ÿWPCÅ ># tUN %Í 0DÓbw@4_s‚ 0ˆŠ 0D 0JVÆ  0Tf 0^º 0@ 0hX 0rÀ D32 0|e 0†á 0g 1u÷ 0dl AQÐ B! 0D> 0D‚ D/Æ Bõ U > U *P B)z DC£ AMæ I3%|»¡\v~tvÓò˜HP LaserJet 4SiHPPCL5MS,ü,,,,,ü0nLHÎ(ÖÃ9 Z ‹6Times New Roman RegularX(ñþ$¡¡Ò°ÒÒ„°Ò- ù- 7E89<=>?ADBÓ€N§aö"3|xN(8(3I¸$¤¤Ý ƒñþ!ÝÒ°ÒÒ„°ÒÝ  Ýà ` àòòÚ  Ú0Ú  Úóó(#Ã$òòÚ  Ú0Ú  Úóó2 ÿÿ0Indent1Ô2ÔÔ3  ÔƒLevel 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 52" ÿÿ0Indent2à0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2, ÿÿ0Indent3à0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô("ÿÿ$££Ò  ÒÒ  Ò26 ÿÿ0Indent4à0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2@ ÿÿ0Indent5à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô****'ÿÿdxd2J ÿÿ0Indent6à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2T ÿÿ0Indent7à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2^ ÿÿ0Indent8à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô"#$ ÿÿ?AGMSYaioIndent0I.A.1.a.(1)(a)i)a)P ÿÿ8Mac DefaultMac DefaultÓ ` °šXÓ+,-Cþÿ<< Cÿÿ d(3¯$¢¢Ý ƒ!ÝÝ  Ý($$””ò òÚ  Ú1Ú  Úó ó..'÷ÿ dxdüÿP Pd< Œ 9p`(&Times New Roman< Œ 9p`(Arial% Line 7 d55557Border 1dd6Cþÿ << Gÿÿ ?Ý ƒ!ÝÑ  ÑÑ#€d#ÑÔ€3ÔÒ  ÒÒ „ ÒÝ  ÝÝ ƒ+"ÝÝ  ÝÔ€4ÔÔ€4ÔÓ  ÓÔ YYY ÔFILEDÔ€4XÔÌÌò òJulyÏ28,Ï1997ÌÌCecilÏCrowson,ÏJr.ÌÔ€4ôÔAppellateÏCourtÏClerkó ó Ý ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€3ÔÒ  ÒÒ „ ÒÝ  ÝÝ ƒ $Ýà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  ÝÔ€3ôÔÔ€4Ô€òòSeeóó€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðððð€40„30„202€and€„206(b)€(Supp.€1996).Ì ±Ý ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€3ÔÒ  ÒÒ „ ÒÝ  ÝÝ ƒ $Ýà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  ÝÔ€3ôÔÔ€4Ô€The€Petitioner€also€argues€that€the€trial€court€erred€in€failing€to€enter€a€preliminary€order€andÏto€direct€the€district€attorney€general€to€respond€to€the€petition.€€òòSeeóó€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðððð€40„30„207,Ï„€208.€€Because€the€petition€clearly€shows€that€it€was€filed€after€the€expiration€of€the€one„year€statute€ofÏlimitations,€we€believe€that€the€trial€court€properly€dismissed€the€petition€upon€preliminaryÏconsideration.€€òòSeeóó€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€40„30„206(b).Ì Ý ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€3ÔÒ  ÒÒ „ ÒÝ  ÝÝ ƒ $Ýà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  ÝÔ€3ôÔÔ€4Ô€òòSeeóó€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€40„30„102€(repealed€1995).ÌPtPtHHÚ(ÿáÿâùFG(üHHÚ(d'hStyl{WP}01•ÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃà Ãà Ãà Ãà Ãà ÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÐ ÐÐHHÐÐ  ÐÐ2ÐÐÿÿ¸æ$ÿÐÐHHÐÐÐÐÐÐÐÐ  ÐÐ ÐÐ ÐÑÑÑGenevaÑÑ ÑÑ € ÑÑ<Px–ÈÑÒÒÒ443!#4ÒÒ$ *$ÒÒ$*$ÒÒ ÿKK ÒÒ  Geneva ÒÒ  Geneva ÒÓ.,ÓÓÓÓ6ÓÓ ÓßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßÑGenevaÑÑ ÑÒ  h HD: Geneva ÒÒ  h HD: Geneva ÒÝ ƒ!ÝÔ . ÔÔ€3ÔÒ  ÒÒ „ ÒÝ  ÝÑ ` ÑÑ\R AØ'\ÑÔ€3ŠÔÔ€4ÔÑ\R AØ'\ÑÑ€ÑÑ7€XXdìdÈ7ÑÑ  ÑÑ  ÑÓ  Óò ò›Þ ÞÌIN€THE€COURT€OF€CRIMINAL€APPEALS€OF€TENNESSEEÌÌAT€œJACKSON›ÌÌœJUNE›€SESSION,€œ1997›ÌÌÌÓ  ÓœALBERT€HOLSTON,›à àà à)à àC.C.A.€NO.