ÿWPCá 2# Ì %× 0(Ýw@4EYhU:pU:ª 0lä 0DP D3” 0JÇ 0T 0^e 0hà 0r+ 0| 0† 0Ÿ 1u/ 0d¤ U* B)2 DC[ AMž ùë fä BJ AOg ƶ 0D| 0@À 0Dv~D D/ BñvÓ˜HP LaserJet 4Si/4SiMX PS 600dpiPSCRIPTÀÌÀääÀÀÌ0  X($¡¡ ¯D°+e±‹²D³E´EµE¶·¸Ó€Ô¡¨ 3|xÁ, øð AZ‹"Arial RegularÂ"Arial Regular((3üÝ$¤¤Ý ƒ!ÝÝ  Ýà  àòòÚ  Ú0Ú  Úóó(#Ã$òòÚ  Ú0Ú  Úóó(((('ÿÿdxd2 ÿÿ0Indent1Ô2ÔÔ3  Ô2" ÿÿ0Indent2à0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2, ÿÿ0Indent3à0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô26 ÿÿ0Indent4à0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2@ ÿÿ0Indent5à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2J ÿÿ0Indent6à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2T ÿÿ0Indent7à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2^ ÿÿ0Indent8à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô ÿÿ?AGMSYaioIndent0I.A.1.a.(1)(a)i)a)P ÿÿ8Mac DefaultMac DefaultÓ ` °šXÓ< Œ 9p`(Arial% Line 7 d####7Border 1dd*,$Cþÿ << Gÿÿ ïÝ ƒ!ÝÑ  ÑÑ#€d#ÑÔ€"ÔÝ  ÝÔ€"ÔÓ  Óò òÔ YYY ÔFILEDÔ€"XÔÌÌMarch€27,€1997ÌÌCecil€W.€CrowsonÌAppellate€Court€ClerkÔ  Ôó ó \Ñ\R AØ'\Ñ d*,-/Cþÿ<< CÿÿƒLevel 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5(3¯$¢¢Ý ƒ!ÝÝ  Ý("ÿÿ$££Ò  ÒÒ  Ò($$””ò òÚ  Ú1Ú  Úó óPtPtHHÚ(ÿáÿâùFG(üHHÚ(d'h00'÷ÿ dxdüÿP PdStyl{WP}01•ÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃà Ãà Ãà Ãà Ãà ÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÐ ÐÐHHÐÐ  ÐÐ2ÐÐÿÿ¸æ$ÿÐÐHHÐÐÐÐÐÐÐÐ  ÐÐ ÐÐ ÐÑÑÑGenevaÑÑ ÑÑ € ÑÑ<Px–ÈÑÒÒÒ443!#4ÒÒ$ *$ÒÒ$*$ÒÒ ÿKK ÒÒ  Geneva ÒÒ  Geneva ÒÓ.,ÓÓÓÓ6ÓÓ ÓßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßÑGenevaÑÑ ÑÒ  h HD: Geneva ÒÒ  h HD: Geneva ÒÝ ƒ!ÝÔ . ÔÔ€"ÔÝ  Ý›Ñ  ÑÑ € ÑÒ € ÒÒ ° ÒÒ € ÒÒ X ÒÓÓÑ\R AØ'\ÑÓ  ÓÑ\R AØ'\ÑÑ7€ &â XXdædÈ7ÑÑ  ÑœÑ  ÑÙ€*ÙßR€%&$A1-j|` ç `€€@ÿRßÞ ÞÌIN›€THE€COURT€OF€CRIMINAL€APPEALS€OF€TENNESSEEÌAT€NASHVILLE€Ì€€€OCTOBER€1996€SESSIONÌÓ  ÓÌÌÓÓSTATE€OF€TENNESSEE,à àà àà à)à àNO.€01C01„9509„CR„00309à àà àà àà àà àà àà à)Ìà àAppelleeà àà àà àà à)à àSUMNER€COUNTYÌà àà àà àà àà àà à)à àÌV.à àà àà àà àà àà à)à àHON.€JANE€WHEATCRAFT,€JUDGEÌà àà àà àà àà àà à)ÌBRIAN€M.€MINOUXà àà àœ›à à)à à(Pretrial€Diversion)Ìà àà àà àà àà àà à)Ìà àAppellantà àà àà àà à)Ìà à€€€€€€€€€à àà àà àà àà à)ÌÌÌòòFOR€THE€APPELLANTà àà àà àà àFOR€THE€APPELLEEóóÌÌJohn€Pellegrinà àà àà àà àà àJohn€Knox€WalkupÌ113€West€Main€Streetà àà àà àà àAttorney€General€and€ReporterÌGallatin,€Tennessee€37066à àà àà à450€James€Robertson€ParkwayÌà àà àà àà àà àà àà àNashville,€Tennessee€37243„0493Ìà àà àà àà àà àÌà àà àà àà àà àà àà àWilliam€D.ÏBridgersà àà àà àà àà àà àà àà àà àà àAssistantÏAttorney€GeneralÌà àà àà àà àà àà àà à450€James€Robertson€ParkwayÌà àà àà àà àà àà àà àNashville,€Tennessee€37243„0493ÌÌà àà àà àà àà àà àà àLawrence€R.€WhitleyÌà àà àà àà àà àà àà àDistrict€Attorney€GeneralÌà àà àà àà àà àà àà à113€West€Main€StreetÌ€€à àà àà àà àà àà àà àGallatin,€Tennessee€37066ÌÌà àà àà àà àà àà àà àDee€D.€GayÌà àà àà àà àà àà àà àAssistant€District€Attorney€GeneralÌà àà àà àà àà àà àà à113€West€Main€StreetÌà àà àà àà àà àà àà àGallatin,€Tennessee€37066ÌÌÌœ›ÌÌOPINION€FILED:______ÌÌÌAFFIRMEDÌÌÌWilliam€M.€Barker,€JudgeÌòòÓÓÓ  ÓOpinionóóÑ€'ÑÇÓÓÓÓÓ  Óà àThe€Appellant,€Brian€M.