ÿWPCŸR …U.V %„bŠŽn­ž 0JK 0(•U:½w@÷47 0TK 0†Ÿ 0D% 0^i 0hÇ 0r/ 0|¡ 0† 0£ 1u3 0d¨ b  BU*- 1mWB)Äí 0dõU:YDC“ AMÖÊ#ífõ[N^¬NË 0@ D3YŒGžÅåª#¯–Ò/h19p3R©49û8ù4; ->,9?åe@JBGdCv~«DvÓ)F 0üK 0Š‹L 0 M 0´µM 0ÇiN 0Û0O 0ï P AOúPÆIQ 0DR D/SR B‚R<þ6X9`(Courier1X ù3|xÆ8«<þ6X9`(CourierXôxþ6X@ɹ`7ûX@2 ÿÿ0Indent1Ô2ÔÔ3  Ô($¡¡, øð AZ"Arial Regular ¨8E©8ª8«8¬8D­8Õ¶8»8e¼8½8Ó€Ô¡¨ x2" ÿÿ0Indent2à0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô(6(2Õd$¤¤Ý ƒ !ÝÝ  ÝÓ  ÓÒ°Òà ` àòòÚ  Ú0Ú  Úóó(#Ã$òòÚ  Ú0Ú  Úóó2, ÿÿ0Indent3à0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô26 ÿÿ0Indent4à0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2@ ÿÿ0Indent5à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2J ÿÿ0Indent6à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2T ÿÿ0Indent7à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2^ ÿÿ0Indent8à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô  ÿÿ?AGMSYaioIndent0I.A.1.a.(1)(a)i)a)P ÿÿ8Mac DefaultMac DefaultÓ ` °šXÓ ù d< Œ 9p`(Arial/tuvwxyz#,37=CIQYag­­1.a.i.(1)(a)(i)1)a)% Line 7 d(<1$´´Ô2Ô6.Ú  Ú0Ú  ÚÔ3  Ôà0  à,c½¬AZ‹"Arial Regular----7Border 1dd€@4Cþÿ << Gÿÿ ÀÝ ƒ !ÝÔ€+ÔÝ  ÝÔ€+ÔÓ  Óò òÔ YYY ÔFILEDÔ€+XÔÌÌJune€26,€1997ÌÌCecil€W.€CrowsonÌAppellate€Court€ClerkÔ  Ôó ó \Ñ\R AØ'\Ñ ùÝ ƒ !ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€+ÔÝ  ÝÝ ƒ$ÝÓ  ÓÒ  ÒÒ ° Òà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  ÝDusty€Mitchell€and€Dustin€Mitchell€appear€to€be€the€same€individual.Ì DÝ ƒ !ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€+ÔÝ  ÝÝ ƒ$ÝÓ  ÓÒ  ÒÒ ° Òà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  ÝAlthough€the€court's€order€is€not€in€the€record€on€appeal,€the€Institute'sÏreport€indicates€the€evaluation€was€ordered€by€the€General€Sessions€CourtÏpursuant€to€Code€section€33„7„301(a).€€This€Code€provision€deals€in€relevantÏpart€with€mental€health€care€for€purposes€of€"evaluation€and€treatment€as€itÏrelates€to€competency€to€stand€trial."€€òòSeeóó€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€33„7„301(a)Ï(Supp.€1996).Ì Ý ƒ !ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€+ÔÝ  ÝÝ ƒ$ÝÓ  ÓÒ  ÒÒ ° Òà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  ÝThe€doctor€admitted€this€history€may€have€been€taken€from€Mrs.€Nolan,Ïrather€than€the€appellant.Ì DÝ ƒ !ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€+ÔÝ  ÝÝ ƒ$ÝÓ  ÓÒ  ÒÒ ° Òà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  ÝTest€results€were€stipulated€into€evidence€which€are€consistent€with€theÏpresence€of€marijuana€in€the€appellant's€body€on€the€date€in€question.Ì("ÿÿ$££Ò  ÒÒ  Ò""""'ÿÿdxd Ý ƒ !ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€+ÔÝ  ÝÝ ƒ$ÝÓ  ÓÒ  ÒÒ ° Òà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  ÝSequatchie€County€Mental€Health€Center€is€part€of€Joe€Johnson€MentalÏHealth€Center.Ì =Ý ƒ !ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€+ÔÝ  ÝÝ ƒ$ÝÓ  ÓÒ  ÒÒ ° Òà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  ÝIn€separate€issues,€the€appellant€has€challenged€the€trial€court's€failureÏto€€rule€as€a€matter€of€the€law€that€the€defendant€was€insane€at€the€time€of€theÏoffenses€and€whether€the€state€proved€sanity€beyond€a€reasonable€doubt.€€WeÏview€the€latter€as€a€sufficiency€of€the€evidence€question€and€as€potentiallyÏdispositive€of€the€former.€€These€issues€are€discussed€at€section€III,€òòinfraóó.Ì »Ý ƒ !ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€+ÔÝ  ÝÝ ƒ$ÝÓ  ÓÒ  ÒÒ ° Òà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  ÝThe€trial€court€entered€a€judgment€of€acquittal€on€the€attempted€firstÏdegree€murder€charges€and€submitted€attempted€second€degree€murder,Ïaggravated€assault,€reckless€aggravated€assault,€reckless€endangerment€andÏassault€on€the€indictments€recited€above.€€€€€€€Ì ûÝ ƒ !ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€+ÔÝ  ÝÝ ƒ$ÝÓ  ÓÒ  ÒÒ ° Òà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  ÝAn€assault€is€committed€by€one€who€intentionally,€knowingly€orÏrecklessly€causes€bodily€injury€to€another,€intentionally€or€knowingly€placesÏanother€in€reasonable€fear€of€bodily€injury,€or€intentionally€or€knowingly€causesÏextremely€offensive€or€provocative€physical€contact€to€another.€€Tenn.€CodeÏAnn.€ðð€39„13„101€(1991).Ì Ý ƒ !ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€+ÔÝ  ÝÝ ƒ$ÝÓ  ÓÒ  ÒÒ ° Òà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  ÝÑ\R AØ'\ÑWe€are€mindful€of€the€question€òòKimbroughóó€raises€regarding€the€viabilityÏof€crimes€which€consist€of€a€criminal€attempt€of€an€offense€requiring€a€knowingÏmental€state.€€òòSee,€e.g.óó€òòState€v.€Fabien€Eldridgeóó,€No.€01C01„9504„CC„00106,Ïslip€op.€at€5„7€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.,€Nashville,€May€7,€1997)€(attempted€secondÏdegree€murder);€òòState€v.€Cecil€Skidmoreóó,€No.€03C01„9502„CR„00039,€slip€op.Ïat€9,€n.7€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.,€Knoxville,€Apr.€24,€1997)€(attempted€voluntaryÏmanslaughter);€òòState€v.€John€Guinnóó,€No.€02A01„9607„CV„00152,€slip€op.€at€4„5Ï(Tenn.€Ct.€App.,€Jackson,€Jan.€17,€1997)€(attempted€second€degree€murder).€ÏAlthough€òòKimbroughóó€addresses€criminal€attempts€of€crimes€which€require€aÏreckless€or€criminally€negligent€mental€state,€it€does€not€specifically€address€theÏviability€of€attempts€of€the€more€culpable€"knowing"€crimes.€€òòKimbroughóó,€924ÏS.W.2d€at€890„91.€€ÌÓÓÌÓÓà àAttempted€second€degree€murder€may€be€proven€by€a€showing€theÏdefendant€"intentionally€acted€with€the€requisite€culpability€to€commit€the€offenseÏof€murder€in€the€second€degree"€and€the€defendant€"could€have€been€convictedÏof€murder€in€the€second€degree€.€.€.€if€he€had€actually€killed€the€victims."€€òòState€v.ÏJohn€L.€Smithóó,€No.€01C01„9309„CR„00308€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.,€Nashville,€Oct.Ï20,€1994);€òòsee€alsoóó€òòState€v.€Edward€Thompsonóó,€No.€03C01„9503„CR„00060Ï(Tenn.€Crim.€App.,€Knoxville,€Dec.€12,€1996);€òòState€v.€Timothy€Jenkinsóó,€No.Ï01C01„9508„CC„00269€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.,€Nashville,€Nov.€15,€1996).€We€seeÏno€inherent€conflict€within€that€definition.€ÌÌà àAdditionally,€we€note€the€difference€between€the€mental€states€ofÏintentional€and€knowing,€as€distinguished€from€reckless€and€criminallyÏnegligent.€€The€former€two€involve€a€level€of€conscious€awareness€andÏvolitional,€affirmative€conduct,€whereas€the€latter€two€contemplate€a€disregard€ofÏthe€situation€and€unintentional€(or€at€least€irresponsible)€conduct€or€failure€toÏact.ÌÌà àFinally,€we€believe€the€overall€structure€of€the€criminal€code€dictates€thisÏresult.€€Crimes€which,€if€completed,€would€amount€to€criminally€negligentÏhomicide€or€vehicular€homicide,€i.e.€those€which€require€a€mental€state€lessÏculpable€than€"knowing,"€but€which€fail€as€a€substantive€offense€under€theÏhomicide€statute€because€the€victim€does€not€die,€are€nevertheless€punishableÏas€assaultive€offenses.€€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€39„13„103€(reckless€endangerment)Ï(1991);€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€39„13„106€(vehicular€assault)€(1991);€òòaccordóó€ModelÏPenal€Code€ðð€5.01€commentary€at€303„04€(1985)€(Model€Penal€Code€createsÏseparate€offenses€for€recklessly€placing€another€person€in€danger€of€death,Ïrather€than€applying€the€law€of€attempt€to€reckless€and€negligent€homicideÏoffenses).€€In€contrast,€the€crime€of€murder€in€the€second€degree€is€often€foundÏas€a€lesser€offense€of€murder€in€the€first€degree€where€€there€has€been€a€failureÏof€proof€of€premeditation€or€deliberation,€the€distinguishing€elements€of€firstÏdegree€murder.€€€Although€the€crimes€of€assault€and€aggravated€assault€could,Ïin€some€cases,€be€found€on€facts€which€would€otherwise€constitute€attemptedÏsecond€degree€murder,€this€is€not€always€the€case.€€For€example,€an€attempt€inÏwhich€the€intended€victim€is€unaware€of€the€threat€of€imminent€bodily€injury€andÏsustains€no€bodily€injury€could€not€support€an€assault€conviction.€€òòSeeóó€Tenn.ÏCode€Ann.€ðð€39„13„101(a)€(1991).€€Thus,€the€criminal€code€does€not€provide€anÏall„encompassing€alternative€to€attempted€second€degree€murder.€€We€believeÏthe€code€contemplates€the€use€of€the€criminal€attempt€statute€with€the€secondÏdegree€murder€statute€in€factually€appropriate€circumstances.€€To€holdÏotherwise€would,€in€some€cases,€allow€the€defendant€who€has€been€indicted€forÏattempted€first€degree€murder,€but€for€whom€proof€of€premeditation€fails,€toÏescape€criminal€responsibility€altogether.€€It€is€beyond€our€comprehension€thatÏthis€result€was€contemplated€by€the€legislature€in€enacting€the€criminal€code€orÏthe€supreme€court€in€its€òòKimbroughóó€decision.€€Ì ŒÝ ƒ !ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€+ÔÝ  ÝÝ ƒ$ÝÓ  ÓÒ  ÒÒ ° Òà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  ÝAlthough€the€Technical€Record€does€not€contain€these€writtenÏinstructions,€we€have€been€provided€with€a€transcribed€version€of€the€judgeððsÏcharge,€including€the€comments€of€counsel€made€at€the€time€of€the€charge.Ì þÝ ƒ !ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€+ÔÝ  ÝÝ ƒ$ÝÓ  ÓÒ  ÒÒ ° Òà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  ÝThe€exact€wording€of€the€appellant's€issue€reads,€"Did€the€Court€err€inÏfailing€to€rule€as€a€matter€of€law€that€the€Defendant€was€òònotóó€insane€at€the€time€ofÏthe€commission€of€the€offenses€charged?"€(emphasis€added)€€It€is€apparent€fromÏthe€appellant's€argument,€however,€that€the€word€"not"€should€be€omitted€fromÏthe€issue.Ì /Ý ƒ !ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€+ÔÝ  ÝÝ ƒ$ÝÓ  ÓÒ  ÒÒ ° Òà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  ÝFor€a€complete€discussion€of€the€legal€standard€for€review€of€theÏsufficiency€of€the€evidence,€see€òòsupraóó,€section€I.Ì HÝ ƒ !ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€+ÔÝ  ÝÝ ƒ$ÝÓ  ÓÒ  ÒÒ ° Òà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  ÝDespite€this€conclusive€testimony€of€the€expert€witness€offered€by€theÏstate,€the€appellant€would€have€us€hold€the€evidence€was€insufficient€becauseÏthe€lay€witnesses'€testimony€was€consistent€with€sanity€but€not€inconsistent€withÏinsanity.€€The€òòEdwardsóó€rule€is€phrased€in€the€alternative.€€Evidence€satisfyingÏany€one€of€the€three€alternatives€is€sufficient€to€carry€the€state's€burden.€€òòAccordóóÏòòState€v.€David€Paul€Martinóó,€No.€03C01„9412„CR„00448,€slip€op.€at€25„26€(Tenn.ÏCrim.€App.,€Knoxville,€Oct.€13,€1995)€(trial€court€did€not€commit€prejudicial€errorÏin€refusing€to€instruct€jury€that€state's€proof€"must€not€only€be€consistent€withÏsanity,€but€inconsistent€with€insanity"€where€state€submitted€both€lay€and€expertÏtestimony€that€defendant€satisfied€test€of€legal€sanity),€òòperm.€app.€granted€onÏother€groundsóó€(Tenn.€Apr.€1,€1996);€òòsee€generallyóó€òòEdwardsóó,€540€S.W.2d€at€646.Ì /Ý ƒ !ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€+ÔÝ  ÝÝ ƒ$ÝÓ  ÓÒ  ÒÒ ° Òà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  ÝThe€next€sentence€is,€"Although€I€think€the€elements€of€attempt€toÏcommit€second€[degree€murder]€are€there€and€I've€got€to€let€it€go€on€it,€but€I€thinkÏwe're€in€a€position€of€having€some€really€muddy€water€as€far€as€what'sÏappropriate."€€The€overall€discussion€pertains€to€whether€aggravated€assault€isÏappropriately€charged€as€a€lesser€included€offense€of€second€degree€murder.Ì ïÝ ƒ !ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€+ÔÝ  ÝÝ ƒ$ÝÓ  ÓÒ  ÒÒ ° Òà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  ÝThe€trial€judge€made€this€statement€during€his€discussion€of€whetherÏthe€sentences€would€be€consecutive€or€concurrent.