ÿWPCq  …# VUNa %¯ 0(µLÝw@) 4i } 0JŒ 0lÖ 0DB 0T† 0^Ú 0h8   0r¨ 0| 0†– 0 1u¬ U,! 0dM B±U,ÎU>úB)8DCa AM¤ D3ñU*$öN 0@Df„‘êv~{vÓù AOÌÆ 0Dá D/% BT ˜HP LaserJet 4Si/4SiMX PS 600dpiPSCRIPTÀÌÀääÀÀÌ0 (ÈhH  Z ‹6Times New Roman RegularX($¡¡C:\OFFICE\WPWIN\TEMPLATE\STANDARD.WPT ¾¿DÀDÁÂÃDÄVeÅÆ -ÇÓ€Ô¡¨ 1) Reg3|xÐ2 ÿÿ0Indent1Ô2ÔÔ3  Ô((3üÝ$¤¤Ý ƒ!ÝÝ  Ýà  àòòÚ  Ú0Ú  Úóó(#Ã$òòÚ  Ú0Ú  Úóó2" ÿÿ0Indent2à0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2, ÿÿ0Indent3à0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô26 ÿÿ0Indent4à0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2@ ÿÿ0Indent5à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2J ÿÿ0Indent6à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2T ÿÿ0Indent7à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2^ ÿÿ0Indent8à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô  ÿÿ?AGMSYaioIndent0I.A.1.a.(1)(a)i)a)< Œ 9p`(ModernP ÿÿ8Mac DefaultMac DefaultÓ ` °šXÓ d< Œ 9p`(Monaco< Œ 9p`(&Times New Roman% Line 7 d''''7Border 1dd€-(Cþÿ << Gÿÿ'ÿÿdxd< Œ 9p`(Arial ìÝ ƒ!ÝÔ€ÔÔ€&ÔÝ  ÝÔ€+ÔÔ€+ÔÓ  Óò òÔ YYY ÔFILEDÔ€+XÔÌÌAugust€22,€1996ÌÌCecil€W.€CrowsonÌAppellate€Court€ClerkÔ  Ôó ó("ÿÿ$££Ò  ÒÒ  Ò \Ñ\R AØ'\Ñ ‡Ý ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€ÔÔ€&ÔÝ  ÝÒ  ÒÒ X ÒÔ€+ÔÔ€+ôÔÓ  Óà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  Úóó€Although€not€raised,€there€also€exists€a€concern€with€this€factor€because€the€offense€ofÏassault€includes€the€element€of€either€causing€bodily€harm€or€threatening€bodily€harm.€€AnÏenhancement€factor€which€is€an€ð ðessential€elementðð€of€the€offense€may€not€be€used€to€enhance€theÏdefendantððs€sentence.€€The€test€for€ð ðessential€elementðð€is€ð ðwhether€the€same€proof€necessary€toÏestablish€[the]€enhancement€factor€would€also€establish€an€element€of€the€offense.ðð€€òòState€v.ÏBinghamóó,€910€S.W.2d€448,€452€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.€1995).€€The€case€of€òòState€v.€Bunnóó€addressed€thisÏissue€with€respect€to€an€aggravated€assault€conviction€and€concluded€that€since€ð ðthe€definition€of€theÏenhancement€factor€includes€an€additional€provision,€i.e.,€that€the€defendant€has€a€previousÏconviction€of€a€felony€that€resulted€in€either€death€or€bodily€injury,ðð€which€is€not€an€element€ofÏaggravated€assault,€the€enhancement€factor€was€appropriately€applied.€€òòState€v.€Bunnóó,€No.€01C01„9311„CC„00401,€1994€WL€658551,€at€*3€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.€Nov.€22,€1994).€€Since€a€previousÏconviction€is€not€an€element€of€assault,€this€enhancement€factor€was€also€appropriately€used€in€thisÏcase.€€ÌPtPtHHÚ(ÿáÿâùFG(üHHØ(d'`Styl{WP}01•ÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃà Ãà Ãà Ãà Ãà ÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÐ ÐÐHHÐÐ  ÐÐ2ÐÐÿÿ¸æ$ÿÐÐHHÐÐÐÐÐÐÐÐ  ÐÐ ÐÐ ÐÑÑÑGenevaÑÑ ÑÑ € ÑÑ<Px–ÈÑÒÒÒ443!