ÿWPC•3 D# ÈUNÓ %!! 0('!w@O!4!£!²! 0Jº!n­"±" 0T¹"  # 0^# 0hq# 0rÙ# 0|K$ 0†Ç$ 0M% 1uÝ%U,R& 0d~&U,â& B'U>+'U6i'B)Ÿ'DCÈ' D3 ( AM>(U*‹( 0@µ(þõ(fó)v~Y*vÓ×+ AQª1Æû1 0DÁ2 D/3 B43 0DQ3˜HP LaserJet 4Si/4SiMX PSPSCRIPTÈÚØÚÚØÈÚ0nLÜÏ(ÖÃ9 Z ‹6Times New Roman RegularX($¡¡ ABUCîDEEEFGUHDIUJU{\ö x3|xJ2 ÿÿ0Indent1Ô2ÔÔ3  Ô«<þ6X9`("Courier 10cpiXÂxþ6X@É“8Ç;X@2" ÿÿ0Indent2à0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  ÔH2, ÿÿ0Indent3à0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô26 ÿÿ0Indent4à0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2@ ÿÿ0Indent5à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2J ÿÿ0Indent6à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2T ÿÿ0Indent7à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2^ ÿÿ0Indent8à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô ÿÿ?AGMSYaioIndent0I.A.1.a.(1)(a)i)a)< Œ 9p`(ModernP ÿÿ8Mac DefaultMac DefaultÓ ` °šXÓ< Œ 9p`(Monaco d< Œ 9p`(&Times New Roman< Œ 9p`(Courier New% Line 7 d((((7Border 1dd%%%%'ÿÿdxd€-)Cþÿ << Gÿÿ< Œ 9p`(Arial("ÿÿ$££Ò  ÒÒ  Ò ôÝ ƒ!ÝÔ€ÔÔ€&ÔÝ  ÝÔ€,ÔÔ€,ÔÓ  ÓÔ YYY ÔFILEDÔ€,XÔÌÌò òJuly€26,€1996ÌÌCecil€Crowson,€Jr.ÌÔ€,ôÔAppellate€Court€Clerkó ó \Ñ\R AØ'\ÑPtPtHHÚ(ÿáÿâùFG(üHHØ(d'`Styl{WP}01•ÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃà Ãà Ãà Ãà Ãà ÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÐ ÐÐHHÐÐ  ÐÐ2ÐÐÿÿ¸æ$ÿÐÐHHÐÐÐÐÐÐÐÐ  ÐÐ ÐÐ ÐÑÑÑGenevaÑÑ ÑÑ € ÑÑ<Px–ÈÑÒÒÒ443!#4ÒÒ$ *$ÒÒ$*$ÒÒ ÿKK ÒÒ  Geneva ÒÒ  Geneva ÒÓ.,ÓÓÓÓ6ÓÓ ÓßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßÑMonacoÑÑ ÑÒ  BA Op Monaco ÒÒ  BA Op Monaco Ò€C-‚ƒCþÿ<< CÿÿƒLevel 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5($$””ò òÚ  Ú1Ú  Úó ó„„'÷ÿ dxdüÿP Pd(3¯$¢¢Ý ƒ!ÝÝ  ÝÝ ƒ!ÝÔ . ÔÔ€ÔÓ&€$$X„d&ÓÑ#€$$Xd#ÑÔ€&ÔÝ  ÝÒ  ÒÒ Ð ÒÓ  ÓÑ ` Ñò òÔ€'ÔÑ\R AØ'\Ñ›œ›ÌÌIN€THE€COURT€OF€CRIMINAL€APPEALS€OF€TENNESSEEó óÌÙ€€ÙœßL€+.);+'h|yÿ£` Å `€€Lß›Ìò òAT€JACKSONÌÌJANUARY€SESSION,€1996ó óÌÌÌÌÓ  Óò òSTATE€OF€TENNESSEE,à àà àà àÏ]à àC.C.A.€#02C01„9506„00166Ìà àà àà àà àà àà à€]Ìà àó óAppellee,à àà àà àà àò ò€]Ìà àà àà àà àà àà à€]Ìà àà àà àà àà àà à€]à àSHELBY€COUNTYÌVS.à àà àà àà àà àà à€]Ìà àà àà àà àà àà à€]à àHON.€ARTHUR€T.€BENNETTÌJONATHAN€MALADY,à àà àà à€]€€€JUDGEÌà àà àà àà àà à€€€€€€]Ìó óà àAppellant.à àà àà à€ò ò]€€€(Habitual€Motor€Offender)ÌÌó óÔ€&ÔÌÌòòÔ€'ÔFOR€THE€APPELLANTóó:à àà àà àà àòòFOR€THE€APPELLEEóó:ÌÌMR.€ROBERT€M.€BRANNON,€JR.à àà àCHARLES€W.€BURSONÌAttorney€at€Lawà àà àà àà àAttorney€General€and€ReporterÌ295€Washington€St.,€Suite€3ÌMemphis,€TN€38103„1911à àà àà àHUNT€S.€BROWNÌà àà àà àà àà àà àà àAttorney€Generalððs€OfficeÌà àà àà àà àà àà àà à450€James€Robertson€ParkwayÌà àà àà àà àà àà àà àNashville,€TN€37243ÌÌà àà àà àà àà àà àà àJOHN€W.