ÿWPC^O …# VUNa %¯ 0ñµU:¦ w@à 4 4 05C 0Dx ¼ 0JÄ 0T 0^b 0hÀ 0r( 0|š 0† 0œ 1u, D3¡ 0dÔ B8U:U 0@U>ÏU* B)7DC` AM£Àð,°øÜÃÔâ—WyhÐ!#8%Q[(r¬*”-G²/tù2^m7;Ë<?Œ#A¹¯Cv~hFvÓæG AO¹MÆN 0DÎN D/O BAO˜HP LaserJet 4Si/4SiMX PS 600dpiPSCRIPTÀÌÀääÀÀÌ0 (ÖÃ9 Z ‹6Times New Roman RegularX(ÉÞÍ$¡¡Ñ  ÑÔ€XíèXXXÔÑ` ` ÑÑÜÜÑÒ4°ÒÒX°ÒÑTR[  AØ'ÿ Legal[  AØ'ÿ Legal AØ'ÿ Legal AØ'ÿ LegalTÑÓÓ,c½¬AZ‹"Arial Regular ä#Då#è#Dé#Dê#Eë#Eì#Ví#î#Ó€ú#»{s 3|xü#(å(31*$¤¤Ý ƒÞÍ!ÝÑ  ÑÔ€X-õXXXÔÑ` °ÑÑܰÑÒ4°ÒÒX°ÒÑTR[  AØ'ÿ Legal3Ø' AØ'ÿ Legalÿ3Ø'TÑÓÓÝ  Ýà Œ àòòÚ  Ú0Ú  Úóó(#Ã$òòÚ  Ú0Ú  Úóó2 ÿÿ0Indent1Ô2ÔÔ3  Ô2" ÿÿ0Indent2à0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2, ÿÿ0Indent3à0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô26 ÿÿ0Indent4à0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2@ ÿÿ0Indent5à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2J ÿÿ0Indent6à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2T ÿÿ0Indent7à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2^ ÿÿ0Indent8à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô ÿÿ?AGMSYaioIndent0I.A.1.a.(1)(a)i)a)$$$$'ÿÿdxdP ÿÿ8Mac DefaultMac DefaultÓ ` °šXÓ dÂ"Arial Regular("ÿÿ$££Ò  ÒÒ  Ò< Œ 9p`(&Times New Roman< Œ 9p`(Arial% Line 7 d00007Border 1dd€-1Cþÿ << Gÿÿ ¶Ý ƒ!ÝÑ  ÑÑ#€d#ÑÔ€.ÔÑ  ÑÔ€/ÔÑ ` ÑÑ Ü ÑÒ 4 ÒÒ X ÒÑ\R AØ'\ÑÓÓÝ  ÝÔ€/ÔÓ  ÓÔ YYY ÔFILEDÔ€/XÔÌÌò òSeptember30,Ï1996ÌÌCecilÏCrowson,ÏJr.ÌÔ€/ôÔAppellateÏCourtÏClerkó ó "Ý ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€.ÔÑ  ÑÔ€/ÔÑ ` ÑÑ Ü ÑÒ 4 ÒÒ X ÒÑ\R AØ'\ÑÓÓÝ  ÝÝ ƒ $Ýà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  ÝÓ€ÓÓ  ÓÓÓà àà àThe€appellants€filed€separate€petitions€and€separate€appeals.€ÏWe€have€consolidated€the€appeals€pursuant€to€Tennessee€Rules€of€AppellateÏProcedure€16(b).€€Ì îÝ ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€.ÔÑ  ÑÔ€/ÔÑ ` ÑÑ Ü ÑÒ 4 ÒÒ X ÒÑ\R AØ'\ÑÓÓÝ  ÝÝ ƒ $Ýà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  ÝÓ€ÓÓ  ÓÓÓà àà àThe€opinion€filed€February€15,€1995,€referred€to€the€appellantsððÏð ðfourth€amended€petition€for€post„conviction€relief,ðð€which€was€filed€on€June€13,Ï1989,€and€denied€by€the€trial€court€on€March€12,€1991.€€Although€the€pleadings€areÏnot€in€this€record,€it€appears€that€Sample€and€McKay€filed€òòproóó€òòseóó€petitions€for€post„conviction€relief€on€June€28,€1989,€and€September€16,€1992,€and€that€theseÏpetitions€were€denied€by€the€trial€court.€€This€court€alluded€to€additional€petitions€forÏpost„conviction€relief€that€had€been€filed,€but€it€did€not€address€them€in€the€opinionÏof€February€15,€1995.€€€€€€Ì ¹Ý ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€.ÔÑ  ÑÔ€/ÔÑ ` ÑÑ Ü ÑÒ 4 ÒÒ X ÒÑ\R AØ'\ÑÓÓÝ  ÝÝ ƒ $Ýà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  ÝÓ€ÓÓ  ÓÓÓà àà àThe€specific€allegations€will€be€set€forth€herein.Ì ØÝ ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€.ÔÑ  ÑÔ€/ÔÑ ` ÑÑ Ü ÑÒ 4 ÒÒ X ÒÑ\R AØ'\ÑÓÓÝ  ÝÝ ƒ $Ýà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  ÝÓ€ÓÓ  ÓÓÓà àà àòòSeeóó€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€40„30„102€[repealed€in€Acts€1995,€ch.Ï207€ðð€1].Ì MÝ ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€.ÔÑ  ÑÔ€/ÔÑ ` ÑÑ Ü ÑÒ 4 ÒÒ X ÒÑ\R AØ'\ÑÓÓÝ  ÝÝ ƒ $Ýà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  ÝÓ€ÓÓ  ÓÓÓà àà àThe€records€containing€the€allegedly€exculpatory€evidenceÏwere€attached€to€the€appellantsðð€post„conviction€petitions.€€It€is€not€clear€from€theÏpetition€exactly€when€the€information€was€obtained.Ì ^Ý ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€.ÔÑ  ÑÔ€/ÔÑ ` ÑÑ Ü ÑÒ 4 ÒÒ X ÒÑ\R AØ'\ÑÓÓÝ  ÝÝ ƒ $Ýà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  ÝÓ€ÓÓ  ÓÓÓà àà àIn€this€regard,€Sample€and€McKay€cite€opinions€from€this€courtÏsupporting€a€subjective€test€for€waiver.€€òòSeeóó€òòPaul€Gregory€House€v.€Stateóó,€No.Ï03C01„9110„CR„00326€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.,€Mar.€28,€1994,€Knoxville)€&€òòDonaldÏEdward€Johnson€v.€Stateóó,€No.€02C01„9111„CR„00237€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.,€Mar.€23,Ï1994).€€As€noted€above,€the€supreme€courtððs€opinion€in€òòHouseóó,€which€was€releasedÏafter€the€briefing€of€this€appeal,€mandates€an€objective€standard.€€€€Ì Ý ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€.ÔÑ  ÑÔ€/ÔÑ ` ÑÑ Ü ÑÒ 4 ÒÒ X ÒÑ\R AØ'\ÑÓÓÝ  ÝÝ ƒ $Ýà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  ÝÓ€ÓÓ  ÓÓÓà àà àWe€initially€note€that€the€State€failed€to€raise€the€defenses€ofÏwaiver€and€previous€determination€in€its€answers€to€the€petitions,€which€couldÏrender€the€defenses€waived€on€appeal.€€òòSee€State€v.€James€Richard€Perryóó,€No.Ï03C01„9401„CR„00016€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.,€July€24,€1995,€Knoxville).€€In€any€event,Ïwe€conclude€that€the€State€has€not€shown€that€these€defenses€were€substantiatedÏby€the€record.Ì GÝ ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€.ÔÑ  ÑÔ€/ÔÑ ` ÑÑ Ü ÑÒ 4 ÒÒ X ÒÑ\R AØ'\ÑÓÓÝ  ÝÝ ƒ $Ýà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  ÝÓ€ÓÓ  ÓÓÓà àà àMoreover,€the€State€again€failed€to€raise€these€defenses€in€itsÏanswer€to€McKayððs€petition.€€The€pleadings€attached€to€the€Stateððs€brief€do€notÏconstitute€evidence€for€our€consideration.Ì hÝ ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€.ÔÑ  ÑÔ€/ÔÑ ` ÑÑ Ü ÑÒ 4 ÒÒ X ÒÑ\R AØ'\ÑÓÓÝ  ÝÝ ƒ $Ýà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  ÝÓ€ÓÓ  ÓÓÓà àà àBoth€Sample€and€McKay€raise€the€Stateððs€failure€to€complyÏwith€its€statutory€duty€in€this€regard€as€separate€issues€on€appeal.€€On€remand,€theÏState€shall€comply€with€the€relevant€statutes.€€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€40„30„114.Ì ŠÝ ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€.ÔÑ  ÑÔ€/ÔÑ ` ÑÑ Ü ÑÒ 4 ÒÒ X ÒÑ\R AØ'\ÑÓÓÝ  ÝÝ ƒ $Ýà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  ÝÓ€ÓÓ  ÓÓÓà àà àThe€court€later€clarified€that€its€decision€was€basedÏindependently€upon€Article€I,€section€16€of€the€Tennessee€Constitution.€€òòState€v.ÏHowellóó,€868€S.W.2d€238€(Tenn.€1993),€òòcertóó.€òòdeniedóó,€___€U.S.€___,€114€S.Ct.€1339,Ï127€L.Ed.2d€687€(1994).€Ì =Ý ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€.ÔÑ  ÑÔ€/ÔÑ ` ÑÑ Ü ÑÒ 4 ÒÒ X ÒÑ\R AØ'\ÑÓÓÝ  ÝÝ ƒ $Ýà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  ÝÓ€ÓÓ  ÓÓÓà àà àOn€appeal,€the€State€notes€that€McKay€and€Sample€filed€òòproóóòòseóóÏmotions€to€have€a€òòMiddlebrooksóó€issue€included€with€a€prior€post„conviction€appealÏto€this€court.€€A€judge€of€this€court€granted€the€motion€on€October€23,€1992;Ïhowever,€the€opinion€filed€by€this€court€on€February€15,€1995,€does€not€addressÏòòMiddlebrooksóó.€€Thus,€the€State€correctly€concedes€that€the€issue€has€not€beenÏwaived€or€previously€determined.€€Ì jÝ ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€.ÔÑ  ÑÔ€/ÔÑ ` ÑÑ Ü ÑÒ 4 ÒÒ X ÒÑ\R AØ'\ÑÓÓÝ  ÝÝ ƒ $Ýà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  ÝÓ€ÓÓ  ÓÓÓà àà àAs€to€Sample,€the€jury€also€found€that€he€created€a€great€risk€ofÏdeath€to€two€or€more€persons€other€than€the€victims€murdered,€and€that€heÏcommitted€the€murder€to€avoid,€interfere€with,€or€prevent€a€lawful€arrest€orÏprosecution.€€òòSeeóó€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€39„2„203(i)(3)€&€(i)(6)(presently€ðð39„13„204(i)(3)€&€(i)(6)).€€As€to€McKay,€the€jury€also€found€that€he€had€a€prior€conviction€forÏa€felony€involving€violence€to€a€person,€that€he€created€a€great€risk€of€death€to€twoÏor€more€persons€other€than€the€victims€murdered,€and€that€he€committed€theÏmurders€to€avoid,€interfere€with,€or€prevent€a€lawful€arrest€or€prosecution.€€Tenn.ÏCode€Ann.€ðð€39„2„203(i)(2),€(i)(3),€&€(i)(6)€(presently€ðð39„13„204(i)(2),€(i)(3),€&Ï(i)(6)).