#4ÒÒ$ *$ÒÒ$*$ÒÒ ÿKK ÒÒ  Geneva ÒÒ  Geneva ÒÓ.,ÓÓÓÓ6ÓÓ ÓßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßÑMonacoÑÑ ÑÒ  BA Op Monaco ÒÒ  BA Op Monaco Ò€-‚ƒCþÿ<< CÿÿƒLevel 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5($$””ò òÚ  Ú1Ú  Úó ó„„'÷ÿ dxdüÿP PdÝ ƒ!ÝÔ . ÔÔ€ÔÓ&€%%X„d&ÓÑ#€%%Xd#ÑÔ€&ÔÝ  Ý›Ò ° ÒÒ X ÒÒ  ÒÒ X ÒòòÑ\R AØ'\ќـ€ÙÙ€€ÙÓ  ÓÑ\R AØ'\ÑßL€),(;+'h|` Å `€€Lß›à@ àÔ€+ÔIN€THE€COURT€OF€CRIMINALÏAPPEALS€OF€TENNESSEEóóà@ àòòÌÌà@ àAT€NASHVILLEóóÌÌÌà@ àFEBRUARY€1995€SESSIONÌÌÌÌÓ ` °†Xp‚, ’X ÓSTATE€OF€TENNESSEE,à àà à}à àC.C.A.#€01C01„9411„CC„00375Ìà àà àà àà àà à}€Ìà àà àAPPELLEE,à àà à}à àWILLIAMSON€COUNTY€Ì€€à àà àà àà àà à}ÌVS.à àà àà àà àà à}à àHon.€Cornelia€A.€ClarkÌà àà àà àà àà à}ÌWILLIAM€D.€œPEWITT›,€€€à à€€€€€€€€€€à à}à à€(Assault€and€Coercion€of€a€Ìà àà àà àà àà à}à à€Witness)Ìà àà àAPPELLANT.à à}ÌÌÌÌòòFor€the€Appellant:óóà àà àà à€€òòà àFor€the€Appellee:óóÌÌVanessa€P.€Bryan€€€€€à àà à€€à àCharles€W.€œBurson›ÌAssistant€Public€Defender€à à€€à àAttorney€General€and€ReporterÌ407€C€Main€Street€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€à à€€à à450€James€Robertson€ParkwayÌP.O.€Box€68€€€€€€€€€€€€€à àà à€€à àNashville,€TN€€37243„0493ÌFranklin,€TN€€37065„0068€Ì€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€à àà à€€à àCharlotte€H.€œRappuhn›€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€à àà à€Ïà àà àà àà àAssistant€Attorney€GeneralÌà àà àà àà àà à€€à à450€James€Robertson€ParkwayÌà àà àà àà àà à€€à àNashville,€TN€€37243„0493Ì€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€Ì€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€à àà à€€à àJoseph€D.€œBaugh›€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€à à€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€Ïà àà àà àà àà àDistrict€Attorney€GeneralÌà àà àà àà àà à€€à àWilliamson€County€CourthouseÌà àà àà àà àà à€€à àRoom.€G„6€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€à àà àà à€Ïà àà àà àà àP.O.€Box€937à àÌà àà àà àà àà àà àFranklin,€TN€€37065„0937€Ì€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€à àà àà àà àà àà àà àà àà àÌÌÌOPINION€FILED:€€òò€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€óóÌÌAFFIRMEDÌÌRex€Henry€Ogle,€Special€JudgeÇÓÓÑ7€µUXXdìXXdì7Ñ€à@ àòòò òOPINIONÌÌó óóóà àà àThe€defendant,€William€D.€Pewitt,€was€indicted€on€two€counts€of€assaultÏand€two€counts€of€coercion€of€a€witness.€€He€was€then€convicted€of€one€count€ofÏassault€and€one€count€of€coercion€of€a€witness€in€the€Circuit€Court€for€WilliamsonÏCounty.€€The€trial€court€imposed€concurrent€sentences€of€eleven€months,€twenty„nineÏdays€in€the€county€jail€for€assault€and€four€years€in€the€Tennessee€Department€ofÏCorrection€for€coercion.ÌÌà àà àOn€appeal,€the€defendant€contends€that€the€evidence€presented€wasÏinsufficient€to€convict€him€of€either€offense,€and€that€the€sentences€imposed€wereÏexcessive.€€Finding€no€error,€we€affirm.€€€€€€ÌÌà àà àThe€defendant,€William€D.€Pewitt,€and€the€victim,€Terry€Kelly,€had€beenÏfriends€for€approximately€four€years€and€worked€together€baling€hay.