ÿWPC@ 2# ÌUN× %% 0(+bSw@[4›¯¾ BÆãU@ãe# 0J$ 0Dn 0T² 0^Æd 0h* 0r’ AQ 0DU 0|™ 0† 0› 1u+ 0d  0@ D3D D/w U>¦ Bä U* B)+ DCT AM—  ä v~ïvÓm˜HP LaserJet 4SiHPPCL5MS,ü,,,,,ü0nLHÎ(ÖÃ9 Z ‹6Times New Roman RegularX($¡¡- ù- §¨{©Eª«D¬­D®¯Ó€°äzz!rJet 43|x° d ɸ·`(ZapfCalligr BTTT2 ÿÿ0Indent1Ô2ÔÔ3  Ô(3¯$¢¢Ý ƒ!ÝÝ  Ý2" ÿÿ0Indent2à0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2, ÿÿ0Indent3à0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  ÔƒLevel 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 526 ÿÿ0Indent4à0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2@ ÿÿ0Indent5à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô$(Cþÿ<< Cÿÿ($$””ò òÚ  Ú1Ú  Úó ó2J ÿÿ0Indent6à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2T ÿÿ0Indent7à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2^ ÿÿ0Indent8à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô ÿÿ?AGMSYaioIndent0I.A.1.a.(1)(a)i)a)P ÿÿ8Mac DefaultMac DefaultÓ ` °šXÓ("ÿÿ$££Ò  ÒÒ  Ò 'ÿÿdxd**'÷ÿ dxd< Œ 9p`(&Times New RomanüÿP Pd< Œ 9p`(Arial% Line 7 d,,,,7Border 1dd$-Cþÿ << Gÿÿ Ý ƒ!ÝÑ  ÑÑ#€d#ÑÔ€)ÔÝ  ÝÝ ƒ"ÝÝ  Ýò òÔ€)ÔÓ  ÓÔ€+ÔÔ eee ÔFILEDÔ€+XÔó óÌò òÔ€+¼ÔÔ"USú ú, úÔÔ ƒ ÔÔ!  Ôó óÔ€+XÔÌÌò òCecil€Crowson,€Jr.Ô€ Ôó óÔ  ÔÌÔ€ ÂÔÔ€+ÔÔ eee Ôò òAppellate€Court€Clerkó óÔ  ÔÔ€ ÔÔ€ XÔPtPtHHÚ(ÿáÿâùFG(üHHÚ(d'hStyl{WP}01•ÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃà Ãà Ãà Ãà Ãà ÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÐ ÐÐHHÐÐ  ÐÐ2ÐÐÿÿ¸æ$ÿÐÐHHÐÐÐÐÐÐÐÐ  ÐÐ ÐÐ ÐÑÑÑGenevaÑÑ ÑÑ € ÑÑ<Px–ÈÑÒÒÒ443!#4ÒÒ$ *$ÒÒ$*$ÒÒ ÿKK ÒÒ  Geneva ÒÒ  Geneva ÒÓ.,ÓÓÓÓ6ÓÓ ÓßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßÑGenevaÑÑ ÑÒ  h HD: Geneva ÒÒ  h HD: Geneva ÒÝ ƒ!ÝÔ . ÔÔ€)ÔÝ  ÝÑ ` ÑÒ  ÒÒ ° ÒÒ  ÒÒ „ ÒÑ\R AØ'\ÑÔ€)ŠÔÔ€+ÔÑ\R AØ'\ÑÑ€ÑÑ7€†XXdìdÈ7ÑÑ  ÑÑ  ÑÓ  Óò òÞ ÞÌIN›€THE€COURT€OF€CRIMINAL€APPEALS€OF€TENNESSEEÌÌAT€œJACKSON›ÌÌœSEPTEMBER›€SESSION,€œ1996›ÌÌÌÓ  ÓœSTATE€OF€TENNESSEE,›à à)à àC.C.A.€NO.€œ02C01„9510„CC„00329›Ìà àà àà àà àà à)ó óÌà àAppellee,à àà àà àò ò)Ìà àà àà àà àà à)Ìà àà àà àà àà à)à àœOBION›€COUNTY̜ـÙßR€./-A1-j|‰„ â `€€@ÿRß›VS.à àà àà àà àà à)à àÌà àà àà àà àà à)à àHON.€œWILLIAM€B.€ACREEó ó›Ìœò òANGELA€CAPRICE›à àà à)à àœJUDGEó óÌò òPARCHMAN,€A/K/A€Rosieà à)›ó óÌà àà àà àà àà àò ò)ó óÌà àAppellant.à àà àà àò ò)à àœó ó(Sale€of€Drugs)ò ò›Ìó óÌÌò òÓ  ÓON€APPEAL€FROM€THE€JUDGMENT€OF€THEÌœCIRCUIT›€COURT€OF€œOBION€COUNTY›ó óÌÌÌòòÓ  ÓFOR€THE€APPELLANTóó:à àà àà àòòFOR€THE€APPELLEEóó:ÌÌœLANCE€E.€WEBB›à àà àà àà àœCHARLES€W.€BURSONÌP.O.€Box€26à àà àà àà àAttorney€General€and€ReporterÌUnion€City,€TN€38281Ìà àà àà àà àà àà àCLINTON€J.€MORGANÌà àà àà àà àà àà àAssistant€Attorney€GeneralÌà àà àà àà àà àà à450€James€Robertson€ParkwayÌà àà àà àà àà àà àNashville,€TN€37243„0943ÌÌà àà àà àà àà àà àTHOMAS€A.€THOMASÌà àà àà àà àà àà àDistrict€Attorney€GeneralÌà àà àà àà àà àà àÌà àà àà àà àà àà àJAMES€T.€CANNONÌà àà àà àà àà àà àAssistant€District€Attorney€GeneralÌà àà àà àà àà àà àP.O.€Box€218Ìà àà àà àà àà àà àUnion€City,€TN€38261ÌÌOPINION€FILED€________________________ÌÌREVERSED€AND€REMANDED›ÌÌDAVID€H.€WELLES,€JUDGEÇò òòòÓ  ÓÔ€+°ÔOPINIONóóó óÔ€+ŠÔÌÌÌÌÓÓÓ  Óà àThis€is€an€appeal€as€of€right€pursuant€to€Rule€œ3€of€the›€Tennessee€RulesÏof€Appellate€Procedure.€€The€Defendant€was€convicted€by€an€Obion€CountyÏjury€of€two€counts€of€the€sale€of€a€controlled€substance.