ÿWPCJ …# VUNa %¯ 0Dµ4ù  $ 0ˆ$ 0D¬ wð 0J 0TP 0^¤ 0h 0rj 0|Ü 0†X 0Þ 1un U,ã 0dU,s BŸU>¼U *úB)$DCM AM D3ÝbBr 0@´v~ôvÓr AOEÆ” 0`Z 0Dº D/þ B-˜HP LaserJet 4 Plus/4M PlusHPPCL5E,,,,0†(ÖÃ9 Z ‹6Times New Roman RegularX(ñÄ$¡¡Ò€°ÒÒX°ÒU_A ppppdp3|x| (8(3Åå$¤¤Ý ƒñÄ!ÝÒ€°ÒÒX°ÒÝ  Ýà Ø àòòÚ  Ú0Ú  Úóó(#Ã$òòÚ  Ú0Ú  Úóóy z D{ D2 ÿÿ0Indent1Ô2ÔÔ3  Ô2" ÿÿ0Indent2à0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2, ÿÿ0Indent3à0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô26 ÿÿ0Indent4à0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2@ ÿÿ0Indent5à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2J ÿÿ0Indent6à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2T ÿÿ0Indent7à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2^ ÿÿ0Indent8à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô ÿÿ?AGMSYaioIndent0I.A.1.a.(1)(a)i)a)< Œ 9p`(ModernP ÿÿ8Mac DefaultMac DefaultÓ ` °šXÓ< Œ 9p`(Monaco d< Œ 9p`(&Times New Roman< Œ 9p`(Arial% Line 7 d''''7Border 1dd€-(Cþÿ << Gÿÿ$$$$'ÿÿdxd XÝ ƒ!ÝÑ  ÑÑ#€d#ÑÔ€ÔÔ€%ÔÒ € ÒÒ X ÒÝ  ÝÝ ƒ"ÝÝ  ÝÔ€&ÔÔ€&ÔÓ  ÓÔ YYY ÔFILEDÔ€&XÔÌÌò òFebruaryÏ14,Ï1996ÌÌCecilÏCrowson,ÏJr.ÌÔ€&ôÔAppellateÏCourtÏClerkó ó 8Ý ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€ÔÔ€%ÔÒ € ÒÒ X ÒÝ  ÝÔ€&ÔÔ€&&Ôà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóThe€appellant's€kidnapping€conviction€occurred€in€1983.€€In€òòAbston€v.€Stateóó,€749ÏS.W.2d€487€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.€1988),€our€Court€held€that€claims€governed€by€T.C.A.€Ô€%ÔÔ€%XÔððÔ€&ÔÔ€&&Ô40„30„102,€but€arising€€before€July€1,1986,€could€be€judicially€reviewed€if€filed€before€July€1,€1989.€Ì("ÿÿ$££Ò  ÒÒ  ÒPtPtHHÚ(ÿáÿâùFG(üHHÚ(d'@Styl{WP}01•ÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃà Ãà Ãà Ãà Ãà ÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÐ ÐÐHHÐÐ  ÐÐ2ÐÐÿÿ¸æ$ÿÐÐHHÐÐÐÐÐÐÐÐ  ÐÐ ÐÐ ÐÑÑÑGenevaÑÑ ÑÑ € ÑÑ<Px–ÈÑÒÒÒ443!#4ÒÒ$ *$ÒÒ$*$ÒÒ ÿKK ÒÒ  Geneva ÒÒ  Geneva ÒÓ.,ÓÓÓÓ6ÓÓ ÓßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßÑMonacoÑÑ ÑÒ  BA: T Monaco ÒÒ  BA: T Monaco Ò€-‚ƒCþÿ<< CÿÿƒLevel 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5(83¼$¢¢Ý ƒñÄ!ÝÒ€°ÒÒX°ÒÝ  Ý($$””ò òÚ  Ú1Ú  Úó ó„„'÷ÿ dxdüÿP PdÝ ƒ!ÝÔ . ÔÔ€ÔÓ&€##X„d&ÓÑ#€##Xd#ÑÔ€%ÔÒ € ÒÒ X ÒÝ  ÝÑ  ÑÑ € ÑÑ7€ÖnXXdìXXdì7ÑÑ  ÑÑ  ÑÓ` °‚Xª ¸ ™XÓÔ€&ÔÑ\R AØ'\ÑÙ€€ÙßL€)+(;+'h|` , `€€Lßà@ àIN€THE€COURT€OF€CRIMINALÏAPPEALS€OF€TENNESSEEÌÌà@ àAT€KNOXVILLEÌÌà@ àDECEMBER€1995€SESSIONÌÌÌLAWRENCE€MOORE,à àà àà à)à àNO.Ï03C01„9504„CR„00122Ìà àà àà àà àà àà àà à)à àÌà àà àAppellantà àà àà àà à)à àKNOXÏCOUNTYÌà àà àà àà àà àà àà à)ÌV.à àà àà àà àà àà àà à)à àHON.€RAYÏL.€JENKINS,€JUDGEÌà àà àà àà àà àà àà à)à àÌSTATE€OF€TENNESSEE,à àà àà à)à àHabeasÏCorpus/Post„ConvictionÌà àà àà àà àà àà àà à)à à€(RobberyÏand€Kidnapping)Ìà àAppelleeà àà àà àà àà à)à à€ÌÌÌòòFOR€THE€APPELLANTóó:à àà àà àà àòòFOR€THEÏAPPELLEEóó:ÌÌMark€E.€Stephensà àà àà àà àà àCharles€W.ÏBursonÌDistrict€Public€Defenderà àà àà àà àAttorneyÏGeneral€and€ReporterÌà àà àà àà àà àà àà àà à450€JamesÏRobertson€ParkwayÌDavid€Gallà àà à€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€à à€à àà àNashville,ÏTennessee€37243„0493ÌAssistant€Public€DefenderÌ1209€Euclid€Avenueà àà àà àà àHunt€S.