Ì TÝ ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€.ÔÑ  ÑÔ€/ÔÑ ` ÑÑ Ü ÑÒ 4 ÒÒ X ÒÑ\R AØ'\ÑÓÓÝ  ÝÝ ƒ $Ýà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  ÝÓ€ÓÓ  ÓÓÓà àà àAs€a€corollary€to€this€issue,€the€appellants€argue€that€òòChapmanóó,Ïand€not€òòHowellóó,€sets€forth€the€proper€test€to€determine€harmless€error,€that€is,Ïwhether€the€State€proves€ð ðbeyond€a€reasonable€doubt€that€the€error...did€notÏcontribute€to€the€verdict€obtained.ðð€€òòChapmanóó,€386€U.S.€at€24.€€Moreover,€theÏappellants€argue€that€the€test€formulated€in€òòHowellóó€violates€the€Tennessee€andÏUnited€States€Constitutions.€€In€òòHowellóó,€our€supreme€court€considered€òòChapmanóóÏand€other€applicable€United€States€Supreme€Court€cases€in€formulating€itsÏharmless€error€analysis.€€òòIdóó.€at€262€(citing,€òòStringer€v.€Blackóó,€503€U.S.€222€(1992),ÏòòSochor€v.€Floridaóó,€___€U.S.€___,€112€S.Ct.€2114,€119€L.Ed.2d€326€(1992),€òòClemonsÏv.€Mississippióó,€494€U.S.€738€(1990),€&€òòSatterwhite€v.€Texasóó,€486€U.S.€249€(1988)).€ÏThus,€we€view€òòHowellóó€as€consistent€with€the€controlling€authority,€and€we€reject€theÏappellantsðð€contentions.Ì 1Ý ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€.ÔÑ  ÑÔ€/ÔÑ ` ÑÑ Ü ÑÒ 4 ÒÒ X ÒÑ\R AØ'\ÑÓÓÝ  ÝÝ ƒ $Ýà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  ÝÓ€ÓÓ  ÓÓÓà àà àBecause€we€hold€that€the€issues€were€either€waived€orÏpreviously€determined,€we€need€not€address€the€appellantsðð€allegations€withÏregard€to€the€statute€of€limitations.Ì Ý ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€.ÔÑ  ÑÔ€/ÔÑ ` ÑÑ Ü ÑÒ 4 ÒÒ X ÒÑ\R AØ'\ÑÓÓÝ  ÝÝ ƒ $Ýà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  ÝÓ€ÓÓ  ÓÓÓà àà àWe€would€note,€however,€that€the€identification€issue€may€beÏaffected€by€the€trial€courtððs€ruling€as€to€the€exculpatory€evidence€claim.€€Ì ‚Ý ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€.ÔÑ  ÑÔ€/ÔÑ ` ÑÑ Ü ÑÒ 4 ÒÒ X ÒÑ\R AØ'\ÑÓÓÝ  ÝÝ ƒ $Ýà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  ÝÓ€ÓÓ  ÓÓÓà àà àThe€motion€cited€Tennessee€Code€Annotated€section€40„14„207(b),€the€sixth,€eighth,€and€fourteenth€amendments€to€the€United€StatesÏConstitution,€and€article€I,€sections€six€through€eleven,€fourteen,€sixteen,€andÏseventeen€of€the€Tennessee€Constitution.Ì ¯Ý ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€.ÔÑ  ÑÔ€/ÔÑ ` ÑÑ Ü ÑÒ 4 ÒÒ X ÒÑ\R AØ'\ÑÓÓÝ  ÝÝ ƒ $Ýà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  ÝÓ€ÓÓ  ÓÓÓà àà àMoreover,€we€note€that€the€appellants€allege€that€numerousÏissues€should€be,€in€effect,€re„litigated€with€the€benefit€of€funds€under€òòOwensóó.€€WeÏreject€this€contention.€€There€is€nothing€in€òòOwensóó€to€suggest€that€any€issuesÏpreviously€determined€or€waived€may€be€revived€in€this€manner.ÌPtPtHHÚ(ÿáÿâùFG(üHHÚ(d'@Styl{WP}01•ÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃà Ãà Ãà Ãà Ãà ÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÐ ÐÐHHÐÐ  ÐÐ2ÐÐÿÿ¸æ$ÿÐÐHHÐÐÐÐÐÐÐÐ  ÐÐ ÐÐ ÐÑÑÑGenevaÑÑ ÑÑ € ÑÑ<Px–ÈÑÒÒÒ443!#4ÒÒ$ *$ÒÒ$*$ÒÒ ÿKK ÒÒ  Geneva ÒÒ  Geneva ÒÓ.,ÓÓÓÓ6ÓÓ ÓßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßÑGenevaÑÑ ÑÒ  BA Op Geneva ÒÒ  BA Op Geneva Ò€-‚ƒCþÿ<< CÿÿƒLevel 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5($$””ò òÚ  Ú1Ú  Úó ó„„'÷ÿ dxdüÿP PdÝ ƒ!ÝÔ . ÔÔ€.ÔÑ  ÑÔ€/ÔÑ ` ÑÑ Ü ÑÒ 4 ÒÒ X ÒÑ\R AØ'\ÑÓÓÝ  ÝÒ  ÒÒ X ÒÑ  ÑÑ  ÑÑ ° ÑÓÓÑ7€(-õ(XXdædÈ7Ñ›à@ àòòIN€THE€COURT€OF€CRIMINALÏAPPEALS€OF€TENNESSEEÌÌÙ€€ÙœßL€231;+'h|$` à. `€€Lß›à@ àAT€JACKSONÌÌà@ àóóNOVEMBER€1995€SESSIONÌÌÌÌœMICHAEL€EUGENE€SAMPLE,›à à*à àNo.€02C01„9505„CR„00131€€à àà àà àà àà àà àÌà àà àœAPPELLANT,›à à*à àSHELBY€COUNTYÌÌVS.à àà àà àà àà à*à àHon.€BernieÏWeinmanÌÌœSTATE€OF€TENNESSEE,à à›à à*à à(Post„Conviction„„ÏDeath€Penalty)Ìà àà àà àà àà àà àÌà àà àœAPPELLEE.à à›à à*à àÌÌÌœLARRY€McKAY,à à›à àà à*à àNo.€02C01„9505„CR„00139ÌÌà àà àœAPPELLANT,›à à*à àSHELBY€COUNTYÌÌVS.à àà àà àà àà à*à àHon.€BernieÏWeinmanÌÌœSTATE€OF€TENNESSEE,›à àà à*à à(Post„Conviction„„ÏDeath€Penalty)ÌÌà àà àœAPPELLEE.à à›à à*ÌòòÌÌFor€Appellant€Sample:à àà àà àFor€the€AppelleeóóÌDavid€M.€Eldridgeà àà àà àà àCharles€W.€BursonÌ606€W.€Main€Ave.à àà àà àà àAttorney€General€&ÏReporterÌP.O.€Box€1126à àà àà àà à450€JamesÏRobertson€ParkwayÌKnoxville,€TN€37902à àà àà àNashville,€TN€37243„0493ÌÌHarry€R.€Reinhartà àà àà àà àJohn€H.€Baker,€IIIà àà àà àÌ536€South€High€Streetà àà àà àAsst.€Attorney€General€&€ReporterÌColumbus,€OH€43215„5605à àà à450€James€Robertson€ParkwayÌà àà àà àà àà àà àNashville,€TN€37243„0493ÌòòFor€Appellant€McKayóó:ÌJacob€M.€Dickinson,€IVà àà àà àJohn€W.€PierottiÌ648€Poplar€Ave.à àà àà àà àDistrict€Attorney€GeneralÌMemphis,€TN€38105„4512Ìà àà àà àà àà àà àReginald€R.€HendersonÌDavid€C.€Stebbinsà àà àà àà àAsst.€District€Attorney€GeneralÌ8€East€Long€Street,€Suite€424à àà à201€Poplar€Ave.ÌColumbus,€OH€43215à àà àà àMemphis,€TN€38103Ìà àà àà àà àà àà àÌœ›ÌOPINION€FILED:€___________Ìœ›ÌREVERSED€AND€REMANDEDÌÌÌWilliam€M.€Barker,€JudgeÌÓ  ÓÓÓà@ àò òOPINIONó óÌà àà àThe€appellants,€Michael€Eugene€Sample€and€Larry€McKay,€appeal€as€ofÏright€from€the€Shelby€County€Criminal€Courtððs€judgments€denying€their€petitions€forÏpost„conviction€relief.× ƒ4 ××  ×€€The€appellants€were€each€convicted€œin€a€joint€trial€of›€two€countsÏof€felony€murder€and€sentenced€to€death€in€November€of€1982.€€Their€convictions€andÏsentences€were€affirmed€on€direct€appeal€by€the€Tennessee€Supreme€Court,€and€aÏpetition€for€writ€of€certiorari€was€denied€by€the€United€States€Supreme€Court.€€òòState€v.ÏMcKay€&€Sampleóó,€680€S.W.2d€447€(Tenn.€1984),€òòcertóó.€òòdeniedóó,€470€U.S.€1034€(1985).€ÍInitial€suits€for€post„conviction€relief€were€denied€by€the€trial€court€and€affirmed€onÏappeal.€€òòLarry€McKay€&€Michael€Eugene€Sample€v.€Stateóó,€No.€25€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.,ÏMar.€1,€1989,€Jackson),€òòpermóó.€òòtoóó€òòappealóó€òòdeniedóó,€(Tenn.€1989).€€Subsequent€œpetititions›Ïfor€post„conviction€relief€œfiled€by€each€were›€also€denied€by€the€trial€court€and€affirmedÏon€appeal.€€òòMichael€E.€Sample€&€Larry€McKay€v.€Stateóó,€No.€02C01„9104„CR„00062Ï(Tenn.€Crim.€App.,€Feb.€15,€1995,€Jackson)(application€for€permission€to€appealÏpending).œ× ƒ5 ××  ×›à àà àà àà àà àà àÌà àà àSampleððs€present€post„conviction€suit€was€filed€on€January€27,€1995,€andÏMcKayððs€suit€was€filed€on€February€1,€1995.€€The€grounds€for€relief€in€both€suits€wereÏessentially€the€same:€(a)€that€the€State€of€Tennessee€presented€false€testimony€at€trialÏand€suppressed€exculpatory€evidence;€(b)€that€the€death€sentences€were€predicatedÏon€an€invalid€aggravating€circumstance€under€òòState€v.€Middlebrooksóó,€840€S.W.2d€317Ï(Tenn.€1992);€(c)€that€the€instructions€defining€reasonable€doubt€in€the€guilt€andÏsentencing€phases€were€unconstitutional;€and€(d)€that€numerous€errors€committed€byÍthe€trial€court,€prosecutors,€and€trial€counsel€violated€the€Tennessee€and€United€StatesÏConstitutions.× ƒ6 ××  ×€€€à àà àÌà àà àThe€trial€court€dismissed€Sampleððs€petition€without€an€evidentiaryÏhearing€after€ruling€that€he€could€not€proceed€with€a€post„conviction€petition€while€anÏappeal€from€the€denial€of€a€prior€post„conviction€suit€was€pending€with€the€Court€ofÏCriminal€Appeals.€€The€trial€court€dismissed€McKayððs€petition€on€the€ground€that€it€hadÏbeen€filed€after€the€expiration€of€the€three€year€statute€of€limitations€then€applicable€toÏpost„conviction€cases.× ƒ7 ××  ×€€On€appeal,€the€appellants€argue€that€the€trial€court€erred€inÏdismissing€their€petitions€without€a€hearing.€€They€reiterate€the€claims€asserted€in€theirÏpetitions€and€also€argue€that€the€trial€court€erred€in€denying€their€requests€for€stateÏfunded€expert€and€investigative€services.