€œ02C01„9609„CR„00298›Ìà àà àà àà àà à)ó ó̜ـÙßR€786A1-j|õŸ` à. `€€@ÿRß›à àœAppellant,›à àà àà àò ò)Ìà àà àà àà àà à)Ìà àà àà àà àà à)à àœSHELBY›€COUNTYÌVS.à àà àà àà àà à)à àÌà àà àà àà àà à)à àHON.€œW.€FRED€AXLEYó ó›Ìœò òSTATE€OF€TENNESSEE,ó ó›à àò ò)à àJUDGEó óÌà àà àà àà àà àò ò)ó óÌà àœAppellee.›à àà àà àò ò)à àœó ó(Post„Conviction)ò ò›Ìó óÌÌò òÓ  ÓON€APPEAL€FROM€THE€JUDGMENT€OF€THEÌœCRIMINAL›€COURT€OF€œSHELBY€COUNTY›ó óÌÌÌòòÓ  ÓFOR€THE€APPELLANTóó:à àà àà àòòFOR€THE€APPELLEEóó:ÌÌœWAYNE€CHASTAIN›à àà àà àœJOHN€KNOX€WALKUPÌ66€Monroe,€Suite€804à àà àà àAttorney€General€and€ReporterÌMemphis,€TN€38103Ìà àà àà àà àà àà àKENNETH€W.€RUCKERÌà àà àà àà àà àà àAssistant€Attorney€GeneralÌà àà àà àà àà àà à450€James€Robertson€ParkwayÌà àà àà àà àà àà àNashville,€TN€37243„4351ÌÌà àà àà àà àà àà àJOHN€W.€PIEROTTIÌà àà àà àà àà àà àDistrict€Attorney€GeneralÌÌà àà àà àà àà àà àJOHNNY€MCFARLANDÌà àà àà àà àà àà àAssistant€District€Attorney€GeneralÌà àà àà àà àà àà àCriminal€Justice€Complex,€Suite€301Ìà àà àà àà àà àà à201€Poplar€StreetÌà àà àà àà àà àà àMemphis,€TN€38103›ÌÌÌÌOPINION€FILED€________________________ÌÌœAFFIRMED›ÌÌDAVID€H.€WELLES,€JUDGEÇò òòòÓ  ÓÔ€4°ÔOPINIONóóó óÔ€4ŠÔÌÌÌÌÓÓÓ  Óà àThe€Petitioner,€Albert€Holston,€appeals€as€of€right€pursuant€to€Rule€3€ofÏthe€Tennessee€Rules€of€Appellate€Procedure€from€the€trial€courtððs€denial€of€hisÏpetition€for€post„conviction€relief.€€œHe€filed›€a€petition€for€post„conviction€relief€onÏJuly€12,€1996.€€On€July€30,€1996,€the€trial€court€dismissed€the€petition€withoutÏconducting€an€evidentiary€hearing,€finding€that€it€was€barred€by€the€statute€ofÏlimitations.œ× ƒ9 ××  ×›€€We€affirm€the€judgment€of€the€trial€court.ÌÌà àOn€April€30,€1992,€the€Petitioner€was€convicted€by€a€Shelby€County€juryÏof€aggravated€rape€and€was€sentenced€to€eighteen€years€imprisonment.€€AÏpanel€of€this€Court€affirmed€his€conviction€on€September€15,€1993.€€òòSeeóó€òòState€v.ÏAlbert€B.€Holstonóó,€C.C.A.€No.€02C01„9210„CR„00247,€Shelby€County€(Tenn.ÏCrim.€App.,€Jackson,€Sept.€15,€1993).€€It€appears€from€the€record€that€theÏPetitioner€did€not€seek€permission€to€appeal€to€our€supreme€court.ÌÌà àOn€July€12,€1996,€the€Petitioner€filed€a€petition€for€post„conviction€reliefÏwhich€is€the€subject€of€the€case€òòsubóó€òòjudiceóó.€€In€the€petition,€he€argued€that€hisÏtrial€counsel€rendered€ineffective€assistance€both€prior€to€trial€and€at€trial.€€HeÍalso€argued€that€the€trial€courtððs€intimidating€demeanor€contributed€to€hisÏcounselððs€deficient€representation,€thereby€violating€his€due€process€rights.€€TheÏtrial€court€found€that€the€petition€was€barred€by€the€statute€of€limitations€andÏdismissed€it€without€conducting€an€evidentiary€hearing.€€It€is€from€the€trial€courtððsÏorder€of€dismissal€that€the€Petitioner€appeals,€raising€the€following€four€issues€forÏour€consideration:ÌÒ  ÒÒ  ÒÓÓ1)€œThat›€the€trial€court€erred€in€finding€that€his€petition€for€post„convictionÏrelief€was€barred€by€the€statute€of€limitations;Ì2)€that€the€one„year€statute€of€limitations€violates€due€process;Ì3)€that€the€one„year€statute€of€limitations€violates€the€TennesseeÏConstitutionððs€prohibition€against€the€retrospective€impairment€ofÏcontractual€obligations;€and,Ì4)€that€the€new€Post„Conviction€Procedure€Actððs€provision€eliminatingÏtolling€of€the€statute€of€limitations€is€in€contravention€of€Tennessee€caseÏlaw€and€violates€due€process.