ÏBrownÌKnoxville,€Tennessee€37921à àà àà àAssistantÏAtty.€Gen.€&€ReporterÌà àà àà àà àà àà àà àà à450€James€Robertson€ParkwayÌà àà àà àà àà àà àà àà àNashville,€Tennessee€37243„0493Ìà àà àà àà àà àà àà àà àÌà àà àà àà àà àà àà àà àRandall€E.€NicholsÌà àà àà àà àà àà àà àà àDistrict€Attorney€GeneralÌà àà àà àà àà àà àà àà àÌà àà àà àà àà àà àà àà àZane€ScarlettÌà àà àà àà àà àà àà àà àAssistant€District€Attorney€GeneralÌà àà àà àà àà àà àà àà àCity„County€BuildingÌà àà àà àà àà àà àà àà àKnoxville,€Tennessee€37902ÌÌà àà àà àà àà àà àà àÌÌÌÌÌÌÌOPINION€FILED:€òò€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€óóà àÌÌREVERSED€AND€REMANDEDÌÌÌWilliam€M.€Barker,€JudgeÓÓòòÌÌÓ Ð Óà@ àOPINIONóóÌThis€is€an€appeal€as€of€right€by€the€appellant,€Lawrence€Moore,€from€aÏjudgment€entered€in€the€Knox€County€Criminal€Court€dismissing€his€petition€entitledÏ"Petition€for€Writ€of€Habeas€Corpus€Without€Application€to€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€Ô€%ÔððÔ€&Ô29„21„104."€€Although€styled€as€a€petition€for€writ€of€habeas€corpus,€the€trial€court€treated€theÏpetition€as€one€seeking€post„conviction€relief,€and€upon€motion€of€the€State,Ídismissed€the€petition€as€being€time„barred€pursuant€to€Tennessee€Code€AnnotatedÏsection€40„30„102.€€ÌIn€his€brief€filed€in€this€Court,€the€appellant,€by€counsel,€concedes€that€the€trialÏcourt€acted€properly€in€treating€his€petition€as€one€seeking€post„conviction€reliefÏrather€than€as€a€petition€for€habeas€corpus.€€The€sole€issue€presented€by€this€appealÏis€whether€the€trial€court€erred€in€finding€that€the€petition€was€barred€by€the€three„yearÏstatute€of€limitation€governing€post„conviction€relief€petitions.€€ÌWe€reverse€the€trial€court€and€remand€the€case€for€further€proceedings.ÌThe€sparse€record€in€this€case€reflects€that€the€appellant€was€convicted€onÏMay€13,€1983,€of€the€offenses€of€robbery€and€kidnapping.€€Apparently€there€was€noÏmotion€for€new€trial€or€appeal€following€his€conviction.€€ÌThe€appellant,€acting€òòproóó€òòseóó,€filed€his€post„conviction€petition€on€June€27,Ï1994,€collaterally€attacking€his€conviction€for€the€offense€of€kidnapping;€he€does€notÏcomplain€of€his€robbery€conviction.€€In€his€unartfully€drawn€òòproóó€òòseóó€petition,€theÏappellant€alleged€that:ÌÓÓà8 à[t]he€facts€of€the€offense€that€petitioner€committed€were,Ïadmittedly,€'robbery'€ONLY.€€The€facts€are€that€the€victimÏwas€walking€down€the€street€and€the€petitionerÏapproached€him€and€pulled€out€a€razor€and€robbed€andÏlet€him€go€his€way.€...Petitioner€is€not€even€guilty€of€aÏmisdemeanor€because€there€was€no€'removing'€orÏ'confining'€of€the€victim."€€ÌÓÓÌIn€other€words,€the€appellant€contends€that€the€kidnapping€was€incidental€toÏthe€robbery,€and€in€accord€with€our€Supreme€Courtððs€holding€in€òòState€v.€Anthonyóó,€817ÏS.W.2d€299€(Tenn.€1991),€the€kidnapping€conviction€is€unconstitutional.€€€In€òòAnthonyóó,Ïour€Supreme€Court€held€that€the€due€process€guarantees€of€the€Fifth€and€FourteenthÏAmendments€to€the€United€States€Constitution€and€Article€I,€Section€8,€of€theÏTennessee€Constitution,€prohibit€a€conviction€for€kidnapping€as€a€separate€offenseÏwhen€the€confinement,€movement€or€detention€of€the€alleged€victim€is€essentiallyÏincidental€to€another€felony.