ÿWPC«  …# VUNa %¯ 0(µbÝw@å4% 9 0lH 0D´ ø 0J 0TJ 0^ž 0hü 0rd 0|Ö 0†R 0Ø 1uh 0dÝ U>A D3 B²U*Ï 0@ùB)9DCb AM¥ ò=ÿî<7*Tav~µvÓ3 AOÆU 0D D/_ BŽ ˜HP LaserJet 4SiHPPCL5MS,ü,,,,,ü0nLHÎ(ÈhH  Z 6Times New Roman RegularX($¡¡- ù- ·¸D¹ºD»E¼½[¾¿EÀÓ€Ô¡¨ lar3|xÉ((3üÝ$¤¤Ý ƒ!ÝÝ  Ýà  àòòÚ  Ú0Ú  Úóó(#Ã$òòÚ  Ú0Ú  Úóó2 ÿÿ0Indent1Ô2ÔÔ3  Ô2" ÿÿ0Indent2à0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2, ÿÿ0Indent3à0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô26 ÿÿ0Indent4à0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2@ ÿÿ0Indent5à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2J ÿÿ0Indent6à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2T ÿÿ0Indent7à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2^ ÿÿ0Indent8à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô ÿÿ?AGMSYaioIndent0I.A.1.a.(1)(a)i)a)P ÿÿ8Mac DefaultMac DefaultÓ ` °šXÓ< Œ 9p`(&Times New Roman++++'ÿÿdxd d< Œ 9p`(Arial("ÿÿ$££Ò  ÒÒ  Ò% Line 7 d....7Border 1dd€-/Cþÿ << Gÿÿ Ý ƒ!ÝÑ  ÑÑ#€d#ÑÔ€)ÔÝ  ÝÔ€,ÔÔ€,ÔÓ  Óò òÔ YYY ÔFILEDÔ€,XÔÌÌJune€26,€1997ÌÌCecil€W.€CrowsonÌAppellate€Court€ClerkÔ  Ôó ó 3Ý ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€)ÔÝ  ÝÝ ƒ $Ýà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  ÝÔ€,ÔÔ€,ôÔ€€Ô€)ÔTenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€55„10„401.Ô€,ÔÔ€,ŠÔ€€Ô€,ôÔÌ äÝ ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€)ÔÝ  ÝÝ ƒ $Ýà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  ÝÔ€,ÔÔ€,ôÔ€€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€39„11„402(2),(3).Ì -Ý ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€)ÔÝ  ÝÝ ƒ $Ýà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  ÝÔ€,ÔÔ€,ôÔ€€We€note€that€the€Defendant€was€also€charged€with€vehicular€assault€and€was€acquitted€of€thatÏà0 àoffense.Ì JÝ ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€)ÔÝ  ÝÝ ƒ $Ýà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  ÝÔ€,ÔÔ€,ôÔWe€note€that€the€Defendant€has€included€in€his€brief€what€is€ostensibly€intended€to€be€anÏà àaffidavit€from€the€jury€foreperson€describing€their€deliberations€and€what€theory€they€used€toÏà0 àconvict.€€The€Defendant€claims€that€the€trial€court€admitted€the€affidavit€at€the€motion€for€new€trial.€ÏFirst,€we€have€found€nothing€in€the€technical€record€documenting€the€hearing€on€the€motion€forÏnew€trial€nor€the€affidavit.€€Second,€admitting€documentation€of€a€juryððs€deliberations€isÏinadmissible€unless€under€specific€circumstances€pursuant€to€Rule€606(b)€of€the€TennesseeÏRules€of€Evidence.€€Therefore,€we€do€not€consider€this€affidavit.ÌPtPtHHÚ(ÿáÿâùFG(üHHÚ(d'hStyl{WP}01•ÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃà Ãà Ãà Ãà Ãà ÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÐ ÐÐHHÐÐ  ÐÐ2ÐÐÿÿ¸æ$ÿÐÐHHÐÐÐÐÐÐÐÐ  ÐÐ ÐÐ ÐÑÑÑGenevaÑÑ ÑÑ € ÑÑ<Px–ÈÑÒÒÒ443!#4ÒÒ$ *$ÒÒ$*$ÒÒ ÿKK ÒÒ  Geneva ÒÒ  Geneva ÒÓ.,ÓÓÓÓ6ÓÓ ÓßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßÑGenevaÑÑ ÑÒ  h HD: Geneva ÒÒ  h HD: Geneva Ò€-‚ƒCþÿ<< CÿÿƒLevel 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5($$””ò òÚ  Ú1Ú  Úó ó„„'÷ÿ dxdüÿP PdÝ ƒ!