€€ÌÌà àà àAfter€a€thorough€review€of€the€record€and€authority,€we€conclude€that€theÏtrial€court€erred€in€dismissing€the€petitions.€€The€trial€courtððs€judgments€are€reversed,Ïand€these€cases€are€remanded€for€further€proceedings€consistent€with€this€opinion.ÌÌà àà àWe€will€briefly€summarize€the€convicting€evidence.€€On€August€29,€1981,ÏMelvin€Wallace,€Jr.,€entered€the€L€&€G€grocery€store€in€Memphis,€Tennessee.€€He€sawÍtwo€employees€of€the€store,€Benjamin€Cooke€and€Steve€Jones,€both€of€whom€he€knew.€ÏHe€saw€a€man€he€later€identified€at€trial€as€McKay€holding€a€gun€to€Cookeððs€head,€andÏhe€realized€a€robbery€was€in€progress.€€When€Wallace€ran€for€the€door,€a€second€man,Ïœwhom›€he€identified€at€trial€as€Sample,€shot€him€in€the€thigh€and€in€the€back.€€WallaceÏheard€Sample€demand€money€and€threaten€to€kill€everyone€in€the€store.€€ShotsÏfollowed.€€Wallace€saw€McKay€shoot€Cooke€in€the€head.€€Wallace€struggled€withÏSample,€and€Sample€tried€to€shoot€him€once€more.€€McKay€and€Sample€then€fled€fromÏthe€store.€€Cooke€and€Jones€died€from€shots€to€the€head€but€Wallace€survived.€ÏCharles€Rice€testified€that€he€also€saw€the€robbery€in€progress;€he€later€identifiedÏSample€and€McKay.€€The€State€introduced€physical€evidence€relating€to€the€crime€andÏevidence€purporting€to€link€the€appellants€to€other€robberies€committed€in€the€area.€ÏThe€appellants€were€convicted€of€two€counts€of€murder€in€the€perpetration€of€armedÏrobbery.€€à àà àÌÌà@ àò òIó óÌà àà àSampleððs€first€issue€is€that€the€trial€court€erred€in€dismissing€the€petitionÏdue€to€the€pendency€of€an€appeal€from€a€previous€petition€for€post„conviction€relief.€ÏHe€argues€that€the€basis€for€dismissal€was€factually€and€legally€erroneous.€€The€StateÏconcedes€that€the€trial€court€erred.€€We€agree.ÌÌà àà àThe€record€indicates€that€œthis›€petition€was€filed€on€January€27,€1995.€€TheÏStateððs€answer€to€the€petition€was€filed€on€February€10,€1995;€it€asserted€only€that€theÍappellant€was€not€permitted€to€pursue€the€post„conviction€case€while€a€separate€post„conviction€suit€was€pending€before€the€Court€of€Criminal€Appeals.€€The€trial€courtÏdismissed€the€petition€on€œthat›€basis€on€the€same€day,€February€10,€1995.€€Five€daysÏlater,€our€court€filed€its€opinion€in€òòMichael€E.€Sample€&€Larry€McKay€v.€Stateóó,€No.Ï02C01„9104„CR„00062€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.,€Feb.€15,€1995,€Jackson).€€Sample€filed€aÏreply€with€the€trial€court,€asserting€that€the€Stateððs€answer€was€factually€and€legallyÏincorrect.€€The€trial€court,€however,€took€no€further€action.€ÌÌà àà àIn€òòLaney€v.€Stateóó,€826€S.W.2d€117€(Tenn.€1992),€which€is€cited€by€bothÏsides,€the€trial€court€dismissed€a€petition€for€post„conviction€relief€because€a€previouslyÏfiled€petition€was€pending€on€appeal.€€Our€supreme€court€said€that€the€Post„ConvictionÏProcedure€Act€did€not€ð ðas€a€matter€of€law€ban€multiple€suits€attacking€the€sameÏconviction.ðð€€òòIdóó.€at€118.€€Instead,€where€ð ðseparate€and€distinctðð€suits€are€filed,€a€trialÏcourt€has€the€jurisdiction€to€hear€and€determine€the€issues€even€if€the€appeal€from€aÏprevious€petition€is€pending€before€a€higher€court.€€òòIdóó.ÌÌà àà àAccordingly,€the€trial€court€erred€in€dismissing€the€petition€on€this€basis.€ÏThe€court€had€the€jurisdiction€to€consider€Sampleððs€petition,€and€it€erred€in€failing€to€doÏso.ÌÌà@ àò òII€ó óÌà àà àSample€and€McKay€argue€that€they€were€denied€their€rights€to€a€fair€trialÏand€to€due€process€under€the€Tennessee€and€United€States€Constitutions€because€theÏState€presented€false€testimony€at€trial€and€suppressed€exculpatory€evidence.€€TheyÏassert€that€the€grounds€for€relief€were€unknown€and€unavailable€prior€to€the€decision€inÏòòCapital€Case€Resource€Center€of€Tennessee,€Inc.€v.€Woodallóó,€No.€€01A01„9104„CH„00150€(Tenn.€App.,€Jan.€29,€1992,€Nashville).€€In€òòWoodallóó,€the€Court€of€Appeals€heldÏthat€police€investigative€records€concerning€a€case€under€collateral€attack€were€notÏexempt€from€disclosure€under€the€Tennessee€Public€Records€Law.€€òòIdóó.€slip€op.€at€5;Ïòòseeóó€òòalsoóó€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€10„7„501,€et.€seq.€€Thus,€having€obtained€previouslyÏsuppressed€police€records€and€statements,€the€appellants€œargue›€that€the€trial€courtÏshould€have€conducted€a€hearing€to€further€develop€the€issues.× ƒ8 ××  ×€€ÌÌà àà àThe€State€argues€on€appeal€that€Sample€has€not€shown€that€he€isÏentitled€to€relief€on€the€substantive€allegations,€but€it€concedes€that€the€trial€courtÏshould€have€conducted€further€proceedings€to€consider€the€issue€raised€and€anyÏprocedural€defenses€available€to€the€State.€€The€State€argues€that€McKay€failed€toÏallege€factual€grounds€in€support€of€his€claim€and€also€failed€to€overcome€proceduralÏbarriers€to€hearing€the€petition.€€The€State€maintains€that€the€trial€court€correctlyÏdismissed€McKayððs€suit€on€the€basis€of€the€statute€of€limitations.ÌÌœÌÌ›à@ àò òAó óÌà àà àWe€will€summarize€the€factual€allegations€made€by€both€Sample€andÏMcKay€in€support€of€their€claims.€They€insist€that€the€Stateððs€key€witness€at€trial,€MelvinÏWallace,€Jr.,€gave€false€testimony.€€Wallace€testified,€in€pertinent€part,€that€he€wrestledÏwith€Sample,€got€a€ð ðgood€lookðð€at€Sampleððs€face,€and€was€ð ðpositiveðð€of€hisÏidentification€of€Sample€at€trial.€€Wallace€admitted€at€trial€that€he€failed€to€identifyÏSample€in€a€physical€line„up,€but€he€said€he€was€confused€due€to€medication.€€SampleÏand€McKay€assert€that€they€filed€motions€requesting€exculpatory€evidence€prior€to€trialÏand€that€they€received€a€three€page€statement€Wallace€made€to€authorities€on€AugustÏ31,€1981.€€They€allege,€however,€that€records€obtained€under€the€public€records€lawÏrevealed€that€the€State€withheld€the€following€evidence:ÌÓÓà8 àà8 à(1)€On€August€30,€1981,€Wallace€told€Memphis€Police€Sgt.ÏJ.D.€Welch€that€he€did€not€notice€subject€#2€[allegedlyÏSample]€during€the€robbery.ÌÌà8 àà8 à(2)€Wallace€told€Sgt.€Welch€that€subject€#1€[allegedlyÏMcKay]€was€the€one€who€stood€over€him€and€shot€him€[andÏnot€subject€#2,€allegedly€Sample,€as€Wallace€testified€atÏtrial].ÌÌà8 àà8 à(3)€On€November€17,€1981,€Wallace€told€Memphis€PoliceÏOfficer€J.D.€Douglas€that€he€could€not€identify€the€secondÏman€[allegedly€Sample]€in€the€robbery.€€Wallace€only€sawÏone€of€the€men€during€the€robbery,€the€one€who€shot€himÏ[allegedly€McKay].ÌÌà8 àà8 à(4)€Wallace€gave€physical€descriptions€of€the€suspects,Ïincluding€their€height,€weight,€and€skin€complexion,€that€didÏnot€match€Sample€or€McKay.ÌÌÓÓThe€appellants€allege€that€the€State€withheld€additional€exculpatory€evidence€that€weÏsummarize€below:ÌÓÓà8 àà8 à(1)€Reports€that€indicated€Sampleððs€and€McKayððsÏfingerprints€were€not€found€at€the€L€&€G€grocery€store.ÌÌà8 àà8 à(2)€€Information€regarding€other€potential€suspects€whoÏwere€alleged€to€be€near€the€scene€at€the€time€of€the€crime,Ïincluding€Sammy€House.ÌÌà8 àà8 à(3)€Descriptions€of€the€perpetrators€given€to€the€policeÏdispatcher€that€did€not€match€Sample€or€McKay.ÌÌà8 àà8 à(4)€€Evidence€that€drugs€were€commonly€sold€from€the€L&GÏgrocery€store,€which€provided€other€possible€motives€andÏsuspects€for€the€crime.ÌÌà8 àà8 à(5)€Descriptions€of€the€perpetrators€given€to€police€officersÏby€Charles€Rice€that€did€not€match€Sample€or€McKay.ÌÌà8 àà8 à(6)€Inconsistent€statements€made€by€Charles€Rice€about€theÏoffense€and€what€he€observed.ÌÌà8 àà8 à(7)€Exculpatory€evidence€relating€to€the€other€robberies€inÏthe€area€which€the€State€tried€to€link€to€Sample€and€McKay.Ìà@ àÌÓÓÌà àà àThe€appellantsðð€allegations€clearly€implicate€constitutional€rights.€€InÏòòBrady€v.€Marylandóó,€373€U.S.€83,€87€(1963),€the€United€States€Supreme€Court€held€thatÏthe€prosecution€has€the€duty€to€furnish€exculpatory€evidence€to€the€accused€uponÏrequest.