X Ðdefendantððs€conviction€becomes€final,€and€may€even€result€in€aÐ °P Ðformerly€convicted€defendantððs€going€free.€€And,€if€the€prosecutorÐ ¨H Ðhas€the€means€readily€at€hand€to€discourage€such€appeals€ð!ð€byÐ   @ Ðð ðupping€the€anteðð€through€a€felony€indictment€whenever€a€convictedÐ ˜!8 Ðmisdemeanant€pursues€his€statutory€appellate€remedy€ð!ð€the€StateÐ "0 Ðcan€insure€that€only€the€most€hardy€defendants€will€brave€theÐ ˆ#( Ðhazards€of€a€òòde€novoóó€trial.Ѐ$ ` ü!` ü! ÐÌÓ _ÓòòId.óó€at€27„28.€Ð p& ÐÌà ` àWhile€the€Supreme€Court€has€imposed€a€presumption€of€vindictivenessÐ P*ð " Ðwhen€a€defendant€receives€a€harsher€sentence€upon€retrial€and€when€aÐ @,à"$ Ðdefendant€is€indicted€for€a€more€serious€offense€after€appealing€a€conviction,€itÐ 0.Ð$& Ðhas€not€yet€applied€the€presumption€in€a€pretrial€setting.€€òòSeeóó€òòBordenkircher€v.Ð  0À&( ÐHayesóó,€434€U.S.€357€(1978);€òòUnited€States€v.€Goodwinóó,€457€U.S.€368€(1982).€Ð 2°(* ÐThe€applicability€of€the€presumption€in€a€pretrial€setting€was€first€considered€byÐ 4 *, Ðthe€Supreme€Court€in€òòBordenkircheróó,€434€U.S.€at€362„65.€€There,€the€defendantÐ ð5,. Ðwas€indicted€on€a€charge€of€uttering€a€forged€instrument€in€the€amount€of€$88.30,Ð à7€.0 Ðwhich€was€an€offense€punishable€by€a€term€of€two€to€ten€years€in€prison.€€DuringÐ Ð9p02 Ðplea€negotiations,€the€prosecutor€offered€a€plea€agreement€and€further€told€theÐ `  Ðdefendant€that€if€he€did€not€plead€guilty,€the€State€would€seek€an€indictment€underÐ P ð Ðthe€Kentucky€Habitual€Criminal€Act€which€would€subject€the€defendant€to€aÐ @ à Ðmandatory€life€sentence€due€to€two€prior€felony€convictions.€€The€defendantÐ 0Ð Ðrejected€the€plea€agreement€and€was€subsequently€indicted€and€convicted€underÐ  À Ðthe€Habitual€Criminal€Act.€€In€distinguishing€this€situation€from€òòPearceóó€andÐ °  ÐòòBlackledgeóó,€the€Supreme€Court€noted€that€Ð    ÐÓÓ€€€€à8 ` à[i]n€those€cases€the€Court€was€dealing€with€the€Stateððs€unilateralÐ ð  Ðimposition€of€a€penalty€upon€a€defendant€who€had€chosen€toÐ èˆ Ðexercise€a€legal€right€to€attack€his€original€conviction€ð!ð€a€situationÐ à€ Ðð ðvery€different€from€the€give„and„take€negotiation€common€in€pleaÐ Øx Ðbargaining€between€the€prosecution€and€defense,€which€arguablyÐ Ðp Ðpossess€relatively€equal€bargaining€power.ððÐÈh` ü!` ü! ÐÌÓ:iÓòòBordenkircheróó,€434€U.S.€at€362€(quoting€òòParker€v.€North€Carolinaóó,€397€U.S.€790,Ð ¸X Ð809€(1970)€(opinion€of€Brennan,€J.)).€€Recognizing€that€a€defendant€may€not€beÐ ¨H Ðpunished€for€exercising€a€legal€right,€the€Court€determined€that€ð ðin€the€ððgive„and„Ð ˜!8 Ðtakeðð€of€plea€bargaining,€there€is€no€such€element€of€punishment€or€retaliation€soÐ ˆ#( Ðlong€as€the€accused€is€free€to€accept€or€reject€the€prosecutionððs€offer.ðð€€òòId.óó€at€363.€Ð x% ÐIt€subsequently€held€that€a€presumption€of€vindictiveness€does€not€arise€when€aÐ h' Ðprosecutor€follows€through€with€a€threat€made€during€plea€negotiations€to€bringÐ X)ø! Ðadditional€charges€against€a€defendant€if€the€defendant€refuses€to€plead€guilty.€Ð H+è!# ÐòòId.óó€at€365.€€€€€€€€€€€€€Ð 8-Ø#% ÐÌà ` àThe€applicability€of€a€presumption€of€vindictiveness€again€came€before€theÐ 1¸') ÐSupreme€Court€in€the€pretrial€context€in€the€case€of€òòUnited€States€v.€Goodwinóó,Ð 3¨)+ Ð457€U.S.