ÝÔ . ÔÔ€)ÔÝ  ÝÑ ` ÑÒ  ÒÒ ° ÒÒ  ÒÒ „ ÒÑ\R AØ'\ÑÔ€)ŠÔÔ€,ÔÑ\R AØ'\ÑÑ€ÑÑ7€ÌÄXXdðdÈ7ÑÑ  ÑÑ  ÑÓ  Óò òÙ€€ÙßR€01/A1-j|` ç `€€@ÿRß›Þ ÞÌIN€THE€COURT€OF€CRIMINAL€APPEALS€OF€TENNESSEEÌÌAT€œNASHVILLE›ÌÌœAPRIL›€SESSION,€œ1997›ÌÌÌÓ  ÓœSTATE€OF€TENNESSEE,›à à)à àC.C.A.€NO.€œ01C01„9605„CC„00227›Ìà àà àà àà àà à)ó óÌà àAppellee,à àà àà àò ò)Ìà àà àà àà àà à)Ìà àà àà àà àà à)à àœHUMPHREYS›€COUNTYÌVS.à àà àà àà àà à)à àÌà àà àà àà àà à)à àHON.€œROBERT€E.€BURCHó ó›Ìœò òJAMES€R.€LEMACKS,ó ó›à àà àò ò)à àJUDGEó óÌà àà àà àà àà àò ò)ó óÌà àAppellant.à àà àà àò ò)à àœó ó(DUI)ò ò›Ìó óÌÌò òÓ  ÓON€APPEAL€FROM€THE€JUDGMENT€OF€THEÌœCIRCUIT›€COURT€OF€œHUMPHREYS€COUNTY›ó óÌÌÌòòÓ  ÓFOR€THE€APPELLANTóó:à àà àà àòòFOR€THE€APPELLEEóó:ÌÌœJ.P.€BRADLEY›à àà àà àà àœJOHN€KNOX€WALKUPÌ110€West€Main€Streetà àà àà àAttorney€General€and€ReporterÌWaverly,€TN€37185Ìà àà àà àà àà àà àJANIS€L.€TURNERÌà àà àà àà àà àà àAssistant€Attorney€GeneralÌà àà àà àà àà àà à450€James€Robertson€ParkwayÌà àà àà àà àà àà àNashville,€TN€37243ÌÌà àà àà àà àà àà àDAN€ALSOBROOKSÌà àà àà àà àà àà àDistrict€Attorney€GeneralÌÌà àà àà àà àà àà àGEORGE€SEXTONÌà àà àà àà àà àà àAssistant€District€Attorney€GeneralÌà àà àà àà àà àà àHumphreys€County€CourthouseÌà àà àà àà àà àà àRoom€206Ìà àà àà àà àà àà àWaverly,€TN€37185›ÌÌÌÌOPINION€FILED€________________________ÌÌœREVERSED€AND€REMANDED›ÌÌDAVID€H.€WELLES,€JUDGEÇò òòòÓ  ÓÔ€,°ÔOPINIONóóó óÔ€,ŠÔÌÌÌÌÓÓÓ  Óà àThe€Defendant€appeals€as€of€right€pursuant€to€Rule€3€of€the€TennesseeÏRules€of€Appellate€Procedure.€€He€was€convicted€by€a€Humphreys€County€juryÏof€driving€while€intoxicated€and€sentenced€to€11€months€and€29€days,Ïsuspended€except€for€30€days€with€the€remainder€to€be€served€on€probation.€ÏHis€driverððs€license€was€suspended€for€one€year€and€he€was€ordered€to€attendÏDUI€school.€€He€appeals€his€conviction€raising€two€issues€for€review:€(1)€ThatÏthe€trial€court€erred€in€charging€criminal€responsibility€when€the€Defendant€wasÏnot€formally€indicted€on€this€charge;€and€(2)€that€the€trial€court€erred€in€chargingÏcriminal€responsibility€when€the€other€party€involved€was€never€charged€withÏany€offense.€€€Although€not€precisely€on€either€of€the€issues€raised,€we€reverseÏand€remand€for€a€new€trial.ÌÌà àThe€Defendant€and€three€other€individuals,€Sanchez,€Duncan,€and€LucasÏplanned€to€attend€a€party€on€October€30,€1993.€€The€four€were€soldiers€at€Ft.ÏCampbell€Army€Post€near€Clarksville,€Tennessee€and€they€drove€to€Waverly,ÏTennessee€for€the€party.€€The€Defendant€drove€the€others€in€his€vehicle,€a€tanÏFord€Bronco.€€The€party€was€being€held€at€Rosie€Matthewsðð€(a.k.a.€RoseÏBramlettððs)€house,€who€was€Sanchezðð€girlfriend.€€The€four€went€to€the€party€andÍto€Pippinððs,€a€bar€in€Waverly.€€They€returned€to€the€house€in€the€early€morningÏhours€of€October€31€to€continue€the€party.€€All€of€them€had€been€drinking€beerÏthat€night,€although€Lucas€testified€that€she€stopped€drinking€before€the€othersÏbecause€the€Defendant€began€acting€strangely€and€she€did€not€know€him€veryÏwell.€€After€they€returned€to€the€house,€Sanchez€and€his€girlfriend€had€a€fight€andÏhe€wanted€to€leave€the€party.ÌÌà àIt€is€at€this€point€in€the€evening€when€the€testimony€of€the€witnesses€atÏthe€trial€conflicts€regarding€who€was€driving€the€Bronco.€€The€State€presented€theÏfollowing€evidence.