ÌÓÓÒ ° ÒÒ  ÒÒ ° ÒÒ ° ÒÌà àThe€Petitioner€first€contends€that€the€trial€court€erred€in€finding€that€his€petitionÏfor€post„conviction€relief€was€barred€by€the€statute€of€limitations.€€At€the€time€theÏPetitionerððs€convictions€became€final,€the€statute€of€limitations€applicable€to€post„conviction€proceedings€was€three€years.€€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€40„30„102€(repealedÏ1995).€€The€three„year€statute€of€limitations€was€subsequently€shortened€to€oneÏyear€by€the€new€Post„Conviction€Procedure€Act,€which€took€effect€on€May€10,Ï1995.€€òòSeeóó€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€40„30„201€òòetóó€òòseq.óó€(Supp.€1996).€€At€the€time€theÏnew€Act€took€effect,€the€previous€three„year€statute€of€limitations€had€not€expired€forÏthe€Petitioner.ÌÌà àOf€course,€the€new€Post„Conviction€Procedure€Act€governs€this€petition€andÏall€petitions€filed€after€May€10,€1995.€€òòSeeóó€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€40„30„201€òòet€seq.óóÏ(Supp.€1996).€€This€Act€provides,€in€pertinent€part,€that€ð ðnotwithstanding€any€otherÏprovision€of€this€part€to€the€contrary,€any€person€having€ground€for€relief€recognizedÏunder€this€part€shall€have€at€least€one€(1)€year€from€May€10,€1995,€to€file€a€petitionÏor€a€motion€to€reopen€a€petition€under€this€part.ðð€€Compilerððs€Notes€to€Tenn.€CodeÏAnn.€ðð€40„30„201€(Supp.€1996)€(referring€to€Acts€1995,€ch.€207,€ðð€3).€€Because€theÏprevious€three„year€statute€of€limitations€had€not€expired€for€the€Petitioner€at€the€timeÏthe€new€Act€took€effect,€his€right€to€petition€for€post„conviction€relief€survived€underÏthe€new€Act.€€œòòSeeóó€òòBetsy€Jane€Pendergrast€v.€Stateóó,€C.C.A.€No.€01C01„9607„CC„00289,€Rutherford€County€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.,€Nashville,€May€16,€1997);€òòcfóó.›€òòDoyleÏCarter€v.€Stateóó,€C.C.A.€No.€01C01„9511„CC„00398,€Davidson€County€(Tenn.€Crim.ÏApp.,€Nashville,€Feb.€12,€1997);€òòEric€C.€Pendleton€v.€Stateóó,€C.C.A.€No.€01C01„9604„CR„00158,€Davidson€County€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.,€Nashville,€Feb.€12,€1997);ÏòòWallace€Butler€v.€Ricky€Bell,€Wardenóó,€C.C.A.€No.€02C01„9510„CC„00297,€FayetteÏCounty€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.,€Jackson,€Nov.€19,€1996);€òòJohnny€L.€Butler€v.€Stateóó,ÏC.C.A.€No.€02C01„9509„CR„00289,€Shelby€County€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.,€Jackson,ÏDec.€2,€1996).ÌÌà àAs€a€result,€the€Petitioner€had€one€year€from€the€effective€date€of€the€newÏAct,€May€10,€1995,€to€file€for€post„conviction€relief.€€òòSeeóó€Compilerððs€Notes€to€Tenn.ÏCode€Ann.€ðð€40„30„201€(Supp.€1996)€(referring€to€Acts€1995,€ch.€207,€ðð€3);€Tenn.ÏCode€Ann.€ðð€40„30„202(a)€(Supp.€1996).€€He€filed€his€petition€for€post„convictionÏrelief€on€July€12,€1996,€œa€few€weeks€after›€the€expiration€of€the€one„year€period.