ÿWPCõ …# VUNa %¯ 0(µw@Ý4 1 @ 0lH 0D´ bø 0J 0TJ 0^ž 0hü 0rd 0|Ö 0†R 0Ø 1uh 0dÝ BAU>^U*œB)ÆDCï AM2  D3‹¾v~¿ 0@=vÓ} AOPÆŸ 0De D/© BؘHP LaserJet 4SiHPPCL5MS,ü,,,,,ü0nLHÎ(ÖÃ9 Z ‹6Times New Roman RegularX($¡¡ 3456U7D8U9D:;D<Ó€Ô¡¨ 3|xE((3üÝ$¤¤Ý ƒ!ÝÝ  Ýà  àòòÚ  Ú0Ú  Úóó(#Ã$òòÚ  Ú0Ú  Úóó- ù-2 ÿÿ0Indent1Ô2ÔÔ3  Ô2" ÿÿ0Indent2à0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2, ÿÿ0Indent3à0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô26 ÿÿ0Indent4à0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2@ ÿÿ0Indent5à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2J ÿÿ0Indent6à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2T ÿÿ0Indent7à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2^ ÿÿ0Indent8à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô ÿÿ?AGMSYaioIndent0I.A.1.a.(1)(a)i)a)P ÿÿ8Mac DefaultMac DefaultÓ ` °šXÓ d< Œ 9p`(&Times New Roman< Œ 9p`(Arial% Line 7 d&&&&7Border 1dd€-'Cþÿ << Gÿÿ Ý ƒ!ÝÑ  ÑÑ#€d#ÑÔ€$ÔÝ  ÝÔ€%ÔÔ€%ÔÓ  Óò òÔ YYY ÔFILEDÔ€%XÔÌÌMay€16,€1997ÌÌCecil€W.€CrowsonÌAppellate€Court€ClerkÔ  Ôó ó'ÿÿdxd ÷Ý ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€$ÔÝ  ÝÒ  ÒÒ X ÒÔ€%ÔÔ€%ôÔÓ  Óà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóThe€jury€found€the€Defendant€not€guilty€of€two€additional€charges:€€official€misconduct€and€Ïprivate€use€of€county€road€materials€and€equipment.€€Moreover,€another€count€of€private€use€of€countyÏroad€materials€and€equipment€was€dismissed€as€a€result€of€the€Stateððs€necessary€election€between€twoÏcounts.ÌPtPtHHÚ(ÿáÿâùFG(üHHÚ(d'h("ÿÿ$££Ò  ÒÒ  ÒStyl{WP}01•ÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃà Ãà Ãà Ãà Ãà ÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÐ ÐÐHHÐÐ  ÐÐ2ÐÐÿÿ¸æ$ÿÐÐHHÐÐÐÐÐÐÐÐ  ÐÐ ÐÐ ÐÑÑÑGenevaÑÑ ÑÑ € ÑÑ<Px–ÈÑÒÒÒ443!#4ÒÒ$ *$ÒÒ$*$ÒÒ ÿKK ÒÒ  Geneva ÒÒ  Geneva ÒÓ.,ÓÓÓÓ6ÓÓ ÓßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßÑGenevaÑÑ ÑÒ  h HD: Geneva ÒÒ  h HD: Geneva Ò€-‚ƒCþÿ<< CÿÿƒLevel 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5($$””ò òÚ  Ú1Ú  Úó ó„„'÷ÿ dxdüÿP PdÝ ƒ!ÝÔ . ÔÔ€$ÔÝ  ÝÑ  ÑÑ€ÑÑ7€V{XXdìdÈ7ÑÒ  ÒÒ X ÒÔ€%Ôò òÑ\R AØ'\ÑÓ  ÓÙ€€ÙßR€()'A1-j|` ç `€€@ÿRßÞ ÞÌÌÌ›à@ àIN€THE€COURT€OF€CRIMINAL€APPEALS€OF€TENNESSEEÌÌà@ àAT€NASHVILLEÌÌà@ àœJUNE›€SESSION,€1994ÌÌÌÌÓ  ÓÓ#` °…XœÈ“X#ÓSTATE€OF€TENNESSEE,à àà à)à àC.C.A.€NO.€01C01„9401„CC„00017Ìà àà àà àà àà à)Ìó óà àAppellee,à àà àà àò ò)à àROBERTSON€COUNTYÌà àà àà àà àà à)Ìà àà àà àà àà à)à àHON.€JOHN€H.€GASAWAY,€III,ÏJUDGEÌVS.à àà àà àà àà à)à àÌà àà àà àà àà à)ó óà àœ(Fabricating›€Evidence,€œOfficial€Misconduct,€›Ìò òBOBBY€GENE€KECK,€€€€€€à àà à)ó óà àœand€€Private€Use€of€County€Road€à àÌà àà àà à›à àà àò ò)ó óà àœMaterials€and€Equipment)Ìà àAppellant.à àà àà àò ò)ó óà àò òÌó óÌÌò òÌÌÓ  ÓON€APPEAL€FROM€THE€JUDGMENT€OF€THEÌCIRCUIT€COURT€OF€ROBERTSON€COUNTYó óÌÌÌòòÌÓ  ÓFOR€THE€APPELLANTóó:à àà àà àòòFOR€THE€APPELLEEóó:ÌÌLARRY€D.€WILKSà àà àà àà àCHARLES€W.€BURSONÌ509€West€Court€Squareà àà àà àAttorney€General€and€ReporterÌSpringfield,€TN€37172Ìà àà àà àà àà àà àCECIL€H.€ROSSÌà àà àà àà àà àà àAssistant€Attorney€GeneralÌà àà àà àà àà àà à450€James€Robertson€ParkwayÌà àà àà àà àà àà àNashville,€TN€€37243„0493ÌÌà àà àà àà àà àà àPATRICK€H.€MCCUTCHEN€Ìà àà àà àà àà àà àDistrict€Attorney€GeneralÌÌà àà àà àà àà àà àDENT€MORRISSÌà àà àà àà àà àà àAssistant€District€Attorney€GeneralÌà àà àà àà àà àà à19th€Judicial€DistrictÌà àà àà àà àà àà à507€Public€SquareÌà àà àà àà àà àà àSpringfield,€TN€37172ÌÌÌÌÌOPINION€FILED€___________________€€€€€ÌÌAFFIRMEDÌÌPER€CURIAMÌÓÓÇÌÌà@ àÔ€%„Ôò òòòOPINIONó óóóÌÔ€%XÔÌà àThe€Defendant€appeals€to€this€Court€as€of€right€from€a€judgment€entered€on€aÏRobertson€County€jury€verdict€convicting€him€of€one€count€of€fabricating€evidence,Ïthree€counts€of€official€misconduct,€and€two€counts€of€private€use€of€county€roadÏmaterials€and€equipment.× ƒ+ ××  ×€€The€Defendant€presents€eight€issues€for€review:€(1)€ThatÏthe€charging€instrument€was€defective€and€should€have€been€dismissed;€(2)€that€theÏtrial€court€should€have€granted€pretrial€diversion;€(3)€that€his€pretrial€statements€to€theÏTennessee€Bureau€of€Investigation€(ð ðT.B.I.ðð)€should€have€been€suppressed;€(4)€thatÏallowing€T.B.I.€Agent€Taylor€to€testify€violated€Tenn.€R.€Evid.€615;€(5)€that€the€StateÏengaged€in€harmful€prosecutorial€misconduct;€(6)€that€the€trial€court€erred€by€refusingÏto€include€in€its€instruction€on€the€range€of€punishment€the€Defendantððs€removal€fromÏpublic€office;€(7)€that€the€trial€court€erred€by€not€granting€a€new€trial,€and€(8)€that€theÏevidence€was€insufficient€to€support€the€guilty€verdicts.€€We€affirm€the€judgment€of€theÏtrial€court.ÌÌà àWe€begin€with€a€brief€summary€of€the€facts€as€they€relate€to€the€counts€for€whichÏthe€Defendant€was€convicted.€€These€proceedings€initially€began€in€March€of€1992,Íwhen€General€Pat€McCutchen,€who€was€District€Attorney€General€for€the€19th€JudicialÏDistrict€at€the€time,€requested€that€the€T.B.I.€investigate€allegations€of€criminal€activity€inÏthe€Robertson€County€Highway€Department€(ð ðHighway€Departmentðð).€€T.B.I.€€AgentÏJohn€Taylor€was€assigned€to€the€case.€€The€Defendant,€then€superintendent€of€theÏHighway€Department,€was€the€focus€of€the€investigation.€€Based€upon€the€T.B.I.ððsÏinvestigation,€the€grand€jury€returned€a€nine„count€presentment€against€the€Defendant.ÌÌà àAs€to€Counts€One€and€Four,€several€Department€employees€testified€that€theyÏsaw€Mark€Hulsey,€a€Highway€Department€employee,€use€the€Highway€DepartmentÏshop€and€tools€to€weld€a€security€door€and€windows€for€an€antique€barn€in€CrossÏPlains,€Tennessee,€owned€by€the€Defendant€and€his€wife.€€The€work€was€done€at€theÏDefendantððs€direction€while€Mr.€Hulsey€was€at€work.€€Tony€Sutterfield,€anotherÏHighway€Department€employee,€testified€that€he€helped€Mr.€Hulsey€with€this€project.€ÏMr.€Hulsey€testified€that€part€of€the€steel€came€from€the€shopððs€inventory€and€part€of€itÏwas€purchased€through€Dean€Oil€Company.€€Mr.€Hulsey€testified€that€when€they€ranÏout€of€steel,€the€Defendant€told€him€to€get€some€more.€€Mr.€Hulsey€and€DavidÏGoodman,€also€a€Highway€Department€employee,€then€went€to€Dean€Oil€Company€toÏpick€up€the€steel€needed€to€complete€the€work.€€The€steel€was€delivered€to€theÏHighway€Department€shop€later€in€the€afternoon.€€The€steel€flat€bars€were€billed€to€theÏHighway€Department€as€grease.€€Mr.€Goodman€testified€that€they€did€not€get€a€receiptÏor€an€invoice.€€Although€not€on€the€ð ðclockðð€when€they€delivered€the€door€and€windows,Ïthe€two€men€assisted€the€Defendant€in€installing€them€at€the€antique€barn.€€After€theÏinvestigation€had€begun,€the€Defendant€told€Mr.€Hulsey€that€the€T.B.I.€had€questionedÍhim€about€the€security€door€and€windows.€€The€Defendant€told€Mr.€Hulsey€to€tell€theÏT.B.I.€that€he€had€worked€on€the€door€and€windows€on€his€own€time€and€that€they€wereÏmade€from€scrap€metal.€€ÌÌà àMr.€Goodman€testified€that€in€July€of€1992,€after€the€investigation€had€begun,€heÏwent€back€to€Dean€Oil€Company€and€asked€for€a€receipt€for€two€pieces€of€flat€bar.€ÏBecause€he€was€unsure€of€the€price,€he€instructed€David€Dean€to€make€the€receipt€forÏ$15.€€The€receipt€was€back„dated€April€1,€1992.€€Mr.€Dean€testified€that€the€steel€wasÏsold€in€April€1992€for€about€$30.€€Mr.€Goodman€testified€that€he€gave€the€falsifiedÏreceipt€to€the€Defendant,€who€put€it€in€his€wallet.ÌÌà àOn€July€13,€1992,€the€Defendant€gave€the€bogus€receipt€to€€Agent€Taylor.€€TheÏDefendant€told€Agent€Taylor€that€Mr.€Goodman€had€brought€him€the€receipt€on€orÏaround€April€1,€1992,€and€that€he€had€paid€Mr.€Goodman€back.€€Later,€on€July€30,Ï1992,€the€Defendant€told€Agent€Taylor€that€the€receipt€may€have€been€given€to€him€twoÏor€three€weeks€after€the€steel€was€purchased.ÌÌà àThe€proof€as€to€Count€Two€indicated€that€the€Defendantððs€wife€owned€aÏsubdivision,€River€Rock€Village,€in€Robertson€County.€€Several€witnesses€testified€thatÏbefore€the€subdivision€was€started,€the€existing€county€road€to€the€subdivision€endedÏat€a€cemetery.€€After€the€construction€of€the€subdivision€had€begun,€the€Defendant€hadÏHighway€Department€employees€create€a€gravel€loop€that€went€past€the€cemetery€andÏthrough€a€wooded€area.€€Although€there€was€testimony€that€the€official€map€of€countyÍroads€was€not€exactly€to€scale,€the€map€indicated€that€the€road€ended€at€the€cemeteryÏand€did€not€include€the€loop.€€Moreover,€Highway€Department€employees€testified€thatÏthe€road€had€never€been€maintained€as€a€county€road.€€Highway€DepartmentÏemployees€cleared,€graded,€and€put€gravel€on€the€loop€in€May€and€June€of€1991.ÌÌà àRobert€Bibb,€Chairperson€of€the€Robertson€County€Regional€Planning€andÏZoning€Commission,€testified€that€when€the€Commission€reviewed€the€DefendantððsÏproposal€for€the€River€Rock€Village€subdivision,€he€asked€the€Defendant€about€theÏloop€on€the€plat€because€it€was€not€shown€on€the€map.€€The€Defendant€assured€Mr.ÏBibb€that€the€road€was€set€up€that€way€and€that€the€county€maintained€the€loop€aroundÏthe€cemetery.€€Based€on€the€Defendantððs€representations,€the€plat€was€approved€byÏthe€Commission.ÌÌà àThe€proof€as€to€Count€Five€showed€that€for€some€period€of€time,€the€HighwayÏDepartment€would€pave€county€roads€upon€request€if€the€residents€paid€for€the€oilÏused€in€paving€the€road.€€Larry€Henry€testified€that€the€Defendant€told€him€the€HighwayÏDepartment€would€pave€the€length€of€his€road€if€Mr.€Henry€paid€six€hundred€dollarsÏ($600)€for€the€oil.€€Mr.€Henry€wrote€a€check€to€the€department,€but€the€check€was€neverÏdeposited.ÌÌà àJohn€Hogan€testified€that€he€agreed€to€pay€for€the€oil€if€his€road€was€paved.€€TheÏDefendant€told€Mr.€Hogan€that€it€would€cost€him€five€hundred€dollars€($500).€€Mr.