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Bx?X $D%D&'()D*D+U,Ó€8(´$Û$¡¡ÑÑÒ°ÒÑTR[  AØ'ÿ Legal[  AØ'ÿ Legal AØ'ÿ Legal AØ'ÿ LegalTÑÑ7€I“XXdæXXdæ7ÑÑ  Ñ, øð AZ‹"Arial Regular»{s 3|x8(#Ã$òòÚ  Ú0Ú  Úóó(Ð(3à$¤¤Ý ƒ$Û!ÝѰÑÒ°ÒÑTR[  AØ'ÿ Legal3Ø' AØ'ÿ Legalÿ3Ø'TÑÑ7€¹×XXdæXXdì7ÑÑ  ÑÝ  Ýà ` àòòÚ  Ú0Ú  Úóó2 ÿÿ0Indent1Ô2ÔÔ3  Ô2" ÿÿ0Indent2à0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2, ÿÿ0Indent3à0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô26 ÿÿ0Indent4à0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô(Â$¡¡ÑÑÒr°ÒÒL°ÒÑTR[  AØ'ÿ Legal[  AØ'ÿ Legal AØ'ÿ Legal AØ'ÿ LegalTÑÑ7€I“XXdæXXdæ7ÑÑ  Ñ2@ ÿÿ0Indent5à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2J ÿÿ0Indent6à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  ÔNeaseexclusionaryWinsettObion AssnWaddellLeonardisPinkham2T ÿÿ0Indent7à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2^ ÿÿ0Indent8à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô  ÿÿ?AGMSYaioIndent0I.A.1.a.(1)(a)i)a)< Œ 9p`(ModernP ÿÿ8Mac DefaultMac DefaultÓ ` °šXÓ< Œ 9p`(Monaco d< Œ 9p`(Arial% Line 7 d$$$$7Border 1dd€-%Cþÿ << Gÿÿ »Ý ƒ!ÝÑ  ÑÑ#€d#ÑÔ€ÔÔ€#ÔÑ  ÑÒ  ÒÒ ! ÒÑ\R AØ'\ÑÑ#€d#ÑÑ  ÑÝ  ÝÔ€#ÔÓ  ÓÔ YYY ÔFILEDÔ€#XÔÌÌò òMayÏ24,Ï1996ÌÌCecilÏCrowson,ÏJr.ÌÔ€#ôÔAp…pellateÏCourtÏClerkó ó /Ý ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€ÔÔ€#ÔÑ  ÑÒ  ÒÒ ° ÒÑ\R AØ'\ÑÑ#€d#ÑÑ  ÑÝ  ÝÝ ƒ $Ýà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  ÝThe€indictment€recites€the€following€alleged€false€statements€by€theÏappellant:€Ìà8 àQ.€And€youððre€an€attorney?€A.€Yes.€€Q.€How€long€have€you€beenÏlicensed€in€Tennessee?€€A.€€Six,€seven€years.€.€.€.€€Q.€€Did€you€takeÏthe€bar€exam€to€get€a€license€in€Tennessee€or€did€you€do€it€onÏreciprocity?€€A.€€Reciprocity.€€Q.€€You€are€currently€licensed€inÏTennessee?€€A.€€Yes.€€Q.€€Since€when?€€A.€€I€believe€ðð87.€€Q.€ButÏyou€pay€your€license€fee€as€an€attorney?€€A.€€Yes.Ì""""'ÿÿdxd ¢Ý ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€ÔÔ€#ÔÑ  ÑÒ  ÒÒ ° ÒÑ\R AØ'\ÑÑ#€d#ÑÑ  ÑÝ  ÝÝ ƒ $Ýà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  ÝThe€appellant€submitted€an€affidavit€from€Frank€Mason,€C.P.A.,€attestingÏthat€the€losses€were€less€than€ninety€thousand€dollars.€€We€note€that€the€affidavitÏwas€submitted€five€months€after€the€appellant's€application€for€pretrial€diversion.€ÏAccordingly,€the€affidavit€could€not€have€been€considered€by€the€district€attorneyÏgeneral.Ì EÝ ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€ÔÔ€#ÔÑ  ÑÒ  ÒÒ ° ÒÑ\R AØ'\ÑÑ#€d#ÑÑ  ÑÝ  ÝÝ ƒ $Ýà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  ÝThe€State€also€refers€to€a€civil€lawsuit€filed€against€the€appellant€by€oneÏof€the€intended€beneficiaries€of€the€will,€seeking€one€hundred€thousand€dollarsÏfor€actual€pecuniary€losses€and€five€hundred€thousand€dollars€for€punitiveÏdamages.€Ì("ÿÿ$££Ò  ÒÒ  Ò Ý ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€ÔÔ€#ÔÑ  ÑÒ  ÒÒ ° ÒÑ\R AØ'\ÑÑ#€d#ÑÑ  ÑÝ  ÝÝ ƒ $Ýà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  ÝThe€trial€court€denied€the€motion€finding€that€the€appellant's€positionÏwas€not€well€taken€and€"even€if€the€questioned€material€was€excluded€.