€€In€so€ruling,€the€Court€said€that€"every€robbery,€byÏdefinition,€involves€some€detention€against€the€will€of€the€victim,€if€only€long€enoughÏto€take€goods€or€money€from.€.€.the€victim.€€This€does€not€mean€that€the€legislatureÏintended€that€every€robbery€should€also€constitute€a€kidnapping.€.€.€."€€òòId.óó€at€306.ÌIn€considering€whether€a€post„conviction€petition€states€a€ground€for€relief,Ïwe€are€bound€to€consider€the€allegations€in€the€petition€as€true.€€òòSkinner€v.€Stateóó,€472ÏS.W.2d€903,€904€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.€1971).€€As€such,€the€allegations€contained€in€theÏpetition€lead€to€the€conclusion€that€the€kidnapping€was€indeed€incidental€to€theÏrobbery.€€At€the€heart€of€the€appellantððs€claim,€however,€is€that€the€three„year€statuteÏof€limitation€which€governs€post„conviction€petitions€should€not€be€applied€in€thisÏcase.× ƒ, ××  ×€€€The€appellant€urges€this€court€to€find€that€the€statute€of€limitation€does€notÍapply€in€this€case€pursuant€to€òòBurford€v.€Stateóó,€845€S.W.2d€204€(Tenn.€1992).€€InÏòòBurfordóó,€our€Supreme€Court€held€that€petitions€for€post„conviction€relief€may€not€beÏdismissed€for€failure€to€comply€with€the€three„year€statute€of€limitation€if€the€claimantÏhas€not€had€a€reasonable€opportunity€to€have€his€or€her€constitutional€claim€heardÏand€determined.€€òòId.óó€at€208.€ÌWhether€the€appellant€has€stated€a€òòBurfordóó€claim€depends€preliminarily€onÏwhether€òòState€v.€Anthonyóó,€òòsupraóó,€announced€a€new€constitutional€rule€and,€if€so,Ïwhether€it€should€be€retroactively€applied.€€In€òòMeadows€v.€Stateóó,€849€S.W.2d€748,Ï751€(Tenn.€1993),€our€Supreme€Court,€quoting€with€approval€from€òòTeague€v.€Laneóó,Ï489€U.S.€288,€301,€109€S.€Ct.€1060,€1070,€103€L.€Ed.€2d€334,€349€(1989),€held:ÌÓÓ€€à8 à[A]€case€announces€a€new€rule€when€it€breaks€newÏground€or€imposes€a€new€obligation€on€the€States€or€theÏFederal€Government.€.€.€.€To€put€it€differently,€a€caseÏannounces€a€new€rule€if€the€result€was€not€òòdictatedóó€byÏprecedent€existing€at€the€time€the€defendant's€convictionÏbecame€final.€€ÌÌÓ  ÓÓÓA€careful€review€of€the€opinion€in€òòState€v.€Anthonyóó,€and€the€Court's€observation€thatÏthere€was€"virtually€no€relevant€precedent"€in€Tennessee,€leads€us€to€the€conclusionÏthat€the€Supreme€Court€did€announce€a€new€rule€of€constitutional€law€in€òòthat€caseóó.€ÏòòSeeóó€òòState€v.€Claude€Copelandóó,€No.€01C01„9410„CR„00366€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.€atÏNashville,€September€27,€1995)€òòperm.€to€appeal€filedóó€November€27,€1995.€ÌÓ Ð ÓHaving€concluded€that€òòState€v.€Anthonyóó,€which€was€decided€onÏSeptember23,€1991,€did€announce€a€new€constitutional€rule€of€law,€we€must€nextÏdetermine€whether€that€rule€should€be€applied€retroactively€in€post„conviction€cases.€ÏòòSeeóó€òòGregory€Hedges€v.€Stateóó,€No.€03C01„9112„CR„00379€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.€atÏKnoxville,€March€10,€1993)€òòperm.€to€appeal€deniedóó,€(Tenn.