ÿWPCˆ … 0ÿVU.U’ƒU < Q UNa %¯ µ 0(µ w Ý 4ç 0Jû 0TE 0^™ 0h÷ 0r_ 0|Ñ 0†M 0Ó 1uc 0dØB)<DCe AM¨U*õãv~ B€vÓ D3p 0@£ AOãÆ2 0Dø D/< Bk<g\ÿÿ:Default ParaÓ  ÓÔ€ôôôÔÔC€ô\  `Tms RmnCÔÔ€ôôôÔÔC€ô\  `Tms RmnCÔô\  `Tms Rmn' OPINION *Marilyn Hathaway 0 .   ô\  `$Times NewRoman#|x (ÖÃ9 Z ‹6Times New Roman RegularX($¡¡Ó€Ô¡¨ 2 ÿÿ0Indent1Ô2ÔÔ3  Ô2" ÿÿ0Indent2à0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2, ÿÿ0Indent3à0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô26 ÿÿ0Indent4à0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2@ ÿÿ0Indent5à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2J ÿÿ0Indent6à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2T ÿÿ0Indent7à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2^ ÿÿ0Indent8à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô ÿÿ?AGMSYaioIndent0I.A.1.a.(1)(a)i)a)P ÿÿ8Mac DefaultMac DefaultÓ ` °šXÓ% Line 7 d7Border 1dd€- Cþÿ << Gÿÿ< Œ 9p`(Arial ÙÝ ƒ !ÝÔ€ÔÝ  ÝÔ€"ÔÔ€"ÔÓ  Óò òÔ YYY ÔFILEDÔ€"XÔÌÌFebruary€28,€1997ÌÌCecil€W.€CrowsonÌAppellate€Court€ClerkÔ  Ôó óPtPtHHÚ(ÿáÿâùFG(üHHÚ(d'h dStyl{WP}01•ÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃà Ãà Ãà Ãà Ãà ÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÐ ÐÐHHÐÐ  ÐÐ2ÐÐÿÿ¸æ$ÿÐÐHHÐÐÐÐÐÐÐÐ  ÐÐ ÐÐ ÐÑÑÑGenevaÑÑ ÑÑ € ÑÑ<Px–ÈÑÒÒÒ443!#4ÒÒ$ *$ÒÒ$*$ÒÒ ÿKK ÒÒ  Geneva ÒÒ  Geneva ÒÓ.,ÓÓÓÓ6ÓÓ ÓßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßÑGenevaÑÑ ÑÒ  h HD: Geneva ÒÒ  h HD: Geneva Ò%%%%'ÿÿdxd("ÿÿ$££Ò  ÒÒ  Ò€-‚ƒCþÿ<< CÿÿƒLevel 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5($$””ò òÚ  Ú1Ú  Úó ó„„'÷ÿ dxdüÿP PdÝ ƒ !ÝÔ . ÔÔ€ÔÝ  ÝÑ  ÑÓ  ÓÓ  ÓÓ  ÓÑ\R AØ'\ÑÒ X ÒÒ ° ÒÒ X ÒÒ À ÒÒ ž ÒÒ À ÒÙ€€ÙÓ  ÓÓ ` ¦h‹XÓÑ\R AØ'\ÑÔ€ŠÔÔ€ÔßR€!# A1-j|` ç `€€@ÿRßÞ ÞÌIN€THE€COURT€OF€CRIMINAL€APPEALS€OF€TENNESSEE€ÌAT€NASHVILLEÌÌSEPTEMBER€SESSION,€1996ÌÌÌÌÓ  ÓSTATE€OF€TENNESSEE,Ìà àà àAPPELLANTÌÌVS.à àà àà àà àà àà àà àC.C.A.€NO.€01C01„9504„CR„00121Ìà àà àà àà àà àà àà àDAVIDSON€COUNTYÌÒ X ÒÒ X Òà àà àà àà àà àà àà àHONORABLE€THOMAS€A.€SHRIVERÌÒ X ÒÒ À ÒMARIO€PENDERGRASS,à àà àà à(EXTRAORDINARY€APPEAL)Ìà àà àAPPELLEEÌÌÌÌòòFOR€THE€APPELLANTóóà àà àà àà àòòFOR€THE€APPELLEEÌÔ€ôÔÌÔ€XÔÔ€ÔóóCharles€W.€Bursonà àà àà àà àà àDavid€M.€SiegelÌAttorney€General€and€Reporterà àà àà àSr.€Assistant€Public€DefenderÌÒ X ÒÒ Â Ò450€James€Robertson€Parkwayà àà àà àOffice€of€the€Metropolitan€Public€DefenderÌÒ X ÒÒ À ÒNashville,€TN€€37243à àà àà àà à1200€Stahlman€Bldg.Ìà àà àà àà àà àà àà àNashville,€TN€€37201ÌÌAmy.€L.€Tarkingtonà àà àà àà àà àRoss€E.€AldermanÌAssistant€Attorney€Generalà àà àà àà àDeputy€Public€DefenderÌÒ X ÒÒ Â Ò450€James€Robertson€Parkwayà àà àà àOffice€of€the€Metropolitan€Public€DefenderÌÒ X ÒÒ À ÒNashville,€TN€€37243à àà àà àà à1200€Stahlman€Bldg.Ìà àà àà àà àà àà àà àNashville,€TN€€37201ÌÌMr.€Tom€ThurmanÌAssistant€€District€Attorney€GeneralÌMr.€Robert€MooreÌAssistant€District€Attorney€GeneralÌWashington€Square€BuildingÌ222€2nd€Avenue€No.