€PIEROTTIÌà àà àà àà àà àà àà àDistrict€Attorney€GeneralÌÌà àà àà àà àà àà àà àCHARLES€BELLÌà àà àà àà àà àà àà àAssistant€District€AttorneyÌà àà àà àà àà àà àà àCriminal€Justice€ComplexÌà àà àà àà àà àà àà à3rd€FloorÌà àà àà àà àà àà àà àMemphis,€TN€38103ÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌœÌÌÌ›ÌÌÌOPINION€FILED€___________________________ÌœÌAFFIRMED€ÌÌLYNN›€W.€BROWN,€œSPECIAL€JUDGEÌÑ ` ÑÓÓÑ€/ÑÇÑ7€–OXXdìXXdì7ÑÔ% € Ô›ÌÌà@ àò òOPINIONó óÌÌà àThe€appellant,€Jonathan€D.€Malady,€appeals€from€an€order€ofÏthe€trial€court€declaring€him€to€be€an€habitual€offender€pursuantÏœto›€the€Motor€Vehicle€Habitual€Offender€Act,€T.C.A.€55„10„601,€œòòetóó.›Ïœòòseqóó.›€€We€affirm€the€judgment€of€the€trial€court€and€remand€forÏthe€proper€entry€of€judgment.ÌÌà àThe€appellant€raises€œfour›€issues,€claiming:€1)€the€MotorÏVehicle€Habitual€Offender€Act€is€unconstitutionally€ambiguous€andÏvague;€2)€the€finding€of€appellant€to€be€an€habitual€offenderÏconstituted€a€violation€of€double€jeopardy;€3)€he€was€improperlyÏdenied€a€jury€trial;€and€4)€the€trial€court€did€not€properlyÏconsider€principles€of€equity€when€it€determined€him€to€be€anÏhabitual€offender.€€In€addition,€this€court€will€address€theÏissue€of€the€technical€validity€of€the€judgment€of€the€trialÏcourt.ÌÌà àThe€appellant€does€not€contest€the€facts€in€this€case,€thatÏhe€had€been€convicted€of€the€following€qualifying€motor€vehicleÏoffenses:Ìà à(1)€reckless€driving€in€violation€of€T.C.A.€55„10„205€onÏAugust€31,€1989;Ìà à(2)€driving€while€under€the€influence€of€an€intoxicant€inÏviolation€of€T.C.A.€55„10„401€on€December€12,€1990;€andÌà à(3)€another€driving€while€under€the€influence€of€anÏintoxicant€on€March€23,€1994.ÌÌò òà àI.€€Constitutional€Vagueness€of€the€Statute.Ìà àó óT.C.A.€55„10„603(2)(A)€defines€a€motor€vehicle€habitualÏoffender€as€follows:ÌÒ ` ÒÒ  ÒÓÓAny€person€who,€during€a€three„year€period,€isÏconvicted€in€a€Tennessee€court€or€courts€of€threeÏ(3)€or€more€of€the€following€offenses;€any€personÏwho,€during€a€five„year€period,€is€convicted€in€aÏTennessee€court€or€courts€of€three(3)€or€more€ofÏthe€following€offenses;€or€any€person€who,€during€aÏten„year€period,€is€convicted€in€a€Tennessee€courtÏor€courts€of€five€(5)€or€more€of€the€followingÏoffenses;€provided,€that€if€the€five„€or€ten„yearÏperiod€is€used,€one€(1)€of€such€offenses€occurredÏafter€July€1,€1991.ÓÓÌÒ  ÒÒ Ð ÒEach€of€the€convictions€to€which€the€appellant€admits€œis€among›Íthose€listed€in€the€statute.€€As€such€the€appellant€qualifies€asÏan€habitual€motor€offender€pursuant€to€T.C.A.€55„10„603(2)(A)€byÏhaving€been€convicted€of€three€separate€offenses€provided€in€theÏstatute€within€a€five€year€period,€the€last€conviction€occurringÏafter€July€1,€1991.