WPCu 9# .UN9 % 0Dbw@4-< 0D 0D 0J 0TZ 0^ 0h  0rt 0|b 0( 0 1u> 0@ D3 0d& AQ B 0D 0D< D/ B U> U * B)4 DC] AM I 6Nv~$vHP LaserJet 4SiHPPCL5MS,,,,,,0nLH(9 Z 6Times New Roman RegularX($- - bdDefDghDijDkӀwa"3|xw(8(3I$ !   `   0  (#$  0  2 0Indent123  2" 0Indent20 23  2, 0Indent30 0 23  26 0Indent40 0 0 23  2@ 0Indent50 0 0 0 23  2J 0Indent60 0 0 0 0 23  ԃLevel 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 52T 0Indent70 0 0 0 0 0 23  2^ 0Indent80 0 0 0 0 0 0 23   ?AGMSYaioIndent0I.A.1.a.(1)(a)i)a)("$    ****'dxdP 8Mac DefaultMac Default ` X+ ,-C<< C d(3$ !  ($$   1  ..' dxdP Pd<  9p`(&Times New Roman<  9p`(Arial% Line 7 d11117Border 1dd 2C << G ? !  #d#/     +"  00   YYY FILED0X July28,1997CecilCrowson,Jr.0AppellateCourtClerk   !#d#/      $       /0ԀSeeTenn.CodeAnn.4030206(b)(Supp.1996).  !#d#/      $       /0ԀInhisbrief,thePetitionerclaimsthatheoriginallymailedhispetitionforpostconvictionrelieffromtheLouisianaStatePenitentiarytotheShelbyCountyCourtClerkonMarch2,1989.Infact,thepetitionfiledonApril10,1996,isapparentlyacopyoftheoriginalpetitionreferredtobythePetitionerandcontainsacertificateofserviceandanaffidavitofindigencydatedinMarchandFebruaryof1989,respectively.Thereisnothingintherecordwhichindicatesthattheoriginalpetitionallegedlymailedin1989waseverreceivedorfiledbytheShelbyCountyCourtClerk.Instead,therecordclearlyreflectsthatthepetitionactuallyconsideredbythetrialcourtinthecaseatbarwasmarkedashavingbeenfiledonApril10,1996.PtPtHH(FG(HH(d'hStyl{WP}01  HH  2$HH  Geneva  <Px443!#4$*$$*$ KK  Geneva  Geneva .,6 Geneva   h HD: Geneva  h HD: Geneva ! . /     ` \RA'\/0\RA'\7XXdd7      INTHECOURTOFCRIMINALAPPEALSOFTENNESSEEATJACKSON̜R342A1-j| ` . `@RJUNESESSION,1997  ӜWALTERE.INGRAM,  ) C.C.A.NO.02C019608CR00258     )  Appellant,   )     )     ) SHELBYCOUNTYVS.     )      ) HON.JAMESC.BEASLEY,JR. ̜ STATEOFTENNESSEE,  ) JUDGE      )  Appellee.   ) (PostConviction)   ONAPPEALFROMTHEJUDGMENTOFTHE̜CRIMINALCOURTOFSHELBYCOUNTY   FORTHEAPPELLANT:   FORTHEAPPELLEE:̜WALTERE.INGRAM,PROSE JOHNKNOXWALKUPP.O.Box1050    AttorneyGeneralandReporterHenning,TN38041      CLINTONJ.MORGAN      AssistantAttorneyGeneral      450JamesRobertsonParkway      Nashville,TN372430493      JOHNW.PIEROTTI      DistrictAttorneyGeneral      LEEV.COFFEE      AssistantDistrictAttorneyGeneral      CriminalJusticeComplex,Suite301      201PoplarStreet      Memphis,TN38103OPINIONFILED________________________̜AFFIRMEDDAVIDH.WELLES,JUDGE   0OPINION 0   ThePetitioner,WalterE.Ingram,appealsasofrightpursuanttoRule3oftheTennesseeRulesofAppellateProcedurefromthetrialcourtsdenialofhispetitionforpostconvictionrelief.ThePetitionerfiledaprosepetitionforpostconvictionreliefonApril10,1996.OnApril25,1996,thetrialcourtdismissedthepetitionwithoutconductinganevidentiaryhearing,findingthatitwasbarredbythestatuteoflimitations. 