ÿWPCU …# VU:a %› 0(¡w@É4  , 0J4 ~ 0T„ 0^Ø 0h6 0rž 0| 0†Œ 0 1u¢ U, 0dC U,§ U*Ó B)ý DC& AMi¶ BÏv~ìvÓj D3= 0@p AO°Æÿ 0DÅ D/  B8˜HP LaserJet 4Si/4SiMX PS 600dpiPSCRIPTÀÌÀääÀÀÌ0 ,c½¬AZ‹"Arial RegularX($¡¡ £E¤D¥¦ʧV¨D©DªU«ʬÓ€©U!3|x·2 ÿÿ0Indent1Ô2ÔÔ3  ÔHH2" ÿÿ0Indent2à0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2, ÿÿ0Indent3à0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô26 ÿÿ0Indent4à0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2@ ÿÿ0Indent5à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2J ÿÿ0Indent6à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2T ÿÿ0Indent7à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2^ ÿÿ0Indent8à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô  ÿÿ?AGMSYaioIndent0I.A.1.a.(1)(a)i)a)< Œ 9p`(ModernP ÿÿ8Mac DefaultMac DefaultÓ ` °šXÓ< Œ 9p`(Monaco< Œ 9p`(Arial% Line 7 d!!!!7Border 1dd€-"Cþÿ << Gÿÿ Ý ƒ!ÝÑ  ÑÑ#€d#ÑÔ€ÔÔ€ ÔÝ  ÝÔ€ ÔÓ  ÓÔ YYY ÔFILEDÔ€ XÔÌÌò òAugust€20,€1996ÌÌCecil€Crowson,€Jr.ÌÔ€ ôÔAppellate€Court€Clerkó ó dPtPtHHÚ(ÿáÿâùFG(üHHØ(d'`Styl{WP}01•ÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃà Ãà Ãà Ãà Ãà ÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÐ ÐÐHHÐÐ  ÐÐ2ÐÐÿÿ¸æ$ÿÐÐHHÐÐÐÐÐÐÐÐ  ÐÐ ÐÐ ÐÑÑÑGenevaÑÑ ÑÑ € ÑÑ<Px–ÈÑÒÒÒ443!#4ÒÒ$ *$ÒÒ$*$ÒÒ ÿKK ÒÒ  Geneva ÒÒ  Geneva ÒÓ.,ÓÓÓÓ6ÓÓ ÓßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßÑMonacoÑÑ ÑÒ  BA Op Monaco ÒÒ  BA Op Monaco Ò%%%%'ÿÿdxd("ÿÿ$££Ò  ÒÒ  Ò€-‚ƒCþÿ<< CÿÿƒLevel 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5($$””ò òÚ  Ú1Ú  Úó ó„„'÷ÿ dxdüÿP PdÝ ƒ!ÝÔ . ÔÔ€ÔÓ&€X„d&ÓÑ#€Xd#ÑÔ€ ÔÝ  ÝÑ ` ÑÑ  ÑÒ D ÒÒ ° ÒÒ D ÒÒ ¦ ÒÓÓÑ\R AØ'\ÑÑ\R AØ'\ÑÑ7€º¡XXdædÈ7ÑÑ  ÑÙ€€ÙßL€#$";+'h|` ¤ `€€Lß›à àà àò òIN€THE€COURT€OF€CRIMINAL€APPEALSÏOF€TENNESSEEÌà@ àAT€KNOXVILLEÌà@ àMAY€1996€SESSIONÌÓÓÌó óÌò òSTATE€OF€TENNESSEE,à àà àà à)ó óÌà àà àà àà àà àà àò ò)ó óà àò òC.C.A.€NO.€03C01„9512„CC„00380ó óÌà àà àAppellee,à àò ò€€€€€à àà à)Ìà àà àà àà àà àà à)à àBRADLEY€COUNTYó óÌVS.à àà àà àà àà àà àò ò)Ìà àà àà àà àà àà à)à àHON.€R.€STEVEN€BEBB,ÌTIM€JAMES€NORWORD,à àà àà à)à àJUDGEÌà àà àà àà àà àà à)Ìà àà àó óAppellant.ò òà àà àà à)à àó ó(Certified€Question)ò òÌó óÌÌÌòòFOR€THE€APPELLANT:óóà àà àà à€€€€€òòà àFOR€THE€APPELLEE:óóÌÌÌò òKENNETH€L.€MILLERà àà àà àà àCHARLES€W.€BURSONÌó óP.O.€Box€191à àà àà àà àà àAttorney€General€&€Reporterò òÌó óCleveland,€TN€€€37364ò òÌó óà àà àà àà àò òà àà àà àHUNT€S.€BROWNó óÌà àà àà àà àà àà àà àAsst.€Attorney€GeneralÌ€€à àà àà àà àà àà àà à450€James€RobertsonÏPkwy.à àà àà àà àà àà àà àà àNashville,€TN€€37243„0493Ìà àà àà àà àÌà àà àà àà àò òà àà àà àJERRY€N.€ESTESó óÌà àà àà àà àà àà àà àDistrict€Attorney€GeneralÌÌà àà àà àà àò òà àà àà àJOE€REHYANSKYó óÌà àà àà àà àà àà àà àAsst.