ÿWPC¼  # ÐUNÛ %) 0(/w@W4—«º 0J 0T  0^` 0h¾ 0r& 0|˜ 0† 0š 1u* 0dŸU>U*Av~kvÓé ˜HP LaserJet 4SiHPPCL5MS,ü,,,,,ü0nLHÎ(ÈhH  Z ‹6Times New Roman RegularX($¡¡ ­®[¯U°D±²E³´DµE¶äzz!¬3|x¶2 ÿÿ0Indent1Ô2ÔÔ3  Ô2" ÿÿ0Indent2à0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2, ÿÿ0Indent3à0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô26 ÿÿ0Indent4à0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2@ ÿÿ0Indent5à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2J ÿÿ0Indent6à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2T ÿÿ0Indent7à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2^ ÿÿ0Indent8à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô  ÿÿ?AGMSYaioIndent0I.A.1.a.(1)(a)i)a)P ÿÿ8Mac DefaultMac DefaultÓ ` °šXÓ< Œ 9p`(&Times New Roman< Œ 9p`(ArialPtPtHHÚ(ÿáÿâùFG(üHHÚ(d'hStyl{WP}01•ÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃà Ãà Ãà Ãà Ãà ÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÐ ÐÐHHÐÐ  ÐÐ2ÐÐÿÿ¸æ$ÿÐÐHHÐÐÐÐÐÐÐÐ  ÐÐ ÐÐ ÐÑÑÑGenevaÑÑ ÑÑ € ÑÑ<Px–ÈÑÒÒÒ443!#4ÒÒ$ *$ÒÒ$*$ÒÒ ÿKK ÒÒ  Geneva ÒÒ  Geneva ÒÓ.,ÓÓÓÓ6ÓÓ ÓßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßÑGenevaÑÑ ÑÒ  h HD: Geneva ÒÒ  h HD: Geneva ÒÝ ƒ!ÝÔ . ÔÔ€ÔÝ  Ý›Ò  ÒÒ ° ÒÑ\R AØ'\ÑÓ  ÓÔ€ÔÑ\R AØ'\ÑÞ ÞÌà@ àò òIN€THE€COURT€OF€CRIMINAL€APPEALS€OF€TENNESSEEÌÌà@ àAT€JACKSONÌÌà@ àFEBRUARY€1997€SESSIONÌÌÌÌJIMMY€EARL€LOFTON,ó óà@ à)Ìà@ à)à àò òNO.€02C01„9603„CR„00073ó óÌà àAppellant,à@ à)Ìà@ à)à àò òSHELBY€COUNTYÌVS.ó óà@ à)Ìà@ à)à àò òHon.€Arthur€T.€Bennett,ÏJudgeÌSTATE€OF€TENNESSEE,ó óà@ à)Ìà@ à)à à(Post„Conviction€œRelief€Petition)›Ìà àAppellee.à@ à)ÌÌÌÌò òòòFOR€THE€APPELLANTóó:à àà àà àà àòòFOR€THE€APPELLEEóó:ÌÌJIMMY€EARL€LOFTON,€òòpro€seóóà àà àà àCHARLES€W.ÏBURSONó óÌCCA€„€South€Central€œCorr›.€Centerà àà àAttorney€General€and€ReporterÌP.O.€Box€279ÌClifton,€TN€38425„0279à àà àà àà àò òELLEN€H.€POLLACKó óÌà àà àà àà àà àà àà àAssistant€Attorney€GeneralÌà àà àà àà àà àà àà à450€James€Robertson€ParkwayÌà àà àà àà àà àà àà àNashville,€TN€37243„0493ÌÌà àà àà àà àà àà àà àò òJOHN€W.€PIEROTTIó óÌà àà àà àà àà àà àà àDistrict€Attorney€GeneralÌÌà àà àà àà àà àà àà àò òTOM€HENDERSONó óÌà àà àà àà àà àà àà àAssistant€District€AttorneyÏGeneralÌà àà àà àà àà àà àà à201€Poplar€AvenueÌà àà àà àà àà àà àà àThird€FloorÌà àà àà àà àà àà àà àMemphis,€TN€38103ÌÌÌÌò òOPINION€FILED:€òò€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€óóÌÌÌÌAFFIRMEDÌÌÌÌJOE€G.€RILEY,ÌJUDGEÇÓÓÑ7€¾ÿXXdðXXdð7Ñà@ àòòOPINIONó óóóÌÌà àJimmy€Earl€Lofton€appeals€the€judgment€of€the€Shelby€County€CriminalÏCourt€denying€his€petition€for€post„conviction€œrelief.€€He€was€declared€anÏhabitual€criminal€at€a€trial€in€1985.€€In€1995,€one€of€the€underlying€convictionsÏwas€set€aside.€€He€now€contends€that€the€habitual€criminal€finding€should€be€setÏaside.›€€The€trial€court€denied€post„conviction€relief€without€a€hearing.€€OnÏappeal,€Lofton€presents€two€issues€for€our€review:€(1)€whether€he€was€deniedÏthe€right€to€a€fair€trial€by€the€use€of€a€1970€conviction€which€was€subsequentlyÏœvacated;›€and€(2)€whether€the€reasonable€doubt€jury€instruction€œviolated›€dueÏprocess.€€We€affirm€the€judgment€of€the€trial€court.ÌÌà0 àà àò òòòà@ àPROCEDURAL€BACKGROUNDó óóóÌÌà àIn€1985,€Lofton€was€convicted€by€a€jury€of€the€offenses€of€œlarceny€from€theÏperson,›€armed€robbery€and€assault€with€the€intent€to€commit€first€degree€murder.