€€Exculpatory€evidence€may€pertain€œnot€only€to›€the€guilt€or€innocence€of€theÍœaccused,€but€also€to›€the€punishment€which€may€be€imposed€if€the€accused€is€convictedÏof€the€crime.€€òòState€v.€Marshallóó,€845€S.W.2d€228€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.€1992).€€AnyÏð ðsuppression€by€the€prosecution€of€evidence€favorable€to€an€accused€upon€requestÏviolates€due€process€where€the€evidence€is€material€either€to€guilt€or€to€punishment,Ïirrespective€of€the€good€faith€or€bad€faith€of€the€prosecution.ðð€€òòBrady€v.€Marylandóó,€373ÏU.S.€at€87.€€The€duty€to€disclose€extends€to€all€ð ðfavorable€informationðð€regardless€ofÏwhether€the€evidence€is€admissible€at€trial.€€òòState€v.€Marshallóó,€845€S.W.2d€at€233;ÏòòBranch€v.€Stateóó,€4€Tenn.€Crim.€App.€164,€168,€469€S.W.2d€533,€536€(1969).€€ÌÌà àà àSimilarly,€it€is€well€established€that€the€Stateððs€knowing€use€of€falseÏtestimony€to€convict€an€accused€violates€the€right€to€a€fair€and€impartial€trial€asÏembodied€in€the€due€process€clause€of€œthe€fourteenth›€amendment€to€the€United€StatesÏConstitution€and€article€1,€sections€8€and€9€of€the€Tennessee€Constitution.€€òòPyle€v.ÏKansasóó,€317€U.S.€213,€216€(1942);€òòState€v.€Spurlockóó,€874€S.W.2d€602,€617€(Tenn.ÏCrim.€App.€1993).€€When€a€witness€answers€questions€on€direct€or€cross€examinationÏfalsely,€the€prosecution€has€an€affirmative€duty€to€correct€the€false€testimony.€€òòGiglio€v.ÏUnited€Statesóó,€405€U.S.€150,€153€(1972);€òòNapue€v.€Illinoisóó,€360€U.S.€264,€269€(1959);ÏòòState€v.€Spurlockóó,€874€S.W.2d€at€617.ÌÌà àà àAccordingly,€the€allegations€made€by€Sample€and€McKay€clearly€statedÏconstitutional€grounds€for€relief.€€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€40„30„105.€€The€key€issues€wereÍwhether€the€grounds€were€viable€at€this€stage€of€the€post„conviction€proceedings.€€AsÏwe€will€discuss,€the€trial€court€did€not€give€due€consideration€to€these€key€issues.ÌÌà@ àò òBó óÌà@ àò ò(1)ó óÌà àà àUnder€the€Post„Conviction€Procedure€Act€governing€these€petitions,€aÏpetitioner€could€raise€all€constitutional€claims€except€those€which€have€beenÏpreviously€determined,€waived,€or€barred€by€the€statute€of€limitations.€€The€statutoryÏdefinitions€for€previous€determination€and€waiver€were€as€follows:ÌÓÓà8 àà8 à(a)€A€ground€for€relief€is€ððpreviously€determinedðð€if€a€court€ofÏcompetent€jurisdiction€has€ruled€on€the€merits€after€a€fullÏand€fair€hearing.ÌÌà8 àà8 à(b)(1)€A€ground€for€relief€is€ððwaivedðð€if€the€petitionerÏknowingly€and€understandingly€failed€to€present€it€forÏdetermination€in€any€proceeding€before€a€court€ofÏcompetent€jurisdiction€in€which€the€ground€could€have€beenÏpresented.ÌÌà8 àà8 à(2)€There€is€a€rebuttable€presumption€that€a€ground€for€reliefÏnot€raised€in€any€such€proceeding€which€was€held€wasÏwaived.ÌÌÓÓTenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€40„30„112.€€ÌÌà àà àIn€òòHouse€v.€Stateóó,€911€S.W.2d€705€(Tenn.€1995),€òòcertóó.€òòdeniedóó,€___€U.S.Ï___,€116€S.Ct.€1685€(1996),€our€supreme€court€held€that€ð ða€ððfull€and€fair€hearingððÏsufficient€to€support€a€finding€of€previous€determination€occurs€if€a€petitioner€is€givenÍthe€opportunity€to€present€proof€and€argument€on€the€petition€for€post„conviction€relief.ðð€ÏòòIdóó.€at€706.€€€With€regard€to€waiver,€the€court€held:ÌÓÓà8 àà8 à[T]he€rebuttable€presumption€of€waiver€is€not€overcome€byÏan€allegation€that€the€petitioner€did€not€personally€andÏtherefore€ððknowingly€and€understandingly,ðð€waive€theÏground€for€relief.€€Waiver€is€to€be€determined€by€anÏobjective€standard€under€which€a€petitioner€is€bound€by€theÏaction€or€inaction€of€his€attorney.€€Because€there€is€no€rightÏto€effective€assistance€of€counsel€in€post„convictionÏproceedings,€an€allegation€of€ineffective€assistance€of€priorÏpost„conviction€counsel€does€not€preclude€application€ofÏthe€defenses€of€waiver€and€previous€determination.ÌÌÓÓòòIdóó.€€Thus,€the€court€gave€a€broad€interpretation€to€both€statutory€defenses.€€ÌÌà àà àThe€burden€is€on€the€post„conviction€petitioner€to€allege€facts€in€a€petitionÏto€overcome€the€application€of€procedural€barriers.€€òòState€v.€Smithóó,€814€S.W.2d€45,€48€Ï(Tenn.€1991);€òòseeóó€òòalsoóó€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€40„30„104(10).€€If€a€competently€draftedÏpetition€is€before€the€court,€and€ð ðall€pleadings,€files€and€records€of€the€case€which€areÏbefore€the€court€conclusively€show€that€the€petitioner€is€entitled€to€no€relief,€the€courtÏmay€order€the€petition€dismissed.ðð€€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€40„30„109(a)(1).€€However,€inÏreviewing€a€post„conviction€petition€and€determining€whether€it€states€a€colorableÏclaim€for€relief,€the€trial€court€must€treat€the€allegations€in€the€petition€as€true.€€òòSkinnerÏv.€Stateóó,€4€Tenn.€Crim.€App.€447,€472€S.W.2d€903,€904€(1971).ÌÌà àà àBoth€Sample€and€McKay€alleged€numerous€grounds€in€their€petitions€toÏrebut€these€defenses,€principally€that€they€were€unable€to€raise€these€issues€prior€toÍthe€òòWoodallóó€decision.€€Additionally,€they€assert€that€as€convicted€felons€they€wereÏunable€to€obtain€public€records€even€after€the€òòWoodallóó€decision.€€€òòSeeóó,€òòe.g.óó,€òòIn€Re:ÏRecords€Sought€By€Daniel€B.€Taylor€v.€Neilóó,€No.€01AO1„9211„CH„00439€(Tenn.€App.,ÏMar.€17,€1993),€òòpermóó.€òòtoóóòòappealóó€òòdeniedóó,€(Tenn.€1993).€€Thus,€they€specifically€assertÏthat€they€did€not€personally€make€a€ð ðknowing€and€understandingðð€waiver€of€theÏissues.× ƒ9 ××  ×€à àà àÌÌà àà àWith€regard€to€Sample,€the€State€asserts€in€its€brief€that€an€exculpatoryÏevidence€issue€was€raised€in€Sampleððs€June€1989€petition€and€that€the€use€of€falseÏevidence€issue€was€not€raised€on€direct€appeal€or€in€a€prior€post„conviction€petition.× ƒ: ××  ×€ÏThe€State€correctly€concedes,€however,€that€Sampleððs€petition€rebutted€the€applicationÏof€procedural€barriers€by€asserting€that€the€grounds€for€relief€were€unavailable€beforeÏthe€òòWoodallóó€decision.€€In€other€words,€if€Sampleððs€allegations€are€accepted€as€true,€theÏgrounds€for€relief€were€unavailable€due€to€the€Stateððs€suppression€of€evidence.€€Thus,ÍSample€could€not€have€had€an€opportunity€to€present€the€issues€for€a€ruling€€ð ðon€theÏmeritsðð€for€the€purpose€of€previous€determination.€€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€40„30„112(a).€ÏLikewise,€the€issues€could€not€have€been€presented€in€a€prior€suit€for€the€purpose€ofÏwaiver.€€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€40„30„112(b)(1);€òòseeóó€òòWooden€v.€Stateóó,€898€S.W.2d€752,Ï754€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.€1994);€òòStephen€C.€Parker€v.€Stateóó,€No.€01C01„9008„CR„00188Ï(Tenn.€Crim.€App.,€Feb.€26,€1991,€Nashville),€òòpermóó.€òòtoóó€òòappealóó€òòdeniedóó,€(Tenn.€1991).€ÏMoreover,€the€trial€court€dismissed€Sampleððs€suit€on€a€legally€incorrect€basis€withoutÏgiving€any€consideration€to€the€allegations€or€the€possible€statutory€defenses.€ÏAccordingly,€as€the€State€concedes€on€appeal,€the€defenses€of€waiver€and€previousÏdetermination€were€rebutted€by€Sample.ÌÌà àà àWith€regard€to€McKay,€the€State€makes€no€concessions.€€Instead,€theÏState€argues€on€appeal€that€the€exculpatory€evidence€issue€was€raised€in€a€petitionÏfiled€in€June€of€1989€and€that€the€use€of€false€evidence€issue€was€raised€in€œa€priorÏpetition›€filed€on€September€16,€1992.€€As€both€suits€were€dismissed€by€the€trial€court,Ïthe€State€suggests€that€the€issues€were€previously€determined.€€These€contentions€areÏnot€supported€by€the€record.