€District€Attorney€GeneralÌà àà àà àà àà àà àà àP.O.€Box€191Ìà àà àà àà àà àà àà àCleveland,€TN€€€37364€Ìà àà àà àà àà àà àà àà àÌÌà àà àà àà àà àà àà à̛̜à àà àà àà àÌOPINION€FILED:____________________ÌÌÌÌò òREVERSED€AND€DISMISSEDó óÌÌÌò òJOHN€H.€PEAY,ó óÌJudgeÌà@ àò òòòO€P€I€N€I€O€Nóóó óÌÌÑ ° ÑÌÌÓÓÓ  Ó€à àà àThe€defendant€was€indicted€for€simple€possession€of€less€than€one„halfÏounce€of€marijuana,€possession€of€drug€paraphernalia,€and€driving€on€a€revokedÏlicense.€€He€signed€a€waiver€of€his€right€to€a€jury€trial,€entering€guilty€pleas€for€allÏoffenses.€€The€defendant€reserved€a€certified€question€of€law€regarding€the€trialÏcourtððs€denial€of€his€motion€to€suppress€all€evidence€obtained€during€an€allegedÏillegal€investigative€stop.€€In€this€appeal€as€of€right,€the€defendant€asserts€that,€sinceÏthe€stop€was€made€without€a€warrant€and€without€reasonable€suspicion,€all€resultingÏevidence€should€be€suppressed.€€We€agree.€€Accordingly,€we€reverse€theÏdefendantððs€conviction€and€dismiss€the€charges.ÌÌà àà àOn€July€25,€1994,€Jimmy€Smith,€a€deputy€with€the€Bradley€CountyÏSheriffððs€Department,€was€on€routine€patrol.€€He€recognized€his€brotherððs€vehicleÍpass€by,€with€an€unknown€driver€at€the€wheel.€€In€order€to€verify€his€brotherððsÏownership€of€the€vehicle,€the€officer€ð ðcalled€the€tag€in€to€confirm€it.ðð€€Officer€Smith,Ïknowing€that€his€brother€did€not€often€lend€his€car€to€others,€proceeded€to€stop€theÏvehicle.€€The€officer€testified€that€the€sole€reason€he€detained€the€defendant€wasÏbecause€he€observed€a€stranger€driving€his€brotherððs€automobile,€not€because€ofÏtraffic€violations.ÌÌà àà àDuring€his€testimony,€the€officer€stated€that€as€he€approached€the€carÏthe€defendant€immediately€admitted€that€he€had€no€driverððs€license.€€Officer€SmithÏnext€saw€a€pack€of€rolling€papers€in€the€defendantððs€pocket€and€asked€him€to€step€outÏof€the€vehicle.€€According€to€the€officer,€the€defendant€voluntarily€allowed€him€toÏexamine€the€rolling€papers€as€well€as€to€search€the€vehicle.€€Upon€further€inspection,ÏOfficer€Smith€discovered€marijuana€cigarettes€inside€the€pack.€€The€defendant€thenÏtold€him€that€he€was€his€brotherððs€coworker€and€had€borrowed€his€car€in€order€toÏpurchase€food€to€bring€back€to€work.€€ÌÌà àà àOfficer€Smithððs€testimony€deviates€noticeably€from€his€own€affidavit€ofÏcomplaint.€€In€the€affidavit,€the€officer€wrote€that€the€defendant€first€ð ðadvised€[me€that]Ïmy€brother€loaned€him€the€car.€€He€then€advised€[me€that]€he€had€no€driverððs€license.