ÿWPC+ ʃ[¤"¤®s„Í•OÝÓù!‘Ö§¡”ƒ†[¹ÏÇlaÁ$ÈÕW­/Ü/ßrµéJ˜,´m#­Põö©Ö8ÙÌﱉô¦)µÍ2îmÑ”/Y ïëÿ€Ã·‰X·š€Až°o†ïÍüËçêPÙÂÅKëÙtºkÚÚ::ùL:–¡ü˜l žãã}˜i£ŸÇúRÒ°ú}Šª’0°5€@KÀ>èHâ„ìårIÍ/ Ñ7Z¹kOiÿgP¹Ádñ:¢«½N‹„îƒÏ|M]äôÁ »[WYëü頻шل§(5MG™¬£b9ÕNGÆ–ÔÐ]nòžM5¸›Ý(¬ª osˆˆD) ø·éúÖé¿"Hí¢ÙfÓK áméö)IˆI•£MœµX4-“;®³`¼$ù)%çƒÓiwi¿½º:T«v„>&Yòf™8‰v¡é¢ºçú€¸Ã1–Ì€;8g.*äGt\`å ™:šîø¥›Ï¢Š?’‘B4*É£L1nx‰’fìÕCy$i5É*`ŽÈmö#*&¤¡’jmü-¼ã.T¯¼Ïvøsmé^‡ñ[ý|ï‰ã¤Í{$ã6süôf‡g¶ `ßš¾Æ›Ö•w…# F UNQ %Ÿ 0(¥ U:Í b 0‚ U:‘ 0ÔË U:Ÿ w@Ù 4 - ó<  /âO91åjãOU:2ºlÄ&&&&&&&&&& Bêê D3 0DBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBB AO†ÆÕÕ 0D› D/ß B˜HP LaserJet 4SiHPPCL5MSðððððð0nLÐ(ÈhH  Z 6Times New Roman RegularX($¡¡,“í|AZ‹"Arial Regular- ù-(A95$Ô€X ÅXXXÔÔ€Š"º ŠXX ÅÔòòÚ  Ú0Ú  Úóó, øð AZ"Arial Regular(‚*2[ª$¤¤Ý ƒ!ÝÝ  ÝÒ°ÒÒ„°ÒÔ€ XÃ.XXXÔÔ€ & ð&X XÃ.ÔÓ  Óà ` àòòÚ  Ú0Ú  Úóó€€, øð AZ"Arial Regular š*D›*œ**ž*Ÿ*D *D¡*¢*D£*Ó€ýhµ&3|x®* éÝ ƒ l*$ÝÒ°ÒÒ„°ÒÔ€ XÓ*XXXÔÔ€ &Ûâ&X XÓ*ÔÓ  Óà ` àòòÚ  Ú1Ú  Úóó€€Ý  ÝòòSeeóó€òòStrickland€v.€Washingtonóó,€466€U.S.€668€(1984). Ô€XCu XXXÔÔ€îåÒ î XXCuÔÓ  ÓÔ Ad ÔFILEDÔ€Ûú  îîåÒÔÐ  ÐÌò òAugust€12,€1999Ð ¶¶ ÐÌCecil€Crowson,€Jr.ÌÔ€ôƒ³ô ÛúÔAppellate€CourtÐ –– ÐClerkó ó ØÝ ƒ l*$ÝÒ°ÒÒ„°ÒÔ€ XÓ*XXXÔÔ€ &Ûâ&X XÓ*ÔÓ  Óà ` àòòÚ  Ú3Ú  Úóó€€Ý  ÝThe€State€provided€this€footnote,€which€the€Court€finds€relevant€to€reproduce:€ð ðIn€fact,Ð `  Ðit€would€come€out€during€the€questioning€of€trial€counsel€Ken€Baldwin€that€McNeil€was€not€calledÏat€trial€because€she€had€no€first„hand€knowledge€of€any€violent€behavior€by€Greg€Peters.ðð /Ý ƒ l*$ÝÒ°ÒÒ„°ÒÔ€ XÓ*XXXÔÔ€ &Ûâ&X XÓ*ÔÓ  Óà ` àòòÚ  Ú2Ú  Úóó€€Ý  ÝMcNeil€offered€the€opinion€that€Greg€Peters€was€a€violent€person€and€that€she€did€notÐ `  Ðwant€to€be€alone€with€him. ÛÝ ƒ l*$ÝÒ°ÒÒ„°ÒÔ€ XÓ*XXXÔÔ€ &Ûâ&X XÓ*ÔÓ  Óà ` àòòÚ  Ú4Ú  Úóó€€Ý  ÝAt€trial,€Foster€testified€that€Defendant€had€told€him€on€the€evening€of€the€murder,€ð ðIÐ `  Ðguess€Iððm€in€trouble€for€what€I€did.ðð€€In€addition,€Foster€testified€that€he€had€failed€to€report€thisÏstatement€to€anyone€until€shortly€before€trial€(over€one€year€after€the€occurrence). ÙÝ ƒ l*$ÝÒ°ÒÒ„°ÒÔ€ XÓ*XXXÔÔ€ &Ûâ&X XÓ*ÔÓ  Óà ` àòòÚ  Ú5Ú  Úóó€€Ý  ÝBecause€we€have€concluded€that€the€trial€court€did€not€create€a€hostile€atmosphereÐ `  Ðwith€respect€to€Defendantððs€proof,€we€decline€to€address€whether€a€hostile€atmosphere,€in€andÏof€itself,€can€function€as€a€denial€of€due€process€in€a€hearing€before€the€trial€court€without€a€jury.,c½¬AZ‹"Arial Regular °Ý ƒ :$ÝÒ°ÒÒ„°ÒÔ€ XÓ\XXXÔÔ€ &›² &X XÓ\ÔÓ  Óà ` àòòÚ  Ú7Ú  Úóó€€Ý  ÝTo€facilitate€later€review,€those€issues€Defendant€argues€here€(which€he€claimsÐ `  Ðsupport€a€contention€of€ineffective€assistance€of€counsel)€are:€that€Tennesseeððs€death€penaltyÏstatute€(1)€allows€the€jury€to€afford€too€little€weight€to€non„statutory€mitigating€factors;€(2)€doesÏnot€require€the€jury€to€determine€that€death€is€the€appropriate€punishment;€(3)€does€not€requireÏwritten€findings€of€fact€relative€to€the€presence€of€aggravating€and€mitigating€factors,€therebyÏprecluding€effective€appellate€review;€(4)€allows€the€State€to€argue€last€in€the€sentencing€phase;Ï(5)€prohibits€the€jury€from€being€informed€of€the€consequences€of€a€non„unanimous€verdict€inÏthe€sentencing€phase;€(6)€does€not€allow€the€correction€of€misconceptions€about€the€length€ofÏa€life€sentence,€parole€eligibility,€consecutive€versus€concurrent€sentences,€the€cost€ofÏincarceration€versus€the€cost€of€execution,€the€deterrent€effect€of€the€death€penalty,€and€theÏidea€that€electrocution€causes€instantaneous€and€painless€death. ºÝ ƒ l*$ÝÒ°ÒÒ„°ÒÔ€ XÓ*XXXÔÔ€ &Ûâ&X XÓ*ÔÓ  Óà ` àòòÚ  Ú6Ú  Úóó€€Ý  ÝDefendant€filed€his€petition€for€post„conviction€relief€on€March€23,€1990,€prior€to€theÐ `  Ðamendment€requiring€petitioners€to€prove€factual€allegation€by€clear€and€convincing€evidence.€Ð : Ú  ÐòòSeeóó€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€40„30„210(f). d 'ÿÿdxd(3¯$££Ý ƒ!ÝÝ  Ý€-‚ƒCþÿ<< CÿÿƒLevel 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5($$””ò òÚ  Ú1Ú  Úó ó„„'÷ÿ dxdüÿP PdÝ ƒ!ÝÝ  Ýñ£*ñ›ñ£*ñÑ` °ÑÒ°ÒÒ„°ÒÔ€Š°LŠXXÔÔ€ŠƒUŠŠŠ°LÔÑTR[¤ AØ'ÿ Legal3Ø' AØ'ÿ Legalÿ3Ø'TÑÑ€ÑÑ7€üÉXXdðXXdð7ÑÑ  ÑÑ  ÑÓ  Óò òñ£*ñßr€*<,(j 8 `€€@E<f  tt0"t` ¨Ørß›ñ£*ñIN€THE€COURT€OF€CRIMINAL€APPEALS€OF€TENNESSEEÐ `  ÐÌAT€KNOXVILLEÌÌNOVEMBER€SESSION,€1998ÌÌÌÓ  ÓDAVID€LEE€McNISH,à h àà À à)à  àC.C.A.€NO.€œ03C01„9712„CR„00550›Ð ` Ðà ` àà ¸ àà  àà h àà À à)ó óÐ ` Ðà ` àAppellant,à  àà h àà À àò ò)Ð `  Ðà ` àà ¸ àà  àà h àà À à)Ìà ` àà ¸ àà  àà h àà À à)à  àCARTER€COUNTYÐ `  ÐVS.à ` àà ¸ àà  àà h àà À à)à  àÐ `  Ðà ` àà ¸ àà  àà h àà À à)à  àHON.€JOHN€K.€BYERS,ó óÐ `  Ðò òSTATE€OF€TENNESSEE,ó óà À àò ò)à  àœSENIOR€JUDGEó ó›Ð ` Ðà ` àà ¸ àà  àà h àà À àò ò)ó óÐ ` Ðà ` àAppellee.à  àà h àà À àò ò)à  àó ó(Post€Convictionð"ðDeath€Penalty)ò òÐ ` Ðó óÌÌÓ  ÓON€APPEAL€FROM€THE€JUDGMENT€OF€THEÌCRIMINAL€COURT€OF€CARTER€COUNTYÌÌÌòòÓ  ÓFOR€THE€APPELLANTóó:à h àà À àà  àòòFOR€THE€APPELLEEóó:Ð 0 Ð ÐÌœPAUL€N.€BUCHANAN,›à h àà À àà  àœJOHN€KNOX€WALKUPÐ  "À ÐPost„Conviction€Defender€à À àà  àAttorney€General€and€ReporterÐ #¸ ÐStaff€AttorneyÌ500€Deaderick€Streetà h àà À àà  àMICHAEL€E.€MOOREÐ %¨ ÐNashville,€TN€37243à h àà À àà  àSolicitor€GeneralÐ &  Ðà ` àà ¸ àà  àà h àà À àà  àÌMARK€SLAGLEà  àà h àà À àà  àPETER€M.€COUGHLANÐ ð' Ð302€Sunset€Driveà  àà h àà À àà  àAssistant€Attorney€GeneralÐ è(ˆ  ÐJohnson€City,€TN€37604à h àà À àà  à425€Fifth€Avenue€NorthÐ à)€ ! Ðà ` àà ¸ àà  àà h àà À àà  àNashville,€TN€37243ÌÌà ` àà ¸ àà  àà h àà À àà  àDAVID€CROCKETTÌà ` àà ¸ àà  àà h àà À àà  àDistrict€Attorney€GeneralÌÌà ` àà ¸ àà  àà h àà À àà  àH.€GREELEY€WELLS,€JR.Ìà ` àà ¸ àà  àà h àà À àà  àAssistant€District€Attorney€GeneralÌà ` àà ¸ àà  àà h àà À àà  àP.O.€Box€526Ìà ` àà ¸ àà  àà h àà À àà  àBlountville,€TN€37617ÌÌÌÌÌOPINION€FILED€________________________ÌÌAFFIRMED›ÌÌDAVID€H.€WELLES,€JUDGEÐ  P;ð13S ÐÓ  ÓÔ€°ª(°ŠŠƒUÔò òòòÑ7€‚Œˆ ˆdXXdð7ÑOPINIONóóó óÔ€ŠƒUа°ª(ÔÐ `  ÐÌÌÌÓ  ÓÓÓà ` àThe€Defendant,€David€Lee€McNish,€appeals€the€decision€of€the€trial€courtÏdenying€him€post„conviction€relief€from€his€sentence€of€death€for€the€premeditatedÏfirst€degree€murder€of€the€seventy„year„old€victim,€Gladys€Smith.€€The€factsÏpresented€at€trial€are€reproduced€below€from€the€decision€of€the€TennesseeÏSupreme€Court€on€direct€appeal€œaffirming€Defendantððs€conviction€and€sentenceÏin›€òòState€v.€McNishóó,€727€S.W.2d€490€(Tenn.€1987).€€For€the€reasons€set€forth€inÐ În Ðthis€opinion,€we€affirm€the€trial€courtððs€denial€of€post„conviction€relief.ÌÌœà ` àIn›€this€appeal,€Defendant€argues€eight€œprimary›€issues:€(1)€the€trial€œcourtÏdenied›€œDefendantððs›€œright›€to€a€full€and€fair€œhearing€by€improperly€conducting€theÏpost„conviction€proceedings;›€(2)€the€trial€court€erred€by€ruling€that€œevidence›€ofÏformer€Deputy€Fosterððs€prior€convictions€and€œconcealment›€did€not€constituteÏœmaterial,›€exculpatory€information€within€the€knowledge€and€control€of€the€State;Ï(3)€the€trial€court€erred€by€precluding€the€testimony€of€Juror€Archie€Parlier€at€theÏpost„conviction€hearing€because€the€testimony€was€admissible€to€show€that€theÏjury€at€trial€was€improperly€influenced€by€extraneous€information;€(4)€the€trial€courtÏerred€by€ruling€that€trial€and€appellate€counselððs€prejudicial,€deficientÏrepresentation€did€not€constitute€a€violation€of€Defendantððs€œright›€to€effectiveÏassistance€of€counsel;€(5)€the€trial€court€erred€by€ruling€that€the€heinous,Ïatrocious,€or€cruel€aggravating€factor€used€in€this€case€is€constitutional;€(6)€deathÏby€electrocution€is€cruel€and€unusual€punishment€which€œviolates›€the€EighthÏAmendment€to€the€United€States€Constitution€and€Article€I,€Section€16€of€theÏTennessee€Constitution;€(7)€the€jury€instruction€at€the€penalty€phase€limited€theÐ ¾8^/0 Ðjuryððs€consideration€of€œmitigation,›€œdenying›€Defendant€his€right€to€individualizedÏsentencing€as€guaranteed€by€the€Sixth,€Eighth,€and€Fourteenth€Amendments€toÏthe€United€States€Constitution€and€Article€I,€Sections€6,€8,€9,€and€16€of€theÏTennessee€Constitution;€and€(8)€the€trial€court€erred€by€ruling€that€several€issuesÏraised€in€Defendantððs€post„conviction€petition€were€waived.€ÌÌà ` àThe€recitation€of€facts€contained€in€the€decision€of€the€Tennessee€SupremeÏCourt€on€Defendantððs€direct€appeal€œis›€consistent€with€the€facts€œgleaned›€œfrom›€aÏthorough€review€of€the€record€in€this€case.€€Therefore,€we€summarize€the€courtððsÏfindings€here€as€follows:ÌÓÓà8 ` àà ¸ àMrs.€Smith€[the€victim]€lived€alone€in€an€upstairs€apartment€inÏthe€Lynnwood€Apartments€in€Elizabethton,€Tennessee.€€The€parentsÏof€appellant€had€an€apartment€in€the€same€complex€of€apartmentÏbuildings,€as€did€Mrs.€Selena€Richardson€(who€was€at€that€time€Mrs.ÏSelena€Welch),€whom€appellant€had€been€dating.€[Appellant]Ïtestified€that€he€was€also€a€friend€of€the€deceased€and€had€beenÏvery€attentive€to€her€needs,€frequently€running€errands€for€her€andÏotherwise€assisting€her.€.€.€.€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€à È à€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€Ðˆ#(` ü!` ü! Ðà8 ` àà ¸ àSince€1974€œ[Appellant]›€had€used€prescription€drugs€ratherÏheavily€because€he€suffered€from€headaches€that€grew€out€ofÏinjuries€in€an€automobile€accident€during€that€year.€€He€also€testifiedÏthat€he€purchased€street€drugs€from€time€to€time.€€Having€littleÏincome,€he€sometimes€borrowed€a€few€dollars€from€friends,Ïincluding€Mrs.€Smith.€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€Ð ` ü!` ü! Ðà8 ` àà ¸ àAt€about€8€p.m.€on€April€5,€1983,€Mrs.€Smith€was€brutallyÏbeaten€about€the€head€and€face€with€a€glass€vase,€the€fragments€ofÏwhich€were€found€in€her€apartment.€.€.€.€€The€vase€itself€wasÏshattered€by€the€blows,€and€the€victimððs€skull€was€fractured€inÏseveral€places.€€Hemorrhaging€of€the€brain€resulted€whichÏcompressed€the€brain€stem€and€prevented€breathing.€€Mrs.€SmithÏdied€within€a€short€time€after€the€beating,€although€she€was€still€aliveÏwhen€first€found€after€it€occurred.€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€Ð ` ü!` ü! Ðà8 ` àà ¸ àAppellant€had€taken€a€number€of€sleeping€tablets€and€otherÏdrugs€during€the€day€on€April€5€to€relieve€a€headache,€according€toÏhis€testimony.€€He€had,€however,€conducted€normal€activities€duringÏthat€day,€having€visited€Mrs.€Welchððs€apartment€at€least€twice€andÏkept€her€infant€son€for€a€few€hours.€€At€about€6:20€p.m.€he€borrowedÏher€automobile€and€left€the€apartment€for€the€purpose€of€borrowingÏsome€money.€€He€returned€about€7€p.m.€and€spoke€with€twoÏacquaintances€in€a€parking€lot€of€the€apartment€complex.€€The€threeÏagreed€to€meet€later€at€the€apartment€of€one€of€these€men€to€watchÐ Ð9p02 Ðtelevision.€€Appellant€told€his€friend€that€he€needed€to€borrow€someÏmoney€to€purchase€beer€and€that€he€might€try€to€borrow€the€moneyÏfrom€Mrs.€Smith.€€€€€€€€€€€€€à  à€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€ÐP ð` ü!` ü! Ðà8 ` àà ¸ àShortly€before€8€p.m.€Greg€Peters,€who€lived€with€his€wife€andÏinfant€child€in€the€apartment€next€to€Mrs.€Smith,€heard€loud€thumpingÏnoises€in€her€apartment.€€He€went€outside€on€the€balcony€and€thenÏheard€the€sound€of€glass€breaking€and€moans€emanating€from€herÏapartment.