€€After€work,€onÏAugust€11,€1992,€the€defendant€and€the€victim€left€in€the€victim's€truck.€€The€defendantÏwas€driving€because€the€victim€had€gotten€sick€from€working€all€day€in€the€heat.€€TheÏtwo€stopped€briefly€at€the€home€of€the€defendant's€girlfriend,€Jennie€Hilliard.€€AfterÏleaving€Ms.€Hilliard's,€Officer€Danny€Gally€pulled€the€vehicle€over€for€speeding,Ïdetermined€that€the€defendant€was€intoxicated,€and€charged€the€defendant€with€DUI.€ÏThe€victim€was€charged€with€DUI€by€consent€because€the€vehicle€was€his.€€AccordingÏto€the€victim,€he€and€the€defendant€no€longer€worked€together€after€this€incident€nor€didÏthey€remain€friends.€€€€€ÌÌà àà àThe€victim€testified€that€on€April€26,€1993,€he€was€talking€to€his€wife€on€aÏpay€telephone€in€front€of€Leiper's€Fork€Grocery,€when€the€defendant€drove€up,€pullingÏhis€vehicle€very€close€to€the€victim.€€The€victim€told€his€wife€that€the€defendant€had€justÏpulled€in€and€that€he€needed€to€hang€up.€€Although€the€defendant€had€others€in€the€carÏwith€him,€only€he€got€out.€€He€approached€the€driver's€side€of€the€victim's€vehicle€andÏtold€him€that€he€knew€the€victim€was€"going€to€get€on€the€stand€and€tell€a€lie,"€referringÏto€the€trial€of€his€DUI€charge.€€He€wanted€the€victim€to€say€that€he€was€not€drunk€andÏthat€he€had€not€had€anything€to€drink€on€the€day€of€his€arrest€for€DUI,€but€the€victimÏtestified€that€he€had€seen€him€drink€that€day.€€The€defendant€told€the€victim€that€if€heÏhad€to€serve€any€time€in€jail€that€"it€would€be€trouble€for€the€victim."€€The€defendantÏproceeded€to€slam€the€victim's€head€against€the€post€of€his€car,€jarring€his€teeth€looseÏand€injuring€his€jaw.€€The€victim€did€not€seek€medical€attention€and€did€not€report€theÏincident€to€the€police€until€seventeen€days€later€because€he€"figured€there€was€nothingÏthe€law€could€do."€€ÌÌà àà àOn€cross„examination,€the€victim€admitted€that€the€defendant€had€paidÏhis€bond€so€that€he€could€get€out€of€jail.€€He€also€admitted€that,€at€the€defendant's€DUIÏtrial,€he€would€have€testified€that€Officer€Gally€could€not€have€been€correct€in€statingÏthat€the€defendant€had€been€driving€seventy„eight€miles€per€hour,€because€his€1968ÏFord€pickup€truck€would€not€go€any€faster€than€sixty„five€miles€per€hour.€€He€had,Ïhowever,€seen€the€defendant€drink€between€three€and€five€beers€before€his€arrest€andÏstated€that€he€would€have€testified€truthfully€to€that€fact.€€The€victim€admitted€that€aÏsubstantial€time€had€passed€between€the€time€of€the€defendant's€arrest€and€his€attemptÏto€get€the€victim€to€lie€at€trial.€€He€denied€having€told€the€defendant's€girlfriend€that€heÍwould€see€to€it€that€the€defendant€went€back€to€jail€and€claimed€that€the€state€hadÏpromised€him€no€leniency€on€his€DUI€by€consent€charge€in€exchange€for€his€testimonyÏin€this€trial.ÌÌà àà àMs.€Hilliard,€who€was€no€longer€dating€the€defendant,€also€testified€atÏtrial.