€€The€four€left€the€party€and€proceeded€down€Clydeton€Road.ÏIt€is€undisputed€that€Duncan€was€in€the€left€rear€passenger€seat€and€thatÏLucas€was€in€the€right€rear€passenger€seat.€€€Less€than€a€mile€from€the€house,Ïthe€vehicle€left€the€roadway€on€the€right€side€and€traveled€285€feet€in€a€ditchÏbefore€it€came€to€rest€at€an€embankment.€€Lucas€testified€at€trial€that€theÏDefendant€was€driving€the€Bronco.€€She€stated€that€she€offered€to€driveÏbecause€she€was€relatively€sober,€but€that€the€Defendant€refused.€€SheÏtestified€that€the€Defendant€started€in€reverse€with€the€emergency€brake€still€on,Ïbut€then€took€the€brake€off€and€proceeded€down€the€road.€€Soon€thereafter,€theÏvehicle€left€the€roadway.€€Lucas€testified€that,€after€the€wreck,€Sanchez€openedÏthe€driverððs€side€door€from€the€outside€and€unlocked€the€Defendantððs€seatbelt.€ÏThe€Defendant€fell€diagonally€into€the€passenger€seat€because€the€vehicle€wasÍat€an€angle.€€Lucas€heard€two€thumps€and€it€appeared€that€the€DefendantððsÏhead€was€cut€and€bleeding.€€Sanchez€explained€that€the€Defendant€hit€hisÏhead€on€the€windshield€and€the€dashboard€after€his€seatbelt€was€removed.€ÏAnother€vehicle€pulled€up€and€Sanchez€got€a€ride€back€to€the€house€to€get€help.ÌÌà àTennessee€State€Trooper€Mike€Smothers€was€dispatched€to€the€accidentÏscene,€along€with€an€ambulance.€€Sanchez€had€a€bump€on€the€head€andÏLucas€had€a€back€injury€and€had€to€be€extracted€from€the€vehicle.€€TheÏDefendant€was€being€treated€in€the€back€of€the€ambulance€when€TrooperÏSmothers€interviewed€him.€€He€testified€that€the€Defendant€was€initiallyÏuncooperative€and€would€not€answer€his€questions.€€He€appeared€intoxicatedÏand€was€arguing€with€the€EMT€personnel.€Lucas€had€stated€that€theÏDefendant€was€driving€and€the€trooper€confronted€him.€Trooper€Smothers€askedÏwhether€he€was€driving,€and€the€Defendant€admitted€that€he€was€driving€andÏthat€he€just€missed€the€curve€and€ran€off€the€road.€€The€Defendant€was€taken€toÏa€hospital€and€consented€to€a€blood€alcohol€test,€resulting€in€a€.20%€bloodÏalcohol€level.ÌÌà àTrooper€Smothers€testified€regarding€the€head€injuries€received€by€theÏDefendant€and€Sanchez€as€they€corresponded€to€the€crack€in€the€vehicleððsÏpassenger€side€windshield.€€He€stated€that€Sanchez€could€have€hit€theÍwindshield€without€receiving€cuts€because€of€the€safety€glass.€€He€also€testifiedÏthat€the€Defendantððs€cuts€on€the€right€side€of€his€head€could€possibly€beÏattributed€to€hitting€the€windshield€if€his€head€was€turned€to€the€left,€but€were€notÏconsistent€with€a€passenger€facing€forward€because€the€cuts€would€be€on€theÏfront€of€the€head.ÌÌà àThe€Defendant€called€Jennifer€Barker,€a€woman€who€was€also€at€theÏparty,€to€testify€that€she€saw€Sanchez,€not€the€Defendant,€get€into€the€driverððsÏseat€of€the€Bronco€and€drive€away.€€She€stated€that€everyone€had€beenÏdrinking€and€that€Sanchez€ð ðwas€very€intoxicated.ðð€€€Sanchez€had€a€problemÏbacking€up€and€ð ðspun€gravelðð€when€he€pulled€onto€the€road.€€She€testified€thatÏhe€returned€shortly,€ð ðsaying€that€heððd€had€a€wreck€and€that€he€thought€heððdÏkilled€one€of€them.