ÿWPCš% ?# ‚U> %Ë 0 ÑUBÚ40n­?U:ìw@& 0Mf 0D³ 0J÷ 0TA • D3 0^Ð 0h. 0r– 0| 0†„ 0@ BJ 0g 1u÷ 0dl AQÐ Æ! 0Dç 0D+ D/o BžU6»U.ñU *B)IDCr AMµÉŸhñv|gfãv~IvÓǘHP LaserJet 4SiHPPCL5MS,ü,,,,,ü0nLHÎ<èÀ( 9Z &Courier RegularX(á…/$¡¡Ò°ÒÒX°ÒÑ  ÑÑ7€+ÖXXdÈ XXdæ7ÑÑ  ÑÓ  ÓÓiU°X` ¸ hÀpÈ xÐ (#€%Ø'0*ˆ,à.813è5@8˜:ð<H? A°œXiÓ<þ6X9`(*Courier 12pt10cpiäzz!3|xû«<þ6X9`(*Courier 12pt10cpiXXxþ6X@ÉJQX@,†r‰AZ‹"Arial Regular çèéêëìEíîDïðÓ€(ý(3&j$¤¤Ý ƒ…/!ÝÒ°ÒÒX°ÒÑ  ÑÑ7€»óXXdÈdÈ7ÑÑ  ÑÓ  ÓÓiU°X` ¸ hÀpÈ xÐ (#€%Ø'0*ˆ,à.813è5@8˜:ð<H? A°œXiÓÝ  Ýà ¸ àòòÚ  Ú0Ú  Úóó(#Ã$òòÚ  Ú0Ú  Úóó2 ÿÿ0Indent1Ô2ÔÔ3  Ô2" ÿÿ0Indent2à0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô!!!!'ÿÿdxd2, ÿÿ0Indent3à0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô26 ÿÿ0Indent4à0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2@ ÿÿ0Indent5à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2J ÿÿ0Indent6à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2T ÿÿ0Indent7à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô("ÿÿ$££Ò  ÒÒ  Ò d2^ ÿÿ0Indent8à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô" ÿÿ?AGMSYaioIndent0I.A.1.a.(1)(a)i)a)P ÿÿ8Mac DefaultMac DefaultÓ ` °šXÓ*+ ,-Cþÿ<< CÿÿƒLevel 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5(3¯$¢¢Ý ƒ!ÝÝ  Ý($$””ò òÚ  Ú1Ú  Úó ó..'÷ÿ dxdüÿP Pd< Œ 9p`(Courier New< Œ 9p`(Courier< Œ 9p`(Arial% Line 7 d44447Border 1dd* 5Cþÿ << Gÿÿ “Ý ƒ!ÝÑ  ÑÑ#€d#ÑÔ€1ÔÒ  ÒÒ X ÒÑ  ÑÑ#€d#ÑÑ  ÑÓ` °˜XÓÝ  ÝÝ ƒ+"ÝÝ  ÝÔ€3ÔÔ€3ÔÓ  ÓÔ YYY ÔFILEDÔ€3XÔÌÌò òMarchÏ27,Ï1997ÌÌCecilÏCrowson,ÏJr.ÌÔ€3ôÔAppellateÏCourtÏClerkó ó ¿Ý ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€1ÔÒ  ÒÒ X ÒÑ  ÑÑ#€d#ÑÑ  ÑÓ` °˜XÓÝ  ÝÝ ƒ$Ýà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  ÝÔ€3ÔÔ€3ôÔ€€For€petitions€filed€after€May€10,€1995,€the€Post„Conviction€Procedure€Act€of€1995€€€Ïcontrols.€€òòSeeóó€T.C.A.€ðððð€40„30„201„„222€(Supp.€1996).Ì Ý ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€1ÔÒ  ÒÒ X ÒÑ  ÑÑ#€d#ÑÑ  ÑÓ` °˜XÓÝ  ÝÝ ƒ$Ýà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  ÝÔ€3ÔÔ€3ôÔ€€òòSeeóó,€òòe.g.óó,€òòCarnley€v.€Cochranóó,€369€U.S.€506,€516„17,€82€S.€Ct.€884,€890€(1962)€(rightÏto€counsel);€òòDuncan€v.€Louisianaóó,€391€U.S.€145,€148„49,€88€S.€Ct.€1444,€1447€(1968)€(right€to€trial€byÏjury).Ì çÝ ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€1ÔÒ  ÒÒ X ÒÑ  ÑÑ#€d#ÑÑ  ÑÓ` °˜XÓÝ  ÝÝ ƒ$Ýà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  ÝÔ€3ÔÔ€3ôÔ€€We€note€that€the€state€argues€that€the€reference€in€òòHouseóó€to€fundamental€trial€rightsÏrequiring€a€defendantððs€personal€waiver€relates€only€to€matters€occurring€in€the€convicting€case€and€anyÏresulting€direct€appeal.€€It€asserts€that€the€supreme€court€did€not€intend€for€the€same€requirement€toÏextend€from€the€first€post„conviction€case€to€the€second.€€Given€our€decision€in€this€case,€we€need€notÏdecide€the€merits€of€this€contention.