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B2!˜HP LaserJet 4Si/4SiMX PS 600dpiPSCRIPTÀÌÀääÀÀÌ0 <èÀ( 9Z &Courier RegularX(á¿Y$¡¡Ò°ÒÒX°ÒÑ  ÑÑ7€φXXdð XXdð7ÑÑ  ÑÓ  ÓÓiU°X` ¸ hÀpÈ xÐ (#€%Ø'0*ˆ,à.813è5@8˜:ð<H? A°œXiÓ<þ6X9`(*Courier 12pt10cpi©U!3|xm«<þ6X9`(*Courier 12pt10cpiXXxþ6X@ÉJQX@,†r‰AZ‹"Arial Regular YZ[D\]^_D`aVbÓ€2 ÿÿ0Indent1Ô2ÔÔ3  Ô(ý(3ú"$¤¤Ý ƒ¿Y!ÝÒ°ÒÒX°ÒÑ  ÑÑ7€®SXXdÈdÈ7ÑÑ  ÑÓ  ÓÓiU°X` ¸ hÀpÈ xÐ (#€%Ø'0*ˆ,à.813è5@8˜:ð<H? A°œXiÓÝ  Ýà ¸ àòòÚ  Ú0Ú  Úóó(#Ã$òòÚ  Ú0Ú  Úóó2" ÿÿ0Indent2à0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2, ÿÿ0Indent3à0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô26 ÿÿ0Indent4à0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2@ ÿÿ0Indent5à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2J ÿÿ0Indent6à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2T ÿÿ0Indent7à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2^ ÿÿ0Indent8à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô ÿÿ?AGMSYaioIndent0I.A.1.a.(1)(a)i)a)P ÿÿ8Mac DefaultMac DefaultÓ ` °šXÓ d< Œ 9p`(Courier New< Œ 9p`(Courier< Œ 9p`(Arial""""'ÿÿdxd% Line 7 d++++7Border 1dd("ÿÿ$££Ò  ÒÒ  Ò€-,Cþÿ << Gÿÿ {Ý ƒ!ÝÑ  ÑÑ#€d#ÑÔ€'ÔÒ  ÒÒ X ÒÑ  ÑÑ#€d#ÑÑ  ÑÓ` °˜XÓÝ  ÝÔ€)ÔÔ€)ÔÓ  ÓÔ YYY ÔFILEDÔ€)XÔÌÌò òOctoberÏ18,Ï1996ÌÌCecilÏCrowson,ÏJr.ÌÔ€)ôÔAppellateÏCourtÏClerkó ó Ý ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€'ÔÒ  ÒÒ X ÒÑ  ÑÑ#€d#ÑÑ  ÑÓ` °˜XÓÝ  ÝÝ ƒ$Ýà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  Ý€Ô€)ÔÔ€)ôÔUnfortunately,€neither€Mr.€Appman€nor€Mr.€Eldridge€was€called€to€testify€at€the€post„convictionÏhearing.Ì \Ñ\R AØ'\Ñ ßÝ ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€'ÔÒ  ÒÒ X ÒÑ  ÑÑ#€d#ÑÑ  ÑÓ` °˜XÓÝ  ÝÝ ƒ$Ýà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  Ý›€Ô€)ÔÔ€)ôÔFor€post„conviction€petitions€filed€on€or€after€May€10,€1995,€petitioners€have€the€burden€ofÏproving€factual€allegations€by€clear€and€convincing€evidence.€€T.C.A.€ðð€40„30„210(f).œÌPtPtHPð€ÿÜÿìô”(üHPð€P € €'Styl{WP}01•ÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃà Ãà Ãà Ãà Ãà ÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÐ ÐÐHHÐÐ  ÐÐ2ÐÐÿÿ¸æ$ÿÐÐHHÐÐÐÐÐÐÐÐ  ÐÐ ÐÐ ÐÑÑÑGenevaÑÑ ÑÑ € ÑÑ<Px–ÈÑÒÒÒ443!#4ÒÒ$ *$ÒÒ$*$ÒÒ ÿKK ÒÒ  Geneva ÒÒ  Geneva ÒÓ.,ÓÓÓÓ6ÓÓ ÓßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßÑGenevaÑÑ ÑÒ  BA Op Geneva ÒÒ  BA Op Geneva Ò€-‚ƒCþÿ<< CÿÿƒLevel 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5($$””ò òÚ  Ú1Ú  Úó ó„„'÷ÿ dxdüÿP PdÝ ƒ!ÝÔ . ÔÔ€'ÔÒ  ÒÒ X ÒÑ  ÑÑ#€((Xd#ÑÑ#€((Xd#ÑÑ  ÑÓ` °˜XÓÝ  ÝÑ  ÑÑ Ü ÑÓÓÑ\R AØ'\ÑÔ€)Ô›Ñ7€ Œ¥ XXdæXXdÈ7ќـ€ÙßL€./,;+'h|` ´- `€€Lß›à8 àà@ àIN€THE€COURT€OF€CRIMINALÏAPPEALS€OF€TENNESSEEÌà@ àAT€KNOXVILLEà@ à€€€€€€€€€Ìà àà à€€€€€€€€€€€€NOVEMBER€1995€SESSIONÌÌÓÓWILLIAM€HATMAKER,€€à àà à)à àÌ€à àà àà àà à)Ìà àAppellant,à àà à)à àNo.€03C01„9506„CR„00169Ìà à€€€€€à àà à€€à à)Ìà àà àà àà à)à àCampbell€CountyÌv.à àà àà àà à)€€€€€€€€€Ìà àà àà àà à)à à€Hon.€James€C.€Witt,ÏJr.€,€Judge€€€€€Ìà àà àà àà à)ÌSTATE€OF€TENNESSEE,à àà à)à à(Post„Conviction)€€€€€€€€Ìà àà àà àà à)Ìà àAppellee.à àà à)Ìà àà àà àà àÌÌòòFor€the€Appellantóó:à àà àà àà àòòFor€the€Appelleeóó:ÌÌR.€Jackson€Roseà àà àà àà àCharles€W.€BursonÌRoute€2,€Box€1„Rà àà àà àà àAttorney€General€ofÏTennesseeÌNettleton€Roadà àà àà àà àà àandÌHarrogate,€TN€37752à àà àà àMichael€J.€Fahey,€IIÌà àà àà àà àà àAssistant€AttorneyÏGeneral€of€Tennessee€à àà àà àà àà à450ÏJames€Robertson€Parkwayà àà àÌà àà àà àà àà àNashville,€TN€37243„0493ÌÌà àà àà àà àà àWilliam€Paul€PhillipsÌà àà àà àà àà àDistrict€AttorneyÏGeneralÌà àà àà àà àà àP.O.€Box€10Ìà àà àà àà àà àHuntsville,€TN€37756„0010ÌÌà àà àà àà àà àMichael€O.€RipleyÌà àà àà àà àà àAssistant€District€Attorney€GeneralÌà àà àà àà àà àP.O.€Box€323Ìà àà àà àà àà àKingston,€TN€37757„0323ÌÌÌÌÌOPINION€FILED:____________________ÌÌAFFIRMEDÌÌJoseph€M.€TiptonÌJudgeÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÓÓà@ àòòò òO€P€I€N€I€O€Nó óóóÌÌà àThe€petitioner,€William€Hatmaker,€appeals€as€of€right€from€the€judgment€of€theÏCriminal€Court€of€Campbell€County€denying€his€petition€for€post„conviction€relief.€€Pursuant€to€anÏagreement,€the€petitioner€entered€a€guilty€plea€on€July€6,€1991,€to€first€degree€murder,€whileÏcharges€of€conspiracy€and€solicitation€to€commit€first€degree€murder€were€dismissed.€€TheÏpetitioner€is€currently€serving€a€life€sentence€in€the€Department€of€Correction.€€He€asserts€onÍappeal€(1)€that€he€received€the€ineffective€assistance€of€counsel€and€(2)€that€he€did€notÏvoluntarily€and€knowingly€enter€his€guilty€plea.€€We€disagree.ÌÌà@ àò òòòBACKGROUNDó óóóÌà àThe€record€on€appeal€contains€few€facts€relating€to€the€underlying€events,€andÏtherefore,€we€rely€primarily€upon€the€factual€summaries€provided€in€the€cases€of€the€petitionerððsÏco„defendants.€€òòSeeóó€òòState€v.€Hutchisonóó,€898€S.W.2d€161,€164€(Tenn.€1994),€òòcertóó.€òòdeniedóó,€___ÏU.S.€___,€116€S.€Ct.€137€(1995);€òòState€v.€Gayloróó,€862€S.W.2d€546,€549€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.€1992),Ïòòappóó.€òòdeniedóó€(Tenn.€1993).€€The€evidence€showed€that€the€offense€for€which€the€petitionerÏentered€a€guilty€plea€stemmed€from€an€agreement€between€the€petitioner€and€several€co„defendants€to€drown€Hugh€Huddleston€and€to€collect€almost€$800,000€in€insurance€proceeds.€ÏThe€victim€was€drowned€on€August€14,€1988.ÌÌà àBefore€the€petitionerððs€guilty€plea,€two€codefendants€were€convicted€by€a€jury€ofÏfirst€degree€murder€and€sentenced€to€death.€€òòSeeóó€òòState€v.€Hutchisonóó,€898€S.W.2d€at€164.€ÏHutchison€was€also€convicted€of€conspiracy€and€solicitation€to€commit€first€degree€murder.€€òòIdóó.€ÏAnother€codefendant€was€convicted€of€first€degree€murder€and€conspiracy€to€commit€first€degreeÏmurder€and€received€concurrent€sentences€of€life€and€ten€years,€respectively.€€òòState€v.€Gayloróó,Ï862€S.W.2d€at€549.€€At€the€codefendantsðð€trials,€Johnny€Rollyson,€also€a€codefendant,€testifiedÏthat€the€petitioner€pushed€the€victim€into€the€water€and€wiped€the€boat€with€a€rag€and€that€theÏpetitioner€had€promised€him€$12,500.00€of€the€insurance€proceeds€for€his€participation€in€theÍmurder€for€hire.€€Other€witnesses€similarly€implicated€the€petitioner€as€the€principal€actor€in€theÏmurder.€€ÌÌà@ àò òòòEVIDENTIARY€HEARINGóóÌó óà àAt€the€post„conviction€evidentiary€hearing,€the€petitioner€raised€variousÏcontentions€regarding€the€ineffective€assistance€of€counsel€and€the€validity€of€his€plea.€€HeÏtestified€that€he€was€represented€by€John€E.€Appman€and€David€Eldridge.œ× ƒ0 ××  ×›€€He€asserted€at€theÏevidentiary€hearing€that€Appman€performed€deficiently€by€giving€to€the€prosecutor€informationÏwithout€his€consent.€€He€stated€that€Appman€continuously€wanted€to€give€the€district€attorneyÏinformation,€telling€him€that€he€would€receive€the€death€penalty€if€he€did€not€provide€them€withÏsome€information.€€The€petitioner€also€said€that€after€the€information€was€conveyed€to€the€districtÏattorney€Rollyson€became€the€main€suspect€and€other€codefendants€were€arrested.€€However,Ïthe€petitioner€testified€that€he€knew€that€Appman€was€negotiating€a€plea€and€that€the€prosecutorÏhad€set€deadlines€for€furnishing€information€in€exchange€for€not€seeking€the€death€penalty.€€AfterÏAppman€gave€the€information€to€the€district€attorney,€the€state€filed€a€notice€of€intent€to€seek€theÏdeath€penalty.€ÌÌà àThe€petitioner€further€argued€that€his€trial€counsel€was€ineffective€by€waiving€hisÏpreliminary€hearing€without€his€consent.€€The€evidence€presented€at€trial€showed€that€theÍpetitioner€was€arrested€on€January€3,€1990.€€The€warrant€indicates€that€a€preliminary€hearingÏwas€scheduled€for€February€5,€1990,€but€was€rescheduled€twice€for€February€12€and€FebruaryÏ28.