€€She€claimed€that€when€the€defendant€and€the€victim€arrived€at€her€home€on€theÏevening€of€the€defendant's€arrest€for€DUI,€that€it€was€the€victim,€not€the€defendant,€whoÏwas€driving.€€She€claimed€that€the€she€could€tell€that€the€defendant€had€not€beenÏdrinking€because€she€kissed€him€and€could€not€detect€any€alcohol.€€Ms.€Hilliard€saidÏthat€the€two€sat€with€her€on€her€front€porch€for€about€twenty€minutes€and€then€left€to€goÏinto€town,€with€the€victim€again€driving.€€She€left€with€her€children€and€a€cousin€almostÏimmediately€because€she€intended€to€meet€the€defendant€and€the€victim€in€town,€butÏhad€to€stop€before€entering€the€main€road€to€put€her€children€in€car€seats.€€Ms.€HilliardÏtestified€she€saw€that€the€defendant€and€the€victim€had€been€pulled€over,€but€did€notÏstop.€€She€saw€the€defendant€standing€by€the€driver's€side€of€the€victim's€truck€and€didÏnot€know€why€the€men€would€have€stopped€to€change€drivers.€€She€also€related€thatÏapproximately€two€to€three€months€before€trial,€the€victim€had€told€her€that€he€would€notÏstop€until€the€defendant€"went€back€to€the€pen."€€ÌÌà àà àDale€Humphrey,€Sr.,€who€had€known€the€defendant€for€fifteen€years,€wasÏwith€the€defendant€at€Leiper's€Fork€Grocery€when€he€allegedly€assaulted€the€victim.€ÏHe€claimed€that€they€were€in€his€truck,€not€the€defendant's€car,€and€that€he€was€driving.€ÏHe€also€stated€that,€although€the€defendant€got€out€and€talked€to€the€victim€for€aboutÏfive€minutes,€no€violence€occurred.€€Mr.€Humphrey€said€that€after€the€defendantÍfinished€talking€with€the€victim,€he€went€into€the€grocery€store€to€get€some€beer€and€thatÏthe€victim€was€still€in€the€parking€lot€when€they€left.€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€ÌÌà àà àThe€defendantððs€first€argument€is€that€the€jury€verdict€was€not€supportedÏby€the€weight€and€sufficiency€of€the€evidence.€€As€a€result,€reasonable€triers€of€factÏcould€not€have€found€beyond€a€reasonable€doubt€that€the€defendant€was€guilty€ofÏcoercion€of€a€witness€or€assault.€€We€disagree.€ÌÌà àà àOn€appeal,€the€state€is€entitled€to€the€strongest€legitimate€view€of€theÏevidence€and€all€inferences€which€might€be€drawn€therefrom.€€òòState€v.€Cabbageóó,€571ÏS.W.2d€832,€835€(Tenn.€1978).€€The€credibility€of€the€witnesses,€the€weight€to€be€givenÏtheir€testimony,€and€the€reconciliation€of€conflicts€in€the€proof€are€matters€entrustedÏexclusively€to€the€jury€as€triers€of€fact.€€òòByrge€v.€Stateóó,€575€S.W.2d€292,€295€(Tenn.ÏCrim.€App.€1978).€€When€the€sufficiency€of€the€evidence€is€challenged,€the€relevantÏquestion€is€whether,€after€reviewing€the€evidence€in€the€light€most€favorable€to€theÏstate,€any€rational€trier€of€fact€could€have€found€the€essential€elements€of€the€crimeÏbeyond€a€reasonable€doubt.€€òòState€v.€Williamsóó,€657€S.W.2d€405,€410€(Tenn.€1983),Ïòòcertóó.€òòdeniedóó,€465€U.S.€1073€(1984);€T.R.A.P.€13(e).