€.€.€thereÏare€more€ample€grounds€supporting€the€denial€in€this€case."€€We€agree€with€theÏtrial€court's€conclusion€that,€even€if€the€contested€evidence€was€excluded,€theÏrecord€shows€the€existence€of€other€"substantial€evidence€to€support€the€districtÏattorney€general's€denial€of€pretrial€diversion."€Ì åÝ ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€ÔÔ€#ÔÑ  ÑÒ  ÒÒ ° ÒÑ\R AØ'\ÑÑ#€d#ÑÑ  ÑÝ  ÝÝ ƒ $Ýà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  ÝWe€note€that€neither€evidence€of€the€uncharged€offense€nor€evidence€ofÏthe€California€Bar€Report€were€included€in€the€record€for€our€review.€€€€Ì @Ý ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€ÔÔ€#ÔÑ  ÑÒ  ÒÒ ° ÒÑ\R AØ'\ÑÑ#€d#ÑÑ  ÑÝ  ÝÝ ƒ $Ýà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  ÝAlthough€we€distinguish€between€probation€and€pretrial€diversion,€ourÏsupreme€court€indicated€in€òòHammersleyóó,€650€S.W.2d€at€354,€that€the€sameÏfactors€relevant€to€the€issue€of€probation€are€equally€relevant€in€determiningÏentitlement€to€diversion.€€Nonetheless,€it€is€not€necessarily€inconsistent€that€theÏsame€criteria€should€be€utilized€for€both.€€Although€previous€appellate€decisionsÏof€this€state€have€referred€to€pretrial€diversion€as€ð ðpretrial€probation,ðð€weÏrecognize€that€they€have€drawn€procedural€similarities€from€other€jurisdictionsÏwhich€have€implemented€pretrial€diversion€programs.€€Specifically€noted€are€theÏdiversion€programs€of€California€and€New€Jersey.€€òòSeeóó€òòPaceóó,€566€S.W.2d€atÏ868€(Henry,€C.J.,€concurring);€òòHammersleyóó,€650€S.W.2d€at€353€(Brock,€J.).€€WeÏnote,€however,€that€in€both€of€those€jurisdictions,€eligibility€for€admission€intoÏtheir€respective€programs€is€determined€by€a€òòjudgeóó;€the€ultimate€decision€toÏdivert€is€by€a€òòjudgeóó;€and€upon€unsuccessful€termination€of€the€program,€it€is€theÏòòjudgeóó€who€orders€prosecution.€€òòSeeóó€òòState€v.€Leonardisóó,€363€A.2d€321,€331€(N.J.Ï1976);€òòsee€alsoóó€òòPeople€v.€Superior€Court€of€San€Mateo€Countyóó,€520€P.2d€405Ï(Cal.€1974).€€In€both€states,€the€prosecutor€exercises€little€or€no€discretion€at€anyÏof€the€procedural€stages€contrary€to€the€statutory€authority€granted€to€the€districtÏattorney€general€in€this€state.€€Both€California€and€New€Jersey€have€interpretedÏtheir€pretrial€diversion€schemes€as€òòjudicial€functionsóó€in€view€of€the€roleÏexercised€by€the€judiciary€in€their€programs.€€Moreover,€we€note€that€TennesseeÏhas€enacted€a€separate€statutory€scheme€for€judicial€diversion.€€òòSeeóó€Tenn.ÏCode€Ann.€ðð€40„35„313€(1990).Ì 7Ý ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€ÔÔ€#ÔÑ  ÑÒ  ÒÒ ° ÒÑ\R AØ'\ÑÑ#€d#ÑÑ  ÑÝ  ÝÝ ƒ $Ýà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  ÝWe€note€that€an€appellate€court€is€not€the€proper€forum€for€resolution€ofÏdisputed€facts.€€Factual€determinations€are€within€the€jurisdiction€of€the€trialÏcourt.€€Accordingly,€we€make€no€determination€resolving€disputed€facts€otherÏthan€affording€the€finding€of€the€district€attorney€general€the€presumption€ofÏcorrectness.