€€He€testified€that€as€he€reached€for€the€door,€appellantÏrushed€out€of€the€apartment€exclaiming€that€Mrs.€Smith€had€fallenÏand€was€hurt.€€Peters€went€inside€and€found€Mrs.€Smith,€still€partiallyÏconscious,€lying€in€the€kitchen€in€a€pool€of€blood,€with€broken€glassÏfrom€a€shattered€flower€vase€scattered€on€the€floor.€€Peters€ranÏoutside€and€called€for€help.€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€Ð ` ü!` ü! Ðà8 ` àà ¸ àMr.€Frank€Garland,€who€lived€in€the€apartment€directlyÏbeneath€Mrs.€Smith,€also€heard€noises€from€her€apartment.€€He€thenÏheard€Peters€calling€for€help,€and€he€saw€appellant€McNish€comingÏdown€the€steps€from€the€upstairs€apartments.€€He€saw€nothingÏunusual€in€the€appearance€of€appellant€at€that€time.€€He€testified€thatÏappellant€stopped€and€spoke€to€the€son€of€a€Mrs.€Irene€Nave,€whoÏlived€in€the€apartment€next€to€Garland.€€He€also€spoke€to€Mrs.€NaveÏbriefly€at€the€doorway€and€then€went€to€the€parking€lot€and€droveÏaway€in€œMrs.€Welchððs€automobile.›€€Other€witnesses€testified€thatÏappellant€drove€away€rapidly.€€Hearing€Peters€call€again€forÏassistance,€Garland€went€upstairs€where€he€found€Mrs.€SmithÏunconscious€in€her€kitchen.€€He€attempted€to€call€for€help€and€hadÏhis€wife€summon€the€police.€.€.€.€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€œÐ ` ü!` ü! Ðà8 ` àà ¸ àAppellant›€drove€Mrs.€Welchððs€automobile€some€mile€andÏone-half€to€two€miles€to€the€residence€of€his€former€wife,€Mrs.€JanieÏBradley.€€He€had€a€mishap€en€route,€near€a€cemetery,€and€damagedÏthe€car€slightly.€€He€also€claimed€that€he€received€some€minorÏinjuries€in€this€accident.€€When€he€reached€the€residence€of€Mrs.ÏBradley,€she€testified€that€his€speech€was€slurred€and€that€heÏappeared€to€some€extent€to€be€under€the€influence€of€a€drug€orÏnarcotic.€€He€told€her€that€he€had€taken€a€number€of€pills,€that€heÏhad€wrecked€Mrs.€Welchððs€car,€and€that€he€had€been€in€a€fight€withÏsomeone,€whom€he€would€not€identify.€€He€said€that€he€had€been€hitÏwith€a€ð ðtool.ðð€€His€nose€was€cut€and€bruised€and€there€was€a€cutÏinside€his€mouth.€€There€was€some€blood€on€his€trousers€and€on€hisÏhands.Ð ` ü!` ü! Ðà8 ` àà ¸ àAppellant€requested€a€bottle€of€beer,€which€Mrs.€Bradley€didÏnot€have.€€She€gave€him€some€Tylenol€for€relief€of€his€headache.€ÏHe€washed€his€hands€and€face€and€lay€down€briefly.€€He€told€Mrs.ÏBradley€that€he€needed€to€ð ðget€out€of€thereðð€and€asked€her€to€takeÏhim€to€a€Mental€Health€Center€in€Johnson€City,€where€he€hadÏpreviously€received€treatment.€€At€her€request€he€drove€Mrs.ÏWelchððs€automobile€to€a€nearby€school,€parking€it€in€the€rear€of€theÏkitchen.€Mrs.€Bradley€then€drove€him€in€her€automobile€to€hisÏparentsðð€apartment€where€she€obtained€for€him€some€fresh€trousers.ÏAppellant€lay€in€the€back€seat€of€her€automobile€during€this€time.ÏShe€then€drove€to€a€nearby€market€to€purchase€some€bread€for€hisÏmother,€while€he€changed€trousers€in€the€back€seat€of€the€car.€€€€€€ÐÐ9p02` ü!` ü! Ðà8 ` àà ¸ àAs€they€approached€the€market,€an€Elizabethton€detectiveÏobserved€the€automobile€which€was€similar€to€that€of€Mrs.€Welch.€ÏHe€had€been€advised€of€the€beating€of€Mrs.€Smith€and€of€appellantððsÏleaving.€€He€apprehended€appellant€as€he€sat€in€the€back€seat€ofÏMrs.€Bradleyððs€automobile€at€the€market.€€He€also€retrievedÏappellantððs€bloodstained€trousers€from€the€automobile.€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€Ð ` ü!` ü! Ðà8 ` àà ¸ àAt€no€time€during€this€interval€did€appellant€state€to€Mrs.ÏBradley,€to€his€parents,€to€Mrs.€Welch€or€to€the€police€officer€thatÏMrs.€Smith€had€been€injured€or€killed,€that€he€had€observed€her,€orÏthat€he€had€any€information€whatever€concerning€her.€€This€wasÏemphasized€later€by€the€State,€after€appellant€professed€toÏremember€the€events€of€the€evening€and€accused€Mrs.€Welch€andÏMr.€Peters€of€conspiring€to€murder€Mrs.€Smith.€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€Ð ` ü!` ü! Ðà8 ` àà ¸ àAppellant€was€taken€to€police€headquarters€by€a€countyÏdeputy€sheriff€who€said€that€appellant€volunteered€to€him€theÏstatement,€ð ðI€guess€I'm€in€trouble€for€what€I€did.ðð€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€Ð ` ü!` ü! Ðà8 ` àà ¸ àAppellant€denied€making€this€statement.€€The€deputy€testifiedÏthat€he€had€not€questioned€appellant€either€before€or€after€theÏstatement€was€made€and€that€he€did€not€pursue€the€matter€further,Ïother€than€to€tell€appellant€that€he€did€not€wish€to€talk€with€someoneÏwho€had€beaten€an€elderly€lady.€€This€evoked€no€response€fromÏappellant,€according€to€the€deputy.€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€Ð ` ü!` ü! Ðà8 ` àà ¸ àWhen€appellant€was€subsequently€questioned€at€policeÏheadquarters€he€denied€any€knowledge€of€the€incident€involvingÏMrs.€Smith.€€He€stated€that€he€was€partially€under€the€influence€ofÏnarcotics,€but€at€no€time€did€he€admit€any€involvement€in€the€beatingÏof€Mrs.€Smith€which€subsequently€resulted€in€her€death.€€PoliceÏofficers€who€took€appellantððs€statement€testified€that€it€was€givenÏvoluntarily€and€after€appellant€was€fully€advised€of€his€rights.€€TheyÏtestified€that€appellant€appeared€to€be€somewhat€under€theÏinfluence€of€some€intoxicant,€although€they€detected€no€odor€ofÏalcohol,€and€all€of€them€testified€that€he€appeared€in€full€commandÏof€his€faculties.€€Tests€of€his€blood€later€revealed€small€traces€ofÏsedatives,€but€a€toxicologist€called€on€behalf€of€appellant€at€trialÏtestified€that€these€were€not€mind-altering€and,€in€the€quantitiesÏfound€present€in€his€blood,€would€not€have€caused€him€to€appearÏabnormal€or€irrational€to€persons€observing€him.€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€Ð ` ü!` ü! Ðà8 ` àà ¸ àScientific€tests€of€the€blood€found€on€appellantððs€trousersÏshowed€that€it€matched€that€of€the€victim,€Mrs.€Smith,€and€that€it€wasÏnot€the€blood€of€appellant.€€Some€blood€particles€taken€from€hisÏfingernails€were€found€to€be€human€blood,€but€it€was€in€quantitiesÏtoo€small€to€test.€€An€analysis€performed€at€the€Tennessee€BureauÏof€Investigation€laboratories€showed€that€a€fragment€of€glass€foundÏinside€the€packaging€material€in€which€appellantððs€trousers€had€beenÏtransmitted€matched€the€glass€particles€found€on€the€rug€and€floorÏof€Mrs.€Smithððs€apartment.€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€Ð ` ü!` ü! Ðà8 ` àà ¸ àThroughout€the€weeks€and€months€immediately€following€theÏdeath€of€Mrs.€Smith,€appellant€remained€silent€and€adhered€to€theÏposition€that€he€knew€nothing€whatever€about€the€subject.€€SomeÏseven€months€after€her€death,€however,€in€November€1983,€heÏwrote€a€letter€to€the€District€Attorney€stating€that€he€had€known€allÐ Ð9p02 Ðalong€that€two€other€persons€were€responsible€for€her€death€and€hadÏconspired€to€kill€her.€€He€gave€a€statement€to€the€District€Attorney,Ïwhich€was€similar€to€his€later€testimony€at€the€trial,€to€the€effect€thatÏMrs.€Welch,€who€was€nineteen€years€old,€was€jealous€of€him€andÏsuspected€him€of€being€sexually€intimate€with€the€70-year-old€Mrs.ÏSmith.€€He€also€stated€to€the€police€and€later€testified€at€trial€thatÏPeters€disliked€Mrs.€Smith€and€that€he€had€heard€Mrs.€Welch€andÏMr.€Peters€threatening€to€murder€her.€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€Ð ` ü!` ü! Ðà8 ` àà ¸ àAppellant€stated€that€on€April€5,€1983€he€had€gone€to€Mrs.ÏSmithððs€apartment€to€borrow€some€money€from€her€when€heÏhappened€upon€Greg€Peters€ð ðstanding€there,€shaking€her€by€the€hairÏof€the€head,€telling€her€to€shut€up.ðð€€He€struggled€with€Peters€untilÏthe€latter€struck€him€on€the€bridge€of€his€nose€and€knocked€himÏunconscious.€€When€he€recovered,€appellant€found€Mrs.€Smith€lyingÏin€the€kitchen€and€attempted€to€move€her€to€a€couch€in€the€livingÏroom€but€was€unable€to€do€so.€€He€stated€that€he€heard€PetersÏmaking€noise€outside€but€by€the€time€appellant€reached€the€door,Ïsomeone€else€had€come€up€the€stairs.€€Appellant€advised€this€otherÏperson€that€Mrs.€Smith€was€injured€and€needed€assistance.€€HeÏfollowed€this€other€person€into€Mrs.€Naveððs€apartment€where€heÏasked€Mrs.€Nave€to€call€the€rescue€squad.€€Appellant€claimed€thatÏhe€was€ð ðall€to€piecesðð€and€so€severely€emotionally€shaken€by€theÏevents€that€he€needed€to€talk€to€someone€and€decided€to€go€to€aÏmental€health€center.€€Unable€to€drive€safely,€however,€he€went€toÏthe€home€of€his€former€wife€for€assistance.€€He€ascribed€hisÏbehavior€during€the€evening€to€confusion,€fear€and€the€effects€ofÏdrugs.€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€Ð ` ü!` ü! Ðà8 ` àà ¸ àThere€was€much€conflicting€testimony€at€the€trial€as€toÏwhether€Peters€was€or€was€not€involved€in€the€homicide,€and€majorÏissues€of€credibility€of€appellant€as€well€as€other€witnesses€wereÏpresented€to€the€trier€of€fact.€€Appellant€was€severelyÏcross-examined€and€impeached€with€respect€to€the€inconsistencyÏbetween€his€conduct€and€statements€on€the€evening€of€April€5,Ï1983,€and€the€statement€which€he€gave€to€the€police€seven€monthsÏlater,€the€latter€being€essentially€similar€to€his€trial€testimony.€€€€€€€Ð ` ü!` ü! Ðà8 ` àà ¸ àThe€jury€obviously€did€not€accept€appellantððs€version€of€theÏevents€surrounding€the€homicide€of€Mrs.€Smith€and€found€appellantÏguilty€of€murder€in€the€first€degree.€€The€record€abundantly€supportsÏthat€verdict.€€Mrs.€Smith€was€mercilessly€beaten€to€death€byÏrepeated€blows€by€an€assailant€who€was€obviously€much€moreÏpowerful€than€she.€€Appellant€was€shown€both€by€the€testimony€ofÏPeters€and€by€his€own€statements€and€testimony€to€have€been€in€herÏapartment,€from€which€he€fled€quickly€and€without€any€satisfactoryÏexplanation.€€He€consistently€denied€knowing€anything€about€herÏhomicide€or€being€involved€until€months€later,€at€which€time€heÏpresented€a€rather€bizarre€and€insubstantial€story€seeking€toÏimplicate€Peters€and€appellantððs€former€girl€friend,€Mrs.€Welch,€fromÏwhom€he€had€by€that€time€become€estranged.€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€Ïà ¸ à.€.€.€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€Ð ` ü!` ü! Ðà8 ` àà ¸ àAt€the€sentencing€hearing€the€State€introduced€severalÏphotographs€of€the€deceased€in€support€of€the€aggravatingÐ Ð9p02 Ðcircumstance€which€the€jury€found€to€have€been€established.€€TheÏState€relied€upon€another€aggravating€circumstance,€that€the€murderÏwas€committed€while€appellant€was€attempting€to€commit€robbery,ÏT.C.A.€Sec.€39-2-203(i)(7),€but€the€jury€did€not€find€that€circumstanceÏto€have€been€established€by€the€evidence.€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€Ð ` ü!` ü! Ðà8 ` àà ¸ àAppellant€relied€upon€testimony€from€his€parents,€relatives,Ïand€friends€as€well€as€himself€seeking€clemency€from€the€jury.€€HeÏparticularly€relied€upon€mitigating€circumstances€of€the€absence€ofÏany€prior€criminal€record,€T.C.A.€Sec.€39-2-203(j)(1),€and€extremeÏmental€or€emotional€disturbance€(T.C.A.€Sec.€39-2-203(j)(2)).€€€€€Ð ` ü!` ü! Ðà8 ` àà ¸ àThe€jury€found€that€no€mitigating€circumstance€wasÏestablished€sufficient€to€outweigh€the€aggravating€circumstanceÏestablished€by€the€evidence€and€sentenced€appellant€to€death.