€€She€appeals€herÏconvictions€and€presents€four€issues€for€review:€(1)€That€the€trial€court€œerred€by›Ïœdenying€the›€Defendantððs€motion€for€œa€new›€trial€because€the€verdict€was€taintedÏby€juror€misconduct;€(2)€that€the€trial€court€erred€in€ruling€that€a€post„trialÏconfession€was€not€newly€discovered€œevidence€such€as€to€warrant€a€new€trial;›Ï(3)€that€€the€trial€court€erred€in€ruling€that€an€alibi€witness€was€œnot€newly›Ïdiscovered€œevidence€such€as€to€warrant€a€new€trial;€and›€(4)€that€the€evidenceÏwas€insufficient€to€support€the€convictions€beyond€a€reasonable€doubt.€€We€findÏmerit€with€œthe€Defendantððs›€œargument€that›€she€is€entitled€to€a€new€trial€becauseÏof€juror€misconduct.€€We€œtherefore€reverse›€the€judgment€of€the€trial€court€andÏremand€for€a€new€trial.ÌÌà àDuring€the€months€of€May€through€October€in€1994,€the€drug€investigationÏunit€of€the€Union€City€Police€Department€was€conducting€a€ð ðcontrolled€informantÏbuyðð€operation.€€They€recruited€paid€informants€to€make€drug€purchases€fromÏindividuals€suspected€of€selling€controlled€substances.€€The€informant€in€thisÍœcase€was›€outfitted€with€œa›€wireless€audio€transmitter€to€record€€transactions€inÏprogress.€ÌÌà àOn€May€31,€1994,€the€informant€was€recruited€to€buy€$40€worth€of€crackÏcocaine€from€ð ðRosieðð,€who€lived€at€apartment€52,€East€College€Court€in€UnionÏCity.€€The€occupant€of€that€apartment€was€Angela€ð ðRosieðð€Parchman,€theÏDefendant.€€The€informant€was€familiar€with€œthe€Defendant›€prior€to€the€drug€buy.€ÏAt€approximately€2:21€p.m.€that€day,€the€informant€went€to€the€apartment€and€aÏchild€opened€the€door,€stating€that€Rosie€was€not€there.€€He€left€the€apartment,Ïbut€then€saw€the€Defendant€arrive€in€her€vehicle.€€The€informant€helped€carry€herÏgroceries€to€the€apartment.€€The€Defendant€offered€a€rock€of€cocaine€for€$80,€butÏthe€informant€was€limited€to€the€$40€purchase.€€He€bought€the€cocaine€andÏreported€back€to€the€investigators.ÌÌà àOn€July€20,€1994,€the€informant€was€employed€to€make€another€drugÏpurchase€from€the€Defendant.€€The€informant€was€supplied€with€$100€to€buyÏtwo€rocks€of€cocaine.€€He€went€to€the€Defendantððs€apartment€at€3:31€p.m.€andÏmade€another€buy€from€her.€€On€both€occasions,€there€were€a€number€of€otherÏpersons€playing€cards€in€the€Defendantððs€apartment.€€On€July€20th,€a€womanÏnamed€Rose€Cannon,€sometimes€referred€to€as€ð ðRosieðð,€€was€allegedly€presentÏwhen€the€drug€purchase€was€made.ÌÌà àThe€police€investigation€unitððs€recording€of€the€transaction€conducted€onÏMay€31st€was€somehow€erased€when€a€copy€of€the€tape€was€made,Ïalthough€defense€counsel€œhad€received€a€copy€of€poor€quality.€€The€July€20thÏtape€was€apparently€in€good€condition.€€At€trial,€the€informant€identified€RosieÏParchman,€the€Defendant,€as€the€person€from€whom€he€bought€the€crackÏcocaine€on€both€dates.€€The€Defendant€presented€witnesses€who€were€in€herÏapartment€on€the€two€dates€in€question€to€identify€the€voices€on€both€of€theÏaudiotapes.€€Two€witnesses€testified€that€Rose€Cannon€was€in€the€apartmentÏon€July€20th€and€that€the€Defendant€was€not€present€when€the€drugs€wereÏsold€on€either€occasion.€€Neither€witness€would€confirm€that€Rose€CannonÏactually€sold€drugs€to€the€informant.