€€The€petitioner€testified€that€the€preliminary€hearing€set€for€February€12,€1990,€had€to€beÏpostponed€œbecause€Tom€Kimble,€an€assistant€public€defender€who€was€initially€appointed€toÏrepresent€him,›€was€not€œprepared.€€He€said€that€Kimble€told€him€about€an€offer€AppmanÏnegotiated€for€a€thirty„year€sentence€for€second€degree€murder.›œ›€€The€petitioner€said€that€he€wasÏindicted€on€the€evening€of€February€12,€following€the€rescheduling€of€the€preliminary€hearingÏand€that€he€later€learned€that€his€attorney€waived€the€preliminary€hearing.ÌÌà àThe€petitioner€also€claimed€ineffective€assistance€of€counsel€on€the€part€of€hisÏtrial€counsel€due€to€incorrect€advice€given€regarding€his€eligibility€for€release€on€parole.€€TheÏpetitioner€testified€that€after€speaking€to€his€attorneys€he€believed€that€a€life€sentence€for€firstÏdegree€murder€would€require€that€he€serve€about€ten€years€before€he€would€be€eligible€forÏparole.€€He€testified€that€he€received€a€letter€from€Appman€explaining€eligibility€for€parole.€HeÏstated€that€Eldridge€also€sent€him€a€letter€regarding€eligibility€for€parole€but€that€he€told€him€aÏdifferent€time€period€on€other€occasions.€€He€claims€on€appeal€that€he€is€not€eligible€for€paroleÏuntil€he€serves€thirty„six€years€of€his€sentence€which€can€be€brought€down€to€twenty„five€yearsÏwith€good€behavior.€€€ÌÌà àThe€letter€from€Appman€dated€February€12,€1990,€detailed€the€demands€andÏdeadlines€being€made€by€the€district€attorney€regarding€plea€negotiations.€€Appman€expressedÍthe€opinion€in€his€letter€to€the€petitioner€that€the€evidence€could€support€a€conviction€for€firstÏdegree€murder€although€he€may€have€a€defense.€€It€further€stated€that€ð ðif€[the€petitioner]€wereÏconvicted€of€even€murder€in€the€second€degree,€the€actual€time€that€[he]€would€serve€would€notÏbe€significantly€different.ðð€€In€the€next€paragraph€of€the€letter,€Appman€conveyed€that€if€theÏpetitioner€were€to€accept€a€thirty€year€sentence€for€second€degree€murder€as€a€standardÏoffender€he€would€be€eligible€for€parole€in€approximately€nine€years.€€The€letter€stated€that€goodÏbehavior€could€reduce€the€actual€time€to€be€served€to€approximately€four€to€five€years.ÌÌà àAnother€letter€from€Eldridge€dated€February€8,€1991,€confirmed€the€petitionerððsÏrefusal€to€accept€an€offer€made€by€the€district€attorney.€€The€letter€stated€that€the€district€attorneyÏoffered€to€withdraw€the€notice€of€intent€to€seek€the€death€penalty€if€the€petitioner€agreed€to€pleadÏguilty€to€first€degree€murder,€solicitation€and€conspiracy€and€to€receive€consecutive€sentences€ofÏlife€imprisonment,€twelve€years,€and€ten€years€respectively.€€In€this€letter,€Eldridge€advised€theÏpetitioner€that€there€was€substantial€proof€against€the€petitioner€and€that€based€upon€theÏevidence€presented€at€Hutchisonððs€trial,€the€petitioner€was€likely€to€be€convicted€and€receive€theÏdeath€penalty.€€The€letter€warned€the€petitioner€of€codefendantsðð€testimony€that€he€would€face€ifÏhe€chose€to€go€to€trial.€€Eldridgeððs€recommendation€in€the€letter€was€that€the€petitioner€accept€theÏoffer€of€a€life€sentence€for€which€he€would€be€required€to€serve€thirty€years€before€being€eligibleÏfor€release€on€parole.€€The€letter€further€stated€that€under€the€terms€of€the€district€attorneyððs€offerÏhe€would€be€required€to€serve€a€total€of€37.1€years€for€all€convictions€before€he€would€be€eligibleÏfor€parole€although€sentencing€credits€might€reduce€the€term€of€imprisonment.€€€ÌÌà àThe€petitioner€also€testified€that€after€being€in€jail€for€approximately€a€year€and€aÏhalf,€he€learned€from€memoranda€written€by€Eldridge€and€contained€in€his€file€that€the€districtÏattorney€had€decided€before€his€guilty€plea€not€to€seek€the€death€penalty€in€his€case.