ðð€€However,€Barker€also€said€that€Sanchez€told€her€that€theÏDefendant€was€driving€and€that€it€threw€him€(Sanchez)€out€the€passenger€sideÏwindow€and€threw€the€Defendant€into€the€passenger€seat.ÌÌà àThe€Defendant€testified€that€Sanchez€was€driving€the€vehicle€prior€to€theÏaccident.€€After€the€wreck,€he€saw€Sanchez€at€the€driverððs€side€window€sayingÏð ðwe€got€in€a€wreckðð€and€that€he€would€get€help.€€The€Defendant€testified€that€heÏfelt€blood€on€his€head€and€passed€out€again€on€the€dashboard.€€He€wasÏpulled€out€of€the€truck€through€the€driverððs€side€because€the€passenger€doorÍwas€obstructed€by€the€embankment.€€He€stated€that€Sanchez€was€drinking€butÏthat€he€couldnððt€answer€whether€Sanchez€was€intoxicated€and€how€much€heððdÏhad€to€drink.ÌÌà àThe€Defendant€was€indicted€in€Humphreys€County€for€vehicular€assaultÏand€driving€while€intoxicated.€€Sanchez€was€not€prosecuted€for€any€crime.€€TheÏjury€found€the€Defendant€guilty€of€driving€while€intoxicated.× ƒ2 ××  ×€ÌÌà àIn€his€first€issue,€the€Defendant€argues€that€the€court€erred€by€charging€theÏjury€with€criminal€responsibility€because€it€was€not€formally€charged€in€theÏindictment.€€After€the€conclusion€of€the€proof€in€this€case,€the€State€requested€thatÏthe€jury€be€charged€on€criminal€responsibility× ƒ3 ××  ×€based€on€the€proof€at€trialÏsuggesting€that€Sanchez€may€have€been€the€driver€of€the€vehicle.ÌÌà àAn€indictment€or€presentment€must€provide€notice€of€the€offense€charged,Ïan€adequate€basis€for€the€entry€of€a€proper€judgment,€and€suitable€protectionÏagainst€double€jeopardy.€€òòState€v.€Trustyóó,€919€S.W.2d€305,€310€(Tenn.€1996);ÏòòState€v.€Byrdóó,€820€S.W.2d€739,€741€(Tenn.€1991);€€€òòState€v.€Lindsayóó,€637ÍS.W.2d€886,€890€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.1982).€€€The€indictment€ð ðmust€state€the€factsÏin€ordinary€and€concise€language€in€a€manner€that€would€enable€a€person€ofÏcommon€understanding€to€know€what€is€intended,€and€with€a€degree€of€certaintyÏwhich€would€enable€the€court€upon€conviction,€to€pronounce€the€properÏjudgment.ðð€€òòWarden€v.€Stateóó,€214€Tenn.€391,€381€S.W.2d€244,€245€(1964).ÌÌà àThe€indictment€in€the€case€at€bar€charged€the€Defendant€with€drivingÏwhile€intoxicated,€requiring€that€the€following€elements€be€proved:€(1)€That€theÏDefendant€was€driving€or€in€control€of€a€motor€vehicle;€(2)€that€the€vehicle€wasÏdriven€on€a€public€road;€and€(3)€that€the€Defendant€was€under€the€influence€ofÏan€intoxicant.€€Initially,€we€note€that€criminal€responsibility€for€the€conduct€ofÏanother€is€not€a€statutory€offense,€but€rather€a€legal€theory€of€criminal€liability€byÏwhich€a€defendant€may€be€convicted€for€an€offense€when€there€are€multipleÏactors€involved.€€òòSeeóó€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€39„11„402.€€ÌÌà àThe€State€decided€that€criminal€responsibility€was€raised€by€the€proof€asÏa€theory€of€liability€based€on€the€Defendantððs€position€œthat€he›€was€not€the€driverÏof€the€vehicle€and€the€State€requested€that€an€instruction€be€given€to€that€effect.€ÏWe€do€not€believe€that€criminal€responsibility€must€have€been€included€in€theÏindictment.€€The€indictment€gave€the€Defendant€notice€of€the€offense€chargedÏand€an€adequate€basis€for€the€entry€of€a€proper€judgment,€and€also€providedÍprotection€against€double€jeopardy.