€€Rose€Cannon€testified,€denying€that€sheÏwas€in€apartment€52€on€either€May€31st€or€July€20th.ÌÌà àThe€Defendant€testified€that€she€had€a€hair€appointment€and€that€she€leftÏthe€apartment€between€12:30€and€1:00€p.m.€on€the€afternoon€of€July€20th.€€SheÏstated€that€she€had€her€hair€done,€but€returned€to€have€it€restyled€because€sheÏwas€dissatisfied€with€it.›€€She€denied€having€returned€to€her€apartment€in€theÏafternoon€hours.ÌÌà àœThe›€Defendant€was€tried€and€convicted€of€one€count€of€sale€of€cocaineÏunder€point€five€(.5)€grams,€a€Class€C€felony,€for€the€May€31,€1994€transactionÏand€sentenced€to€3€years€œin€split›€confinement,€œwith€one›€year€to€be€served€in€theÏcounty€jail€and€two€years€to€be€served€in€community€corrections.€€She€was€alsoÏconvicted€œon›€the€second€count€of€sale€of€cocaine€over€point€five€(.5)€grams,€aÏClass€B€felony,€for€the€July€20,€1994€transaction€and€sentenced€to€€eight€yearsÏœin€split›€confinement,€œwith€one›€year€to€be€served€in€the€county€jail€and€theÏbalance€in€community€corrections.€€The€sentences€were€ordered€to€be€servedÏconcurrently.€€She€appeals€her€convictions.ÌÌÓ  ÓNewly€Discovered€EvidenceÌÌÓ  Óà àWe€will€first€address€Defendantððs€issues€(2)€and€(3),€that€the€trial€courtÏerred€in€ruling€that€evidence€of€a€post„trial€confession€and€an€alibi€witness€œwereÏnot›€newly€discovered€œevidence€warranting€a€new€trial.›€€œThe›€decision€to€grant€orÏdeny€a€new€trial€on€the€basis€of€newly€discovered€evidence€is€a€matter€whichÏrests€in€the€sound€discretion€of€the€trial€court.€€òòState€v.€Goswickóó,€656€S.W.2dÏ355,€358€(Tenn.€1983).€€To€œbe€entitled€to€a›€new€trial€œbased›€on€newly€discoveredÏevidence,€the€defendant€must€demonstrate€(1)€reasonable€diligence€in€seekingÏthe€newly€discovered€evidence;€(2)€materiality€of€the€evidence;€and€(3)€that€theÏevidence€will€likely€change€the€result€of€the€trial.€€òòState€v.€Nicholsóó,€877€S.W.2dÍ722,€737€(Tenn.€1994);€òòGoswickóó,€656€S.W.2d€at€358„360.€€A€new€trial€will€notÏbe€granted€on€newly€discovered€evidence€when€the€effect€is€merely€to€impeachÏa€witnessðð€testimony€at€trial€unless€the€impeaching€evidence€is€so€crucial€to€theÏdefendantððs€guilt€or€innocence€that€its€admission€would€change€the€outcome€ofÏthe€case.€€òòState€v.€Singletonóó,€853€S.W.2d€490,€496€(Tenn.€1993);€òòState€v.ÏRogersóó,€703€S.W.2d€166,€169€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.),€òòperm.€to€appeal€deniedóó,€òòid.óóÏ(Tenn.€1985).ÌÌà àFirst,€the€Defendant€contends€that€Rose€Cannonððs€admission€that€sheÏcommitted€the€crime€made€to€defense€counsel€after€trial€warrants€a€new€trial.€€AtÏtrial,€Rose€Cannon€testified€as€the€Stateððs€rebuttal€witness€that€she€was€notÏpresent€in€the€Defendantððs€apartment€on€either€occasion€when€the€drug€salesÏwere€transacted.€€There€was€œother€testimony›€at€trial€that€Rose€Cannon€wasÏindeed€in€the€Defendantððs€apartment,€€that€she€spoke€with€the€police€informant,Ïand€could€have€conducted€a€drug€sale.ÌÌà àAfter€trial,€defense€counsel€interviewed€Rose€Cannon,€who€was€œthen€in›Ïthe€Obion€County€œjail€where€she€was€being€held€on€charges€of€aggravatedÏrobbery.›€€She€listened€to€the€tape€of€the€July€20th€drug€sale€at€the€DefendantððsÏapartment€and€admitted€that€her€voice€was€on€the€tape€and€that€she€sold€theÏdrugs.