€€A€verdict€of€guilt€rendered€by€theÏtrier€of€fact€and€approved€by€the€trial€judge€accredits€the€testimony€of€the€witnesses€forÏthe€State€and€resolves€all€conflicts€in€favor€of€the€Stateððs€theory.€€òòState€v.€Smithóó,€868ÏS.W.2d€561,€568„69€(Tenn.€1983).€€A€verdict€of€guilt€removes€the€presumption€ofÏinnocence€and€replaces€it€with€a€presumption€of€guilt.€€òòIdóó.€€This€presumption€shifts€theÏburden€of€proof€to€the€defendant,€to€prove€to€the€appellate€court€that€the€evidence€isÏinsufficient€to€support€the€verdict€returned€by€the€trier€of€fact.€€òòState€v.€Smithóó,€751ÍS.W.2d€851€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.€1988).ÌÌà àà àThe€defendant€claims€that€the€victimððs€testimony€should€not€be€believedÏbecause€the€victim€failed€to€go€to€the€hospital€as€a€result€of€his€alleged€injuries,€theÏvictim€failed€to€file€a€police€report€for€seventeen€days,€and€the€defendant€had€noÏincentive€to€coerce€the€victim€because€he€wanted€the€victim€to€testify€truthfully.ÌÌà àà àThe€credibility€of€the€witnesses,€the€weight€to€be€given€their€testimony,Ïand€the€reconciliation€of€conflicts€in€the€proof€are€matters€entrusted€to€the€jury€as€triersÏof€fact.€òòByrgeóó,€575€S.W.2d€at€295.€€The€jury€chose€to€accredit€the€testimony€of€the€victimÏand€rejected€the€claims€of€the€defendant.€€It€was€entitled€to€do€so.€Because€a€rationalÏtrier€of€fact€could€have€found€the€essential€elements€of€the€crime,€the€evidence€wasÏlegally€sufficient€to€support€a€conviction.€€òòSeeóó€òòJackson€v.€Virginiaóó,€443€U.S.€307€(1979).€ÏThe€defendant€is€thus€asking€us€to€re„evaluate€the€credibility€of€the€witnesses.€€This€weÏcannot€do.€€Therefore,€this€issue€is€without€merit.ÌÌà àà àThe€defendantððs€second€argument€is€that€the€trial€court€misappliedÏmitigating€and€enhancing€factors€in€sentencing€the€defendant.€€As€a€result,€theÏdefendant€contends€that€his€sentence€must€be€reduced.ÌÌà àà àWhen€there€is€a€challenge€to€the€length,€range,€or€manner€of€service€of€aÏsentence,€it€is€the€duty€of€this€court€to€conduct€a€òòdeóó€òònovoóó€review€with€a€presumptionÏthat€the€determinations€made€by€the€trial€court€are€correct.€€T.C.A.€ðð€40„35„401(d).€€ThisÏpresumption€is€"conditioned€upon€the€affirmative€showing€in€the€record€that€the€trialÍcourt€considered€the€sentencing€principles€and€all€relevant€facts€and€circumstances."€ÏòòState€v.€Ashbyóó,€823€S.W.2d€166,€169€(Tenn.€1991).€€The€Sentencing€CommissionÏComments€provide€that€the€burden€is€on€the€defendant€to€show€the€impropriety€of€theÏsentence.€€In€the€case€at€hand,€since€the€trial€court€has€affirmatively€shown€in€theÏrecord€that€it€considered€the€sentencing€principles€and€all€relevant€facts€andÏcircumstances€in€sentencing€the€defendant,€we€review€the€sentence€imposed€by€theÏtrial€court€de€novo€with€a€presumption€of€correctness.ÌÌà àà àThe€defendant€first€argues€that€the€enhancement€factor€in€T.C.A.