Ìà àÌà àThe€appellant,€however,€characterizes€the€language€of€theÏstatute€quoted€above€as€being€inconsistent,€ambiguous,€and€vagueÏin€its€meaning.€€He€asks€this€court€to€declare€itÏunconstitutionally€void€for€vagueness€as€violative€of€the€dueÏprocess€clause€of€the€14th€Amendment€to€the€United€StatesÏConstitution.ÌÌà àA€basic€principle€of€due€process€is€that€an€enactment€whoseÏprohibitions€are€not€sufficiently€clearly€defined€is€void€forÏvagueness.€€The€language€of€a€penal€statute€must€be€clear€andÏconcise€to€give€sufficient€warning€so€that€people€may€avoid€theÏconduct€which€is€forbidden.€€Also,€the€language€and€actual€wordsÏof€a€statute€must€"be€taken€in€their€natural€and€ordinary€sense€œÌÌÌwithout›€a€forced€construction€to€limit€or€extend€their€meaning."€ÏœòòState›€v.€œThomasóó,›€635€S.W.€2d€114,€116€(Tenn.€1982),€citingÏòòGrayned€v.€City€of€Rockfordóó,€408€U.S.€104,€108€(1972),€andÏòòEllenburg€v.€Stateóó,€215€œTenn.›€153,€384€S.W.€2d€29,€30€(1964).ÌÌà àThe€statutory€provision€quoted€above,€when€read€in€itsÏnatural€and€ordinary€sense€creates€three€categories€of€habitualÏoffenders:€€(1)€a€person€with€three€qualifying€convictions€in€aÏthree„year€period;€(2)€a€person€with€three€qualifying€convictionsÏin€a€five„year€period€ò òonly€ifó ó€at€least€one€of€the€convictionsÏoccurred€after€July€1,€1991;€and€(3)€a€person€with€fiveÏqualifying€convictions€in€a€ten„year€period€ò òonly€ifó ó€at€least€oneÏof€the€convictions€occurred€after€July€1,€1991.€€There€is€nothingÏinconsistent€or€ambiguous€about€the€statute.€€We€conclude€thatÏthe€statute€is€not€unconstitutionally€void€for€vagueness.ÌÌà àA€brief€look€at€the€legislative€history€of€this€statuteÏexplains€its€present€form.€€Before€1992€only€the€first€categoryÏwas€included€in€the€statute.€€However,€the€legislature€in€thatÍyear€amended€the€statute€to€include€the€second€and€thirdÏcategories.€€1992€Public€Acts€of€Tennessee,€Chapter€936,Ïeffective€July€1,€œ1992.€By›€providing€that€the€œlatter›€twoÏcategories€of€habitual€motor€offender€require€a€convictionÏoccurring€after€July€1,€œ1991,›€the€legislature€apparentlyÏattempted€to€prevent€ex€post€facto€attacks€on€judgments€enteredÏpursuant€to€the€revised€statute.ÌÌœÌÌ›à àò òII.€€Double€Jeopardyó óÌà àThe€petitioner€asserts€that€having€been€previously€convictedÏof€the€offenses€which€form€the€basis€for€adjudicating€him€to€beÏan€habitual€motor€offender,€the€double€jeopardy€provisions€of€theÏState€and€Federal€Constitutions€prohibit€the€additionalÏpunishment€of€habitual€offender€status.