€€When€read€in€the€context€ofÏthe€entire€colloquy,€it€is€apparent€the€judge€was€not€questioning€whether€theÏappellant€possessed€the€requisite€mental€states€for€each€of€the€crimes€on€whichÏthe€jury€found€guilt.€€Rather,€he€was€expressing€his€uncertainty€as€to€whetherÏCode€section€40„35„115(b)(4)€required€a€finding€of€intentional€disregard€forÏhuman€life€and€readiness€to€act€where€risk€to€human€life€was€high€in€order€toÏimpose€consecutive€sentencing.Ì Ý ƒ !ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€+ÔÝ  ÝÝ ƒ$ÝÓ  ÓÒ  ÒÒ ° Òà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  ÝThe€trial€judge€was€commenting€on€the€sufficiency€of€the€convictingÏevidence.Ì "Ý ƒ !ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€+ÔÝ  ÝÝ ƒ$ÝÓ  ÓÒ  ÒÒ ° Òà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  ÝWe€are,€however,€permitted€to€review€the€sufficiency€of€the€evidence,Ïwhich€is€discussed€in€section€I€above.€Ì ÛÝ ƒ !ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€+ÔÝ  ÝÝ ƒ$ÝÓ  ÓÒ  ÒÒ ° Òà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  ÝTennessee€Code€Annotated€ðð€40„35„302(d)€(Supp.€1996)€requires€theÏtrial€court€to€specify€the€percentage€of€a€misdemeanor€sentence€which€theÏdefendant€is€being€required€to€serve.€€We€interpret€the€courtððs€judgment€on€theÏassault€case€to€fix€30%€as€the€time€to€be€served€on€the€misdemeanor.Ì Ý ƒ !ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€+ÔÝ  ÝÝ ƒ$ÝÓ  ÓÒ  ÒÒ ° Òà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  ÝThe€trial€court€made€no€findings€of€fact€on€the€record€concerning€theÏmisdemeanor€sentence.Ì =Ý ƒ !ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€+ÔÝ  ÝÝ ƒ$ÝÓ  ÓÒ  ÒÒ ° Òà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  ÝòòSee€State€v.€Kenneth€Eugene€Troutmanóó,€No.€03C01„9509„CC„00287Ï(Tenn.€Crim.€App.,€Knoxville,€Nov.€6,€1996)€(Hayes,€J.,€dissenting).ÌPtPtHHÚ(ÿáÿâùFG(üHHÚ(d'hStyl{WP}01•ÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃà Ãà Ãà Ãà Ãà ÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÐ ÐÐHHÐÐ  ÐÐ2ÐÐÿÿ¸æ$ÿÐÐHHÐÐÐÐÐÐÐÐ  ÐÐ ÐÐ ÐÑÑÑGenevaÑÑ ÑÑ € ÑÑ<Px–ÈÑÒÒÒ443!#4ÒÒ$ *$ÒÒ$*$ÒÒ ÿKK ÒÒ  Geneva ÒÒ  Geneva ÒÓ.,ÓÓÓÓ6ÓÓ ÓßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßÑGenevaÑÑ ÑÒ  h HD: Geneva ÒÒ  h HD: Geneva Ò(gfi$µµà0  àÔ2(ÆÔ6.Ú  Ú0Ú  Ú.Ú  Ú0Ú  ÚÔ3  Ôà0` (#(#à(bÕä$¶¶à0  àà0` (#(#àÔ2ˆAÔÚ  ÚÚ  Ú.Ô3  Ôà0¸ ` (#` (#à(xâr$··à0  àà0` (#(#àà0¸ ` (#` (#àÔ2ˆAÔ(Ú  Ú0Ú  Ú)Ô3  Ôà0¸ (#¸ (#à(ŒU$¸¸à0  àà0` (#(#àà0¸ ` (#` (#àà0¸ (#¸ (#àÔ2ˆAÔ(Ú  ÚaÚ  Ú)Ô3  Ôà0h(#(#à(Ÿ@Æ$¹¹à0  àà0` (#(#àà0¸ ` (#` (#àà0¸ (#¸ (#àà0h(#(#àÔ2ˆAÔ(Ú  ÚÚ  Ú)Ô3  Ôà0Àh(#h(#à(³ýt$ººà0  àà0` (#(#àà0¸ ` (#` (#àà0¸ (#¸ (#àà0h(#(#àà0Àh(#h(#àÔ2ˆAÔÚ  Ú0Ú  Ú)Ô3  Ôà0À(#À(#à(Çñû$»»à0  àà0` (#(#àà0¸ ` (#` (#àà0¸ (#¸ (#àà0h(#(#àà0Àh(#h(#àà0À(#À(#àÔ2ˆAÔÚ  ÚaÚ  Ú)Ô3  Ôà0p(#(#à€@‚ƒCþÿ<< CÿÿƒLevel 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5($$””ò òÚ  Ú1Ú  Úó ó„„'÷ÿ dxdüÿP PdÝ ƒ !ÝÔ . ÔÔ€+ÔÝ  Ý›Ñ ` ÑÒ  ÒÒ ° ÒÑ\R AØ'\ÑÑ€Ñò òœÙ€€ÙÓ  ÓÑ\R AØ'\ÑßR€794A1-j|` ç `€€@ÿRß›Þ ÞÌà@ àIN€THE€COURT€OF€CRIMINAL€APPEALS€OF€TENNESSEEÌÌ€à@ àAT€NASHVILLEÌó óÌà@ àFEBRUARY€1997€SESSIONÌÌÌÌò òSTATE€OF€TENNESSEE,à à€à àà àó ó)Ìà àà àà àà àà àà à)à àÌà àà àAppellee,à àà àà à)à àC.C.A.€No.€01C01„9511„CC„00387Ìà àà àà àà àà àà à)Ìvs.à àà àà àà àà àà à)à àSequatchie€Countyà àÌà àà àà àà àà àà à)Ìò òDALE€NOLAN,ó óà àà àà àà à)à àHonorable€Buddy€D.€Perry,ÏJudge€à àà àà àà àà àà à)à àÌà àà àAppellant.à àà àà à)à à(Assault,€AggravatedÌà àà àà àà àà àà à)à à€Assault,€Attempted€2d€DegreeÌà àà àà àà àà àà à)à àMurder,€Kidnapping)Ìà àà àà àà àà àà àÌà àà àà àà àÌà àà àà àà àà àà àà àÌÌFOR€THE€APPELLANT:à àà àà àà àFOR€THE€APPELLEE:ÌÌPHILIP€A.€CONDRAà àà àà àà àJOHN€KNOX€WALKUPÌDistrict€Public€Defenderà àà àà àà àAttorney€General€&€ReporterÌÌB.€JEFFERY€HARMONà àà àà àà àMERRILYN€FEIRMANÌAssistant€District€Public€Defenderà àà àAssistant€Attorney€GeneralÌP.O.€Box€220à àà àà àà àà àCriminal€Justice€DivisionÌ204€Betsy€Pack€Driveà àà àà àà à450€James€Robertson€ParkwayÌJasper,€TN€€37347à àà àà àà àà àNashville,€TN€37243„0493à àÌÌà àà àà àà àà àà àà àJAMES€MICHAEL€TAYLORÌà àà àà àà àà àà àà àDistrict€Attorney€GeneralÌÌà àà àà àà àà àà àà àJAMES€W.€POPE,€IIIÌà àà àà àà àà àà àà àAsst.€District€AttorneyÌà àà àà àà àà àà àà à265€Third€Ave.,€Ste.€300Ìà àà àà àà àà àà àà àDayton,€TN€€37321ÌÌÌÌOPINION€FILED:€____________________ÌÌÌò òAFFIRMED€„€ATTEMPT€TO€COMMIT€SECOND€DEGREE€MURDER;€à à€€€Ïà àà àKIDNAPPING;€ASSAULTÌREVERSED€AND€DISMISSED€„€AGGRAVATED€ASSAULTó óÌÌÌCURWOOD€WITT€ÌJUDGEÑ€;ÑÇÑ7€²XXdðXXdæ7ÑÑ  ÑÑ  ÑÓÓÑ7€ ²  XXdðXXdð7ÑÑ€ÑÑ  Ñà@ àò òòòOPINIONó óóóÌà àà àThe€appellant,€Dale€Nolan,€was€convicted€by€the€Circuit€Court€ofÏSequatchie€County€of€assault,€aggravated€assault,€attempted€second€degreeÏmurder€and€kidnapping.€€The€court€imposed€sentences€of€11€months,€29€daysÏfor€the€€assault,€4€years€for€the€reckless€aggravated€assault,€and€9€years€for€theÏattempted€second€degree€murder,€all€to€run€concurrently.€€The€court€alsoÏimposed€a€6„year€sentence€for€the€kidnapping€conviction€to€be€servedÏconsecutively€to€the€attempted€second€degree€murder€sentence.€€The€appellantÏis€before€this€court€on€his€direct€appeal,€and€he€has€raised€numerous€issues€forÏour€consideration€relating€to€the€sufficiency€of€the€evidence,€jury€instructionsÏand€verdict€form,€the€applicability€of€the€insanity€defense,€the€constitutionalÏrights€of€a€unanimous€verdict€and€protection€against€double€jeopardy,€theÏcourt's€role€as€the€thirteenth€juror,€and€sentencing.€€Upon€our€review,€we€affirmÏthe€convictions€and€sentences€in€all€cases€except€the€aggravated€assault.€€ThisÏlatter€conviction€is€reversed,€and€the€indictment€€is€dismissed,€an€action€that€theÏstate€concedes€is€appropriate.ÌÌà àà àOn€December€28,€1993,€the€appellant€lived€in€a€house€trailer€withÏhis€wife,€Christine€Nolan,€and€his€15€year€old€daughter,€Tina€Nolan,€inÏSequatchie€County.€€During€the€day,€the€appellant€attended€a€medicalÍappointment€with€a€neurologist€who€treated€him€for€epilepsy€and€a€licensedÏprofessional€counselor€who€provided€mental€health€treatment.€€Christine€NolanÏaccompanied€the€appellant€to€these€appointments.€€ÌÌà àà àAfter€returning€home€in€the€afternoon,€the€appellant€visited€with€aÏneighbor,€and€he€returned€to€his€home€upset€and€crying.€€By€all€accounts,€heÏhad€not€been€upset€earlier€in€the€day.€€The€appellant€left€his€home€for€a€fewÏhours€and€returned€wanting€to€go€to€church,€which€he€and€his€wife€did€thatÏevening.€€Mrs.€ØØØØÙ  ÙNolan€testified€that€her€husband€told€her€during€their€trip€toÏchurch€that€his€cigarettesÛÛÛÛ€tasted€strange€and€he€wanted€to€get€fresh€ones.€€HeÏalso€remarked€that€something€was€wrong€because€there€were€cars€with€out„of„state€license€tags€at€the€store€where€they€stopped€to€purchase€cigarettes.ÌÌà àà àAfter€returning€home€from€church,€the€appellant€went€to€a€freshÏwater€spring€to€get€water€because€he€did€not€think€the€tap€water€at€his€trailerÏtasted€as€it€should.€€Christine€Nolan€went€to€bed€while€the€appellant€was€out€toÏget€water.€€Sometime€after€the€appellant€returned€to€his€home,€he€awoke€hisÏwife€and€told€her€she€must€get€up€because€the€world€was€coming€to€an€end.€€HeÏtold€her€God€had€put€him€"in€charge."€€Mrs.€Nolan€observed€that€the€appellantÏwas€very€upset.€€During€these€events,€the€appellant€squatted€on€the€floor€andÍbeat€his€fist€in€a€circle.ÌÌà àà àThe€appellant€and€Mrs.€Nolan€went€into€the€living€room,€where€theÏappellant€retrieved€a€gun€from€under€the€couch.€€The€appellant€also€madeÏstatements€that€he€was€God€and€God€had€put€him€in€charge,€and€he€smackedÏhis€own€face.€€Mrs.€Nolan€testified€that€the€appellant€had€a€"wild€look"€on€hisÏface€and€his€expression€was€not€normal.ÌÌà àà àThe€appellant€took€the€gun,€pointed€it€under€his€wife's€breast,€andÏÜÜÜÜpulled€the€trigger.€€It€clicked€and€did€not€fire.€€The€appellant€then€pointed€andÏfired€at€the€television€set,€blowing€a€hole€through€it.€€Mr.€Nolan€beganÏdemanding€that€his€wife€get€Joe€May,€the€Sequatchie€County€Sheriff,€on€theÏphone.€€He€continued€to€profess€to€be€God.€€He€also€stated€he€was€going€toÏshoot€Satan€and€put€Satan€back€in€Hell€where€he€belonged.€€Mrs.€NolanÏinterpreted€the€appellant's€comments€about€Satan€as€referring€to€Sheriff€May.ÌÌà àà àAt€approximately€1:30€a.m.,€Officer€Loyd€Grant€of€the€DunlapÏPolice€Department€responded€to€a€complaint€of€a€family€disturbance€at€theÏNolan€residence.€€€When€he€arrived,€he€parked€his€patrol€car€in€the€drivewayÏand€walked€to€the€porch.€€He€testified€it€was€dark€and€foggy,€and€he€hadÍdifficulty€seeing.€€He€was€able€to€determine€that€Dale€Nolan,€whom€he€knew,Ïand€a€woman€he€did€not€know€were€on€the€porch.€€The€appellant€indicated€thatÏhe€wanted€to€see€the€sheriff.€€€Mr.€Nolan€was€holding€the€gun,€although€OfficerÏGrant€did€not€see€it€until€Mr.€Nolan€poked€him€in€the€chest€with€it.€€The€appellantÏshoved€Officer€Grant€three€times€with€the€gun,€and€the€third€time€Officer€GrantÏshoved€the€appellant€back€by€the€barrel€of€the€gun.€€As€the€appellant€was€fallingÏbackwards,€the€Nolans'€dog€bit€Officer€Grant,€and€the€gun€fired.€€The€bullet€hitÏOfficer€Grant€between€his€first€finger€and€thumb,€split€another€finger,€and€causedÏother€minor€injuries€to€his€leg.€€Officer€Grant€testified€he€did€not€know€how€theÏgun€discharged,€only€that€it€went€off€as€the€appellant€was€going€backwards.€ÏOfficer€Grant€then€went€around€the€trailer,€and€he€encountered€Sheriff's€DeputyÏDustin€Mitchell,€who€had€responded€to€the€scene€along€with€Deputy€MikeÏStephens€as€backup.ÌÌà àà àMitchell,€who€at€the€time€of€the€trial€was€employed€as€a€policeÏofficer€with€the€City€of€Dunlap,€testified€he€was€not€in€uniform€because€he€wasÏnot€scheduled€to€work€that€evening.€€He€had€been€at€the€jail€when€a€complaintÏcall€came€in€and€had€accompanied€Deputy€Stephens€to€the€Nolan€trailer€atÏStephens'€€request.€€He€testified€Deputy€Stephens€was€in€uniform,€and€theyÏarrived€at€the€Nolan€residence€in€a€marked€patrol€car.€€Officer€Mitchell€recalledÍseeing€two€men€struggling€on€the€porch€when€he€arrived.€€He€jumped€out€of€theÏcar€and€ran€to€approximately€ten€yards€from€the€porch,€at€which€point€heÏrecalled€seeing€the€appellant€jerk€away€from€Officer€Grant,€step€back€and€shootÏthe€gun€he€had€pointed€at€Grant.€€Officer€Mitchell€testified€that€the€appellantÏimmediately€turned€and€shot€in€his€direction,€and€he€heard€a€sound€like€aÏmosquito€whizzing€by€him.€€ÌÌà àà àOfficer€Stephens€testified€he€was€standing€about€2€car€lengths€orÏ15€feet€from€the€end€of€the€trailer€when€he€heard€the€first€shot€fired.€€He€lookedÏup,€and€it€appeared€that€the€appellant€shot€again,€this€time€at€Mitchell.€€AlthoughÏStephens€could€not€see€the€weapon€itself,€he€saw€the€muzzle€flash.ÌÌà àà àThe€appellant€retreated€to€his€trailer,€where€his€wife€had€alreadyÏreturned€during€the€preceding€events.€€Tina€Nolan€and€her€16„year„old€friend,ÏNancy€Smith,€were€also€in€the€trailer€in€Tina's€bedroom.€€During€the€evening,ÏMiss€Smith€heard€the€appellant€crying€and€saying€the€world€was€ending.€€SheÏalso€heard€gunshots€and€observed€the€hole€in€the€television€and€the€walls.€ÏMiss€Smith€heard€the€appellant€making€statements€that€he€was€God€and€that€heÏwanted€to€shoot€Sheriff€May.€€The€appellant€also€made€statements€that€MissÏSmith's€father,€whom€the€appellant€had€never€met,€had€the€deed€to€the€NolanÍtrailer.