€€The€Defendant€was€only€charged€with€andÏat€risk€of€being€convicted€for€DUI.× ƒ4 ××  ×€€He€was€apprised€of€the€elements€of€theÏcrime€against€which€he€was€to€defend€and€for€which€the€trial€court€entered€aÏjudgment.€€Although€we€do€not€know€upon€what€theory€the€jury€based€itsÏverdict,€the€Defendant€cannot€be€charged€with€another€DUI€offense€based€onÏthat€same€incident.€€Thus,€he€is€not€at€risk€for€double€jeopardy.€€ÌÌà àWe€do€not€believe€that€our€law€requires€criminal€responsibility€for€theÏconduct€of€another€to€be€charged€in€the€indictment.€€In€this€case,€the€State€hadÏno€notice€of€the€defense€that€Sanchez€may€have€been€the€driver.€€Because€theÏevidence€at€trial€raised€the€issue,€it€was€not€improper€to€request€the€charge€atÏthe€conclusion€of€the€proof.ÌÌà àIn€his€second€issue,€the€Defendant€contends€that€the€trial€court€erred€byÏcharging€the€jury€on€criminal€responsibility€when€the€other€person€was€neverÏcharged€with€the€offense€and€no€proof€was€presented€at€trial€regarding€hisÏdegree€of€intoxication.€€We€first€note€that€the€fact€that€a€party€to€an€offense€hasÏnot€been€charged€or€convicted€is€not€a€defense.€€However,€we€conclude€thatÍcharging€criminal€responsibility€for€the€conduct€of€another€led€to€error€œin€the€caseÏòòsubóó€òòjudiceóó€for›€another€related€reason.€€ÌÌà àOne€is€criminally€responsible€as€a€party€to€an€offense€ð ðif€the€offense€isÏcommitted€by€the€personððs€own€conduct,€by€the€conduct€of€another€for€which€theÏperson€is€criminally€responsible,€or€by€both.ðð€€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€39„11„401.€ÏFurthermore,€the€legislature€has€provided€that€a€defendant€may€be€criminallyÏresponsible€based€on€the€conduct€of€another€ð ðon€proof€of€commission€of€theÏoffenseðð€and€that€the€defendant€was€a€party.€€€œTenn.€Code€Ann.€ð𛀜39„11„407.›€ÏIt€is€not€a€defense€that€ð ð[t]he€œperson€for€whose›€conduct€the€defendant€isÏcriminally€responsible€has€been€acquitted,€has€not€been€prosecuted€orÏconvicted,€has€been€convicted€of€a€different€offense€or€different€type€or€class€ofÏoffense,€or€is€immune€from€prosecution.ðð€€œTenn.›€Code€Ann.€ðð€œ39„11„407(2).€€The›ÏSentencing€Commission€Comments€to€section€407€state€the€following€policyÏdetermination€for€offenses€based€on€criminal€responsibility€for€the€conduct€ofÏanother:ÌÌÒ ` ÒÒ „ ÒÒ ` ÒÒ ° ÒÓÓà àThis€section€reflects€a€policy€determination€that,€in€a€caseÏinvolving€multiple€offenders,€a€conviction€should€be€sustained€whereÏthere€is€sufficient€evidence€to€support€it,€regardless€of€whether€there€isÏa€failure€of€proof€in€another€case€involving€other€people.€€€Thus,€theÏdefendant€may€be€convicted€whether€the€other€parties€to€the€offenseÏare€convicted,€acquitted,€or€incapable€of€criminal€responsibility.