€€It€has€long€beenÏestablished€that€both€the€State€and€Federal€Constitutions€protectÏagainst€the€"peril€of€both€a€second€punishment€and€a€second€trialÏfor€the€same€offense."€€òòWhitwell€v.€œStateóó,›€520€S.W.€2d€338,€341Ï(Tenn.€œ1975);€€òòState€v.€Smithóó,€810€S.W.€2d€155€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.Í1991).€€€However,›€the€appellant€candidly€admits€that€theÏTennessee€Supreme€Court€has€ruled€contrary€to€his€position.€ÏòòState€v.€Conleyóó,€639€S.W.€2d€435,€437€(Tenn.€1982)€holds€thatÌÒ ` ÒÒ  ÒÓÓthe€revocation€of€all€driving€privileges€of€oneÏdeclared€to€be€an€habitual€offender€under€the€ActÏis€nothing€more€than€the€deprivation€of€aÏprivilege,€is€"remedial€in€nature,"€and€is€notÏintended€to€have€the€effect€of€imposingÏ"punishment"€in€order€to€vindicate€public€justice.ÓÓÌÒ  ÒÒ Ð ÒTherefore,€the€declaration€of€an€individual€to€be€an€habitualÏoffender€and€the€removal€of€his€driving€privileges€"does€notÏsubject€him€to€double€œjeopardy."€€òòIdóó.›€€We€have€considered€theÏauthority€cited€by€the€appellant€pertaining€to€forfeitures€and€Ïdouble€jeopardy,€but€find€none€of€such€to€be€pertinent€to€thisÏissue.€€The€driving€of€an€automobile€upon€a€public€road€is€aÏprivilege,€not€a€property€right.€€òòSullins€v.€Butler€et€alóó.,€175ÏTenn.€468,€135€S.W.€2d€930€(1940).€€There€was€no€violation€ofÏdouble€jeopardy€in€the€declaration€of€the€petitioner€to€be€anÏhabitual€motor€offender.ÌÌœÌÌ›à àœò òIII.€€Right€to€Trial€by€Jury.ó ó›Ìà àThe€appellant€contends€that€he€was€entitled€to€a€trial€byÏjury€in€this€case€as€guaranteed€by€Article€I,€Section€6€of€theÏConstitution€of€the€State€of€Tennessee,€1870,€which€œprovides›€thatÏ"the€right€of€trial€by€jury€shall€remain€inviolate."€€He€isÏcorrect€in€stating€that€proceedings€under€the€Motor€VehicleÏHabitual€Offender€Act€are€civil€in€nature.€€òòEverhart€v.€Stateóó,Ï563€S.W.€2d€795€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.€1978).€€Furthermore€the€actÏitself€œprovides›€that€a€defendant€has€the€right€to€demand€a€juryÏtrial€for€any€disputed€issues.€€T.C.A.€55„10„611.€€In€this€caseÏthe€appellant€did€not€allege€that€there€were€any€disputed€issuedÏof€fact€in€the€trial€court.€€He€admitted€to€the€three€convictionsÏwithin€a€five„year€period.€€Since€there€were€no€factual€disputes,Ïthe€trial€court€was€acting€within€his€authority€under€T.C.A.€55„10„610€to€"render€an€order€or€judgment€as€may€be€appropriateÏwithout€the€intervention€of€a€jury."ÌÌà àThis€is€the€same€procedure€as€would€occur€in€any€civil€case.€ÏThe€Tennessee€Rules€of€Civil€Procedure,€Rule€56,€provides€for€aÏmotion€for€summary€judgment.€€Summary€judgment€is€to€be€renderedÍby€a€trial€court€only€when€it€is€shown€that€there€is€no€genuineÏissue€regarding€any€material€fact,€and€that€the€moving€party€isÏentitled€to€a€judgment€as€a€matter€of€law.