€€At€various€times€throughout€the€night,€the€appellant€went€into€Tina'sÏbedroom€with€the€gun€to€check€on€Tina€and€Nancy,€and€at€other€times,€he€hadÏthe€girls€come€into€the€living€room.€€The€appellant€demanded€that€Miss€SmithÏcall€her€father,€which€she€attempted€to€do.€€He€also€had€Tina€call€the€police€toÏhave€Joe€May€come€to€the€house.€€Miss€Smith€testified€that€although€theÏappellant€never€told€her€she€could€not€leave€the€trailer,€she€was€afraid€to€do€soÏand€feared€the€appellant€was€going€to€shoot€her.€€She€further€testified€thatÏalthough€her€intention€had€been€to€spend€the€night€at€the€Nolan€residence,€sheÏno€longer€wanted€to€stay€there€after€she€became€fearful€of€the€appellant.ÌÌà àà àIn€addition€to€these€events,€Mrs.€Nolan€testified€that€throughout€theÏnight€her€husband€was€upset€about€a€deed,€which€she€did€not€understand.€€AtÏone€point,€she€told€him€he€was€not€God,€he€was€Dale€Nolan,€to€which€heÏresponded,€"Who's€Dale€Nolan?"€€Mrs.€Nolan€also€testified€her€husband€wasÏnormally€good€with€the€family€cat€and€dog,€although€that€night€he€kicked€the€dogÏand€aimed€the€gun€at€the€cat.€€The€appellant€also€turned€lights€off€and€on€in€theÏhouse€and€removed€drawers,€set€them€on€the€cabinet,€and€acted€like€he€wasÏtaking€items€from€them.€ÌÌà àà àAdditional€law€enforcement€officers€responded€to€the€scene,Íincluding€a€SWAT€team€from€Chattanooga.€€The€appellant€and€the€officersÏcommunicated€by€telephone€and€by€yelling€back€and€forth€at€the€scene.€€AroundÏdaybreak,€Mrs.€Nolan€was€able€to€escape€while€the€appellant€was€on€his€kneesÏpraying.€€Tina€Nolan€and€Nancy€Smith€escaped€the€house€later€in€the€morningÏwhen€the€appellant€set€the€gun€down€momentarily.ÌÌà àà àShortly€thereafter,€Mr.€Nolan€was€disarmed€and€taken€into€custody.€ÏBy€this€time,€the€media€had€arrived,€and€as€Mr.€Nolan€was€taken€away,€heÏlooked€into€the€cameras€and€made€statements€about€God€and€the€Devil€and€thatÏhe€owned€everything.€€He€was€placed€in€Officer€Stephens'€patrol€car.€€While€inÏthe€car,€the€appellant€stuck€his€head€through€the€glass€cage€separating€the€frontÏand€back€of€the€car€and€bit€Officer€Mitchell€on€the€shoulder.ÌÌà àà àSheriff€May€ordered€Deputy€Coy€Swanger€to€transport€theÏappellant€directly€to€Joe€Johnson€Mental€Health€Center.€€Deputy€Clyde€JohnsonÏaccompanied€Deputy€Swanger€to€the€mental€health€center.€€Once€there,€theÏstaff€requested€that€the€appellant€be€taken€to€Erlanger€Hospital€for€collection€ofÏblood€and€urine€samples.€€Deputy€Swanger€testified€that€the€appellant€becameÏvery€violent€while€giving€the€urine€sample,€and€after€an€Erlanger€security€guardÏassisted€in€obtaining€the€sample,€it€took€Deputies€Swanger€and€Johnson€andÍtwo€Erlanger€security€guards€to€get€him€back€into€the€patrol€car.€€DeputyÏSwanger€testified€the€appellant€calmed€down€after€he€was€in€the€car;€however,Ïduring€the€return€trip€to€the€mental€health€center€he€again€became€violent€andÏkicked€out€one€of€the€back€windows€of€the€patrol€car.€€Despite€DeputyÏSwanger's€efforts€to€throw€the€appellant€off€balance€by€swerving€back€and€forth,Ïthe€appellant€€proceeded€to€crawl€out€the€opening€while€the€car€was€travelingÏ30€to€40€miles€per€hour.€€The€deputies€fought€to€restrain€the€appellant,€who€wasÏvery€violent,€and€were€able€to€do€so€after€a€protracted€struggle€and€numerousÏChattanooga€police€officers€responded.ÌÌà àà àThe€appellant€was€indicted€for€kidnapping€Nancy€Smith,€€attemptÏof€first€degree€murder€of€Loyd€Grant,€attempt€of€first€degree€murder€of€DustyÏMitchell,× ƒ< ××  ×€and€assault€on€an€officer,€Dustin€Mitchell.ÌÌà àà àShortly€after€the€appellant€was€taken€into€custody,€he€was€sent€toÏthe€Middle€Tennessee€Mental€Health€Institute€("Institute")€for€a€forensicÏevaluation.× ƒ= ××  ×€€A€second€forensic€evaluation€was€ordered€with€the€Institute€inÍNovember€1994,€following€an€out„patient€evaluation€at€Joe€Johnson€MentalÏHealth€Center€in€October€1994€and€the€appellant's€notice€of€intent€to€rely€on€theÏinsanity€defense€of€Tennessee€Code€Annotated€section€39„11„501.ÌÌà àà àAt€trial,€the€state€presented€the€expert€testimony€of€RokeyaÏFarooque,€Ìa€psychiatrist€who€evaluated€the€appellant€during€both€of€his€admissions€at€theÏInstitute.€€Doctor€Farooque€testified€that€the€Institute€utilizes€a€"team"€approachÏto€forensic€evaluations,€whereby€the€psychiatrist,€psychologists,€social€workersÏand€nurses€work€together€to€determine€whether€the€patient€is€competent€toÏstand€trial,€whether€the€patient€meets€the€criteria€for€the€insanity€defense,€andÏwhether€the€patient€is€committable.€€Doctor€Farooque€testified€that€sheÏdisagreed€with€the€previous€diagnoses€of€paranoid€schizophrenia,€atypicalÏpsychosis€and€delusional€disorder€which€had€been€given€to€the€appellant€byÏother€mental€health€professionals.€€She€testified€the€appellant€initially€madeÏsome€complaints€that€his€food€did€not€taste€right€and€of€hearing€spirits'€voicesÏspeaking€to€him,€but€the€only€psychiatric€diagnosis€she€found€appropriate€wasÏcannabis€(marijuana)€€abuse.€€The€doctor's€evaluation€included€a€history€ofÍsevere€post„initial„effect€violent€reactions€to€marijuana× ƒ> ××  ×€and€a€long€history€ofÏmarijuana€use.€€Moreover,€Dr.€Farooque€testified€the€appellant€admittedÏmarijuana€use€on€the€date€of€the€incident,× ƒ? ××  ×ò ò€ó óand€in€her€opinion,€his€actions€wereÏthe€result€of€marijuana€consumption.€€She€opined€that€the€appellant€wasÏcompetent€to€stand€trial,€not€an€appropriate€candidate€for€the€insanity€defenseÏand€not€committable.€ÌÌà àà àThe€appellant's€expert€witnesses€were€Bob€Fairweather,€aÏlicensed€professional€counselor€who€treated€the€appellant€at€SequatchieÏCounty€Mental€Health€Center,× ƒD ××  ×€and€Duncan€Cater,€a€psychiatrist€specializing€inÏaddiction€medicine,€who€treated€the€appellant€at€Joe€Johnson€Mental€HealthÏCenter.€€Mr.€Fairweather€testified€that€his€license€allows€him€to€makeÏpsychological€diagnoses,€although€his€employer€requires€that€all€diagnosesÏmade€by€licensed€professional€counselors€must€be€confirmed€by€a€medicalÏdoctor.€€In€the€appellant's€case,€he€was€unsure€of€the€appellant's€diagnosis,€andÍreferred€the€matter€to€a€medical€doctor,€who€diagnosed€paranoid€schizophrenia.€ÏDoctor€Cater€testified€he€saw€the€appellant€on€January€13,€1993€and€made€aÏdual€diagnosis€of€paranoid€schizophrenia€and€seizure€disorder,€causeÏunknown.€€This€doctor€testified€he€had€not€seen€the€appellant€since€June€1994,Ïhad€"no€idea"€whether€the€appellant€was€suffering€from€paranoid€schizophreniaÏon€December€29,€1993,€and€had€no€idea€whether€the€appellant€met€the€criteriaÏfor€the€insanity€defense€on€that€date.€€Doctor€Cater€found€the€videotape€taken€ofÏthe€appellant€at€the€scene€consistent€with€"very€psychotic"€behavior.ÌÌà àà àThe€appellant€was€tried€before€a€jury€of€his€peers€in€SequatchieÏCounty€Criminal€Court€on€February€23€and€24,€1995.€€Following€the€jury'sÏverdict,€the€appellant€filed€a€motion€for€new€trial,€which€was€denied€after€hearingÏon€July€26,€1996.€€The€appellant€then€perfected€his€appeal€to€this€court.€€ÌÌò òÓ  ÓIÌÌÓ  Óà àà àó óThe€first€issue€before€us€is€whether€the€evidence€is€sufficient€toÏsupport€the€convictions.× ƒE ××  ×€€When€an€accused€challenges€the€sufficiency€of€theÍevidence,€an€appellate€courtððs€standard€of€review€is€whether,€after€consideringÏthe€evidence€in€the€light€most€favorable€to€the€prosecution,€any€rational€trier€ofÏfact€could€have€found€the€essential€elements€of€the€crime€beyond€a€reasonableÏdoubt.€€òòJackson€v.€Virginiaóó,€443€U.S.€307,€324,€99€S.€Ct.€2781,€2791„92€(1979);ÏòòState€v.€Duncanóó,€698€S.W.2d€63,€67€(Tenn.€1985);€Tenn.€R.€App.€P.€€13(e).€€ThisÏrule€is€applicable€to€findings€of€guilt€based€upon€direct€evidence,€circumstantialÏevidence,€or€a€combination€of€direct€and€circumstantial€evidence.€€òòState€v.ÏDykesóó,€803€S.W.2d€250,€253€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.€1990).€€€ÌÌà àà àIn€determining€the€sufficiency€of€the€evidence,€this€court€should€notÏreweigh€or€reevaluate€the€evidence.€€òòState€v.€Matthewsóó,€805€S.W.2d€250,€253Ï(Tenn.€Crim.€App.€1990).€€Questions€concerning€the€credibility€of€the€witnesses,Ïthe€weight€and€value€of€the€evidence,€as€well€as€all€factual€issues€raised€by€theÏevidence€are€resolved€by€the€trier€of€fact.€€òòState€v.€Cabbageóó,€571€S.W.2d€833,Ï835€(Tenn.€1978).€€Nor€may€this€Court€substitute€its€inferences€for€those€drawnÏby€the€trier€of€fact€from€the€evidence.€€òòLiakas€v.€Stateóó,€199€Tenn.€298,€286ÏS.W.2d€856,859€(1956);€€òòFarmer€v.€Stateóó,€574€S.W.2d€49,€51€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.Ï1978).€€On€the€contrary,€this€court€is€required€to€afford€the€State€of€TennesseeÍthe€strongest€legitimate€view€of€the€evidence€contained€in€the€record€as€well€asÏall€reasonable€and€legitimate€inferences€which€may€be€drawn€from€theÏevidence.€€òòCabbageóó,€571€S.W.2d€at€835.ÌÌà àà àThe€appellant€was€tried€and€convicted€by€a€jury.€€A€guilty€verdictÏfrom€the€jury,€approved€by€the€trial€judge,€accredits€the€testimony€of€the€state'sÏwitnesses€and€resolves€all€conflicts€in€favor€of€the€state.€€òòState€v.€Williamsóó,€657ÏS.W.2d€405,€410€(Tenn.€1983);€òòState€v.€Hatchettóó,€560€S.W.2d€627,€639€(Tenn.Ï1978).€€€Because€a€verdict€of€guilty€removes€the€presumption€of€innocence€andÏreplaces€it€with€a€presumption€of€guilt,€the€accused€has€the€burden€in€this€courtÏof€demonstrating€why€the€evidence€is€insufficient,€as€a€matter€of€law,€to€supportÏthe€verdict.€€òòState€v.€Tuggleóó,€639€S.W.2d€913,€914€(Tenn.€1982).€€ÌÌà àà àIn€its€brief,€the€state€concedes€the€evidence€was€insufficient€toÏsupport€the€jury's€verdict€of€reckless€aggravated€assault€of€Dustin€Mitchell.€€TheÏstate's€concession€is€based€upon€the€lack€of€bodily€injury€to€Officer€Mitchell.€ÏòòSeeóó€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðððð€39„13„101€(1991),€39„13„102(1)€(1991)€(requiringÏeither€serious€bodily€injury€or€use€or€display€of€a€deadly€weapon).€€€We€agreeÏthat€the€conviction€was€improper;€however,€our€reasoning€somewhat€differs€fromÏthe€state's.ÌÌà àà àAn€offense€is€generally€considered€to€be€a€lesser€included€offenseÏof€a€charged€offense€if€the€elements€of€the€included€offense€consist€of€some,€butÏnot€all,€of€the€elements€of€the€charged€offense€and€if€commission€of€the€greaterÏoffense€does€not€occur€without€commission€of€the€lesser€offense.€€òòState€v.ÏTrustyóó,€919€S.W.2d€305,€310€(Tenn.€1996).€€Moreover,€lesser€included€offensesÏare€distinguished€from€lesser€grade€offenses,€the€latter€being€established€byÏstatute.€€òòTrustyóó,€919€S.W.2d€at€310„11.€€The€indictment€that€resulted€in€theÏaggravated€assault€conviction€provided:ÌÒ ` ÒÒ ° ÒÒ ` ÒÒ  ÒÓÓ[T]hat€Dale€Nolan€on€the€29th€day€of€December,€1993,€inÏSequatchie€County,€Tennessee,€and€before€the€finding€of€thisÏindictment,€òòdid€unlawfully,€intentionally,€deliberately€and€withÏpremeditation€attempt€to€kill€one€Loyd€Grant,€in€violation€of€T.C.A.Ï39„12„101,€and€T.C.A.€39„13„202óó,€and€all€of€which€is€against€theÏpeace€and€dignity€of€the€State€of€Tennessee.€€(emphasis€added)× ƒF ××  ×ÌÌÒ  ÒÒ  ÒÒ  ÒÒ ° ÒÓÓÌAggravated€assault€is€an€assault× ƒG ××  ×€resulting€in€serious€bodily€injury€orÍaccomplished€through€the€use€or€display€of€a€weapon.€€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€39„13„102(a)(1)€(1991).€€The€language€of€the€indictments€here€in€question€allegesÏneither€serious€bodily€injury€nor€use€or€display€of€a€weapon.€The€language€ofÏthe€indictment€now€before€us€is€similar€to€the€language€of€the€indictmentÏcharging€attempt€to€commit€first„degree€murder€in€òòTrustyóó,€òòsupraóó,€leading€us€toÏthe€conclusion,€compelled€by€òòTrustyóó,€that€under€such€an€indictment,€aggravatedÏassault€is€not€a€lesser€included€offense€of€attempted€murder€in€the€first€degree.