ÌNashville,€TN€€37201ÌÌÌÌÌÔ€ŠÔÔ€ÔOPINION€FILED:€à à____________________ÌÌREVERSED€IN€PART;€AFFIRMED€IN€PARTÌÌL.€T.€LAFFERTY,€SPECIAL€JUDGEÌÌÒ  ÒÒ À ÒÓÓò òÓ  ÓÓ ` ŒXÓÔ€ÔÇOPINIONÌÓ  Óó óà àOn€April€27,€1995,€the€state€filedò ò€ó óan€application€for€extraordinaryÏappeal€by€permission€pursuant€to€T.R.A.P.€Rule€10€in€this€Court.€€This€Court,€onÏJune€27,€1995,€granted€the€State's€application€for€extraordinary€appeal.€€The€StateÏhas€presented€two€issues€for€review.€€(1)€A€trial€court€for€Davidson€County,€subjectÏto€a€motion€to€suppress,€Ô€¼Ôgranted€the€suppression€of€a€portion€of€a€first€statementÏmade€by€the€defendant,€Mario€Ô€ŠÔPendergrass,€but€refused€to€suppress€twoÏadditional€statements.€€Subsequently,€the€trial€court€heldò ò€ó óthat€although€hisÏsuppression€ruling€was€legally€correct,€the€trial€court€did€not€feel€it€fair€to€introduceÏthese€legally€admissible€statements€in€a€capital€case€and€would€not€admit€theseÏstatements€unless€the€State€withdrew€its€notice€of€intent€to€seek€the€death€penalty.€ÏDid€the€trial€court€commit€error?€€(2)€Did€the€trial€court€commit€error€in€denying€the,ÏStateððs€motion€to€recuse€itself€based€on€its€ruling€that€the€trial€court€would€suppressÏthe€legally€admissible€statements€unless€the€State,€withdrew€its€notice€of€intent€toÏseek€the€deÔ€¼Ôath€penalty?Ìà àAfter€a€reviewò ò€ó óof€the€record,€this€Court€holds€the€trial€courtÏcommitted€error€in€denying€the€State,€the€right€to€seek€the€death€penalty.€€TheÏtrial€courtððs€holding€is€reversed.Ô€ŠÔ€This€Court€affirms€the,€trial€court's€denial€of€theÏStateððs€Motion€to€Recuseò ò€ó óitself€from€this€trial.€€Ìà àOn€September€21,€1993,€the€Davidson€County€Grand€Jury€returned€anÏindictment€against€the€defendant,€Mario€Pendergrass,€charging€him€withÏpremeditated€murder€first€degree,€first€degree€felony€murder,€especially€aggravatedÏkidnapping€and€especially€aggravated€robbery.€€On€February€17,€1994,€the€StateÏfiled€its€notice€of€intent€to€seek€the€death€penalty€relying€on€four€aggravatingÍfactors:€€Tenn.€Code€Anno.€ðð€39„13„204(i)€(2),€(5),€(6),€and€(7).€€On€October€11,€1994,Ïthe€defendant€through€his€attorneys,€filed€a€€motion€to€suppress€his€statements.€ÏAfter€a€lengthy€hearing€the€trial€court€held€that€any€part€of€the€defendant's€initialÏexculpatory€statement€made€prior€to€òòMiranda€óówarnings€should€be€suppressed,€As€toÏall€subsequent€statements,€however,€the€trial€court€found€a€valid€waiver€of€theÏdefendant's€rights€and€overruled€the€motion€to€suppress.€€On€December€19,€1994,€theÏdefendant€filed€a€motion€to€strike€the€State's€notice€of€intent€to€seek€the€deathÏpenalty€on€the€basis€such€notice€violated€fundamental€fairness.€€On€January€20,Ï1995,€the€trial€court€held€a€hearing€to€determine€the€merits€of€the€motion€to€strike.