ÌÒ  ÒÒ ° ÒÒ  ÒÒ „ ÒÓÓà àÌÌà àThus,€upon€proof€that€an€offense€has€been€committed,€with€multipleÏactors,€even€if€another€person€was€the€principal,€a€defendant€may€be€convictedÏfor€the€conduct€of€the€other€based€on€one€of€three€theories:ÌÌÒ ` ÒÒ „ ÒÒ ` ÒÒ ° ÒÓÓà à(1)€Acting€with€the€culpability€required€for€the€offense,€the€personÏcauses€or€aids€an€innocent€or€irresponsible€person€to€engage€inÏconduct€prohibited€by€the€definition€of€the€offense;ÌÌà à(2)€Acting€with€intent€to€promote€or€assist€the€commission€of€theÏoffense,€or€to€benefit€in€the€proceeds€or€results€of€the€offense,€theÏperson€solicits,€directs,€aids,€or€attempts€to€aid€another€person€toÏcommit€the€offense;€€orÌÌà à(3)€Having€a€duty€imposed€by€law€or€voluntarily€undertaken€toÏprevent€commission€of€the€offense€and€acting€with€intent€to€benefit€inÏthe€proceeds€or€results€of€the€offense,€or€to€promote€or€assist€itsÏcommission,€the€person€fails€to€make€a€reasonable€effort€to€preventÏcommission€of€the€offense.ÌÒ  ÒÒ ° ÒÒ  ÒÒ „ ÒÓÓÌ€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€39„11„402;€òòsee€alsoóó€òòState€v.€Williamsóó,€920€S.W.2d€247,Ï257„58€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.€1995);€òòState€v.€Gennoeóó,€851€S.W.2d€833,€836€(Tenn.ÏCrim.€App.€1992);€òòState€v.€Brownóó,€756€S.W.2d€700,€703€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.Ï1988).ÌÌà àHere,€the€jury€was€charged€with€the€latter€two€theories.€€The€trial€court€alsoÏcharged€the€jury€that:€ð ðThe€facts€presented€in€this€case€allow€the€jury€to€findÏeither€that€(1)€the€defendant€was€the€driver€or€(2)€that€the€defendant€was€not€theÍdriver.ðð€The€jury€convicted€the€Defendant€of€DUI€and€rendered€a€general€verdict.€ÏWe€do€not€know€upon€which€theory€and€upon€whose€actions€as€principal€theÏjury€relied.× ƒ5 ××  ×ÌÌà àThe€jury€was€given€the€choice€of€convicting€the€Defendant€based€on€hisÏown€conduct€or€criminal€responsibility€for€Sanchezðð€conduct.€€Ordinarily,€the€factÏthat€the€other€actor€was€neither€charged€nor€convicted€of€the€crime€is€not€aÏdefense,€and€we€agree€that€this€charge€was€not€error€in€the€case€òòsub€judiceóó.€ÏHowever,€the€State€could€only€œproperly€convict›€the€Defendant€ð ðon€proof€ofÏcommission€of€the€offense.ðð€€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€39„11„407.€€This€case€is€unlikeÏa€conviction€where€an€offense€has€been€proved€to€have€been€committed€withÏmultiple€actors€where€the€identity€of€the€actual€perpetrator€is€unclear.€€òòSeeóó€òòStateÏv.€Williamsóó,€920€S.W.2d€247,€258€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.€1995).€€In€òòWilliamsóó,€theÏvictim€was€raped€by€one€man€when€two€others€were€present€and€participatingÏand€the€victim€could€not€identify€the€actual€perpetrator.€€There,€the€jury€wasÏproperly€charged€with€criminal€responsibility.€€òòId.óó€at€251,€257.€€ÌÌà àHere,€in€order€to€convict€the€Defendant,€it€was€òòpossibleóó€for€the€State€toÏprove€that€either€the€Defendant€or€Sanchez€was€driving.€€The€court€could€thenÏcharge€the€jury€with€DUI€and€criminal€responsibility€and€convict€the€Defendant€forÏdriving€drunk€himself€or€for€allowing€Sanchez€to€drive€drunk.€òòSeeóó€òòWilliams€v.ÏStateóó,€352€S.W.2d€230,€209€Tenn.€208€(1961).€€However,€it€would€have€beenÏòònecessaryóó€to€prove€that€both€the€Defendant€and€Sanchez€were€intoxicated€inÏorder€to€establish€that€an€offense€had€indeed€been€committed€for€the€purpose€ofÏconvicting€the€Defendant€based€on€alternate€theories€of€responsibility.€€TheÏState€argues€that€there€was€sufficient€evidence€to€support€a€finding€thatÏSanchez€was€driving€and€that€he€was€intoxicated.