€€OneÏmemorandum€dated€May€15,€1990,€stated€that€Appman€told€Eldridge€that€the€district€attorneyÏhad€informed€him€that€the€death€penalty€would€not€be€sought€against€the€petitioner€if€he€couldÏnot€get€the€death€penalty€against€the€other€codefendants€or€if€Olen€ð ðEddieðð€Hutchison€wasÏconvicted€and€received€the€death€penalty.€€The€memorandum€stated€that€Eldridge€explained€toÏAppman€that€they€could€not€be€sure€whether€the€district€attorney€would€withdraw€the€notice€toÏseek€the€death€penalty€until€trial€because€the€exposure€to€the€death€penalty€would€be€used€inÏplea€bargaining.€€The€petitioner€testified€that€he€pled€guilty€only€because€his€attorneysÏguaranteed€a€sentence€of€death€if€he€went€to€trial€and€that€his€attorneys€told€him€to€lie€to€theÏjudge€or€he€would€be€sentenced€to€death.ÌÌà àBobbie€Cox,€the€petitionerððs€sister,€testified€that€she€heard€Appman€tell€her€cousinÏthat€the€petitioner€would€sue€him€in€about€three€years€for€incompetent€representation€and€wouldÏbe€released€within€six€to€seven€years.€€She€also€stated€that€the€petitionerððs€attorneys€took€theÏpetitioner€to€a€closed€room€twice€before€he€pled€guilty.€€ÌÌà àMillard€C.€Curnutt,€the€father€of€one€of€the€codefendants€who€received€a€sentenceÏof€death€and€an€acquaintance€of€the€petitionerððs€mother€and€sister,€testified€that€the€petitionerÍappeared€nervous€and€upset€during€the€guilty€plea€hearing€and€that€the€proceedings€wereÏinterrupted€at€least€once€in€order€to€permit€his€attorneys€to€talk€to€the€petitioner.€€On€cross„examination,€he€stated€that€the€petitioner€acted€calm€when€he€entered€his€guilty€plea.€€€ÌÌà àTom€Kimble,€an€assistant€public€defender,€testified€that€he€was€initially€appointedÏto€represent€the€petitioner.€€He€said€that€the€district€attorney€told€him€that€if€the€petitioner€agreedÏto€give€them€information€and€to€testify€against€his€codefendants,€the€death€penalty€would€not€beÏsought€and€that€they€would€ð ðtake€care€of€him€down€the€road.ðð€€The€deadline€for€giving€theÏinformation€was€extended€by€the€district€attorney€several€times.€€Kimble€stated€that€on€severalÏoccasions€he€disclosed€to€the€petitioner€evidence€that€the€district€attorney€had€against€him,€butÏthe€petitioner€refused€to€give€information,€believing€that€the€district€attorney€had€nothing€againstÏhim.€€Ñ€1ÑÇÌà àKimble€also€testified€that€the€petitioner€told€him€that€Appman€came€back€from€hisÏvacation€and€met€with€the€district€attorney€concerning€the€case€over€the€weekend.€€At€that€time,ÏAppman€told€the€district€attorney€that€Johnny€Rollyson€was€involved€with€the€murder.€€KimbleÏsaid€that€the€petitioner€was€very€angry€and€excited€that€the€information€was€given€to€the€districtÏattorney.€€He€also€stated€that€after€the€district€attorney€received€the€information€that€Rollyson€wasÏinvolved,€several€individuals€were€arrested€and€Rollyson€gave€a€statement€that€the€petitionerÏwas€the€killer.€€Kimble€stated€that€in€his€opinion€the€information€ð ðcrackedðð€the€case.€€On€cross„examination,€he€admitted€that€there€was€no€way€for€him€to€know€the€full€extent€of€the€districtÏattorneyððs€knowledge.€€Kimble€also€testified€on€redirect€examination€that€the€district€attorney€hadÏsaid€that€in€exchange€for€information€the€petitioner€would€receive€a€reasonable€bond€ofÏ$10,000.00€and€be€located€in€a€facility€apart€from€his€codefendants€if€he€could€not€make€bond.€ÏAccording€to€Kimble,€the€petitioner€did€not€receive€the€reasonable€bond€amount€and€instead,ÏRollyson,€who€was€not€represented€by€counsel,€received€the€deal€offered€by€the€district€attorney.€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€ÌÌà àSherman€Fetterman,€an€assistant€public€defender,€testified€that€he€was€awareÏthat€Appman€and€the€district€attorney€were€negotiating€a€plea.€€Fetterman€stated€that€he€knewÏthat€Appman€had€provided€the€district€attorney€information€that€Rollyson€was€involved€in€theÏmurder.€€He€explained€that€the€information€was€given€because€the€district€attorney€had€set€aÏdeadline€for€negotiations€or€else€the€death€penalty€would€be€sought€against€the€petitioner.