ðð€ÏAt€the€suspension€hearing,€Officer€Smith,€while€admitting€having€written€the€affidavit,Ïdenied€its€veracity,€stating,€ð ðThatððs€not€how€it€occurred.ðð€€The€defendantððs€ownÍtestimony€corroborates€the€affidavitððs€sequence€of€events.€€According€to€theÏdefendant,€he€first€told€Officer€Smith€that€his€brother€let€him€borrow€the€car€in€order€toÏbring€back€food€to€their€workplace,€and€then€the€officer€asked€to€see€his€driverððsÏlicense.ÌÌà àà àOn€July€7,€1995,€the€defendant€pled€guilty€to€the€three€charges,Ïreserving€the€right€under€Tennessee€Rules€of€Criminal€Procedure€37(b)(2)(I)€toÏappeal€a€certified€question€of€law,€dispositive€of€his€case.€€Specifically,€the€issue€onÏappeal€is€whether€Officer€Jimmy€Smith€had€either€probable€cause€or€reasonableÏsuspicion€to€make€an€investigative€stop€of€his€brotherððs€car€which€was€driven€in€aÏlawful€manner€by€an€unknown€individual.€€ÌÌà àà àð ð[S]topping€an€automobile€and€detaining€its€occupants€constitute€aÏððseizureðð€within€the€meaning€of€[the€Fourth€and€Fourteenth€Amendments€of€the€UnitedÏStates€Constitution],€even€though€the€purpose€of€the€stop€is€limited€and€the€resultingÏdetention€quite€brief.ðð€€òòDelaware€v.€Prouseóó,€440€U.S.€648,€653€(1979).€€In€someÏcircumstances,€an€officer€may€briefly€detain€a€suspect€without€probable€cause€inÏorder€to€investigate€possible€criminal€activity.€€òòBrown€v.€Texasóó,€443€U.S.€47,€51Ï(1979).€€In€these€situations,€an€investigatory€stop€is€only€permissible€when€a€policeÏofficer€has€a€reasonable€suspicion,€supported€by€specific€and€articulable€facts,€that€aÏcriminal€offense€has€been€or€is€about€to€be€committed.€€òòTerry€v.€Ohioóó,€392€U.S.€1,€21Í(1968).€€In€order€to€determine€specific€and€articulable€facts,€this€Court€must€considerÏthe€ð ðtotality€of€the€circumstances.ðð€€òòUnited€States€v.€Cortezóó,€449€U.S.€411,€417€(1981).€ÏAmong€the€relevant€elements€to€be€considered€are€ð ðobjective€observations,Ïinformation€obtained€from€other€police€officers€or€agencies,€information€obtainedÏfrom€citizens,€and€the€pattern€of€operation€of€certain€offenders.ðð€€òòId.óó€at€418.€ÌÌà àà àThe€specific€and€articulable€facts€must€be€judged€by€an€objectiveÏstandard,€not€the€subjective€beliefs€of€the€officer€making€the€stop.€€òòCortezóó,€449€U.S.€atÏ417„18.€€In€òòState€v.€Johnsonóó,€we€considered€a€police€officer€who€had€stopped€aÏCadillac€after€noticing€that€its€rear€vent€window€was€broken.€€òòState€v.€Joe€A.€Johnsonóó,ÏNo.€01„C„01„9003„CR„00061,€Davidson€County€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.€filed€œAugust›€2,Ï1990,€at€Nashville).€€The€officer€testified€that€he€had€observed€numerous€stolenÏCadillacs€with€these€broken€windows.