€€òòTaylor€v.€NashvilleÏBanneróó€òòPublishing€Co.óó,€573€S.W.€2d€476€(Tenn.€App.€1978),€cert.Ïdenied,€441€U.S.€923,€99€S.€Ct.€2032€(1979).€€òòDaniels€v.€WhiteÏœConsolidated›€œIndustries,›€Inc.óó,€692€S.W.€2d€422€(Tenn.€App.€1985).ÌÌà àThe€right€to€trial€by€jury€under€the€Tennessee€ConstitutionsÏof€1796€and€1834€was€stated€exactly€as€it€is€found€in€presentÏconstitution.€€It€has€long€been€established€that€the€right€ofÏtrial€by€jury€sanctioned€and€secured€by€this€constitutionalÏprovision€is€a€right€to€trial€by€jury€as€it€existed€and€was€inÏforce€and€use€according€to€the€course€of€the€common€law€under€theÏlaws€and€Constitution€of€North€Carolina€at€the€time€of€theÏformation€and€adoption€of€the€Tennessee€Constitution€in€1796.€ÏòòMcGinnis€v.€Stateóó,€28€Tenn.€43€(1848),€òòTrigally€v.€Mayor€ofÏMemphisóó,€46€Tenn.€382€(1869),€òòGrooms€v.€Stateóó,€221€Tenn.€243,€426ÏS.W.€2d€176€(1968).€€€Where,€however,€there€is€no€disputeÏregarding€the€facts,€which€are€legally€apparent,€the€judgeÏwithout€intervention€of€a€jury,€applies€the€law€to€the€facts,€andÍrenders€judgment€accordingly.€€òòSevier€v.€The€Justices€ofÏWashington€Countyóó,€7€Tenn.€334,€339€(1824).€€Entry€of€summaryÏjudgment€does€not€amount€to€an€improper€denial€of€the€right€toÏtrial€by€jury€where€there€is€no€genuine€issue€as€to€any€materialÏfact.€€òòUnion€Planters€National€Bank€v.€Inmanóó,€588€S.W.€2d€757Ï(Tenn.€App.€1979).€€œSince›€there€was€no€dispute€regarding€theÏfacts€of€this€case,€the€appellant€had€no€right€to€trial€by€juryÏunder€the€Tennessee€Constitution.ÌÌà àò òIV.€€Principles€of€Equityó óÌà àThe€appellant€contends€that€because€proceedings€pursuant€toÏthe€Motor€Vehicle€Habitual€Offender€Act€œare›€civil€in€nature,€theÏtrial€court€erred€in€refusing€to€consider€principles€of€equity€inÏdeciding€whether€to€declare€him€an€habitual€offender.Ìà àT.C.A.€œ55„10„613(a)›€states€as€follows:ÌÒ ` ÒÒ  ÒÓÓIf€the€court€œfinds›€that€the€defendant€is€not€anÏhabitual€offender,€the€proceeding€shall€beÏdismissed,€but€if€the€court€finds€that€suchÏdefendant€is€an€habitual€offender,€the€court€œòòshallóó›Ïmake€an€order€directing€that€such€person€shall€notÏoperate€a€motor€vehicle€on€the€highways€of€thisÏstate€and€that€such€person€shall€surrender€to€theÏcourt€all€licenses€to€operate€a€motor€vehicle€uponÏthe€highways€of€this€state.€€(emphasis€added).ÓÓÌÒ  ÒÒ Ð ÒWhen€the€word€"shall"€is€used€in€a€statutory€provision,€it€is€toÏbe€construed€as€mandatory€and€not€discretionary.€€òòGabel€v.€Lermaóó,Ï812€S.W.€2d€580€(Tenn.€App.€1990).€€See€also€òòState€v.€Gurleyóó,€691ÏS.W.€2d€562€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.