€€At€the€œhearing€on€the€motion›€for€œa€new›€trial,€she€testified€that€she€did€notÍsell€the€drugs€and€that€she€only€made€that€statement€to€help€the€Defendant.€ÏShe€asserted€that€the€Defendant€told€her€that€she€would€not€get€in€troubleÏbecause€two€people€could€not€be€charged€œwith€the›€same€crime,€which€inducedÏher€to€confess€to€the€crime.€€€She€testified€that€the€Defendant€offered€to€pay€forÏher€bond€if€she€admitted€to€the€crime.€€Rose€Cannon€was€released€on€bond€onÏthe€same€day€she€spoke€with€defense€counsel.€€Another€witness€testified€thatÏRose€Cannon€said€she€was€leaving€town€and€that€she€alluded€to€the€fact€thatÏsomeone€in€the€jail€was€there€rather€than€her€because€the€police€got€the€wrongÏperson.€€There€was€nothing€beyond€this€that€specified€œthat€the›€drug€sale€wasÏthe€crime€she€was€referring€œto€rather€than€the€aggravated€robbery€or€some€otherÏcrime.›ÌÌà àThe€Defendant€contends€that€this€is€newly€discovered€evidence€that,Ïalthough€impeaching€a€witnessðð€testimony€at€trial,€is€crucial€enough€to€warrant€aÏnew€trial.€€The€Defendant€cites€òòState€v.€Burnsóó,€777€S.W.2d€355,€361€(Tenn.ÏCrim.€App.€1989),€in€which€œthis€court€held€that€a›€post„trial€confession€merited€aÏnew€trial€because€it€suggested€that€the€individual€committed€the€crime,€ratherÏthan€merely€impeaching€a€witness.€€That€individual€was€present€at€trial€butÏrefused€to€testify,€invoking€his€5th€Amendment€right€against€self„incrimination.€ÏThere€was€no€other€suggestion€at€trial€that€he€committed€the€crime.ÌÌà àIn€the€case€òòsub€judiceóó,€there€was€testimony€that€placed€Rose€Cannon€inÏthe€apartment€when€the€drugs€were€sold.€€There€was€testimony€that€she€mayÏhave€conversed€with€the€informant€and€that€she€may€have€conducted€a€drugÏtransaction.€€She€was€a€witness€at€trial€and€denied€her€involvement.€€TheÏDefendant€asserts€that€Rose€Cannonððs€confession€to€the€crime€is€newÏevidence€that€would€affect€the€outcome€of€the€trial.€€However,€she€also€recantedÏher€confession€at€the€œhearing€on€the€motion›€for€new€trial.€€€It€is€apparent€that€thisÏissue€was€raised€at€trial€during€the€Defendantððs€proof€when€witnesses€testifiedÏthat€Rose€Cannon€was€present€and€might€be€involved€with€the€drug€sale.€€Yet,Ïher€œconfession€does›€œappear›€to€be€newly€discovered€evidence.€€œIt€does€notÏnecessarily€follow€that›€the€new€information€was€material€or€that€it€would€changeÏthe€outcome€of€the€trial.€€œWe€agree€with€the›€trial€œcourtððs€finding€that›€RoseÏCannonððs€statements€were€conflicting,€confusing,€and€possibly€influenced€by€theÏDefendant.€€We€cannot€conclude€that€the€evidence€is€so€crucial€to€theÏDefendantððs€case€that€it€warrants€a€new€trial.€€This€issue€is€without€merit.ÌÓ  ÓÌÓ  Óà àSecond,€the€Defendant€contends€that€the€testimony€of€a€newlyÏdiscovered€alibi€witness€warrants€a€new€trial.€€She€states€that€she€did€notÏremember€where€she€was€on€July€20th€during€the€time€when€the€crime€wasÏcommitted,€but€that€shortly€before€trial,€she€recalled€going€to€the€hairdresser€thatÏday.€€She€contends€that€she€was€unable€to€locate€the€hairdresser€to€testify€untilÍafter€her€trial.€€The€State€argues€and€the€trial€court€œobserved€that›€the€DefendantÏdid€not€request€a€continuance.