ÏHogan€gave€a€check€for€five€hundred€dollars€($500)€to€the€Highway€Department,Íhowever,€the€check€was€never€deposited.ÌÌÇà àDonna€Choate€testified€that€the€Defendant€told€her€that€if€she€paid€for€the€oil,€theÏHighway€Department€would€pave€her€road.€€The€Choates€wrote€a€check€for€threeÏhundred€dollars€($300)€to€pay€for€the€oil,€however,€it€was€never€deposited.ÌÌà àFreddy€Hix€testified€that€he€talked€to€the€Defendant€about€getting€his€roadÏpaved.€€After€the€work€had€been€done,€the€Defendant€came€by€his€house€to€pick€up€aÏ$500€check.€€Mr.€Hix€testified€that€the€check€was€never€deposited.ÌÌà àWilliam€Byrne,€bookkeeper€for€the€Highway€Department€and€secretary€for€theÏRobertson€County€Highway€Commission,€testified€that€he€first€saw€these€fourÏundeposited€checks€in€the€Defendantððs€office€drawer.€€When€Mr.€Byrne€inquired€aboutÏthe€checks,€the€Defendant€instructed€him€to€hold€on€to€the€checks€until€he€receivedÏfurther€instruction.€€In€Spring€of€1992,€after€the€T.B.I.€investigation€had€begun,€Mr.ÏByrne€was€ð ðwiredðð€and€went€to€the€Defendantððs€office€to€ask€about€the€four€checks.€€OnÏtape,€the€Defendant€instructed€Mr.€Byrne€to€tear€up€the€checks.€€Later€in€theÏconversation,€the€Defendant€told€Mr.€Byrne€to€put€the€checks€in€the€safe.€€Mr.€ByrneÏeventually€gave€the€checks€to€Agent€Taylor€on€May€7,€1992.€€There€was€proof€that€Mr.ÏByrne€and€the€Defendant€were€the€only€ones€who€had€access€to€the€checks.€ÏMoreover,€it€was€Mr.€Byrneððs€responsibility€as€bookkeeper€to€deposit€the€checks€withÏthe€Robertson€County€Trusteeððs€Office.ÌÌà àProof€as€to€Count€Six€showed€that€Ernest€and€Patricia€Adcock€owned€a€farm€inÏRobertson€County€which€could€be€accessed€only€by€a€gravel€road€that€passed€over€aÍcreek€bed.€€When€there€were€heavy€rains,€the€Adcocks€could€not€access€their€property.€ÏThe€Defendant€agreed€to€sell€the€Adcocks€a€county€bridge€from€Hooperððs€Hollow.€€TheÏAdcocks€gave€the€Defendant€a€check€for€$100€on€May€9,€1991,€however,€it€was€neverÏdeposited.€€Ìà àHighway€Department€equipment€was€used€to€move€the€bridge,€which€had€beenÏtaken€out€of€service,€to€the€Adcocksðð€property,€to€cut€down€trees,€to€haul€dirt,€and€toÏflatten€the€dirt€out€to€level€the€approach€to€the€bridge.€€There€was€also€proof€that€theÏconcrete€used€to€finish€the€bridge€cost€one€thousand€two€hundred€five€dollars€andÏtwenty„five€cents€($1205.25)€and€was€billed€to€the€Highway€Department.€€Mr.€HulseyÏdid€most€of€the€work€on€the€bridge€and€was€paid€by€the€Adcocks.€€The€Adcocks€put€aÏð ðNo€Trespassingðð€sign€on€the€bridge.€€The€bridge€was€not€approved€by€the€highwayÏcommission.ÌÌà àThe€proof€as€to€Count€Nine€showed€that€Eddie€Mack€White,€a€HighwayÏDepartment€employee,€decided€to€put€a€driveway€on€the€upper€side€of€his€property€inÏCross€Plains,€Tennessee.€€Proof€showed€that€the€Defendant€authorized€Calvin€Grant€toÏleave€a€culvert€pipe€at€Mr.€Whiteððs€property€without€charge.€€Because€Mr.€White€was€onÏa€state€road,€the€Tennessee€Highway€Maintenance€Department€installed€the€pipe€forÏMr.€White.€€After€the€pipe€was€installed,€the€Defendant€drove€by€Mr.€Whiteððs€house.€ÏThe€Defendant€said€that€the€drive€would€need€to€be€wider€for€Mr.€Whiteððs€truck€andÏboat.€€A€week€later,€another€pipe€appeared.€€This€pipe€was€also€not€paid€for€and€wasÏinstalled€by€Highway€Department€employees.€€Mr.€Grant€testified€that€he€took€four€menÏwith€him€to€install€the€pipe.€€They€used€a€county€dump€truck€and€a€backhoe€to€completeÍthe€job.€€Mr.€Grant€had€asked€the€Defendant€if€the€county€would€pay€for€the€pipesÏbecause€Mr.€White€was€a€Highway€Department€employee.€€The€Defendant€instructedÏMr.€Grant€to€bill€the€work€to€Cross€Plains€Road€instead€of€Highway€25,€where€the€pipesÏwere€installed.€€Mr.€White€said€that€he€offered€to€pay€for€the€pipes,€however,€theÏDefendant€told€him€that€he€should€not€have€to€worry€about€it€because€he€was€aÏHighway€Department€employee.ÌÌà@ àI.ÌÌà àIn€his€first€issue€on€appeal,€the€Defendant€argues€that€the€trial€court€erred€inÏdenying€his€motion€to€dismiss€the€charging€instrument€issued€against€him.€€InÏparticular,€he€contends€that€the€charging€instrument€was€an€indictment€which€lackedÏthe€signature€of€the€district€attorney,€thereby€rendering€it€fatally€defective.€€òòSeeóó€òòState€v.ÏMyersóó,€85€Tenn.€(1€Pickle)€203,€5€S.W.€377€(1886);€òòTeas€v.€Stateóó,€26€Tenn.€(7ÏHumphreys)€174€(1846);€òòHite€v.€Stateóó,€17€Tenn.€(9€Yerger)€198€(1836);€òòFoute€v.€Stateóó,Ï4€Tenn.€(3€Haywood)€98€(1816).€€In€support€of€his€contention,€the€Defendant€focusesÏon€several€aspects€of€the€charging€instrument€which,€he€asserts,€indicate€that€it€is€anÏindictment.€€For€example,€there€is€a€typed€line€for€the€signature€of€the€district€attorneyÏafter€every€count€of€the€charging€instrument.€€The€charging€instrument€itself€containsÏthe€language,€ð ðand€prior€to€the€finding€of€this€òòindictmentóóðð€(emphasis€added).€€TheÏnames€of€the€witnesses€were€listed€where€those€names€are€typically€listed€forÏindictments€rather€than€presentments.€€In€addition,€T.B.I.€Agent€Taylor€was€listed€as€theÏprosecutor€as€though€the€charging€instrument€were€an€indictment.€€Clearly,€however,Íthe€signature€of€the€district€attorney€does€not€appear€on€the€charging€instrument.ÌÌà àThe€State€does€not€contest€that€the€charging€instrument€lacks€the€signature€ofÏthe€district€attorney.€€Nor€does€the€State€contest€that€an€indictment€lacking€the€districtÏattorneyððs€signature€is€defective.€€Instead,€the€State€argues€that€the€chargingÏinstrument€is€actually€a€valid€presentment.€€The€State€points€out€that€the€chargingÏinstrument€contains€the€signatures€of€all€of€the€members€of€the€grand€jury,€which€theÏDefendant€does€not€contest.ÌÌà àPrior€to€trial,€the€Defendant€filed€a€motion€to€dismiss€the€ð ðindictmentðð€due€to€theÏlack€of€the€district€attorneyððs€signature.€€Each€party€argued€its€position€at€a€pretrialÏmotion€hearing€conducted€on€March€19,€1993.€€After€hearing€argument,€the€trial€courtÏdenied€the€Defendantððs€motion€to€dismiss€the€indictment.€€The€trial€court€found€that,Ïalthough€the€charging€instrument€contained€ð ðcertain€indicators€that€the€instrument€mayÏhave€been€prepared€in€the€typical€fashion€of€an€indictment,ðð€the€fact€that€it€containedÏthe€signatures€of€all€of€the€grand€jurors€rendered€it€a€valid€presentment.ÌÌà àIn€considering€this€issue,€we€begin€with€the€long„standing€principle€ð ðthat€noÏperson€shall€be€put€to€answer€any€criminal€charge€but€by€presentment,€indictment€orÏimpeachment.ðð€€Tenn.€Const.€art.€I,€ðð€14.€€Although€the€most€common€method€ofÏinitiating€prosecution€is€an€indictment,€Tennessee€law€also€allows€for€prosecution€toÏcommence€by€a€presentment.€€òòSeeóó€òòState€v.€Streetóó,€768€S.W.2d€703,€713€(Tenn.€Crim.ÏApp.€1988);€Raybin,€òòTennessee€Criminal€Practice€and€Procedureóó,€ðð€9.2.€€In€fact,Íindictments€and€presentments€are€virtually€identical€in€purpose.€€The€general€purposeÏof€either€instrument€Çis€to€advise€the€accused€of€the€offense€with€which€he€or€she€is€charged.€€òòSee,€e.g.óó,ÏòòStanley€v.€Stateóó,€171€Tenn.€(7€Beeler)€406,€104€S.W.2d€819,€821€(1937).ÌÌà àWe€note€that€there€are€no€specific€constitutional€or€statutory€requirements€as€toÏthe€form,€manner,€or€method€in€which€a€presentment€must€be€made.€€òòSeeóó€òòStoots€v.ÏStateóó,€205€Tenn.€(9€McCanless)€59,€325€S.W.2d€532,€536€(1959);€òòState€v.€Mingledorffóó,Ï713€S.W.2d€88,€88€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.€1986).€€The€form€of€a€presentment€is€often,€byÏpractice,€sufficiently€similar€to€the€form€of€an€indictment€that€the€Tennessee€code€statesÏthat€the€use€of€indictment€includes€presentment€ð ðwhenever€the€context€so€requires€orÏwill€permit.ðð€€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€40„13„101(b).€€As€the€late€Chief€Justice€Grafton€GreenÏexplained,€ð ð[t]he€presentment€is€òòin€the€form€of€a€bill€of€indictmentóó,€and€is€signedÏindividually€by€the€grand€jurors€who€returned€it.ðð€€òòState€v.€Davidsonóó,€171€Tenn.€(7ÏBeeler)€347,€103€S.W.2d€22,€23€(1937)€(quoting€òòState€v.€Darnalóó,€20€Tenn.€(1ÏHumphreys)€290€(1839))€(emphasis€added).€€The€primary€difference€between€the€formÏof€an€indictment€and€that€of€a€presentment€is€that€an€indictment€must€be€signed€by€theÏdistrict€attorney€and€endorsed€by€the€foreperson€of€the€grand€jury,€whereas€aÏpresentment€must€be€signed€by€all€of€the€grand€jurors€but€need€not€be€signed€by€theÏdistrict€attorney.€€òòSeeóó€òòCrumley€v.€Stateóó,€180€Tenn.€(16€Beeler)€303,€174€S.W.2d€572,Ï573€(1943);€òòGarret€v.€Stateóó,€17€Tenn.€(9€Yerger)€389,€390€(1836);€òòState€v.€Hudsonóó,€487ÏS.W.2d€672,€675€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.€1972).ÌÌà àApplying€those€precepts€to€the€case€at€bar,€we€conclude€that€the€trial€court€didÏnot€err€in€finding€that€the€charging€instrument€was€a€valid€presentment.€€The€instrumentÍcontained€the€signatures€of€all€of€the€members€of€the€grand€jury.€€Regardless€of€theÏlack€of€the€district€attorneyððs€signature,€the€instrument€satisfied€the€requirements€of€aÏpresentment.€€Thus,€the€Defendantððs€first€issue€lacks€merit.ÌÌà@ àII.ÌÌà àThe€Defendant€contends€that€the€trial€court€erred€by€denying€him€pretrialÏdiversion.€€After€the€District€Attorney€refused€to€enter€into€a€memorandum€ofÏunderstanding€to€grant€pretrial€diversion,€the€Defendant€applied€for€a€writ€of€certiorariÏto€the€trial€court.€€After€a€hearing,€the€trial€court€denied€the€Defendantððs€application.€ÏSubsequently,€the€Defendant€Ìmoved€for€an€interlocutory€appeal€pursuant€to€T.R.A.P.€9.€€Review€was€denied,€and€theÏDefendant€proceeded€to€trial.ÌÌà àHe€now€raises€on€direct€appeal€that€the€trial€court€erred€in€failing€to€grant€pretrialÏdiversion.€€The€State€argues€that€the€Defendant€has€waived€this€issue,€and€we€agree.