€ÏòòSee€Trustyóó,€919€S.W.2d€at€312„313.€€Neither€is€the€aggravated€assault€a€lesserÏgrade€of€attempt€to€commit€murder€in€the€first€degree.€€òòTrustyóó,€919€S.W.2d€atÏ312.€€Accordingly,€the€ð ðconviction€for€an€unindicted€offense€that€is€not€a€lesserÏdegree€of€the€offense€charged€or€a€lesser€included€offense€may€not€stand.ðð€ÏòòTrustyóó,€919€S.W.2d€at€307;€òòState€v.€Lampkinóó,€619€S.W.2d€520€(Tenn.€1981);ÏòòMcLean€v.€Stateóó,€527€S.W.2d€76€(Tenn.€1975).€€Thus,€we€agree€with€the€stateÏthat€the€appellant's€conviction€of€reckless€aggravated€assault€was€improper,Ïalthough€we€do€not€arrive€at€this€result€as€a€sufficiency„of„the„evidenceÏdetermination.ÌÌà àà àOn€the€other€hand,€the€appellant's€brief€raises€the€issue€ofÏsufficiency€€of€the€evidence€in€the€other€three€convictions,€but€in€the€argumentÍon€the€issue€he€concedes€that€the€evidence€was€sufficient€as€to€the€simpleÏassault€conviction.€€Again,€we€agree.€€The€assault€conviction€was€proper.ÌÌà àà àWith€respect€to€the€first€of€the€remaining€two€convictions,€attemptedÏsecond€degree€murder,€the€appellant€asserts€the€evidence€is€insufficientÏbecause€there€was€no€showing€the€appellant€attempted€a€"òòknowingóó€killing€ofÏanother."€€€òòSeeóó€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€39„13„210(a)(1)€(1991)€(emphasis€added).€ÏThe€Code€defines€this€mental€state:ÌÒ ` ÒÒ ° ÒÒ ` ÒÒ  ÒÓÓ"Knowing"€refers€to€a€person€who€acts€knowingly€with€respect€toÏthe€conduct€or€to€circumstances€surrounding€the€conduct€when€theÏperson€is€aware€of€the€nature€of€the€conduct€or€that€theÏcircumstances€exist.€€€A€person€acts€knowingly€with€respect€to€aÏresult€of€the€person's€conduct€when€the€person€is€aware€that€theÏconduct€is€reasonably€certain€to€cause€the€result.€€Tenn.€CodeÏAnn.€ðð€39„11„302(b)€(1991).ÌÌÒ  ÒÒ  ÒÒ  ÒÒ ° ÒÓÓThe€appellant€bases€this€sufficiency€challenge€on€the€testimony€of€Officer€Grant,Ïthe€victim€of€the€attempted€second€degree€murder,€and€the€appellant's€wife.€ÏAccording€to€the€appellant's€logic,€we€should€find€the€evidence€insufficientÏbecause€Officer€Grant€and€Mrs.€Nolan€did€not€know€how€the€gun€dischargedÏand€testified€the€appellant€was€falling€backwards€when€the€gun€fired.€€What€theÏappellant€does€not€address,€and€what€we€find€compelling,€is€the€testimony€ofÏOfficer€Mitchell€that€the€appellant€stepped€back,€pointed€the€rifle€at€Officer€GrantÏand€fired.€€In€the€light€most€favorable€to€the€state,€this€evidence€sufficientlyÍsupports€a€verdict€of€attempted€second€degree€murder,€and€specifically,€theÏ"knowing"€element€of€the€crime.ÌÌà àà àAdditionally,€the€appellant€contends€the€state€failed€to€presentÏsufficient€evidence€of€malice.€€Prior€to€the€1989€revisions€to€the€Code,€secondÏdegree€murder€was€the€malicious€killing€of€another.€€€òòState€v.€Tracy€Lamar€Belleóó,ÏNo.€03C01„9503„CR„00094,€slip€op.€at€3€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.,€Knoxville,€Mar.€6,Ï1996),€òòperm.€app.€deniedóó€(Tenn.€1996);€òòsee€generallyóó€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€39„2„211€(Supp.€1988)€(amended€1989,€1995).€€However,€the€offense€here€inÏquestion€was€committed€after€the€1989€revisions€to€the€criminal€code,€underÏwhich€the€relevant€definition€of€second€degree€murder€is€an€unlawful,€knowingÏkilling.€€òòSeeóó€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€39„13„210€(Supp.€1996)€(also€defining€secondÏdegree€murder€as€a€reckless€killing€related€to€the€distribution€of€certainÏscheduled€drugs).€€Malice€is€not€intrinsically€required€to€sustain€a€conviction,Ïalthough€it€may€be€inherent€in€some€second€degree€murders.€€òòTracy€LamarÏBelleóó,€€slip€op.€at€3€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.,€Knoxville,€Mar.€6,€1996)€(citation€omitted).€ÏIt€can€likewise€be€said€that€attempted€second€degree€murder€has€no€maliceÏrequirement.€€òòSeeóó€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€39„12„101(a)(2)€(1991).ÌÌà àà àThus,€the€appellant's€sufficiency€challenge€to€the€attemptedÍsecond€degree€murder€conviction€is€without€merit.ÌÌà àà àFinally,€the€appellant€maintains€that€the€evidence€is€insufficient€toÏsupport€his€conviction€of€kidnapping€of€Nancy€Smith.€€He€argues€there€wasÏinsufficient€evidence€of€unlawful€confinement€of€Miss€Smith.€€UnlawfulÏconfinement€is€defined€as€confinement€"accomplished€by€force,€threat€or€fraud."€ÏTenn.€Code.€Ann.€ðð€39„13„301(2)€(1991).€€The€appellant€contends€the€stateÏmade€an€insufficient€showing€because€prior€to€the€events€which€form€the€basisÏfor€the€appellant's€convictions,€Miss€Smith€intended€to€spend€the€night€at€theÏNolan€residence,€the€appellant€never€pointed€a€gun€at€her,€the€appellant€neverÏtold€her€she€could€not€leave,€and€in€fact,€told€her€she€could€leave€and€that€sheÏmerely€waited€for€a€good€opportunity€to€do€so.€€Despite€the€appellant'sÏresourceful€arguments,€we€are€unpersuaded.€€The€evidence,€in€the€light€mostÏfavorable€to€the€state,€includes€the€testimony€of€Miss€Smith€that€she€wanted€toÏleave€the€Nolan€residence€once€the€shooting€began.€€From€these€facts,€a€juryÏcould€have€reasonably€inferred€the€defendantððs€guilt.€€As€a€result,€we€hold€thatÏthe€evidence€is€sufficient€to€support€the€appellant's€conviction€of€kidnapping€ofÏNancy€Smith.€Moreover,€we€reject€the€appellant's€arguments€of€no€unlawfulÏconfinement€because€he€never€pointed€a€gun€at€Miss€Smith€or€told€her€sheÏcould€not€leave.€€Neither€of€these€facts€is€necessary€under€the€statutoryÍdefinition€of€the€crime.€€òòSeeóó€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðððð€39„13„301(2),€39„13„302,€39„13„304€(1991).€€Accordingly,€the€evidence€sufficiently€supports€the€appellant'sÏconviction€of€kidnapping.ÌÌÌà@ àò òIIó ó€ÌÌà àà àNext,€the€appellant€challenges€three€issues€pertaining€to€the€juryÏinstructions€and€the€verdict€form.€€He€contests€the€trial€judge's€(1)€refusal€toÏcharge€the€jury€on€attempt€to€commit€manslaughter€and€failure€to€instruct€theÏjury€on€attempt€to€commit€criminally€negligent€homicide€as€lesser€degrees€ofÏattempt€to€commit€second€degree€murder,€(2)€charge€of€aggravated€assault€as€aÏlesser€included€offense€of€attempt€to€commit€second€degree€murder,€and€(3)Ïfailure€to€provide€the€jury€a€verdict€form€in€conformity€with€Tennessee€PatternÏInstruction€„€Criminal€43.10,€"Verdict€Form:€Not€Guilty€by€Reason€of€Insanity."€ÏWe€address€each€of€these€issues€in€order.ÌÌà àà àWe€preface€our€discussion€of€issues€(1)€and€(2)€with€recognition€ofÏthe€distinction€between€lesser€grades€or€degrees€of€charged€offenses€andÏlesser€included€offenses.€€As€recently€explained€by€our€supreme€court€in€òòTrustyóó,Íòòsupraóó,€our€statutory€scheme€sets€forth€the€classes€or€grades€of€crimes.€€òòSee,Ïe.g.óó,€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðððð€39„13„201€through€39„13„213€(1991€and€Supp.€1996)Ï(degrees€of€criminal€homicide€include€first„degree€murder,€second„degreeÏmurder,€voluntary€manslaughter€and€criminally€negligent€homicide).€€The€trialÏcourt€has€an€obligation€€to€instruct€the€jury€on€the€charged€crime€as€well€as€theÏlesser€degrees€of€€the€offense€where€the€evidence€could€support€a€conviction€ofÏthe€lesser€offense.€€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€40„18„110(a)€(1990);€òòTrustyóó,€919€S.W.2dÏat€310.€€ÌÌà àà àOn€the€other€hand,€lesser€included€offenses€are€offensesÏ"necessarily€included€in€the€offense€charged€or€of€an€attempt€to€commit€eitherÏthe€offense€charged€or€an€offense€necessarily€included€therein€if€the€attempt€isÏan€offense."€€Tenn.€R.€Crim.€P.€31(c).€€An€offense€is€generally€considered€to€be€aÏlesser€included€offense€"only€if€the€elements€of€the€included€offense€are€aÏsubset€of€the€elements€of€the€charged€offense€and€only€if€the€greater€offenseÏcannot€be€committed€without€also€committing€the€lesser€offense."€€òòTrustyóó,€919ÏS.W.2d€at€310€(citing€òòSchmuck€v.€United€Statesóó,€489€U.S.€705,€716,€109€S.€Ct.Ï1443,€1450„51€(1989)).€€In€Tennessee,€the€elements€of€the€greater,€indictedÏoffense€must€include,€but€not€be€congruent€with,€all€the€elements€of€the€lesserÏoffense.€€òòTrustyóó,€919€S.W.2d€at€310„11€(citing€òòHoward€v.€Stateóó,€578€S.W.2d€83,Í85€(Tenn.€1979)).€€A€defendant€is€entitled€to€have€the€jury€instructed€on€a€lesserÏincluded€offense€where€the€evidence€would€support€an€inference€of€guilt€of€theÏlesser€included€offense.€€òòTrustyóó,€919€S.W.2d€at€310.ÌÌà àà àWith€that€background,€we€turn€to€the€issue€relating€to€the€trialÏcourt's€failure€to€instruct€the€jury€on€attempted€voluntary€manslaughter.€€TheÏlegislature€has€classified€voluntary€manslaughter€as€a€lesser€degree€of€secondÏdegree€murder.€€òòSeeóó€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðððð€39„13„201,€210€and€211€(1991).€ÏThus,€instructions€on€this€offense€should€have€been€given€if€the€evidence€wouldÏsupport€a€finding€of€guilt€thereon.€€Voluntary€manslaughter€is€defined€as€"theÏintentional€or€knowing€killing€of€another€in€a€state€of€passion€produced€byÏadequate€provocation€sufficient€to€lead€a€reasonable€person€to€act€in€anÏirrational€manner."€€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€39„13„211(a)€(1991).€€The€appellant'sÏbrief€addresses€only€the€passion€prong€of€the€elements,€alleging,€"TheÏ[appellant]€was€repeatedly€referred€to€[in€the€evidence]€as€being€upset€.€.€.,Ïcrying€or€sobbing,€.€.€.€[and]€acting€or€looking€wild."€€In€contrast,€the€state's€briefÏconcedes€there€is€evidence€that€the€appellant's€behavior€was€irrational,€andÏargues€instead€there€is€an€absence€of€evidence€of€adequate€provocation€to€leadÏa€reasonable€person€to€act€irrationally.€€After€carefully€reviewing€the€record,€weÏagree€with€the€state.€€Adequate€provocation€and€passion€have€a€cause„and„effect€relationship€in€the€definition€of€voluntary€manslaughter.€€In€other€words,Ïthe€provocation€must€beget€the€passion.€€In€the€case€at€bar,€we€find€no€evidenceÏof€any€provocation€of€the€appellant€which€brought€about€his€irrational€behavior.€ÏAt€most,€the€evidence€shows€Officer€Grant,€in€uniform€and€standing€within€a€fewÏfeet€of€the€appellant€in€a€dimly„lit,€foggy€area,€tried€to€take€the€appellant's€gunÏfrom€him€while€the€appellant€was€"holding€it€up."€€We€find€no€evidence€ofÏprovocation€in€these€facts.€€òòAccordóó€òòLove€v.€Bassóó,€145€Tenn.€522,€528„29,€238ÏS.W.€94,€96€(1921)€(attempt€to€effectuate€lawful€arrest€does€not€give€rise€toÏpassion€element€of€murder).ò ò€ó óAccordingly,€we€find€no€error€in€the€trial€court'sÏfailure€to€instruct€the€jury€on€attempted€voluntary€manslaughter.ÌÌà àà àNext,€we€turn€to€the€appellant's€contention€the€judge€should€haveÏinstructed€the€jury€on€attempted€criminally€negligent€homicide.€The€appellantÏneither€requested€an€instruction€on€criminally€negligent€homicide€at€trial€norÏraised€the€trial€court's€failure€to€give€the€instruction€in€the€motion€for€a€new€trial.€ÏAccordingly,€the€appellant€has€waived€appellate€consideration€of€this€issue.€ÏTenn.€R.€App.€P.€3(e)€("[I]n€all€cases€tried€by€a€jury,€no€issue€presented€for€reviewÏshall€be€predicated€upon€error€in€.€.€.€jury€instructions€granted€or€refused€.€.€.Ïunless€the€same€was€specifically€stated€in€a€motion€for€a€new€trial;€otherwiseÏsuch€issues€will€be€treated€as€waived.");€Tenn.€R.€App.€P.€36(a)€(appellate€courtÍis€not€required€to€grant€relief€to€party€responsible€for€error€or€who€failed€to€takeÏaction€to€prevent€or€nullify€its€harmful€effect);€òòsee€alsoóó€òòState€v.