× ƒ; ××  ×€€Moreover,€the€State€did€not€address€McKayððsÏallegations€that€the€grounds€for€relief€could€not€have€been€raised€earlier€or€heard€onÏthe€merits€due€to€the€Stateððs€suppression€of€the€evidence€and€the€unavailability€of€theÍevidence€prior€to€òòWoodallóó.€€Thus,€we€conclude€that€McKay,€like€Sample,€rebutted€theÏdefenses€of€waiver€and€previous€determination.€€€ÌÌà@ àò ò(2)ó óÌà àà àThe€State€also€argues€that€Sample€and€McKay€filed€their€petitions€afterÏthe€expiration€of€the€three€year€statute€of€limitations€then€applicable€to€post„convictionÏcases.€€While€the€State€concedes€that€Sampleððs€suit€should€be€remanded€for€furtherÏconsideration,€it€maintains€that€McKayððs€suit€was€properly€dismissed.€€The€relevantÏstatute€provided:ÌÓÓà8 àà8 à[a]€prisoner€in€custody€under€sentence€of€a€court€of€this€stateÏmust€petition€for€post„conviction€relief€under€this€chapterÏwithin€three€(3)€years€of€the€date€of€final€action€of€theÏhighest€state€appellate€court€to€which€an€appeal€is€taken€orÏconsideration€of€such€petition€shall€be€barred.ÌÌÓÓTenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€40„30„102€[repealed€by€Acts€1995,€ch.€207,€ðð1].€€The€statute,€whichÏtook€effect€July€1,€1986,€was€applied€prospectively€by€our€courts.€€òòState€v.€Masuccióó,Ï754€S.W.2d€90€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.€1988);€òòAbston€v.€Stateóó,€749€S.W.2d€487€(Tenn.€Crim.ÏApp.€1988).€€Thus,€defendants€like€McKay€and€Sample,€whose€cases€were€final€priorÏto€the€enactment€of€the€statute,€were€given€three€years€from€July€1,€1986,€in€which€toÏseek€post„conviction€relief.ÌÌà àà àSample€and€McKay€allege€that€application€of€the€statute€would€denyÏthem€a€reasonable€opportunity€to€have€the€suppression€of€exculpatory€evidence€andÍthe€use€of€false€testimony€issues€considered€inasmuch€as€they€were€not€known€orÏavailable€until€after€the€expiration€of€the€three€year€period.€€They€cite€òòBurford€v.€Stateóó,Ï845€S.W.2d€204€(Tenn.€1992),€in€which€the€supreme€court€said:€€€€ÌÓÓà8 àà8 à[B]efore€a€state€may€terminate€a€claim€for€failure€to€complyÏwith€procedural€requirements€such€as€statutes€of€limitations,Ïdue€process€requires€that€potential€litigants€be€provided€anÏopportunity€for€the€presentation€of€claims€at€a€meaningfulÏtime€and€in€a€meaningful€manner.€€The€question,€then,€isÏððwhether€the€stateððs€policy€reflected€in€the€statute€affords€aÏfair€and€reasonable€opportunity€for€...€bringing€...€suit.ðð€ÏòòPickett€v.€Brownóó,€638€S.W.2d€369,€376€(Tenn.€1982),€òòrevððdÏon€equal€protection€groundsóó,€462€U.S.1,€103€S.Ct€2199,€76ÏL.Ed.€2d€372€(1983).€€òòIn€other€words,€the€test€is€whether€theÏtime€period€provides€an€applicant€a€reasonable€opportunityÏto€have€the€claimed€issue€heard€and€determinedóó.€€òòMichel€v.ÏLouisianaóó,€350€U.S.€91,€93,€76€S.Ct.€158,€160,€100€L.Ed€83,Ï89€(1955).ÌÌÓÓòòBurford€v.€Stateóó,€845€S.W.2d€at€208€(emphasis€added;€citation€omitted).€€As€a€result,Ïthe€court€in€òòBurfordóó€recognized€that€ð ðit€is€possible€that€under€the€circumstances€of€aÏparticular€case,€application€of€the€statute€may€not€afford€a€reasonable€opportunityðð€toÏlitigate€an€issue.€€òòIdóó.ÌÌà àà àòòBurfordóó€was€clarified€by€the€supreme€court€in€òòSands€v.€Stateóó,€903€S.W.2dÏ297€(Tenn.€1995).€€In€certain€cases,€ð ðdue€process€prohibits€the€strict€application€of€theÏpost„conviction€statute€of€limitations€to€bar€a€petitionerððs€claim€òòwhen€the€grounds€forÏrelief,€whether€legal€or€factualóó,€arise€after€the€ððfinal€action€of€the€highest€state€appellateÏcourt€to€which€an€appeal€is€takenðð„„€or,€in€other€words,€when€the€grounds€arise€after€theÏpoint€at€which€the€limitations€period€would€normally€have€begun€to€run.ðð€€òòIdóó.€at€301Í(emphasis€added).€€The€court€set€forth€the€following€process€in€analyzing€òòBurfordóóÏsituations:ÌÓÓà8 àà8 à(1)€determine€when€the€limitations€period€would€normallyÏhave€begun€to€run;€(2)€determine€whether€the€grounds€forÏrelief€actually€arose€after€the€limitations€period€wouldÏnormally€have€commenced;€and€(3)€if€the€grounds€are€ððlater„arising,ðð€determine€if,€under€the€facts€of€the€case,€a€strictÏapplication€of€the€limitations€period€would€effectively€denyÏthe€petitioner€a€reasonable€opportunity€to€present€the€claim.€ÏIn€making€this€final€determination,€courts€should€carefullyÏweigh€the€petitionerððs€liberty€interest€in€ððcollaterallyÏattacking€constitutional€violations€occurring€during€theÏconviction€process,ðð€òòBurfordóó,€845€S.W.2d€at€207,€against€theÏStateððs€interest€in€preventing€the€litigation€of€ððstale€andÏfraudulent€claims.ðð€€òòIdóó.€at€208.ÌÌÓÓòòSandsóó,€903€S.W.2d€at€301;€òòseeóó€òòalsoóó€òòCaldwell€v.€Stateóó,€917€S.W.2d€662€(Tenn.€1996).ÌÌà àà àHere,€the€appellantsðð€direct€appeals€were€decided€in€1984.€€The€effectiveÏdate€of€the€statute€of€limitations,€as€noted,€was€July€1,€1986.€€Given€the€prospectiveÏapplication€of€the€statute,€the€appellants€had€three€years€from€the€effective€date€inÏwhich€to€file€post„conviction€petitions.€€They€have€alleged€that€the€legal€and€factualÏgrounds€in€support€of€their€exculpatory€evidence€and€false€testimony€issues€arose€afterÏthe€statute€had€commenced€to€run€and€then€expired.€€Thus,€in€accepting€theÏallegations€as€true,€it€would€appear€that€the€appellants€have€had€no€reasonableÏopportunity€in€which€to€litigate€the€issues€despite€prior€post„conviction€suits.€€Moreover,Ïin€balancing€the€interests€of€the€parties,€it€is€obvious€that€the€rights€affected„„€dueÏprocess€and€a€fair€trial„„€implicate€personal€trial€rights€of€the€appellants.€€òòSeeóó€òòCaldwell€Ív.€Stateóó,€917€S.W.2d€at€667„68.€€As€such,€the€grounds€raised€by€Sample€and€McKayÏdirectly€affect€ð ðthe€òòjustice€or€integrityóó€of€the€conviction€or€sentence.ðð€€òòIdóó.€at€667Ï(emphasis€in€original).€€ÌÌà àà àWe€note€that€a€òòBradyóó€issue€was€envisioned€as€a€later€arising€ground€inÏJustice€Daughtreyððs€concurring€opinion€in€òòBurfordóó:€ð ð[L]egitimate€grounds€for€reliefÏmight€come€to€light€long€after€the€three€year€period€has€run,€as€in€the€case€ofÏsuppression€of€material€evidence€by€the€prosecution€that€is€concealed€for€many€yearsÏafter€the€trial.ðð€€òòSeeóó€òòBurford€v.€Stateóó,€845€S.W.2d€at€211€(Daughtrey,€J.,€concurring).€ÏSimilarly,€in€òòArthur€L.€Armstrong€v.€Stateóó,€No.€01C01„9311„CR„00403€(Tenn.€Crim.ÏApp.,€Dec.€8,€1994,€Nashville),€a€habeas€corpus€petitioner€raised€a€late„arisingÏexculpatory€evidence€issue.€€Our€court€noted€that€the€issue€could€not€be€raised€in€aÏstate€habeas€corpus€case€but€indicated€that€the€petitioner€could€again€seek€post„conviction€relief.€€The€court€said:ÌÓÓà8 àà8 àThe€state€concedes,€and€we€agree,€that€under€the€rule€ofÏòòBurford€v.€Stateóó,€845€S.W.2d€204€(Tenn.€1992),€the€three„year€statute€of€limitations€would€not€apply€to€a€petitionÏraising€allegations€of€a€recently€discovered€òòBradyóó€issue.€€InÏòòBurfordóó,€the€Supreme€Court€balanced€the€governmentalÏinterest€in€preventing€litigation€of€stale€or€fraudulent€claimsÏand€the€interest€of€administrative€efficiency€against€theÏprivate€interests€of€the€defendant€and€concluded€that€theÏgovernmental€interests€did€not€outweigh€the€infringement€ofÏa€constitutional€right€affecting€life€or€liberty.€€845€S.W.2d€atÏ209.€€In€a€concurrence€to€òòBurfordóó,€Justice€DaughtreyÏhypothesized€a€situation€in€which€the€suppression€ofÏmaterial€evidence€by€the€prosecution€is€concealed€for€manyÏyears€after€trial€and€concluded€that€the€application€of€aÍstatute€of€limitations€in€such€a€situation€would€be€a€violationÏof€due€process.€€òòIdóó.€at€211.€ÌÌÓÓòòArmstrongóó,€slip€op.€at€7.€€ÌÌà àà àLikewise,€in€òòWooden€v.€Stateóó,€898€S.W.2d€at€753,€a€petitioner€alleged€inÏhis€third€petition€for€post„conviction€relief€that€the€state€had€suppressed€exculpatoryÏevidence.