€Minoux,€appeals€as€of€right€the€judgment€of€theÏSumner€County€Criminal€Court€affirming€the€Sumner€County€assistant€districtÏattorneyððs€revocation€of€pretrial€diversion.€€He€presents€two€arguments€on€appeal.€ÏFirst,€he€contends€that€the€trial€court€erred€when€it€affirmed€the€revocation€of€theÏmemorandum€of€understanding.€€Second,€that€the€November,€1991,€memorandum€ofÏunderstanding€expired€in€November€of€1993€and€that€the€charges€against€him€shouldÏhave€been€dismissed.€€After€a€careful€review€of€the€record€on€appeal€we€affirm€theÏtrial€courtððs€findings.ÌÌà àDuring€the€1980's,€the€Appellant€owned€and€operated€the€company€Tri„CircleÏEquipment,€Incorporated.€€In€1988€or€1989,€after€the€Tennessee€Department€ofÏRevenue€conducted€a€tax€audit€on€Tri„Circle€it€became€apparent€that€the€companyÏhad€failed€to€pay€$96,738.00€in€sales€taxes€during€the€period€of€June,€1985,€to€April,Ï1987.Ìà àIn€October€of€1989,€the€Sumner€County€Grand€Jury€handed€down€a€twenty„Ïcount€€indictment€charging€the€Appellant€with€filing€falsified€sales€tax€returns€inÏviolation€of€Tennessee€Code€Annotated,€section€67„1„1440(d).€€The€AppellantÏrequested€to€be€placed€on€pretrial€diversion.€€On€November€26,€1991,€the€AppellantÏand€the€assistant€district€attorney€entered€into€a€two„year€memorandum€ofÍunderstanding€under€which€the€Appellant€was€liable€to€cause€Tri„Circle€to€pay€theÏ$96,738.00€tax€liability.€€€€Ìà àAt€some€point€thereafter€Tri„Circle€ceased€to€operate€as€a€business.€ÏAccording€to€the€Appellant,€the€bad€publicity€surrounding€the€indictments€chargingÏthe€company€with€tax€fraud€caused€Tri„Circle€to€lose€its€clients€and€forced€it€out€ofÏbusiness.Ìà àOn€November€23,€1993,€only€a€few€days€before€the€memorandum€expired,€theÏassistant€district€attorney€filed€a€notice€that€he€was€terminating€the€memorandum€ofÏunderstanding€because€no€restitution€had€been€paid€under€the€agreement.€€On€JuneÏ21,€1994,€the€Appellant€and€the€assistant€district€attorney€entered€into€an€agreedÏorder€extending€the€memorandum€for€two€more€years.€€This€order€specifically€statedÏthat€the€Appellant€was€to€sell€Tri„Circleððs€remaining€assets€and€inventory€no€laterÏthan€October€1,€1994,€and€then€personally€pay€the€balance€of€the€debt€to€theÏDepartment€of€Revenue€before€the€memorandum€expired.Ìà àOn€March€7,€1995,€the€assistant€district€attorney€filed€a€notice€of€intent€toÏterminate€the€extended€memorandum€of€understanding€because€the€Appellant€hadÏfailed€to€sell€any€of€the€inventory€and€had€not€paid€any€restitution€to€the€DepartmentÏof€Revenue.€€At€an€August€4,€1995,€revocation€hearing€the€trial€court€affirmed€theÏrevocation€of€the€memorandum.€€The€Appellant€now€appeals.ÌÌÓ  ÓI.ÌÓ  Óà àThe€Appellant€first€argues€that€the€trial€court€erred€when€it€affirmed€theÏassistant€district€attorneyððs€revocation€of€the€memorandum€of€understanding.€€ThisÏissue€is€without€merit.Ìà àA€defendant€with€no€prior€criminal€record€who€satisfies€certain€conditions€canÏbe€granted€pretrial€diversion€and€be€allowed€to€enter€into€a€memorandum€ofÏunderstanding€to€suspend€prosecution€with€the€district€attorney.€€Tenn€Code€Ann.€ððÏ40„15„105(a);€òòseeóó€òòState€v.€Houstonóó,€900€S.W.2d€712,€714€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.