€€TheÏtrial€judge€approved€the€verdict€and€overruled€post-trial€motions€filedÏon€behalf€of€appellant.ÓúÓòòÐð ` ü!` ü! ÐId.óó€at€491„94.€Ð à€ ÐÌà ` àBecause€Defendant€filed€his€original€petition€for€post„conviction€relief€inÏMarch€of€1990,€prior€to€the€Post„Conviction€Procedure€Act€of€1995€whichÏheightened€a€petitionerððs€burden€of€proof,€he€bears€the€burden€to€prove€hisÏfactual€allegations€by€a€preponderance€of€the€evidence.€€òòMcBee€v.€Stateóó,€655Ð "0 ÐS.W.2d€191,€195€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.€1993);€òòseeóó€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€40„30„210(f)Ð €$  Ð(requiring€a€petitioner€to€prove€factual€allegations€by€clear€and€convincingÏevidence).€€In€addition,€findings€of€fact€made€by€the€post„conviction€œcourt›€areÏconclusive€on€appeal€so€long€as€the€evidence€does€not€preponderate€againstÏœthese›€findings.€€òòButler€v.€Stateóó,€789€S.W.2d€898,€899€(Tenn.€1990).Ð @,à"$ Ѐ€Ìà@J J ®àI.€FULL€AND€FAIR€HEARING€ON€POST„CONVICTION€PETITIONˆÌà ` àDefendant€first€argues€that€the€œpost„conviction€court›€violated€his€right€toÏdue€process€of€law€by€denying€him€a€full€and€fair€hearing€œon›€his€allegations€ofÏconstitutional€deprivations€occurring€at€trial.€€Specifically,€he€contends€that€theÏcourt€denied€him€a€full€and€fair€hearing€(1)€by€ð ðrushingðð€his€post„convictionÏcounsel€to€a€hearing€shortly€after€they€were€appointed€and€before€they€wereÐ Ð9p02 Ðadequately€prepared,€(2)€by€improperly€denying€his€requests€for€investigatory€andÏexpert€services,€and€(3)€by€improperly€restricting€the€evidence€he€was€permittedÏto€present€at€the€post„conviction€hearing.€ÌÌà ` àContrary€to€Defendantððs€assertion,€while€we€must€determine€whether€hisÏrights€to€due€process€were€satisfied€in€the€trial€court€on€post„conviction,€we€needÏnot€necessarily€find€that€he€was€afforded€a€ð ðfull€and€fair€hearing,ðð€such€that€heÏwas€granted€ð ðevery€opportunity€to€present€evidence€and€argument.ðð€€òòSeeóó€òòHouseÐ ð  Ðv.€Stateóó,€911€S.W.2d€705,€711€(Tenn.€1995),€òòcert.€deniedóó,€òòHouse€v.€Tennesseeóó,Ð à€ Ð517€U.S.€1193,€1193€(1996).€€A€review€by€this€Court€of€whether€a€defendantÏreceived€a€full€and€fair€hearing€at€an€earlier€date€is€triggered€only€when€thatÏdefendant€seeks€and€is€denied€the€opportunity€to€present€an€issue€on€the€basisÏthat€the€issue€has€been€previously€determined€by€a€court€of€competentÏjurisdiction.€€òòSeeóó€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€40„30„112€(stating€that€a€post„convictionÐ "0 Ðground€for€relief€is€previously€determined,€and€thereby€excluded€from€furtherÏreview,€ð ðif€a€court€of€competent€jurisdiction€has€ruled€on€the€merits€after€a€full€andÏfair€hearingðð)€(repealed€and€replaced€by€Tennessee€Code€Annotated€ðð€œ40„30„¼206(h)).›€€Following€a€thorough€review€of€the€post„conviction€record,€we€concludeÏthat€the€œpost„conviction€court›€did€not€violate€Defendantððs€right€to€due€process.ÌÌà@ ®àòòA.€Adequate€Preparation€TimeóóˆÐ  0À&( Ðà ` àThe€procedural€history€of€this€post„conviction€cause€reflects€that€DefendantÏfiled€his€original€petition€for€post„conviction€relief€in€March€of€œ1990;›€and€the€œcourt›Ïappointed€representation,€including€Attorney€Eddie€Lauderback,€on€that€date.€ÏLauderback€represented€Defendant€with€the€assistance€of€a€succession€of€co„¼counsel€until€the€œcourt›€replaced€him€œwith›€the€newly€created€Post„ConvictionÐ Ð9p02 ÐDefenderððs€Office€on€April€30,€1996.€€The€œpost„conviction€court›€appointed€the€lastÏof€Lauderbackððs€co„counsel,€Attorney€Mark€Slagle,€on€January€5,€1996.€€SlagleÏcontinued€his€representation€of€Defendant€after€the€appointment€of€the€Post„¼Conviction€Defenderððs€Office,€and€they€coordinated€their€efforts€on€behalf€ofÏDefendant€up€to€and€including€the€present€appeal.€€ÌÌà ` àThe€post„conviction€court€originally€set€Defendantððs€hearing€for€May€30,Ïœ1996,›€but€continued€the€case€until€June€26€because€the€newly€created€defenderððsÏoffice€could€not€begin€its€responsibilities€on€the€case€until€April€30.€€One€weekÏprior€to€June€26,€defense€counsel€again€moved€for€a€œcontinuance,›€and€the€trialÏcourt€reset€Defendantððs€hearing€for€October€1.€€No€other€requests€to€continueÏappear€in€the€record.€€Due€to€an€illness,€a€defense€expert€witness€could€not€testifyÏat€the€October€1€hearing;€and€the€post„conviction€court€therefore€permitted€theÏdefense€to€carry€over€its€proof€to€the€second€installment€of€the€hearing,€held€onÏJanuary€14,€1997.€€€€€€ÌÌà ` àDefendant€charges€that€ð ðfour€monthsðð€is€ð ðwoefully€inadequateðð€to€prepareÏfor€a€post„conviction€hearing€in€a€capital€case.€€In€addition,€he€insists€thatÏsignificant€evidence€remained€undeveloped€at€the€time€of€the€hearing.€ÏSpecifically,€he€argues,€counsel€were€not€able€to€(1)€obtain€and€analyze€all€ofÏ[former]€trial€counselððs€files;€(2)€conduct€continuing€social€history€interviews€ofÏDefendant;€(3)€interview€others€from€Defendantððs€social€history;€(4)€gather€socialÏhistory€documents€and€œrecords;›€and€(5)€consult€with€experts€regarding€results€ofÏthese€efforts.€Ìâ âÐ à7€.0 Ðà ` àThe€State€responds€that€the€post„conviction€court€was€ð ðgenerousðð€byÏâ âproviding€trial€counsel€adequate€time€for€preparation.€€According€to€the€State,ÏDefendant€had€not€four€months€to€prepare,€but€six€years,€due€to€the€successiveÏchain€of€counsel€as€well€as€the€long„time€investigation€by€Defendantððs€attorneyÏfor€five€years€of€that€time,€Eddie€Lauderback.€€The€State€also€notes€that€theÏdefense€did€not€request€the€trial€court€to€continue€the€case€for€a€specific€periodÏof€time.€€ÌÌà ` àWe€agree€with€the€State€that€although€Defendant€characterizes€theÏprocedural€history€on€post„conviction€as€chaotic,€the€defense€remainedÏcoordinated€enough€to€adequately€prepare€for€the€evidentiary€hearing€in€anÏappropriate€amount€of€time.€€Through€his€continuous,€five„year€representation,ÏAttorney€Lauderback€served€as€the€common€thread€for€what€might€otherwiseÏhave€been€a€disjointed€effort€at€defense.€€Lauderback€conveyed€the€case€toÏAttorney€Slagle,€who€saw€the€case€to€the€hearing€nine€months€later€(and€whoÏcontinues€to€serve€as€Defendantððs€counsel)€with€the€assistance€of€advocates€whoÏspecialize€in€post„conviction€œcapital€cases.›€€Finally,€Defendant€gained€additionalÏtime€when€the€trial€court€continued€the€proof€for€three€and€one„half€months€toÏpermit€in„court€testimony€by€the€defense€expert€œwitnesses.›€ÌÌà ` àBased€on€the€facts€in€the€record,€we€find€that€the€œpost„conviction€court›€didÏnot€violate€due€process€by€denying€Defendant€additional€time€in€which€to€prepareÏfor€the€post„conviction€evidentiary€hearing.€€òòSee,€e.g.óó,€òòState€v.€Cazesóó,€875Ð 4 *, МS.W.2d€253,›€261€(Tenn.€1994)€(holding€that€the€trial€court€did€not€abuse€itsÏdiscretion€by€denying€a€capital€defendant€a€continuance€where€trial€counsel€wereÏappointed€to€the€case€two€and€one„half€months€prior€to€trial,€prior€counsel€workedÐ Ð9p02 Ðon€case€for€thirteen€months€before€trial€counsel€were€appointed,€and€manyÏcontinuances€had€been€granted€at€the€defendantððs€request).ÌÌà@` ` ®àòòB.€Requests€for€Investigatory€and€Expert€ServicesóóˆÐ 0Ð Ðà ` àThe€second€tenet€of€Defendantððs€due€process€claim€concerns€œthe€post„¼conviction›€courtððs€denial€of€his€motion€for€investigative€and€expert€services.€ÏDefendant€cites€Tennessee€Code€Annotated€ðððð€40„30„215€and€40„14„207(b),Ïstating,€ð ðThese€statutes€œòòrequireóó›€the€œpost„conviction€court›€to€grant€the€servicesÐ ð  Ðrequested€if,€based€on€the€motion€and€the€evidence€presented€at€the€ex€parteÏhearing,€the€petitioner€makes€a€threshold€showing€of€particularized€need.ðð€€HeÏasserts€that€post„conviction€counsel€made€this€threshold€showing.€€ÌÌà ` àIn€particular,€Defendant€contends€that€the€œpost„conviction€court›€erred€byÏgranting€his€motion€for€the€expert€services€necessary€to€prove€that€he€sufferedÏdeficient€representation€at€trial€(the€first€prong€of€òòStricklandóó€analysis€on€ineffectiveÐ €$  Ðassistance€of€counsel),œ×ƒ×Ý ƒ95ÝÔ€ŠŽ ŠŠŠ“\ÔÔ€ŠŽ Š ŠŠŽÔòòÚ  Ú1Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý×  ×›€while€reserving€his€decision€for€funding€of€expertsÐ p& Ðnecessary€to€prove€prejudice€to€his€defense€(the€second€òòStricklandóó€prong).€€TheÐ €(   Мpost„conviction€court›€explained€that€if€Defendant€could€not€bear€his€burden€ofÏproof€on€the€issue€of€deficient€representation,€then€the€court€need€not€waste€stateÏexpenses€for€expert€services€to€prove€the€issue€of€prejudiceð"ðabsent€success€onÏthe€former€element,€proof€of€the€latter€element€would€not€merit€relief€from€theÏcourt.€€€€€€Ìâ âÐ °4P+, Ðà ` àThe€State€responds€that€the€œpost„conviction€court›€properly€deniedÏâ âDefendantððs€motion€for€expert€services€to€show€prejudice€from€deficientÏrepresentation€at€trial.€€The€State€notes€that€the€œpost„conviction€court›€clearlyÏindicated€to€Defendant€that€if€deficient€representation€was€shown,€funding€forÏadditional€services€would€be€forthcoming.€€Finally,€the€State€argues€thatÏDefendant€was€not€entitled€by€law€to€the€services€the€œpost„conviction€court›Ïgranted€himð"ðnamely€ð ðattorney„expertðð€Ann€Short,€who€testified€that€in€herÏprofessional€opinion,€the€performance€by€Defendantððs€trial€counsel€fell€below€theÏstandard€of€competent€criminal€defense€attorneys€in€several€respectsð"ðbecauseÏDefendantððs€post„conviction€counsel€should€œhave,€and›€customarily€would€œhave,Ïperformed›€this€task€themselves€without€the€assistance€of€an€attorney€acting€asÏan€ð ðexpert€on€attorneys.ððÌÌà@®à1.€Motion€for€Ex€Parte€HearingˆÌà ` àTennessee€Code€Annotated€ðð€40„14„207€provides,ÌÓÓà8 ` àà ¸ àIn€capital€cases€where€the€defendant€has€been€found€to€beÏindigent€by€the€court€of€record€having€jurisdiction€of€the€case,€suchÏcourt€in€an€ex€parte€hearing€may,€in€its€discretion,€determine€thatÏinvestigative€or€expert€services€or€other€similar€services€areÏnecessary€to€ensure€that€the€constitutional€rights€of€the€defendantÏare€properly€protected.€€If€such€determination€is€made,€the€court€mayÏgrant€prior€authorization€for€these€necessary€services€in€aÏreasonable€amount€to€be€determined€by€the€court.€€ÓäuÓÐ ` ü!` ü! ÐTenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€40„14„207(b).€€The€Tennessee€Supreme€Court€has€held€ðð€40„¼14„207(b)€applicable€to€post„conviction€proceedings€for€capital€defendants.€ÏòòOwens€v.€Stateóó,€908€S.W.2d€923,€928€(Tenn.€1995).Ð  5¬++ Ðâ âÐ 7´-- Ðà ` àIn€òòOwensóó,€the€œsupreme€court›€held€that€the€same€procedures€used€pretrialÐ `  Ðâ âto€obtain€an€ex€parte€hearing€on€a€motion€for€expert€or€investigative€servicesÏapply€prior€to€a€defendantððs€post„conviction€evidentiary€hearing.€€òòId.óó€€TheseÐ p  Ðprocedures,€found€in€Tennessee€Supreme€Court€Rule€13,€require€a€defendant€toÏinclude€in€the€motion€for€services:€(1)€the€name€of€the€proposed€expert€or€service;Ï(2)€how,€when,€and€where€the€examination€is€to€be€conducted€or€the€services€areÏto€be€performed;€(3)€the€cost€of€the€evaluation€and€report€thereof;€and€(4)€the€costÏof€any€other€necessary€services,€such€as€court€appearances.€€Tenn.€Sup.€Ct.€R.Ï13,€ðð€2(B)(10).