€€ÌÌà àAt€the€end€of€the€evidentiary€hearing,€the€trial€court€found€that€trial€counselððsÏperformance€was€not€deficient€in€any€way€and€that€the€petitioner€knowingly€and€voluntarilyÏentered€his€guilty€plea.€€In€holding€that€counsel€was€not€ineffective,€the€trial€court€commendedÏthem€for€their€performance€under€the€circumstances€of€the€case.€€The€trial€court€reasoned€thatÏthe€petitionerððs€attorneys€continued€to€negotiate€for€a€lesser€sentence€until€the€entry€of€his€guiltyÏplea,€and€were€successful€in€dismissing€two€counts€and€in€obtaining€a€sentence€to€be€served€inÏMorgan€County.€€The€trial€court€also€concluded€that€the€petitioner€was€properly€advised€that€heÏwould€have€to€serve€thirty€years€before€he€would€be€eligible€for€parole€and€that€he€wouldÏprobably€be€eligible€after€twenty„five€years€when€good€behavior€is€taken€into€account.€ÌÌà àIn€its€decision€that€the€petitionerððs€guilty€plea€was€knowing€and€voluntary,€the€trialÏcourt€found€that€the€petitioner€was€aware€of€what€he€was€doing,€that€he€knew€that€he€wasÏreceiving€a€life€sentence,€and€that€he€had€been€advised€that€a€life€sentence€was€thirty€years.€€ItÏalso€stated€that€the€petitioner€understood€the€guilty€plea€proceedings€and€noted€that€theÏpetitioner€had€several€opportunities€to€notify€the€court€of€any€deficient€performance€by€trialÏcounsel.€Ìà àÌà@ àò òòòI.€€INEFFECTIVE€ASSISTANCE€OF€COUNSELóóó óÌà àIn€his€first€issue,€the€petitioner€argues€that€trial€counsel€was€ineffective€in€threeÏrespects:€(1)€by€giving€information€to€the€district€attorney€during€plea€negotiations€withoutÏobtaining€concessions€for€the€petitioner,€(2)€by€waiving€the€preliminary€hearing,€and€(3)€byÍproviding€incorrect€information€regarding€the€petitionerððs€eligibility€for€parole.€€Under€the€SixthÏAmendment,€when€a€claim€of€ineffective€assistance€of€counsel€is€made,€the€burden€is€upon€theÏpetitioner€to€show€(1)€that€counsel's€performance€was€deficient€and€(2)€that€the€deficiency€wasÏprejudicial€in€terms€of€rendering€a€reasonable€probability€that€the€result€of€the€trial€wasÏunreliable€or€the€proceedings€fundamentally€unfair.€€òòStrickland€v.€Washingtonóó,€466€U.S.€668,Ï687,€104€S.€Ct.€2052,€2064€(1984);€òòseeóó€òòLockhart€v.€Fretwellóó,€506€U.S.€364,€113€S.€Ct.€838,€842„44€(1993).€€The€òòStricklandóó€standard€has€been€applied,€as€well,€to€the€right€to€counsel€underÏArticle€I,€Section€9€of€the€Tennessee€Constitution.€òòState€v.€Melsonóó,€772€S.W.2d€417,€419€n.2Ï(Tenn.),€òòcert.óó€òòdeniedóó,€493€U.S.€874€(1989).€€ÌÌà àIn€òòBaxter€v.€Roseóó,€523€S.W.2d€930,€936€(Tenn.€1975),€our€supreme€court€decidedÏthat€attorneys€should€be€held€to€the€general€standard€of€whether€the€services€rendered€wereÏwithin€the€range€of€competence€demanded€of€attorneys€in€criminal€cases.€€Further,€the€courtÏstated€that€the€range€of€competence€was€to€be€measured€by€the€duties€and€criteria€set€forth€inÏòòBeasley€v.€United€Statesóó,€491€F.2d€687,€696€(6th€Cir.€1974)€and€òòUnited€States€v.€DeCosteróó,€487ÏF.2d€1197,€1202„04€(D.C.€Cir.€1973),€òòcert.óó€òòdeniedóó,€444€U.S.€944€(1979).€€Also,€in€reviewingÏcounsel's€conduct,€a€"fair€assessment€of€attorney€performance€requires€that€every€effort€beÏmade€to€eliminate€the€distorting€effects€of€hindsight,€to€reconstruct€the€circumstances€ofÏcounsel's€challenged€conduct,€and€to€evaluate€the€conduct€from€counsel's€perspective€at€theÏtime."€€òòStrickland€v.€Washingtonóó,€466€U.S.€at€689,€104€S.€Ct.€at€2065;€òòseeóó€òòHellard€v.€Stateóó,€629ÏS.W.2d€4,€9€(Tenn.€1982)€(counsel's€conduct€will€not€be€measured€by€"20„20€hindsight").€€Thus,Íthe€fact€that€a€particular€strategy€or€tactic€failed€or€even€hurt€the€defense€does€not,€alone,€supportÏa€claim€of€ineffective€assistance.€€Deference€is€made€to€trial€strategy€or€tactical€choices€if€theyÏare€informed€ones€based€upon€adequate€preparation.