€€As€a€result,€he€had€formed€a€subjectiveÏconclusion€that€ð ðany€vehicle€with€a€broken€rear€vent€window€was€probably€stolen.ðð€ÏòòId.óó€€This€Court€deemed€such€a€subjective€supposition€inadequate€justification€to€stopÏthe€vehicle.€€€Similarly,€Officer€Smith€only€surmised€the€possibility€of€foul€play€inÏseeing€another€person€driving€his€brotherððs€car.€€He€had€no€objective€affirmation€ofÏhis€suspicion.ÌÌà àà àIn€its€brief,€the€State€favors€using€the€balancing€test€found€in€òòState€v.ÏPulleyóó€which€weighs€the€ð ðgravity€of€the€public€concern,€the€degree€to€which€theÍseizure€advances€that€concern,€and€the€severity€of€the€intrusion€into€individualÏprivacy.ðð€€òòState€v.€Pulleyóó,€863€S.W.2d€29,€30€(Tenn.€1993).€€The€State€insists€thatÏOfficer€Smithððs€investigatory€stop€passes€muster€given:€ð ð(1)€the€serious€risk€that€hisÏbrotherððs€car€being€driven€by€a€stranger,€might€have€been€stolen;€(2)€the€smallÏamount€of€time€and€few€steps€necessary€to€verify€the€driverððs€right€to€be€in€the€car;Ïand€(3)€the€minimal€inconvenience€the€stop€would€have€on€the€driver,€as€judged€byÏthe€brief€amount€of€time€necessary€to€contact€his€brother€to€verify€the€defendantððsÏstory.ðð€€However,€the€brevity€of€the€stop€does€not€rectify€the€constitutional€violation.€ÏOfficer€Smith€simply€lacked€reasonable€suspicion€to€stop€the€defendant.€œÌ›Ìœ›à àà àIn€addition,€the€òòPulleyóó€court€utilized€this€balancing€test€in€a€muchÏdifferent€context.€€In€that€case,€a€police€officer€received€an€informantððs€tip€thatÏdefendant€Pulley€was€brandishing€a€shotgun€and€threatening€to€shoot€bystanders.€ÏThe€officer€recognized€Pulley€inside€a€moving€vehicle€and€detained€him.€€òòPulleyóó,€863ÏS.W.2d€at€29.€€Our€Supreme€Court€found€that€curtailing€an€imminent€threat€to€humanÏlife€constituted€a€Ô% € Ôcompelling€enough€interest€to€merit€an€investigatory€stop.€€òòId.óó€at€34.€œ›ÏœComparatively,›€the€danger€involved€in€the€property€crime€entailed€here€does€notÏremotely€equate€òòPulleyóóððs€immediate€risk€to€human€life€with€a€dangerous€weapon.€ÏHere,€individual€privacy€trumps€public€concern.ÌÌà àà àEven€though€the€strange€driver€may€have€ð ðlooked€suspiciousðð,€OfficerÍSmith€was€unable€to€point€to€any€facts€supporting€that€conclusion.€€òòSeeóó€òòBrownóó,€443ÏU.S.€at€52.€€The€officer€knew€that€his€brother€did€not€habitually€loan€his€vehicle€toÏothers,€but€had€not€received€any€indication€of€unlawful€acts.€€The€defendant€wasÏviolating€no€traffic€law.€€Officer€Smithððs€actions€were€no€doubt€geared€toward€theÏlaudable€goal€of€crime€prevention.€€Nevertheless,€as€soon€as€he€stopped€theÏdefendant€with€no€specific€œobjective€basis›€for€suspecting€criminal€involvement,€heÏstretched€the€Fourth€Amendment€boundaries€too€far.