€€The€œDefendant›€counters€that€any€request€wouldÏœhave€been›€futile€because€Rule€12.02€of€the€Local€Rules€of€Court€for€the€27thÏDistrict€precludes€absence€of€a€witness€as€grounds€for€a€continuance€unlessÏthe€witness€has€been€subpoenaed.€€€It€is€clear€that€the€Defendant€did€not€evenÏattempt€to€request€a€continuance,€œnor€request€a€òòsubpoena€instanteróó,€which›Ïmakes€it€difficult€to€conclude€that€due€diligence€was€exercised€to€produce€theÏevidence.€€Assuming€that€due€diligence€was€employed,€we€are€not€convincedÏthat€testimony€from€the€hairdresser€would€be€material€to€the€Defendantððs€case.€ÏThe€€Defendant€testified€at€trial€that€she€left€for€a€hair€appointment€before€1:00Ïp.m.,€left€and€returned€sometime€later€that€afternoon€to€have€her€hair€redone.€€œÌÌà àThe›€hairdresserððs€affidavit€states€that€the€Defendant€had€an€appointmentÏscheduled€at€1:30€p.m.€on€July€20th€and€that€she€was€there€for€approximatelyÏone€and€a€half€hours€having€her€hair€done.€€He€also€stated€that€she€returnedÏlater,€but€does€not€specify€when.€€The€time€frame€for€the€appointment€and€herÏreturn€leaves€a€gap€of€time€œbetween›€3:00€p.m.€and€œthe€time€when›€theÏDefendant€returned€within€which€she€could€have€conducted€a€drug€sale.€€ThisÏcorroborates€the€Defendantððs€testimony,€but€leaves€an€unexplained€time€gapÏand€does€not€provide€evidence€of€such€magnitude€that€it€is€material€or€that€itÏwould€affect€the€outcome€of€the€trial.€€This€issue€is€without€merit.ÌÓ  ÓÌà àà àJuror€MisconductÌÌÓ  Óà àThe€Defendant€argues€that€a€jurorððs€conversation€with€the€bailiff€during€theÏjuryððs€deliberations€tainted€the€verdict€and€that€œtherefore€she›€is€entitled€to€a€newÏtrial.€€At€the€Defendantððs€motion€for€new€trial,€the€jury€forewoman€testified€aboutÏthe€suspected€extraneous€influence.€€She€testified€that,€during€their€deliberations,Ïthe€jury€had€a€question€regarding€verdicts.€€At€that€point,€they€had€votedÏunanimously€for€guilt€on€one€count€of€the€indictment.€€On€the€other,€the€vote€wasÏeleven€guilty€to€one€not€guilty.€€The€jury€had€a€€discussion€about€whether€aÏverdict€would€be€required€and€made€statements€œto›€the€effect€that€the€judgeÏwould€send€them€back€to€deliberate.€€There€was€still€a€question€about€this€andÏone€male€juror€said€ð ðIððll€go€ask.ðð€€He€left€the€jury€room€and€spoke€with€the€bailiff.€ÏThe€forewoman€looked€out€the€door,€saw€them€talking,€but€could€not€hear€theÏconversation.ÌÌà àThe€male€juror€returned€to€the€jury€room€and€stated€something€to€the€effectÏof:€ð ðIf€we€go€back€out€the€judge€is€just€going€to€send€us€back€in€to€come€up€withÏa€verdict.ðð€€At€some€point€after€another€vote,€although€the€forewoman€wasÏunsure€whether€they€voted€once€or€several€times,€the€votes€on€the€count€inÏquestion€were€all€for€guilty.€€She€could€not€confirm€what€effect,€if€any,€theÍstatement€made€by€the€male€juror€had€on€the€other€jurors€during€theirÏdeliberations.€€The€bailiff€testified€that€the€male€juror€approached€her€and€asked:Ïð ðCan€we€find€her€guilty€on€one€charge€and€innocent€on€the€other?ðð€€The€bailiffÏreplied:€ð ðYes.ðð€€The€bailiff€reported€no€other€conversation.ÌÌà àIt€is€the€law€in€Tennessee€that€an€unexplained€juror€conversation€with€aÏthird€party€is€good€cause€for€a€new€trial.€€òòState€v.€Blackwellóó,€664€S.W.2d€686,Ï689€(Tenn.€1984).€€When€there€is€extraneous€prejudicial€information€or€anyÏoutside€influence€is€brought€to€bear€on€a€juror,€the€validity€of€the€verdict€isÏquestionable.