€1993)€(specificallyÏreserving€the€issue€of€retroactive€application€of€òòAnthonyóó).€€In€òòMeadowsóó,€òòsupraóó,€ourÏSupreme€Court€held€that€"a€new€state€constitutional€rule€is€to€be€retroactively€appliedÏto€a€claim€for€post„conviction€relief€if€the€new€rule€materially€enhances€the€integrityÏand€reliability€of€the€fact€finding€process€of€the€trial."€€òòState€v.€Meadowsóó€at€755.ÌApplying€the€òòMeadowsóó€standard€to€the€present€case,€we€conclude€thatÏòòAnthonyóó€should€be€applied€retroactively€because€the€rule€announced€therein€doesÏmaterially€enhance€the€integrity€and€reliability€of€the€fact„finding€process.€€In€reachingÏthis€conclusion,€we€are€guided€by€the€rationale€expressed€by€our€Supreme€Court€inÏòòBarber€v.€Stateóó,€889€S.W.2d€185€(Tenn.€1994)€òòcert.€deniedóó,€__€U.S.€__,€115€S.Ct.Ï1177,€130€L.€Ed.€2d€1129€(1995).€€In€that€case,€the€Court€applied€the€òòMeadowsóó€ruleÏand€held€that€the€new€constitutional€rule€announced€in€òòState€v.€Middlebrooksóó,€840ÏS.W.2d€317€(Tenn.€1992)€òòcert.€dismissed€as€improvidently€grantedóó,€__€U.S.€__,€114ÏS.Ct.€651,€126€L.€Ed.€2d€555€(1993),€€should€be€given€retroactive€application€in€post„conviction€cases.€€In€reaching€that€conclusion,€the€Court€stated:€ÌÓÓà8 à[In€òòMiddlebrooksóó],€the€felony€murder€aggravatingÏcircumstance€duplicates€the€crime€of€felony€murder€andÏthereby€makes€all€felony€murderers€susceptible€to€theÏdeath€penalty.€€This€Court€found€that€such€a€result€violatesÏthe€Eighth€Amendment€to€the€United€States€Constitution,Ïas€well€as€Article€I,€Section€16€of€the€TennesseeÏConstitution.€.€.€.€€When€an€aggravating€circumstance€isÏimproperly€injected€into€the€process€by€which€the€jurorsÏmust€weigh€aggravating€and€mitigating€circumstances€toÏdetermine€a€sentence,€the€integrity€and€reliability€of€theÏsentencing€process€is€jeopardized€because€the€deathÏpenalty€may€not€be€reserved€for€only€the€most€culpableÏdefendants.€€For€this€reason,€we€apply€òòMiddlebrooksóóÏretroactively€under€the€òòMeadowsóó€rule.€€ÌÌÓ  ÓòòBarber€v.€Stateóó,€at€187.€€ÌÓ Ð ÓÌÓÓThe€rule€in€òòAnthonyóó€ensures€that€an€accused€will€not€be€convicted€of€multipleÏcrimes€where€a€kidnapping€is€"incidental"€to€a€robbery.€€The€question€of€whether€suchÏa€crime€was€"incidental"€necessarily€focuses€on€the€specific€facts€of€the€case.€€òòSeeóó,Ïe.g.,€òòState€v.€Colemanóó.€865€S.W.2d€455€(Tenn.€1993).€€As€stated€in€òòAnthonyóó,€òòsupraóó,Ïthe€resolution€of€this€question€depends€upon€"whether€the€defendant's€conductÏ'substantially€increased€[the]€risk€of€harm€over€and€above€that€necessarily€present€inÏthe€crime€of€robbery€itself.'"€€òòId.óó€at€306€(òòquotingóó,€òòState€v.€Rollinsóó,€605€S.W.2d€828,€830Ï(Tenn.€Crim.€App.€1980)).ÌThus,€it€is€clear€that€the€rule€in€òòAnthonyóó€is€central€to€the€fact„finding€processÏand,€in€our€opinion,€a€rule€that€enhances€the€integrity€and€reliability€of€that€process.€ÏAs€such,€if€it€is€properly€raised€(as€in€this€case),€and€otherwise€capable€of€review,€it€isÍdeserving€of€retroactive€application€in€post„conviction€cases.€€òòSeeóó€òòThomas€RayÏTarpley€v.€Stateóó,€No.€03C01„9303„CR„00067€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.