€€He€argued€that€the€issue€was€not€previously€available€because€he€hadÏbeen€denied€access€to€records€under€the€Public€Records€Law.€€€Our€court,€afterÏdiscussing€possible€exceptions€to€the€three€year€statute€of€limitations€under€òòBurfordóó,Ïremanded€the€case€to€the€trial€court€with€the€following€instructions:€€ÌÓÓà8 àà8 àUpon€remand,€the€trial€court€should€consider€first€whetherÏthe€evidence€is€in€fact€exculpatory.€€If€so,€it€can€thenÏdetermine€whether€the€evidence€supports€the€application€ofÏthe€òòBurfordóó€due€process€exception€to€the€statute€ofÏlimitations.€€If€each€of€these€questions€is€resolved€in€theÏaffirmative,€the€trial€court€may€then€consider€appropriateÏrelief.ÌÌÓÓ898€S.W.2d€at€755.€€ÌÌà àà àAccordingly,€we€conclude€that€the€State€has€not€shown€that€the€statute€ofÏlimitations€barred€the€appellantsðð€petitions,€insofar€as€these€grounds€are€concerned.€ÏTo€the€contrary,€we€believe€that€a€hearing€is€necessary€to€further€consider€the€issue.€€ÌÌà@ àò òCó óà àà àÌà àà àIn€summary,€we€conclude€that€Sample€and€McKay€have€statedÏconstitutional€grounds€for€relief€with€regard€to€the€use€of€false€testimony€andÏsuppression€of€exculpatory€evidence.€€The€appellantsðð€allegations€as€to€why€the€claimsÏwere€not€waived,€previously€determined,€or€barred€by€the€statute€of€limitations€rebuttedÏthe€application€of€these€statutory€defenses.€€The€State€made€no€effort€œin€the€trial›€œcourtÏto›€show€that€the€defenses€were€applicable€and€it€has€not€substantiated€its€allegationsÏon€appeal.€€Moreover,€the€State€did€not€comply€with€its€statutory€duty€to€compile€thoseÏportions€of€the€record€necessary€to€resolve€the€issues.€€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€40„30„114.× ƒ< ××  ×€ÏThus,€we€conclude€that€the€cases€must€be€remanded€to€the€trial€court€for€furtherÏconsideration.€€If€the€appellantsðð€allegations€are€substantiated,€and€no€statutoryÏdefenses€are€shown€to€apply,€the€trial€court€shall€consider€the€merits€of€the€issues€inÏaccordance€with€the€applicable€authority.€€€€ÌÌà@ àò òIIIó óÌà àà àSample€and€McKay€next€argue€that€they€were€entitled€to€post„convictionÏrelief€under€òòState€v.€Middlebrooksóó,€840€S.W.2d€317€(Tenn.€1992).€€In€òòMiddlebrooksóó,Ïour€supreme€court€held€that€ð ðwhen€a€defendant€is€convicted€of€first„degree€murderÏsolely€on€the€basis€of€felony€murder,€the€aggravating€circumstance€set€out€in€Tenn.ÏCode€Ann.€ðð€39„2„203(i)(7)(1982)€and€ðð39„13„204(i)(7)(1991)€does€not€narrow€theÍclass€of€death€eligible€murderers€sufficiently€under€the€Eighth€Amendment€to€theÏUnited€States€Constitution€and€Article€I,€section€16€of€the€Tennessee€ConstitutionÏbecause€it€duplicates€the€elements€of€the€offense.ðð€€òòIdóó.€at€346.× ƒ= ××  ×€€The€appellants€allegeÏthat€the€factor€was€erroneously€applied€in€their€cases,€that€harmless€error€analysis€isÏinappropriate€when€reviewing€errors€made€in€a€capital€sentencing€proceeding,€andÏthat,€assuming€a€harmless€error€analysis€must€be€applied,€the€òòMiddlebrooksóó€error€wasÏnot€harmless€under€the€facts€and€circumstances€of€these€cases.ÌÌà àà àòòMiddlebrooksóó€was€decided€on€September€8,€1992.€€The€constitutionalÏrule€announced€therein€was€later€held€to€apply€retroactively€in€post„conviction€cases.ÏòòBarber€v.€Stateóó,€889€S.W.2d€185€(Tenn.€1994),€òòcertóó.€òòdeniedóó,€___€U.S.€___,€115€S.Ct.Ï1177,€130€L.Ed.2d€1129€(1995);€òòseeóó€òòalsoóó€òòWorkman€v.€Stateóó,€868€S.W.2d€705€(Tenn.ÏCrim.€App.€1993).€€In€òòBarberóó,€the€court€said:ÌÓÓà8 àà8 àWhen€an€aggravating€circumstance€is€improperly€injectedÏinto€the€process€by€which€the€juror€must€weigh€aggravatingÏand€mitigating€circumstances€to€determine€a€sentence,€theÏintegrity€and€reliability€of€the€sentencing€process€isÏjeopardized€because€the€death€penalty€may€not€beÏreserved€for€only€the€most€culpable€defendants.€€For€thisÏreason,€we€apply€òòMiddlebrooksóó€retroactively....ÌÌÓÓòòIdóó.€at€187.€€ÌÌà àà àThe€State€concedes€that€the€issue€has€not€been€waived€or€previouslyÏdetermined€with€regard€to€either€Sample€or€McKay.× ƒ> ××  ×€€Moreover,€althoughÏòòMiddlebrooksóó€was€decided€well€after€the€statutory€period€of€limitations€hadÏcommenced€and€expired,€the€State€acknowledges€that€it€is€a€later„arising€groundÏinvolving€significant€liberty€interests€to€the€appellants.€€As€such,€application€of€the€threeÏyear€statute€of€limitations€would€deny€the€appellants€a€reasonable€opportunity€to€haveÏthe€claim€litigated.€€òòSeeóó€òòSands€v.€Stateóó,€903€S.W.2d€at€301;€òòBurford€v.€Stateóó,€845ÏS.W.2d€at€208.€€œAdditionally,€we›€note€that€the€appellantsðð€petitions€were€filed€withinÏthree€years€of€the€òòMiddlebrooksóó€opinion.€€òòSeeóó€òòLawrence€Moore€v.€Stateóó,€No.€03C01„9504„CR„00122€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.,€Feb.€14,€1996,€Knoxville)(petition€filed€within€threeÏyears€of€opinion€announcing€a€new€constitutional€rule);€òòRudy€Myers€v.€Stateóó,€No.Ï01C01„9308„CC„00270€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.,€Jan.€20,€1994,€Nashville)(petition€filedÏwithin€three€years€of€a€new,€retroactively€applied€constitutional€rule).€€Thus,€the€claimÏunder€òòMiddlebrooksóó€was€a€viable€ground€for€post„conviction€relief,€and€the€trial€courtÏerred€in€dismissing€the€petitions€without€considering€the€issues.ÌÌà àà à€With€regard€to€the€substance€of€the€issue,€the€appellants€concede€thatÏthe€original€sentencing€jury€found€aggravating€circumstances€in€addition€to€the€felonyÏmurder€factor.œ× ƒ? ××  ×›€€Nonetheless,€the€appellants€contend€that€a€new€sentencing€hearingÏis€mandated€under€Tennessee€constitutional€and€statutory€law€because€an€appellateÏcourt€cannot€reweigh€aggravating€and€mitigating€factors€or€otherwise€conduct€aÏharmless€error€analysis.€€Moreover,€the€appellants€argue€that€even€if€a€harmless€errorÏanalysis€is€applied,€the€òòMiddlebrooksóó€errors€were€not€harmless€under€either€òòChapmanÏv.€Californiaóó,€386€U.S.€18€(1967)€or€òòState€v.€Howellóó,€868€S.W.2d€at€260.œ× ƒ@ ××  ×›€€€TheÍappellants€cite€òòRickman€v.€Duttonóó,€864€F.€Supp.€686€(M.D.€Tenn.€1994)€in€support€ofÏtheir€position.ÌÌà àà àIn€òòState€v.€Howellóó,€our€supreme€court€held€that€a€òòMiddlebrooksóó€violationÏwas€subject€to€a€harmless€error€analysis.€€In€undertaking€such€an€analysis,€anÏappellate€court€should€consider€ð ðthe€number€and€strength€of€the€remainingÏaggravating€circumstances,€the€prosecutorððs€argument€at€sentencing,€the€evidenceÏadmitted€to€establish€the€invalid€aggravator,€and€the€nature,€quality,€and€strength€ofÏmitigating€evidence.ðð€€òòIdóó.€at€261.€€The€court€further€said:ÌÓÓà8 àà8 à[E]ven€more€crucial€than€the€sum€of€the€remainingÏaggravating€circumstances€is€the€qualitative€nature€of€eachÏcircumstance,€its€substance€and€persuasiveness,€as€well€asÏthe€quantum€of€proof€supporting€it.€€In€that€respect,€theÏTennessee€statute€assigns€no€relative€importance€to€theÏvarious€statutory€aggravating€circumstances.€€By€their€veryÏnature,€and€under€the€proof€in€certain€cases,€however,Ïsome€aggravating€circumstances€may€be€more€qualitativelyÏpersuasive€and€objectively€reliable€than€others....ÌÌÓÓòòIdóó.€at€260„61.€€Upon€reviewing€these€factors,€an€appellate€court€may€uphold€a€deathÏsentence€if€it€concludes€ð ðbeyond€a€reasonable€doubt€that€the€sentence€would€haveÏbeen€the€same€had€the€jury€given€no€weight€to€the€invalid€felony€murder€aggravatingÏfactor....ðð€€òòIdóó.€at€262€(citing€òòStringer€v.€Blackóó,€503€U.S.€222€(1992)).€€Since€its€decisionÏin€òòHowellóó,€the€supreme€court€has€applied€the€harmless€error€analysis€on€numerousÏoccasions.€€òòState€v.€Smithóó,€893€S.W.2d€908,€925€(Tenn.€1994),€òòcertóó.€òòdeniedóó,€___€U.S.Ï___,€116€S.Ct.