€€ÌÌà ` àDefendantððs€initial€motion€to€the€post„conviction€court€and€its€supportingÏaffidavits€appear€to€have€been€omitted€from€the€record€on€appeal.€€However,Ïbecause€the€œpost„conviction€court›€granted€a€telephone€conference€on€this€matterÏprior€to€granting€the€services€of€Ann€Short€and€denying€all€other€services,€weÏassume€for€the€purpose€of€this€appeal€that€Defendant€fulfilled€the€Rule€13Ïprerequisites€for€an€ex€parte€hearing.€€€€€€€€€€à p àà È àà  àÐ Ø'x ÐÌà@00®à2.€Particularized€Need€for€ServicesˆÌà ` àThe€òòOwensóó€court€declared€that€a€motion€for€services€should€be€granted€if,Ð ð-$$ Ðat€the€ex€parte€hearing,€the€petitioner€ð ðdemonstrates€that€investigative€or€expertÏservices€are€necessary€to€ensure€the€protection€of€the€petitionerððs€constitutionalÏrights.ðð€€908€S.W.2d€at€928.€€To€demonstrate€necessity,€a€defendant€should€meetÏthe€same€test€as€required€by€courts€reviewing€direct€appeals€in€capital€cases:Ïð ðThe€defendant€must€show€that€a€substantial€need€exists€requiring€the€assistanceÏof€state€paid€supporting€services€and€that€his€defense€cannot€be€fully€developedÐ  :À00 Ðwithout€such€professional€assistance.ðð€€òòState€v.€Evansóó,€838€S.W.2d€185,€192Ð `  Ð(Tenn.€1992);€òòOwensóó,€908€S.W.2d€at€928€(adopting€rule€in€òòEvansóó€for€post„Ð h  Ðconviction€œpetitioners›€in€capital€cases).€€Furthermore,€a€trial€court€may€properlyÏdeny€a€motion€for€services€that€is€ð ðaccompanied€by€little€more€than€undevelopedÏassertions€that€the€services€were€needed€to€attempt€to€counter€the€Stateððs€proof.ðð€ÏòòState€v.€Cazesóó,€875€S.W.2d€253,€261€(Tenn.€1994);€òòseeóó€òòState€v.€Barnettóó,€909Ð ˆ(  ÐS.W.2d€œ423,€431›€(Tenn.€1995)€(stating€that€ð ð[u]nsupported€assertions€that€aÏpsychiatric€expert€is€necessary€to€counter€the€Stateððs€proof€are€not€sufficientðð€toÏmeet€the€threshold€showing€of€particularized€need€for€a€non„capital€defendant).€Ï̛̜à ` àThe€ð ðdetermination€of€whether€provision€of€expert€services€to€an€indigentÏcapital€defendant€is€necessary€to€ensure€that€the€constitutional€rights€of€theÏdefendant€are€properly€protected€is€entrusted€to€the€discretion€of€the€trial€court.ðð€ÏœòòCazesóó,€875€S.W.2d€at€261›€(citing€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€40„14„207(b)€(stating€thatÐ Ð%p Ðthe€court€ð ðin€an€ex€parte€hearing€may,€in€its€discretion,€determine€thatÏinvestigative€or€expert€services€or€other€similar€services€are€necessary€to€ensureÏthat€the€constitutional€rights€of€the€defendant€are€properly€œprotectedðð));€òòseeóó›Ð è+ˆ"" ÐòòOwensóó,€908€S.W.2d€at€929€(observing€that€ðð€40„14„207(b)€ð ðvests€with€the€trialÐ ð-$$ Ðcourt€discretion€to€determine€if€investigative€or€expert€services€are€necessary€toÏensure€that€the€movantððs€constitutional€rights€are€protectedðð);€òòThompson€v.€Stateóó,Ð 2 (( Ð958€S.W.2d€156,€169€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.€1997).€€Therefore,€this€Court€must€affirmÏthe€decision€of€the€trial€court€unless€the€facts€show€an€abuse€of€discretion.€€Ìâ âà ` à€€Ð 8¸.. Ðà ` àœIn€this€case,€the›€record€does€not€contain€a€transcription€of€theÏâ âteleconference€apparently€conducted€as€a€hearing€on€Defendantððs€ex€parteÏmotion€for€services.€€In€òòThompsonóó,€958€S.W.2d€at€171,€this€Court€announced€thatÐ p  Ðwe€may€not€review€a€decision€by€the€trial€court€for€abuse€of€discretion€where€weÏare€not€privy€to€the€presentation€of€proof€made€by€a€defendant€in€support€of€theÏmotion€for€services.€€òòId.óó€œòòThompsonóó›€states,€ð ðòòOwensóó€clearly€contemplates€aÐ ˆ(  Ðpresentation€of€proof€.€.€.€.€Without€a€record€of€the€hearing,€this€court€cannotÏdetermine€whether€[the€judge]€erred€by€denying€the€motion.ðð€€òòId.óó€€Likewise,€weÐ ˜8 Ðcannot€examine€whether€the€trial€œjudge›€abused€his€discretion€in€this€case€withoutÏa€record€of€the€proof€brought€before€that€court.ÌÌà ` àShortly€before€his€evidentiary€hearing€in€the€trial€court,€Defendant€movedÏthe€court€to€reconsider€its€decision€to€deny€his€requests€for€all€services€exceptÏthose€of€Attorney€Ann€Short.€€In€that€written€motion,€Defendant€relied€upon€hisÏearlier€motion€and€its€supporting€affidavits,€which,€as€noted,€do€not€appear€toÏhave€been€included€in€the€record.€€Upon€the€ex€parte€hearing€of€this€motion€toÏreconsider,€held€prior€to€proof€on€the€first€day€of€Defendantððs€evidentiary€hearing,Ïcounsel€presented€no€proof€but€instead€requested€the€opportunity€to€have€AnnÏShort€appear€ex€parte€at€a€future€date€to€attest€to€the€need€for€additional€services.€ÏÌà ` àThe€œpost„conviction€judge›€indicated€that€he€did€not€intend€to€hearÏsubstantive€proof€from€Ms.€Short€in€an€ex€parte€proceeding,€but€that€he€wouldÏtreat€Defendantððs€motion€for€investigative€and€expert€services€as€a€continuingÏone.€€œThe€judge›€instructed€Defendant€that€if€he€proved€deficient€representationÏin€the€course€of€the€post„conviction€hearing,€œthen€additional,›€necessary€servicesÐ  :À00 Ðwould€be€granted.€€The€œjudge›€stated,€ð ðEx€parte€only€means€youð"ðyouððve€got€aÏright€to€ask€the€court€to€give€you€certain€funds€for€services€.€.€.€not€to€have€theÏcourt€hear€ex€parte€any€substantive€evidence.ðð€€ÌÌà ` àBased€upon€the€foregoing€recitation€of€authority,€we€find€that€the€œpost„¼conviction€judge›€misstated€his€authority€and€duty€to€hold€an€ex€parte€hearing€inÏwhich€Defendant€had€an€opportunity€(and€indeed€a€duty,€in€order€to€prevail)€toÏpresent€concrete€facts€tending€to€show€a€particularized€need€for€the€investigativeÏor€expert€services.€€However,€the€post„conviction€œjudgeððs›€misstatement€of€the€lawÏdoes€not€€entitle€Defendant€to€relief.€€At€the€motion€to€reconsider€the€denial€ofÏadditional€services,€Defendant€was€clearly€unprepared€to€present€evidence€toÏshow€a€particularized€need€for€the€services.€€In€the€absence€of€a€transcriptÏmemorializing€the€evidence€presented€at€his€first€ex€parte€teleconference,ÏœDefendant€cannot›€œbear€his€burden€of€proof€that›€the€œpost„conviction€judge›€abusedÏhis€discretion€by€denying€additional€investigative€and€expert€services.€ÌÌ€à@  ®àòòC.€Restriction€of€Post„Conviction€EvidenceóóˆÐ à)€  Ðà ` àDefendant€next€argues€that€the€trial€court€impaired€his€right€to€presentÏevidence€to€support€his€case€at€the€post„conviction€hearing€by€limiting€the€proofÏadvanced€during€witness€Walter€William€Fosterððs€testimony.€€Furthermore,€heÏœasserts›€the€œpost„conviction€judge›€created€a€hostile€atmosphere€at€the€evidentiaryÏhearing€by€referring€to€witnesses€Archie€Parlier€and€Louise€McNeil€as€irrelevant.ÌÌà ` àIn€response,€the€State€contends€the€record€demonstrates€that€the€trial€courtÏpermitted€each€of€these€witnesses€to€fully€testify.€€The€State€posits€that€the€trialÐ  :À00 Ðjudge€simply€performed€his€function€as€gatekeeper€of€admissible€evidence€andÏthat€although€the€judge€determined€some€testimony€inadmissible€based€uponÏrelevancy,€he€nevertheless€permitted€questioning€as€an€offer€of€proof€for€theÏrecord.ÌœÌÓ  Ó1.›€Archie€ParlierÌÓ  Óà ` àWhen€Defendant€called€Archie€Parlier€to€testify€at€the€post„convictionÏevidentiary€hearing,€the€State€immediately€objected€on€the€grounds€that€hisÏtestimony€was€irrelevant€(ð ðoutside€the€scope€of€th[e]€hearingðð).€€The€œpost„¼conviction€judge›€sustained€the€Stateððs€objection,€saying,€ð ðI€wonððt€consider€it€asÏany€substantive€proof€in€the€case.€€I€think€itððs€an€improper€impeachment€of€.€.€.€theÏjury€verdict,ðð€and€permitted€Defendant€to€examine€the€witness€by€leadingÏquestions€for€an€offer€of€proof.€€We€find€that€the€trial€courtððs€comments€wereÏwithin€the€proper€scope€of€issuing€a€ruling€on€the€objection€to€admissibility€of€theÏevidence€and€therefore€not€for€the€purpose€or€to€the€effect€of€creating€a€hostileÏatmosphere.€€Moreover,€the€trial€judge€permitted€a€thorough€examination€ofÏParlier€as€a€proffer€into€evidence€notwithstanding€the€fact€that€he€had€alreadyÏruled€the€testimony€outside€the€scope€of€post„conviction€proof.€€œOnly€afterÏdefense€counsel€had€rested€and€thereafter€reconsidered€and€resumedÏquestioning€did€the€trial€court€cease€Defendantððs€proffer.€€We›€find€no€œimproperÏlimitation›€on€proof.ÌÌà@rr&®à2.€€Louise€McNeilˆÌà ` àThe€post„conviction€record€reflects€œthat€after€permitting€testimony€by€LouiseÏMcNeil€which,€when€transcribed,€spanned€several€pages,€the€court›€sua€sponteÐ  :À00 Ðinquired€into€the€relevancy€of€the€witness.€€Defendantððs€counsel€explained€that€heÏwas€attempting€to€elicit€information€known€by€McNeil€œwhich€was€critical›€toÏDefendantððs€case€at€trial.׃×Ý ƒ95ÝÔ€ŠŽ Š ŠŠŽÔÔ€ŠŽ Š ŠŠŽÔòòÚ  Ú2Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý×  ×€€The€trial€judge€replied,€ð ðThe€.€.€.€issue€of€guilt€andÐ p  Ðinnocence€has€already€been€decided.€€The€Supreme€Court€affirmed€it.€€And€thisÏ.€.€.€evidence€is€really€irrelevant€until€you€show€why€it€wasnððt€presented.€€ThereÏmight€have€been€a€good€reason€why€[McNeil]€wasnððt€called.ðð€€In€addition,€the€trialÏjudge€expressed,€ð ðYouððve€got€to€prove€whether€defense€counsel€knew€about€thisÏœwitness,›€whether€there€was€some€reason€he€didnððt€call€this€witness€and€all€that.ððÌÌà ` àDefendantððs€post„conviction€counsel€explained,€ð ð[The€order€of€witnesses]Ïwas€just€a€question€of€trying€to€work€out€the€convenience€of€the€attorneyððsÏschedules€with€the€witness€schedules.ðð€€Although€the€trial€court€seems€to€haveÏbecome€increasingly€impatient€with€the€order€of€the€witnesses,€we€can€find€noÏimpermissible€restriction€of€the€proof.€€The€trial€court€permitted€McNeil€to€continueÏher€testimony;€furthermore,€it€appears€that€the€court€was€primarily€concerned€withÏjudicial€economy:€ð ð[I]t€seems€to€me€that€.€.€.€you€ought€to€start€off€at€the€top€withÏ.€.€.€that€and€not€subject€everybody€to€listening€to€what€may€be€irrelevant€proof.׃D×Ý ƒ95ÝÔ€ŠŽ Š ŠŠŽÔÔ€ŠŽ Š ŠŠŽÔòòÚ  Ú3Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý×  ׀Рà)€  ÐÌà@øø!®à3.€Walter€William€Foster€€ˆÌà ` àSimilarly,€the€trial€court€objected€to€the€time€œat›€which€former€SheriffððsÏDeputy€Fosterððs€œtestimony€was›€given.€€Defense€counsel€called€Foster€to€testifyÐ 2 (( Ðthat€he€had€previously€been€convicted€of€felonies€in€Louisiana,€information€whichÏwas€not€provided€to€the€defense€œeither€before€or€during›€trial€and€which€theÏdefense€argues€would€have€been€greatly€relevant€to€impeaching€FosterððsÏcredibility€at€trial.׃×Ý ƒ95ÝÔ€ŠŽ Š ŠŠŽÔÔ€ŠŽ Š ŠŠŽÔòòÚ  Ú4Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý×  ×€€The€trial€court€deemed€this€testimony€irrelevant€and€orderedÐ x Ðthe€witness€excused€until€such€time€as€Defendant€ð ðproved€to€[the€trial€court]€thatÏ[Fosterððs]€testimony€is€material.ððÌÌà ` àThe€trial€court€later€permitted€Foster€œto›€testify€œconcerning›€his€convictionsÏand€subsequent€pardon€by€the€governor€of€Louisiana.€€Foster€stated€that€theÏSheriff€of€Carter€County€(the€county€of€this€action)€knew€about€his€convictionsÏprior€to€the€trial€of€this€case€and€that,€in€fact,€Judge€Don€Lewis,€Sheriff€GeorgeÏPapantonio,€and€numerous€other€law€enforcement€officers€had€written€letters€onÏFosterððs€behalf€to€the€governor€of€Louisiana€recommending€that€Foster€beÏpardoned€for€his€crimes.