€ÏAn€appeal€of€the€grant€or€denial€of€pretrial€diversion€is€available€by€interlocutoryÏappeal€pursuant€to€Rule€9€and€Rule€10€of€the€Tennessee€Rules€of€AppellateÏProcedure.€€òòState€v.€Mecordóó,€815€S.W.2d€218,€219€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.€1991);€òòState€v.ÏMcDuffóó,€691€S.W.2d€569,€€570€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.€1984);€òòState€v.€Montgomeryóó,€623ÏS.W.2d€116,€118€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.€1981).€€The€Defendant€argues€that€òòMecordóóÏmisinterprets€the€holdings€of€òòMcDuffóó€and€òòMontgomeryóó,€and€urges€that€an€interlocutoryÏappeal€may€be€taken€by€either€a€Rule€9€òòoróó€Rule€10€application€or€the€issue€is€waived.€ÍThe€State€contends€that€òòMecordóó€states€the€preferred€rule,€that€the€issue€is€waivedÏunless€the€Defendant€appealed€through€òòbothóó€Rule€9€and€Rule€10.ÌÌà àHowever,€the€determination€of€waiver€does€not€depend€upon€whether€theÏDefendant€used€Rule€9€and€Rule€10€in€succession€or€simply€appealed€using€oneÏmethod.€€The€Defendant€waived€the€pretrial€diversion€issue€because€he€proceeded€toÏtrial.€€Review€of€the€granting€or€denial€of€pretrial€diversion€is€not€available€in€a€T.R.A.P.Ï3€direct€appeal.€€òòSeeóó€òòState€v.€Nabbóó,€713€S.W.2d€685,€686€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.€1986).€ÏòòMecordóó€accurately€states€the€process€for€appeal:€ð ð[T]he€defendant€correctly€petitionedÏthe€trial€court€to€allow€an€interlocutory€appeal€pursuant€to€T.R.A.P.€9.€.€.€.€Rather€thanÏproceeding€to€trial,€the€defendant€should€have€filed€an€application€for€an€extraordinaryÏappeal€by€permission€under€T.R.A.P.€10.ðð€€òòMecordóó,€815€S.W.2d€at€219.€€This€failure€toÏpursue€the€second€available€option€for€an€interlocutory€appeal€constitutes€a€waiver.€ÏThe€usual€and€preferred€method€is€to€first€appeal€through€Rule€9,€and€if€unsuccessful,Ïthrough€Rule€10.€€If€the€appeal€is€unsuccessful€after€review€or€denial€of€review€underÏRule€10,€a€defendant€has€exhausted€his€or€her€remedies€on€the€issue€of€pretrialÏdiversion.€€We€note,€however,€that€judicial€diversion€is€a€remedy€that€could€have€beenÏpursued€after€trial.€€òòSeeóó€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð40„35„313.€This€issue€has€no€merit.ÌÌà@ àIII.ÌÌà àAs€his€next€issue,€the€Defendant€argues€that€the€trial€court€erred€by€denying€hisÏmotion€to€suppress€three€statements€he€made€to€T.B.I.€Agent€John€Taylor.€€HeÍcontends€that€his€first€statement€on€June€17,€1992,€was€involuntary€and€thatÏsubsequent€statements€should€have€been€excluded€as€fruits€from€the€initial€illegalÏstatement.€€The€Defendant€was€contacted€by€Agent€Taylor€and€Agent€Jeff€Puckett€at€hisÏoffice€at€the€Highway€Department.€€At€the€same€time,€other€T.B.I.€agents€wereÏexecuting€a€subpoena€to€collect€the€Highway€Department€records.€€Agent€Taylor€toldÏthe€Defendant€that€the€T.B.I.€had€received€some€complaints€regarding€his€possibleÏillegal€conduct€in€the€Highway€Department.€€The€Defendant€was€the€focus€of€theÏinvestigation€at€that€point€because€the€complaints€originated€with€him.€€Agent€Taylor,Ïwith€Agent€Puckett€present,€interviewed€the€Defendant€in€his€office;€the€Defendant€wasÏseated€behind€his€desk.€€No€òòMirandaóó€warnings€were€given€before€questioning€wasÏinitiated.€€Agent€Taylor€was€wearing€a€firearm€in€a€holster,€but€it€is€unclear€whether€itÏwas€visible€to€the€Defendant.€€The€interview€lasted€somewhat€over€an€hour,€duringÏwhich€Agent€Taylor€composed€a€handwritten€statement€from€the€Defendantððs€answers.€ÏThe€Defendant€reviewed€the€statement,€made€corrections€and€initialed€them,€andÏsigned€the€statement.€€Agent€Taylor€contacted€the€Defendant€again€at€his€place€ofÏemployment€on€July€7€and€July€30,€1992,€to€inquire€about€specific€incidents.€€TheseÏmeetings€were€conducted€in€a€similar€manner€to€the€June€17€encounter.ÌÌà àThe€Defendant€was€later€indicted€for€the€alleged€offenses.€€He€submitted€aÏmotion€to€suppress€all€three€statements€on€grounds€that€he€was€entitled€to€òòMirandaóóÏwarnings€and€that€the€initial€statement€was€involuntary€and€thus,€tainted€the€remainingÏstatements.€€The€trial€court€conducted€a€hearing€and€denied€the€Defendantððs€motion.€ÏOn€appeal,€the€Defendant€argues€only€one€ground:€that€his€statement€made€on€JuneÍ17,€1992,€was€involuntary€and€that€it€and€the€remaining€statements€should€have€beenÏexcluded.ÌÌà àThe€privilege€against€self„incrimination€protects€an€accused€from€beingÏcompelled€to€testify€against€himself.€€òòSeeóó€òòMiranda€v.€Arizona,óó€384€U.S.€436,€86€S.Ct.Ï1602,€16€L.Ed.2d€694€(1966).€€TheòòMirandaóó€court€held€that€"the€prosecution€may€notÏuse€statements,€whether€exculpatory€or€inculpatory,€stemming€from€custodialÏinterrogation€of€the€defendant€unless€it€demonstrates€the€use€of€procedural€safeguardsÏeffective€to€secure€the€privilege€against€self„incrimination."€€òòMirandaóó,€384€U.S.€at€444,Ï86€S.Ct.€at€1612.€€The€test€for€determining€whether€the€òòMirandaóó€warnings€should€haveÏbeen€given€by€a€law€enforcement€officer€in€this€state€is€whether€there€has€been€aÏ"custodial€interrogation."€€€òòSeeóó€òòState€v.€Joe€L.€Andersonóó,€___€S.W.2d€___,€No.€02„S„01„9511„CC„00121€(Tenn.,€Jackson,€Sept.€16,€1996).€€The€United€States€SupremeÏCourt€has€defined€this€phrase€as€"questioning€initiated€by€law€enforcement€officersÏafter€a€person€has€been€taken€into€custody€or€otherwise€deprived€of€his€freedom€ofÏaction€in€any€significant€way."€€òòMirandaóó,€384€U.S.€at€444,€86€S.Ct.€at€1612.€€In€otherÏwords,€òòMirandaóó€warnings€are€required€when€"there€[has€been]€a€'formal€arrest€orÏrestraint€on€freedom€of€movement'€of€the€degree€associated€with€a€formal€arrest.'€"€ÏòòCalifornia€v.€Beheleróó,€463€U.S.€1121,€1125,€103€S.Ct.€3517,€3520,€77€L.Ed.2d€1275Ï(1983)€(quoting€òòOregon€v.€Mathiasonóó,€429€U.S.€492,€495,€97€S.Ct.€711,€714,€50ÏL.Ed.2d€714€(1977)).€€ÌÌà àThe€United€States€Supreme€Court€has€also€interpreted€the€Fifth€Amendment€toÍrequire€that€an€incriminating€statement€or€confession€be€freely€and€voluntarily€given€toÏbe€admissible.€€€This€even€applies€to€statements€obtained€after€the€proper€òòMirandaóóÏwarnings€have€been€issued.€€òòSeeóó€òòState€v.€Kellyóó,€603€S.W.2d€726,€729€(Tenn.€1980).€ÏStatements€and€confessions€not€made€as€a€result€of€custodial€interrogations€must€alsoÏbe€voluntary€to€be€admissible.€€òòSeeóó€òòArizona€v.€Fulminanteóó,€499€U.S.€279,€286„88,€111ÏS.€Ct.€1246,€1252„53,€113€L.Ed.2d€302€(1991)€(while€an€inmate,€the€defendantÏconfessed€to€another€prisoner€in€exchange€for€protection€and€this€was€held€to€beÏcoerced).€€It€must€not€be€extracted€by€"any€sort€of€threats€or€violence,€nor€obtained€byÏany€direct€or€implied€promises,€however€slight,€nor€by€the€exertion€of€any€improperÏinfluence."€€€òòBram€v.€United€Statesóó,€168€U.S.€532,€542„543,€18€S.Ct.€183,€187,€42€L.Ed.Ï568€(1897)(citations€omitted).€€€Moreover,€due€process€requires€that€confessionsÏtendered€in€response€to€either€physical€or€psychological€coercion€be€suppressed.€€ÏòòRogers€v.€Richmondóó,€365€U.S.€534,€540„541,€81€S.Ct.€735,€739,€5€L.Ed.2d€760€(1961);ÏòòKellyóó,€603€S.W.2d€at€728„29.€€This€has€evolved€into€the€ð ðtotality€of€the€circumstancesððÏtest€to€determine€whether€a€confession€is€voluntary.€€òòFulminanteóó,€499€U.S.€at€285„87,Ï111€S.€Ct.€at€1251„52;€€€òòFrazier€v.€Cuppóó,€394€U.S.€731,€739,€89€S.€Ct.€1420,€1425,€22ÏL.Ed.2d€684€(1969);€òòState€v.€Crumpóó,€834€S.W.2d€265,€271€(Tenn.),€òòcert€deniedóó,€506ÏU.S.€905,€113€S.Ct.€298,€121€L.Ed.2d€221€(1992).ÌÌà àHere,€the€Defendant€does€not€argue€that€the€statements€he€made€were€elicitedÏwhile€undergoing€a€custodial€interrogation.€€Rather,€he€simply€contends€that,€becauseÏof€the€ð ðsurpriseðð€visit€from€the€T.B.I.€agents,€the€atmosphere€was€such€that€he€could€notÏhave€made€the€statements€voluntarily.€€He€points€to€the€fact€that€he€was€initiallyÍcontacted€at€his€office€without€warning.€€He€claims€he€was€questioned€ð ðbehind€closedÏdoors€for€several€hours.ðð€€He€also€stresses€that,€while€he€was€being€questioned,€T.B.I.Ïagents€were€seizing€hundreds€of€documents€from€the€Highway€Department€office.€ÏThis,€he€contends,€created€an€atmosphere€that€renders€any€statements€made€on€JuneÏ17,€1992,€involuntary.€€As€a€result,€any€statements€made€on€subsequent€occasionsÏshould€have€been€excluded€as€ð ðfruit€of€the€poisonous€tree,ðð€and€he€cites€òòState€v.ÏSmithóó,€834€S.W.2d€915€(Tenn.€1992).ÌÌà àHowever,€the€State€counters€that€there€is€no€evidence€that€supports€the€claimÏthat€the€atmosphere€was€coercive.€€The€Defendant€agreed€to€be€questioned€and€wasÏable€to€remain€in€his€own€office,€sitting€behind€his€own€desk.€€There€is€no€evidence€thatÏthe€agents€made€any€threats€or€promises€to€the€Defendant.€€There€is€uncontrovertedÏtestimony€that€the€interrogation€lasted€over€an€hour€and€no€evidence€that€the€meetingÏlasted€several€hours.€€Furthermore,€the€State€asserts,€citing€authority,€that€the€agentsððÏsimply€wearing€weapons€does€not€constitute€coercion€and€neither€does€theÏDefendantððs€discomfort€while€under€close€scrutiny.ÌÌà àWe€have€studied€the€evidence,€considering€the€totality€of€the€circumstances,Ïand€we€cannot€conclude€that€the€trial€court€erred€by€denying€the€Defendantððs€motion€toÏsuppress.€€A€trial€court's€findings€of€fact€in€a€suppression€hearing€will€be€upheld€unlessÏthe€evidence€preponderates€otherwise.€€òòState€v.€Odomóó,€928€S.W.2d€18,€23€(Tenn.Ï1996).€€The€Defendant€has€failed€to€meet€his€burden€of€demonstrating€that€theÏevidence€preponderates€against€the€trial€courtððs€findings.€€Although€the€atmosphereÍsurrounding€the€interrogation€may€have€proved€distressing,€there€is€little€evidence€toÏsupport€that€the€statement€was€coerced.