€ÏHe€was€also€found€to€be€an€habitual€criminal€based€œupon›€œconvictions€resultingÏfrom€guilty€pleas€in€1970›€œfor›€third€degree€burglary€and€œin›€1982€for€(1)€œattemptedÏthird€degree€burglary;€(2)€receiving›€stolen€property€under€the€value€of€$200;€œ(3)›€Ïtwo€œ›€counts€of€forgery€œover›€the€value€of€$200;€€and€(4)€forgery€œunder›€the€value€ofÏ$200.€€He€was€sentenced€to€three€(3)€life€sentences,€two€(2)€of€which€were€to€beÏserved€consecutively.€€The€convictions€and€the€sentences€were€affirmed€onÏappeal.€€òòState€v.€James€Earl€Loftonóó,€No.€39,€Shelby€County€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.Ífiled€Feb.€5,€œ1986,›€at€Jackson),€òòper.€app.€deniedóó€(Tenn.€April€28,€1986).Ìà àIn€January€1995,€this€Court€vacated€the€1970€burglary€conviction.€€TheÏCourt€reasoned€that€when€Lofton€pled€guilty€to€this€offense,€his€guilty€plea€wasÏnot€knowingly€entered.€€However,€the€Court€found€that,€even€after€voiding€theÏ1970€conviction,€there€was€sufficient€evidence€to€sustain€his€status€as€anÏhabitual€criminal.€€òòJames€Earl€œLofton€v.€Stateóó,›€C.C.A.€No.€02C01„9306„CR„00111€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.€filed€Jan.€11,€œ1995,›€at€Jackson),€òòper.€app.€deniedóóÏ(Tenn.€June€12,€1995).Ìà àLofton€filed€the€present€petition€in€November€1995.€€In€his€œpetition›€heÏœasserted›€that€his€habitual€criminal€status€is€œinvalid.›€€He€bases€this€œclaim›€on€theÏfact€that€the€Court€of€Criminal€Appeals€vacated€the€1970€burglary€conviction.€ÏThe€trial€court€dismissed€his€petition€without€a€œhearing.›ÌÌà@ àò òòòHABITUAL€CRIMINAL€STATUSóóó óÌÌà àLoftonððs€main€contention€is€that€he€was€improperly€convicted€as€anÏhabitual€criminal€on€the€basis€on€an€invalid€œunderlying€conviction.›€€œThis›€issueÏhas€been€previously€determined€in€the€appeal€from€his€first€post„convictionÏpetition.€€òòJames€Earl€œLofton€v.€Stateóó,›€œòòsupraóó.›€€Under€the€new€Post„ConvictionÏProcedure€Act,€a€ground€for€relief€is€previously€determined€if€ð ða€court€ofÏcompetent€jurisdiction€has€ruled€on€the€merits€after€a€full€and€fair€hearing.€€A€fullÏand€fair€hearing€has€occurred€where€the€petitioner€is€afforded€the€opportunityðð€toÏpresent€evidence.€€T.C.A.€ðð€40„30„206(h)€(Supp.€1996);€òòseeóó€òòWorkman€v.€Stateóó,Í868€S.W.2d€705,€708€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.€1993);€òòCaruthers€v.€Stateóó,€814€S.W.2dÏ64,€70€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.€1991).€€Lofton€was€allowed€to€present€evidence€at€theÏevidentiary€hearing€in€1991.€€On€appeal,€this€Court€specifically€found€that€hisÏsentencing€as€an€habitual€criminal€would€not€be€affected€by€the€voiding€of€theÏ1970€conviction.€€Therefore,€as€this€issue€has€been€previously€determined,€itÏhas€no€merit.ÌÌà@ àò òòòREASONABLE€DOUBT€JURY€INSTRUCTIONó óóóÌÌà àœLofton›€also€argues€that€the€jury€instruction€given€at€trial€on€œð ðreasonable›Ïœdoubtðð›€is€constitutionally€infirm€as€it€violates€due€process.€€There€is€no€mentionÏof€this€issue€in€the€post„conviction€petition.€€This€court€has€appellate€jurisdictionÏonly.€€T.C.A.€ðð€16„5„108(a).€€Issues€not€raised€in€the€petition€for€post„convictionÏrelief€cannot€be€raised€for€the€first€time€on€appeal.€€A€post„conviction€petitionÏð ðmust€necessarily€rest€upon€and€be€determined€by€the€factual€allegations€itÏcontains.ðð€€òòLong€v.€Stateóó,€510€S.W.2d€83,€85€(Tenn.€€Crim.€App.€1974).€€ThisÏissue€œis,›€œtherefore,›€waived.Ìà àSecondly,€any€relief€has€been€barred€by€the€three„year€statute€ofÏlimitations€for€post„conviction€relief€under€T.C.A.