€€Finally,€Foster€admitted€that€he€had€not€revealed€hisÏconvictions€on€his€written€application€to€become€a€Carter€County€Deputy€Sheriff.€ÏDefendant€has€presented€no€evidence€before€this€Court€that€the€trial€courtÏrestricted€his€post„conviction€hearing.€€In€addition,€we€find€no€evidence€that€theÏtrial€court€created€a€hostile€atmosphere€by€ruling€Fosterððs€testimony€irrelevantÏuntil€proven€relevant€through€other€witnesses.׃×Ý ƒ95ÝÔ€ŠŽ Š ŠŠŽÔÔ€ŠŽ Š ŠŠŽÔòòÚ  Ú5Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý×  ×Ð ð-$$ Ðà ` àÌà@dd%®àII.€òòBRADYóó€VIOLATIONˆÐ 2 (( Ðà ` àIn€his€second€issue,€Defendant€contends€the€trial€court€erred€by€concluding€Ïthat€no€òòBradyóó€violation€occurred€where€the€State€did€not€disclose€evidence€thatÐ h  Ðformer€deputy€sheriff€Walter€William€Foster€had€been€convicted€of€felonies€inÏLouisiana€and€that€Foster€had€failed€to€disclose€those€convictions€as€required€onÏhis€application€for€employment€with€the€sheriffððs€department,€among€otherÏdocuments.€€òòSeeòòóó€òòóóBrady€v.€Marylandóó,€373€U.S.€83€(1963).Ð ˆ(  ÐÌà ` àIn€order€to€prove€a€due€process€violation€under€òòBrady€v.€Marylandóó,Ð ˜8 МDefendant›€must€show€that€œ(1)›€the€State€suppressed€the€information,€œ(2)›€theÏinformation€was€favorable€to€the€accused,€and€œ(3)›€the€information€was€material.€ÏòòState€v.€Edginóó,€902€S.W.2d€387,€389€(Tenn.€1995).€€The€undisclosed€informationÐ °P Ðis€material€ð ðonly€if€there€is€a€reasonable€probability€that,€had€the€evidence€beenÏdisclosed€to€the€defense,€the€result€of€the€proceeding€would€have€been€different.ðð€ÏòòUnited€States€v.€Bagleyóó,€473€U.S.€667,€682€(1985).€€Furthermore,€a€reasonableÐ È#h Ðprobability€is€a€ð ðprobability€sufficient€to€undermine€confidence€in€the€outcome.ðð€Ð Ð%p ÐòòId.ó󀀜In€òòGiglio€v.€United€Statesóó,€405€U.S.€150,€154„155€(1972),€the€Supreme€CourtÐ Ø'x Ðheld€that€impeachment€evidence€falls€under€the€òòBradyóó€rule.€€òòSeeóó€òòalsoóó,€òòUnitedÐ à)€  ÐStates€v.€Bagleyóó,€473€U.S.€667,€676€(1985);€òòDavis€v.€Stateóó,€823€S.W.2d€217,€218Ð è+ˆ"" Ð(Tenn.€Crim.€App.,€1991).›ÌÌà ` àIn€òòKyles€v.€Whitleyóó,€514€U.S.€419€(1995),€the€United€States€Supreme€CourtÐ 2 (( Мclarified€the›€materiality€standard€set€forth€in€òòBagleyóó.€€òòId.óó€at€433„37.€€First,€ð ðaÐ 4¨** Ðshowing€of€materiality€does€not€require€demonstration€by€a€preponderance€thatÏdisclosure€of€the€suppressed€evidence€would€have€resulted€ultimately€in€theÏdefendantððs€acquittal.ðð€€òòId.óó€at€434.€€Therefore,€according€to€the€Court,€ð ð[t]heÐ  :À00 Ðquestion€is€not€whether€the€defendant€would€more€likely€than€not€have€receivedÏa€different€verdict€with€the€evidence,€but€whether€in€its€absence€he€received€a€fairÏtrial,€understood€as€a€trial€resulting€in€a€verdict€worthy€of€confidence.ðð€€òòId.óó€€Ð p  ÐÌà ` àNext,€the€òòKylesóó€Court€directed€that€a€defendant€ð ðneed€not€demonstrate€thatÐ €  Ðafter€discounting€the€inculpatory€evidence€in€light€of€the€undisclosed€evidence,Ïthere€would€not€have€been€enough€left€to€convict.ðð€€òòId.óó€at€434„35.€€The€majorityÐ 0  Мdisputed›€the€conclusion€of€the€dissent€in€that€case,€commenting,€ÌÓÓà8 ` àà ¸ àThis€rule€is€clear,€and€none€of€the€òòBradyóó€cases€has€everÐ  @ Ðsuggested€that€sufficiency€of€the€evidence€.€.€.€is€the€touchstone.€ÏAnd€yet€the€dissent€appears€to€assume€that€Kyles€must€loseÏbecause€there€would€still€have€been€adequate€evidence€to€convictÏeven€if€the€favorable€evidence€had€been€disclosed.Ó=·ÓÐ ` ü!` ü! ÐòòId.óóat€435€n.8;€òòseeóó€òòStrickler€v.€Greeneóó,€œ119€S.€Ct.€1936€(1999).›Ð ¸X ÐÌà ` àThird,€the€Court€œcautioned›€that€constitutional€errors€under€òòBradyóó€are€notÐ È#h Ðsubject€to€a€harmless€error€ruleð"ða€notion€quite€related€to€the€last€point€ofÏemphasis,€in€that€a€court€is€not€at€liberty€to€conclude€that€the€totality€of€theÏevidence€indicating€guilt€renders€the€nondisclosure€harmless€beyond€aÏreasonable€doubt.€€òòId.óó€at€435.€€Finally,€the€òòKylesóó€Court€stressed€that€allÐ è+ˆ"" Ðsuppressed€or€undisclosed€evidence€should€be€considered€cumulatively€toÏdetermine€its€materiality.€€òòId.óó€at€436.Ð ø/˜&& Ѐ€Ìà ` àTurning€to€the€facts€of€this€case,€in€support€of€his€assignment€of€error,ÏDefendant€argues€that€contrary€to€the€trial€courtððs€ruling,€the€evidence€notÏdisclosed€was€indeed€material.€€Defendant€correctly€notes€that€the€StateÏconceded€the€first€prongs€of€òòBradyóó:€that€the€evidence€was€favorable€to€theÐ  :À00 Ðdefense€and€that€knowledge€of€the€information€by€state€law€enforcement€officialsÏis€imputed€to€the€State€as€prosecution.€€Therefore,€the€only€issue€for€review€isÏwhether€the€evidence€was€material.€€If€the€undisclosed€testimony€was€material€toÏthe€defense,€then€Defendant€is€entitled€to€a€reversal.€€ÌÌà ` àIn€its€order€denying€post„conviction€relief,€the€trial€court€stated,€ÌÓÓà8 ` àà ¸ àIn€order€to€qualify€as€material,€there€must€be€a€reasonableÏprobability€that€the€evidence,€had€it€been€disclosed,€would€haveÏchanged€the€result€of€the€trial.€€After€a€thorough€review€of€theÏevidence€presented€at€the€petitionerððs€trial,€this€court€concludes€thatÏthis€evidence€is€not€material.€€There€was€overwhelming€evidence€ofÏthe€petitionerððs€guilt€presented€at€trial.€€Furthermore,€even€if€theÏcourt€were€to€assume€the€admissibility€of€the€evidence€of€the€felonyÏburglaries€and€Officerððs€Fosterððs€nondisclosure€of€them€on€anÏemployment€application,€the€court€finds€that€they€have€littleÏimpeachment€value€in€light€of€the€full€pardon€Officer€Foster€hadÏreceived.€€Óh¾ÓÐ ` ü!` ü! ÐÌà ` àIn€response,€Defendant€challenges€this€finding,€arguing€in€his€brief€that€theÏtrial€courtððs€reliance€upon€Fosterððs€official€pardon€was€erroneous€because€theÏpardon€did€not€serve€to€negate€the€conviction€for€impeachment€purposes,€nor€didÏthe€pardon€eliminate€Fosterððs€duty€to€disclose€the€convictions€on€his€employmentÏapplicationð"ðalso€evidence€Defendant€would€have€used€for€impeachment.€ÏDefendant€contends,€ð ðHad€the€trial€court€allowed€a€full€examination€of€DeputyÏFoster€at€the€post„conviction€hearing,€[Defendant]€would€have€established€thatÏthe€Louisiana€pardon€would€have€done€nothing€to€diminish€the€value€of€thisÏevidence€as€impeachment.ððÌÌà ` àWe€disagree€with€Defendantððs€impression€of€the€trial€courtððs€decision.€€First,Ïwe€find€no€improper€reliance€on€Fosterððs€pardon€by€the€trial€court.€€AlthoughÐ  :À00 ÐDefendant€correctly€argues€that€the€pardon€could€not€have€relieved€Foster€of€theÏlegal€duty€to€report€his€convictions€(therefore,€the€pardon€has€no€effect€uponÏFosterððs€falsification€of€his€employment€application),€the€trial€court€appears€toÏhave€placed€greater€importance€on€the€practical€value€of€the€pardon€in€theÏperception€of€the€jury,€as€it€would€have€been€used€to€rehabilitate€Foster€at€trial.€ÌÌà ` àSecond,€the€trial€courtððs€estimation€of€the€practical€impact€of€FosterððsÏconvictions,€falsification,€and€pardon€were€influenced€by€the€significant€weight€ofÏevidence€against€Defendant.€€Though,€as€the€Supreme€Court€has€instructed,€theÏsufficiency€of€the€evidence€has€no€bearing€on€a€test€of€materiality,€the€òòstrengthóóÐ ¨H Ðof€the€additional€convicting€evidence€is€pivotal€in€our€determination€œof€whether›€theÏsuppressed€òòBradyóó€evidence€places€the€case€in€ð ðsuch€a€different€light€so€as€toÐ ¸X Ðundermine€confidence€in€the€verdict.ðð€€òòSeeóó€òòKyles€v.€Whitleyóó,€514€U.S.€419,€435Ð À!` Ð(1995).€€The€post„conviction€court€in€the€case€at€bar€found€the€evidence€of€guiltÏso€overwhelming€that€consideration€of€the€undisclosed€evidence€could€notÏundermine€its€confidence€in€the€outcome€of€the€trial.€€We€agree,€and€for€thisÏreason€we€affirm€the€trial€courtððs€denial€of€post„conviction€relief€on€this€issue.ÌÌà@^ ^ ®àIII.€EXCLUSION€OF€ARCHIE€PARLIERððS€TESTIMONYˆÌà ` àAs€previously€addressed,€Defendant€called€Archie€Parlier,€a€juror€at€hisÏtrial,€to€testify€at€his€post„conviction€hearing.€€The€trial€court€sustained€the€StateððsÏimmediate€objection€that€Parlierððs€testimony€was€ð ðoutside€the€scopeðð€of€the€post„¼conviction€hearingð"ðan€impermissible€attempt€to€impeach€the€juryððs€verdict.€Ïâ âDefendant€requested€the€opportunity€to€proffer€evidence€to€preserve€his€recordÐ 8¸.. Ðfor€appeal,€and€the€trial€court€granted€his€request,€permitting€limited€questioning.€ÏÌâ âà ` àParlier€testified€that€the€foreperson€for€the€jury€which€decided€DefendantððsÏcase€discussed€with€the€jury€that€if€sentenced€to€life€imprisonment,€DefendantÏwould€ð ðprobablyðð€only€serve€six€to€eight€years€before€being€released.€€ParlierÏstated€that€had€he€been€assured€that€a€sentence€of€life€would€ensure€thatÏDefendant€remained€imprisoned€for€his€lifetime,€his€verdict€would€ð ð[m]ore€thanÏlikelyðð€have€changed.€€Furthermore,€he€ventured€the€opinion€that€the€other€jurorsÏrelied€upon€this€piece€of€information€as€a€pivotal€issue€on€sentencing.€€Finally,ÏParlier€testified€that€the€foreperson€did€not€indicate€where€she€had€learned€theÏinformation€she€passed€on€to€the€jury.ÌÌà ` àTennessee€Rule€of€Evidence€606€provides:ÌÓÓà8 ` àà ¸ àUpon€an€inquiry€into€the€validity€of€a€verdict€or€indictment,€aÏjuror€may€not€testify€as€to€any€matter€or€statement€occurring€duringÏthe€course€of€the€juryððs€deliberations€or€to€the€effect€of€anythingÏupon€any€jurorððs€mind€or€emotion€as€influencing€that€juror€to€assentÏto€or€dissent€from€the€verdict€or€indictment€or€concerning€the€jurorððsÏmental€processes,€except€that€a€juror€may€testify€on€the€question€ofÏwhether€extraneous€prejudicial€information€was€improperly€broughtÏto€the€juryððs€attention,€whether€any€outside€influence€was€improperlyÏbrought€to€bear€upon€any€juror,€or€whether€the€jurors€agreed€inÏadvance€to€be€bound€by€a€quotient€or€gambling€verdict€withoutÏfurther€discussion;€nor€may€a€jurorððs€affidavit€or€evidence€of€anyÏstatement€by€the€juror€concerning€a€matter€about€which€the€jurorÏwould€be€precluded€from€testifying€be€received€for€these€purposes.Ó¥ÏÓÐ ` ü!` ü! ÐTenn.€R.€Evid.€606(b).€ÌÌà ` àDefendant€argues€that€Juror€Parlierððs€testimony,€if€explored,€would€œhaveÏsuccessfully›€impeached€the€juryððs€verdict€by€proving€extraneous€prejudicialÏinformation,€necessitating€a€new€sentencing€hearing.€€The€State€argues€thatÐ  :À00 ÐParlierððs€testimony€œreflected›€only€his€mental€processes€and€that€the€trial€courtÏcorrectly€excluded€the€testimony€as€inadmissible.€€We€agree€that€the€testimonyÏwas€inadmissible€to€impeach€the€juryððs€verdict,€and€we€affirm€the€trial€courtððsÏdecision€to€exclude€this€testimony.€€ÌÌà ` àFirst,€contrary€to€Defendantððs€assertions,€the€trial€court€did€notÏunreasonably€curtail€his€offer€of€proof€with€Parlier.€€The€record€reflects€thatÏdefense€counsel€œceased›€his€œquestioning›€by€stating,€ð ðThatððs€all.ðð€€DefendantððsÏcounsel€thereupon€stated,€ð ðJust€one€minute,€Your€Honor,ðð€and€œrecommenced€his›Ïquestioning.€€After€counsel€posed€his€second€œadditional›€question€to€the€witness,Ïthe€trial€court€cut€short€questioning,€commenting,€ð ðYouððve€gone€far€enough€withÏthis.€€Thatððs€enough.ðð€€Defendant€had€essentially€ended€his€proffer€through€thisÏwitness€when€he€realized€his€desire€to€further€explore€the€issue.