€€In€any€case,€the€only€disputed€fact€is€the€amount€of€the€lossesÏsuffered€by€the€victims,€which€is€not€at€issue€in€this€appeal.€€òòSeeóó€òòsupraóó€note€2.Ì <Ý ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€ÔÔ€#ÔÑ  ÑÒ  ÒÒ ° ÒÑ\R AØ'\ÑÑ#€d#ÑÑ  ÑÝ  ÝÝ ƒ $Ýà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  ÝA€written€response€denying€diversion€should€include:Ìà8 à1.€An€enumeration€of€all€the€evidence€considered;Ìà à2.€€The€reason€for€denial.€.€.;€andÌà à3.€€An€identification€of€any€disputed€issue€of€fact.ÌòòIdóó.Ì ¼Ý ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€ÔÔ€#ÔÑ  ÑÒ  ÒÒ ° ÒÑ\R AØ'\ÑÑ#€d#ÑÑ  ÑÝ  ÝÝ ƒ $Ýà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  ÝIn€the€present€case,€the€district€attorney€general€denied€the€appellantððsÏapplication€for€pretrial€diversion€on€April€22,€1994;€the€appellant€filed€a€petitionÏfor€writ€of€certiorari€on€May€9,€1994;€and€on€August€22,€1994,€the€appellant€filedÏa€motion€to€exclude€evidence€from€consideration€for€purposes€of€pretrialÏdiversion€and€writ€of€certiorari€hearing.Ì $Ý ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€ÔÔ€#ÔÑ  ÑÒ  ÒÒ ° ÒÑ\R AØ'\ÑÑ#€d#ÑÑ  ÑÝ  ÝÝ ƒ $Ýà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  ÝIdentifying€disputed€facts€in€the€petition€enables€the€trial€court€to€findÏthat€an€evidentiary€hearing€òòis€necessaryóó€to€resolve€the€disputed€facts€andÏreview€the€district€attorney€generalððs€decision.ÌPtPtHHÚ(ÿáÿâùFG(üHHÚ(d'@Styl{WP}01•ÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃà Ãà Ãà Ãà Ãà ÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÐ ÐÐHHÐÐ  ÐÐ2ÐÐÿÿ¸æ$ÿÐÐHHÐÐÐÐÐÐÐÐ  ÐÐ ÐÐ ÐÑÑÑGenevaÑÑ ÑÑ € ÑÑ<Px–ÈÑÒÒÒ443!#4ÒÒ$ *$ÒÒ$*$ÒÒ ÿKK ÒÒ  Geneva ÒÒ  Geneva ÒÓ.,ÓÓÓÓ6ÓÓ ÓßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßÑMonacoÑÑ ÑÒ  BA Op Monaco ÒÒ  BA Op Monaco Ò€-‚ƒCþÿ<< CÿÿƒLevel 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5($$””ò òÚ  Ú1Ú  Úó ó„„'÷ÿ dxdüÿP PdÝ ƒ!ÝÔ . ÔÔ€ÔÓ&€!!X„d&ÓÑ#€!!Xd#ÑÔ€#ÔÑ  ÑÒ  ÒÒ ° ÒÑ\R AØ'\ÑÑ#€Xd#ÑÑ#€Xd#ÑÑ  ÑÝ  Ýò ò›à@ àIN€THE€COURT€OF€CRIMINAL€APPEALS€OF€TENNESSEEÌà@ àAT€JACKSONÌÙ€€ÙœßL€&'%;+'h|Xm` | `€€Lß›à@ àJANUARY€SESSION,€1996Ìó óÌÌÌÌò òSTATE€OF€TENNESSEEó ó,à àà à)Ìà àà àà àà àà à)à àNo.€02C01„9502„CR„00040Ìà àAppelleeà àà àà à)Ìà àà àà àà àà à)à àSHELBY€COUNTYÌvs.à àà àà àà àà à)Ìà àà àà àà àà à)à àHon.€JULIANÏGUINN,€Judge€(byÏà àà àà àà àà àà à)à àdesignationÏof€the€Supreme€Court)Ìò òCHARLES€A.€PINKHAM,€JR.ó ó,à à)Ìà àà àà àà àà à)à àœ(Denial€of€PretrialÏDiversion)›Ìà àAppellantà àà àà à)à àÌ̛̜ÌÌòòFor€the€Appellantóó:à àà àà àà àòòFor€the€Appelleeóó:ÌÌLarry€Riceà àà àà àà àà àCharles€W.€Bursonà àÌ44€North€Second€Streetà àà àà àAttorney€General€and€ReporterÌTenth€Floor€à àÌMemphis,€TN€€38103à àà àà àJohn€Patrick€CauleyÌà àà àà àà àà àà àAssistant€AttorneyÏGeneralà àà àà àà àà àà àà àCriminal€Justice€DivisionÌà àà àà àà àà àà à450€James€Robertson€ParkwayÌà àà àà àà àà àà àNashville,€TN€37243„0493à àà àà àà àÌà àà àà àà àà àà àÌà àà àà àà àà àà àJohn€W.€PierottiÌà àà àà àà àà àà àDistrict€Attorney€GeneralÌÌà àà àà àà àà àà àJudson€Phillips€and€Lee€CoffeeÌà àà àà àà àà àà àAsst.