€€InÏmaking€his€ruling,€the€trial€court€stated€in€Exhibit€one,€Transcript€of€Evidence,ÏJanuary€29,€1995,€beginning€at€page€29,€line€23:€ÌÒ ` ÒÒ À ÒÒ ` ÒÒ p ÒÓÓÓ ` h‹XÓ"He€asserted€his€rights€and€those€rights„„that€assertion€wasÏrespected€by€Detective€McElroy;€but€it€was€also€very€carefully„„uh„„manipulated€by€Detective€McElroy.€€And,€by€using€his,Ïown„„uh„„albeit€vague„„uh„„promises€of€'help',€and€the€sameÏkinds€of€promises€suggested€to€the€mother€and€the€use€of€herÏinducing€the€confession.€€I€think€puts€you€in€the€position€that„„uh€„„either„„my„„first€thought€was€that€I€don't€see„„l€think€it'sÏfundamentally€unfair€to€ask€for€the€death€penalty€under€thoseÏcircumstances.€*€*€*€I€think€I'm€gonna€make€my€ruling€this€way.€ÏYou€either„„you€got€your€choice.€€Uh„„you€can€either€drop€theÏdeath€penalty€or€the€confession€is€suppressed.€€You€can't€haveÏit€both€ways.€*€*€*€So,€the€ruling,€then,€is€either€you€don't€useÏthe€death€penalty„„either€you€don't€ask€for€the€death€penalty€orÏyou€don't€use€this€confession."ÌÒ  ÒÒ p ÒÒ  ÒÒ  ÒÓ ` ŒXÓÌÒ  ÒÒ À ÒÓÓà àThe€trial€court,€sua€sponte,€announced€that€it€would€not€grant€anÏinterlocutory€appeal€by€permission€pursuant€to€T.R.A.P.€Rule€9€regarding€this€ruling.Ï€Based€on€this€ruling€the€State,€on€March€29,€1995,€filed€a€motion€to€have€the€trialÏcourt€recuse€itself€from€this€capital€case.€€After€a€hearing,€the€trial€court€denied€theÏState's€motion€for€recusalò ò€ó óon€April€17,1995.Ìò òÓ  ÓCONCLUSIONS€OF€LAWó óÌÓ  ÓÔ€¼Ôà àThe€trial€court's€decision€to€make€his€suppression€rulingÏconditional€upon€whether€the€State€would€seek€the€death€penalty€is€reversedÏbecause€itò ò€ó óis€the€sole€function€of€the€Ô€ŠÔDistrict€Attorney€General,€subject€toÏcapricious€decision,€to€decide€which€cases€he€will€seek€the€death€penalty.Ìò òÓ  ÓTennessee€Authoritiesó óÌÓ  Óà àThe€office€of€the€District€Attorney€General€is€created€by€Article€VI,€Sec.Ï5€of€the€1870€Tennessee€Constitution.€it€is€well€established€in€Tennessee€that€theò òÏó óduty€of€the€district€attorney€general€is€to€seek€justice.€€The€Supreme€Court€of€thisÏState€in€òòFoute€v.€State,€óó4€Tenn.€(3€Haywood)€98€(1816)€described€theÏresponsibilities€of€the€office€of€district€attorney€general€as€follows:ÌÒ ` ÒÒ À ÒÒ ` ÒÒ p ÒÓÓÓ ` h‹XÓ€€€€€ð ðHe€is€to€judge€between€the€people€and€the€government;€heÏis€toò ò€ó óbe€the€safeguard€of€the€one€and€the€advocate€for€the€rightsÏof€the€other;€he€ought€not€to€suffer€the€innocent€to€beÏoppressed€or€vexatiously€harassed€any€more€than€those€whoÏdeserve€prosecution€to€escape;€he€is€to€pursue€guilt;€he€is€toÏprotect€the€innocent;€he€is€to€judge€the€circumstances,€and,Ïaccording€to€their€true€complexion,€to€combine€the€publicÏwelfare€and€the€safety€of€the€citizens,€preserving€both€and€notÏimpairing€either."ÌÒ  ÒÒ p ÒÒ  ÒÒ À ÒÓÓÓ ` ŒXÓÌà àIn€a€concurring€opinion€in€òòPace€v.€State,€óó566€S.W.€2d€861€(Tenn.Ï1978)€theÌlate€Chief€Justice€Joe€Henry,€at€page€866,€held€that€the€district€attorney€general€isÌan€officer€of€the€executive€department€and€apparent€problems€of€separation€ofÏpowers€stem€from€the€fact€that€the€district€attorney€general€and€the€trial€judge€areÏmembers€of€different€branches€of€government.