€€Ì rÝ ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€1ÔÒ  ÒÒ X ÒÑ  ÑÑ#€d#ÑÑ  ÑÓ` °˜XÓÝ  ÝÝ ƒ$Ýà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  ÝÔ€3ÔÔ€3ôÔ€€We€also€note€that€this€court€has€previously€held€that€there€is€neither€a€constitutional€norÏa€statutory€right€for€a€post„conviction€petitioner€to€represent€him€or€herself.€€òòCole€v.€Stateóó,€798€S.W.2dÏ261,€263€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.€1990).€€Although€òòColeóó€indicates€a€common€law€right€to€self„representationÏexists,€we€do€not€believe€that€it€is€a€fundamental€right.€€In€fact,€given€the€nature€of€a€post„convictionÏproceeding,€including€the€typical€imprisonment€of€the€petitioner€at€a€site€distant€from€the€forum€court€whichÏnecessarily€limits€investigation€capability€and€nonevidentiary„hearing€court€appearances,€we€do€notÏbelieve€that€a€trial€court€is€barred€from€appointing€counsel€if€necessary€to€aid€in€the€proper€administration€ofÏjustice.€€òòSeeóó,€òòe.g.óó,€òòState€v.€Reevesóó,€610€S.W.2d€730,€731€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.€1980).Ì \Ñ\R AØ'\ÑPtPtHHÚ(ÿáÿâùFG(üHHÚ(d'hStyl{WP}01•ÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃà Ãà Ãà Ãà Ãà ÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÐ ÐÐHHÐÐ  ÐÐ2ÐÐÿÿ¸æ$ÿÐÐHHÐÐÐÐÐÐÐÐ  ÐÐ ÐÐ ÐÑÑÑGenevaÑÑ ÑÑ € ÑÑ<Px–ÈÑÒÒÒ443!#4ÒÒ$ *$ÒÒ$*$ÒÒ ÿKK ÒÒ  Geneva ÒÒ  Geneva ÒÓ.,ÓÓÓÓ6ÓÓ ÓßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßÑGenevaÑÑ ÑÒ  h HD: Geneva ÒÒ  h HD: Geneva ÒÝ ƒ!ÝÔ . ÔÔ€1ÔÒ  ÒÒ X ÒÑ  ÑÑ#€22Xd#ÑÑ#€22Xd#ÑÑ  ÑÓ` °˜XÓÝ  Ý›Ñ  ÑÑ Ü ÑÑ\R AØ'\ÑÓÓÑ\R AØ'\ÑÔ€3ÔÑ7€ ü› XXdæXXdÈ7ќـ*ÙßR€675A1-j|` ´- `€€@ÿRß›Þ ÞÌ€à8 àà@ àIN€THE€COURT€OF€CRIMINAL€APPEALS€OF€TENNESSEEÌà@ àAT€œJACKSON›à@ à€€€€€€€€€Ìà àà à€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€MAY€1996€SESSIONÌÌÓÓDONNIE€E.€JOHNSON,à àà à)à àÌ€à àà àà àà à)Ìà àAppellant,à àà à)à àNo.€œ02C01„9111„CR„00237›Ìà à€€€€€à àà à€€à à)Ìà àà àà àà à)à àShelby€CountyÌv.à àà àà àà à)€€€€€€€€€Ìà àà àà àà à)à à€œHonorable›€L.€T.€Lafferty,€Judge€€€€€Ìà àà àà àà à)ÌSTATE€OF€TENNESSEE,€€€€€à à)à à€(Post„Conviction)Ìà àà àà àà à)€€€€€€€€Ìà àAppellee.à àà à)Ìà àà àà àà àÌÌòòFor€the€Appellantóó:à àà àà àà àòòFor€the€Appelleeóó:ÌÌœJames€V.€Ball›à àà àà àà àœJohn€Knox€Walkup›Ìœ217€Exchange€Avenue›à àà àà àAttorney€General€of€TennesseeÌMemphis,€TN€38115à àà àà àà àandÌœ€€€€€and€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€à àà àà à›à àœKathy›€MoranteÌœDwight€Duncan›à àà àà àà àAssistant€Attorney€General€of€Tennessee€€€€€Ïœ5507€Winchester€Road›à àà àà àœ450›€James€Robertson€Parkwayà àà àÌœMemphis,€TN€38115€€›à àà àà àNashville,€TN€37243„0493Ìœ(AT€TRIAL)€€€€€€€€€›Ìœ€€€€€€€€€€€›à àà àà àà àœà àJohn›€W.€Pierotti,€Jr.ÌœPaul€J.€Morrow,€Jr.›à àà àà àà àDistrict€Attorney€GeneralÌœ1505€Compton€Avenue›à àà àà àà àandÌœNashville,€TN€37212›à àà àà àJanet€ShipmanÌœ(ON€APPEAL)›à àà àà àà àAssistant€District€Attorney€GeneralÌà àà àà àà àà à201€Poplar€AvenueÌà àà àà àà àà àMemphis,€TN€38103„1947ÌÌÌÌÌOPINION€FILED:____________________ÌÌAFFIRMEDÌÌJoseph€M.€TiptonÌJudgeÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÇÓÓà@ àòòò òO€P€I€N€I€O€Nó óóóÌÌà àThis€capital€post„conviction€case€was€remanded€to€us€by€the€TennesseeÏSupreme€Court€for€reconsideration€in€light€of€its€opinion€in€òòHouse€v.€Stateóó,€911€S.W.2dÏ705€(Tenn.€1995),€defining€concepts€of€waiver€and€previous€determination€in€the€post„conviction€context.€€The€present€case€involves€the€petitionerððs€second€petition€for€post„conviction€relief€from€both€his€conviction€for€first€degree€murder€of€his€wife€and€hisÏresulting€death€penalty€sentence.€€The€Shelby€County€Criminal€Court€dismissed€theÏpetition€without€an€evidentiary€hearing,€concluding€that€all€grounds€raised€had€beenÏeither€waived€or€previously€determined.€€In€this€courtððs€first€opinion,€it€reversed€the€trialÏcourt,€holding€that€the€concept€of€waiver€of€a€ground€for€relief€provided€in€T.C.A.€ðð€40„30„112(b)€allowed€the€petitioner€to€rebut€the€presumption€of€waiver€by€showing€thatÏhe,€personally,€did€not€knowingly€and€understandingly€forego€the€assertion€of€aÏground€at€a€previous€post„conviction€proceeding.€€òòDonnie€Edward€Johnson€v.€Stateóó,ÏNo.€02C01„9111„CR„00237,€Shelby€County€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.€Mar.€23,€1994).€€AfterÏrebriefing€and€reargument€by€the€parties,€we€have€concluded€that€the€trial€courtððsÏdismissal€of€the€second€petition€was€proper.€€ÌÌà àGiven€the€detailed€account€of€the€history€of€the€petitionerððs€case€in€thisÏcourtððs€first€opinion,€we€will€provide€only€the€basic€circumstances€relevant€to€ourÏpresent€decision.€€While€the€trial€court€had€his€first€post„conviction€case€underÍadvisement€after€evidentiary€hearings,€the€petitioner€filed€his€second€òòproóó€òòseóó€petitionÏwith€an€incorporated€affidavit.€€In€these€and€subsequent€pleadings,€he€allegedÏnumerous€constitutional€violations€in€the€convicting,€sentencing€and€appellate€stagesÏof€his€convicting€case,€including€claimed€instances€of€the€ineffective€assistance€ofÏcounsel.€€Also,€he€alleged€that€counsel€in€his€first€post„conviction€case€ineffectivelyÏpresented€certain€issues€at€the€evidentiary€hearing,€improperly€failed€to€raise€someÏissues,€and€improperly€refused€to€raise€other€issues€even€though€the€petitionerÏinsisted€upon€their€presentation.€€ÌÌà àIn€dismissing€the€second€post„conviction€case€without€an€evidentiaryÏhearing,€the€trial€court€concluded€that€some€eight€or€nine€claimed€grounds,€asÏcategorized€in€the€stateððs€pleadings,€had€been€previously€determined,€including€theÏone€for€the€ineffective€assistance€of€counsel€at€the€convicting€trial,€and€that€theÏremaining€grounds€had€been€waived.€€It€indicated€that€a€petitionerððs€claim€that€formerÏpost„conviction€counsel€was€ineffective€in€the€presentation€of€grounds€or€in€failing€toÏraise€grounds€did€not€present€a€basis€for€post„conviction€relief.