€at€Knoxville,€Dec.€20,Ï1993)€òòperm.€to€appeal€deniedóó,€(Tenn.€1994)€(applied€in€post„conviction€case€withoutÏanalysis).ÌHaving€found€that€òòState€v.€Anthonyóó€did€indeed€announce€a€newÏconstitutional€rule,€and€that€the€new€rule€should€be€applied€retroactively€in€post„conviction€cases,€the€remaining€issue€is€more€problematic;€that€is,€would€applicationÏof€the€three„year€statute€of€limitation€under€these€circumstances€constitute€a€denial€ofÏdue€process€as€it€applies€to€the€appellant.€€Our€Supreme€Court€was€confronted€with€aÏsimilar€situation€in€òòBurford€v.€Stateóó,€845€S.W.2d€204€(Tenn.€1992).€€In€1976,€BurfordÏpled€guilty€to€and€was€convicted€of€five€counts€of€armed€robbery.€€In€1984,€BurfordÏwas€again€convicted€of€robbery.€€€At€his€sentencing€hearing,€his€five€robberyÏconvictions€from€1976€were€used€to€establish€his€status€as€an€habitual€criminal.€ÏAccordingly,€Burford€was€sentenced€to€life€in€prison.€€In€1985,€Burford€again€wasÏconvicted€of€robbery€with€a€deadly€weapon€and€his€five€1976€convictions€were€usedÏto€have€him€sentenced€as€a€persistent€offender.€€Our€Court€affirmed€that€convictionÏand€sentence,€and€the€Supreme€Court€denied€Burford's€application€for€permission€toÏappeal€on€August€4,€1986.€€ÌIn€1988,€Burford€filed€a€post„conviction€petition€contending€that€his€1976Ïrobbery€convictions€were€invalid€because€he€had€been€denied€his€constitutional€rightÍto€be€advised€of€his€right€against€self„incrimination€before€pleading€guilty€to€thoseÏoffenses.€€The€trial€court€agreed€and€invalidated€four€of€the€five€1976€convictions.€ÏAccordingly,€the€trial€court€reduced€the€1984€life€sentence€to€a€term€of€forty€years.€€ÌIn€1990,€Burford€filed€a€second€post„conviction€petition€alleging€that€his€1985Ïpersistent€offender€sentence€was€excessive€in€light€of€the€fact€that€four€of€the€1976Ïconvictions€used€to€enhance€his€1985€sentence€had€been€set€aside.€€The€trial€courtÏand€our€Court€held€that€Burford's€1990€post„conviction€petition€was€time„barred€andÏsubject€to€dismissal.€€ÌIn€considering€Burford's€appeal,€our€Supreme€Court€held€that€while€theÏthree„year€statute€of€limitation€was€valid€on€its€face,€the€due€process€clauses€of€theÏstate€and€federal€constitutions€require€that€the€claimant€be€given€"a€reasonableÏopportunity€to€have€the€claimed€issue€heard€and€determined"€before€it€is€terminatedÏfor€failure€to€comply€with€a€statute€of€limitation.€€òòBurfordóó,€845€S.W.2d€at€208.€€InÏreaching€its€conclusion,€the€Court€weighed€the€valid€State€interest€in€preventingÏprisoners€from€asserting€claims€so€long€after€their€convictions€that€witnesses€are€noÏlonger€available,€or€their€memory€of€the€criminal€events€is€affected,€against€aÏpetitioner's€right€to€be€provided€a€reasonable€opportunity€to€have€his€or€her€claimÏheard€and€determined.€€In€weighing€those€competing€interests€in€Burford's€case,€theÏCourt€concluded€that€his€interests€outweighed€the€government's€interests€because€ifÏhis€petition€was€time„barred€he€would€be€forced€to€serve€a€persistent€offenderÍsentence€that€was€enhanced€by€previous€convictions€that€no€longer€stood.