€1995).€ÏThe€memorandum€of€understanding€shall€be€conditioned€on€the€occurrence€or€non„occurrence€of€certain€statutorily€outlined€events€or€circumstances.€€òòSeeóó€Tenn.€CodeÏAnn.€ðð€40„15„105(a)(2)(A)„„(H).€€The€memorandum€of€understanding€can€beÏterminated€by€either€the€district€attorney€or€the€defendant€by€filing€a€notice€that€theÏmemorandum€is€terminated.€€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€40„15„105(d).€€If€the€district€attorneyÏfiles€the€notice,€the€defendant€may€ð ðpetition€the€court€to€review€the€action€of€theÏprosecution€to€determine€whether€the€prosecution€acted€arbitrarily,€capriciously€orÏabused€its€discretion€to€terminate.ðð€€òòIdóó.Ìà àIf€the€trial€court€affirms€the€district€attorneyððs€termination€of€the€memorandum€ofÏunderstanding,€an€appeal€can€be€taken€to€the€court€of€criminal€appeals.€€òòSeeóó€Tenn.ÏR.€App.€P.€9,€10.€€This€Court€has€not€had€the€opportunity€to€review€a€termination€of€aÏmemorandum€of€understanding€before€this€instance.€€We€have,€however,€reviewedÍseveral€cases€where€trial€courts€have€reviewed€district€attorneysðð€decisions€to€denyÏpretrial€diversion€and€our€standard€of€review€has€been€ð ðwhether€the€finding€of€the€trialÏcourt€that€the€district€attorney€general€did€not€abuse€his€discretion€.€.€.€is€supported€byÏa€preponderance€of€the€evidence.ðð€€òòState€v.€Winsettóó,€882€S.W.2d€806,€809€(Tenn.ÏCrim.€App.€1993).€€We€have€also€stated€that€this€Court€may€not€substitute€its€ownÏjudgment€for€the€district€attorneyððs€judgment.€€òòHoustonóó,€900€S.W.2d€at€714.€€We€are€ofÏthe€opinion€that€the€standard€of€appellate€review€under€the€pretrial€diversion€statuteÏshould€be€uniform€and€we€will,€therefore,€apply€this€standard€to€the€case€before€us.€ÏòòSeeóó€òòState€v.€Carróó,€861€S.W.2d€850,€856€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.€1993);€òòState€v.€Markhamóó,Ï755€S.W.2d€850,€853€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.€1988).€€€€€Ìà àThis€case€is€somewhat€problematic€because€the€Tennessee€CodeÏAnnotatedððs€pretrial€diversion€statute€provides€that€a€memorandum€of€understandingÏcan€suspend€prosecution€for€a€maximum€period€of€two€years€and€that€a€defendantÏcan€only€be€granted€pretrial€diversion€once.€€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€40„15„105(a)(Supp.Ï1995).€Therefore,€we€conclude€that€the€Appellantððs€memorandum€of€understandingÏshould€have€been€terminated€following€the€assistant€district€attorneyððs€November,Ï1993,€notice€of€termination.€€However,€since€the€memorandumððs€extension€ranÏentirely€in€the€Appellantððs€favor,€we€do€not€believe€that€the€Appellant€has€suffered€anyÏharm€that€needs€to€be€corrected€on€appeal.€€Moreover,€if€the€Appellant€at€any€timeÏhad€been€discontent€with€either€of€the€pretrial€diversion€arrangements€he€could€haveÍterminated€the€memorandum€of€understanding€under€Tennessee€Code€Annotated,Ïsection€40„15„105(d).€€Since€the€Appellant€has€suffered€no€prejudice€and€the€twoÏmemorandums€are€almost€identical€we€will€review€the€trial€courtððs€actions.€Ìà àHere,€the€assistant€district€attorney€filed€both€notices€of€intent€to€terminate€theÏmemorandums€of€understanding€because€the€Appellant€had€not€caused€one€dollar€toÏbe€paid€towards€the€agreed€upon€restitution.