€ÌÌà@ àò òIó óÌà àUnder€the€statutes€applicable€to€this€case,œ× ƒ8 ××  ×›€the€scope€of€a€post„convictionÏhearing€extends€to€all€grounds€a€petitioner€may€have€except€those€which€the€trial€courtÏfinds€should€be€excluded€because€they€have€been€waived€or€previously€determined.€ÏT.C.A.€ðð€40„30„111.€€Those€terms€are€defined€in€T.C.A.€ðð€40„30„112€as€follows:ÌÓÓÓ  Óà8 àà àòòWhen€ground€for€relief€is€ð ðpreviously€determinedðð€orÏð ðwaived.ððó󀄄€(a)€A€ground€for€relief€is€ð ðpreviously€determinedððÏif€a€court€of€competent€jurisdiction€has€ruled€on€the€meritsÏafter€a€full€and€fair€hearing.€€ÌÌà8 àà à(b)(1)€A€ground€for€relief€is€ð ðwaivedðð€if€the€petitionerÏknowingly€and€understandingly€failed€to€present€it€forÏdetermination€in€any€proceeding€before€a€court€ofÏcompetent€jurisdiction€in€which€the€ground€could€have€beenÏpresented.€€ÌÌà8 àà à(2)€There€is€a€rebuttable€presumption€that€a€groundÏfor€relief€not€raised€in€any€such€proceeding€which€was€heldÏwas€waived.ÌÌÓÓÓ  ÓIn€òòHouse€v.€Stateóó,€our€supreme€court€undertook€a€full€analysis€of€these€terms,€notingÏthat€no€previously€reported€Tennessee€case€had€interpreted€what€constitutes€a€ð ðfullÏand€fair€hearingðð€for€previous€determination€purposes€or€what€standard€of€waiver€isÏmeant€by€our€post„conviction€law.€€911€S.W.2d€at€710,€713.€€ÌÌà àWe€need€not€repeat€that€analysis€in€this€case,€but€the€supreme€court€ððsÏconclusions€are€controlling.€€As€for€previous€determination,€the€court€essentiallyÍdetermined€that€a€full€and€fair€hearing€is€provided€when€a€petitioner€is€given€anÏòòopportunityóó€to€present€his€or€her€constitutional€claims€at€a€meaningful€time€and€in€aÏmeaningful€manner,€that€is,€without€undue€restriction€of€the€scope€of€the€hearing€orÏundue€limitation€on€the€introduction€or€presentation€of€evidence.€€œòòIdóó.€at€711.›€€In€thisÏrespect,€the€court€also€concluded€that€because€there€is€neither€constitutional€norÏstatutory€right€to€the€effective€assistance€of€counsel€in€post„conviction€proceedings,€ð ðaÏcourt€should€not€consider€the€ineffectiveness€of€counsel€at€a€prior€post„convictionÏproceeding€in€deciding€whether€a€ground€for€relief€has€been€previously€determined.ðð€ÏòòIdóó.€at€712.€€ÌÌà àAs€for€waiver,€the€supreme€court€concluded€that€the€standard€to€apply€inÏpost„conviction€cases€is€an€objective€one€that€does€not€hinge€upon€the€petitionerððsÏpersonal€decision.€€Save€for€certain€fundamental€constitutional€trial€rights,× ƒ9 ××  ×€aÏpetitionerððs€ignorance€or€lack€of€personal€decision€does€not€matter€and€his€or€herÏcounselððs€action€or€inaction€may€be€imputed€to€the€petitioner€as€waiver.€€911€S.W.2d€atÏ713„14.€€Also,€the€supreme€court€held€that€ineffective€assistance€of€prior€post„conviction€counsel€does€not€rebut€the€presumption€of€waiver.€€òòId.óó€at€712.€€ÌÌà@ àò òIIà@ àó óÌà àGiven€òòHouseóóððs€conclusions,€the€petitionerððs€claims€about€theÏineffectiveness,€failures€and€refusals€of€counsel€in€his€first€post„conviction€case€neitherÏrefute€previous€determination€of€some€grounds€nor€rebut€the€presumption€of€waiver€asÏto€other€grounds.