€ðð€40„30„102€(repealed€by€1995ÏTenn.€Pub.€Act€207,€ðð€1).€€Petitionerððs€convictions€were€affirmed€on€February€5,Ï1986,€and€the€Tennessee€Supreme€Court€denied€permission€to€appeal€on€AprilÏ28,€1986.€€œThis›€post„conviction€petition€was€filed€on€November€20,€œ1995.€€TheÏstatute€of€limitations€for€post„conviction€relief€expired€on€July€1,€1989.€€òòSeeóóÍòòAbston€v.€Stateóó,€749€S.W.2d€487€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.€1988).›Ìà àThe€new€Post„Conviction€Procedure€Act,€T.C.A.€ðð€40„30„201€et.€seq.Ï(Supp.€1996),€reduced€the€statute€of€limitations€for€post„conviction€relief€to€oneÏ(1)€year.€€The€Act€also€provides€for€a€one€(1)€year€grace€period€from€May€10,Ï1995,€to€file€a€petition€or€reopen€a€petition€for€post„conviction€relief.€€The€graceÏperiod€does€not€apply€in€this€instance€because€post„conviction€relief€wasÏalready€barred€by€the€statute€of€limitations€when€the€legislation€was€enacted.€ÏThe€new€Post„Conviction€Procedure€Act€was€not€meant€to€revive€previouslyÏbarred€claims.€€òòSeeóó€òòJohnny€L.€Butler€v.€Stateóó,€C.C.A.€No.€02C01„9509„CR„00289,€Shelby€County€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.€filed€December€2,€1996,€at€Jackson);Ïòòbut€seeóó€òòArnold€Carter€v.€Stateóó,€C.C.A.€No.€03C01„9509„CC„00270,€MonroeÏCounty€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.€filed€July€11,€1996,€at€Knoxville).€€As€a€result,€anyÏpost„conviction€relief€is€œtime„barred.Ìà àFurthermore,›€the€issue€has€no€merit.€€Lofton€argues€that€the€juryÏinstruction€œdefining›€œð ðreasonable›€œdoubtðð›€violates€due€process€of€law€by€loweringÏthe€burden€œon›€the€œstate€to€prove€guilt.›€€We€are€unable€to€ascertain€whatÏinstruction€was€actually€given€to€the€jury€because€this€was€not€included€as€partÏof€the€record.€€However,€Tennessee€courts€have€consistently€held€that€using€theÏphrase€ð ðmoral€certaintyðð€in€conjunction€with€an€instruction€that€ð ðreasonableÏdoubt€is€that€doubt€engendered€by€an€investigation€of€all€the€proof€in€the€caseÏand€an€inability,€after€such€investigation,€to€let€the€mind€rest€easily€as€to€theÏcertainty€of€guiltðð€is€a€valid€instruction€on€reasonable€doubt.€€òòNichols€v.€Stateóó,Ï877€S.W.2d€722,€734€(Tenn.€1994);€òòState€v.€Sextonóó,€917€S.W.2d€263,€266Í(Tenn.€Crim.€App.€1995);€òòPettyjohn€v.€Stateóó,€885€S.W.2d€364,€366€(Tenn.€Crim.ÏApp.€1994);€òòState€v.€Hallockóó,€875€S.W.2d€285,€294€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.€1993).€ÏTherefore,€this€issue€is€without€œmerit.ÌÌà@ àò òòòDISMISSAL€WITHOUT€A€HEARINGó óóóÌÌ›à àLofton€œclaims›€that€the€trial€court€erred€in€not€œconducting›€an€evidentiaryÏhearing€on€the€petition.€€If€it€appears€on€the€face€of€the€petition,€any€exhibits€orÏprior€proceedings€in€the€case€that€the€petition€was€not€filed€within€the€statute€ofÏlimitations€or€that€a€prior€petition€attacking€the€conviction€was€resolved€on€theÏmerits,€the€œtrial€court›€may€summarily€dismiss€the€petition.€€T.C.A.€ðð€40„30„206(b)Ï(Supp.€1996).€€œAccordingly,€we€find€that€the€trial€court€acted€appropriately€andÏaffirm€the€judgment.ÌÌÌÓÓà àà àà àà àà àà àà àòò€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€óóÌà àà àà àà àà àà àà àò òJOE€G.€RILEY,€JUDGEÌÌÌÌÌÌCONCUR:ÌÌÌÌÌÌòò€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€óóÌJOE€B.€JONES,€PRESIDING€JUDGEÌÌÌÌÌÌòò€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€óóÌJOHN€H.€PEAY,€JUDGEó ó›