€Christopher€ClayÏKennedyóó,€No.€01C01„9601„CC„00038,€slip€op.€at€6€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.,ÏNashville,€Mar.€27,€1997)€(appellant€who€neither€objected€to€jury€instructionsÏnor€requested€additional€charge€waived€issue€on€appeal).ÌÌà àà àAlthough€the€appellant€has€failed€to€preserve€this€issue€for€appeal,Ïwe€take€this€opportunity€to€discuss€it€because€of€its€significance.€€We€believe€theÏcrime€of€attempted€criminally€negligent€homicide€is€not€viable€in€TennesseeÏbased€upon€the€supreme€court's€recent€pronouncement€in€òòState€v.€Kimbroughóó,Ï924€S.W.2d€888€(Tenn.€1996).€€In€òòKimbroughóó,€the€supreme€court€was€faced€withÏa€challenge€to€the€validity€of€the€crime€of€attempted€felony€murder.€€The€courtÏheld€that€the€crime€does€not€exist€in€Tennessee,€reasoning€that€a€criminalÏattempt€requires€intent,€while€the€crime€of€felony€murder€requires€onlyÏrecklessness.€€Thus,€attempted€felony€murder€would€require€an€actor€to€intendÏto€commit€an€unintentional€act.€€òòKimbroughóó,€924€S.W.2d€at€892.€€The€court'sÏanalysis€included€citation€to€òòPeople€v.€Hernandezóó,€614€P.2d€900,€901€(Colo.€Ct.ÏApp.€1980),€for€the€proposition€the€"offense€of€'attempted€criminally€negligentÏhomicide'€does€not€exist."€€òòKimbroughóó,€924€S.W.2d€at€891.€€The€court€also€citedÏòòHull€v.€Stateóó,€553€S.W.2d€90,€94€(Tenn.€Crim€App.),€òòcert.€deniedóó€(Tenn.€1977),€inÍwhich€this€court€said€there€was€no€crime€of€attempted€involuntary€manslaughter,Ïas€such€a€crime€"would€require€proof€that€one€intended€a€result€that€accidentallyÏoccurred."€€òòKimbroughóó,€924€S.W.2d€at€891.€€Significantly,€involuntaryÏmanslaughter€is€the€legal€predecessor€of€criminally€negligent€homicide€inÏTennessee€law.€€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€39„13„212,€Sentencing€Comm'nÏComments€(1991).€€òòBut€seeóó€òòTrustyóó,€919€S.W.2d€305€(in€case€prior€to€òòKimbroughóó,Ïsupreme€court€said€that€a€defendant€indicted€for€attempted€first€degree€murderÏ"could€well€have€[been]€convicted€of€attempted€criminally€negligent€homicide").€ÏConsequently,€we€believe€the€crime€of€attempted€criminally€negligent€homicideÏdoes€not€exist€in€this€state.œ× ƒH ××  ×›ÌÌà àà àThe€next€issue€presented€is€whether€the€trial€court€committed€errorÏin€charging€the€jury€on€the€crime€of€aggravated€assault€as€a€lesser€includedÏoffense€of€attempt€to€commit€second€degree€murder,€an€instruction€that€wasÏgiven€in€both€attempted€homicide€cases.€€It€is€unnecessary€for€us€to€address€theÏissue€with€respect€to€the€indictment€alleging€attempted€homicide€of€DustyÏMitchell.€€We€have€determined€that€the€aggravated€assault€conviction€resultingÏfrom€that€indictment€is€reversed.€€As€to€the€attempted€homicide€of€Loyd€Grant,Ïwe€agree€with€the€appellant€that€€such€instruction€should€not€have€been€given,Ïunder€the€authority€of€òòTrustyóó,€919€S.W.2d€305.€€However,€the€appellant€wasÏconvicted€of€a€more€serious€offense,€the€Class€B€felony€of€attempt€to€commitÏsecond€degree€murder,€and€we€see€no€prejudice€to€the€appellant€from€theÏcourt's€improperly€charging€the€jury€as€to€the€possibility€of€a€verdict€beingÏreturned€on€aggravated€assault,€a€Class€C€felony,€nor€has€the€appellant€claimedÏor€shown€any€such€prejudice.€€We€conclude€that€any€error€of€the€trial€court€isÏharmless€beyond€a€reasonable€doubt.€€Tenn.€R.€App.€P.€36(b);€Tenn.€R.€Crim.€P.Ï52(a).€€We€are€aware€that€the€appellant€claims€that€the€trial€court€was€withoutÏjurisdiction€to€try€the€appellant€for€aggravated€assault.€€Had€he€been€convictedÍof€aggravated€assault€under€the€attempted€homicide€indictment,€the€validity€ofÏthe€judgment€may€well€have€been€in€doubt€under€òòTrustyóó,€but€the€appellant€wasÏnot€convicted€of€aggravated€assault.€€The€issue€is€without€merit.ÌÌà àà àFinally,€the€appellant€challenges€the€trial€court's€failure€to€supplyÏthe€jury€with€a€verdict€sheet€on€which€to€report€a€verdict€of€not€guilty€by€reason€ofÏinsanity.€€The€verdict€form€used€has€the€choices€"guilty"€and€"not€guilty"€for€eachÏoffense,€but€has€no€designation€of€"not€guilty€by€reason€of€insanity."€€The€trialÏjudge,€however,€instructed€the€jury€on€the€requisites€of€the€insanity€defense,€andÏon€the€request€of€defense€counsel,€he€instructed€the€jury€to€write€in€a€verdict€ofÏ"not€guilty€by€reason€of€insanity"€if€they€so€found€on€any€of€the€offenses.€ÏNevertheless,€the€appellant€€contends€that€Code€section€40„18„117,€requiringÏthe€trial€judge€to€charge€the€jury€that€a€verdict€of€not€guilty€by€reason€of€insanityÏshall€be€explicitly€stated,€coupled€with€Tennessee€Pattern€Instruction€„€CriminalÏ43.07,€stating€that€the€jury€"will€be€provided€with€forms€for€all€possible€verdicts€inÏthis€case,"€mandates€that€the€jury€should€have€been€given€the€pattern€verdictÏform€upon€which€to€report€a€verdict€of€insanity.€€òòSee€generallyóó€Tenn.€Patt.€Instr.€„ÏCrim.€43.10€(verdict€form€„€not€guilty€by€reason€of€insanity).€The€state€countersÏthis€argument€by€pointing€out€the€appellant's€failure€to€object€to€this€purportedÏdefect€either€at€trial€or€in€the€Motion€for€a€New€Trial.€€Moreover,€the€stateÍcontends,€error€should€not€be€found€because€the€trial€judge€properly€instructedÏthe€jury€on€the€insanity€defense.ÌÌà àà àIt€is€well„established€law€in€Tennessee€that€a€party€must€object€toÏerrors€or€omissions€in€jury€instructions€at€trial€or€in€a€motion€for€new€trial€in€orderÏto€complain€of€the€issue€on€appeal.€€òòSee,€e.g.óó,€Tenn.€R.€App.€P.€3(e);€òòState€v.ÏLisa€Breweróó,€No.€01C01„9502„CC„00042,€slip€op.€at€7€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.,ÏNashville,€Aug.€4,€1995);€òòState€v.€Keelóó,€882€S.W.2d€410,€417„18€(Tenn.€Crim.ÏApp.€1994).€€We€believe€this€rule€applies€to€the€submission€of€a€verdict€form,€asÏwell.€€òòCfóó.€òòChristopher€Clay€Kennedyóó,€slip€op.€at€6€(appellant€waived€objection€toÏtrial€judge€having€written€in€amount€for€potential€fine€assessment€on€verdict€Ïform€prior€to€its€submission€to€jury€by€failing€to€object€in€the€trial€court);€òòKeith€v.ÏMurfreesboro€Livestock€Marketóó,€780€S.W.2d€751,€758„59€(Tenn.€App.€1989)€(inÏcontext€of€civil€litigation,€failure€to€object€to€verdict€form€in€trial€court€amounts€toÏwaiver€of€objection)€(citations€omitted).€€The€appellant€failed€to€object€when€heÏhad€the€opportunity€to€do€so,€and€his€chance€to€raise€this€issue€has€beenÏwaived.€ÌÌà àà àMoreover,€this€is€not€a€case€of€plain€error€which€requires€ourÏintervention€despite€the€appellant's€waiver€of€this€issue.€€The€trial€judge€gave€aÍthorough€instruction€on€the€insanity€defense.€€He€pointed€out€to€the€jurors€duringÏthe€charge€that€they€should€write€in€a€"not€guilty€by€reason€of€insanity"€verdict€onÏthe€form€if€that€was€their€finding,€and€he€reiterated€this€directive€at€theÏappellant's€request€at€the€conclusion€of€the€charge€to€insure€the€jurorsÏunderstood€this€instruction€applied€to€all€four€counts€of€the€indictment€submittedÏfor€their€determination.€€€Additionally,€there€is€no€requirement€that€the€patternÏinstructions€be€used.€€òòState€v.€Westóó,€844€S.W.2d€144,€151€(Tenn.€1992).€€€Thus,Ïthere€was€no€error€òòper€seóó€when€the€trial€judge€did€not€submit€the€pattern€form€toÏthe€jury.€€Furthermore,€there€is€nothing€in€the€record€or€the€parties'€briefs€whichÏcauses€us€to€doubt€that€the€jury€had€the€benefit€of€the€court's€full€writtenÏinstructions€on€the€insanity€defense€in€the€jury€room€with€them€during€theirÏdeliberations.× ƒI ××  ×€€òòSeeóó€Tenn.€R.€Crim.€P.€30(c)€(requiring€every€word€of€theÏjudge's€instructions€to€be€given€to€the€jury€in€writing€and€taken€into€the€jury€roomÏwhen€the€jury€retires€for€its€deliberations).€€In€light€of€these€facts,€it€would€beÏinappropriate€for€us€to€address€this€issue€as€plain€error.€ÌÌà@ àò òIIIó óÌÌà àà àThe€appellant's€next€issues€pertain€to€the€insanity€defense€uponÏwhich€he€unsuccessfully€relied€at€trial.€€He€contends€the€trial€court€committedÏerror€in€failing€to€rule€as€a€matter€of€law€that€he€was€insane€at€the€time€of€theÏcommission€of€the€offenses.× ƒJ ××  ×€€He€further€contends€the€state€failed€to€proveÏbeyond€a€reasonable€doubt€that€he€was€not€insane€at€the€time€of€the€offenses.€ÏWe€view€the€latter€question€as€an€issue€of€sufficiency€of€the€evidence€andÏreview€it€as€such.€€Moreover,€because€the€latter€issue,€if€answered€in€favor€of€theÏstate,€would€render€moot€consideration€of€the€former€question,€we€consider€theÏlatter€first.ÌÌà àà àThe€defense€of€insanity€applies€where,€"at€the€time€of€such€conductÏ[giving€rise€to€the€offense],€as€a€result€of€mental€disease€or€defect,€the€personÏlacked€substantial€capacity€either€to€appreciate€the€wrongfulness€of€theÏperson's€conduct€or€to€conform€that€conduct€to€the€requirements€of€the€law."€ÏTenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€39„11„501(a)€(1991)€(amended€1995);€òòGraham€v.€Stateóó,€547ÏS.W.2d€531,€543„44€(Tenn.€1977).€€In€a€criminal€prosecution,€sanity€isÏpresumed.€€òòBrooks€v.€Stateóó,€489€S.W.2d€70,€72€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.€1972).€€If,Íhowever,€the€evidence€raises€a€reasonable€doubt€as€to€the€sanity€of€theÏdefendant,€the€state€assumes€a€burden€of€proof€beyond€a€reasonable€doubt€ofÏthe€defendant's€sanity.€€òòCollins€v.€Stateóó,€506€S.W.2d€179,€184€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.Ï1973);€òòCovey€v.€Stateóó,€504€S.W.2d€387,€391€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.€1973).€ÏAdditionally,€if€the€defendant's€alleged€mental€disease€is€one€which€is€subject€toÏremission,€the€defendant€must€make€a€prima€facie€showing€of€non„remissionÏbefore€the€state€assumes€the€burden€of€proving€sanity.€€òòForbes€v.€Stateóó,€559ÏS.W.2d€318,€325€(Tenn.€1977).€€Once€the€burden€has€been€properly€shifted€toÏthe€state,€sanity€becomes€an€essential€element€of€the€crime.€€òòState€v.€Claytonóó,Ï656€S.W.2d€344,€346€(Tenn.€1983).ÌÌà àà àTo€overcome€its€burden€of€proof,€the€state€must€demonstrate€eitherÏ(1)€the€defendant€was€not€"suffering€from€a€mental€illness€at€the€time€of€theÏcommission€of€the€crime,"€or€(2)€the€mental€illness€or€defect€neither€preventedÏhim€from€knowing€the€wrongfulness€of€his€act€nor€rendered€him€"substantiallyÏincapable€of€conforming€his€conduct€to€the€requirements€of€the€law€he€isÏcharged€with€violating."€€òòClaytonóó,€656€S.W.2d€at€351.€€In€the€event€the€state€failsÏto€present€evidence€addressing€an€essential€element€of€the€insanity€test,€anyÏconviction€obtained€violates€due€process€and€must€be€reversed.€€òòClaytonóó,€656ÏS.W.2d€at€352€(citation€omitted).ÌÌà àà àAs€discussed€in€detail€elsewhere€in€this€opinion,€a€review€of€theÏsufficiency€of€the€evidence€entails€a€determination€of€whether,€uponÏconsideration€of€the€evidence€in€the€light€most€favorable€to€the€prosecution,€anyÏrational€trier€of€fact€could€have€found€the€essential€elements€of€the€crime€beyondÏa€reasonable€doubt.× ƒK ××  ×€€€As€that€analysis€is€applied€to€the€insanity€defense,€onceÏthe€defendant€has€produced€some€evidence€amounting€to€reasonable€doubt€ofÏhis€sanity,€the€state€may€overcome€its€burden€of€proving€the€defendant's€sanityÏbeyond€a€reasonable€doubt€in€one€of€three€ways.€€First,€the€state€may€introduceÏexpert€opinion€testimony€on€the€issue€of€sanity.€€òòEdwards€v.€Stateóó,€540€S.W.2dÏ641,€646€(Tenn.€1976).€€Second,€the€state€may€establish€the€defendant's€sanityÏthrough€lay€opinion€testimony,€once€a€proper€foundation€is€laid.€€òòEdwardsóó,€540ÏS.W.2d€at€646.€€Finally,€the€state€may€show€that€the€acts€and€statements€of€theÏpetitioner,€at€or€near€the€time€of€the€crime,€were€consistent€with€sanity€andÏinconsistent€with€insanity.