€€Moreover,€because€we€find€the€initialÏstatement€to€be€voluntarily€given,€the€other€two€statements€the€Defendant€made€wereÏproperly€admitted.€€òòSeeóó€òòSmithóó,€834€S.W.2d€at€921.€€This€issue€is€without€merit.ÌÌà@ àIV.ÌÌà àIn€his€next€issue,€the€Defendant€argues€that€Agent€Taylor€should€not€have€beenÏallowed€to€testify€in€violation€of€Rule€615€of€the€Tennessee€Rules€of€Evidence.€€TheÏDefendant€asserts€that€under€òòState€v.€Mothershedóó,€578€S.W.2d€96€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.Ï1978),€once€he€invoked€the€rule€to€sequester€witnesses,€the€stateððs€representative€hadÏto€testify€first€or€waive€his€opportunity.€€We€find€that€under€Tenn.€R.€Evid.€615,€AgentÏTaylor€was€permitted€to€remain€in€the€courtroom€as€the€stateððs€representative.ÌÌà àà àTennessee€Rules€of€Evidence€615€provides:ÌÌÓÓà8 àAt€the€request€of€a€party€the€court€shall€order€witnesses,€including€rebuttalÏwitnesses,€excluded€at€trial€or€other€adjudicatory€hearing.€€SequestrationÏshall€be€effective€before€voir€dire€or€opening€statements€if€requested.€ÏThe€court€shall€order€all€persons€not€to€disclose€by€any€means€toÏexcluded€witnesses€any€live€trial€testimony€or€exhibits€created€in€theÏcourtroom€by€a€witness.€€This€rule€does€not€authorize€exclusion€of€(1)€aÏparty€who€is€a€natural€person,€or€(2)€an€officer€or€employee€of€a€partyÏwhich€is€not€a€natural€person€designated€as€its€representative€by€itsÏattorney,€or€(3)€a€person€whose€presence€is€shown€by€a€party€to€beÏessential€to€the€presentation€of€the€partyððs€cause.ÌÌÓÓÌà àWhile€ð ðthe€ruleðð€may€be€invoked€at€any€time€and€is€mandatory,€òòState€v.€Anthonyóó,Ï836€S.W.2d€600,€605€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.€1992),€Rule€615€provides€for€three€exceptions.€ÏUnder€subsection€(2),€the€state€is€permitted€to€designate€a€representative.€€€In€òòState€v.ÏWingardóó,€891€S.W.2d€628€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.€1994),€this€Court€held€that€the€prisonÏwarden€was€the€chief€official€at€the€correctional€facility€and€a€participant€in€the€searchÏfor€the€defendant€and€therefore,€qualified€as€the€stateððs€designated€representative€orÏð ðprosecutorðð€in€the€case.€€As€such,€the€witness€was€allowed€to€testify€in€rebuttal€evenÏthough€he€had€not€been€excluded€from€the€courtroom€during€the€previous€testimony.€ÏòòIdóó.€at€635.ÌÌà àIn€the€present€case,€Agent€Taylor€was€assigned€the€responsibility€of€Ïinvestigating€alleged€criminal€conduct€at€the€Highway€Department.€€He€was€clearly€theÏrepresentative€or€prosecutor€for€the€state.€€As€such,€under€subsection€(2),€it€was€not€aÏviolation€of€Rule€615€to€allow€Agent€Taylor€to€sit€at€the€Stateððs€table€during€theÏtestimony€of€the€first€five€witnesses€before€being€called€to€testify.€€This€issue€is€withoutÏmerit.ÌÌà@ àV.ÌÌà àIn€his€next€issue,€the€Defendant€raises€several€actions€by€the€State€which€heÏclaims€constituted€prosecutorial€misconduct.€€In€òòHarrington€v.€Stateóó,€215€Tenn.€(19ÏMcCanless)€338,€385€S.W.2d€758€(1965),€our€Supreme€Court€set€out€the€test€to€beÏapplied€by€an€appellate€court€in€reviewing€instances€of€improper€conduct,€i.e.,Í"whether€the€improper€conduct€could€have€affected€the€verdict€to€the€prejudice€of€theÏdefendant."€€òòIdóó.€at€340,€385€S.W.2d€at€759.€€In€òòJudge€v.€Stateóó,€539€S.W.2d€340€(Tenn.ÏCrim.€App.€1976),€this€Court€noted€five€factors€generally€accepted€as€those€to€beÏconsidered€in€making€the€determination€of€whether€allegedly€improper€conductÏaffected€the€verdict€to€a€defendant's€prejudice:ÌÌÓÓà à1.à8 àThe€conduct€complained€of€viewed€in€context€and€in€light€ofÏthe€facts€and€circumstances€of€the€case.ÌÌà à2.à8 àThe€curative€measures€undertaken€by€the€court€and€theÏprosecution.ÌÌà à3.à8 àThe€intent€of€the€prosecutor€in€making€the€improperÏstatement.ÌÌà à4.à8 àThe€cumulative€effect€of€the€improper€conduct€and€any€otherÏerrors€in€the€record.ÌÌà à5.à8 àThe€relative€strength€or€weakness€of€the€case.ÌÌÓÓÌòòIdóó.€at€344.Ìà àWe€have€reviewed€the€Defendantððs€contentions€of€prosecutorial€misconduct€inÏlight€of€these€factors€and€found€that€none€has€merit.ÌÌà@ à(a)ÌÌà àFirst,€the€Defendant€argues€that€the€State€improperly€and€prejudicially€contactedÏapproximately€seventy€witnesses€prior€to€trial.€€From€the€record,€it€appears€that€€prior€toÏtrial,€Mr.€Byrne€expressed€to€the€District€Attorney€General€the€concerns€of€HighwayÍDepartment€employees€as€to€whether€they€were€obligated€to€talk€with€the€DefendantÏand€his€attorney.€€In€response,€the€District€Attorney€General€dictated€and€sent€out€aÏletter€to€several€witnesses.€€The€body€of€the€letter€read€as€follows:ÌÌÓÓà8 àYou€are€a€potential€witness€in€this€case.€€I€wanted€to€let€you€know€that€theÏDistrict€Attorney€cannot€legally€suggest€to€you€that€you€not€discuss€whatÏyou€may€know€about€the€case€with€the€attorney€representing€an€indictedÏdefendant.€€This€office€is€not,€by€this€letter,€suggesting€that€you€not€do€so.ÌÌà8 àHowever,€no€defendant€or€defense€attorney€can€compel€you€to€discussÏthe€case€with€them,€and€your€decision€about€whether€or€not€you€wish€toÏdo€so€is€entirely€up€to€you.ÌÌà8 àWe€have€written€you€because€we€have€received€inquiries€from€potentialÏwitnesses€who€have€asked€us€if€they€must€discuss€this€case€with€theÏdefendant€or€his€lawyer.ÌÌÓÓÌà àà àIn€òòGammon€v.€Stateóó,€506€S.W.2d€188€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.€1973),€this€CourtÏstated€the€well„recognized€principle€that:ÌÌÓÓà8 àProspective€witnesses€are€not€partisans,€and€they€should€be€regarded€asÏspokesmen€for€the€facts€as€they€see€them.€€Because€they€do€not€ð ðbelongððÏto€either€party,€a€prosecutor,€defense€counsel€or€anyone€acting€for€eitherÏshould€not€suggest€to€a€witness€that€he€not€submit€to€an€interview€byÏopposing€counsel.ÌÌÓÓÌòòIdóó.€at€190.€€Under€Tennessee€case€law,€a€prospective€witness€has€ð ðthe€discretion€toÏtalk€„€or€not€to€talk€„€to€either€counsel,€as€the€witness€sees€fit.€€Of€course,€the€law€alsoÏprovides€that€counsel€may€not€instruct€a€witness€not€to€discuss€the€facts€of€a€case€withÏopposing€counsel.ðð€€òòState€v.€Singletonóó,€853€S.W.2d€490,€493€(Tenn.€1993).ÌÌà àà àAlthough€the€letter€correctly€explains€the€rights€of€any€witness€in€criminalÏjustice€litigation,€the€fact€that€copies€were€sent€to€witnesses€who€did€not€request€theÏinformation€is€of€concern.€€Both€Prosecution€Function€Standard€3„3.1(d)€and€DefenseÏFunction€Standard€4„4.3(d),€ABA€Standards€for€Criminal€Justice€(3d€ed.€1993),€provideÏin€part€that€counsel€ð ðshould€not€discourage€or€obstruct€communication€betweenÏprospective€witnesses€and€[opposing€counsel].ðð€€In€the€Commentary€to€both€standards,Ïthe€following€is€stated:ÌÓÓà8 àBecause€witnesses€do€not€ð ðbelongðð€to€either€party,€it€is€improper€for€aÏprosecutor,€defense€counsel,€or€anyone€acting€for€either€side€to€suggestÏto€a€witness€that€the€witness€not€submit€to€an€interview€by€opposingÏcounsel.ÌÌà8 àà àIt€is€not€only€proper€but€it€may€be€the€duty€of€the€prosecutor€andÏdefense€counsel€to€interview€any€person€who€may€be€called€as€a€witnessÏin€the€case€.€.€.€.€€òòIn€theóó€òòevent€a€witness€asksóó€the€prosecutor€or€defenseÏcounsel,€or€a€member€of€their€staffs,€whether€it€is€proper€to€submit€to€anÏinterview€by€opposing€counsel€or€whether€it€is€obligatory,€the€witnessÏshould€be€informed€that€there€is€no€legal€obligation€to€submit€to€anÏinterview.€€It€is€proper,€however,€and€may€be€the€duty€of€both€counsel€inÏmost€cases€to€interview€all€persons€who€may€be€witnesses€and€it€is€in€theÏinterest€of€justice€that€witnesses€be€available€for€interview€by€counsel.ÌÌÓÓÓ  Ó(Emphasis€added).€€Thus,€to€the€extent€letters€went€to€witnesses€who€had€expressedÏconcern€about€an€obligation€to€talk€to€the€defense€and€had€sought€advice,€they€wereÏan€appropriate€response€by€the€District€Attorney€General.ÌÌà àOn€the€other€hand,€to€the€extent€letters€went€to€witnesses€who€did€not€seekÏadvice€from€the€prosecutor€about€their€rights€and€who€had€already€been€interviewedÏby€state€investigators,€the€letters€presented€a€risk€that€they€could€have€been€taken€as€aÍsuggestion€not€to€talk€to€defense€personnel,€regardless€of€the€District€AttorneyÏGeneralððs€disclaimer€in€the€letter€to€the€contrary.€€In€the€Commentary€to€DiscoveryÏProcedure€Before€Trial€Standard€11„4.1,€ABA€Standards€for€Criminal€Justice€(2d€edÏ1980)€dealing€with€counselððs€obligation€not€to€impede€opposing€counselððsÏinvestigation,€including€potential€witness€interviews,€the€following€is€stated:€€ÌÓÓÓ  Óà8 àà àThe€standard€imposes€a€duty€on€prosecution€and€defenseÏcounsel,€and€their€respective€staffs,€to€refrain€from€impeding€theÏinvestigation€of€the€charges€either€by€advising€potential€witnesses€not€toÏdiscuss€the€case€with€opposing€counsel€or€by€taking€other€steps€thatÏwould€prevent€or€interfere€with€further€investigation€by€opposing€counsel.Ìà àÌà à*€*€*ÌÌà8 àà àObstruction€or€interference€with€opposing€counselððs€investigationÏand€preparation€of€the€case€frequently€takes€the€form€of€instructingÏwitnesses€not€to€talk€with€opposing€counsel€or€their€staffs,€òòbut€it€may€takeÏthe€form€of€more€subtle€instructionsóó.ÌÌÓÓÓ  Ó(Emphasis€added).€€Although€the€record€in€this€case€reflects€that€the€District€AttorneyÏGeneral€had€no€intention€of€unduly€interfering€with€or€impeding€defense€counselððsÏpreparation,€the€letter€could€have€had€that€effect€with€witnesses€who€had€not€solicitedÏadvice.€€ÌÌà àUltimately,€though,€neither€the€Defendant€nor€the€record€discloses€the€witnessesÏwho€were€in€either€category.€€Also,€there€is€no€specification€or€showing€of€anyÏprejudice€that€was€incurred€by€the€Defendant€in€his€trial€preparation€or€presentationÏbecause€of€a€witnessðð€reaction€to€the€letter.