€€The€trial€courtÏpermitted€Defendantððs€questioning€until€he€became€confident€that€the€post„¼conviction€proceedings€were€being€frustrated€by€Defendantððs€attempts€toÏintroduce€proof€which€could€not€secure€him€relief.€€€€€€à  àÐ Ø'x ÐÌà ` àSecond,€the€trial€court€correctly€excluded€Parlierððs€testimony€€from€the€post„¼conviction€proof.€€We€believe€the€facts€of€this€case€are€most€similar€to€those€inÏòòState€v.€Workmanóó,€667€S.W.2d€44,€51„52€(Tenn.€1984).€€In€òòWorkmanóó,€theÐ ø/˜&& Ðdefendant€ð ðpresented€evidence€that€the€jury€had€discussed€parole€time€for€a€lifeÏsentence,€the€possibility€that€defendant€would€never€be€executed,€and€theÏconsequences€if€the€jury€could€not€agree€on€a€verdict.ðð€€òòId.óó€at€52.€€The€TennesseeÐ 6°,, ÐSupreme€Court€recounted€that€the€trial€court€in€that€case€ð ðfound€that€theÏdefendant€was€trying€to€impeach€the€verdict€and€disallowed€an€offer€of€proof€thatÐ  :À00 Ðone€juror€was€affected€by€the€irrelevant€talk.ðð€€òòId.óó€€The€supreme€court€concurredÐ `  Ðwith€the€decision€of€the€trial€court,€affirming€Workmanððs€conviction€and€sentenceÏof€death.€€òòId.óó€Ð p  ÐÌà ` àLikewise,€in€òòState€v.€Keenóó,€926€S.W.2d€727€(Tenn.€1994),€the€œdefendant,›Ð €  Мin›€support€of€his€motion€for€new€œtrial,€offered›€the€affidavit€of€a€juror€ð ðto€the€effectÏthat€the€amount€of€time€a€person€would€serve€on€a€life€sentence€was€consideredÏby€him€and€other€jurors€in€reaching€their€verdict.ðð€€òòId.óó€at€738.€€In€concluding€thatÐ ˜8 Ðsuch€œdiscussions›€do€not€constitute€ð ðextraneous€prejudicial€informationðð€prohibitedÏby€Tennessee€Rule€of€Evidence€606,€the€supreme€court€stated,€ð ðWe€areÏconstrained€to€say€that€question€would€not€be€an€unusual€one€for€a€jury€toÏconsider€and€debate€in€reaching€a€verdict€in€a€capital€case.ðð€€òòId.óó€€Ð ¸X ÐÌà ` àOur€supreme€court€elaborated€on€its€interpretation€of€ð ðextraneousÏprejudicial€informationðð€in€òòState€v.€Cokeróó,€746€S.W.2d€167€(Tenn.€1987).€€TheÐ Ð%p Ðcourt€stated,€ÌÓÓà8 ` àExtraneous€means€ð ðcoming€from€withoutðð€and€the€fact€that€one€orÏmore€jurors€may€have€commented€about€the€possibility€of€defendantÏemploying€a€third€person€to€murder€one€or€more€jurors€would€not€beÏadmissible€unless€the€comment€included€information€that€the€threatÏoriginated€from€and€was€transmitted€to€the€jury€by€an€outsideÏsource.ÓÂàÓÐ ` ü!` ü! ÐòòId.óó€at€171.€€In€this€case,€Juror€Parlier€testified€that€the€jury€foreperson€did€notÐ ü0œ'' Ðindicate€her€source€of€knowledge.€€We€must€assume€that€she€spoke€from€aÏgeneralized€belief€that€criminal€defendants€sentenced€to€life€incarceration€serveÏonly€six€to€eight€years;€and€while€this€information€was€incorrect,€Defendant€is€notÏentitled€to€relief€absent€an€outside€source€of€knowledge.Ð 9¼// Ѐ€Ìà ` àIn€òòCaldararo€v.€Vanderbilt€Universityóó,€794€S.W.2d€738€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.Ð h  Ð1990),€the€Tennessee€Court€of€Appeals€thoroughly€examined€the€issue€ofÏextraneous€prejudicial€information.€€òòId.óóat€740„44.€€The€court€noted,Ð x ÐÓÓà8 ` àExternal€influences€that€could€warrant€a€new€trial€if€found€to€beÏprejudicial€include:€(1)€exposure€to€news€items€about€the€trial,€(2)Ïconsideration€of€facts€not€admitted€in€evidence,€and€(3)Ïcommunications€with€non„jurors€about€the€case.€€Internal€influencesÏthat€are€not€grounds€to€overturn€a€verdict€include:€(1)€discussionsÏamong€jurors,€(2)€intimidation€or€harassment€of€one€juror€by€another,Ï(3)€a€jurorððs€personal€experiences€not€directly€related€to€the€litigation,Ïand€(4)€a€jurorððs€subjective€thoughts,€fears,€and€emotions.Ó åÓÐ ` ü!` ü! ÐòòId.óó€at€742€(citations€omitted).€€We€conclude€that€the€information€communicatedÐ ¤D Ðby€the€foreperson€of€the€jury€in€the€case€at€bar€constituted€an€internal€influence;Ïtherefore,€the€trial€court€properly€excluded€Parlierððs€testimony€from€theÏsubstantive€evidence€taken€at€the€post„conviction€hearing.€Ìà ` à€€€Ìà@¨ ¨ ®àIV.€INEFFECTIVE€ASSISTANCE€OF€COUNSELˆÌà ` àIn€support€of€his€argument€that€his€trial€counsel€were€ineffective,€DefendantÏcontends€that€they€(1)€failed€to€identify€and€request€forensic€experts,€(2)€failed€toÏadequately€investigate€in€the€guilt€phase€of€trial,€(3)€failed€to€ð ðknow€relevant€law,ððÏ(4)€failed€to€adequately€move€to€suppress€Defendantððs€statement€to€police,€(5)Ïfailed€to€adequately€investigate€in€the€sentencing€phase,€(6)€failed€to€identify€andÏrequest€sentencing€mitigation€experts,€and€(7)€œthat€the€post„conviction€courtÏutilized€an€incorrect€standard›€to€determine€ineffectiveness€of€counsel.ÌÌÔ‡Š“\Š ŠŠŽÔà ` àTo€determine€whether€counsel€provided€effective€assistance€at€trial,€theÐ 7´-- Ðcourt€must€decide€whether€counselððs€performance€was€within€the€range€ofÐ 9¤// Ðcompetence€demanded€of€attorneys€in€criminal€cases.€€òòBaxter€v.€Roseóó,€523Ð `  ÐS.W.2d€930,€936€(Tenn.€1975).€€To€succeed€on€a€claim€that€his€counsel€wasÏineffective€at€trial,€a€petitioner€bears€the€burden€of€showing€that€his€counsel€madeÏerrors€so€serious€that€he€was€not€functioning€as€counsel€as€guaranteed€under€theÏSixth€Amendment€and€that€the€deficient€representation€prejudiced€the€œpetitioner,›Ïresulting€in€a€failure€to€produce€a€reliable€result.€€òòStrickland€v.€Washingtonóó,€466Ð °  ÐU.S.€668,€œ687€(1984);›€òòCooper€v.€Stateóó,€849€S.W.2d€744,€747€(Tenn.€1993);€òòButlerÐ    Ðv.€Stateóó,€789€S.W.2d€898,€899€(Tenn.€1990).€€To€satisfy€the€second€œprong,›€theÐ ð  Ðpetitioner€must€show€a€reasonable€probability€œthat;›€but€for€counselððsÏunreasonable€error,€the€fact€finder€would€have€had€reasonable€doubt€regardingÏpetitionerððs€guilt.€€òòStricklandóó,€466€U.S.€at€695.€€This€reasonable€probability€mustÐ À` Ðbe€ð ðsufficient€to€undermine€confidence€in€the€outcome.ðð€€òòHarris€v.€Stateóó,€875Ð °P ÐS.W.2d€662,€665€(Tenn.€1994).ÌÌà ` àWhen€reviewing€trial€counselððs€actions,€this€œCourt›€should€not€use€theÏbenefit€of€hindsight€to€second„guess€trial€strategy€and€criticize€counselððs€tactics.€ÏòòHellard€v.€Stateóó,€629€S.W.2d€4,€9€(Tenn.€1982).€€Counselððs€alleged€errors€shouldÐ `(  Ðbe€judged€at€the€time€they€were€made€in€light€of€all€facts€and€circumstances.€ÏòòStricklandóó,€466€U.S.€at€690;€òòseeóó€òòCooperóó€849€S.W.2d€at€746.Ô#†ŠŽ ŠŠŠ“\aë#ÔÐ @,à"$ ÐÌà ` àIf€afforded€a€post-conviction€evidentiary€hearing€by€the€trial€court,€aÏpetitioner€must€do€more€than€merely€present€evidence€tending€to€showÏincompetent€representation€and€prejudice;€œñ *ñsñ *ñhe›€must€prove€œhñ¡*ñisñ¡*ññ¢*ñerñ¢*ñ›€factual€allegationsÏby€the€preponderance€of€the€evidence.׃×Ý ƒ95ÝÔ€ŠŽ Š ŠŠŽÔÔ€ŠŽ Š ŠŠŽÔòòÚ  Ú6Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý×  ×€€òòState€v.€Clennyóó,€576€S.W.2d€œ12,€14›Ð P6ð,. Ð(Tenn.€Crim.€App.€1978).€€When€an€evidentiary€hearing€is€held,€findings€of€factÏmade€by€that€court€are€conclusive€and€binding€on€this€Court€unless€the€evidenceÏpreponderates€against€them.€€òòCooper€v.€Stateóó,€849€S.W.2d€744,€746€(Tenn.1993)Ð p  Ð(citing€òòButler€v.€Stateóó,€789€S.W.2d€898,€899€(Tenn.1990)).Ð x ÐÌà ` àFollowing€the€post„conviction€hearing,€the€œpost„conviction€court›€concludedÏthat€Defendant€had€not€suffered€the€ineffective€assistance€of€trial€œcounsel.›€€WeÏagree€with€the€œconclusion€that€Defendant€received€the€effective€assistance€ofÏcounsel€at€trial€and€on€direct€appeal€of€his€conviction,€and€we€address€theÏarguments€collectively.€€ÌÌà@Ô Ô ®àòòA.€Location€of€Victimððs€Wounds€and€Bloodstained€ClothingóóˆÐ ¸X Ðà ` àDefendant€first€states€that€his€counsel€were€ineffective€for€failing€to€identifyÏand€request€forensic€expertsð"ðspecifically,€a€pathologist€and€criminologist.€ÏDefendant€contends€that€ð ðthe€evidence€these€experts€would€have€presentedÏwould€establish€[Defendantððs]€innocence€by€confirming€that€the€attacker€wasÏright„handed€and€that€the€blood€splatter€pattern€on€[Defendantððs]€clothes€isÏconsistent€with€his€version€of€the€events€and€inconsistent€with€Greg€PetersððÏversion€of€the€events.ðð€€Furthermore,€he€argues€that€trial€counsel€were€deficientÏfor€generally€failing€to€investigate€(1)€the€ð ðleft„handed/right„handedðð€theory€thatÏonly€a€right„handed€person,€Greg€Peters,€could€have€inflicted€the€victimððsÏwounds,€and€(2)€the€manner€in€which€blood€left€patterns€on€Defendantððs€andÏPetersðð€clothing,€to€determine€whose€version€of€events€was€more€likely.€€€Ð 6°,, Їà ` àThe€trial€court€found,€following€a€ð ðthorough€review€of€the€trial€record€and€theÏtestimony€from€the€evidentiary€hearing,ðð€that€Defendant€ð ðfailed€to€show€how€heÏwas€prejudiced€by€any€of€the€alleged€errors.ðð€€Because€the€post„conviction€court›Ïdenied€Defendant€the€assistance€of€requested€experts€that€he€claimed€wereÏnecessary€to€show€œprejudiceñ‹*ñ›ñ‹*ñ,€however,›€Defendant€argues€that€the€courtððs€rulingÏwas€improper.€€Based€upon€the€œpost„conviction€judgeððs›€continued€assurance€thatÏhe€would€provide€funding€for€additional€expert€services€if€Defendant€provedÏinitially€that€his€trial€counsel€had€been€ineffective,€œwe€must€assume›€for€theÏpurpose€of€review€that€the€œpost„conviction€courtððs›€denial€of€those€additionalÏservices€indicated€that€he€found€no€evidence€of€deficient€representation€under€theÏòòStricklandóó€standard.€€Ð °P ÐÌà ` àAt€the€post„conviction€evidentiary€hearing,€Defendantððs€trial€counselÏtestified€that€he€had€neither€recollection€of€nor€explanation€for€the€failure€toÏexplore€a€theory€that€the€blows€to€the€victim€could€not€have€been€administeredÏby€a€left„handed€person€(Defendant),€but€must€have€been€delivered€only€by€aÏright„handed€person€(Greg€Peters).€€Defendant€contends€that€this€evidence€couldÏhave€exculpated€him€at€trial,€had€his€counsel€secured€an€expert€to€show€that€theÏvictimððs€assailant€could€not€have€been€left„handed.ÌÌà ` àHad€Defendantððs€trial€counsel€been€able€to€show€that€a€left„handed€œpersonÏcould›€never€have€inflicted€the€victimððs€injuries,€of€course,€the€outcome€of€the€trialÏcould€have€been€different.€€œHowever,›€without€more€than€an€assertion€that€anÏexpert€could€have€shown€that€a€left„handed€person€could€not€have€delivered€theÏœblows,›€we€are€constrained€to€hold€that€Defendant€has€not€shown€(and€we€œbelieve›Ð  :À00 Ðcannot€show)€either€that€counsel€fell€below€the€standard€of€care€for€a€criminalÏdefense€attorney€or€that€there€exists€a€reasonable€probability€of€a€different€result.€Ï€ÌÌà ` àDefendantððs€trial€counsel€also€testified€that€they€did€not€investigate€theÏblood€splatters€on€Defendantððs€clothing€in€an€attempt€to€detract€attention€fromÏtheir€existence.€€We€believe€this€was€a€legitimate€trial€strategy€outside€the€scopeÏof€proper€review€by€this€Court.€€The€evidence€at€trial€showed€that€DefendantððsÏpants€had€blood€ð ðsplatteredðð€on€them,€while€Petersðð€shirt€was€ð ðsmearedðð€withÏblood.€€It€is€within€common€knowledge€that€a€splatter€bloodstain€would€occur€fromÏblood€spurting€at€some€force,€while€a€blood€smear€would€arise€from€contact€withÏa€bloody€surface.€€In€this€way,€the€splatter€pattern€on€Defendantððs€pants€versusÏPetersðð€smeared€shirt€supports€the€Stateððs€theory€of€the€caseð"ðthat€DefendantÏinflicted€the€wounds€and€Peters€attempted€to€assist€the€victim€in€the€aftermath€ofÏthe€attack.