€ÏThe€Petitioner€has€not€alleged€that€œhis€claims€fit›€within€one€of€the€enumeratedÏexceptions€to€the€one„year€statute€of€limitations.€€òòSeeóó€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€œð𛀜40„30„202(b),(c)›€(Supp.€1996).€€Accordingly,€we€conclude€that€the€trial€court€correctly€foundÏthat€the€petition€was€barred€by€the€statute€of€limitations.œ× ƒ: ××  ×›ÌÌà àAs€his€second€issue,€the€Petitioner€argues€in€the€alternative€that€if€the€trialÏcourt€correctly€dismissed€the€petition€as€having€been€time„barred,€the€new€ActððsÏone„year€statute€of€limitations€violates€due€process€guarantees.€€òòSeeóó€U.S.€Const.Ïamend.€XIV,€ðð€1;€Tenn.€Const.€art.€I,€ðð€8.€€The€State,€on€the€other€hand,€argues€thatÏit€was€within€the€legislatureððs€power€to€enact€the€one„year€statute€of€limitations€andÏthat€the€statute€does€not€violate€due€process€because€it€provides€a€reasonableÏperiod€of€time€in€which€post„conviction€claims€can€be€asserted.ÌÌà àIt€is€well„established€that€the€identification€of€the€precise€dictates€of€dueÏprocess€requires€consideration€of€both€the€governmental€interests€involved€and€theÏprivate€interests€affected€by€the€official€action.€€òòBurford€v.€Stateóó,€845€S.W.2d€204,Ï207€(Tenn.€1992)€(citing€òòFusari€v.€Steinbergóó,€419€U.S.€379,€389,€95€S.Ct.€533,€539,Ï42€L.Ed.2d€521,€529€(1975)).€€With€regard€to€post„conviction€proceedings,€theÏprivate€interest€at€stake€is€a€prisonerððs€opportunity€to€attack€his€or€her€convictionÏand€incarceration€on€the€grounds€that€he€or€she€was€deprived€of€a€constitutionalÏright€during€the€conviction€process.€€òòId.óó€€The€governmental€interest€represented€byÏthe€statute€of€limitations€is€the€prevention€of€the€litigation€of€stale€and€groundlessÏclaims,€with€œthe€accompanying›€cost.€€òòId.óóÌÌà àFurthermore,€although€freedom€from€bodily€restraint€and€punishment€by€theÏState€without€due€process€of€law€is€a€fundamental€right,€it€is€clear€that€states€haveÏno€constitutional€duty€to€provide€post„conviction€relief€procedures.€€òòId.óó€(citationsÏomitted).€€Thus,€as€our€supreme€court€held€in€òòBurfordóó,€the€opportunity€to€œcollaterallyÏassert€constitutional›€violations€which€occurred€during€the€conviction€process€is€not€aÏfundamental€right€entitled€to€heightened€due€process€protection.€€òòId.óóÌÌà àIt€is€also€clear€that€the€State€has€a€legitimate€interest€in€preventing€theÏlitigation€of€stale€or€fraudulent€claims.€€òòId.óó€at€208€(citing€òòJimenez€v.€Weinbergeróó,€417ÏU.S.€628,€636,€94€S.Ct.€2496,€2501,€41€L.Ed.2d€363,€370€(1974)).€€The€State€mayÍtherefore€erect€reasonable€procedural€requirements€for€triggering€the€right€to€anÏadjudication,€such€as€statutes€of€limitations,€and€may€terminate€a€claim€for€failure€toÏcomply€with€a€reasonable€procedural€rule€without€violating€due€process€rights.€€òòId.óóÏ(citing€òòLogan€v.€Zimmerman€Brush€Co.óó,€455€U.S.€422,€437,€102€S.Ct.€1148,€1158,Ï71€L.Ed.2d€265,€279€(1982)).