€District€Attorneys€GeneralÌà àà àà àà àà àà àCriminal€Justice€Complex,€3rd€FlÌà àà àà àà àà àà à201€Poplar€Ìà àà àà àà àà àà àMemphis,€TN€38103ÌÌÌÌOPINION€FILED:€€òò€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€óóÌÌAFFIRMEDÌÌÌÌò òDavid€G.€Hayesó óÌJudgeÇÓÓ€à@ àòòò òOPINIONóóó óÌÌà àThe€appellant,€Charles€A.€Pinkham,€Jr.,€pursuant€to€Rule€10,€Tenn.€R.ÏApp.€P.,€appeals€from€the€decision€of€the€trial€court€affirming€the€district€attorneyÏgeneral's€denial€of€his€application€for€pretrial€diversion.€€The€appellant€seeks€toÏdivert€the€offenses€of€falsely€representing€himself€as€a€lawyer,€Tenn.€Code€Ann.Ïðð€23„3„108€(1994),€a€class€E€felony;€impersonating€a€licensed€professional,ÏTenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€39„16„302€(1991),€a€class€E€felony;€and€aggravated€perjury,ÏTenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€39„16„703€(1991),€a€class€D€felony.€€In€this€interlocutoryÏappeal,€the€appellant€presents€two€issues.€€First,€the€appellant€challenges€theÏtrial€court's€finding€that€the€district€attorney€general€did€not€abuse€his€discretionÏin€denying€diversion.€€Next,€the€appellant€contends€that€the€trial€court€erred€byÏrefusing€to€exclude€certain€evidence€from€consideration€for€the€purposes€ofÏpretrial€diversion€and€writ€of€certiorari€hearing.ÌÌà àAfter€a€review€of€the€record,€we€affirm€the€judgment€of€the€trial€court.ÌÌÌà@ àò òI.€Factual€Backgroundó óÌÌà àOn€January€20,€1994,€three€indictments€were€returned€against€theÏappellant€charging€him€with€(1)€aggravated€perjury€by€making€false€statementsÍunder€oath€during€a€hearing€in€the€Probate€Court€of€Shelby€County;× ƒ) ××  ×€(2)€twoÏcounts€of€practicing€law€without€a€license€during€the€period€between€DecemberÏ1,€1992,€and€September€15,€1993;€and€(3)€falsely€representing€himself€as€anÏattorney€during€the€period€between€December€1,€1992€and€September€15,Ï1993.ÌÌà àThe€undisputed€facts€reveal€that,€on€December€3,€1992,€the€appellant,Ïalthough€not€licensed€to€practice€law€in€this€state,€drafted€and€improperlyÏexecuted€a€will€on€behalf€of€Mrs.€Hilda€Bratton.€€Mrs.€Bratton€died€shortlyÏthereafter.€€The€will€left€the€majority€of€Mrs.€Brattonððs€estate€to€two€of€her€naturalÏchildren.€€A€third€child€challenged€the€will.€€The€appellant€testified€at€the€willÏcontest€hearing,€which€was€conducted€in€the€Probate€Court€of€Shelby€County.ÌÌà àThe€Probate€Court€declared€the€will€to€have€been€invalidly€executed.€ÏConsequently,€the€heirs€received€shares€of€the€estate€through€the€laws€ofÏintestacy.€€The€actual€amount€of€the€losses€incurred€by€the€two€intendedÏbeneficiaries€is€disputed.€€The€appellant€contends€that€the€losses€were€less€thanÍninety€thousand€dollars.× ƒ+ ××  ×€€The€State€asserts€that,€as€a€direct€result€of€theÏappellant's€criminal€behavior,€the€two€beneficiaries€suffered€losses€amountingÏto€two€hundred€thousand€dollars.× ƒ, ××  ×€€These€losses€were€distributed€to€the€thirdÏnatural€child€of€the€testatrix.€€Thus,€although€in€a€different€proportion€thanÏoriginally€intended,€all€funds€remained€with€the€children€of€the€testatrix.