€€Therefore,€trial€counselððs€decision€to€forego€investigation€of€theÏresulting€bloodstains€did€not€constitute€deficient€performance.€ÌÌà@@@"®àòòB.€Failure€to€InvestigateóóˆÐ è+ˆ"" Ðà ` àFirst,€Defendant€contends€that€counsel€were€ineffective€for€failing€toÏvigorously€cross„examine€Greg€Peters,€because€Peters€was€the€key€witness€inÏthe€case.€€The€œpost„conviction€court›€concluded€in€general€that€Defendant€failedÏto€show€he€was€prejudiced€by€any€potential€errors€of€counsel.€€We€agree€withÏDefendant€that€the€credibility€of€Peters€was€crucial€to€Defendantððs€case.€ÏHowever,€his€contention€that€œcounselððs€performance›€fell€below€the€standard€ofÏcare€to€his€prejudice€for€failing€to€bring€out€through€cross„examination€that€PetersÐ  :À00 Ðwas€right„handed€lacks€merit.€€We€find€nothing€in€the€record€tending€to€show€thatÏthere€is€a€reasonable€probability€that€had€counsel€shown€Peters€is€right„handed,Ïthe€jury€would€have€had€reasonable€doubt€about€Defendantððs€guilt.ÌÌà ` àNext,€Defendant€argues€that€counsel€were€ineffective€for€failing€ð ðtoÏinvestigate€and€present€evidence€that€no€robbery€had€occurred,€in€spite€of€theÏfact€that€the€Stateððs€theory€involved€a€robbery„murder.ðð€€According€to€Defendant,Ïhis€trial€counsel€ð ðshould€have€presented€evidence€that€[Defendant]€had€no€moneyÏwhen€he€was€arrested,ðð€ð ðshould€have€pursued€questions€establishing€that€GregÏPeters€had€not€been€searched€to€determine€if€he€had€money,ðð€and€ð ðshould€haveÏinterviewed€and€presented€Ms.€[Louise]€McNeil€as€a€witness€regarding€the€factÏthat€she€found€the€victimððs€purse€at€the€crime€scene.ðð€€In€addition,€he€claims€thatÏdefense€counsel€should€have€investigated€and€further€developed€testimony€givenÏat€the€post„conviction€evidentiary€hearing€by€the€victimððs€neighbor,€FrankÏGarland,€that€twenty€seconds€lapsed€between€the€time€he€heard€a€commotion€inÏthe€victimððs€apartment€and€the€time€he€heard€Greg€Peters€call€for€help.€€Ìà ` àÌà ` àAgain,€œconscientious€decisions›€regarding€investigation,€development,€andÏdirect€and€cross„examination€are€best€considered€judgments€of€trial€strategyÏwithin€the€discretion€of€counsel€and€not€subject€to€the€scrutiny€of€hindsight.€ÏFurthermore,€we€cannot€conclude€there€is€a€reasonable€probability€that€had€theÏjury€known€the€victimððs€purse€was€found€in€her€bedroom€closet€and€DefendantÏpossessed€no€money€when€he€was€arrested,€it€would€have€had€reasonable€doubtÏwhether€Defendant€killed€the€victim.€€Nor€can€we€say€that€the€testimonyÏpresented€by€Garland€would€have€had€such€an€effect€upon€Greg€PetersððÐ  :À00 Ðcredibility€so€as€to€create€reasonable€doubt.€€The€evidence€at€trial€stronglyÏindicated€Defendantððs€guilt,€as€noted€by€the€post„conviction€court€in€its€FindingsÏof€Fact€and€Conclusions€of€Law.€€We€find€that€Defendant€has€neither€shown€hisÏcounsel€erred€nor€how€he€was€prejudiced€by€any€such€error,€and€we€concludeÏthat€nothing€presented€œthus€far›€has€undermined€our€confidence€in€the€verdict€ofÏthe€jury.ÌÌà@ŠŠ®àòòC.€Failure€to€Know€Relevant€LawóóˆÐ ˜8 Ðà ` àDefendant€next€claims€that€his€counsel€were€ineffective€for€failing€to€knowÏrelevant€Tennessee€criminal€œlaw.€€He€contends€that€counsel€should€haveÏprocured€the€exclusion€of€former€Deputy€Fosterððs€testimony€inculpatingÏDefendant€or€that€counsel€should€have€obtained€a€continuance.€€The€supremeÏcourt€on€direct€review€determined€that€the€statement€to€Foster€was€notÏdiscoverable.€€òòState€v.€McNishóó,€727€S.W.2d€490,€496€(Tenn.€1987).€€In€addition,Ð È#h Ðwe€have€held€that€the€information€presented€by€Foster€was€not€material€underÏòòBrady€v.€Marylandóó,€òòseeóó€òòsupraóó€Part€II;€therefore,€we€find€no€prejudice€toÐ Ø'x ÐDefendant.€€Furthermore,€we€find€no€prejudice€in€counselððs€failure€to€secure€aÏcontinuance€upon€learning€of€the€new€information;€Defendant€has€not€proposedÏto€the€Court€how€a€continuance€would€have€created€a€reasonable€probability€ofÏa€different€result.ÌÌà@< < ®àòòD.€Failure€to€Adequately€Move€to€Suppress€Defendantððs€StatementóóˆÐ 4¨** Ðà ` àIn€his€next€issue,€Defendant€argues€that€trial€counsel€were€ineffective€by›Ïfailing€to€adequately€move€to€suppress€the€statement€Defendant€made€to€officersÏon€the€night€of€his€arrest.€€He€argues€that€counsel€should€have€investigated€andÐ  :À00 Ðpresented€evidence€to€show€that€he€was€too€intoxicated€or€impaired€by€drugs€toÏhave€given€the€statement€knowingly€and€voluntarily.ÌÌà ` àThe€State€responds€by€noting€that€the€Tennessee€Supreme€Court€affirmedÏthe€voluntary€nature€of€Defendantððs€statement€in€òòMcNishóó,€727€S.W.2d€at€496.€€InÐ €  Ðthat€opinion,€the€court€stated,€ÌÓÓà8 ` àThe€trial€judge€conducted€a€suppression€hearing€and€found€that€theÏstatement€was€voluntarily€and€freely€given€after€appellant€had€beenÏfully€advised€of€his€rights€and€had€signed€a€written€waiver.€€TheÏevidence€supports€the€findings€of€the€trial€judge€and€certainly€doesÏnot€establish€the€contention€of€the€appellant€that€he€was€soÏintoxicated€from€drugs€at€that€time€as€to€be€incapable€of€realizing€theÏconsequences€of€his€statement.Ó7ÓÐ ` ü!` ü! ÐòòId.óó€€Furthermore,€the€State€points€out€that€Defendantððs€œtestimony€at€trial€indicatedÐ °P Ðhe€had€a€clear,€coherent,›€œand›€œcomprehensive€memory€of€the€events€on€theÏevening€of€the€murder.›€€The€State€argues€that€one€may€infer€from€the€detailedÏnature€of€the€œtestimony›€that€Defendant€œwaived›€his€right€to€counsel€and€right€toÏremain€silent€knowingly€and€voluntarily,€without€impairment€œby›€the€narcotics€in€hisÏsystem.ÌÌà ` àWe€find€that€Defendant€has€not€shown€by€a€preponderance€of€the€evidenceÏhow€he€was€prejudiced€by€counselððs€failure€to€further€investigate€his€degree€ofÏintoxication€when€he€delivered€the€statement€to€officers.€€Assuming€that€suchÏfailure€constituted€deficient€representation,€and€further€assuming€that€œtrial›€counselÏwere€able€to€procure€suppression€of€the€statement,€Defendant€has€not€shown€theÏreasonable€probability€of€a€different€result€at€trial.€€This€issue€lacks€merit.€€ÌÌà@¶ ¶ ®àòòE.€Failure€to€Adequately€Investigate€and€Present€MitigationóóˆÐ  :À00 Ðà ` àDefendant€contends€that€his€trial€counsel€breached€the€standard€of€care€ofÏattorneys€in€capital€criminal€cases€to€his€prejudice€by€failing€to€adequatelyÏinvestigate€and€present€mitigation€testimony€in€the€sentencing€phase€of€his€trial.ÏHe€argues€that€counsel€should€have€requested€psychological€experts€toÏinvestigate€and€testify€regarding€his€extensive€history€of€poor€mental€health€andÏsubstance€abuse.€€He€maintains€that€because€of€the€aforementioned€ð ðrushðð€to€œtheÏpost„conviction›€hearing€in€this€case,€post„conviction€counsel€did€not€have€time€toÏadequately€locate€and€present€this€evidence.€€òòSeeóóòòsupraóó€Part€I.€€We€affirm€theÐ ˜8 Ðdecision€of€the€post„conviction€judge,€who€stated,ÌÓÓà8 ` àà ¸ àPetitionerððs€trial€attorneys€testified€that€they€chose€not€toÏpursue€a€mental€defense€at€sentencing€because€it€did€not€mesh€withÏthe€petitionerððs€defense€that€Greg€Peters€was€the€assailant€andÏbecause€much€of€the€petitionerððs€psychological€history€revealedÏnegative€aspects€of€his€character€that€the€prosecutor€couldÏcapitalize€on€if€mental€capacity€was€put€at€issue.€€His€trial€attorneysÏalso€stated€that€any€history€of€blackouts€that€the€petitioner€may€haveÏexperienced€had€absolutely€nothing€to€do€with€this€case.€€A€reviewÏof€the€exhibits€relating€to€the€petitionerððs€mental€history€reveals€thatÏthe€petitioner€suffered€from€long€term€drug€abuse.€€There€is€also€anÏescalating€pattern€of€anger€control€problems€noted€in€theÏpsychological€history.€€Besides€the€negative€aspects€of€theÏescalating€anger€control€problems,€the€reports€all€state€a€negativeÏprognosis€due€to€the€petitionerððs€unwillingness€to€undergo€a€properÏcourse€of€treatment.€€Furthermore,€after€a€thorough€review€of€theÏoverwhelming€evidence€presented€at€trial,€the€court€notes€that€theÏpetitioner€testified€extensively€regarding€the€events€leading€up€to€theÏvictimððs€death.€€Thus,€the€trial€court€agrees€with€trial€counsel€that€anyÏhistory€of€blackouts€that€the€petitioner€may€have€experienced€hadÏvery€little,€if€anything,€to€do€with€the€events€relating€to€this€offense.€ÏQuite€simply,€the€court€concludes€that€the€petitioner€has€failed€toÏmeet€his€burden€of€proof€with€respect€to€these€allegations€by€hisÏfailure€to€show€how€he€was€prejudiced€by€any€of€counselððs€acts€orÏomissions.Ó)#ÓÐ ` ü!` ü! ÐWe€agree€entirely€with€the€post„conviction€courtððs€exhaustive€and€comprehensiveÏreview€of€this€issue.€€This€issue€lacks€merit.ÌÐ 9¼// Ðà@& & ®àòòE.€Improper€Standard€for€Effective€AssistanceóóˆÐ `  Ðà ` àFinally,€Defendant€asserts€that€the€œpost„conviction€judge›€used€an€improperÏstandard€to€determine€whether€his€trial€counsel€had€been€ineffective€by€relyingÏon€an€outcome„€or€result„determinative€test€for€prejudice.€€As€the€State€notes,€theÏtrial€court€recited€in€its€Findings€of€Fact€and€Conclusions€of€Law€in€this€case,€ÌÓÓà8 ` àIn€order€to€be€granted€relief€on€the€grounds€of€ineffective€assistanceÏof€counsel,€the€petitioner€must€establish€that€the€advice€given€or€theÏservices€rendered€were€not€within€the€range€of€competenceÏdemanded€of€attorneys€in€criminal€cases€and€that€ð ðthere€is€aÏreasonable€probability€that,€but€for€counselððs€unprofessional€errors,Ïthe€result€of€the€proceeding€would€have€been€different.ððÓç+ÓÐ ` ü!` ü! Ð(Quoting€òòStrickland€v.€Washingtonóó,€466€U.S.€668,€693€(1984)).€€Thus,€weÐ ¤D Ðconclude€that€the€trial€court€knew€and€applied€the€proper€standard€to€determineÏwhether€Defendant€suffered€the€ineffective€assistance€of€œcounsel.Ìñ‹*ñ›ñ‹*ñÌñ‹*ñ›ñ‹*ñà ` àñ‹*ñ›ñ‹*ñAs€our€Supreme€Court€stated€in€òòHenly€v.€Stateóó,€960€S.W.2d€572,€580Ð Ä"d Ð(Tenn.€1997),ÌÓÓà8 ` àBecause€a€petitioner€must€establish€both€prongs€of€the€test€toÏprevail€on€a€claim€of€ineffective€assistance€of€counsel,€failure€toÏprove€either€deficient€performance€or€resulting€prejudice€provides€aÏsufficient€basis€to€deny€relief€on€the€claim.€€Indeed,€a€court€need€notÏaddress€the€components€in€any€particular€order€or€even€addressÏboth€if€the€defendant€makes€an€insufficient€showing€of€oneÏcomponent.€€òòStricklandóó,€466€U.S.€at€697,€104€S.Ct.€ñ•*ñAñ•*ññ—*ññ–*ñañ–*ññ—*ññ˜*ññ—*ñAñ—*ññ˜*ññ™*ñañ™*ñt€2069;€òòGoadóó,Ð ì,Œ## Ð938€S.W.2d€at€370.›Ð ` ü!` ü! М̛ÌÓÓà@®®.®àœˆÐ  ü0œ'' ÐÓ  ÓV.›€HEINOUS,€ATROCIOUS,€AND€CRUEL€AGGRAVATORÌÓ  Óà ` àIn€his€next€assignment€of€error,€Defendant€argues€that€the€œpost„convictionÏcourt›€erred€by€failing€to€find€that€the€ð ðheinous,€atrocious,€and€cruelðð€aggravatingÏœcircumstance€(HAC)›€for€sentencing€was€unconstitutionally€vague.€€The€StateÏcontends€that€this€issue€œwas€previously›€determined€by€the€Tennessee€SupremeÏCourt€on€direct€appeal.€€òòSeeóó€òòState€v.€McNishóó,€727€S.W.2d€490,€494€(Tenn.€1987).€Ð ˆ(  ÐÌà ` àIn€òòMcNishóó,€the€supreme€court€concluded€that€the€evidence€was€sufficientÐ ˜8 Ðto€show€that€the€murder€was€especially€heinous,€atrocious,€or€cruel€andÏdemonstrated€torture€and€depravity€of€mind.€€òòId.óó€(citing€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€39„2„Ð ¨H Ð203(i)(5)€(repealed)).