€€òòEdwardsóó,€540€S.W.2d€at€646.ÌÌà àà àThe€state€does€not€contend€on€appeal€that€the€defendant€made€anÏinadequate€prima€facie€showing€of€insanity€and€non„remission.€€Therefore,€weÍproceed€directly€to€the€sufficiency€of€the€state's€rebuttal€evidence.€€The€stateÏpresented€the€expert€testimony€of€Dr.€Farooque,€who€examined€the€appellantÏduring€two€30„day€inpatient€admissions€at€the€Middle€Tennessee€Mental€HealthÏInstitute€and€was€unable€to€support€any€psychological€diagnosis,€save€cannabisÏintoxication.€€She€specifically€opined€the€appellant€did€not€meet€the€òòGrahamóó€testÏfor€legal€insanity.€€In€other€words,€she€found€him€sane.€€Having€established€this,Ïthe€state€satisfied€the€first€evidentiary€alternative€for€proof€of€legal€sanityÏannounced€in€òòEdwardsóó.× ƒL ××  ×€€By€its€verdict,€the€jury€obviously€accredited€thisÏtestimony€over€the€contrary€testimony€of€the€lay€and€expert€witnesses€who€gaveÏcontrary€testimony.€€Because€the€jury€so€found,€and€the€state's€evidenceÏcomplies€with€the€dictates€of€òòEdwardsóó,€we€are€obliged€to€conclude€that€theÏevidence€supports€a€finding€by€a€rational€trier€of€fact€of€the€appellant's€sanityÏbeyond€a€reasonable€doubt.€€ÌÌà àà àHaving€found€the€defendant's€sanity€sufficiently€supported€by€theÏevidence€of€record,€we€find€it€unnecessary€to€address€the€appellant's€relatedÏissue€pertaining€to€whether€the€trial€court€erred€in€failing€to€find€the€defendantÏinsane€as€a€matter€of€law.Ìò òÌà@ àIVó óÌÌà àà àNext,€the€appellant€argues€the€jury€found€him€guilty€of€bothÏattempted€second€degree€murder€and€reckless€aggravated€assault€of€OfficerÏLoyd€Grant,€thereby€violating€his€right€to€a€unanimous€verdict€and€againstÏdouble€jeopardy.€The€verdict€forms€reflect€the€finding€of€guilt€of€attemptedÏsecond€degree€murder€applied€to€the€victim€Loyd€Grant,€and€the€finding€of€guiltÏof€reckless€aggravated€assault€applied€to€victim€Dusty€Mitchell.€€The€appellantÏhas€included€in€the€record€on€appeal€an€affidavit€of€the€jury€foreman,€in€whichÏthe€foreman€avows€that€the€jury€thought€they€were€convicting€the€appellant€ofÏthe€reckless€aggravated€assault€of€Grant,€not€Mitchell.€€We€find,€however,€thatÏwe€are€not€required€to€address€this€issue€because€the€state€has€conceded€theÏimpropriety€of€the€reckless€aggravated€assault€conviction.ÌÌà@ àò òVó óÌÌà àà àThe€appellant€next€contends€the€trial€judge€failed€to€fulfill€his€roleÏas€the€thirteenth€juror.€€Rule€33(f)€of€the€Rules€of€Criminal€Procedure€imposes€aÏmandatory€duty€on€the€trial€judge€to€serve€as€the€thirteenth€juror€in€everyÏcriminal€case.€€òòState€v.€Carteróó,€896€S.W.2d€119,€122€(Tenn.€1995).€€Under€theÏRule,€the€judge€is€empowered€to€grant€a€new€trial€if€he€disagrees€with€the€juryÏabout€the€weight€of€the€evidence.€€Tenn.€R.€Crim.€P.€33(f).€€In€fulfilling€this€role,Ï"Rule€33(f)€does€not€require€the€trial€judge€to€make€an€explicit€statement€on€theÏrecord.€€Instead,€when€the€trial€judge€simply€overrules€a€motion€for€new€trial,€anÏappellate€court€may€presume€that€the€trial€judge€has€served€as€the€thirteenthÏjuror€and€approved€the€jury's€verdict."€€òòCarteróó,€896€S.W.2d€at€122.ÌÌà àà àOnly€if€the€record€contains€statements€by€the€trial€judge€indicatingÏdisagreement€with€the€jury's€verdict€or€evidencing€the€trial€judge's€refusal€to€actÏas€the€thirteenth€juror€may€an€appellate€court€reverse€the€trial€court's€judgment.€ÏòòCarteróó,€896€S.W.2d€at€122.€€Otherwise,€appellate€review€is€limited€to€sufficiencyÏof€the€evidence€pursuant€to€Rule€13(e)€of€the€Rules€of€Appellate€Procedure.€ÏòòState€v.€Burlisonóó,€868€S.W.2d€713,€718„19€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.€1993).€€€If€theÏreviewing€court€finds€the€trial€judge€has€failed€to€fulfill€his€or€her€role€asÏthirteenth€juror,€the€reviewing€court€must€grant€a€new€trial.€€òòState€v.€Moatsóó,€906ÍS.W.2d€431€(Tenn.€1995).ÌÌà àà àIn€the€case€before€us,€the€appellant€contends€the€trial€judgeÏmisunderstood€his€role€as€the€thirteenth€juror€because€he€made€remarksÏexpressing€his€dissatisfaction€with€the€jury's€verdict,€yet€he€failed€to€grant€a€newÏtrial.€€In€support€of€this€argument,€the€appellant€cites€the€following€comments€theÏtrial€judge€made€at€trial:ÌÒ ` ÒÒ ° ÒÒ ` ÒÒ  ÒÓÓYou€know,€the€truth€of€the€matter€is,€this€case€should€have€beenÏindicted€as€an€aggravated€assault.Ì.€.€.ÌThat's€where€we€are€and€if€that€had€been€the€right€indictment€thereÏit€would€save€a€lot€of€trouble.× ƒM ××  ×Ì.€.€.ÌWell,€I'm€not€going€to€[enter€a€directed€verdict€on€attempted€firstÏdegree€murder€and€attempted€second€degree€murder€and€chargeÏthe€jury€on€aggravated€assault€alone].€€The€State€of€TennesseeÏhas€spent€a€bunch€of€money€at€this€point€and€if€it€needs€to€beÏcorrected€in€that€fashion€we'll€let€the€Court€of€Appeals€do€theÏcorrecting.ÌÌÒ  ÒÒ  ÒÒ  ÒÒ ° ÒÓÓThe€appellant€also€challenges€these€statements€made€at€the€sentencingÏhearing:ÌÒ ` ÒÒ ° ÒÒ ` ÒÒ  ÒÓÓI€don't€know€whether€he€had€the€intent€or€not.× ƒN ××  ×Ì.€.€.ÌAnd€I€will€state€again€the€logic€in€the€[consecutive]€sentencing€is,€IÏhope€during€this€time€period€you€get€some€help€Mr.€Nolan.ÌÌÒ  ÒÒ  ÒÒ  ÒÒ ° ÒÓÓLikewise,€the€appellant€cites€the€following€statements€made€at€the€hearing€onÏthe€motion€for€new€trial:€€ÌÒ ` ÒÒ ° ÒÒ ` ÒÒ  ÒÓÓI€think€there's€some€close€question€there€in€regard€to€theÏparticularly€to€[sic]€whether€the€offense€was€second€„„€attempt€toÏcommit€second€degree€murder€or€not.€It's€my€judgment€that€it€was,Ïbut€it's€sure€a€close€question,€and€if€someone€sees€it€differently,Ïthat's€not€going€to€upset€me,€but€it's€close€enough€that€it€probablyÏshould€be€looked€at€and€reviewed.× ƒO ××  ×Ì.€.€.ÌAlthough€in€this€case,€Mr.€Harmon,€I€think€you've€got€„„€youÏcertainly€got€a€legitimate€issue€on€the€attempt€to€commit€secondÏdegree€murder€case.€€That's€a€close€one€there,€and€maybe€it€doesÏneed€to€be€looked€at€by€someone€who's€got€the€time€to€review€the,Ïyou€know€review€the€record€in€the€calm€of€a€library.€€It€may€have€aÏdifferent€perspective€there.€€If€they€do€that€doesn't€particularlyÏmove€me€one€way€or€the€other.ÌÌÒ  ÒÒ  ÒÒ  ÒÒ ° ÒÓÓÌà àà àOn€the€other€hand,€the€state€defends€the€trial€judge's€actions,Ïcontending€the€trial€judge's€statements€made€at€the€hearing€on€motion€for€newÏtrial€are€indicative€merely€of€a€factually€"close€call"€and€not€of€the€trial€judge'sÏdisagreement€or€dissatisfaction€with€the€verdict.€€The€state€also€contends,€albeitÏwithout€citing€any€supporting€authority,€that€the€statements€made€during€theÏcourse€of€the€trial€and€at€the€sentencing€hearing€are€irrelevant€to€our€inquiry,Ïand€we€should€consider€only€those€statements€made€when€the€trial€judge€wasÏpassing€on€the€motion€for€a€new€trial.ÌÌà àà àWe€agree€with€the€state's€position€that€we€may€only€consider€theÏstatements€of€the€trial€judge€made€in€passing€on€the€motion€for€new€trial€in€ourÏreview€of€the€trial€judge's€actions€as€thirteenth€juror.€€òòCumberland€Tel.€&€Tel.€Co.Ïv.€Smithwickóó,€112€Tenn.€463,€467„68€(1903)€("[I]f€the€circuit€judge€is€dissatisfiedÏwith€the€verdict€of€the€jury,€it€is€his€duty€to€set€it€aside€and€grant€a€new€trial,€andÏthat€upon€its€being€made€to€appear€to€this€court,€òòfrom€statements€made€by€theÏcircuit€judge€in€passing€upon€the€motion€for€new€trialóó,€that€he€was€really€notÏsatisfied€with€the€verdict,€it€becomes€the€duty€of€this€court€.€.€.€to€do€what€theÏcircuit€judge€should€have€done;€that€is,€to€grant€a€new€trial€.€.€.€.")€(emphasisÏadded).€€òòBut€cfóó.€òòState€v.€Ernest€L.€McCormickóó,€No.€01C01„9502„CC„00027,€slipÏop.€at€9€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.,€Nashville,€Oct.€4,€1995)€(relying€in€part€on€trial€court'sÍstatement,€"I€accept€the€verdict"€made€at€trial€after€jury's€return€of€guilty€verdict€asÏrationale€for€concluding€trial€judge€did€not€fail€to€act€as€thirteenth€juror).€ÏAlthough€the€òòCumberland€Telephoneóó€rule€was€announced€in€the€context€of€civilÏproceedings,€its€principles€have€been€relied€on€by€this€court€and€the€supremeÏcourt€in€criminal€cases.€€òòSee,€e.g.óó,ò ò€òòó óState€v.€Moatsóó,€906€S.W.2d€431,€433€(Tenn.Ï1995);€òòState€v.€Dankworthóó,€919€S.W.2d€52,€58€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.€1995).€ÏTherefore,€we€find€it€instructive€on€the€review€to€be€undertaken€in€the€case€atÏbar.Ìò òÌà àà àó óUpon€consideration€of€the€trial€court's€entire€colloquy€on€theÏmotion€for€new€trial,€including€the€excerpted€portions€relied€on€by€the€appellant,Ïwe€are€of€the€opinion€the€€trial€court€weighed€the€evidence€and€concurred€withÏthe€jury's€verdict,€thereby€fulfilling€his€role€as€thirteenth€juror.€€Having€found€theÏtrial€judge€fulfilled€this€duty,€we€would€be€in€error€in€revisiting€the€issue€andÏdecline€to€do€so.× ƒP ××  ×Ìò òÌà@ àVIó óÌÌà àà àIn€his€final€series€of€arguments,€the€appellant€challenges€theÏpropriety€of€the€sentences€imposed€on€him€by€the€trial€court.€€He€insists€(1)€theÏtrial€court€improperly€refused€to€consider€alternative€sentencing;€(2)€the€trialÏcourt€failed€to€consider€relevant€mitigating€factors;€(3)€the€trial€court€improperlyÏconsidered€the€appellant's€alleged€prior€convictions€without€certified€copiesÏevidencing€their€authenticity;€(4)€€the€trial€court€afforded€too€much€weight€to€theÏappellant's€criminal€history;€(5)€the€trial€court€improperly€enhanced€theÏkidnapping€sentence;€and€(6)€the€trial€court€committed€error€in€imposingÏconsecutive€sentences.ÌÌà àà àWhen€an€accused€challenges€the€length,€range,€or€manner€ofÏservice€of€a€sentence,€it€is€the€duty€of€this€court€to€conduct€a€òòde€novoóó€review€withÏa€presumption€that€the€determinations€made€by€the€trial€court€are€correct.€Tenn.ÏCode€Ann.€ðð€40„35„401(d)€(1990).€€This€presumption€is€"conditioned€upon€theÏaffirmative€showing€in€the€record€that€the€trial€court€considered€the€sentencingÏprinciples€and€all€relevant€facts€and€circumstances."€€òòState€v.€Ashbyóó,€823ÏS.W.2d€166,€169€(Tenn.€1991).€€In€conducting€our€òòde€novoóó€review,€we€mustÏconsider€the€evidence€at€sentencing,€the€presentence€report,€the€sentencingÏprinciples,€the€arguments€of€counsel,€the€statements€of€the€defendant,€theÏnature€and€characteristics€of€the€offense,€any€mitigating€and€enhancementÍfactors,€and€the€defendantððs€amenability€to€rehabilitation.€€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ððððÏ40„35„210(b),€40„35„103(5)€(1990);€òòState€v.€Ashbyóó,€823€S.W.2d€at€168.€ÏMoreover,€the€burden€of€demonstrating€that€the€sentence€is€improper€is€on€theÏappellant.€€òòAshbyóó,€823€S.W.2d€at€169.ÌÌà àà àOur€review€of€the€record€leads€us€to€conclude€that€the€trial€judge's€Ïsentencing€determinations€should€be€afforded€a€presumption€of€correctness€inÏthat€his€statements€on€the€record€evidence€his€consideration€of€the€sentencingÏprinciples€and€the€relevant€facts€and€circumstances.€€Thus,€our€òòde€novoóó€reviewÏis€accompanied€by€this€presumption.ÌÌò òA.à0 àEnhancement€Factorsó óÌÌà àThe€appellant€challenges€the€trial€court's€consideration€of€twoÏenhancement€factors.€€First,€the€appellant€takes€issue€with€the€court'sÏconsideration€of€his€prior€convictions€without€certified€copies€evidencing€theirÏauthenticity€and€the€weight€given€the€appellant's€criminal€history.€€Second,€theÏappellant€contends€the€trial€court€should€not€have€enhanced€the€kidnappingÏsentence€based€on€the€appellant's€use€of€a€firearm€during€the€commission€ofÏthat€offense.€€ÌÌà àà àThe€appellant's€criminal€history€was€detailed€in€the€PresentenceÏReport.