€99,€133€L.Ed.2d€53€(1994);€òòBarber€v.€Stateóó,€889€S.W.2d€at€187„189;ÍòòState€v.€Nicholsóó,€877€S.W.2d€722,€738€(Tenn.€1994),€òòcertóó.€òòdeniedóó,€___€U.S.€___,€115ÏS.Ct.€909,€130€L.Ed.2d€791€(1995);€òòState€v.€Cazesóó,€875€S.W.2d€253,€269„70€(Tenn.Ï1994),€òòcertóó.€òòdeniedóó,€___€U.S.€___,€115€S.Ct.€743,€130€L.Ed.2d€644€(1995).€ÌÌ€€à àà àThus,€our€supreme€court€has€not€only€adopted€a€harmless€error€analysisÏfor€this€type€of€case,€it€has€also€applied€the€analysis€on€numerous€occasions.€€As€anÏintermediate€appellate€court,€we€are€bound€to€follow€œour€supreme›€court€precedent€œoverÏthe€federal€district€court€case€of€òòRickman€v.€Duttonóó,€òòsupraóó,€which€is›€cited€by€theÏappellants.€€òòSeeóó€òòState€v.€Bowersóó,€673€S.W.2d€887,€889€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.€1984);€òòseeóóÏòòalsoóó€Rotunda€&€Nowak,€òòTreatise€on€Constitutional€Law:€Substance€&€Procedureóó,€2nd,Ïðð1.6(c)(ð ðbecause€the€state€courts€are€not€ððlower€courts,ðð€they€are€not€required€to€followÏthe€interpretations€of€lower€federal€courts,€such€as€the€Court€of€Appeals€withÏjurisdiction€over€their€state€territory,€even€on€matters€relating€to€the€Constitution€of€theÏUnited€States.ðð).€€We€therefore€reject€the€appellantsðð€contentions€with€respect€to€theÏpropriety€and€manner€of€a€harmless€error€review€in€death€penalty€sentencingÏprocedures€by€an€appellate€court.€€Given€the€presence€of€a€òòMiddlebrooksóó€error,€aÏharmless€error€analysis€is€not€only€appropriate€but€is€mandated€by€our€supreme€court.€€ÌÌà àà àWhile€not€conceding€any€of€œtheir€other›€arguments,€Sample€and€McKayÏcontend€that€the€error€was€not€harmless€under€òòChapmanóó€or€òòHowellóó.€€They€argue€thatÏthere€was€significant€mitigating€evidence€at€trial,€that€the€prosecution€focused€itsÏarguments€and€its€evidence€on€the€invalid€aggravating€factor,€and€that€the€evidenceÍsupporting€the€remaining€aggravating€factors€was€weak€or€altogether€insufficient.€€TheÏState€contends€that€the€error€was€harmless.€€Because€of€the€scant€record€before€ourÏcourt€and€because€of€the€remand€on€other€issues,€we€conclude€that€the€issues€shouldÏbe€considered€first€by€the€trial€court.€€The€trial€judge€is€in€the€better€position€to€reviewÏthe€record€of€the€proceedings,€to€hear€the€arguments€of€the€parties,€and€to€undertakeÏthe€initial€review€of€the€òòMiddlebrooksóó€error€under€the€analysis€set€forth€in€òòHowellóó.€€ÌÌà@ àò òIVó óÌà àà àThe€appellants€contend€that€they€were€entitled€to€post„conviction€reliefÏbecause€the€jury€instructions€at€trial€equated€ð ðreasonable€doubtðð€with€ð ðmoral€certaintyððÏand€allowed€the€jury€to€convict€if€it€could€ð ðlet€the€mind€rest€easily€on€the€certainty€ofÏguilt.ðð€€The€appellants€argue€that€the€instruction€relieved€the€State€of€its€burden€of€proofÏin€violation€of€the€Tennessee€and€United€States€Constitutions.€€The€appellants€claimÏthat€the€issue€was€not€raised€earlier€and€is€not€barred€by€the€statute€of€limitationsÏbecause€it€is€based€on€the€recent€United€States€Supreme€Courtððs€opinions€in€òòVictor€v.ÏNebraskaóó,€511€U.S.€1€(1994)€and€òòSandoval€v.€Californiaóó,€511€U.S.€1€(1994).€€InÏaddition,€the€appellants€rely€on€òòRickman€v.€Duttonóó,€òòsupraóó,€in€which€the€district€courtÏheld€that€a€similarly€worded€reasonable€doubt€instruction€was€unconstitutional.€€TheÏState,€however,€maintains€that€the€appellants€are€not€entitled€to€post„conviction€reliefÏon€this€ground.ÌÌà àà àAlthough€the€State€did€not€raise€specific€procedural€defenses€to€thisÏclaim€in€its€answer€to€the€petitions,€we€have€concluded€that€it€is€without€merit€underÏprior€opinions€of€our€court.€€In€òòPettyjohn€v.€Stateóó,€885€S.W.2d€364€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.Ï1994),€the€post„conviction€petitioner€raised€a€similar€issue:ÌÓÓà8 àà8 à[T]he€United€States€Supreme€Court€rendered€an€opinion€inÏtwo€cases€in€which€it€analyzed€the€relationship€ofÏreasonable€doubt€to€the€ððmoral€certaintyðð€phrase.€€òòVictor€v.ÏNebraskaóó€and€òòSandoval€v.€Californiaóó,€___€U.S.€___,€114ÏS.Ct.€1239,€127€L.Ed.2d€583€(1994).€€The€Court€indicatedÏthat€the€phrase€ððmoral€certaintyðð€may€have€lost€its€nineteenthÏcentury€meaning€relative€to€the€level€of€certainty€humanlyÏattainable€in€matters€relating€to€human€affairs.€€It€recognizedÏthat€a€modern€jury,€unaware€of€the€historical€meaning,€mightÏunderstand€the€phrase,€in€the€abstract,€to€mean€somethingÏless€than€the€very€high€level€of€determinationÏconstitutionally€required€in€criminal€cases.€€òòHowever,Ïalthough€it€expressed€criticism€of€the€continued€use€of€theÏððmoral€certaintyðð€phrase,€the€Court€did€not€actually€hold€thatÏit€was€œconstitutionally›€inappropriate,€but€looked€to€the€fullÏcharge€to€the€jury€to€determine€if€the€phrase€was€placed€inÏsuch€a€context€that€a€jury€would€understand€that€it€meantÏcertainty€with€respect€to€human€affairsóó.ÌÌÓÓòòIdóó.€at€365„66€(emphasis€added).€€The€court€concluded€that€ð ðthe€instructions€as€a€wholeÏdid€not€make€it€reasonably€likely€that€the€jury€understood€the€words€ððmoral€certaintyððÏeither€as€suggesting€a€standard€of€proof€lower€than€due€process€requires€or€asÏallowing€conviction€upon€factors€other€than€the€evidence.ðð€€òòIdóó.€at€366.€€Thus,€the€courtÏheld€that€the€instruction€did€not€violate€due€process.€€Id.€€Similarly,€our€court€hasÏcontinued€to€reject€òòVictoróó„òòSandovalóó€claims.€€òòSeeóó€òòState€v.€Sextonóó,€917€S.W.2d€263,€266Ï(Tenn.€Crim.€App.€1995);€òòState€v.€Michael€Dean€Bushóó,€No.€03C01„9403„CR„00094Ï(Tenn.€Crim.€App.,€Feb.€12,€1996,€Knoxville)(presently€before€the€supreme€courtÍpursuant€to€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€39„13„206(a)(1));€òòState€v.€Ricky€Thompsonóó,€No.Ï03C01„9406„CR„00198€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.,€Jan.€24,€1996,€Knoxville)(application€forÏpermission€to€appeal€pending).€€€ÌÌà àà àAccordingly,€the€appellants€have€failed€to€œshow€a€violation€ofÏconstitutional€due€process.›€€We€are€aware€that€the€federal€district€court€granted€habeasÏcorpus€relief€on€this€issue€in€òòRickman€v.€Duttonóó,€864€F.Supp.€at€710.€€As€we€noted€inÏthe€preceding€issue,€however,€we€are€not€required€to€follow€òòRickmanóó€over€theÏdecisions€of€our€court.€€Thus,€we€believe€that€the€appellants€are€not€entitled€to€post„conviction€relief€on€this€issue.ÌÌà@ àò òVó óÌà àà àThe€appellants€contend€that€the€trial€court€erred€in€summarily€dismissingÏnumerous€grounds€alleging€deprivations€of€constitutional€rights€under€the€fifth,€sixth,Ïeighth€and€fourteenth€amendments€to€the€United€States€Constitution€and€Article€I,Ïsections€8,€9,€16,€and€17€of€the€Tennessee€Constitution.€€The€appellants€insist€that€theyÏdid€not€ð ðknowingly€and€understandinglyðð€waive€any€of€the€issues€and€that€the€statute€ofÏlimitations€should€not€apply€to€bar€the€claims€from€being€heard.× ƒA ××  ×€€The€problem€withÏthe€appellantsðð€claim€is€that€they€rely€on€the€ð ðsubjectiveðð€test€for€waiver€that€theÍsupreme€court€rejected€in€òòHouse€v.€Stateóó,€911€S.W.2d€at€707.€€As€discussed€earlier,ÏòòHouseóó€adopted€a€broad,€objective€test€for€waiver€that€also€imputes€the€actions€orÏomissions€of€counsel€to€a€post„conviction€petitioner.€€It€is€with€this€standard€that€weÏreview€the€appellantsðð€issues.ÌÌà àà àThe€following€issues€asserted€by€Sample€are€waived€because€they€wereÏnot€raised€on€direct€appeal:€that€a€.32€caliber€handgun€was€obtained€pursuant€to€anÏunlawful€search€of€a€vehicle€and€that€the€prosecution€engaged€in€misconduct€throughÏits€questioning€of€witnesses€during€the€sentencing€phase.€€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€40„30„112(b)(1)€&€(b)(2).