WPC  0&"VUPvƞ1,ȜCȘ$sܴZN^k k!:0`P.;ap \ ] AG:IL*c/5Ț ?sCd FRЄ \:'w~EwhݕcFLdQ. >/_fpA-E~2>:z\,Dm<3ѰEǥ DnU5 k mf!Fo~c)87p,# hU>s % 0UB4U:f7(w@U: BG G 0Dd D3 AQ , 0D 0D6 D/z B HP LaserJet 4 PlusHPPCL5MS,,,,,,0nL<( 9Z &Courier RegularX($7>XXdXXd7    iUX` hp x (#%'0*,.8135@8:<H?AXi<6X9`(*Courier 12pt10cpiP9&6X3|x,rAZ"Arial Regular \\R3' Letter\  ("   X-XXX UX X-   Ad FILED X-X U   February9,1999  CecilCrowson,Jr. ڻX X-AppellateCourtClerk DDDDӀ,cAZ"Arial Regular d(3$ !  'dxd'(!)*C<< CLevel 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5(3$ !  ($$   1  ++' dxdP Pd !7 XXdd7    iUX` hp x (#%'0*,.8135@8:<H?AXi  ݛX-44 XX` X-TR[A' Legal3'A' Legal3'TX-XXX /7 XXdXXd7r& "<,(j 8` `@E  ` ttx$X rߛ8 @ D INTHECOURTOFCRIMINALAPPEALSOFTENNESSEE  @zz)DATKNOXVILLE@DD/D@DD/DDENVERJOEMcMATH,SR.,  )       h   ) Appellant, h   )  No.03C019712CR00525       h   )    h   )  HamiltonCounty   v.    h   ) z      h   )  HonorableDouglasAMeyer,Judge h`     h   )STATEOFTENNESSEE, h   )  (PostConviction) 4,     h   ) Appellee. h   )  FortheAppellant:   h     FortheAppellee:  BartonC.Solomon    JohnKnoxWalkup d\ 100E.TenthStreet,Suite401    AttorneyGeneralofTennessee JB Chattanooga,TN37402 h      p and 0 ( Ѐ   h     ToddR.Kelley !     h     AssistantAttorneyGeneralofTennessee    h     450JamesRobertsonParkway    h     Nashville,TN372430493    h     WilliamH.Cox,III̜    h     DistrictAttorneyGeneral    h     600MarketStreet̜    h     Chattanooga,TN37402OPINIONFILED:_______________________AFFIRMEDJosephM.TiptonJudge    r8j17S  /TRY3' Letter[A' Legal 3' LetterA' LegalT  TR[A' LegalY3' LetterA' Legal 3' LetterT      h     OPINION    ThepetitionerappealsfromtheorderoftheHamiltonCountyCriminal   Courtdismissinghis PetitionforPostConvictionRelieforintheAlternativeMotiontoReopenPostConvictionPetition.Hecontendsthathis1975convictionforthirddegreeburglaryandresultinglifesentenceasanhabitualcriminalarevoidbecausetheindictmentfailstoallegetherequisitemensreathatheactedeither intentionally,knowinglyorrecklessly.񛀀Weaffirmthedismissal.  Thetrialcourtdeniedthepetitionerreliefonthebasisthattheindictmentwassufficientunderthelawthatexistedatthetimeofthedefendantsconviction.Weagree.Thepetitionerarguesinhispetitionthattheallegationsthathe didunlawfully,feloniouslyandburglariouslybreakandenterintoabusinesshousecontainsnoallegationoftherequisitementalstateelementforburglary.However,theword feloniouslyhashistoricallymeant proceedingfromanevilheartorpurpose,donewithadeliberateintentionofcommittingacrime.BlacksLawDictionary,617(6thed. "  1990).Asoursupremecourthaspreviouslynoted, onemeaningattachedtothewordis:Inalegalsense,donewithintenttocommitacrime.Statev.Smith,119Tenn. %" 521,105S.W.68,70(1907).Thus,thementalstateinherentintheword feloniouslyissufficientforthepetitionersburglarycharge. However,arecurrentcircumstancehasarisenaftertheenactmentofthe1995PostConvictionProcedureActandexistsinthepresentcase.Itrelatestoincorrecttreatmentofthepetitionerspleadingasapetitionforpostconvictionreliefthatentitleshimtocertainproceduralprotectionsunderthe1995Actandtoanappealasofright.  5.4  Thepetitioners1975thirddegreeburglaryconvictionwasaffirmedon appeal.McMathv.State,544S.W.2d902(Tenn.Crim.App.1976).Thepetitionerhas  previouslysoughtpostconvictionrelieffromthisconviction.SeeDenverJoeMcMathv.   State,No.578,HamiltonCounty(Tenn.Crim.App.Nov.28,1977),cert.denied(Tenn. l d Feb.6,1978);Statev.DenverJoeMcMath,No.882,HamiltonCounty(Tenn.Crim. 80 App.Oct.24,1984). Underthe1995Act,asecondpetitionforpostconvictionreliefshallbesummarilydismissedifthepriorpetitionwasresolvedonthemeritsbyacourtofcompetentjurisdiction.T.C.A.4030202(c).Aspreviouslynoted,suchisthecasewiththepetitionerandhisburglaryconviction.Thus,theonlyavenuethatwasavailabletothepetitionerwasamotiontoreopenapriorpostconvictionpetitionpursuanttoT.C.A.4030217.Inthisrespect,thepetitionersdesignationofhispleadingasa PetitionforPostConvictionRelieforintheAlternativeMotiontoReopenPostConvictionPetitionisinappropriateunderthe1995Actbecausetheexistenceofapriorpostconvictioncaseresolvedonthemeritslimitsapetitionersubsequentlytoonlyamotiontoreopen.ThismeansthatthepetitionerwaslimitedtothegroundsprovidedinT.C.A.4030217(a)andcouldonlyseekpermissiontoappealtothiscourtwithintendaysofthedenialofthemotion.SeeT.C.A.4030217(c). `'X $  However,thetrialcourttreatedthepetitionerspleadingasapostconvictionpetition,anditsorderdenyingreliefstatedthatthepetitionerhadthirtydaystoperfectanappeal.PThisstatementprovidinganincorrecttimeperiodmaybefatal,becausewehavenoauthoritytoignorethestatutorylimitoftendaysforfilinganapplicationseekingpermissiontoappealadenialofamotiontoreopen. Whenfacedwithanalternativepleadingthatpurportstobeeitherapetitionoramotiontoreopen,thetrialcourtmustfirstestablishiftherehasbeena 706 previouspetitionforpostconvictionrelieffiledregardingthatconvictionandresolutiononthemerits.Iftherehasbeen,thetrialcourtmayonlyreviewthepleadingunderthestandardsandrequirementsprovidedformotionstoreopen.Itmaynottreatitasafullpetitionforpostconvictionrelief.Inthepresentcase,thepleadingdoesnotmeetthestandardscontainedinT.C.A.4030217(a)foramotiontoreopen,andthepetitionerisnotentitledtohavehispriorpostconvictionpetitionreopened. Inconsiderationoftheforegoingandtherecordasawhole,thejudgmentofthetrialcourtisaffirmed.    h      p      x   (#     h      p __________________________    h      p JosephM.Tipton,JudgeCONCUR:_________________________GaryR.Wade,PresidingJudge_________________________NormaMcGeeOgle,Judge