€€Thus,€under€these€circumstances€and€theÏfact€that€the€record€shows€that€there€was€no€bad€faith€on€the€part€of€the€District€AttorneyÏGeneral,€we€do€not€believe€that€the€record€establishes€either€misconduct€or€harmÍresulting€from€the€letter.€€The€Defendant€is€not€entitled€to€a€new€trial€because€of€thisÏissue.à0 àÌ€€à àÌà@ à(b)ÌÌà àNext,€the€Defendant€argues€that€the€State€should€have€disclosed€before€trial€aÏmeeting€between€Agent€Taylor€and€Mr.€Hulsey,€who€was€a€key€witness€in€the€case,Ïand€his€attorney€pursuant€to€the€Defendantððs€Motion€for€Disclosure€of€ImpeachingÏInformation€and/or€the€Defendantððs€Motion€for€Production€of€Exculpatory€Evidence.€ÏSpecifically,€the€Defendant€complains€that€he€did€not€learn€of€Mr.€Hulseyððs€meetingÏwith€Agent€Taylor€until€Mr.€Hulsey€testified€at€trial.€€Accordingly,€the€DefendantÏcontends€that€the€Stateððs€failure€to€disclose€this€meeting€was€by€definition€either€aÏviolation€of€òòBrady€v.€Marylandóó,€373€U.S.€83,€83€S.Ct.€1194,€10€L.Ed.2d€215€(1963),Ïbecause€the€State€failed€to€reveal€exculpatory€evidence,€or€it€was€a€violation€of€theÏStateððs€duty€to€disclose€impeaching€evidence€pursuant€to€the€Defendantððs€pretrialÏMotion€for€Disclosure€of€Impeaching€Information,€which€was€granted€by€the€trial€court.ÌÌà àDuring€the€cross„examination€of€Mr.€Hulsey,€it€developed€that€at€the€beginningÏof€the€investigation,€Agent€Taylor€contacted€Mr.€Hulsey€and€asked€if€he€would€beÏwilling€to€meet€him€at€the€T.B.I.€office€in€Gallatin,€Tennessee.€€Mr.€Hulsey€and€hisÏlawyer€met€with€Agent€Taylor€in€April€of€1992,€for€approximately€four€and€a€half€hours.€ÏMr.€Hulsey€testified€that€Agent€Taylor€took€notes€during€the€interview€and€showed€themÏto€him.€€The€Defendant€did€not€pursue€this€issue€during€Mr.€Hulseyððs€testimony.€€TheÍnotes€from€the€interview€were€not€made€a€part€of€this€record.ÌÌà àIn€òòBrady€v.€Marylandóó,€373€U.S.€at€87,€83€S.Ct.€at€1196„97,€the€United€StatesÏSupreme€Court€held€that€the€prosecution€has€the€duty€to€furnish€exculpatory€evidenceÏto€the€accused€upon€request.€€Any€"suppression€by€the€prosecution€of€evidenceÏfavorable€to€an€accused€upon€request€violates€due€process€where€the€evidence€isÏmaterial€either€to€guilt€or€to€punishment,€irrespective€of€the€good€faith€or€bad€faith€of€theÏprosecution."€€òòIdóó.€€The€duty€to€disclose€extends€to€all€"favorable€information"€regardlessÏof€whether€the€evidence€is€admissible€at€trial.€€òòState€v.€Marshallóó,€845€S.W.2d€228,€232„33€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.€1992);€€òòBranch€v.€Stateóó,€4€Tenn.€Crim.€App.€164,€168,€469€S.W.2dÏ533,€536€(1969).€€In€òòUnited€States€v.€Bagleyóó,€473€U.S.€667,€676,€105€S.Ct.€3375,€3380,Ï87€L.Ed.2d€481€(1985),€the€Supreme€Court€held€that€both€exculpatory€andÏimpeachment€evidence€fall€under€the€òòBradyóó€rule.ÌÌà àBefore€an€accused€is€entitled€to€relief€under€this€theory,€he€must€establishÏseveral€prerequisites:€(a)€the€prosecution€must€have€suppressed€the€evidence;€(b)€theÏevidence€suppressed€must€have€been€favorable€to€the€accused;€and€(c)€the€evidenceÏmust€have€been€material.€€òòSeeóó€òòBagleyóó,€473€U.S.€at€674„75,€105€S.€Ct.€at€3379„80;ÏòòBradyóó,€373€U.S.€at€87,€83€S.€Ct.€at€1196„97;€òòWorkman€v.€Stateóó,€868€S.W.2d€705,€709Ï(Tenn.€Crim.€App.€1993),€òòcert.€deniedóó,€510€U.S.€1171,€114€S.Ct.€1207,€127€L.Ed.2dÏ555€(1994);€òòState€v.€Marshallóó,€845€S.W.2d€228,€232;€òòStrouth€v.€Stateóó,€755€S.W.2d€819,Ï828€(Tenn.€€Crim.€App.€1986).€€In€òòState€v.€Spurlockóó,€874€S.W.2d€602€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.Ï1993),€this€Court€recognized€a€fourth€prerequisite€to€relief:€"the€accused€must€make€aÍproper€request€for€the€production€of€the€evidence,€unless€the€evidence,€when€viewedÏby€the€prosecution,€is€obviously€exculpatory€in€nature€and€will€be€helpful€to€theÏaccused."€òòIdóó.€at€609€(citations€omitted).ÌÌà àFirst,€we€find€that€the€Stateððs€failure€to€disclose€this€meeting€with€Mr.€Hulsey€didÏnot€violate€the€Defendantððs€request€for€impeaching€information.€€Specifically,€theÏDefendant€requested€information€concerning€all€considerations€or€promises€ofÏconsideration€given€to€or€made€on€behalf€of€prosecution€witnesses.€€The€DefendantÏimplies€that€Mr.€Hulseyððs€subsequent€appointment€to€the€Defendantððs€position€at€theÏHighway€Department€indicates€that€Mr.€Hulsey€received€some€consideration€from€theÏState€for€his€testimony.€€We€first€note€that€Mr.€Hulsey€testified€that€Agent€Taylor€neverÏindicated€that€he€was€the€focus€of€the€investigation.€€Moreover,€there€is€no€proof€of€anyÏconsideration€given€to€Mr.€Hulsey€in€exchange€for€his€testimony.€Also,€there€is€no€proofÏthat€the€State€had€any€connection€to€the€subsequent€promotion€of€Mr.€Hulsey€or€thatÏsuch€promotion€was€in€any€way€related€to€his€testimony€at€trial.€€Finally,€we€concludeÏthat€the€Defendant€does€not€have€a€valid€claim€under€òòBradyóó.€€Without€the€notes€takenÏby€Agent€Taylor€at€the€meeting€with€Mr.€Hulsey,€we€are€unable€to€find€that€suchÏevidence€was€favorable€or€material.ÌÌà@ à(c)ÌÌà àNext,€the€Defendant€asserts€that€the€prosecutor€improperly€continued€to€ask€andÏimply€that€witnesses€from€the€Highway€Department€were€afraid€of€losing€their€jobs€as€aÍresult€of€testifying€at€the€Defendantððs€trial.ÌÌà àBecause€the€Defendant€has€failed€to€cite€authority€in€support€of€this€complaint,Ïthe€issue€is€waived.€€€T.R.A.P.€27(a);€Tenn.€Ct.€Crim.€App.€R.€10(b);€òòState€v.€Chanceóó,Ï778€S.W.2d€457,€462€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.€1989);€òòState€v.€Killebrewóó,€760€S.W.2d€228,Ï231€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.€1988).€€Moreover,€the€Defendant€failed€to€make€anyÏcontemporaneous€objection€to€the€prosecutor's€remarks€and€questions€objected€toÏnow.€€It€is€well€settled€that€without€a€contemporaneous€objection€to€a€prosecutor'sÏstatements,€the€error€is€waived.€€òòState€v.€Suttonóó,€562€S.W.2d€820,€825€(Tenn.€1978);€ÏòòState€v.€Comptonóó,€642€S.W.2d€745,€747€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.€1982).€€ÌÌà àRegardless,€any€attempt€by€an€accused€to€suppress,€destroy,€or€concealÏevidence€is€a€relevant€circumstance€from€which€the€guilt€of€the€accused€can€beÏinferred.€€òòHicks€v.€Stateóó,€533€S.W.2d€330,€334€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.€1975).€€€€It€is€proper€toÏpermit€the€introduction€of€testimony€from€a€witness€that€he€was€threatened€by€aÏdefendant€after€the€offense€occurred€in€an€effort€to€intimidate€the€witness€not€to€testify.€ÏòòTillery€v.€Stateóó,€565€S.W.2d€509,€511€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.€1978).€€Here,€any€intimidationÏof€Highway€Department€employees€by€the€Defendant€was€relevant€on€the€issue€of€theÏDefendantððs€guilt.ÌÌÌà@ à(d)ÌÌà àà àNext,€the€Defendant€asserts€that€the€State€abused€the€use€of€leadingÏquestions,€citing€to€thirty„four€(34)€times€where€the€defense€objected€to€theÏprosecutorððs€use€of€leading€questions.€€The€prosecutor€used€an€inordinate€number€ofÏleading€questions,€and€the€defenseððs€objections€to€this€practice€were€sustained.€€InÏreviewing€the€record,€we€do€not€find€that€the€prosecutorððs€use€of€leading€questionsÏprejudiced€the€verdict€in€this€case.€€òòSeeóó€òòJudge€v.€Stateóó,€539€S.W.2d€340,€344.€€Instead,Ïwe€find€that€the€prosecutorððs€use€of€leading€questions€was€for€the€most€part€merely€theÏð ðððgive€and€takeðð€that€occurs€in€any€trial€where€emotions€are€high€and€the€penaltyÏsevere.ðð€€òòState€v.€Williamsóó,€784€S.W.2d€660,€666€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.€1989).€€At€the€sameÏtime,€we€admonish€the€prosecution€to€adhere€to€the€dictates€of€Tenn.€R.€Evid.€611(c)€inÏfuture€proceedings.ÌÌ€à@ à(e)ÌÌà àNext,€the€Defendant€asserts€that€the€State€improperly€dramatized€the€testimonyÏof€Ray€Cole,€a€land€surveyor,€who€flew€over€the€Defendantððs€subdivision€to€compare€itÏwith€aerial€photographs€of€the€area.€€Specifically,€the€Defendant€complains€about€theÏState€asking€Mr.€Cole€ð ðwhen€you€went€up€in€that€little€unsafe€airplane,€did€you€takeÏwith€you€what€has€been€marked€in€evidence€as€Exhibit€61?ððÌà àà à€€Ìà àBecause€the€Defendant€has€failed€to€cite€authority€in€support€of€this€complaint,Ïthe€issue€is€waived.€€€T.R.A.P.€27(a);€Tenn.€Ct.€Crim.€App.€R.€10(b);€€òòState€v.€Chanceóó,Ï778€S.W.2d€457,€462;€òòState€v.€Killebrewóó,€760€S.W.2d€228,€231.€€Moreover,€theÍDefendant€failed€to€make€any€contemporaneous€objection€to€the€prosecutor's€remarks.€ÏAs€previously€stated,€it€is€well€settled€that€without€a€contemporaneous€objection€to€aÏprosecutor's€statements,€the€error€is€waived.€€òòState€v.€Suttonóó,€562€S.W.2d€820,€825;€ÏòòState€v.€Comptonóó,€642€S.W.2d€745,€747.€€Regardless,€we€find€that€the€prosecutorððsÏsingular€comment€concerning€the€safety€of€Mr.€Coleððs€plane€was€harmless€error.€€òòSeeóóÏTenn.€R.€Crim.€P.€52(a).Ìà@ à(f)ÌÌà àFinally,€the€Defendant€argues€that€the€State€improperly€injected€evidenceÏregarding€thirteen€(13)€roads€not€affected€by€this€indictment,€the€lack€of€a€biddingÏprocess,€and€alleging€the€Defendant€was€a€silent€partner€in€Mid„South€PavingÏCompany€(ð ðMid„Southðð).€€Initially,€we€note€that€the€Defendant€has€failed€to€citeÏauthority€in€support€of€this€complaint,€and€the€issue€is€waived.€€€T.R.A.P.€27(a);€Tenn.ÏCt.€Crim.€App.€R.€10(b);€òòState€v.€Chanceóó,€778€S.W.2d€457,€462;€òòState€v.€Killebrewóó,€760ÏS.W.2d€228,€231.€€Regardless,€we€will€address€the€issue€briefly.ÌÌà àIn€Count€Eight,€the€Defendant€was€charged€with€authorizing€and€knowinglyÏpermitting€the€private€use€of€county€equipment€and€materials.€€Specifically,€theÏDefendant€was€charged€with€authorizing€and€knowingly€permitting€between€100€andÏ200€tons€of€county€hot€mix€asphalt€to€be€used€to€pave€a€private€driveway€owned€byÏWilliam€W.