€ðð€40„35„114(1),€ð ðthe€defendant€has€a€previous€history€of€criminal€convictions€or€criminalÏbehavior€in€addition€to€those€necessary€to€establish€the€appropriate€range,ðð€wasÏmisapplied.€€The€defendant€argues€that€since€his€felony€conviction€was€almost€10Ïyears€old€and€his€other€convictions€were€mostly€alcohol„related€misdemeanors,€thatÏthis€enhancement€factor€should€not€have€been€applied.€€This€argument€is€œmeritless.›€ÌÌà àà àThe€State€presented€as€evidence€a€certified€copy€of€the€defendantððsÏaggravated€assault€conviction€and€the€defendant€testified€that€he€had€previously€beenÏconvicted€of€cocaine€possession,€driving€under€the€influence€on€several€occasions,Ïdriving€with€a€revoked€license,€and€marijuana€possession.€€It€appears€clear€that€theÏintent€of€the€Legislature€in€adopting€this€factor€is€to€increase€the€sentences€of€repeatÏoffenders€like€the€defendant.€€Therefore,€based€on€the€defendantððs€extensive€criminalÏrecord,€the€trial€court€properly€applied€this€enhancement€factor.ÌÌà àà àThe€defendant€next€argues€that€the€enhancement€factor€in€T.C.A.€ðð€40„35„114(8),€ð ðthe€defendant€has€a€previous€unwillingness€to€comply€with€the€conditionsÏof€a€sentence€involving€release€into€the€community,ðð€was€also€misapplied.€€OnceÏagain,€the€defendantððs€argument€is€œmeritless.›€€The€testimony€of€Probation€Officer€JoeÏBilbry€attested€to€the€fact€that€the€defendantððs€previous€probation€had€been€revokedÏbecause€the€defendant€failed€to€serve€the€number€of€weekends€required,€failed€toÏreport€his€arrest€to€the€probation€officer,€and€failed€to€pay€the€necessary€fines€andÏcosts.€€This€proof€supports€the€trial€courtððs€application€of€this€enhancement€factor.ÌÌà àà àThirdly,€the€defendant€argues€that€the€enhancement€factor€in€T.C.A.€ðð€40„35„114(11),€ð ðthe€felony€resulted€in€death€or€bodily€injury€or€involved€the€threat€of€deathÏor€bodily€injury€to€another€person€and€the€defendant€has€previously€been€convicted€ofÏa€felony€that€resulted€in€death€or€bodily€injury,ðð€was€also€inappropriately€used€becauseÏit€wasÑ€.ÑÇnever€proven€that€the€defendant€inflicted€bodily€injury€on€someone€as€a€result€of€a€pastÏconviction.€€This€argument€is€also€œmeritless.›€€Here,€the€defendant€was€convicted€ofÏassault€(an€offense€involving€bodily€injury)€and€had€a€prior€conviction€of€aggravatedÏassault€in€which€the€defendant€testified€that€the€victim€in€the€aggravated€assault€had€toÏgo€to€the€hospital€from€the€resulting€injuries.€Therefore,€it€is€clear€from€the€proof€that€theÏenhancement€factor€was€appropriately€applied.× ƒ/ ××  ×ÌÌà àà àThe€defendant€next€argues€that€the€trial€court€should€have€applied€twoÏmitigating€factors.€€First,€the€defendant€claims€that€the€trial€court€should€have€appliedÏthe€mitigating€factor€in€T.C.A.€ðð€40„35„113(1)€which€states€ð ðthe€defendantððs€criminalÏconduct€neither€caused€nor€threatened€serious€bodily€injury.ðð€€The€defendantððs€claim€isÏœmeritless.