€€The€ABA€standards€relating€to€theÏò òProsecution€Function,€ðð€1.1(a)€ó óis€clear€on€the€jurisdiction€and€duties€of€theÏprosecuting€authority.€€In€òòDearborn,€v.€State,€óó575€S.W.€2d€259€(Tenn.€1978),€ChiefÏJustice€Henry,€speaking€for€the€Supreme€Court€stated€at€page€262;ÌÒ ` ÒÒ À ÒÒ ` ÒÒ p ÒÓÓÓ ` h‹XÓ€€€€€"He€or€she€is€answerable€to€no€superior€and€has€virtuallyÏunbridled€discretion€in€determining€whether€to€prosecute€andÏfor€what€offense.€€No€court€may€interfere€with€his€discretion€toÏprosecute,€and€in€the€formulation€of€this€decision€he€or€she€isÏanswerable€to€no€one.€€In€a€very€real€sense€this€is€the€mostÏpowerful€officeò ò€ó óin€Tennessee€today.€€Its€responsibilities€areÏawesome;€the€potential€for€abuse€is€frightening.€€Indeed,€asÏincident€of€separation€of€powers,€the€Courts€may€not€interfereÏwith€the€discretion€of€the€District€Attorney€in€their€control€overÏprosecutions.€€See€òòU.S.€v.€Cox,€óó342€F.2d€167€at€171€(5th€Cir.Ï1965)."ÌÒ  ÒÒ p ÒÒ  ÒÒ  ÒÓ ` ŒXÓÌÒ  ÒÒ À ÒÓÓà àJustice€Anderson€in€òòState€v.€Superior€Oil,€Inc.€óó875€SW.2d€658€(Tenn.Ï1994)€at€page€660€stated:ÌÒ ` ÒÒ À ÒÒ ` ÒÒ p ÒÓÓÓ ` h‹XÓ€€€€€"Although€there€are€various€statutes,€which€assign€duties€toÏthe€elected€constitutional€office€of€district€attorney€general,Ïthere€are€no€statutory€criteria€governing€the€exercise€of€theÏprosecutorial€discretion€traditionally€vested€in€the€officer€inò òÏó ódetermining€whether,€when,€and€against€whom€to€instituteÏcriminal€proceedings.€€Indeed€it€has€been€often€recognized€thatÏ'prosecutorial€discretion€in€the€charging€process€is€very€broad.'€ÏCiting€òòCooper€vò òóó.€ó óòòState,€óó847€S.W.2d€521€(Tenn.€€Crim.€€App.Ï1992).ððÌÒ  ÒÒ p ÒÒ  ÒÒ À ÒÓ ` ŒXÓÌÓÓà àThe€sole€discretion€whether€to€seek€a€sentence€of€death€under€theÏappropriate€circumstances€is€vested€in€the€prosecutor.€òòState€v.€Cazes,€óó875€S.W.2dÏ253,€268(Tenn.€1994;€òòState€v.€Brimmer€óó876€S.W.2d€75,€86€(Tenn.€1994).Ìò òÓ  ÓU.S.€Supremeó ó€ò òCourtó óÌÓ  Óà àMr.€Justice€White€in€òòGregg€Ô€XÔv.€Ô€ŠÔGeorgia,€óó96€S.Ct.€2909€(1976)€stated€atÏpage€2949:ÌÒ ` ÒÒ À ÒÒ ` ÒÒ p ÒÓÓÓ ` h‹XÓ€€€€€"Absent€facts€to€the€contrary,€it€cannot€be€assumed€thatÏprosecutors€will€be€motivated€in€their€charging€decisions€byÏfactors€other€than€the€strength€of€their€case€and€the€likelihoodÏthat€a€jury€would€impose€the€death€penalty€if€it€convicts.€ÏUnless€prosecutors€are€incompetent€in€their€judgments,€theÏstandards€by€which€they€decide,€whether€to€charge€a€capitalÏfelony€will€be€the€same€as€those€by€which€the€jury€will€decideÏthe€questions€of€guilt€and€sentence.€€Thus€defendants€willÏescape€the€death€penalty€through€prosecutorial€chargingÏdecisions€only€because€the€offense€is€not€sufficiently€serious;€orÍbecause€the€proof€is€unsufficiently€(sic)€strong.