€€The€report€contains€a€certified€copy€of€an€escape€conviction€from€1975,Ïan€admission€by€the€appellant€that€he€was€convicted€of€possession€ofÏmarijuana,€pending€charges€for€reckless€driving€and€driving€on€a€revokedÏlicense€(those€events€were€alleged€to€have€occurred€a€few€days€prior€to€theÏoffenses€that€are€the€subject€of€this€appeal),€and€uncertified€complaints€andÏwarrants€from€1989€and€1993€for€destruction€of€property€and€two€counts€ofÏaggravated€assault€of€an€officer.€€The€report€also€listed€several€€additionalÏcharges€on€which€the€appellant€was€arrested€"that€did€not€have€verifiableÏdispositions€or€were€dismissed."€At€the€sentencing€hearing,€the€appellant€didÏnot€challenge€the€accuracy€of€the€information€in€the€Presentence€Report,€otherÏthan€that€the€account€of€the€present€crimes€"was€leaning€heavily€towards€theÏstate."€€Moreover,€the€appellant€presented€evidence€of€the€facts€underlyingÏcertain€charges€and€the€escape€conviction€in€his€criminal€history.€€The€trialÏjudge€is€required€to€consider€the€Presentence€Report€in€his€sentencingÏdetermination.€€€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€40„35„210(b)(2)€(Supp.€1996).€€There€is€noÏindication€anywhere€in€the€record€that€the€appellant€sought€to€have€the€stateÏprove€the€prior€convictions€by€any€greater€evidence€than€that€which€wasÏpresented€at€the€sentencing€hearing.€Absent€a€challenge€to€the€reliability€of€theÍinformation€presented€by€the€state€through€the€Presentence€Report,€the€courtÏdid€not€err€in€considering€it.€€òòState€v.€Richardsonóó,€875€S.W.2d€671,€677€(Tenn.ÏCrim.€App.€€1993)€(trial€court€properly€considered€appellant's€criminal€history€asÏreported€in€Presentence€Report€in€imposing€sentence€where€defendant€did€notÏdeny€earlier€crimes€or€refute€accuracy€of€information€in€Presentence€Report);€òòcfóó.ÏTenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€40„35„209(b)€(Supp.€1996)€(court€may€consider€"reliableÏhearsay"€if€opposing€party€is€given€fair€opportunity€to€rebut€such€hearsayÏevidence).€€In€this€limited€circumstance,€it€is€irrelevant€whether€certified€copies€ofÏconvictions€have€been€filed.€€òòSeeóó€òòState€v.€Dewayne€Fosteróó,€No.€01C01„9501„CC„00008,€slip€op.€at€6„7€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.,€Nashville,€Nov.€21,€1995)Ï(appellant€not€entitled€to€relief€on€trial€court's€sentencing€determination€whereÏhis€only€challenge€was€to€state's€failure€to€file€certified€copies€of€convictions,€notÏto€the€accuracy€of€those€convictions);€òòState€v.€Richard€J.€Crossmanóó,€No.€01C01„9311„CR„00394,€slip€op.€at€11„12€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.,€Nashville,€Oct.€6,€1994)€(inÏdetermining€sentence,€trial€court€properly€relied€on€criminal€history€of€defendantÏcontained€in€Presentence€Report€despite€absence€of€certified€copies€ofÏconvictions€where€defendant€did€not€object€to€accuracy€of€information),€òòperm.Ïapp.€deniedóó€(Tenn.€1995).ÌÌà àà àThe€appellant€also€challenges€the€weight€the€trial€court€gave€hisÍcriminal€history€in€imposing€the€sentences.€€The€appellant€contends€the€trialÏcourt€"should€not€use€a€mere€arrest€in€determining€what€sentence€to€impose."€ÏThe€law,€however,€allows€the€court€to€consider€criminal€convictions€òòoróó€criminalÏbehavior.€€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€40„35„114(1)€(Supp.€1996).€€This€court€hasÏpreviously€recognized€that€a€trial€judge€may€find€evidence€of€criminal€behaviorÏeven€though€there€has€been€no€conviction.€€òòState€v.€Masseyóó,€757€S.W.2d€350Ï(Tenn.€Crim.€App.€1988);€òòcfóó.€òòState€v.€Buckmeiróó,€902€S.W.2d€418€(Tenn.€Crim.ÏApp.€1995)€(evidence€of€pending€charges,€without€more,€is€not€enough€toÏestablish€criminal€activity).€€In€this€case,€the€appellant€took€the€witness€stand€atÏsentencing€and€testified€about€some€of€his€prior€criminal€activity.€€TheÏappellant's€testimony€was€sufficient€to€establish€that€he€had€broken€the€law€onÏnumerous€occasions€by€smoking€marijuana.€€This€is€"criminal€activity"€evenÏthough€there€is€only€one€conviction€for€marijuana€possession.€€Moreover,€theÏrecord€reflects€that€the€trial€court€primarily€considered€the€possession€andÏescape€convictions,€as€well€as€"a€pattern€of€criminal€activity€that€went€on,€notÏonly€[prior]€to€this€event,€but€continued€through€this€event€and€the€disturbingÏthing€about€that€pattern€of€criminal€activity€is€that€it€involved€violence€to€otherÏindividuals"€in€utilizing€this€enhancement€factor.€€The€judge€further€explainedÏthat€he€could€infer€from€Mr.€Nolan's€testimony€that€he€had€smoked€marijuana€inÏjail,€which€would€amount€to€additional€criminal€activity.€€Based€on€all€of€thisÍevidence,€we€see€no€error€in€the€weight€the€trial€court€gave€to€this€factor.ÌÌà àà àThe€appellant€likewise€challenges€the€application€of€aggravatingÏfactor€(9),€that€he€employed€a€firearm€in€the€commission€of€the€kidnappingÏoffense.€€His€contention€is€that€he€was€indicted€for€aggravated€kidnapping,€andÏbecause€the€use€of€a€weapon€is€an€element€of€that€offense,€the€factor€cannot€beÏused€again€in€enhancing€his€sentence.€€òòSeeóó€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€40„35„114,ÏSentencing€Comm'n€Comments€(enhancement€factors€can€be€utilized€if€theyÏare€not€essential€elements€of€the€indicted€offense)€(1990).€€The€state€countersÏthis€argument€with€citation€to€òòSills€v.€Stateóó,€884€S.W.2d€139€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.Ï1994),€which€it€contends€carves€out€an€exception€for€application€ofÏenhancement€factors€despite€their€character€as€essential€elements€of€theÏoffense€where€a€conviction€is€obtained€on€a€crime€other€than€the€indictedÏoffense.€€€ÌÌà àà àWe€agree€with€the€state's€interpretation€of€òòSillsóó€and€find€itsÏprinciples€applicable€to€the€1989€Sentencing€Act,€even€though€it€spoke€to€theÏ1982€Act.€€òòSee€alsoóó€òòState€v.€Michael€Shane€Emmertóó,€No.€03C01„9210„CR„00354,€slip€op.€at€7€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.,€Knoxville,€Oct.€5,€1993).€€The€relevantÏindictment€in€this€case€alleges€aggravated€kidnapping€through€use€of€a€deadlyÍweapon.€€The€appellant€was€convicted€of€kidnapping.€€The€use€of€a€deadlyÏweapon€is€not€part€of€the€statutory€definition€of€kidnapping.€€Thus,€in€sentencingÏthe€appellant€on€his€conviction€of€kidnapping,€the€trial€court€did€not€err€inÏenhancing€the€appellant's€sentence€based€upon€his€use€of€a€firearm€whileÏcommitting€the€offense.€ÌÌò òB.à0 àMitigating€FactorsÌó óÌà àà àNext,€we€consider€the€challenge€pertaining€to€the€mitigating€factorsÏthe€trial€court€declined€to€consider€in€imposing€the€sentences.€€The€appellantÏsubmitted€three€mitigating€factors€for€the€trial€court's€consideration€„„€(1)Ïsubstantial€grounds€exist€tending€to€excuse€or€justify€the€defendant's€criminalÏconduct,€although€failing€to€establish€a€defense,€(2)€the€defendant€was€sufferingÏfrom€a€mental€or€physical€condition€that€significantly€reduces€his€culpability€forÏthe€offense€(excluding€any€condition€caused€by€the€voluntary€use€of€intoxicants)Ïand€(3)€the€defendant,€though€guilty€of€the€crime,€committed€the€offense€underÏsuch€unusual€circumstances€that€it€is€unlikely€that€a€sustained€intent€to€violateÏthe€law€motivated€his€conduct.€€òòSeeóó€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€40„35„113€(3),€(8)€andÏ(11)€(1990).€€At€the€sentencing€hearing,€the€trial€judge€commented€on€theseÏfactors:ÌÒ ` ÒÒ ° ÒÒ ` ÒÒ  ÒÓÓI'm€going€to€rule€and€I€want€the€record€clear€so€you'll€be€able€toÏuse€it€and€argue€from€it,€I've€read€all€three€of€you[r]€mitigators€andÏI'm€going€to€rule€that€what€you're€saying€to€me€is€the€same€thingÏthree€different€ways.€€You're€saying€Judge,€consider€his€mentalÏcondition€and€I'm€going€to€find€that€mental€condition€is€a€mitigatingÏfactor€in€this€case,€but€that€I€don't€have€three€separate€mitigatingÏfactors€here.€€I've€got€one€mitigating€and€that's€the€mentalÏcondition€and€I'm€saying€that€so€the€record€will€be€clear,€becauseÏsomeone€else€might€could€[sic]€read€those€and€say,€no,€you're€notÏright.€€They€are€[sic]€three€here€and€you€need€to€be€able€to€argueÏthat.ÌÌÒ  ÒÒ  ÒÒ  ÒÒ ° ÒÓÓThe€state€defends€the€judge's€ruling,€arguing€that€the€trial€court's€statementÏmerely€refers€to€the€weight€he€was€giving€each€of€the€three€mitigating€factors.€ÏWe€believe€the€judge€meant€what€he€said€„„€that€he€was€rejecting€the€statutoryÏmitigating€factors€requested€by€the€appellant€and€applying€only€one€generalÏmitigating€factor€pertaining€to€the€appellant's€mental€health.€€In€this€result,€weÏbelieve€the€trial€court€was€correct,€and€we€find€additional€grounds€supportingÏthe€trial€court's€decision.€€First,€we€reject€the€argument€the€appellant€did€notÏhave€a€sustained€intent€to€violate€the€law.€€The€evidence€presented€at€trialÏthrough€Dr.€Farooque€that€the€appellant€continued€to€use€marijuana€while€inÏpretrial€detention€belies€this€argument.€€€Further,€€we€do€not€believe€that€on€theÏfacts€of€this€case€the€appellant's€mental€condition€equals€a€substantial€ground€toÏjustify€or€excuse€the€appellant's€placing€several€other€people€in€jeopardy€ofÏphysical€harm.€ÌÌà àà àThe€appellant€likewise€complains€that€the€trial€court€failed€toÏconsider€€the€defendant's€remorse€in€mitigation.€€òòSeeóó€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€40„35„113(13)€(1990)€(allowing€the€court€to€consider€"any€other€factor"€consistent€withÏthe€Sentencing€Reform€Act€as€a€mitigating€factor);€òòState€v.€Mossóó,€727€S.W.2dÏ229,€240€(Tenn.€1986).€€Because€we€believe€the€defense€has€failed€to€establishÏthe€propriety€of€this€factor€in€light€of€all€of€the€evidence,€we€find€no€error€in€theÏtrial€court's€failure€to€consider€this€miscellaneous€factor.ÌÌÌò òC.à0 àLength€of€Sentencesó óÌÌà àà àHaving€reviewed€the€enhancement€and€mitigating€factorsÏchallenged€by€the€appellant,€we€move€to€the€question€of€the€propriety€of€theÏlength€of€the€sentences.€€The€appellant€received€sentences€of€six€years€forÏkidnapping,€nine€years€for€attempted€second€degree€murder,€and€elevenÏmonths€and€twenty„nine€days€for€assault.× ƒQ ××  ×€€The€kidnapping€and€assaultÏsentences€were€ordered€to€be€served€concurrently€€to€one€another,€and€bothÍwere€ordered€to€run€consecutively€to€the€attempted€second€degree€murderÏconviction.€€Thus,€the€appellant's€effective€sentence€is€15€years.ÌÌà àà àIn€imposing€a€sentence€on€a€felony€conviction€whereÏenhancement€and€mitigating€factors€have€been€found,€the€trial€judge€must€beginÏat€the€minimum€sentence€within€the€range,€apply€the€enhancement€factors€toÏenhance€the€sentence€within€the€range,€and€then€apply€the€mitigating€factors€toÏreduce€the€sentence€within€the€range.€€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€40„35„210(e)€(Supp.Ï1996).€€The€appellant€has€two€felony€convictions€as€a€result€of€the€crimes€thatÏare€the€subject€of€this€appeal.€€As€a€Standard,€Range€I€offender,€the€appellantÏfaced€3€to€6€years€for€kidnapping,€a€Class€C€felony,€€and€€8€to€12€years€forÏattempted€second€degree€murder,€a€Class€B€felony.€€òòSeeóó€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ððÏ39„13„303(b)€€(1991)€(kidnapping);€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€39„12„107(a)€(1991)Ï(attempt);€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€39„13„210(b)€(1991)€(second€degree€murder).ÌÌà àà àThe€enhancement€factors€for€the€kidnapping€conviction€are€theÏappellant's€previous€history€of€criminal€convictions€or€criminal€behavior,€Tenn.ÏCode€Ann.€ðð40„35„114(1)€(Supp.€1996),€the€offense€involved€more€than€oneÏvictim,€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€40„35„114(3)€(Supp.