€€Before€a€state€may€terminate€a€claim€for€failure€toÏcomply€with€procedural€requirements€such€as€statutes€of€limitations,€however,€dueÏprocess€requires€that€potential€litigants€be€provided€an€opportunity€for€theÏpresentation€of€claims€at€a€meaningful€time€and€in€a€meaningful€manner.€€òòId.óóÌÌà àAs€was€the€case€in€œòòBurfordóó,›€when€our€supreme€court€considered€theÏconstitutionality€of€the€three„year€statute€of€limitations,€the€question€before€us€isÏð ðwhether€the€Stateððs€policy€reflected€in€the€statute€affords€a€fair€and€reasonableÏopportunity€for€...€bringing€...€suit.ðð€€òòId.óó€(quoting€òòPickett€v.€Brownóó,€638€S.W.2d€369,Ï376€(Tenn.€1982),€òòrevððd€on€equal€protection€groundsóó,€462€U.S.€1,€103€S.Ct.€2199,Ï76€L.Ed.2d€372€(1983)).€€The€test€is€whether€the€time€period€provides€a€petitioner€aÏreasonable€opportunity€to€have€the€claimed€issue€heard€and€determined.€€òòId.óó€(citingÏòòMichel€v.€Louisianaóó,€350€U.S.€91,€93,€76€S.Ct.€158,€160,€100€L.Ed.2d€83,€89Ï(1955)).€€Having€considered€the€private€and€governmental€interests€at€stake,€weÏconclude€that€the€one„year€statute€of€limitations€contained€in€Tennessee€CodeÏAnnotated€section€40„30„202€provides€a€reasonable€opportunity€for€theÏpresentation€of€post„conviction€claims.€€òòCf.óó€òòBurfordóó,€845€S.W.2d€at€208.€ÍAccordingly,€we€believe€that€the€one„year€statute€of€limitations€on€petitions€for€post„conviction€relief€does€not€violate€the€due€process€guarantees€of€the€United€StatesÏand€Tennessee€Constitutions.ÌÌà àMoreover,€we€do€not€believe€that€the€application€of€the€one„year€statute€ofÏlimitations€in€the€present€case€violated€this€Petitionerððs€due€process€rights.€€As€weÏstated€above,€the€Petitionerððs€conviction€became€final€on€September€15,€1993.€€AtÏthat€time,€the€previous€three„year€statute€of€limitations€applied€to€the€Petitioner,Ïmeaning€that€he€would€ordinarily€have€had€until€September€15,€1996€to€file€for€post„conviction€relief.€€The€new€Post„Conviction€Procedure€Act€took€effect€on€May€10,Ï1995,€and€governed€all€petitions€filed€after€that€date,€including€the€Petitionerððs,€whichÏwas€filed€on€July€12,€1996.€€The€new€Act€had€the€effect€of€shortening€the€statutoryÏperiod€applicable€to€the€Petitioner€from€September€of€1996€to€May€of€1996.€€TheÏPetitionerððs€claims€regarding€his€trial€counselððs€representation€and€the€trial€courtððsÏdemeanor€were€readily€apparent€as€of€the€conclusion€of€his€trial€and€direct€œappeal.›€ÏWe€can€only€conclude€that€the€application€of€the€one„year€statute€of€limitations€didÏnot€violate€the€Petitionerððs€due€process€rights.€€The€Petitionerððs€second€issueÏtherefore€lacks€merit.ÌÌà àAs€his€third€issue,€the€Petitioner€contends€that€the€one„year€statute€ofÏlimitations€impairs€contractual€obligations€in€violation€Article€I,€section€20€of€theÍTennessee€Constitution.€€That€constitutional€provision€provides€that€ð ðnoÏretrospective€law,€or€law€impairing€the€obligations€of€contracts,€shall€be€made.ðð€ÏTenn.€Const.€art.€I,€ðð€20.€€The€provision€has€been€interpreted€to€œmean›€that€ð ðnoÏretrospective€law€which€impairs€the€obligation€of€contracts,€or€any€other€law€whichÏimpairs€their€obligation,€shall€be€made.ðð€€òòHamilton€County€v.€Gerlachóó,€176€Tenn.