ÌÌà àà àThe€following€grounds€argued€by€both€Sample€and€McKay€are€likewiseÏwaived:€€that€the€trial€court€erred€in€instructing€the€jury€that€it€need€not€find€the€elementÏof€malice€to€convict€for€felony€murder;€that€the€trial€court€erred€in€failing€to€instruct€theÏjury€that€it€had€to€find€all€of€the€elements€alleged€in€the€indictment€to€convict€for€felonyÏmurder;€that€trial€counsel€were€ineffective€due€to€a€conflict€of€interest;€that€the€StateÏintroduced€prejudicial€victim„impact€evidence€during€the€guilt€phase€of€the€trial;€thatÏtrial€counsel€were€ineffective€because€the€appellants€were€made€to€sit€in€the€secondÏrow€during€the€trial;€that€the€prosecution€made€improper€closing€arguments€during€theÏguilt€and€sentencing€phases€of€the€trial;€that€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€39„2„203(i)(3)€andÏ(i)(6)€were€constitutionally€defective€and€not€supported€with€sufficient€evidence;€thatÏthe€trial€court€erred€in€instructing€the€jury€that€its€verdict€should€not€be€influenced€byÍsympathy;€that€the€trial€court€erred€in€instructing€the€jury€on€the€range€of€penalties€forÏlesser€included€offenses;€that€the€trial€court€erred€in€instructing€the€jury€that€witnessesÏare€presumed€to€tell€the€truth;€that€the€juryððs€verdict€was€prejudiced€by€extraneousÏinfluences;€that€the€trial€court€erred€in€excluding€jurors€for€religious€reasons;€that€theÏtrial€court€erred€in€excluding€juror€Bishop;€that€trial€and€appellate€counsel€wereÏineffective€for€failing€to€raise€the€above€errors;€and€that€the€cumulative€effect€of€theÏerrors€denied€a€fair€trial.€€In€sum,€the€issues€were€not€raised€on€direct€appeal€or€in€priorÏpost„conviction€suits.€€Thus,€the€issues€are€without€merit.€€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€40„30„112(b)(1)€&€(b)(2).ÌÌà àà àThe€following€issues€were€raised€by€the€appellants€in€earlier€proceedingsÏand€were€previously€determined:€that€the€trial€court€erred€by€instructing€the€jury€that€itÏcould€presume€malice€from€the€use€of€a€deadly€weapon€and€the€death€of€the€victim;Ïthat€the€trial€court€erred€in€failing€to€instruct€the€jury€on€the€effects€of€a€non„unanimousÏverdict;€that€trial€counsel€were€ineffective;€and€that€the€trial€court€erred€in€failing€toÏsever€the€trials.€€Similarly,€Sampleððs€contention€that€Wallaceððs€identification€of€him€wasÏunduly€suggestive€and,€therefore,€unconstitutional,€was€addressed€on€direct€appeal.× ƒB ××  ×€ÏThus,€the€issues€are€without€merit.€€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€40„30„112(a).ÌÌà àà àFinally,€we€note€that€the€appellants€also€allege€that€the€foregoing€issuesÏshould€not€be€procedurally€barred€due€to€the€inactions€of€prior€post„conviction€counsel.€ÏThis€claim€has€been€foreclosed€by€òòHouseóó,€in€which€the€court€held€that€the€actions€orÏinactions€of€post„conviction€counsel€are€imputed€to€a€petitioner.€€òòIdóó.€at€707.€€Moreover,Ïthe€ineffectiveness€of€post„conviction€counsel€is€not€a€separate€ground€for€post„conviction€relief.€€òòIdóó.€at€712€(citing€òòMurray€v.€Giarratanoóó,€492€U.S.€1,€10€(1989)€&ÏòòPennsylvania€v.€Finleyóó,€481€U.S.€551,€554„55€(1987)).ÌÌà@ àò òVIó óÌà àà àSample€contends€that€the€trial€court€erred€in€denying€his€ð ðmotion€toÏproceed€òòexóó€òòparteóó€in€seeking€investigative€and€expert€services.ðð€€The€motion€assertedÏthat€funds€for€investigative€and€expert€services€were€necessary€to€prepare€the€post„conviction€issues€and€to€conduct€a€full€and€fair€hearing.€€The€motion€further€assertedÏthat€statutory€and€constitutional€principles€mandated€that€the€need€for€the€funds€beÏshown€in€an€òòexóó€òòparteóó€hearing.× ƒC ××  ×€€McKay€did€not€file€a€specific€motion€for€an€òòexóó€òòparteóóÏproceeding;€however,€he€asserts€that€the€trial€court€erred€in€denying€his€request€forÏstate€funded€expert€and€investigative€services.€€The€State€did€not€address€the€requestsÏin€its€answers€to€the€petitions,€and€the€trial€court€did€not€make€a€specific€œruling€in€eitherÏcase.›ÌÌà àà àOn€appeal,€the€appellants€rely€in€part€on€this€courtððs€opinions€in€òòOwens€v.ÏStateóó,€No.€02C01„9111„CR„00259€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.,€Mar.€25,€1994,€Jackson)€andÏòòPayne€v.€Stateóó,€No.€02C01„9204„CR„00094€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.,€Mar.€25,€1994,ÏJackson).€€This€court€had€held€that€a€capital€post„conviction€petitioner€is€not€entitled€toÏan€òòexóóòòparteóóproceeding€but€that,€upon€a€sufficient€showing,€a€petitioner€may€receiveÏfunds€for€expert€services€needed€to€establish€a€constitutional€violation.€€€The€State€alsoÏrelies€on€the€òòOwensóó„„òòPayneóó€cases;€it€argues€that€the€appellants€were€not€entitled€to€anÏòòexóó€òòparteóó€hearing€and€did€not€show€a€particularized€need€for€state€funded€experts.ÌÌà àà àAs€noted€by€the€parties,€the€supreme€court€granted€applications€to€appealÏin€both€òòOwensóó€and€òòPayneóó,€and€it€released€its€opinion€after€the€briefing€in€this€appeal.€ÏIn€òòOwens€v.€Stateóó,€908€S.W.2d€923€(Tenn.€1995),€the€supreme€court€ruled,€as€a€matterÏof€statutory€construction,€that€the€òòexóó€òòparteóó€provisions€of€Tennessee€Code€AnnotatedÏsection€40„14„207(b)€are€to€be€applied€in€post„conviction€death€penalty€cases.€€òòIdóó.€atÏ928.€€The€court€said:ÌÓÓà8 àà8 àTo€obtain€an€òòexóó€òòparteóó€hearing,€a€capital€post„convictionÏpetitioner€must€submit€a€written€motion€to€the€trial€court,Ïalleging€why€under€the€particular€facts€and€circumstances€ofÏthe€case,€investigative€or€expert€services€are€necessary€toÏensure€the€protection€of€the€petitionerððs€constitutional€rights.€ÏA€bare€allegation€that€support€services€are€needed€is€notÏsufficient.€€In€addition,€the€motion€must€include:€(a)€the€nameÏof€the€proposed€expert€or€service;€(b)€how,€when€and€whereÏthe€examination€is€to€be€conducted€or€the€services€are€to€beÏperformed;€(c)€the€cost€of€the€evaluation€and€report€thereof;Íand€(d)€the€cost€of€any€other€necessary€services,€such€asÏcourt€appearances.€€Tenn.€Sup.€Ct.€Rule€13,€ðð2(b)(10).€ÏOnce€the€petitioner€satisfies€these€threshold€proceduralÏrequirements,€the€trial€court€must€conduct€an€òòexóó€òòparteóóÏhearing€on€the€motion.ÌÌÓÓòòIdóó.€at€928.€€Moreover,€the€court€said€that,€upon€showing€a€ð ðparticularized€needððÏrequiring€expert€or€investigative€services€to€ensure€the€protection€of€a€constitutionalÏright,€a€petitioner€may€receive€state€funding€for€such€services.€€òòIdóó.€Ì€€€€Ìà àà àObviously,€òòOwensóó€had€not€been€decided€when€the€appellantsðð€post„conviction€petitions€were€filed;€however,€supreme€court€Rule€13,€ðð2(b)(10),€which€wasÏcited€in€òòOwensóó,€governed€requests€for€òòexóó€òòparteóó€hearings.€€In€this€regard,€we€note€thatÏMcKay€did€not€even€request€an€òòexóó€òòparteóó€hearing€much€less€comply€with€Rule€13.€ÏMoreover,€McKay€made€only€a€bare€allegation€that€he€needed€funds€for€expert€andÏinvestigative€services.€€McKayððs€request,€therefore,€fell€far€short€of€œshowing›€aÏparticularized€need€for€relief.€€Sample€filed€a€specific€request€for€the€òòexóó€òòparteóó€hearingÏand€cited€numerous€grounds€in€support€of€the€request,€including€the€statute€interpretedÏin€òòOwensóó;€however,€he€too€failed€to€set€forth€detailed€allegations€in€support€of€theÏmotion€as€required€by€Rule€13.€€Thus,€we€conclude€that€neither€Sample€nor€McKayÏshowed€he€was€entitled€to€relief€on€this€œground.›× ƒD ××  ×ÌÌà@ àò òVIIó óÌà àà àIn€summary,€the€judgments€in€both€cases€are€reversed€and€the€cases€areÏremanded€to€the€trial€court€for€further€proceedings€consistent€with€this€opinion.̜ǛÌÓÓà àà àà àà àà àà àà à_________________________________Ìà àà àà àà àà àà àà àWilliam€M.€Barker,€JudgeÌÌÌÌ___________________________ÌPaul€G.€Summers,€JudgeÌÌÌÌ___________________________ÌDavid€H.€Welles,€JudgeÌà àà àÌÌ