€Hinkle,€Jr.,€owner€of€the€Hinkle€Chair€Company.€€The€State€alleged€that€theÏdriveway€at€Hinkle€Chair€Company€was€paved€while€the€Highway€Department€andÏMid„South€were€paving€the€intersection€of€Mt.€Sharon€and€Abednego€Roads.€€TheÍHighway€Department€had€contracted€with€Mid„South€to€do€the€work€on€several€roads,Ïincluding€Mt.€Sharon€and€Abednego€roads.€€The€required€bidding€process€was€notÏfollowed€by€the€Highway€Department.€€At€trial,€there€was€extensive€proof€regarding€theÏpaving€of€Mt.€Sharon€and€Abednego€Roads€and€the€driveway€of€Hinkle€ChairÏCompany.€€In€relationship€to€this,€there€was€extensive€proof€regarding€the€relationshipÏbetween€the€Defendant,€the€Highway€Department,€and€Mid„South.ÌÌà àWe€note€first€that€the€cited€statements€by€the€prosecution€alleging€that€theÏDefendant€was€a€silent€partner€in€Mid„South€were€made€outside€the€presence€of€theÏjury.€€As€to€the€proof€that€was€presented€to€the€jury,€the€trial€court€retains€broadÏdiscretion€in€controlling€counsels'€conduct€occurring€within€its€courtroom,€and€we€willÏnot€interfere€with€the€trial€courtððs€discretion,€absent€a€showing€that€it€abused€itsÏdiscretion.€€òòSmith€v.€Stateóó,€527€S.W.2d€737,€739€(Tenn.1975).ÌÌà àWe€have€reviewed€the€questioned€proof€in€relation€to€the€record€as€a€whole€andÏin€the€context€in€which€it€was€made.€€€The€Defendant€has€not€shown€that€the€proofÏconcerning€Mid„South€affected€the€jury's€verdict€to€the€Defendant's€detriment.€€TheÏState€presented€a€substantial€amount€of€testimony€concerning€the€work€done€for€theÏHighway€Department€by€Mid„South,€however,€the€jury€acquitted€the€Defendant€as€toÏCount€Eight€to€which€this€proof€related.€€Accordingly,€we€find€that€the€introduction€ofÏthis€proof,€if€in€fact€irrelevant,€was€harmless€error€and€that€the€state's€actions€did€notÏrise€to€a€level€of€prosecutorial€misconduct.€€€This€issue€is€without€merit.ÌÌ€à@ àVI.ÌÌà àIn€his€next€issue,€the€Defendant€contends€that€the€trial€court€erred€by€refusingÏhis€request€to€include€a€jury€instruction€for€the€range€of€punishment€that€encompassedÏthe€Defendantððs€removal€from€office.€€The€Defendant€filed€a€request€with€the€trial€courtÏfor€jury€instructions€pursuant€to€Tennessee€Code€Annotated€section€40„35„201(b).€ÏThe€applicable€language€states€that€ð ðupon€the€motion€of€either€party,€filed€with€theÏcourt€prior€to€the€selection€of€the€jury,€the€court€shall€charge€the€possible€penalties€forÏthe€offense€charged€and€all€lesser€included€offenses.ðð€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€40„35„201(b).ÌÌà àThe€Defendant€was€charged€and€convicted€of€three€counts€of€official€misconductÏpursuant€to€Tennessee€Code€Annotated€section€39„16„402.€€Under€Tennessee€CodeÏAnnotated€section€39„16„406,€a€public€servant€shall€be€removed€from€office€whenÏconvicted€of€offenses€under€section€39„16„402.€€The€statute€reads:€ÌÌÓÓà à(a)à8 àA€public€servant€convicted€under€ðð€39„16„402,€ðð€39„16„403Ïor€ðð€39„16„404€shall€be€removed€from€office€or€dischargedÏfrom€the€position.ÌÌà à(b)à8 àA€public€servant€elected€or€appointed€for€a€specified€termÏshall€be:ÌÌà àà à(1)à8 àSuspended€without€pay€immediately€uponÏconviction€in€the€trial€court€through€the€finalÏdisposition€of€the€case;ÌÌà àà à(2)à8 àRemoved€from€office€for€the€duration€of€theÏterm€during€which€the€conviction€occurred€ifÍthe€conviction€becomes€final;€€andÌÌà àà à(3)à8 àBarred€from€holding€any€appointed€or€electedÏoffice€for€ten€(10)€years€from€the€date€theÏconviction€becomes€final.ÌÌà à(c)à8 àA€public€servant€who€serves€at„will€shall€be€dischargedÏupon€conviction€in€the€trial€court.€€Subsequent€publicÏservice€shall€rest€with€the€hiring€or€appointing€authority,Ïprovided€that€such€authority€has€been€fully€informed€of€theÏconviction.ÌÌÓÓÌTenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€39„16„406.ÌÌà àThe€Defendant€argues€that€the€jury€should€have€been€informed€of€all€possibleÏconsequences€of€being€convicted€for€official€misconduct,€including€sentencing€and€theÏouster€from€office.€€The€trial€court€concluded€that€the€removal€from€office€constituted€aÏchange€in€ð ðstatusðð€rather€than€a€punishment€subject€to€the€requirements€in€TennesseeÏCode€Annotated€section€40„35„201.€€The€Defendant€asserts€that€the€failure€to€instructÏthe€jury€on€all€the€ð ðpunitive€consequencesðð€resulted€in€prejudicial€error,€and€he€citesÏòòState€v.€Cookóó,€816€S.W.2d€322,€326„27€(Tenn.€1991).€€In€òòCookóó,€the€trial€courtÏerroneously€charged€the€jury€with€only€the€Range€I€sentences€when€the€defendant€wasÏactually€eligible€for€Range€II€sentences.€€In€conducting€a€harmless€error€analysis,€ourÏSupreme€Court€concluded€that€there€was€no€affirmative€evidence€in€the€record€thatÏdemonstrated€an€effect€on€the€results€of€the€trial.€€òòIdóó.€at€326.€€However,€the€Court€foundÏprejudicial€error€when,€on€remand€for€resentencing,€which€included€the€proper€RangeÏII€sentences,€the€defendant€would€be€ð ðsentenced€to€punishment€not€known€to€orÏcontemplated€by€the€convicting€jurors.ðð€€òòIdóó.€at€326„27.€€The€Defendant€argues€that€theÍòòCookóó€rationale€should€be€applied€to€the€case€at€bar.ÌÌà àThe€State€counters€that€the€trial€court€properly€denied€the€request€for€juryÏinstructions.€€The€State€notes€that€ouster€is€a€ð ðcivil€disabilityðð€and€not€an€integral€part€ofÏthe€punishment€for€official€misconduct.€The€State€makes€a€persuasive€argument€thatÏthe€heading€of€the€statute€may€provide€clarification€as€to€the€meaning€of€its€provisions.€ÏThe€heading€of€Tennessee€Code€Annotated€section€40„35„201€reads:€ð ðIssue€of€guiltÏand€sentence€to€be€tried€separately„Instructing€jury€on€possible€òòsentencesóó.ðð€(EmphasisÏadded).€€The€phrase€ð ðpossible€penalties,ðð€standing€alone,€could€certainly€beÏinterpreted€to€include€a€removal€from€office.€€òòSeeóó€òòState€v.€Blazeróó,€619€S.W.2d€370,€374Ï(Tenn.€1981).€€Indeed,€holding€a€public€office€for€a€term€has€been€held€as€a€propertyÏright€subject€to€forfeiture.€€òòSeeóó€òòidóó.;€òòState€v.€Kerbyóó,€136€Tenn.€(9€Thompson)€386,€389,Ï189€S.W.€859,€860€(1916);€òòState€ex€rel.€Shelby€County€v.€Stewartóó,€147€Tenn.€(20ÏThompson)€375,€380,€247€S.W.€984,€985€(1919).€€Without€more€than€the€phraseÏð ðpossible€penalties,ðð€we€would€be€more€inclined€to€conclude€that€the€removal€fromÏoffice€constitutes€a€penalty€of€which€the€jury€should€have€been€instructed.€€Yet,€theÏcaption€clearly€refers€to€instructions€for€ð ðpossible€sentences.ðð€€€Thus,€we€conclude€thatÏthe€trial€court€did€not€err€in€failing€to€instruct€the€jury€on€the€ouster€provisions,€which€areÏnot€included€within€the€sentencing€scheme€of€the€Criminal€Sentencing€Reform€Act.€ÏòòSeeóó€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€40„35„101€et.€seq.ÌÌà àEven€if€we€were€to€conclude€that€the€ouster€provisions€were€penalties€that€theÏtrial€court€should€have€included€in€the€jury€instructions,€we€find€no€reversible€errorÍbecause€the€Defendant€has€not€demonstrated€that€the€error€affected€the€judgment.€ÏAfter€considering€the€entire€record€in€the€case€òòsubóó€òòjudiceóó,€we€are€satisfied€that€anyÏerror€ÌÌÌwas€harmless.€€T.R.A.P.€36(b);€Tenn.€R.€Crim.€P.€52(a).ÌÌà@ àVII.ÌÌà àIn€his€next€issue,€the€Defendant€asserts€that€the€trial€court€should€have€grantedÏhis€motion€for€a€new€trial€based€on€an€affidavit€submitted€by€the€jury€foreperson.€€€NoÏcomplete€transcript€of€the€hearing€on€the€motion€is€included€in€the€record.€€However,Ïthe€juror€forepersonððs€affidavit€is€included€with€the€Defendantððs€motion€for€new€trial.€ÏThe€Defendant€argues€two€instances€of€bias€on€the€part€of€the€jury.€€First,€theÏDefendant€challenges€the€qualifications€of€the€jurors€based€on€the€jury€forepersonððsÏdisclosure€in€his€affidavit€that€two€members€of€the€jury€brought€to€the€deliberations€aÏpersonal€bias€against€the€Defendant€because€they€were€personally€offended€by€theÏfact€that€either€they,€their€families,€or€friends€had€written€checks€for€oil€to€the€HighwayÏDepartment€which€were€deposited€in€a€timely€manner.€€Secondly,€the€DefendantÏsubmits€that€the€jury€foreperson€was€affected€by€newly€discovered€evidence€that€afterÏthe€trial€Mr.€Hulsey,€a€key€state€witness,€sought€and€obtained€the€Defendantððs€positionÏas€county€road€superintendent.€€In€his€affidavit,€the€jury€foreperson€requested€that€hisÏvote€be€changed€to€ð ðnot€guiltyðð€based€on€this€information.€€The€Defendant€implies€thatÍMr.€Hulseyððs€testimony€was€tainted€by€his€aspirations€of€obtaining€the€Defendantððs€jobÏat€the€Highway€Department.ÌÌà àThe€common€law€rules€governing€challenges€to€juror€qualifications€fall€into€twoÏcategories:€€(1)€propter€defectum€and€(2)€propter€affectum.€€òòPartin€v.€Hendersonóó,€686ÏS.W.2d€587,€589€(Tenn.€App.€1984).€€€Objections€based€upon€generalÏdisqualifications,€such€as€alienage,€family€relationship,€or€statutory€mandate,€are€withinÏthe€propter€defectum€class€and,€as€such,€must€be€made€before€the€return€of€a€juryÏverdict.€€€Literally€translated,€propter€defectum€means€"on€account€of€defect."€€òòState€v.ÏAkinsóó,€867€S.W.2d€350,€355€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.1993).ÌÌà àIn€contrast,€a€propter€affectum€challenge,€translated€as€"on€account€ofÏprejudice,"€is€based€upon€the€existence€of€bias,€prejudice,€or€partiality€towards€oneÏparty€in€the€litigation€"actually€shown€to€exist€or€presumed€to€exist€from€circumstances.ðð€ÏòòDurham€v.€Stateóó,€182€Tenn.€(18€Beeler)€577,€588,€188€S.W.2d€555,€559€(1945);€€òòseeÏalsoóó€òòToombs€v.€Stateóó,€197€Tenn.€(1€McCanless)€229,€232,€270€S.W.2d€649,€650Ï(1954).€€€Propter€affectum€challenges€may€be€made€after€the€return€of€the€jury€verdict.€ÏòòState€v.€Furloughóó,€797€S.W.2d€631,€652€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.1990).