€€òòId.óó€ÌÌà àIn€€òòBlackwellóó,€the€Supreme€Court€adopted€Rule€606(b)€of€the€FederalÏRules€of€Evidence€and€defined€the€type€of€evidence€admissible€from€a€juror€toÏimpeach€a€jury€verdict.€€This€holding,€subsequently€established€as€Rule€606(b)Ïof€the€Tennessee€Rules€of€Evidence,€prohibits€a€juror€from€giving€testimony€onÏany€matter€or€statement€occurring€during€the€course€of€the€jury's€deliberations€orÏthe€effect€of€anything€upon€a€juror's€mind€or€emotion€as€influencing€his€or€her€voteÏexcept€that€a€juror€may€testify€on€the€question€of€whether€any€extraneousÏprejudicial€information€was€improperly€brought€to€the€jury's€attention€or€whetherÏany€outside€influence€was€improperly€brought€to€bear€upon€any€juror.ÌÌà àIf€it€is€shown€that€one€or€more€jurors€has€been€exposed€to€extraneousÏprejudicial€information€or€improper€influence,€there€arises€a€rebuttableÏpresumption€of€prejudice,€and€the€burden€then€shifts€to€the€prosecution€toÏexplain€the€conduct€or€to€demonstrate€the€harmlessness€of€it.€€òòBlackwellóó,€664ÏS.W.2d€at€689;€òòState€v.€Youngóó,€866€S.W.2d€194,196€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.€1992),Ïòòperm.€to€appeal€deniedóó,€òòid.óó€(Tenn.€1993).€€Examples€of€impermissible€outsideÏinfluence€include€reading€prejudicial€newspaper€editorials€during€the€juryððsÏdeliberation,€the€imparting€of€prejudicial€information€from€a€court€officer€havingÏcharge€of€the€jury,€or€if€the€bailiff€is€present€in€the€jury€room€during€deliberations.€ÏòòMontgomery€v.€Stateóó,€556€S.W.2d€559,€562€€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.€),€òòcert.€deniedóó,òò€id.óóÏ(Tenn.€1977).ÌÌà àIn€order€to€shift€the€burden€to€œthe€prosecution›€to€demonstrate€theÏharmlessness€of€the€communication€with€the€jury,€the€threshold€question€is€Ïwhether€the€statement€communicated€to€the€jury€was€prejudicial€to€theÏDefendant.€€œÌÌà àThe€Defendant€asserts›€that€a€statement€to€the€effect€that€the€jury€mustÏð ðcome€up€with€a€verdictðð€was€prejudicial€because€it€impermissibly€imparted€toÏthe€jury€the€idea€that€they€could€not€end€up€with€a€ð ðhung€jury.ðð€€Therefore,€theÏDefendant€œargues€that€he€was›€deprived€of€the€chance€that€the€jury€might€haveÍbeen€unable€to€reach€a€unanimous€decision€on€the€one€count€for€which€thereÏwas€a€lone€holdout€voting€not€guilty,€eliminating€the€possibility€of€a€mistrial.ÌÌà àThe€Supreme€Court€rejected€the€use€of€a€jury€charge€that€instructs€minorityÏvoters€to€follow€the€majority€voters.€€òòKersey€v.€Stateóó,€525€S.W.2d€139,€144Ï(Tenn.€1975).€€The€court€prescribed€the€use€of€the€ABA€Standards€Relating€toÏTrial€by€Jury,€Sec.€5.4€when€there€is€jury€deadlock.€€òòId.óó€at€144„45.ÌÌÒ ` ÒÒ „ ÒÒ ` ÒÒ  ÒÓÓà à€The€instruction€contemplated€in€Sec.€5.4(a)€may€be€givenÏas€a€part€of€the€main€charge€and€should€be€given€in€theÏfollowing€form:ÌÌÒ ` ÒÒ „ ÒÒ ` ÒÒ ` ÒÒ  ÒÒ ` ÒÒ " ÒÒ ` ÒÒ " ÒÒ „ ÒThe€verdict€must€represent€the€considered€judgment€of€each€juror.€€InÏorder€to€return€a€verdict,€it€is€necessary€that€each€juror€agree€thereto.€ÏYour€verdict€must€be€unanimous.€€ÌÌIt€is€your€duty,€as€jurors,€to€consult€with€one€another€and€to€deliberateÏwith€a€view€to€reaching€an€agreement,€if€you€can€do€so€withoutÏviolence€to€individual€judgment.