Ï288,€140€S.W.2d€œ1084,€1085›€œ(1940)€(citations€omitted).›€€The€Petitioner€claims€thatÏthe€passage€of€a€law€constitutes€ð ða€contract€between€the€Legislature€and€itsÏconstituency.ðð€€He€asserts€that€the€passage€of€the€previous€three„year€statute€ofÏlimitations€on€petitions€for€post„conviction€reliefœ× ƒ; ××  ×›€conferred€on€prisoners€the€right€toÏchallenge€their€convictions€within€a€three„year€period.€€The€Petitioner€argues€that€theÏsubsequent€passage€of€the€new€Post„Conviction€Procedure€Act€with€its€one„yearÏstatute€of€limitations,€thereby€curtailing€the€previous€three„year€period,€wasÏtantamount€to€an€impairment€of€a€contract.ÌÌà àIn€our€view,€the€Petitioner€is€once€again€arguing€that€the€one„year€statute€ofÏlimitations€does€not€provide€sufficient€time€in€which€to€file€for€post„conviction€relief.€ÏAs€we€explained€during€our€discussion€of€the€second€issue€on€appeal,€œwe›€believeÏthat€the€one„year€statute€of€limitations€does€provide€a€reasonable€time€period€for€theÏfiling€of€post„conviction€petitions.€€Furthermore,€although€the€new€Act€shortens€theÍprevious€statute€of€limitations,€it€does€provide€those€prisoners€who€were€still€withinÏthe€prior€three„year€statutory€period,€such€as€the€Petitioner€in€the€case€at€bar,€aÏreasonable€opportunity€to€file€for€post„conviction€relief€after€the€effective€date€of€theÏnew€one„year€statutory€period.€€òòSeeóó€Compilerððs€Notes€to€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€40„30„201€(Supp.€1996)€(referring€to€Acts€1995,€ch.€207,€ðð€3);€òòcf.óó€òòPacific€œEastern›€Corp.€v.ÏGulf€Lite€Holding€Co.óó,€902€S.W.2d€œ946,€956›€(Tenn.€œ›€App.€œ1995)€(citations€omitted).›€ÏAccordingly,€this€issue€lacks€merit.ÌÌà àThe€Petitionerððs€fourth€and€final€contention€on€appeal€is€another€challenge€toÏthe€constitutionality€of€the€new€Post„Conviction€Procedure€Act.€€The€PetitionerÏfocuses€on€language€in€the€new€Act€which€provides€that€the€one„year€ð ðstatute€ofÏlimitations€shall€not€be€tolled€for€any€reason,€including€any€tolling€or€saving€provisionÏotherwise€available€at€law€or€equity.ðð€€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€40„30„202(a)€(Supp.Ï1996).€€He€argues€that€the€elimination€of€tolling€in€the€new€Act€is€in€directÏcontravention€of€a€decision€rendered€by€our€supreme€court,€òòWatkins€v.€Stateóó,€903ÏS.W.2d€302€(Tenn.€1995),€and€is€therefore€violative€of€due€process.ÌÌà àIn€òòWatkinsóó,€our€supreme€court€held€that€the€tolling€provision€codified€atÏTennessee€Code€Annotated€section€28„1„106€was€applicable€to€post„convictionÏproceedings€governed€by€the€previous€Post„Conviction€Procedure€Act.€€òòSeeóóÍòòWatkinsóó,€903€S.W.2d€at€305;€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€40„30„101€òòetóó€òòseq.óó€(repealedÏ1995).€€That€tolling€provision€reads€as€follows:ÌÒ ° ÒÒ  ÒÒ  ÒÒ  ÒÓÓà àò òPersons€under€disability€on€accrual€of€right.