€€The€State€contends€thatÏð ð[a]ll€of€the€witnesses,€including€the€defendant€himself€admitted€that€Mr.€SanchezÏwas€drunk.ððÌÌà àWe€disagree.€€To€determine€the€sufficiency€of€the€convicting€evidence,€theÏstandard€is€whether,€after€reviewing€the€evidence€in€the€light€most€favorable€toÏthe€prosecution,€any€rational€trier€of€fact€could€have€found€the€essential€elementsÏof€the€crime€beyond€a€reasonable€doubt.€€òòJackson€v.€Virginiaóó,€443€U.S.€307,Ï319€(1979).€€After€a€careful€review€of€the€record,€we€have€found€little€evidence€toÏsupport€a€finding€beyond€a€reasonable€doubt€that€Sanchez€was€intoxicated.€ÏThere€is€only€one€statement€from€one€witness,€Jennifer€Barker,€that€SanchezÏwas€ð ðvery€intoxicated.ðð€€Other€than€that,€the€witnessðð€statements€were€thatÍgenerally€everyone€was€drinking.€€The€Defendant€stated€that€Sanchez€wasÏdrinking,€but€would€not€confirm€how€much€he€had€to€drink€or€whether€he€wasÏintoxicated.€€There€is€no€testimony€regarding€Sanchezðð€appearance€or€behavior,Ïno€field€sobriety€tests€were€conducted€and€no€blood€alcohol€level€was€taken.€ÏTherefore,€we€are€compelled€to€conclude€that€the€evidence€was€insufficient€toÏsupport€a€conviction€based€on€Sanchezðð€driving€while€intoxicated.€€More€proof€ofÏintoxication€than€that€which€was€offered€in€the€case€at€bar€is€necessary€toÏuphold€a€conviction€for€DUI.€€€òòSeeóó€€òòWilliams€v.€Stateóó,€352€S.W.2d€230,€209ÏTenn.€208€(1961);€òòHopson€v.€Stateóó,€299€S.W.2d€11,€201€Tenn.€337€(1957);ÏòòState€v.€Nunneryóó,€875€S.W.2d€681€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.€1993);€òòState€v.€Vasseróó,Ï870€S.W.2d€543€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.€1993).ÌÌà àWhile€there€is€ample€evidence€that€the€Defendant€himself€drove€theÏvehicle€and€that€he€was€intoxicated,€the€jury€rendered€a€general€verdict,€notÏspecifying€upon€which€theory€they€relied€to€convict.€€As€a€result,€the€jury€mightÏhave€convicted€the€Defendant€based€on€insufficient€evidence€of€SanchezððÏœintoxication,€and€thus,€we›€œcannot›€conclude€that€instructing€the€jury€on€criminalÏresponsibility€was€harmless€error.€€€Yet,€the€insufficiency€of€the€evidence€merelyÏhighlights€the€problem€of€instructing€the€jury€on€criminal€responsibility€withoutÏmaking€it€clear€that€the€jury€was€to€agree€unanimously€that€either€the€DefendantÏor€Sanchez€was€driving€òòandóó€that€the€driver€was€intoxicated.€€Even€if€theÍevidence€was€legally€sufficient€to€support€a€conviction€based€on€SanchezððÏintoxication,€it€would€be€impossible€to€assure€that€the€conviction€was€the€resultÏof€a€unanimous€jury€verdict.ÌÌà àA€defendant€has€a€fundamental€constitutional€right€to€a€unanimous€verdictÏbefore€a€conviction€for€a€criminal€offense€may€be€imposed.€€€òòState€v.€Sheltonóó,Ï851€S.W.2d€134,€134€(Tenn.€1993);€€€òòState€v.€Brownóó,€823€S.W.2d€576,€583Ï(Tenn.€Crim.€App.1991).€€€The€unanimity€of€a€verdict€is€required€so€that€the€jury'sÏverdict€may€not€be€a€matter€of€choice€between€offenses€in€which€some€jurorsÏconvict€of€one€offense€and€others€of€another€offense,€all€within€the€same€count.€ÏòòTidwell€v.€Stateóó,€922€S.W.2d€497,€500€(Tenn.