€€Further,€he€does€not€now€specify€the€violation€of€any€particularÏfundamental€trial€right€that€would€require€his€personal€waiver€in€a€knowing€andÏunderstood€fashion.× ƒ: ××  ×€€ÌÌà àRather,€the€petitioner€contends€that€the€trial€court€in€his€first€post„conviction€case€wrongly€denied€his€requests€to€represent€himself,€which€he€claims€wasÏa€fundamental€right,€particularly€when€he€repeatedly€notified€the€court€in€òòproóó€òòseóóÏpleadings€and€documents€that€counsel€was€not€preparing€properly,€was€failing€to€raiseÏclaims,€and€was€even€refusing€to€raise€claims€requested€by€him.€€He€now€argues€that€Ïconsequently,€he€cannot€be€held€to€have€waived€any€grounds€by€what€occurred€in€thatÏcase.€€The€state€responds€that€this€claim€has€been€waived,€stating€that€the€issue€of€self„representation€ð ðwas€never€raised€during€the€appeal€from€the€dismissal€of€the€first€post„conviction€petition.ðð€€Also,€it€contends€that,€in€any€event,€the€merits€of€such€a€claimÏcannot€be€addressed€until€we€determine€that€the€presumption€of€waiver€has€beenÏrebutted.€€ÌÌà àContrary€to€the€stateððs€initial€assertion,€the€petitioner€did€raise€as€error€inÏthe€appeal€of€his€first€post„conviction€case€the€trial€courtððs€failure€to€allow€him€toÏrepresent€himself.€€However,€although€this€court€expressly€stated€that€it€would€addressÏthis€issue€in€its€opinion,€the€opinion€fails€to€contain€any€further€mention€of€the€issue€orÏits€relative€merits.€€òòDonnie€E.€Johnson€v.€Stateóó,€No.€61,€Shelby€County€(Tenn.€Crim.ÏApp.€June€26,€1991),€òòapp.óó€òòdeniedóó€(Tenn.€Mar.€8,€1993).€€The€petitioner€also€raised€theÏissue€in€his€application€for€permission€to€appeal€to€the€supreme€court.€€In€any€event,Ïthe€fact€that€this€court€affirmed€the€trial€courtððs€denial€of€relief€and€that€the€supremeÏcourt€denied€further€review€may€be€taken€as€a€previous€determination€of€this€issue.€ÏThus,€as€the€state€contends,€the€petitioner€cannot€now€receive€any€benefit€from€a€claimÏthat€he€was€improperly€denied€the€right€to€represent€himself€in€his€first€post„convictionÏcase.× ƒ; ××  ×ÌÌà àThe€petitionerððs€remaining€arguments€are€attempts€to€show€eitherÌthat€òòHouseóó€was€unwisely€decided€or€that€rejection€of€his€claim€of€a€personal€waiverÏstandard€„„€which€he€claims€existed€under€T.C.A.€ðð€40„30„112(b)€before€òòHouseó󀄄Ïviolates€his€rights€to€due€process€of€law,€equal€protection€of€law,€and€fundamentalÏfairness.€€Obviously,€we€are€bound€to€follow€òòHouseóó.€€As€for€his€constitutional€claims,Ïthe€petitionerððs€premise€„„€that€the€post„conviction€waiver€standard€in€Tennessee€was€aÏpersonal€one€before€òòHouseó󀄄€is€rather€weak.€€We€believe€that€there€was€no€clearÏindication€before€òòHouseóó€that€the€statute€was€interpreted€to€require€personal€waiver.€€InÏfact,€as€òòHouseóó€indicates,€the€relevant€case€history€reflects€the€opposite.€€911€S.W.2d€atÏ713;€òòseeóó,€òòe.g.óó,€òòState€v.€Milleróó,€668€S.W.2d€281€(Tenn.€1984);€òòArthur€v.€Stateóó,€483ÏS.W.2d€95€(Tenn.€1972);€òòHoliday€v.