€€òòSeeóó€òòHellard€v.€Stateóó,€629€S.W.2d€at€9;ÏòòUnited€States€v.€DeCosteróó,€487€F.2d€at€1201.€€ÌÌà àAlso,€we€note€that€the€approach€to€the€issue€of€the€ineffective€assistance€ofÏcounsel€does€not€have€to€start€with€an€analysis€of€an€attorney's€conduct.€€If€prejudice€is€notÏshown,€we€need€not€seek€to€determine€the€validity€of€the€allegations€about€deficientÏperformance.€€òòStrickland€v.€Washingtonóó,€466€U.S.€at€697,€104€S.€Ct.€at€2069.ÌÌà àThe€burden€was€on€the€petitioner€in€the€trial€court€to€prove€his€allegations€thatÏwould€entitle€him€to€relief€by€a€preponderance€of€the€evidence.œ× ƒ2 ××  ×›€€òòBrooks€v.€Stateóó,€756€S.W.2dÏ288,€289€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.€1988).€€On€appeal,€we€are€bound€by€the€trial€courtððs€findings€unlessÏwe€conclude€that€the€evidence€preponderates€against€those€findings.€€òòBlack€v.€Stateóó,€794ÏS.W.2d€752,€755€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.€1990).€€In€this€respect,€the€petitioner€has€the€burden€ofÏillustrating€how€the€evidence€preponderates€against€the€judgment€entered.€€òòIdóó.€ÌÌà@ àò òòòA.€€DISCLOSURE€OF€INFORMATIONóóó ó€Ìà àFirst,€the€petitioner€claims€that€Appman€was€ineffective€during€the€pleaÏbargaining€process€in€giving€to€the€district€attorney€information€that€Johnny€Rollyson€wasÏinvolved€in€the€murder€without€obtaining€concessions€for€the€petitioner.€€The€state€argues€thatÏeven€if€trial€counselððs€performance€was€deficient,€the€petitioner€is€not€entitled€to€relief€becauseÏhe€has€failed€to€show€how€he€was€prejudiced€by€counselððs€conduct.€€We€agree€that€theÏpetitioner€has€failed€to€establish€that€he€suffered€any€prejudice.Ìà àÌà àAt€the€evidentiary€hearing,€the€petitioner€asserted€that€Appman€did€not€have€hisÏpermission€to€disclose€information€to€the€district€attorney.€€Testimony€from€Kimble€corroboratedÏthe€petitionerððs€testimony.€€However,€the€petitioner€does€not€claim€on€appeal€that€Appman€wasÏnot€authorized€to€give€the€district€attorney€information€that€Rollyson€was€involved€in€the€murderÏduring€plea€negotiations.€€Instead,€he€asserts€that€the€state€did€not€abide€by€the€agreement€asÏunderstood€by€his€attorneys.€€In€addition€to€the€petitioner,€Kimble€and€Fetterman€testified€that€theÏstate€agreed€not€to€seek€the€death€penalty€if€the€petitioner€gave€them€information€regarding€theÏmurder.Ì€€€€Ìà àThe€trial€court€found€that€the€demand€made€by€the€district€attorney€in€exchangeÏfor€not€seeking€the€death€penalty€was€that€the€petitioner€provide€them€with€information€andÏtestify€against€his€codefendants.€€However,€the€trial€court€stated€that€the€petitioner€would€notÏagree€to€be€a€witness€and€denied€that€he€even€knew€much€about€the€crime.€€Further,€theÏpetitioner€did€not€testify€at€the€trial€of€his€codefendants.€€In€its€decision,€however,€the€trial€courtÍmade€no€specific€findings€regarding€Appmanððs€authority€to€disclose€information€to€the€districtÏattorney.€ÌÌà àThe€evidence€does€not€preponderate€against€the€findings€made€by€the€trial€court.€ÏMoreover,€the€petitioner€has€failed€to€show€how€he€suffered€prejudice€by€Appmanððs€giving€ofÏinformation€to€the€district€attorney.€€The€petitioner€ultimately€pled€guilty€to€first€degree€murder€inÏthe€face€of€substantial€evidence€supporting€a€conviction€and€sentence€of€death.€€Before€theÏpetitionerððs€guilty€plea,€two€other€codefendants€had€received€a€death€sentence.€€The€trial€courtÏeven€expressed€the€opinion€that€the€petitioner€was€in€jeopardy€of€receiving€the€death€penalty.€ÏWe€note,€as€well,€that€the€petitioner€has€failed€to€show€that€Appmanððs€giving€of€information€aboutÏJohnny€Rollyson€would€bar€the€state€in€a€retrial€from€using€evidence€and€witnesses€derived€fromÏRollysonððs€cooperation.