€1996)€€Protection€of€this€right€oftenÏrequires€"special€precautions€[by€the€court]€to€ensure€that€the€jury€deliberatesÏover€the€particular€charged€offense,€instead€of€creating€a€'patchwork€verdict'Ïbased€on€different€offenses€in€evidence."€€òòSheltonóó,€851€S.W.2d€at€134.€€€WhereÏthere€is€evidence€of€multiple€offenses,€the€precaution€is€the€doctrine€of€election,Ïwhich€requires€the€state€to€elect€and€identify€at€the€end€of€its€œcase„in„chief›€theÏexact€offense€for€which€it€seeks€conviction.€€òòId.óó;€€òòBurlison€v.€Stateóó,€501€S.W.2dÏ801,€804€(Tenn.1973).€€€Where€there€is€technically€one€offense,€but€evidence€ofÏmultiple€acts€which€would€constitute€the€offense,€a€defendant€is€still€entitled€toÏthe€protection€of€unanimity.€€òòState€v.€Forbesóó,€918€S.W.2d€431,€445„46€(Tenn.ÏCrim.€App.€1995)ÌÌÒ  ÒÒ ° ÒÒ ` ÒÒ ° ÒÓÓ[I]n€cases€involving€evidence€which€shows€a€real€potential€that€aÏconviction€may€occur€as€a€result€of€different€jurors€concluding€that€theÏdefendant€committed€different€acts,€each€of€which€separately€showingÏthe€commission€of€an€offense,€the€trial€court€must€augment€the€generalÏunanimity€instruction€to€insure€that€the€jury€understands€its€duty€toÏagree€unanimously€to€a€particular€set€of€facts.€€€The€assessment€ofÏthis€potential€would€involve€consideration€of€the€allegations€made€andÏthe€statutory€offense€charged,€as€well€as€the€actual€evidenceÏpresented.€€ÌÌÌÒ  ÒÒ ° ÒÒ  ÒÒ „ ÒÓÓòòBrownóó,€823€S.W.2d€at€583€œ(citing›€òòUnited€States€v.€Gipsonóó,€553€F.2d€453€(5thÏCir.1977)€and€òòUnited€States€v.€Berosóó,€833€F.2d€455€(3rd€Cir.1987)).ÌÌà àIn€the€case€at€bar,€the€trial€court€charged€that€ð ðThe€facts€presented€in€thisÏcase€allow€the€jury€to€find€either€that€(1)€the€defendant€was€the€driver€or€(2)€thatÏthe€defendant€was€not€the€driver.ðð€Also,€the€jury€was€charged€that€they€wereÏrequired€to€reach€a€unanimous€verdict.€€However,€we€do€not€believe€that€thisÏinstruction€effectively€communicated€to€the€jury€that€they€were€to€unanimouslyÏagree€upon€the€facts€constituting€the€offense,€specifically,€to€unanimously€agreeÏwhether€the€Defendant€was€or€was€not€driving€the€Bronco.€€This€leaves€theÏpossibility€that€part€of€the€jury€could€have€convicted€the€Defendant€for€drivingÏhimself,€and€the€others€could€have€concluded€that€he€did€not€drive.€€The€jury€didÏnot€indicate€upon€which€theory€and€set€of€facts€it€convicted€the€Defendant.€€€It€isÏthis€potential€for€confusion€that€invades€the€Defendantððs€constitutional€rights.€ÍFurthermore,€this€problem€is€compounded€by€the€fact€that€the€jury€may€haveÏindeed€compiled€a€ð ðpatchwork€verdictðð€and€convicted€him€without€sufficientÏevidence€of€an€offense.€€We€hold€that€it€was€error€for€the€trial€court€to€chargeÏcriminal€responsibility€for€the€conduct€of€another€without€clearly€communicating€toÏthe€jury€the€need€for€a€unanimous€verdict€on€the€facts.ÌÌà àTherefore,€we€must€reverse€the€judgment€of€the€trial€court€and€remand€forÏa€new€trial.Ó  ÓÌÌÓÓà àà àà àà àà à____________________________________Ìà àà àà àà àà àDAVID€H.€WELLES,€JUDGEÌÌÌÌCONCUR:ÌÌÌÌ___________________________________ÌœGARY€R.€WADE,€JUDGE›ÌÌÌ___________________________________ÌœCURWOOD€WITT,€JUDGE›