›€Regardless€of€whether€the€defendantððs€injuries€from€being€slammed€into€aÏpole€are€serious€enough€to€constitute€serious€bodily€injury,€the€defendantððs€threat€thatÏif€he€was€convicted€of€the€DUI€charge€ð ðit€would€be€trouble€for€the€victimðð€suffices€toÏmeet€the€threat€of€serious€bodily€harm€provision.€€Thus,€the€trial€court€correctly€refusedÏto€consider€this€mitigating€factor.ÌÌà àà àThe€defendant€also€claims€that€the€trial€court€erred€by€not€applying€theÏmitigating€factor€in€T.C.A.€ðð€40„35„113(13)€which€states€that€ð ðany€other€factorÏconsistent€with€the€purposes€of€this€chapterðð€may€be€considered.€€The€defendantÏclaims€that€his€fiancee€and€her€children€are€dependent€on€his€income.€€The€case€ofÏòòState€v.€Claybrooksóó€recognizes€that€providing€for€oneððs€children€is€a€mitigating€factorÏunder€the€ð ðcatch€allðð€category€in€T.C.A.€ðð€40„35„113€(13).€€òòState€v.€Claybrooksóó,€910ÏS.W.2d€868,€873€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.€1994).€€But,€in€this€case,€the€evidence€shows€that€atÏthe€time€of€the€hearing,€the€defendant€was€unemployed€and€did€not€have€a€mode€ofÏtransportation,€thus,€making€his€prospects€for€employment€improbable.€€Therefore,€asÏin€the€case€of€òòState€v.€Smithóó,€No.€02C01„9201„CR„00017,€1993€WL€15173€(Tenn.ÏCrim.€App.€Jan.€27,€1993)€(in€which€the€defendantððs€unsteady€work€history€madeÏmitigating€factor€(13)€inapplicable),€the€trial€court€was€correct€in€not€applying€thisÏmitigating€factor.ÌÌà àà àIn€conclusion,€it€is€clear€that€the€trial€court€correctly€applied€and€weighedÏthe€requisite€enhancement€and€mitigating€factors.€€Therefore,€the€sentence€is€affirmed.ÌÌà àà àFinally,€the€defendant€argues€that€the€trial€court€erred€in€not€granting€himÏa€sentence€of€probation.€€The€defendant€argues€that€the€trial€court€failed€to€apply€theÏpresumption€of€alternative€sentencing€as€statutorily€required.€€òòSeeóó€T.C.A.€ðð€40„35„102(b).€€As€with€the€other€arguments€of€the€defendant,€this€argument€is€without€merit.ÌÌà àà àOur€review€requires€an€analysis€of€(1)€the€evidence,€if€any,€received€atÏthe€trial€and€sentencing€hearing;€(2)€the€presentence€report;€(3)€the€principles€ofÍsentencing€and€the€arguments€of€counsel€relative€to€sentencing€alternatives;€(4)€theÏnature€and€characteristics€of€the€offense;€(5)€any€mitigating€or€enhancing€factors;€(6)Ïany€statements€made€by€the€defendant€in€his€own€behalf;€and€(7)€the€defendant'sÏpotential€for€rehabilitation€or€treatment.€€T.C.A.€ðððð€40„35„102,€„103,€and€„210;€òòState€v.ÏSmithóó,€735€S.W.2d€859,€862€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.€1987).ÌÌà àà àAmong€the€factors€applicable€to€the€defendant's€application€for€probationÏare€the€circumstances€of€the€offense,€the€defendant's€criminal€record,€social€historyÏand€present€condition,€and€the€deterrent€effect€upon€and€best€interest€of€the€defendantÏand€the€public.€€òòState€v.€Grearóó,€568€S.W.2d€285,€286„87€(Tenn.€1978).