€Stateóó,€512€S.W.2d€953€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.€1972).€ÏThus,€as€this€court€has€previously€noted,€ð ðòòHouseóó€may€very€well€represent€a€clarificationÏof,€as€opposed€to€a€change€in,€the€law.ðð€€òòHugh€Melson€v.€Stateóó,€No.€02C01„9402„CR„00023,€Madison€County,€order€denying€rehearing€at€2€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.€July€28,Ï1996).€€Under€these€circumstances,€there€is€no€constitutional€problem€with€theÏapplication€of€òòHouseóó€to€this€case.€€ÌÌà àFinally,€the€petitioner€contends€that€as€a€matter€of€agency,€counselÏcannot€waive€a€claim€over€the€express€objection€of€the€petitioner.€€He€refers€to€federalÏhabeas€corpus€cases€which€he€claims€support€his€position.€€òòSeeóó,€òòe.g.óó,€òòColeman€v.ÏThompsonóó,€501€U.S.€722,€111€S.€Ct.€2546€(1991);€òòWainwright€v.€Sykesóó,€433€U.S.€72,Ï93€n.1,€97€S.Ñ€<ÑÇCt.€2497,€2510€n.1€(1977)€(Burger,€C.J.,€concurring);€òòPaine€v.€McCarthyóó,€527€F.2d€173,Ï175„76€(9th€Cir.€1975).€€However,€the€references€in€òòSykesóó€and€in€òòPaineóó€concern€theÏð ðdeliberate€bypassðð€standard€announced€in€òòFay€v.€Noiaóó,€372€U.S.€391,€438„39,€83€S.ÏCt.€822,€849€(1963),€a€standard€rejected€in€òòSykesóó€and€replaced€with€a€cause€andÏprejudice€standard.€€Needless€to€say,€òòHouseóó€provides€that€the€waiver€standard€underÏthe€post„conviction€statutes€was,€and€is,€in€no€way€limited€to€a€deliberate€bypass.€€ÌÌà àIn€òòColemanóó,€the€Supreme€Court€concluded€that€in€the€federal€habeasÏcorpus€context,€a€procedural€default€barrier€to€a€claim€is€not€overcome€by€theÏseriousness€of€counselððs€error€in€not€raising€the€claim€previously,€but€by€showing€thatÏcounselððs€conduct€constituted€a€constitutional€violation€itself.ÌÓÓÓ  Óà8 àà àWhere€a€petitioner€defaults€a€claim€as€a€result€of€theÏdenial€of€the€right€to€effective€assistance€of€counsel,€theÏState,€which€is€responsible€for€the€denial€as€a€constitutionalÏmatter,€must€bear€the€cost€of€any€resulting€default€and€theÏharm€to€state€interests€that€federal€habeas€review€entails.€€AÏdifferent€allocation€of€costs€is€appropriate€in€thoseÏcircumstances€where€the€State€has€no€responsibility€toÏensure€that€the€petitioner€was€represented€by€competentÏcounsel.€€As€between€the€State€and€the€petitioner,€it€is€theÏpetitioner€who€must€bear€the€burden€of€a€failure€to€followÏstate€procedural€rules.€€In€the€absence€of€a€constitutionalÏviolation,€the€petitioner€bears€the€risk€in€federal€habeas€forÏall€attorney€errors€made€in€the€course€of€the€representation,Ïas€[òòMurray€v.€Carrieróó,€477€U.S.€478,€106€S.€Ct.€2639€(1986)]Ïsays€explicitly.ÌÌÓÓòòÓ  ÓColemanóó,€501€U.S.€at€754,€111€S.€Ct.€at€2567.€€As€previously€noted,€òòHouseóó€states€thatÏthere€is€neither€a€constitutional€nor€a€statutory€right€to€the€effective€assistance€ofÍcounsel€in€Tennessee€post„conviction€proceedings.