€€This€does€notÏcause€the€system€to€be€standardless...ððÌÒ  ÒÒ p ÒÒ  ÒÒ  ÒÓ ` ŒXÓÌÒ  ÒÒ À ÒÓÓà àThe€Tennessee€Supreme€Court€adopted€this€statement€in€òòState€v.ÏCazes,€supra,€óóand€òòState€v.€Brimmer,€supra.óóÌò òÓ  ÓForeign€Jurisdictionsó óÌòòÓ  Óà àóóInòò€State€ò òóóv.€ó óòòBloom,€óó497€So.2d€(Fla.€1986),€the€State€of€FloridaÏpetitioned€the€Supreme€Court€for€a€writ€prohibiting€the€respondent,€a€circuit€judge,Ïfrom€determining€prior€toò ò€ó ótrial€the€appropriateness€of€the€death€penalty€in€the€eventÏthe€defendant€was€convicted€of€first€degree€murder.€€The€state€argued€in€the€petitionÏthat€the€judge€has€no€Ô€¼Ôauthority€to€prejudge€the€appropriateness€of€the€deathÏpenalty€because€such€a€ruling€Ô€ŠÔunconstitutionally€infringes€on€an€executiveÏfunction€exclusively€within€a€prosecutor's€discretion.€€Under€Florida'sò ò€ó óconstitutionÏtheò ò€ó ódecision€to€chargeò ò€ó óandò ò€ó óprosecuteò ò€ó óis€an€Ô€¼Ôexecutive€responsibility,€and€the€stateÏattorney€has€complete€discretion€in€deciding€Ô€ŠÔwhether€and€how€to€prosecute.€ÏArt.€II,€ðð€3.€€The€court€granted€the€writ€ofò ò€ó óprohibition€and€Ô€¼Ôheld€that€a€circuit€judgeÏlacks€the€authority€to€decide€pretrial€whether€the€death€penalty€Ô€ŠÔwill€beò ò€ó óimposedÏin€a€first€degree€murder.€€Ìà àÔ€¼ÔThe€district€attorney€general€in€Tennessee€has€very€broadÏdiscretion€in€determining€who€to€prosecute€and€what€charges€to€bring.€€TheÏdecision€to€seek€the€death€penalty€under€the€appropriate€circumstances€isÏsolely€within€the€discretion€of€the€prosecutor.€€The€trial€Ô€ŠÔcourt€has€no€authorityÏto€condition€a€ruling€on€whether€or€not€the€prosecutor€seeks€the€death€penalty.€€In€aÏcase€where€the€death€penalty€is€appropriate,€based€on€the€existence€of€theÏaggravating€factors€set€forth€in€Tenn.€Code€Anno.€ðð€39„13„204(I)€1,€the€prosecutorÍhas€the€discretion€to€decide€to€seek€the€death€penalty.€€The€jury€in€this€case,€underÏproper€facts€and€instructions,€and€not€the€trial€judge,€hasò ò€ó óthe€responsibility€toÏdetermineò ò€ó ówhether€or€not€it€will€sentence€the€defendant€toò ò€ó ódeath.Ìò òÓ  ÓMOTION€TO€RECUSEó óÌÓ  Óà àFrom€a€review€of€the€record,€the€State€has€failed€to€carry€its€burden€inÏestablishing€that€the€trial€court€abused€its€discretion€in€refusing€to€recuse€itself.€€TheÏState€strongly€contends€the€trial€court€demonstrated€its€bias€against€the€StateÏseeking€the€death€penalty.€€The€State€alleges€that€the€trial€court's€unique€ruling,€theÏadmissibility€of€the€defendant's€statements€conditioned€on€the€State€not€seeking€theÏdeath€penalty,€establishes€such€bias.€€It€is€correct€that€the€trial€court€on€January€20,Ï1995,€made€a€statement,€"It„„there's€no€question€this€is€a€terrible€murder;€but,€I'mÏhaving€grave€doubts€that€you've€got€a€death€penalty€case€here€in€the€first€place."€€AÏreview€of€the€transcript€of€evidence€reveals€the€Ô€¼Ôtrial€court€was€discussing€not€onlyÏits€position€on€the€admissibility€of€the€statements€versus€the€death€penalty,€butÏthe€trial€court's€duty€and€responsibility€in€weighing€the€Ô€ŠÔevidence€as€to€allÏapplicable€aggravating€circumstances.