€€As€aÏresult,€he€would€be€forced€to€serve€an€excessive€sentence€in€violation€of€his€rightsÏunder€the€Eighth€Amendment€to€the€United€States€Constitution€and€Article€I,€SectionÏ16,€of€the€Tennessee€Constitution.€€In€reaching€that€conclusion,€the€CourtÏemphasized€that€the€trial€court€would€only€have€to€examine€the€records€from€the€1988Ïproceedings€in€Wilson€County€reflecting€that€four€of€Burford's€1976€convictions€hadÏbeen€invalidated.€€No€witnesses€from€the€past€would€be€needed€for€a€properÏadjudication€of€Burford's€claim.ÌThe€rule€from€òòBurfordóó€was€later€clarified€in€òòSands€v.€Stateóó,€903€S.W.2d€297,Ï301€(Tenn.€1995):ÌÓÓà8 à[I]n€certain€circumstances,€due€process€prohibits€the€strictÏapplication€of€the€post„conviction€statute€of€limitations€toÏbar€a€petitioner's€claim€when€the€grounds,€whether€legalÏor€factual,€arise€after€the€"final€action€of€the€highest€stateÏappellate€court€to€which€an€appeal€is€taken"„„or,€in€otherÏwords,€when€the€grounds€arise€after€the€point€at€which€theÏlimitations€period€would€normally€have€begun€to€run.ÌÌÓ  ÓÓÓIn€applying€the€rule,€the€Court€adopted€a€three€step€analysis:€€"(1)determine€whenÏthe€limitation€period€would€normally€have€begun€to€run;€(2)determine€whether€theÏgrounds€for€relief€actually€arose€after€the€limitations€period€would€normally€haveÏcommenced;€and€(3)€if€the€grounds€are€'later€arising,'€determine€if,€under€the€facts€ofÏthe€case,€a€strict€application€of€the€limitations€period€would€effectively€deny€theÏpetitioner€a€reasonable€opportunity€to€present€the€claim."€€òòId.óó€Ó Ð ÓHere,€the€limitationÍperiod€began€to€run€on€July€1,€1986,€the€effective€date€of€Tennessee€Code€AnnotatedÏsection€40„30„102.€€The€period€expired€on€July€1,€1989.€€òòAbston€v.€Stateóó,€749€S.W.2dÏat€488.€€The€decision€in€òòAnthonyóó€was€released€on€September€23,€1991;€thus,€itÏbecame€a€legal€ground€for€relief€well€after€the€limitation€period€had€run.€€TheÏappellant€certainly€did€not€have€a€"reasonable€opportunity"€to€raise€the€issue€prior€toÏthe€expiration€of€the€statute€of€limitation.ÌThis€does€not,€however,€end€our€analysis.€€Although€the€appellant€could€notÏhave€raised€the€òòAnthonyóó€issue€before€the€statute€ran,€he€waited€some€two€years€andÏten€months€after€the€decision€to€raise€it€in€post„conviction.€€As€noted€in€òòBurfordóó.€theÏpost„conviction€act€governing€this€case€does€not€contain€a€limitation€period€for€raisingÏclaims€that€arose€after€the€three€year€period€in€section€40„30„102€has€expired.€€TheÏCourt€noted,€in€fact,€that€"it€would€be€helpful€in€such€instances€for€the€legislature€toÏadopt€a€òòshorter€statute€of€limitations€for€later€arising€groundsóó.€.€.€."€€òòBurfordóó,€845ÏS.W.2d€at€208€(emphasis€added).€€In€response,€the€legislature€has€since€enacted€aÏone€year€period€for€raising€claims€based€on€retroactive€application€of€a€constitutionalÏright€that€did€not€exist€at€the€time€of€the€trial.€€òòSeeóó€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€Ô€%ÔððÔ€&Ô€40„30„202(b)(1)Ï(1995€Supp.).€€Thus,€were€the€appellant€subject€to€the€new€act,€his€claim€would€beÏtime€barred.ÌThe€only€time€period€noted€in€the€act€governing€the€appellant's€petition,Ïhowever,€is€the€three€years€set€forth€in€section€40„30„102.