€€Each€of€you€must€decide€the€caseÏfor€yourself,€but€do€so€only€after€an€impartial€consideration€of€theÏevidence€with€your€fellow€jurors.€€In€the€course€of€your€deliberations,Ïdo€not€hesitate€to€reexamine€your€own€views€and€change€yourÏopinion€if€convinced€it€is€erroneous.€€But€do€not€surrender€your€honestÏconviction€as€to€the€weight€or€effect€of€evidence€solely€because€ofÏthe€opinion€of€your€fellow€jurors,€òòor€for€the€mere€purpose€of€returning€aÏverdict.ÌÒ  ÒÒ „ ÒÒ ` ÒÒ „ ÒÒ ` ÒÒ  ÒóóÌà àIf€given€as€a€part€of€the€main€charge,€it€may€be€repeatedÏshould€a€deadlock€develop.ÌÌà àJudicial€economy€and€uniformity€demand€these€results.€ÏStrict€adherence€is€expected€and€variations€will€not€beÏpermissible.ÌÒ  ÒÒ „ ÒÓÓÌòòId.óó€At€145€(emphasis€added).ÌÌà àThe€Defendant€cites€òòState€v.€Crowderóó,€No.€01„C„019101„CR„00024,ÏJackson€County€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.,€Nashville,€Aug.€16,€1991),€in€which€anÏimproper€statement€by€the€bailiff€warranted€a€new€trial.€€In€òòCrowderóó,€theÏDefendant€testified€that€he€overheard€the€bailiff€tell€the€jury,€after€they€had€posedÏa€question€to€the€judge,€relayed€by€the€bailiff,€that€they€ð ðhad€to€reach€a€verdict.ððÏòòId.óó€at€3€The€State€offered€the€courthouse€janitor€as€a€rebuttal€witness,€whoÏtestified€that€the€Defendant€was€not€near€the€bailiff€when€the€communicationÏoccurred€and€could€not€have€heard€it.€€òòId.óó€at€4.ÌÌà àAlthough€the€trial€court€credited€the€Stateððs€witnessðð€testimony,€a€panel€ofÏthis€court€found€œthat€once€evidence€was€offered€that€the€communication›€by€theÏbailiff€œwas€improper,€the€burden€shifted€to€the€prosecution.€€òòCrowderóó,€slip€op.€atÏ4.›€€Because€of€the€possibility€that€one€of€the€jurors€may€have€been€improperlyÏinfluenced€to€render€a€verdict€finding€the€Defendant€guilty,€the€presumption€aroseÏand€the€State€was€required€to€show€either€that€the€communication€did€not€occur,Ïor€that€it€had€no€prejudicial€effect€on€the€jurors€and€was€harmless.€€The€courtÏfound€that€the€State€did€not€carry€its€burden€to€rebut€the€presumption.€€òòCrowderóó,ÏSlip€op.€at€4.ÌÌà àIn€the€case€òòsubóó€òòjudiceóó,€it€in€undisputed€that€some€communication€wasÏmade€between€the€bailiff€and€a€male€juror.€€Even€if€we€were€to€accredit€theÏtestimony€of€the€bailiff€that€she€only€communicated€to€the€juror€that€they€couldÏreturn€œone›€guilty€and€œone€not›€guilty€verdict,€this€does€not€eliminate€the€possibilityÏthat€the€jurors€were€influenced.€€What€was€stated€to€the€jury€was€œaparently€that›Ïthey€had€to€reach€a€verdict.€€This€was€communicated€by€a€juror€who€had€justÏstepped€out€to€ask€a€court€officer€a€question€about€verdicts.€€Regardless€ofÏwhat€the€bailiff€actually€said,€the€impression€given€to€the€jurors€was€that€theÏanswer€or€confirmation€supplied€to€them€by€the€male€juror€originated€from€a€courtÏofficer.€€œThis›€suggests€that€the€jury€was€exposed€to€extraneous€prejudicialÏinformation.ÌÌà àThe€trial€court€denied€the€œDefendantððs›€motion€for€new€trial€on€this€issueÏbecause€the€statement€by€the€bailiff€was€a€ð ðproper€statement€of€law.ðð€€Further,Ïhe€resolved€the€issue€on€whether€the€jury€was€œaffected›€as€follows:€ð ðIt€would€beÏcompletely€speculative€to€determine€or€for€the€court€to€hold€that€the€jury€verdictÏwas€tainted€upon€the€evidence€before€the€court.