5   כWeaffirmthejudgmentofthetrialcourt. Therecordrevealsthatfrom1982to1984,thePetitioneramassedsevenconvictionsforrobberywithadeadlyweaponandoneconvictionforseconddegreemurder.Atabifurcatedtrialononeofthechargesforrobberywithadeadlyweapon,thePetitionerwasalsofoundtobeanhabitualcriminalandwassentencedtolifeimprisonment.Althoughtherecordissomewhatunclear,itappearsthatthehabitualcriminalconvictionoccurredinSeptemberorNovemberof1983.BoththeconvictionandsentencewereaffirmedupondirectappealtothisCourt.SeeStatev.WalterEugeneIngram,C.C.A.No.147,ShelbyCounty(Tenn.Crim.App.,Jackson,June26,1985). AccordingtothePetitioner,heescapedfromtheTennesseeDepartmentofCorrectionin1987.HewascapturedinLouisianain1988andapparentlywasconvictedofattemptedmurderthere.AfterbeingimprisonedintheLouisianaStatePenitentiaryforaperiodoftime,hewasreturnedtotheTennesseeDepartmentofCorrectioninFebruaryof1996. ThepetitionforpostconvictionreliefconsideredbythetrialcourtinthecasesubjudicewasfiledonApril10,1996. 6   ׀ThepetitionallegedthatseveralofthepriorconvictionsusedtoformthebasisforthePetitionershabitualcriminalconvictionwereinvalid.Thechallengedconvictionswereallbasedonguiltypleas.ThePetitionerassertedthatthetrialcourtdidnotadvisehimofhisconstitutionalrightsbeforehepleadedguilty,therebyrenderinghisguiltypleasinvoluntary.Becausetheconvictionsusedtoformthebasisforthehabitualcriminalfindingwereallegedlybasedoninvoluntaryguiltypleas,thePetitonerarguedthathishabitualcriminalconvictionandaccompanyinglifesentencewereinvalid.Thetrialcourtfoundthatthepetitionwasbarredbythestatuteoflimitationsanddismisseditwithoutconductinganevidentiaryhearing.ItisfromthetrialcourtsorderofdismissalthatthePetitionerappeals. Onappeal,thePetitionercontendsthatthetrialcourterredinfindingthathispetitionforpostconvictionreliefwasbarredbythestatuteoflimitations.AtthetimethePetitionersconvictionsbecamefinal,aprisonercouldpetitionforpostconvictionrelief atanytimeafterheha[d]exhaustedhisappellateremediesandbeforethesentenceha[d]expiredorha[d]beenfullysatisfied.Tenn.CodeAnn.4030102(1982).In1986,thissectionwasamendedtoprovidethata prisonerincustodyundersentenceofacourtofthisstatemustpetitionforpostconvictionreliefunderthischapterwithinthree(3)yearsofthedateofthefinalactionofthehigheststateappellatecourttowhichanappealistakenorconsiderationofsuchpetitionshallbebarred.Tenn.Code.Ann.4030102(1990).ThethreeyearlimitationsperiodbegantorunforthePetitionerontheeffectivedateoftheamendedprovision,July1,1986.SeeStatev.Mullins,767S.W.2d668,669(Tenn.Crim.App.1988).TheexpirationofthethreeyearstatuteoflimitationsinthePetitionerscaseoccurredonJuly1,1989.Aswestatedabove,thepetitionconsideredbythetrialcourtinthepresentcasewasnotfileduntilApril10,1996. Ofcourse,thenewPostConvictionProcedureActgovernsthispetitionandallpetitionsfiledafterMay10,1995.SeeTenn.CodeAnn.4030201etseq.