€€Thus,€the€deficient€performanceÏof€post„conviction€counsel€that€results€in€a€procedural€default€of€an€issue€in€our€stateÏcourts€would€not€constitute€cause€for€the€federal€courts€to€review€on€the€merits€aÏpetitionerððs€habeas€corpus€claim€on€that€same€issue.€€ÌÌà àMore€importantly,€òòHouseóó€reflects€that€the€supreme€court€intended€theÏsame€reasoning€used€in€òòColemanóó€to€apply€to€our€post„conviction€cases.€€That€is,€theÏpresumption€of€waiver€will€not€be€rebutted€by€counsel€error€that€does€not€rise€to€theÏlevel€of€a€constitutional€violation€itself.€€In€this€respect,€the€fact€that€counsel€has€refusedÏto€follow€the€petitionerððs€request€does€not€mean€that€a€constitutional€violation€hasÏoccurred.€€In€his€first€post„conviction€case,€the€petitioner€requested€and€received€theÏappointment€of€counsel.€€Although€he€sought€counselððs€removal€and€claimed€thatÏcounsel€was€refusing€to€present€grounds€requested€by€him,€the€trial€court€denied€hisÏmotion,€a€ruling€affirmed€on€appeal.€€The€case€proceeded€to€three€days€of€evidentiaryÏhearings€with€some€twenty„eight€witnesses€testifying.€€Obviously,€post„convictionÏcounsel€actively€pursued€relief€for€the€petitioner.€€Under€these€circumstances,€weÏconclude€that€this€case€presents€nothing€that€would€exempt€it€from€the€òòHouseóó€holdings.€ÏThus,€counselððs€decisions,€even€those€opposite€the€wishes€of€the€petitioner,€areÏimputed€to€the€petitioner€for€the€purposes€of€waiver.€€œÌ›Ìà àUnder€the€foregoing€analysis,€we€also€conclude€that€there€is€noÏsignificance€to€the€fact€that€the€petitioner€filed€the€post„conviction€petition€in€this€caseÏwhile€his€first€petition€was€pending€decision€in€the€trial€court,€although€after€theÏevidentiary€hearing€was€concluded.€€The€actions€taken€or€not€taken€by€and€on€behalfÏof€the€petitioner€and€the€trial€courtððs€ultimate€decisions€in€the€first€case€resulted€inÏgrounds€being€determined€or€waived€under€òòHouseóó€regardless€of€what€other€actionsÏwere€then€pending.€€In€fact,€given€that€the€trial€court€refused€to€remove€counsel€andÏrefused€to€allow€the€petitioner€to€act€as€counsel€in€the€first€œcase,›€œwe›€view€the€secondÏpetition€to€be€œ›€an€attempt€to€œavoid€the€trial€courtððs€actions€in€the€first€case€in€order€thatÏthe€petitioner€could€present€what€he,€not€counsel,€wanted€to€pursue.€€However,€underÏòòHouseóó,€the€claims€in€the€second€petition€could€not€negate€the€validity€of€the€legalÏramifications€flowing€from€the€first€case,€whose€results€were€affirmed€on€appeal.€€ÌÌà àIn€consideration€of€the€foregoing€and€the€record€as€a€whole,€the€judgmentÏof€the€trial€court€is€affirmed.€€Having€affirmed€the€denial€of€post„conviction€relief,€weÏestablish€a€new€execution€date€and€direct€that€the€sentence€be€carried€out€as€providedÏby€law€on€September€24,€1997,€unless€stayed€or€otherwise€modified€by€appropriateÏauthority.›ÌÌÓÓà àà àà àà àà àà à_____________________________Ìà àà àà àà àà àà àJoseph€M.€Tipton,€JudgeÌÌCONCUR:ÌÌÌÌ___________________________ÌGary€R.€Wade,€JudgeÌÌÌÌ___________________________ÌWilliam€M.€Barker,€JudgeÌÌÌ.ÌÌÌÌÌÌÌ