€€In€addition,€the€petitionerððs€trial€counsel€cannot€be€held€accountable€forÏthe€stateððs€failure€to€comply€with€an€agreement€not€to€seek€the€death€penalty€as€claimed€by€theÏpetitioner€on€appeal.€€For€these€reasons,€we€hold€that€the€petitioner€has€failed€to€meet€hisÏburden€of€proof.€€Ì€€€€Ìà@ àò òòòB.€€WAIVER€OF€PRELIMINARY€HEARINGóóó óÌà àThe€petitioner€also€claims€that€his€trial€counsel€was€ineffective€by€waiving€hisÏpreliminary€hearing€without€his€consent.€€He€concedes€that€there€is€no€constitutional€right€to€aÏpreliminary€hearing€but€argues€that€the€denial€of€a€preliminary€hearing€due€to€the€ineffectiveÏassistance€of€counsel€raises€the€error€to€a€constitutional€violation.€€òòSeeóó€òòMcKeldin€v.€Stateóó,€516ÍS.W.2d€82,€84€(Tenn.€1974);€òòSmith€v.€Stateóó,€757€S.W.2d€14,€17„18€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.€1988).€ÏThe€state€counters€that€the€petitioner€has€failed€to€show€how€the€alleged€deficient€performanceÏby€counsel€resulted€in€prejudice€under€the€standard€set€forth€in€òòStrickland€v.€Washingtonóó,€466ÏU.S.€at€687,€104€S.€Ct.€at€2064€(1984).€€We€agree€that€no€prejudice€has€been€shown.€ÌÌà àBecause€the€right€to€a€preliminary€hearing€is€not€a€constitutional€right,€the€lack€ofÏa€preliminary€hearing€due€to€counselððs€waiver€may€be€addressed€at€the€post„conviction€levelÏonly€as€it€relates€to€the€ineffective€assistance€of€counsel.€€òòSmithóó,€757€S.W.2d€at€17.€€However,€aÏdetermination€of€deficient€performance€is€not€required€when€a€showing€of€prejudice€is€lacking.€ÏòòStrickland€v.€Washingtonóó,€466€U.S.€at€697,€104€S.€Ct.€at€2069.€€ÌÌà àIn€this€case,€the€petitioner€has€failed€to€show€what€prejudice€he€suffered€due€toÏthe€waiver€of€the€preliminary€hearing.€€The€record€is€devoid€of€any€showing€of€prejudice€sufferedÏby€the€petitioner€as€a€result€of€the€lack€of€a€preliminary€hearing.€€€€The€record€reflects€only€theÏunsupported€claims€of€the€petitioner€that€witnesses€would€have€testified€differently€had€aÏpreliminary€hearing€been€conducted.€€Because€no€prejudice€has€been€established,€the€baldÏassertion€that€the€petitioner€was€entitled€to€a€preliminary€hearing€is€not€sufficient€to€establishÏineffective€assistance€of€counsel€when€his€counsel€waived€the€preliminary€hearing€without€theÏpetitionerððs€consent.€€€€€€€€€€€€€€ÌÌà@ àò òòòC.€€ADVICE€REGARDING€PAROLE€ELIGIBILITYóóó óÌà àThe€petitioner€also€argues€that€he€received€ineffective€assistance€of€counselÏbecause€his€trial€counsel€did€not€provide€him€with€correct€information€regarding€parole€eligibilityÏand€that€as€a€consequence€he€did€not€knowingly€and€voluntarily€enter€his€guilty€plea.€€The€stateÏdisagrees.ÌÌà àœIf›€a€petitioner€seeks€to€vacate€convictions€based€upon€his€pleas€of€guilty€on€theÏground€that€the€pleas€resulted€from€improper€legal€advice,€the€petitioner€must€show€(1)€that€theÏadvice€given€was€deficient€and€(2)€ð ðthat€there€is€a€reasonable€probability€that,€but€for€counselððsÏerrorððs,€he€would€not€have€pleaded€guilty€and€would€have€insisted€on€going€to€trial.ðð€€òòHill€v.ÏLockhartóó,€474€U.S.€52,€58„59,€106€S.€Ct.€366,€370€(1985).€€œAlso,›€ð ð[t]he€findings€of€fact€of€trialÏjudge€on€post„conviction€hearings€are€conclusive€on€appeal€unless€the€evidence€preponderatesÏagainst€the€judgment.ðð€€òòButler€v.€Stateóó,€789€S.W.2d€898,€899€(Tenn.€1990).ÌÌà àIn€this€regard,€there€is€substantive€evidence€in€the€record€to€support€the€trialÏcourtððs€determination€that€the€petitionerððs€trial€counsel€properly€advised€him€of€the€punishment€toÏwhich€he€was€exposed.€€At€the€guilty€plea€hearing,€the€trial€court€asked€the€petitioner€whether€heÏunderstood€that€he€was€pleading€guilty€to€first€degree€murder€and€that€the€sentence€for€firstÏdegree€murder€is€life€imprisonment.€€The€petitioner€responded€affirmatively.€€Although€the€trialÏcourt€told€the€petitioner€that€it€did€not€know€how€long€the€petitioner€would€be€imprisoned€if€heÏreceived€a€life€sentence,€the€petitioner€stated€that€he€understood€the€punishment€of€a€lifeÏsentence€because€his€attorneys€had€talked€to€him€about€it.