€1984),€holding€the€legislature'sÏuse€of€the€words€"shall"€and€"day€for€day"€imposes€a€mandatoryÏsentence€upon€DUI€offenders.€€We€conclude€that€the€use€of€theÏœword›€"shall"€by€the€legislature€removes€all€discretion€from€theÏtrial€court€as€to€the€decision€to€revoke€a€person's€license€toÏdrive€once€the€determination€that€he€is€an€habitual€offender€hasÏbeen€made.€€The€sanction€of€declaring€an€individual€to€be€anÏhabitual€offender€is€not€a€matter€affected€by€principles€ofÏequity.ÌÌà àò òV.€€Validity€of€the€Judgment.ó óÌà àThere€remains€another€issue€not€raised€by€the€parties€whichÏshould€be€addressed.€€The€judgment€of€the€trial€court€is€signedÏonly€by€the€judge.€€It€contains€neither€the€signatures€of€theÏrespective€counsel€for€the€parties€nor€a€certificate€by€counselÏor€the€clerk.€€A€proceeding€under€the€Motor€Vehicle€HabitualÏOffender€Act€is€civil€in€nature€and€therefore€is€governed€by€theÍTennessee€Rules€of€Civil€Procedure.€€See€òòEverhart€v.€Stateóó,€563ÏS.W.€2d€795€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.€1978).€€òòBankston€v.€Stateóó,€815€S.W.Ï2d€213€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.€1991).€€Rule€œ58›€Tennessee€Rules€CivilÏProcedure€provides€in€part:€ÓÓÌÒ  ÒÒ  Ò€ÌÒ ` ÒÒ  ÒEntry€of€the€judgment€or€an€order€of€finalÏdisposition€is€effective€when€a€judgment€containingÏone€of€the€following€is€marked€on€the€face€by€theÏclerk€as€filed€for€entry:€€Ìà à(1)€the€signatures€of€the€judge€and€all€theÏparties€or€counsel;€or€€Ìà à(2)€the€signatures€of€the€judge€and€one€partyÏor€counsel€with€a€certificate€of€counsel€that€aÏcopy€of€the€proposed€order€has€been€served€on€allÏother€parties€or€counsel;€or€€Ìà à(3)€the€signature€of€the€judge€and€aÏcertificate€of€the€clerk€that€a€copy€has€beenÏserved€on€all€other€parties€or€counsel.€.€.€.€€œÌ̛̀ÌÒ  ÒÒ Ð ÒÓÓœà àAs›€a€result€of€this€omission,€the€judgment€of€the€trialÏcourt€finding€the€appellant€to€be€an€habitual€offender€was€neverÏproperly€entered€or€in€effect.€€òòState€v.€Jacksóó,€No.Ï03C01„9108„CR„00256€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.€at€Knoxville,€Apr.€28,Ïœ1992);›€òòGrantham€v.€Tennessee€State€Board€of€Equalizationóó,€794ÏS.W.€2d€751€(Tenn.€App.€1990).€€On€remand€the€trial€court€shouldÏrequire€that€the€judgment€be€entered€pursuant€to€Rule€œ58.›ÌÌà àAccordingly,€the€judgment€of€the€trial€court€is€affirmed€andÏthe€case€remanded€for€proper€entry€of€judgment.ÌÌÌà àà àà àà àà àà à__________________________________ÓÓÌà àà àà àà àà àà àLynn€W.€Brown,€Special€JudgeÌÌÌÌÌÌÌCONCUR:ÌÌÌÌ_______________________________ÌDavid€G.€Hayes,€JudgeÌÌÌÌ_______________________________ÌJerry€L.€Smith,€JudgeÌ€œÔ€'Ô›