€€It€is€also€apparent€from€that€opinion€that€DefendantÏchallenged€ð ðthe€constitutionality€of€the€Tennessee€statutory€provisions€respectingÏthe€death€penalty€in€first€degree€murder€casesðð€on€eleven€points€of€law.€€òòId.óó€Ð À!` ÐHowever,€because€the€supreme€court€declined€to€address€these€specifically,€thisÏCourt€cannot€determine€from€that€opinion€whether€Defendant€specificallyÏchallenged€this€aggravator€as€unconstitutionally€vague,€as€he€does€in€this€appeal.€ÏTherefore,€we€will€not€consider€the€issue€previously€determined,€as€the€StateÏurges.ÌÌà ` àNevertheless,€Defendant€is€not€entitled€to€relief€on€this€issue.€€The€trialÏcourt€instructed€the€jurors€that€to€impose€the€death€penalty,€they€must€findÏbeyond€a€reasonable€doubt€œthat›€ð ð[t]he€murder€was€especially€heinous,€atrociousÏor€cruel€in€that€it€involved€torture€or€depravity€of€mind.ðð€€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€39„2„¼203(i)(5)€(repealed€and€replaced€in€1989€by€ðð€39„13„204(i)(5),€which€states,€ð ðTheÏmurder€was€especially€heinous,€atrocious,€or€cruel€in€that€it€involved€torture€orÐ  :À00 Ðserious€physical€abuse€beyond€that€necessary€to€produce€death€.€.€.€.ðð).€€ThoughÏthe€statute€no€longer€contains€this€œform€of€the€aggravator,›€the€TennesseeÏSupreme€Court€has€many€times€affirmed€its€constitutionality€and€affirmed€deathÏœsentences›€based€upon€its€application.€€òòE.g.óó,€òòKing€v.€Stateóó,€989€S.W.2d€319,€326Ð x Ð(Tenn.€1999);€òòState€v.€Hallóó,€976€S.W.2d€121,€162„63€(Tenn.€1998);€òòState€v.Ð €  ÐCauthernóó,€967€S.W.2d€726,€732„33€(Tenn.€1998)€(holding€that€had€the€jury€beenÐ ˆ(  Ðinstructed€properlyð"ðon€the€pre„1989€ðð€39„2„203(i)(5)€aggravatorð"ðthe€evidenceÏwould€have€been€sufficient€to€establish€the€factor);€òòState€v.€Hinesóó,€919€S.W.2dÐ ˜8 Ð573,€584€(Tenn.€1995);€òòHartman€v.€Stateóó,€896€S.W.2d€94,€106€(Tenn.€1995);Ð  @ ÐòòState€v.€Blackóó,€815€S.W.2d€166,€181„82€(Tenn.€1991);€òòState€v.€Williamsóó,€690Ð ¨H ÐS.W.2d€517,€526„31€(Tenn.€1985)€(determining€that€the€instruction€wasÏconstitutional,€but€that€the€evidence€did€not€support€its€œapplication);›€œòòState€v.Ð ¸X ÐMiddlebrooksóó,€____€S.W.2d€____€(Tenn.€1ñš*ñ000ñš*ññ›*ñ999ñ›*ñ)€(pre„1989€ðð€39„2„203(i)(5)Ð À!` Ðaggravator€again€found€to€withstand€constitutional€attack).›ÌÌà ` àIn€œthe€second€prong€to€Defendantððs€challenge€to€the€HAC€aggravator,€heÏargues›€that€the€jury€engaged€in€impermissible€ð ðdouble€countingðð€when€it€found€theÏapplicability€of€the€ð ðheinous,€atrocious,€and€cruelðð€aggravator,€relying€upon€òòStateÐ è+ˆ"" Ðv.€Middlebrooksóó,€840€S.W.2d€317€(Tenn.€1992),€for€support.€€œThe€crux€of€thisÐ ð-$$ Ðargument€is€that€the€State€impermissibly€used€the€same€evidenceð"ðblows€to€theÏvictimððs€skullð"ðto€prove€both€(1)€the€actus€reas€of€the€offense€of€murder,€and€(2)Ïthe€aggravating€factor€which€permits€the€jury€to€sentence€Defendant€to€death.€€He›Ïœcontends,›€œð ð[I]t›€was€the€blows€to€the€[victimððs]€head€that€ððhastenedðð€the€death€andÏtherefore€the€same€blows,€especially€without€some€intent€that€they€cause€theÏvictim€not€to€die€immediately,€cannot€also€be€used€to€prove€HAC.ðð€€Ð  :À00 Їà ` àIn€a€case€featuring€a€similar€argument€to€the€case€at€bar,€the€TennesseeÏSupreme€Court€addressed€a€contention€that€the€same€evidence€was€improperlyÏused€to€support€two€different€statutory€aggravators.€€òòState€v.€Hallóó,€958€S.W.2dÐ p  Ð679,€692€(Tenn.€1997).€€The€court€initially€noted,€ð ðContrary€to€the€defendantððsÏassertion,€òòMiddlebrooksóó€did€not€embrace€the€broad€principle€of€double€countingÐ €  Ð.€.€.€which€precludes€the€use€of€the€same€evidence€to€establish€more€than€oneÏaggravating€circumstance.ðð€€òòId.óó€€The€court€nevertheless€concluded€that€the€sameÐ 0  Ðevidence€had€not€been€used€to€support€both€aggravators,€recognizing€that€ð ð[t]heÏjuryððs€finding€of€the€(i)(5)€[HAC]€circumstance€was€based€upon€the€torturousÏmeans€by€which€the€defendant€chose€to€kill€the€victim,€and€the€suffering€sheÏendured€prior€to€her€death.ðð€€òòId.óó€€Ð °P ÐÌà ` àWe€agree€that€applying€the€HAC€aggravator€requires€a€jury€to€considerÏwhether€the€instance€of€murder€has€been€aggravated€by€the€òòmanneróó€andÐ È#h Ðòòcircumstancesóó€surrounding€the€deathð"ða€distinction€assisted€by€the€use€of€theÐ Ð%p Ðadverb€ð ðespeciallyðð€and€the€concept€of€ð ðtorture,ðð€which€elevate€the€level€of€atrocityÏto€a€degree€beyond€the€means€or€method€of€the€murder.€€The€foregoing€issueÏlacks€merit.€€€€€€€€€€€ÌœÌ›Ìà@* * ®àVI.€ELECTROCUTION€AS€CRUEL€AND€UNUSUAL€PUNISHMENTˆÌà ` àIn€his€next€issue,€Defendant€contends€that€the€death€penalty,€as€carried€outÏby€electrocution,€constitutes€cruel€and€unusual€punishment.€€The€State€arguesÏâ âthat€this€issue€has€been€waived,€and€the€trial€court€so€found,€noting€thatÐ 8¸.. ÐDefendant€ð ðfailed€to€present€this€allegation€at€any€prior€proceeding.ðð€€This€CourtÏis€constrained€to€agree.Ìâ âÌà ` àTennessee€Code€Annotated€ðð€40„30„206€provides:ÌÓÓà8 ` àà ¸ àA€ground€for€œrelief›€is€waived€if€the€petitioner€personally€orÏthrough€an€attorney€failed€to€present€it€for€determination€in€anyÏproceeding€before€a€court€of€competent€jurisdiction€in€which€theÏground€could€have€been€presented€unless:Ð ` ü!` ü! Ðà8 ` àà ¸ à(1)€The€claim€for€relief€is€based€upon€a€constitutional€right€notÏrecognized€as€existing€at€the€time€of€trial€if€either€the€federal€or€stateÏconstitution€requires€retroactive€application€of€that€right;€or€Ð ` ü!` ü! Ðà8 ` àà ¸ à(2)€The€failure€to€present€the€ground€was€the€result€of€stateÏaction€in€violation€of€the€federal€or€state€constitution.ÓæIÓÐ ` ü!` ü! ÐòòId.óó€ðð€40„30„206(g).€€Defendant€did€not€present€this€issue€upon€direct€appeal,€andÐ ¨H Ðwe€therefore€consider€it€waived.€€Furthermore,€the€issue€lacks€merit,€as€alsoÏnoted€by€the€trial€court€within€its€Findings€of€Fact€and€Conclusions€of€Law€issuedÏfollowing€Defendantððs€post„conviction€hearing.€€òòSee,€e.g.óó,€òòState€v.€Pikeóó,€978Ð À!` ÐS.W.2d€904,€925€(Tenn.€1998);€òòState€v.€Cazesóó,€875€S.W.2d€253,€268€(Tenn.Ð È#h Ð1994);€òòState€v.€Howellóó,€868€S.W.2d€238,€258€(Tenn.€1993);€òòState€v.€Blackóó,€815Ð Ð%p ÐS.W.2d€166,€179€(Tenn.€1991).€ÌÌà@^ ^ ®àVII.€JURY€INSTRUCTION€ON€MITIGATING€FACTORSˆÌà ` àIn€his€seventh€issue,€Defendant€argues€that€the€trial€court€improperlyÏinstructed€the€jury€at€sentencing,€resulting€in€a€denial€of€his€right€to€individualizedÏsentencing.€€He€alleges€that€the€mitigation€instruction€given€at€his€sentencingÏhearing€ð ðfailed€to€adequately€inform€the€jury€of€its€ability€to€consider€non„statutoryÏmitigation,ðð€citing€òòHitchcock€v.€Duggeróó,€481€U.S.€393€(1987).€€Defendant€assertsÐ 6°,, Ðthat€the€trial€court€failed€to€address€this€issue€in€its€Findings€of€Fact€andÏConclusions€of€Law.€€The€State€responds€(1)€that€the€jury€was€indeed€instructedÐ  :À00 Ðthat€it€must€consider€any€mitigation€evidence€presented,€not€limited€to€thoseÏenumerated;€and€(2)€that€contrary€to€Defendantððs€reading,€òòHitchcockóó€holds€a€trialÐ h  Ðcourt€cannot€instruct€a€jury€òònotóó€to€consider€evidence€of€non„statutory€mitigatingÐ p  Ðfactors.ÌÌà ` àIn€òòHitchcockóó,€Justice€Scalia,€speaking€for€the€Court,€found€that€ð ðit€could€notÐ ˆ(  Ðbe€clearer€that€the€advisory€jury€was€instructed€not€to€consider,€and€theÏsentencing€judge€refused€to€consider,€evidence€of€nonstatutory€mitigatingÏcircumstancesðð;€and€it€remanded€the€case,€holding€that€the€proceedings€at€œtheÏoriginal›€sentencing€did€not€comport€with€òòSkipper€v.€South€Carolinaóó,€476€U.S.€1Ð ¨H Ð(1986),€òòEddings€v.€Oklahomaóó,€455€U.S.€104€(1982),€and€òòLockett€v.€Ohioóó,€438Ð °P ÐU.S.€586€(1978).€€òòId.óó€at€398„99.€€Later,€in€his€dissenting€opinion€to€òòMcKoy€v.€NorthÐ ¸X ÐCarolinaóó,€494€U.S.€433€(1990),€Justice€Scalia€acknowledged,€ð ðThe€principleÐ À!` Ðestablished€by€[òòSkipperóó,€òòEddingsóó,€and€òòLockettóó,€òòinteróóòòaliaóó]€is€that€a€State€may€notÐ È#h Ðpreclude€the€sentencer€from€considering€and€giving€effect€to€evidence€of€anyÏrelevant€mitigating€circumstance€proffered€by€the€defendant.ðð€€òòId.óó€at€1245€(Scalia,Ð Ø'x ÐJ.,€dissenting).€€ÌÌà ` àUpon€a€review€of€the€decisions€of€the€United€States€Supreme€Court,€weÏconclude€that€the€trial€court€did€not€err€by€its€instruction€to€the€jury€regardingÏstatutory€and€non„statutory€mitigating€circumstances.€€The€instruction€given€in€thisÏcase€provided,€ð ðIn€arriving€at€the€punishment€the€jury€shall€consider,€asÏheretofore€indicated,€any€mitigating€circumstance€which€shall€include,€but€not€beÏlimited€to€the€following:€[enumeration€of€statutory€factors].ðð€€We€follow€the€law€inÏthis€state:€that€such€an€instruction,€which€replicates€the€statutory€terms€providedÐ  :À00 Ðin€Tennessee€Code€Annotated€ðð€39„13„204(j),€not€only€does€not€in€any€mannerÏpreclude€the€jury€from€considering€non„statutory€mitigation,€but€in€factÏaffirmatively€directs€the€jury€that€it€òòshouldóó€consider€òòanyóó€mitigating€circumstance,Ð p  Ðstatutory€and€non„statutory.€€òòSeeóó€òòState€v.€Smithóó,€857€S.W.2d€1,€22€(Tenn.€1997).€Ð x ÐÌà@""®àVIII.€WAIVER€OF€ADDITIONAL€ISSUESˆÌà ` àFinally,€Defendant€argues€that€the€œpost„conviction€court›€erred€byÏconsidering€several€post„conviction€issues€waived.€€Specifically,€he€asserts€thatÏthe€œñ*ñcourt€ñ*ññœ*ñpost„conviction€court›€ñœ*ñimproperly€considered€his€arguments›€regarding€the€constitutionality€ofÏthe€death€penalty€waived€because€the€contentions€supported€a€proper€post„¼conviction€argument€on€the€ineffective€assistance€of€his€trial€court€for€failing€toÏconstitutionally€challenge€the€death€penalty€on€direct€appeal.€€€€€€ÌÌà ` àDefendant€provides€a€lengthy€discourse€on€the€law€of€waiver,€and€byÏfootnote€indicates€that€he€desires€to€preserve€this€issue€for€later€review.€€DespiteÏthis€wish,€we€need€not€determine€whether€Defendant€argued€below€that€his€trialÏcounsel€were€ineffective€for€failing€to€challenge€the€constitutionality€of€the€deathÏpenalty€(which€would€certainly€be€a€permissible€argument,€not€subject€to€waiver,Ïin€post„conviction€proceedings).€€Rather,€we€need€only€recognize€what€the€trialÏcourt€œheldð"ðthat›€none€of€his€challenges€to€the€constitutionality€of€the€deathÏpenalty€bears€merit.€€òòSee,€e.g.óó,€òòState€v.€Cazesóó,€875€S.W.2d€253,€268„69€(Tenn.Ð 2 (( Ð1994);€òòState€v.€Smithóó,€857€S.W.2d€1,€22€(Tenn.€1993).€€Therefore,€Defendant€hasÐ 4¨** Ðâ ânot€and€cannot€satisfy€the€prejudice€prong€of€the€òòStricklandóó€test€for€ineffectiveÐ 6°,, Ðassistance€of€counsel.€€òòSeeóó€Ô‡Šã8Š ŠŠ¢ÂÔòòStrickland€v.€Washingtonóó,€466€U.S.€668,€687€(1984).œ×ƒ×Ý ƒ95ÝÔ€Š¢Â ŠŠŠã8ÔÔ€Š¢Â Š ŠŠ¢ÂÔòòÚ  Ú7Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý×  ×›Ô#†Š¢Â Š ŠŠ¢ÂCa#ԀР`  Ðâ â€ÌœÌà ` àBecause€we€have€concluded€that€none€of€Defendantððs€issues€for€reviewÏbear€merit,€we€affirm€the€decision€of€the€trial€court€denying€post„conviction€relief.›ÌÌÓ  Óà ` àÌÌÓÓà ` àà ¸ àà  àà h àà À à____________________________________Ìà ` àà ¸ àà  àà h àà À àDAVID€H.€WELLES,€JUDGEÌÌÌÌCONCUR:ÌÌÌÌ___________________________________ÌœJAMES€CURWOOD€WITT,€JR.,€JUDGE›ÌÌÌ___________________________________ÌœL.€Tñž*ñ.ñž*ññŸ*ñERRYñŸ*ñ€LAFFERTY,€SENIOR€JUDGE›