ó 󀄄€If€the€personÏentitled€to€commence€an€action€is,€at€the€time€the€cause€of€actionÏaccrued,€either€within€the€age€of€eighteen€(18)€years,€or€of€unsoundÏmind,€such€person,€or€his€representatives€and€privies,€as€the€caseÏmay€be,€may€commence€the€action,€after€the€removal€of€suchÏdisability,€within€the€time€of€limitation€for€the€particular€cause€of€action,Ïunless€it€exceed€three€(3)€years,€and€in€that€case€within€three€(3)Ïyears€from€the€removal€of€such€disability.ÌÌÓÓÒ ° ÒÒ  ÒÒ ° ÒÒ ° ÒTenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€28„1„106€(1980).€€òòWatkinsóó€involved€a€petitioner€who€wasÏmentally€incompetent€for€a€period€of€time€during€the€running€of€the€previous€three„year€statute€of€limitations€on€post„conviction€petitions.€€òòWatkinsóó,€903€S.W.2d€at€303.€ÏA€panel€of€this€Court€has€applied€the€òòWatkinsóó€reasoning€to€a€case€involving€aÏpetitioner€who€filed€for€post„conviction€relief€more€than€three€years€after€his€convictionÏhad€become€final€but€within€three€years€of€his€turning€eighteen€years€of€age,Ïholding€that€the€previous€three„year€statute€of€limitations€was€tolled€while€theÏpetitioner€was€a€minor.€€òòState€v.€David€Wayne€Brittóó,€C.C.A.€No.€02C01„9410„CC„00234,€Hardeman€County€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.,€Jackson,€July€26,€1995).ÌÌà àFor€purposes€of€the€case€òòsubóó€òòjudiceóó,€even€if€we€were€to€conclude€that€theÏlanguage€of€Tennessee€Code€Annotated€section€40„30„202(a)€eliminated€the€tollingÏprovision€codified€at€Tennessee€Code€Annotated€section€28„1„106€and€that€theÏelimination€of€the€tolling€provision€violated€due€process€guarantees,€we€do€notÍbelieve€that€the€Petitioner€would€be€entitled€to€œseek€post„conviction›€relief.€€TheÏPetitioner€does€not€allege€that€he€was€a€minor€or€mentally€incompetent€during€theÏrunning€of€the€one„year€statute€of€limitations€applicable€to€his€case.€Furthermore,€theÏnew€Post„Conviction€Procedure€Act€does€contain€a€severability€clause.€€1995ÏTenn.€Pub.€Acts€ch.€207,€ðð€2.€€As€a€result,€if€we€concluded€that€the€elimination€ofÏthe€tolling€provision€was€unconstitutional,€the€otherwise€constitutional€one„yearÏstatute€of€limitations€could€œapparently€be›€given€effect€without€that€language€andÏwould,€therefore,€continue€to€apply€to€the€Petitioner.€€Because€the€Petitioner€has€notÏalleged€that€he€was€a€minor€or€mentally€incompetent€during€the€running€of€theÏstatute€of€limitations,€the€tolling€provision€codified€at€Tennessee€Code€œAnnotatedÏsection€28„1„106›€has€no€application€in€the€present€case€and€would€not€alter€theÏstatutory€period€for€the€Petitioner.€€Accordingly,€we€can€only€conclude€that€the€fourthÏcontention€is€without€merit.ÌÌà àFor€the€reasons€set€forth€in€the€discussion€above,€we€conclude€that€the€trialÏcourt€did€not€err€in€dismissing€the€petition€for€post„conviction€relief.€€We€also€concludeÏthat€the€Petitionerððs€challenges€to€the€constitutionality€of€the€one„year€statute€ofÏlimitations€on€petitions€for€post„conviction€relief€lack€merit.€€The€judgment€of€the€trialÏcourt€is€therefore€affirmed.Ìà àà àà àà àà àÌÌÌÓÓÓ  Óà àà àà àà àà à____________________________________Ìà àà àà àà àà àDAVID€H.€WELLES,€JUDGEÌÌÌÌCONCUR:ÌÌÌÌ___________________________________ÌPAUL€G.€SUMMERS,€JUDGEÌÌÌÌ___________________________________ÌJOE€G.€RILEY,€JUDGE