€€The€burden€is€on€theÏdefendant€to€show€that€the€juror€had€an€actual€bias€or€prejudice.€€òòState€v.€Caughronóó,Ï855€S.W.2d€526,€539€(Tenn.),€òòcertóó.€òòdeniedóó,€510€U.S.€979,€114€S.Ct.€475,€126€L.Ed.2dÏ426€(1993).ÌÌà àProof€on€this€matter€is€controlled€by€Tenn.€R.€Evid.€606(b),€which€provides:ÌÌÓÓà8 àUpon€an€inquiry€into€the€validity€of€a€verdict€or€indictment,€a€juror€may€notÏtestify€as€to€any€matter€or€statement€occurring€during€the€course€of€theÏjuryððs€deliberations€or€to€the€effect€of€anything€upon€any€jurorððs€mind€orÏemotion€as€influencing€that€juror€to€assent€to€or€dissent€from€the€verdict€orÏindictment€or€concerning€the€jurorððs€mental€processes,€except€that€a€jurorÏmay€testify€on€the€question€of€whether€extraneous€prejudicial€informationÏwas€improperly€brought€to€the€juryððs€attention,€whether€any€outsideÏinfluence€was€improperly€brought€to€bear€upon€any€juror,€or€whether€theÏjurors€agreed€in€advance€to€be€bound€by€a€quotient€or€gambling€verdictÏwithout€further€discussion;€nor€may€a€jurorððs€affidavit€or€evidence€of€anyÏstatement€by€the€juror€concerning€a€matter€about€which€the€juror€wouldÏbe€precluded€from€testifying€be€received€for€these€purposes.ÌÌÓÓà àUnder€Tennessee€Rule€of€Evidence€606,€a€juror€may€testify€only€aboutÏextraneous€prejudicial€information€that€was€improperly€brought€to€the€juryððs€attention,Ïoutside€influence€that€was€improperly€brought€to€bear€on€any€juror,€and€whether€theÏjurors€had€agreed€in€advance€to€be€bound€by€a€quotient€or€gambling€verdict€withoutÏfurther€discussion.€€N.€Cohen,€S.€Sheppeard,€D.€Paine,€òòTennessee€Law€of€Evidenceóó,€ððÏ606.2€(3rd€Ed.€1995).€€A€juror€cannot€testify€about€the€effect€of€anything€in€influencing€aÏjurorððs€mind€or€emotion€and€leading€the€juror€to€decide€as€he€or€she€did.€€Nor€canÏjurors€testify€about€the€information€they€used€from€their€store€of€general€knowledge,Ïbecause€jurors€are€entitled€to€bring€their€knowledge€and€experience€to€bear€on€theirÏdecision€making.€€òòIdóó.€€In€òòCaldararo€v.€Vanderbilt€Universityóó,€794€S.W.2d€738€(Tenn.ÏApp.€1990),€the€Court€of€Appeals€stated:ÌÌÓÓà8 à[J]urors›€are€not€required€to€be€completely€ignorant€about€a€case,€and€aÏverdict€will€not€be€overturned€because€of€jurorsðð€generalized€knowledgeÏof€the€parties€or€of€some€other€aspect€of€the€case.€€A€jurorððs€personalÏexperiences€unrelated€to€the€litigation€are€not€external€information.€ÏHowever,€a€jurorððs€personal€experiences€directly€relating€to€the€parties€orÏevents€directly€involved€in€the€litigation€may€be.ÌÌÓÓÌòòIdóó.€at€744€(citations€omitted).ÌÌà àInitially,€we€find€that€whether€some€jurors€were€personally€offended€by€the€factÏthat€either€they,€their€families,€or€friends€had€written€checks€for€oil€to€the€œHighwayÏDepartment›€which€were€deposited€in€a€timely€manner€does€not€constitute€extraneousÏprejudicial€information€or€outside€influence.€€The€jurors€were€entitled€to€bring€theirÏknowledge€and€experience€to€bear€on€their€decision€making€process€and€were€entitledÏto€react€to€the€proof€that€four€checks€for€oil€were€not€deposited€at€the€DefendantððsÏdirection.€€Moreover,€the€impact€of€Mr.€Hulseyððs€subsequent€promotion€on€the€jurorÏforepersonððs€verdict€is€irrelevant€and€inadmissible€under€Rule€606(b).€€Jury€verdictsÏare€to€be€founded€on€the€proof€presented€at€trial€and€should€not€be€later€overturnedÏbased€on€subsequent€events€unknown€by€and€outside€the€control€of€the€parties.€€ThisÏissue€is€without€merit.ÌÌœ›à@ àVIII.ÌÌà àThe€Defendant's€final€issue€is€whether€there€was€sufficient€evidence€to€supportÏthe€guilty€verdicts.€€œWhen›€an€accused€challenges€the€sufficiency€of€the€convictingÏevidence,€the€standard€is€whether,€after€reviewing€the€evidence€in€the€light€mostÏfavorable€to€the€prosecution,€any€rational€trier€of€fact€could€have€found€the€essentialÏelements€of€the€crime€beyond€a€reasonable€doubt.€€€òòJackson€v.€Virginiaóó,€443€U.S.€307,Í319,€99€S.Ct.€2781,€2789,€61€L.Ed.2d€560€(1979).€€€Questions€concerning€theÏcredibility€of€the€witnesses,€the€weight€and€value€to€be€given€the€evidence,€as€well€asÏall€factual€issues€raised€by€the€evidence,€are€resolved€by€the€trier€of€fact,€not€this€Court.€ÏòòState€v.€Pappasóó,€754€S.W.2d€620,€623€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.€1987).€€Nor€may€this€CourtÏreweigh€or€reevaluate€the€evidence.€€òòState€v.€Cabbageóó,€571€S.W.2d€832,€835Ï(Tenn.1978).ÌÌà àA€jury€verdict€approved€by€the€trial€judge€accredits€the€State's€witnesses€andÏresolves€all€conflicts€in€favor€of€the€State.€€òòState€v.€Graceóó,€493€S.W.2d€474,€476€(Tenn.Ï1973).€€€On€appeal,€the€State€is€entitled€to€the€strongest€legitimate€view€of€the€evidenceÏand€all€inferences€therefrom.€€òòCabbageóó,€571€S.W.2d€at€835.€€€Because€a€verdict€of€guiltÏremoves€the€presumption€of€innocence€and€replaces€it€with€a€presumption€of€guilt,€theÏaccused€has€the€burden€in€this€Court€of€illustrating€why€the€evidence€is€insufficient€toÏsupport€the€verdict€returned€by€the€trier€of€fact.€€òòState€v.€Tuggleóó,€639€S.W.2d€913,€914Ï(Tenn.1982);€€òòGraceóó,€493€S.W.2d€at€476.€€Having€reviewed€the€proof€in€this€case,€weÏfind€that€it€is€sufficient€to€support€the€Defendantððs€convictions.ÌÌà àFirst,€the€Defendant€argues€that€the€proof€as€to€Count€One,€in€which€he€wasÏcharged€with€fabricating€evidence,€was€insufficient€in€that€there€was€no€proof€that€theÏDefendant€knew€the€receipt€from€Dean€Oil€Company€had€been€fabricated.€€ÌÌà àœTennessee€Code€Annotated€section€39„16„503(a)(2)›€states€that€it€is€unlawful€forÏany€person,€knowing€that€an€investigation€or€official€proceeding€is€pending€or€inÍprogress€to€make,€present,€or€use€any€record,€document,€or€thing€with€knowledge€of€itsÏfalsity€and€with€intent€to€affect€the€course€or€outcome€of€the€investigation€or€officialÏproceedings.ÌÌà àIn€this€case,€the€evidence€was€sufficient€to€œprove€that›€the€Defendant€knew€theÏreceipt€was€false.€€Mr.€Hulsey€testified€that€in€April€1992,€the€Defendant€instructed€himÏto€build€a€security€door€and€windows€for€his€antique€barn.€€When€they€ran€out€of€steelÏat€the€œHighway€Department›€shop,€the€Defendant€instructed€him€to€get€more.€€Mr.ÏHulsey€and€Mr.€Goodman€went€to€Dean€Oil€Company€and€charged€the€steel€as€greaseÏto€the€œHighway€Department.›€€After€the€investigation€was€initiated,€Mr.€GoodmanÏreturned€to€Dean€Oil€Company€in€July€1992€and€asked€Mr.€Dean€to€provide€a€fakeÏreceipt€for€$15.€€Mr.€Goodman€then€took€this€false€receipt€to€the€Defendant,€who€in€turnÏput€it€in€his€wallet.€€Although€Mr.€Goodman€testified€that€the€Defendant€did€not€instructÏhim€to€get€the€false€receipt,€he€did€so€because€he€was€scared€œhe€would€lose›€his€job.€€ÌÌà àDuring€the€investigation,€the€Defendant€gave€contradictory€statements€Ïconcerning€the€receipt.€€In€his€first€statement€to€Agent€Taylor,€taken€on€June€17,€1992,Ïthe€Defendant€stated€that€Mr.€Hulsey€welded€the€iron€bars€for€the€security€door€andÏwindows€on€his€own€time,€using€his€own€equipment.€€The€Defendant€further€stated€thatÏhe€furnished€the€bars€himself.€€On€July€13,€1992,€the€Defendant€gave€Agent€Taylor€theÏfalse€receipt€and€made€the€following€statement:ÌÌÓÓà8 àOn€April€1st,€1992€Mark€Hulsey€was€fixing€a€gate€for€me,€I€assume€on€hisÍown€time.€€He€needed€a€piece€of€flat€bar€steel.€€David€Goodman€went€toÏDean€Oil€Company,€bought€the€steel€for€me,€and€brought€me€a€receipt.€€IÏpaid€him€back.€€I€guess€the€reason€Goodman€went€instead€of€Hulsey€wasÏmaybe€he€needed€some€things€for€the€county€and€he€is€our€purchasingÏagent.€€The€receipt€is€dated€April€1st€and€is€in€the€amount€of€$16.16.ÌÌÓÓÌà àFinally,€on€July€30,€1992,€the€Defendant€told€Agent€Taylor€that€ð ð[t]he€steel€cameÏfrom€a€scrap€pile€at€American€Limestone...The€flat€bar€came€from€Dean€Oil.€€I€donððtÏremember€buying€flat€bar€for€use€on€a€gate.€€David€Goodman€bought€the€flat€bar€andÏbrought€me€the€receipt.€€I€don[ðð]t€remember€when€he€gave€me€the€receipt.€€It€might€haveÏbeen€two€or€three€weeks€later.€€This€was€the€receipt€that€I€have€already€turned€over€toÏthe€TBI.ðð€€From€this€proof,€the€jury€could€have€found€that€the€Defendant€did€in€factÏknowingly€provide€the€false€receipt€to€Agent€Taylor.ÌÌà àAs€to€Count€Two,€which€charged€the€Defendant€with€official€misconduct,€theÏDefendant€argues€that€the€countyððs€records€made€it€impossible€to€prove€whether€theÏgravel€loop€at€the€River€Rock€Village€subdivision€was€a€county€road.€€The€DefendantÏargues€that€based€on€the€poor€records€kept€by€the€county,€that€the€proof€was€œð ð50„50"›Ïas€to€whether€the€road€was€a€private€way€or€an€abandoned€county€road€and€therefore,Ïwas€insufficient€to€support€the€verdict€as€to€this€count.€€ÌÌà àœTennessee€Code€Annotated€section€39„16„402(a)(4)›€provides€that€a€publicÏservant€commits€an€offense€who,€with€intent€to€obtain€a€benefit€or€to€harm€another,Ïintentionally€or€knowingly€violates€a€law€relating€to€the€public€servantððs€office€orÏemployment.€€€The€jury€found€that€the€Defendant€œviolated€Tennessee€Code€AnnotatedÍsection›€54„7„202(a),€which€provides€that€the€chief€administrative€officer€shall€notÏauthorize€nor€knowingly€permit€the€trucks€or€road€equipment,€the€rock,€crushed€stoneÏor€any€other€road€materials€to€be€used€for€any€private€use€or€for€the€use€of€anyÏindividual€for€private€purposes.€€ÌÌà àWhile€there€was€proof€that€the€official€map€of€county€roads€was€not€exact,€it€didÏnot€show€the€loop€at€the€River€Rock€Village€subdivision€as€a€county€road.€€In€fact,€theÏaerial€photographs€of€the€area€taken€in€1974€did€not€show€the€gravel€loop.€€Moreover,Ïseveral€witnesses€testified€that€before€the€development€of€the€Defendantððs€subdivision,Ïthere€had€never€been€a€county€road€beyond€the€cemetery.