€368€(1982).€€In€òòGoodwinóó,€the€Court€considered€whether€the€prosecutorððsÐ ø4˜+- Ðaddition€of€a€pretrial€felony€charge€following€the€defendantððs€pretrial€demand€forÐ è6ˆ-/ Ða€jury€trial€on€a€misdemeanor€charge€gives€rise€to€a€presumption€ofÐ Ø8x/1 Ðvindictiveness.€€While€acknowledging€that€it€has€been€necessary€to€ð ðpresumeðð€aÐ `  Ðvindictive€motive€in€some€circumstances,€the€Court€stated,€ð ðGiven€the€severity€ofÐ P ð Ðsuch€a€presumption,€however,€which€may€operate€in€the€absence€of€any€proof€ofÐ @ à Ðan€improper€motive€and€thus€may€block€a€legitimate€response€to€criminal€conductÐ 0Ð Ðð!ð€the€Court€has€done€so€only€in€cases€in€which€a€reasonable€likelihood€ofÐ  À Ðvindictiveness€exists.ðð€€òòId.óó€at€373.€€In€comparing€post„trial€actions€of€prosecutorsÐ °  Ðto€pretrial€actions,€the€Supreme€Court€had€the€following€to€say:Ð    ÐÓÓà8 ` àà ¸ àThere€is€good€reason€to€be€cautious€before€adopting€anÐ ð  Ðinflexible€presumption€of€prosecutorial€vindictiveness€in€a€pretrialÐ èˆ Ðsetting.€€In€the€course€of€preparing€a€case€for€trial,€the€prosecutorÐ à€ Ðmay€uncover€additional€information€that€suggests€a€basis€for€furtherÐ Øx Ðprosecution€or€he€simply€may€come€to€realize€that€informationÐ Ðp Ðpossessed€by€the€State€has€a€broader€significance.€€At€this€stage€ofÐ Èh Ðthe€proceedings,€the€prosecutorððs€assessment€of€the€proper€extentÐ À` Ðof€prosecution€may€not€have€crystallized.€€In€contrast,€once€a€trialÐ ¸X Ðbegins€ð!ð€and€certainly€by€the€time€a€conviction€has€been€obtainedÐ °P Ðð!ð€it€is€much€more€likely€that€the€State€has€discovered€and€assessedÐ ¨H Ðall€of€the€information€against€an€accused€and€has€made€aÐ   @ Ðdetermination,€on€the€basis€of€that€information,€of€the€extent€to€whichÐ ˜!8 Ðhe€should€be€prosecuted.€€Thus,€a€change€in€the€charging€decisionÐ "0 Ðmade€after€an€initial€trial€is€completed€is€much€more€likely€to€beÐ ˆ#( Ðimproperly€motivated€than€is€a€pretrial€decision.Ѐ$ ` ü!` ü! ÐÌà8 ` àà ¸ àIn€addition,€a€defendant€before€trial€is€expected€to€invokeÐ p& Ðprocedural€rights€that€inevitably€impose€some€ð ðburdenðð€on€theÐ h' Ðprosecutor.€€Defense€counsel€routinely€file€pretrial€motions€toÐ `(  Ðsuppress€evidence;€to€challenge€the€sufficiency€and€form€of€anÐ X)ø! Ðindictment;€to€plead€an€affirmative€defense;€to€request€psychiatricÐ P*ð " Ðservices;€to€obtain€access€to€government€files;€to€be€tried€by€jury.€Ð H+è!# ÐIt€is€unrealistic€to€assume€that€a€prosecutorððs€probable€response€toÐ @,à"$ Ðsuch€motions€is€to€seek€to€penalize€and€to€deter.€€The€invocation€ofÐ 8-Ø#% Ðprocedural€rights€is€an€integral€part€of€the€adversary€process€inÐ 0.Ð$& Ðwhich€our€criminal€justice€system€operates.Ð(/È%'` ü!` ü! ÐÌà8 ` àà ¸ àThus,€the€timing€of€the€prosecutorððs€action€in€this€caseÐ 1¸') Ðsuggests€that€a€presumption€of€vindictiveness€is€not€warranted.€€AÐ 2°(* Ðprosecutor€should€remain€free€before€trial€to€exercise€the€broadÐ 3¨)+ Ðdiscretion€entrusted€to€him€to€determine€the€extent€of€the€societalÐ 4 *, Ðinterest€in€prosecution.€€An€initial€decision€should€not€freeze€futureÐ ø4˜+- Ðconduct.€€As€we€made€clear€in€òòBordenkircheróó,€the€initial€charges€filedÐ ð5,. Ðby€a€prosecutor€may€not€reflect€the€extent€to€which€an€individual€isÐ è6ˆ-/ Ðlegitimately€subject€to€prosecution.