€€ð ðWhen€such€a€stop€is€not€basedÏon€objective€criteria,€the€risk€of€arbitrary€and€abusive€police€practices€exceedsÏtolerable€limits.ðð€€òòId.óó€€A€citizenððs€reasonable€expectation€of€privacy€cannot€beÏvulnerable€to€arbitrary€invasions€simply€ð ðat€the€unfettered€discretion€of€officers€in€theÏfield.ðð€€òòBrownóó,€443€U.S.€at€51.€€In€the€absence€of€ascertainable,€objective€facts,€ofÏcriminal€wrongdoing,€the€balance€tips€in€favor€of€freedom€from€police€interference,Ïinsuring€personal€security€and€privacy.€€òòId.óó€at€52.€ÌÌà àà àIn€the€alternative,€the€defendant€asks€this€Court€to€find€that,€even€if€thereÏwas€initial€reasonable€suspicion€for€the€officer€to€stop€the€defendant,€upon€hearingÏthe€defendantððs€explanation€that€the€automobile€had€been€loaned€to€him,€OfficerÏSmith€had€no€right€to€request€his€driverððs€license.€€This€issue€is€waived.€€No€issuesÏbeyond€the€scope€of€the€certified€question€will€be€considered€on€appeal.€€òòState€v.ÏPrestonóó,€759€S.W.2d€647,€650€(Tenn.€1988).€€Notwithstanding€the€waiver,€however,Ïthe€defendant€raises€another€meritorious€issue.€€€As€provided€in€T.C.A.€ðð€40„7„103(b):ÌÒ ô ÒÒ ¦ ÒÒ ô ÒÒ ° ÒÓÓÌUnless€a€law€enforcement€officer€has€probable€cause€to€believeÏthat€an€offense€has€been€committed,€no€such€officer,€exceptÏmembers€of€the€Tennessee€highway€patrol€.€.€.€,€shall€have€theÏauthority€to€stop€a€motor€vehicle€for€the€sole€purpose€of€examiningÏor€checking€the€operatorððs€license€of€the€driver€of€such€œvehicle.›ÌÓÓà0 àÌÒ D ÒÒ ° ÒÒ D ÒÒ ¦ ÒThis€constitutes€unreasonable€conduct€according€to€Fourth€Amendment€standards.€ÏòòProuseóó,€440€U.S.€at€663.€€òòSee€alsoóó€òòState€v.€Westbrooksóó,€594€S.W.2d€741,€743€(Tenn.ÏCr.€App.€1979)€(ð ðTo€allow€unfettered€discretion€in€the€State€to€arbitrarily€seize€anyoneÏtraveling€upon€the€public€highways€strikes€at€the€very€heart€of€the€protectionsÏguaranteed€United€States€citizens€by€the€Fourth€Amendment.ðð)ÌÌà àà àWe€find€that€the€evidence€contained€in€the€record€preponderatesÏagainst€the€trial€courtððs€denial€of€the€defendantððs€motion€to€suppress€the€evidenceÏrelated€to€the€unlawful€investigatory€stop.€€Accordingly,€the€order€of€the€trial€courtÏdenying€the€defendantððs€motion€to€suppress€is€reversed,€the€evidence€is€suppressed,Ïthe€€convictions€as€entered€by€the€trial€court€are€reversed,€and€the€charges€areÏdismissed.ÌÌÓÓà àà àà àà àà àà àà à______________________________à àà àà àà àà àà à€€€€Ïà àJOHN€H.€PEAY,€JudgeÌÌÌCONCUR:ÌÌÌ______________________________ÌJERRY€L.€SMITH,€JudgeÌÌÌœÌ______________________________›ÌJOHN€K.€BYERS,€Senior€Judge