€€After€the€final€notice€of€termination€theÏAppellant€petitioned€the€trial€court€for€a€revocation€hearing€and€at€that€hearing€theÏtrial€judge€found€that€the€Appellant€had€been€given€several€chances€to€settle€theÏdelinquent€taxes€with€the€Department€of€Revenue,€but€that€he€had€only€been€willingÏto€do€so€on€his€own€terms.€€The€trial€judge€found€that€the€district€attorney€had€notÏacted€arbitrary,€capriciously,€or€abused€his€discretion.€€Ìà àReviewing€the€trial€courtððs€actions€and€considering€the€fact€that€the€AppellantÏdid€not€attempt€to€sell€any€of€Tri„Circleððs€inventory€or€did€not€cause€Tri„Circle€to€make€Ïany€payments€to€the€Department€of€Revenue€between€November€of€1991€and€MarchÏof€1995,€we€find€that€the€trial€courtððs€findings€are€supported€by€a€preponderance€ofÏthe€evidence.€€We,€therefore,€affirm€the€memorandumððs€termination€and€the€AppellantÏwill€have€to€face€his€criminal€charges€in€court.€€Ìà àThe€Appellant€also€contends€that€to€hold€this€matter€in€abeyance€from€theÏexpiration€of€the€first€memorandum€until€the€August,€1995,€hearing€violates€the€spiritÏand€intent€of€the€pretrial€diversion€statute.€€The€Appellant€has€failed€to€support€thisÍargument€with€citations€or€other€authority€and€the€issue€is,€therefore,€waived.€€RulesÏof€the€Court€of€Criminal€Appeals€of€Tennessee€10(b);€òòState€v.€Killebrewóó,€760€S.W.2dÏ228,€231€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.€1988).ÌÌÓ  ÓII.ÌÓ  Óà àThe€Appellant€next€argues€that€the€November,€1991,€memorandum€ofÏunderstanding€expired€in€November€of€1993€and€that€pursuant€to€its€expiration€hisÏcharges€should€have€been€dismissed€by€the€trial€judge.€€This€issue€is€without€merit.Ìà àIn€making€this€argument€the€Appellant€cites€Tennessee€Code€Annotated,Ïsection€40„15„105(e),€which€provides,€in€pertinent€part:€ð ðThe€trial€court€shall€dismissÏwith€prejudice€any€warrant€or€charge€against€the€defendant€upon€the€expiration€ofÏninety€(90)€days€after€the€expiration€of€the€period€of€suspension€specified€in€theÏmemorandum€of€understanding€.€.€.€provided€that€no€termination€of€the€memorandumÏof€understanding€has€been€filed€.€.€.€.ðð€€òòIdóó.€€The€Appellant€reads€this€to€mean€that€theÏmemorandum€of€understanding€expired€ninety€days€after€November€26,€1996€andÏthat€the€trial€court€should€have€dismissed€all€charges€against€him€at€the€expiration€ofÏthose€ninety€days.€€The€Appellantððs€argument€is€not€well€taken.€€The€statute€clearlyÏprovides€that€the€trial€court€shall€dismiss€the€charges€if€no€termination€ofÏunderstanding€has€been€filed.€€In€this€case€the€assistant€district€attorney€filed€a€timelyÍnotice€of€termination€of€the€memorandum€of€understanding€and€we,€therefore,€findÏthat€the€trial€judge€was€not€in€error.Ìà àFor€the€above€stated€reasons,€we€affirm€the€trial€courtððs€revocation€of€theÏAppellantððs€memorandum€of€understanding.ÌÌÓÓà àà àà àà àà àà àà à__________________________Ìà àà àà àà àà àà àà àWILLIAM€M.€BARKER,€JUDGEÌœ›ÌCONCUR:ÌÌÌœ__________________________________›ÌJOE€B.€JONES.€PRESIDING€JUDGEÌÌÌœ__________________________________›ÌJ.€STEVEN€STAFFORD,€SPECIAL€œJUDGE›ÓÓ