€Ðà7€.0` ü!` ü! ÐÌÔ_ÔÐ  Ð9p02 Ðà8 ` àà ¸ à.€.€.€This€Court€in€òòÔ_ÔBordenkircherÔ_Ôóó€made€clear€that€the€mere€factÐ `  Ðthat€a€defendant€refuses€to€plead€guilty€and€forces€the€governmentÐ X ø Ðto€prove€its€case€is€insufficient€to€warrant€a€presumption€thatÐ P ð Ðsubsequent€changes€in€the€charging€decision€are€unjustified.€€€€ÐH è` ü!` ü! ÐÌÓ»sÓòòId.óó€at€381„83.Ð 8Ø ÐÌà ` àWhile€the€Supreme€Court€did€not€hold€that€the€presumption€can€neverÐ ¸  Ðapply€in€a€pretrial€context,€in€light€of€its€reasoning€in€òòÔ_ÔBordenkircherÔ_Ôóó€and€òòGoodwinóó,€Ð ¨  Ðwe€cannot€find€the€existence€of€a€presumption€of€prosecutorial€vindictiveness€justÐ ø˜  Ðbecause€the€prosecutor€seeks€enhanced€punishment€after€plea€negotiations€failÐ èˆ Ðand€defense€counsel€files€motions€with€the€trial€court.€€òòSeeóó€òòState€v.€Ô_ÔPhippsÔ_Ôóó,€959Ð Øx ÐS.W.2d€538,€546€(Tenn.€1997)€(setting€forth€when€the€presumption€ofÐ Èh Ðvindictiveness€arises€after€considering€the€Supreme€Court€precedent).€€Had€theÐ ¸X Ðprosecutor€sought€enhanced€punishment€after€the€Defendantððs€conviction€hadÐ ¨H Ðbeen€overturned€and€the€case€was€sent€back€for€retrial,€there€might€very€wellÐ ˜!8 Ðhave€been€a€different€outcome€in€this€case.€€òòSeeóó€òòid.óó€€However,€the€situation€hereÐ ˆ#( Ðis€precisely€the€type€of€situation€in€which€the€Supreme€Court€said€the€presumptionÐ x% Ðdoes€not€arise.€€òòSeeóó€òòGoodwinóó,€457€U.S.€at€381„82.€€Ð h' ÐÌà ` àBecause€the€presumption€is€not€applicable,€for€us€to€find€prosecutorialÐ H+è!# Ðvindictiveness€in€this€pretrial€context,€the€Defendant€would€have€to€prove€actualÐ 8-Ø#% Ðvindictiveness.€€òòSeeóó€òòid.óó€at€384.€€The€Defendant€has€pointed€us€to€no€proof€ofÐ (/È%' Ðvindictiveness.€€He€has€only€cited€our€supreme€courtððs€opinion€upholding€theÐ 1¸') Ðgrant€of€post„conviction€relief,€in€which€the€court€noted€that€the€prosecutor€filedÐ 3¨)+ Ðthe€notice€of€intent€to€seek€enhanced€punishment€on€the€same€day€it€notifiedÐ ø4˜+- Ðdefense€counsel€that€it€viewed€the€plea€offer€as€rejected€and€that€no€further€offersÐ è6ˆ-/ Ðwould€be€forthcoming.€€òòSeeóó€òòHarrisóó,€875€S.W.2d€at€663,€665.€€The€court€alsoÐ Ø8x/1 ÐÔ_Ônoted€that€there€was€some€evidence€of€a€developing€friction€between€counsel€atÐ `  Ðthis€point.€€òòSeeóó€òòid.óó€at€665€n.2.€€Without€the€presumption€of€vindictiveness,€thisÐ P ð Ðfalls€far€short€of€establishing€by€any€standard€that€the€filing€of€the€notice€wasÐ @ à Ðimproperly€motivated.€€It€is€undisputed€that€the€facts€supported€the€enhancedÐ 0Ð Ðsentence€and€that€the€prosecutor€had€the€discretion€to€seek€an€enhancedÐ  À Ðsentence.€€Therefore,€we€uphold€the€trial€courtððs€finding€that€the€minimumÐ °  Ðsentence€under€the€1982€Act€would€be€thirty„two€and€a€half€years€because€theÐ    ÐDefendant€committed€an€especially€aggravated€offense.€€Accordingly,€theÐ ð  ÐDefendant€was€properly€sentenced€to€twenty„three€years€under€the€1989€Act.Ð à€ ÐÌà ` àThe€judgment€is€affirmed.€€Ð À` Ðò òó óÌÌÓÓà ` àà ¸ àà  àà h àà À àà  à______________________________Ð "0 Ðà ` àà ¸ àà  àà h àà À àà  àDAVID€H.€WELLES,€JUDGEÐ ˆ#( ÐÌÌÌCONCUR:Ð h' ÐÌÌÌ________________________________Ð H+è!# ÐGARY€R.€WADE,€PRESIDING€JUDGEÐ @,à"$ ÐÌÌÌ________________________________Ð  0À&( ÐDAVID€G.€HAYES,€JUDGEÐ 1¸') Ѐ