€1996),€and€the€appellantÏpossessed€or€employed€a€firearm€during€the€commission€of€the€offenses.€€Tenn.ÍCode€Ann.€ðð€40„35„114(9)€(Supp.€1996).€€The€mitigating€factor€is€the€defendantÏwas€suffering€from€a€mental€or€physical€condition€that€significantly€reduces€hisÏculpability€for€the€offense€(excluding€any€condition€caused€by€the€voluntary€useÏof€intoxicants).€€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€40„35„113(8)€(1990).€€Giving€due€regard€toÏthe€presumption€of€correctness€afforded€the€trial€judge,€we€find€the€appellant'sÏnine€year€sentence€is€appropriate.ÌÌà àà àFor€the€attempted€second€degree€murder€conviction,€the€trial€courtÏapplied€the€prior€criminal€history€enhancement€factor€and€the€sole€mitigatingÏfactor.€Again€affording€the€trial€judge€the€presumption€of€correctness,€we€find€theÏappellant's€six€year€sentence€is€appropriate.ò òÌó óÌà àà àIn€imposing€a€sentence€on€a€misdemeanor€conviction,€the€trialÏjudge€€is€not€bound€by€a€presumption€the€defendant€is€entitled€to€the€minimumÏsentence.€€òòState€v.€Creasyóó,€885€S.W.2d€829,€832€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.€1994)Ï(citations€omitted).€€€In€the€case€at€bar,€the€appellant€has€one€misdemeanorÏconviction€which€is€before€us€for€review.€€The€appellant€was€convicted€ofÏassault,€which€is€a€Class€A€misdemeanor€and€which€carries€a€maximumÏconfinement€of€11€months€and€29€days.€òòSeeóó€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€39„13„101(b)Ï(1991);€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€40„35„111(e)(1)€(1990).€Considering€the€principlesÍof€sentencing,€the€evidence€and€arguments€before€the€court€at€sentencingÏ(including€the€presentence€report,€the€defendant's€statement,€the€evidenceÏadduced€at€trial,€and€the€arguments€of€counselò ò)ó ó€and€this€court's€view€of€theÏappellant's€amenability€to€rehabilitation,€we€agree€with€the€result€reached€by€theÏtrial€court.€€In€our€view€the€result€is€appropriate€regardless€of€whether€theÏpresumption€of€correctness€applies€to€this€misdemeanor€sentence.× ƒR ××  ×€Thus,€theÏappellant's€sentence€of€11€months,€29€days€for€assault€is€affirmed.× ƒS ××  ×ÌÌò òD.à0 àConsecutive€Sentencingó óÌÌà àThe€appellant€protests€the€imposition€of€consecutive€sentences,€givingÏhim€an€effective€15„year€sentence.€€Consecutive€sentencing€may€be€imposed€byÏthe€€trial€court€upon€a€determination€that€one€or€more€of€the€criteria€set€forth€inÏTennessee€Code€Annotated€Section€40„35„115(b)€exist.ÌÌà àà à€In€the€case€at€bar,€the€trial€judge€relied€on€Code€section€40„34„114(b)(4),€finding€the€appellant€was€a€dangerous€offender.€€Our€supreme€courtÏhas€recently€addressed€the€issue€of€consecutive€sentencing€in€a€case€involvingÏthe€"dangerous€offender"€subsection€of€Code€section€40„35„115.€€òòSeeóó€òòState€v.ÏWilkersonóó,€905€S.W.2d€933€(Tenn.€1995).€€€In€òòWilkersonóó,€the€supreme€court€heldÏthat€consecutive€sentencing,€although€inherently€a€case„by„case€determination,Ïis€appropriate€where€a€defendant€was€appropriately€classified€as€a€dangerousÏoffender€under€Code€section€40„35„115(b)(4),€òòandóó€consecutive€sentences€areÏreasonably€related€to€the€severity€of€the€offenses€committed€and€are€necessaryÏto€protect€the€public€from€further€criminal€conduct.€€òòWilkersonóó,€905€S.W.2d€atÏ937„38.€€Moreover,€the€trial€judge€remains€under€the€obligation€to€apply€theÏsentencing€principles€and€to€provide€justification€for€his€sentencingÏdetermination.€€òòWilkersonóó,€905€S.W.2d€at€938.€€This€€obligation€includes€the€dutyÏto€make€appropriate€findings€and€justifications€regarding€consecutiveÏsentencing.€€òòSeeóó€òòWilkersonóó,€905€S.W.2d€at€938„39.€€If€the€appellate€courtÏdetermines€that€the€trial€court€has€not€considered€the€sentencing€principlesÏapplicable€to€the€facts€and€circumstances€of€the€particular€case,€the€case€will€beÏremanded€to€the€trial€court€for€resentencing.€€òòWilkersonóó,€905€S.W.2d€at€935.ÌÌà àà àIn€this€case,€the€sentencing€hearing€took€place€prior€to€the€releaseÏof€the€òòWilkersonóó€opinion.€€Nevertheless,€we€are€convinced€the€trial€judgeÍconsidered€the€appropriate€factors€as€required€by€òòWilkersonóó.€€In€addressingÏwhether€the€appellant€was€a€dangerous€offender€under€Code€section€40„35„115(b)(4),€the€trial€judge€said,€"I'm€interpreting€the€facts€that€I've€heard€thisÏmorning€that€there's€been€a€whole€series€of€violent€activities.€€I€don't€know€whyÏthere's€not€been€a€lack€of€hesitation.€€I€can€reasonable€[sic]€conclude€thereÏcertainly€has€been€a€lack€of€hesitation.€€Now€it€may€be€because€of€the€mentalÏhesitation,€but€nevertheless€it's€occurred."€€We€believe€this€statement€satisfiesÏthe€statutory€definition€that€the€appellant's€behavior€indicates€little€or€no€regardÏfor€human€life€and€that€he€has€no€hesitation€about€committing€a€crime€in€whichÏthe€risk€to€human€life€is€high.€€òòSeeóó€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€40„35„115(b)(4)€(1990).€ÏAdditionally,€the€trial€court€found€that€€the€appellant's€psychological€concernsÏand€drug€abuse€had€not€been€adequately€addressed€in€the€past€because€theÏcriminal€justice€system€had€deferred€on€multiple€occasions€to€the€mental€healthÏsystem,€and€adequate€treatment€had€not€been€provided.€€These€untreatedÏconditions€resulted€in€the€crimes€of€which€the€appellant€was€convicted,€andÏconsecutive€sentencing€for€the€attempted€second€degree€murder€andÏkidnapping€convictions€was€necessary€so€that€the€appellant€could€"get€someÏhelp"€and€to€"assure€that€during€a€reasonable€period€of€time€that€[sic]€others€inÏthe€community€are€protective€[sic]€from€[the€appellant's]€behavior[.]"€€The€courtÏalso€remarked€on€the€gravity€of€the€offenses,€noting€that€"somebody€could€haveÍvery€well€gotten€killed[.]"€€€We€believe€these€statements€by€the€trial€courtÏsatisfactorily€support€the€requirement€that€the€trial€judge€find€that€consecutiveÏsentences€are€reasonably€related€to€the€severity€of€the€offenses€committed€andÏare€necessary€to€protect€the€public€from€further€criminal€conduct.€ò ò€€òòó óSeeóóÏòòWilkersonóó,€905€S.W.2d€at€937„38.€€The€trial€court€went€on€to€conclude€that€theseÏfacts€supported€consecutive€sentencing€on€the€attempted€second€degreeÏmurder€and€kidnapping€convictions.€€We€find€that€the€appellant€has€failed€to€Ïdemonstrate€the€impropriety€of€consecutive€sentencing.€€Accordingly,€this€issueÏis€without€merit.ÌÌò òE.à0 àAlternative€SentencingÌó óÌà àà àFinally,€we€turn€to€the€appellant's€challenge€of€the€trial€court'sÏdenial€of€alternative€sentencing.€€In€his€brief,€the€appellant€makes€twoÏarguments€regarding€alternative€sentencing.€€First,€he€contends€the€trial€courtÏimposed€a€sentence€greater€than€eight€years€"for€the€purposes€of€denyingÏeligibility€for€probation."€€Second,€he€maintains€he€should€have€been€sentencedÏto€Community€Corrections.€€ÌÌà àà àThe€legislature€has€recognized€that€prison€capacity€is€limited€andÍhas€determined€that€certain€offenders€should€be€given€priority€for€prison€space.€ÏParticularly,€confinement€is€a€priority€for€"convicted€felons€committing€the€mostÏsevere€offenses,€possessing€criminal€histories€evincing€a€clear€disregard€for€theÏlaws€and€morals€of€society,€and€evincing€failure€of€past€efforts€at€rehabilitation[.]"€ÏTenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€40„35„102(5)€(Supp.€1996).€€Moreover,€especially€mitigatedÏor€standard€offenders€convicted€of€Class€C€or€lesser€felonies€are€presumed€toÏbe€favorable€candidates€for€alternative€sentencing€absent€contrary€evidence,Ïprovided€they€do€not€qualify€under€the€previous€provision€as€offenders€for€whomÏincarceration€is€a€priority.€€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€40„35„102(6)€(Supp.€1996).€ÏThus,€as€a€Class€B€felon,€the€appellant€is€not€presumed€to€be€a€favorableÏcandidate€for€alternative€sentencing€under€the€1989€Sentencing€Act,€at€least€asÏto€the€attempted€second€degree€murder€conviction.€ÌÌà àà àWith€respect€to€probation,€an€individual€is€eligible€for€theÏalternative€sentence€of€probation€if€the€actual€sentence€imposed€is€8€years€orÏless.€€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€40„35„303(a)€(Supp.€1996).€€Eligibility,€however,€doesÏnot€equate€to€entitlement€to€a€probation€sentence.€€òòState€v.€Fletcheróó,€805€S.W.2dÏ785,€787€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.€1991).€€Moreover,€the€appellant€has€the€burden€ofÏshowing€the€sentence€imposed€is€improper.€€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€40„35„401(d),ÏSentencing€Comm'n€Comments€(1990€repl.);€òòState€v.€Ashbyóó,€823€S.W.2d€166,Í169€(Tenn.€1991).€€In€the€case€before€us,€the€appellant€contends€the€trial€courtÏimposed€a€nine€year€sentence€on€the€attempted€second€degree€murderÏconviction€for€the€purpose€of€denying€the€appellant€probation.€ÌÌà àà àBecause€we€have€found€the€appellant's€attempted€second€degreeÏmurder€sentence€of€nine€years€to€be€appropriate,€the€appellant€is€ineligible€forÏprobation€under€the€statute,€and€we€are€not€required€to€address€this€issue.€€WeÏnote€parenthetically,€however,€that€the€appellant€has€offered€no€citation€to€theÏrecord€to€support€his€bare€assertion€that€€the€trial€court€contrived€the€sentenceÏas€a€means€of€disqualifying€the€appellant€for€probation.€€ÌÌà àà àThe€appellant€also€claims€the€trial€court€should€have€consideredÏan€alternative€sentence€of€Community€Corrections.€€With€respect€to€review€ofÏissues€pertaining€to€the€Community€Corrections€Act,€this€court€considers€theÏsentencing€considerations€announced€in€Code€sections€40„35„103€and€40„35„210,€the€eligibility€criteria€of€the€Community€Corrections€Act,€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ððÏ40„36„106,€and€the€report€of€the€entity€administering€the€local€CommunityÏCorrections€Program.€€òòState€v.€Tayloróó,€744€S.W.2d€919,€920€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.Ï1987).ÌÌà àà àInitially,€we€note€that€a€Community€Corrections€sentence€is€aÏprivilege€generally€reserved€for€those€who€have€not€been€convicted€of€crimesÏagainst€the€person.€€òòSeeóó€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€40„36„106(a)(2)€(Supp.€1996).€ÏAlthough€the€appellant€is€initially€disqualified€for€Community€Corrections€due€toÏhis€convictions€for€crimes€against€the€person,€a€"savings"€provision€elsewhere€inÏthe€statute€provides€for€eligibility€of€felony€offenders€who€would€otherwise€beÏdisqualified€and€"who€would€be€usually€considered€unfit€for€probation€due€toÏhistories€of€chronic€alcohol,€drug€abuse€or€mental€health€problems,€but€whoseÏspecial€needs€are€treatable€and€could€best€be€served€in€the€community€ratherÏthan€in€a€correctional€institution[.]"€€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€40„36„106(c)(Supp.Ï1996).€€ÌÌà àà àThe€appellant€insists€he€should€be€considered€for€CommunityÏCorrections€under€this€provision.€à àBased€upon€the€record€and€the€trial€courtððsÏcomments,€the€trial€court€clearly€found€that€the€appellant's€mental€healthÏproblems€were€not€best€served€in€the€community.€€Thus,€we€find€the€appellantÏhas€failed€to€demonstrate€that€the€trial€court's€failure€to€sentence€him€toÏCommunity€Corrections€was€improper.ÌÌà àà àIn€summary,€we€reverse€and€dismiss€the€conviction€for€aggravatedÍassault.€€This€matter€is€affirmed€in€all€other€respects.€€ÌÌÓÓà àà àà àà àà àà à_______________________________Ìà àà àà àà àà àà àCURWOOD€WITT,€JUDGEÌÌÌÌÌCONCUR:ÌÌÌÌ_______________________________ÌGARY€R.€WADE,€JUDGEÌÌÌÌ_______________________________ÌDAVID€G.€HAYES,€JUDGEÌ