ðð€€However,€when€the€improperÏcommunication€was€made,€the€taint€of€the€jury€verdict€wasòò€presumed.€€óóOnce€theÏDefendant€œestablished€an›€improper€communication€with€the€jury,€she€was€notÏrequired€to€prove€that€an€improper€influence€occurred.€€œIt€is€clear€that€an€improperÍcommunication€occured.€€It›€was€œthen€the›€Stateððs€burden€to€affirmatively€showÏthat€any€contact€was€harmless.ÌÌà àThe€State€presented€no€proof€on€the€issue.€€It€would€have€been€possibleÏto€call€the€jurors€to€testify€whether€they€were€influenced€by€the€statement€relayedÏto€them€by€the€male€juror.€œAlso,›€the€male€juror€could€have€confirmed€that€theÏstatement€made€by€the€bailiff€was€not€œprejudicial,€and€this€juror€could€haveÏtestified€as€to€what€statement€he€then€made€to€the€remaining€jurors.›€€œHowever,Ïfor›€the€above€cited€reasons,€we€cannot€conclude€that€the€error€was€harmless.€ÏWe€œmust€reverse›€and€remand€this€case€for€a€new€trial.ÌÌÓ  ÓœÇSufficiency›€of€the€EvidenceÌÌÓ  Óà àIn€her€final€issue,€the€Defendant€contends€that€the€evidence€wasÏinsufficient€to€support€the€verdicts€of€guilt€beyond€a€reasonable€doubt.€€When€anÏaccused€challenges€the€sufficiency€of€the€convicting€evidence,€the€standard€isÏwhether,€after€reviewing€the€evidence€in€the€light€most€favorable€to€theÏprosecution,€any€rational€trier€of€fact€could€have€found€the€essential€elements€ofÏthe€crime€beyond€a€reasonable€doubt.€€òòJackson€v.€Virginiaóó,€443€U.S.€307,€319Ï(1979).€€Questions€concerning€the€credibility€of€the€witnesses,€the€weight€andÏvalue€to€be€given€the€evidence,€as€well€as€all€factual€issues€raised€by€theÏevidence,€are€resolved€by€the€trier€of€fact,€not€this€court.€€òòState€v.€Pappasóó,€754ÏS.W.2d€620,€623€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.),€òòpermóó.€òòtoóó€òòappealóó€òòdeniedóó,€òòidóó.€(Tenn.€1987).€ÏNor€may€this€court€reweigh€or€reevaluate€the€evidence.€€òòState€v.€Cabbageóó,€571ÏS.W.2d€832,€835€(Tenn.€1978).€€ÌÌà àA€jury€verdict€approved€by€the€trial€judge€accredits€the€Stateððs€witnessesÏand€resolves€all€conflicts€in€favor€of€the€State.€€òòState€v.€Graceóó,€493€S.W.2d€474,Ï476€(Tenn.€1973).€€On€appeal,€the€State€is€entitled€to€the€strongest€legitimateÏview€of€the€evidence€and€all€inferences€therefrom.€€òòCabbageóó,€571€S.W.2d€atÏ835.€€Because€a€verdict€of€guilt€removes€the€presumption€of€innocence€andÏreplaces€it€with€a€presumption€of€guilt,€the€accused€has€the€burden€in€this€courtÍof€illustrating€why€the€evidence€is€insufficient€to€support€the€verdict€returned€byÏthe€trier€of€fact.€€òòState€v.€Tuggleóó,€639€S.W.2d€913,€914€(Tenn.€1982);€òòGraceóó,€493ÏS.W.2d€at€476.€ÌÌà àœThe€jury€resolved€any€conflicts€in€the€evidence€in€favor€of€the€state.€€WeÏfind€that€the€evidence€was€sufficient€to€support€the€elements€of€the€crime€of€saleÏof€controlled€substance€beyond€a€reasonable€doubt.€€Nevertheless,€we€mustÏreverse€the€judgment€of€the€trial€court€for€the€reasons€previously€explained,€andÏremand€this€case€for€a€new€trial.Ìà à€ÌÓÓà àà àà àà àà à____________________________________Ìà àà àà àà àà àDAVID€H.€WELLES,€JUDGEÌÌÌÌCONCUR:ÌÌÌÌ___________________________________ÌJOE.€B.€JONES,€PRESIDING€JUDGEÌÌÌ___________________________________ÌJERRY€L.€SMITH,€JUDGE