€€The€proof€as€to€this€countÏwas€overwhelming€that€the€Defendant€directed€his€employees€to€grade€and€gravel€aÏnew€extension€of€the€road€to€service€his€wifeððs€subdivision.€€ÌÌà àAs€to€Count€Four,€which€also€charged€the€Defendant€with€official€misconduct,Ïthe€Defendant€contends€that€the€proof€does€not€support€a€conviction€for€false€billing€inÏthat€Mr.€Dean€of€Dean€Oil€Company€testified€that€he€had€never€had€any€dealings€withÏthe€Defendant.ÌÌà àThe€Defendant€was€charged€with€causing€Dean€Oil€Company€to€sendÏRobertson€County€a€bill€for€grease€when€in€fact€œthe›€billing€was€actually€for€steel€usedÏby€him€for€his€personal€use€and€benefit€with€the€intent€that€Robertson€County€pay€theÏbill€for€steel,€and€that€œRobertson›€œCounty›€œdid›€in€fact€pay€the€bill.€€While€there€was€noÏproof€that€the€Defendant€had€any€direct€dealings€with€Dean€Oil€Company,€there€wasÍtestimony€that€the€Defendant€instructed€Mr.€Hulsey€to€purchase€the€steel€on€his€behalf.€€ÌÌà àEven€if€Mr.€Goodman€and€Mr.€Hulsey€were€considered€accomplices€to€thisÏcrime,€their€testimony€was€sufficiently€corroborated€by€the€testimony€of€Mr.€Dean€andÏby€the€documentation€of€the€transaction,€both€showing€that€the€steel€used€on€theÏDefendantððs€security€door€and€windows€was€charged€to€and€paid€by€Robertson€CountyÏat€the€direction€of€the€Defendant.€€When€an€accompliceððs€testimony€is€presented,Ï"corroborative€evidence€need€not€be€direct€evidence,€but€the€rule€of€corroboration€isÏsatisfied€even€though€the€evidence€is€entirely€circumstantial."€€òòSherrill€v.€Stateóó,€204ÏTenn.€(8€McCanless)€427,€321€S.W.2d€811€(1959).€€To€be€corroborative,€the€evidenceÏneed€not€be€adequate€in€and€of€itself€to€convict.€€òòMcKinney€v.€Stateóó,€552€S.W.2d€787,Ï789€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.€1977).€€Only€slight€circumstances€are€required€to€furnish€theÏnecessary€corroboration.€€òòGarton€v.€Stateóó,€206€Tenn.€(10€McCanless)€79,€87,€332ÏS.W.2d€169,€175€(1960).€€It€is€sufficient€to€meet€the€requirements€of€the€legal€standardÏif€it€fairly€and€legitimately€tends€to€connect€the€defendant€with€the€commission€of€theÏcrime€charged.€€œòòSherrillóó,›€204€Tenn.€at€435,€321€S.W.2d€815.€€The€sufficiency€of€theÏcorroboration€is€a€jury€determination.€€The€jury€may€consider€all€the€evidence€and€drawÏwhatever€reasonable€inferences€may€exist.€€This€Court€may€not€substitute€its€judgmentÏfor€that€of€the€fact€finder.€€òòState€v.€Copelandóó,€677€S.W.2d€471,€475€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.Ï1984).€€The€proof€as€to€this€count€is€sufficient.ÌÌà àAs€to€Count€Five,€in€which€the€Defendant€was€charged€with€official€misconduct,Ïthe€Defendant€asserts€that€Mr.€Byrne€was€in€sole€control€of€the€four€checks€that€wereÍnot€deposited,€and€that€Mr.€Byrne€chose€not€to€deposit€them.€€The€Defendant€submitsÏthat€Mr.€Byrne€worked€for€the€œRobertson€County€Highway›€Commission,€and€becauseÏhe€did€not€work€directly€for€the€Defendant,€Mr.€Byrne€did€not€need€his€approval€toÏdeposit€the€checks.ÌÌà àThe€jury€found€that€the€Defendant€œviolatedTennessee€Code€Annotated€section›Ï39„16„402(a)(3),€which€€states€that€a€public€servant€commits€an€offense€who,€withÏintent€to€obtain€a€benefit€or€to€harm€another,€intentionally€or€knowingly€refrains€fromÏperforming€a€duty€that€is€imposed€by€law€or€that€is€clearly€inherent€in€the€nature€of€theÏpublic€servantððs€office€or€œemployment.€€Here,›€the€jury€found€that€the€Defendant€failed,Ïrefused,€and€neglected€to€deposit€the€four€checks,€and€did€in€fact€give€instructionsÏduring€the€month€of€May€1992€for€all€said€checks€to€be€destroyed.€€ÌÌà àThe€proof€showed€that€the€Defendant€told€four€residents€of€Robertson€CountyÏthat€if€they€would€pay€for€the€oil,€the€œHighway€Department›€would€pave€their€roads.€€AllÏfour€testified€that€the€roads€were€paved,€they€delivered€checks€to€the€Defendant€or€toÏthe€œHighway€Department,›€and€that€the€checks€were€never€deposited.€€Mr.€Byrne,€whoÏwas€secretary€to€the€Highway€Commission€and€was€also€the€bookkeeper€for€theÏœHighway€Department›€under€the€direction€of€the€Defendant,€testified€that€he€initiallyÏasked€the€Defendant€what€to€do€with€the€checks€and€was€told€to€hold€on€to€them€untilÏthe€Defendant€gave€him€further€instruction.€€Moreover,€on€tape,€the€Defendant€told€Mr.ÏByrne€at€a€later€date€that€he€should€tear€œup€the›€œchecks.›€€Later€in€the€conversation,€theÏDefendant€told€Mr.€Byrne€to€put€them€in€the€safe€until€further€notice.€€ÌÌà àIn€his€statement€to€Agent€Taylor,€taken€on€July€30,€1992,€the€DefendantÏadmitted:ÌÌÓÓà8 àThere€were€four€checks€that€people€sent€in€to€pay€for€oil€that€went€on€theirÏroad.€€We€might€have€tore€up€the€checks€because€I€feel€that€itððs€not€rightÏto€charge€someone€for€road€work.€€I€asked€them€to€send€in€checksÏbecause€I€feel€that€it€was€the€only€way€the€county€could€afford€to€do€theÏjob€at€the€time.€€Lately€I€have€charged€people€for€oil.€€I€charged€GeorgeÏAnderson€about€$8500.00€for€oil€on€his€county€road€but€he€was€the€onlyÏone€to€benefit.€€I€told€Billy€Byrne€to€tear€up€the€four€checks€becauseÏseveral€people€lived€on€each€road.ÌÌÓÓÌà àWe€œconclude›€that€the€proof€is€sufficient€to€show€that€the€Defendant,€in€hisÏposition€as€superintendent,€intentionally€and€knowingly€failed€to€ensure€that€theseÏchecks€were€properly€deposited€with€the€county€trustee.ÌÌà àAs€to€Count€Six,€in€which€the€Defendant€was€charged€with€the€private€use€ofÏcounty€road€materials€and€equipment,€the€Defendant€asserts€that€his€conviction€shouldÏbe€dismissed€because€he€was€only€helping€a€taxpayer€and€did€not€receive€anyÏpersonal€compensation€or€benefit.ÌÌà àœTennessee€Code€Annotated€section€54„7„202(a)›€states€that€the€chiefÏadministrative€officer€shall€not€authorize€nor€knowingly€permit€the€trucks€or€roadÏequipment,€the€rock,€crushed€stone,€or€any€other€road€materials€to€be€used€for€anyÏprivate€use€or€for€the€use€of€any€individual€for€private€purposes.€€We€note€thatÍregardless€of€the€Defendantððs€good€intentions,€the€statute€clearly€states€that€countyÏequipment€and€materials€shall€not€be€authorized€for€private€use.€€Whether€theÏDefendant€received€any€personal€compensation€or€benefit€is€irrelevant.€€The€proofÏshowed€that€the€Defendant€authorized€the€use€of€a€county€bridge€(albeit€obsolete),Ïcounty€equipment,€and€county€concrete€to€be€used€on€the€Adcocksðð€private€property.€ÏAlthough€the€Defendant€took€the€Adcocksðð€check€for€œone€hundred€dollars€($100),›Ïwhich€was€intended€to€pay€for€the€bridge,€the€Defendant€never€deposited€it.€€In€his€JulyÏ30,€1992,€statement,€the€Defendant€admitted:ÌÌÓÓà8 àBub€Adcock€gave€us€a€check€for€$100.00€for€the€bridge.€€I€œdidn›[ðð]t€depositÏthe€check€because€I€just€œdidn›[ðð]t€want€to€charge€him.€€We€used€a€countyÏdozier€to€pull€the€bridge€across€the€creek€because€it[ðð]s€a€county€road€onÏthe€Robertson€County€side€of€the€creek.€€We€pushed€down€a€few€treesÏand€graded€it€a€little€for€him.€€Bub€Adcock€is€the€only€one€who€benefited.€ÏWe€furnished€part€of€the€concrete€that€went€in€the€bridge.€€I€think€MarkÏHulsey€poured€the€floor€of€the€bridge€on€his€own€time.€€I€think€Mr[.]€AdcockÏfelt€like€he€should€share€the€expense.€€I€œdidn›[ðð]t€realize€that€the€countyÏpaid€for€all€the€concrete.€€I€offered€to€pay€for€half.€€I€don[ðð]t€know€where€theÏlumber€came€from€that€was€used€for€the€forms,€nor€do€I€know€whoseÏwelding€equipment€or€œrebar›€was€used.€€I€don[ðð]t€know€why€I€œwouldn›[ðð]tÏaccept€the€$100.00€payment€for€the€bridge€if€I€let€him€pay€for€half€theÏconcrete.€€I€feel€this€was€a€public€project.€€However,€it€was€not€discussedÏin€the€commission€meetings.€€The€Commissioner€Joe€œTeasley›€was€notÏaware€that€this€was€done.€€I€can[ðð]t€explain€why€the€county€œdidn›[ðð]t€pay€forÏthe€entire€project€except€that€Bub€Adcock€felt€he€should€help€with€theÏcost.€€We€hauled€maybe€fifteen€loads€of€dirt€there€to€build€a€ramp€for€theÏbridge.ÌÌÓÓÌà àWe€find€that€the€proof€is€sufficient€to€support€this€conviction.ÌÌÌà àFinally,€as€to€Count€Nine,€in€which€the€Defendant€was€also€charged€with€theÏprivate€use€of€county€equipment€and€materials,€the€Defendant€argues€that€there€wasÏno€proof€of€intent.€€He€further€asserts€that€the€culvert€pipes€given€to€Mr.€White€could€beÏconsidered€as€an€employee€bonus€or€to€ensure€that€Mr.€White€had€a€safe€exit€onto€theÏbusy€state€highway.ÌÌà àThe€jury€found€that€the€Defendant€authorized€and€knowingly€permitted€countyÏmaterials€to€be€used€for€the€private€purposes€of€Mr.€White,€a€œHighway€Department›Ïemployee.€€Specifically,€the€proof€showed€that€the€Defendant€authorized€hisÏemployees€to€provide€two€culvert€pipes€for€use€in€the€driveway€on€Mr.€Whiteððs€property.€ÏHere,€œHighway€Department›€employees€testified€that€the€Defendant€authorized€them€toÏdeliver€the€two€culvert€pipes€to€Mr.€Whiteððs€property.€€Mr.€White€testified€that€the€firstÏpipe€appeared€on€his€property€about€a€week€after€making€inquiries€at€the€œHighwayÏDepartment›€concerning€the€cost€of€such€pipes.€€After€the€first€pipe€had€been€installed,Ïthe€Defendant€stopped€by€Mr.€Whiteððs€house€and€told€Mr.€White€he€needed€a€secondÏpipe€to€get€his€truck€and€boat€safely€across€the€drive.€€Subsequently,€another€pipeÏappeared€on€Mr.€Whiteððs€property.€€After€both€had€been€installed,€Mr.€White€asked€theÏDefendant€if€he€could€pay€for€the€pipes,€and€the€Defendant€told€him€no€because€thereÏshould€be€some€benefit€to€being€a€œHighway€Department›€employee.€€This€is€sufficientÏproof€to€support€the€juryððs€verdict.ÌÌà àThe€Court€having€reviewed€all€of€the€Defendantððs€issues€and€having€found€thatÏthey€are€without€merit,€the€judgment€of€the€trial€court€is€affirmed.ÌÓÓÌà àà àà àà àà àPER€CURIAMÌà àà àà àà àà à(œTipton›€and€œWelles›,€œJ.J.›)Ìà àà àà àà àà à(œBevil›,€S.J.,€not€participating)