€€Also,€the€letter€from€Eldridge,Íapproximately€five€months€before€the€petitioner€entered€his€œguilty›€œplea,›€focused€on€sentencingÏfor€first€degree€murder€and€correctly€informed€the€petitioner€regarding€his€eligibility€for€parole.€ÏTherefore,€the€petitionerððs€claim€that€he€received€the€ineffective€assistance€of€counsel€is€withoutÏmerit.€€Ì̜Ǜà@ àò òòòII.€€INVOLUNTARY€GUILTY€PLEAóóó óÌà àThe€petitioner€next€contends€that€he€did€not€knowingly€and€voluntarily€pleadÏguilty€because€he€was€not€properly€advised€of€his€constitutional€rights€when€he€entered€hisÏguilty€plea.€€Although€he€asserted€that€he€was€not€advised€of€his€right€to€a€preliminary€hearingÏand€to€subpoena€witnesses€at€the€evidentiary€hearing,€on€appeal€he€does€not€cite€any€specificÏomissions€made€by€the€trial€court.ÌÌà àThe€issue€concerning€invalid€guilty€pleas€is€controlled€by€òòState€v.€Nealóó,€810ÏS.W.2d€131€(Tenn.€1991)€and€òòJohnson€v.€Stateóó,€834€S.W.2d€922€(Tenn.€1992),€which€bear€uponÏthe€procedural€and€substantive€requirements€for€the€entry€of€a€guilty€plea€in€order€that€a€validÏjudgment€of€conviction€may€be€obtained€and€for€subsequent€review€of€the€validity€of€a€convictionÏbased€upon€a€guilty€plea.€€These€œcases›€œstem,€in€part,›€from€òòBoykin€v.€Alabamaóó,€395€U.S.€238,Ï243,€89€S.€Ct.€1709,€1712€(1969)€in€which€the€Supreme€Court€stated€that€entry€of€a€guilty€pleaÏeffectively€constituted€a€waiver€of€certain€consti‚tutional€rights:€€the€right€against€compulsory€self„incrimina‚tion,€the€right€to€confront€one's€accusers,€and€the€right€to€trial€by€a€jury.€€òòBoykinóó€heldÏthat€a€valid€waiver€of€such€a€right€required€the€intentional€relin‚quishment€or€abandonment€of€aÏknown€right€and€that€such€a€waiver€may€not€be€presumed€from€a€silent€record.€€òòId.óó€ÌÌà àAt€the€guilty€plea€hearing,€the€trial€court€informed€the€petitioner€that€he€wasÏwaiving€his€constitutional€rights€to€be€free€from€compulsory€self„incrimination,€to€a€trial€by€jury,Ïand€to€confront€and€cross„examine€witnesses.€€Therefore,€no€òòBoykinóó€violation€occurred.€€WeÍnote€that€the€trial€court€failed€to€follow€the€advice€mandated€by€€òòState€v.€Mackeyóó,€553€S.W.2dÏ337,€341€(Tenn.€1977)€and€òòState€v.€McClintockóó,€732€S.W.2d€268,€273€(Tenn.€1987).€€First,€theÏtrial€court€did€not€inform€the€petitioner€that€the€resulting€judgment€of€conviction€could€be€used€inÏthe€future€to€enhance€punishment€for€subsequent€convictions.€€òòSeeóó€òòMcClintockóó,€732€S.W.2d€atÏ273.€€Also,€the€petitioner€was€not€told€that€his€answers€to€the€trial€courtððs€questions€during€theÏguilty€plea€hearing€could€be€used€against€the€petitioner€if€the€petitioner€was€charged€withÏperjury.€€òòSeeóó€Tenn.€R.€Crim.€P.€11(c)(5);€òòMackeyóó,€553€S.W.2d€at€341.€€However,€failure€to€giveÏadvice€not€required€by€òòBoykinóó€is€not€proper€grounds€for€post„conviction€relief€because€theÏomission€does€not,€by€itself,€rise€to€the€level€of€constitutional€error.€€òòSeeóó€T.C.A.€ðð€40„30„105;ÏòòState€v.€Princeóó,€781€S.W.2d€846,€853€(Tenn.€1989);€òòState€v.€Nealóó,€810€S.W.2d€at€140.€ÏTherefore,€post„conviction€relief€is€not€warranted€in€this€case.€€€€€ÌÌà àThe€trial€courtððs€findings€of€fact€and€conclusions€that€the€petitionerððs€trial€counselÏperformed€competently€and€that€the€petitioner€knowingly€and€voluntarily€entered€his€guilty€pleaÏare€amply€supported€by€the€record.€€Therefore,€the€judgment€of€the€trial€court€is€affirmed.ÌÌÓÓà àà àà àà àà àà àòò€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€óóÌà àà àà àà àà àà àJoseph€M.€Tipton,€Judge€€ÌÌÌÌÌCONCUR:ÌÌÌòò€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€óóÌGary€R.€Wade,€JudgeÌÌòòÌ€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€óóÌJohn€K.€Byers,€Senior€Judgeà àÌ