€€In€Justice€Daughtrey'sÏconcurrence€in€òòBurfordóó,€it€was€noted:ÌÓÓà8 à[T]he€legislature€could€adopt€a€shorter€statute€of€limitationsÏfor€later„arising€grounds.€€Perhaps€as€a€matter€of€policy€theÏpetitioner€should€be€restricted€to€one€year„€or€to€even€lessÏthan€one€year€.€.€.€.€òòIn€order€to€square€such€an€abbreviatedÏlimitation€with€the€requirements€of€due€process,€however,Ïthe€petitioner€has€to€have€had€adequate€notice€of€theÏshortened€periodóó.ÌÌÓ  ÓÓÓòòBurfordóó,€845€S.W.2d€at€210€(emphasis€added).€€The€concurring€opinion€then€notedÏthat€"the€only€notice€provision€imposed€by€the€legislature"€under€the€former€act€wasÏthe€three€year€period€contained€in€section€40„30„102.€€òòId.óó€at€211.€€Thus,Ïnotwithstanding€the€appellant's€lengthy€delay€in€seeking€relief€under€òòAnthonyóó,€hisÏpetition€was€filed€within€three€years€of€òòAnthonyóó,€and€we€deem€it€timely€under€theÏcircumstances.€€òòSeeóó€òòalsoóó€òòO'Donnell€v.€Stateóó,€905€S.W.2d€951€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.Ï1993)€(claim€arising€after€the€statute€of€limitations€expired€was€time€barred€whereÏpetition€was€filed€more€than€three€(3)€years€after€the€claim€arose).ÌÓ Ð ÓWe€conclude,€therefore,€that€this€case€must€be€remanded€to€the€trial€court€forÏfurther€proceedings.€€In€doing€so,€we€must€note€the€entirely€inadequate€record€onÏappeal€before€us€at€this€time.€€For€example,€we€are€unable€to€determine€from€theÏrecord€whether€the€appellant€was€convicted€in€1983€by€way€of€a€guilty€plea€or€a€juryÏtrial.€€The€sworn€petition€alleged€that€the€kidnapping€and€robbery€convictionsÍstemmed€from€guilty€pleas;€however,€when€counsel€attempted€to€procure€a€transcriptÏof€a€guilty€plea€submission€hearing,€he€was€informed€that€one€did€not€exist.€ÏMoreover,€in€its€argument€before€the€trial€court€on€its€motion€to€dismiss€the€petition,Ïthe€State€advised€that€the€conviction€was€by€a€jury€following€a€two€day€trial.€€It€is€clearÏthat€appellant's€counsel€acquiesced€in€that€statement.ÌThe€Post„Conviction€Act€in€effect€at€the€time€the€appellant's€petition€was€filedÏrequired€the€District€Attorney€General€to€obtain€and€file€the€record€or€transcripts,€orÏparts€thereof,€that€were€material€for€the€questions€raised€by€the€petition.€€Tenn.€CodeÏAnn.€Ô€%ÔððÔ€&Ô€40„30„114(b)€(1990€Repl.).€€Thus,€upon€remand,€those€portions€of€the€recordÏnecessary€to€review€this€issue,€including€any€trial€transcripts,€must€be€obtained€andÏassembled€for€the€court's€review.€€Upon€compliance€with€these€statutoryÏrequirements,€the€trial€court€will€then€be€able€to€address€the€òòAnthonyóó€issue€whether€inÏthe€context€of€the€guilty€plea€or€the€jury€trial.ÌFor€all€of€the€foregoing€reasons,€the€judgment€is€reversed,€and€this€case€isÏremanded€to€the€trial€court€for€further€proceedings.ÌÌÌÓÓà àà àà àà àà àòò€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€óóÌà àà àà àà àà àWILLIAM€M.€BARKERÌÓ  ÓCONCUR:ÌÌÌÌòò€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€óóÌDAVID€G.€HAYES,€JUDGEÌÌÌÌòò€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€óóÌJERRY€L.€SMITH,€€JUDGE