(Supp.1996).ThisActprovides,inpertinentpart,that notwithstandinganyotherprovisionofthisparttothecontrary,anypersonhavinggroundforreliefrecognizedunderthispartshallhaveatleastone(1)yearfromMay10,1995,tofileapetitionoramotiontoreopenapetitionunderthispart.CompilersNotestoTenn.CodeAnn.4030201(Supp.1996)(referringtoActs1995,ch.207,3).AnotherpanelofthisCourthasheld,withonememberdissenting,thatthenewPostConvictionProcedureActprovides aoneyearwindowduringwhicheachandeverydefendantmayfileapetition.SeeArnoldCarterv.State,C.C.A.No.03C019509CC00270,MonroeCounty(Tenn.Crim.App.,Knoxville,July11,1996),perm.toappealgranted(Tenn.1996).TheCartercourtheldthattheoneyearwindowisavailableevenifthepetitionwouldhavebeenlongagobarredbythethreeyearstatuteprovidedunderthepreviousact. OtherpanelsofthisCourthavefollowedthereasoningofthedissentinCarterandheldthatthe1995ActdidnotprovidepreviouslybarredpetitionerswithanewoneyearperiodfromMay10,1995duringwhichtheycouldpetitionforpostconvictionrelief.SeeDoyleCarterv.State,C.C.A.No.01C019511CC00398,DavidsonCounty(Tenn.Crim.App.,Nashville,Feb.12,1997);EricC.Pendletonv.State,C.C.A.No.01C019604CR00158,DavidsonCounty(Tenn.Crim.App.,Nashville,Feb.12,1997);WallaceButlerv.RickyBell,Warden,C.C.A.No.02C019510CC00297,FayetteCounty(Tenn.Crim.App.,Jackson,Nov.19,1996);JohnnyL.Butlerv.State,C.C.A.No.02C019509CR00289,ShelbyCounty(Tenn.Crim.App.,Jackson,Dec.2,1996);StephenϜKoprowskiv.State,C.C.A.No.03C019511CC00365,AndersonCounty(Tenn.Crim.App.,Knoxville,Jan.28,1997);SteveKoprowskiv.State,C.C.A.No.03C019511CR00378,KnoxCounty(Tenn.Crim.App.,Knoxville,Jan.28,1997). WechoosetofollowthereasoningsetforthintheCarterdissent.Inourview,theoneyearwindowprovidedbythelanguageofthenewActisapplicableonlytothosepetitionerswhowerenotalreadybarredbythepreviousstatuteoflimitationsatthetimethenewActtookeffect.Thus,ifthepreviousthreeyearstatuteoflimitationshadnotexpiredonapetitioneratthetimethenewActtookeffect,heorshewouldhaveoneyearfromtheeffectivedateofthestatute,May10,1995,tofileforpostconvictionrelief.ThisapproachisinaccordancewiththegeneraltenoroftheentireActaswellasitslegislativehistory. Inthecasesubjudice,therecordindicatesthatthePetitionershabitualcriminalconvictionbecamefinalinJuneof1985.ThepreviousthreeyearstatuteoflimitationsbegantorunforthePetitioneronJuly1,1986andexpiredonJuly1,1989.Asaresult,thePetitionerwasalreadybarredbythepreviousstatuteoflimitationsonthedatethenewActtookeffect,May10,1995.Inaddition,thePetitionerhasnotdemonstratedthathefitswithinanexceptiontothestatuteoflimitations.SeeTenn.CodeAnn.𛀜4030202(b),(c)(Supp.1996).Accordingly,thetrialcourtdidnoterrinfindingthatthepetitionwasbarredbythestatuteoflimitations. Forthereasonssetforthinthediscussionabove,weconcludethatthetrialcourtdidnoterrindismissingthepetitionforpostconvictionrelief.Wethereforeaffirmthejudgmentofthetrialcourt.             ____________________________________     DAVIDH.WELLES,JUDGECONCUR:___________________________________PAULG.SUMMERS,JUDGE___________________________________JOEG.RILEY,JUDGE