€€€€ÌÌà àà àEspecially€mitigated€or€standard€offenders€convicted€of€Class€C,€D,€or€EÏfelonies€are€presumed€to€be€favorable€candidates€"for€alternative€sentencing€optionsÏin€the€absence€of€evidence€to€the€contrary."€€T.C.A.€ðð€40„35„102(6).€€The€trial€courtÏmust€presume€that€the€defendant€is€subject€to€alternative€sentencing,€unless€the€courtÏis€presented€with€evidence€sufficient€to€overcome€the€presumption.€€òòState€v.€Ashbyóó,Ï823€S.W.2d€166,€167„69€(Tenn.€1991).€€In€the€case€at€hand,€the€trial€court€wasÏpresented€with€more€than€enough€evidence€to€conclude€that€the€defendant€should€notÏreceive€a€sentence€of€probation.ÌÌà àà àFirst,€the€trial€court€found€that€the€defendant€had€been€granted€probationÏin€the€past€but€had€failed€to€successfully€complete€his€requirements€either€time.€€In€theÏcase€of€òòState€v.€Fletcheróó,€this€Court€held€that€ð ðif€the€record€reflects€multiple€or€recentÏunsuccessful€application€of€sentencing€measures€not€including€confinement,€thenÍconfinement€may€be€appropriate.ðð€€òòState€v.€Fletcheróó,€805€S.W.2d€785,787„788€(Tenn.ÏCrim.€App.€1991).€€In€addition,€in€the€case€at€hand,€the€trial€court€found€that€it€would€beÏunlikely€that€the€defendant€could€meet€the€probation€requirements€this€time€because€ofÏhis€unsteady€employment€and€lack€of€transportation.ÌÌà àà àSecond,€the€trial€court€found€that€both€personal€and€general€deterrenceÏconcerns€weighed€strongly€in€favor€of€confinement€over€probation.€€Deterrence€is€aÏvalid€consideration€in€evaluating€the€appropriateness€of€probation.€€òòState€v.€Byrdóó,€861ÏS.W.2d€377,€380€(Tenn.€Crim.€œApp€1993).›€€In€terms€of€personal€deterrence,€this€CourtÏstated€in€òòFletcheróó€that€ð ðif€a€defendant€has€a€long€history€of€criminal€conduct,€thenÏpersonal€deterrence€by€confinement€may€be€necessary€to€protect€society€from€thatÏdefendant.ðð€€òòFletcheróó,€805€S.W.2d€at€787.€€In€the€case€at€hand,€as€mentioned€above,Ïthe€defendant€has€a€long€history€of€criminal€activity,€and€it€appears€that€confinement€isÏnecessary€to€protect€society€from€the€defendant.€€In€addition,€due€to€the€serious€natureÏof€the€offense€(coercion€of€a€witness)€and€the€need€to€protect€the€integrity€of€our€judicialÏsystem,€the€trial€court€properly€determined€that€there€exists€a€strong€incentive€to€deterÏthis€type€of€conduct.ÌÌà àà àAs€a€result€of€these€findings€the€trial€court€concluded€that€this€evidenceÏoutweighed€the€defendantððs€rehabilitative€capabilities.€€We€agree.€€Therefore,€underÏde€novo€review€with€a€presumption€that€the€trial€court€is€correct,€we€affirm€the€trialÏcourtððs€denial€of€probation.€ÌÌà àà àFinding€all€of€the€defendantððs€issues€to€be€without€merit,€the€defendantððsÍconvictions€and€sentences€are€affirmed.ÌÌÌÓÓà àà àà àà àà àà à________________________________Ìà àà àà àà àà àà àREX€HENRY€OGLE,€SPECIAL€JUDGEÌÓÓÌCONCUR:ÌÌÓÓ________________________________ÌGARY€R.€WADE,€JUDGEÌÌÌÌÌ________________________________ÌJOHN€H.€PEAY,€JUDGEÌÌÌÓÓÌà àÌà à€€Ìà à€€€€òòò òÌó óóó€