€€In€its€ruling€on€Aprilò ò€ó ó13,€1995,€the€trial€courtÏlet€it€be€known€that€it€generally€supported€the€concept€of€the€death€penaltyò ò.€€ó óDoÏsuch€statements€byò ò€ó óthe€trial€court€establish€a€clear,€abuse€of€discretion€in€denying€theÏState's€motion€to€recuse?€€We€believe€not.Ìà àA€motion€for€recusal€based€upon€the€alleged€bias€or€prejudice€of€theÏtrial€court€addresses€itself€to€the€sound€discretion€of€the€trial€court€and€will€not€beÏreversed€on€appeal€unless€clear€abuse€appears€on€the€recordò ò.€€ó óòòState€ex€rel.€€Phillipsò òóóÏó óòòvò òóó.€ó óòòHenderson,€óó423€S.W.2d€489€(Tenn.€1968).€€In.òòAlleyóó€òòv.€State,€óó882€S.W.2d€810,€theÏTennessee€Court€of€Criminal€Appeals€addressed€the€question€of€the€standard€to€beÍapplied€on€motions€for€trial€courts€to€recuse€itself.€€At€page€822,€Judge€Penny€WhiteÏset€out€several€circumstances€where€trial€judges€should€recuse€themselves.ÌÒ ` ÒÒ À ÒÒ ` ÒÒ p ÒÓÓÓ ` h‹XÓ€€€€€ð ðWhenòò€óóa€trial€court's€comments€indicate€that€the€judge€hasÏprejudged€factual€issues,€Tennessee€courts€have€requiredÏdisqualification,€'In€the€trial€of€any€lawsuit€the€judge€must€beÏcareful€not€to€give€an€expression€to€any€thought,€or€to€inferÏwhat€his€opinion€would€be€in€favor€or€against€either€of€theÏparties€in€the€trial.'€òòLeighton,€óó414€S.W.2d€419€(Tenn.Ô€XÔ€1967).ððÌÌÒ  ÒÒ p ÒÒ  ÒÒ À ÒÓÓÓ ` ŒXÓÔ€ŠÔà àSupreme€Court€Rule€10,€Canon€3€(C)(1)€mandates€that€the€trial€judgeÏdisqualify€himself€in€a€proceeding€in€which€his€impartiality€might€be€reasonablyÏquestioned.Ìà àThis€Court€adopted€an€objective€test€for€determining€whether€recusalÏwas€warranted.€€This€Court€stated€that€recusal€was€necessary€when€a€person€ofÏordinaryÌprudence€in€the€judge's€position,€knowing€all€the€facts€known€to€the€judge,€wouldÏfind€a€Ô€¼Ôreasonable€basis€for€questioning€the€judge's€impartiality.€€Applying€theÏobjectiveò ò€ó ótest€set€Ô€ŠÔforth€in€òòAlley,€supra,€óórecusal€is€not€warranted.€€A€reasonableÏperson€in€theò ò€ó ótrial€court's€position€would€not€find€a€reasonable€basis€for€questioningÏtheò ò€ó ótrial€court's€impartialityò ò.€€Ô€¼Ôó óFurthermore,€a€motion€for€recusal€addresses€itselfÏto€the€sole€discretion€of€the€trial€court€Ô€ŠÔand€only€upon€a€showing€of€clear€abuse€inÏthe€record€will€the€ruling€be€reversed€on€appeal.€€This€record€lacks€evidence€of€clearÏabuse€of€discretion€on€the€trial€court's€decision€to€deny€the€motion€to€recuse.€€TheÏdenial€of€the€trial€court€in€the€motion€to€recuse€Ô€¼Ôis€affirmed.ÌÓÓÔ€ŠÔà àà àà àà àà àà àà àà àà à€Ì€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€_____________________________Ìà àà àà àà àà àà à€€€€€€€€L.€T.€Lafferty,€Special€JudgeÌÌCONCUR:ÌÌ______________________________ÌGary€R.€Wade,€JudgeÌÌ______________________________ÌPaul€G.€Summers,€JudgeÌ