̛̜Ìà àOn€March€17,€1994,€the€appellant€filed€an€application€for€pretrialÏdiversion.€€The€appellant's€application€is€accompanied€by€fifty€letters€of€support,Ïoutlining€his€contributions€to€the€community.€€The€appellant€is€fifty€years€old,Ïmarried,€and€has€two€children.€€Educationally,€the€appellant€possesses€both€aÏbachelor's€degree€and€a€law€degree.€€The€appellant€is€a€native€of€California€andÏentered€the€practice€of€law€in€that€state.€€In€his€application,€the€appellantÏexplained€that,€in€1983,€he€realized€that€he€had€an€alcohol€problem€andÏadmitted€himself€to€a€treatment€center€in€Mississippi.€€In€1984,€the€appellantÍvoluntarily€surrendered€his€California€law€license.€€Soon€thereafter,€theÏappellant€and€his€family€permanently€moved€to€Memphis.€€Immediately€uponÏsettling€in€Memphis,€the€appellant€became€very€active€within€his€church€andÏAlcoholics€Anonymous.€€He€has€continued€with€these€activities€and€also€isÏinvolved€with€other€support€groups€and€youth€organizations.€€The€appellant€is€aÏself„employed€financial€planner€with€an€excellent€work€history.€€The€applicationÏreflects€a€commitment€to€his€family€and€his€church.€The€appellant€has€no€priorÏcriminal€history,€has€an€exemplary€social€history,€and€is€a€leader€in€hisÏcommunity.€€Additionally,€the€appellant€accepts€responsibility€for€his€actions€andÏhas€established€a€plan€for€self„rehabilitation€which€involves€ongoing€therapy,Ïattendance€with€a€support€group,€and€restriction€of€his€employment.€€TheÏappellant€contends€that€a€conviction€would€cause€him€to€lose€those€professionalÏlicenses€related€to€his€ability€to€engage€as€a€financial€planner€in€this€state.ÌÌà àThe€prosecuting€attorney€denied€the€application€for€the€followingÏreasons:ÌÓÓà8 à(1)€The€circumstances€of€the€case€indicate€that€the€defendantÏengaged€in€a€systematic€and€continuing€criminal€activity.€.€.€.€ÏHaving€engaged€in€the€unauthorized€practice€of€law,€Mr.€PinkhamÏcompounded€original€criminal€behavior€by€lying€under€oath€whenÏquestioned€by€Judge€Southern€„€some€ten€months€later€„€as€toÏwhether€or€not€Mr.€Pinkham€is€a€licensed€attorney€in€the€State€ofÏTennessee.€€In€addition€to€committing€three€(3)€separate€offensesÏfor€which€he€is€indicted,€Mr.€Pinkham€has€a€fourth€unchargedÏoffense€in€which€he€contracted€to€prepare€another€œWill›€for€a€Mr.ÏCharles€E.€Shartle€on€March€23,€1993.ÌÌà8 à(2)€The€magnitude€of€the€losses€suffered€by€the€victim€mandateÏagainst€Mr.€Pinkhamððs€application€for€diversion.ÌÌà8 à(3)€I€believe€further€that€Mr.€Pinkham€is€not€a€suitable€candidate€forÏpretrial€diversion€because€Mr.€Pinkham,€unfortunately,€has€aÏhistory€of€dishonesty€and€unethical€behavior.€€Mr.€PinkhamÏvoluntarily€resigned€from€the€California€Bar€on€December€31,Ï1986,€while€a€disciplinary€proceeding€was€pending€to€disbar€Mr.ÏPinkham.€€The€State€of€California€alleged€that€Mr.€Pinkham:Ïengaged€in€professional€misconduct;€violated€his€oath€and€dutiesÏas€an€attorney;€misappropriated€or€converted€client€funds;Ïabandoned€his€clients;€and/or€committed€acts€involving€moralÏturpitude,€dishonesty€and/or€corruption.€€Having€voluntarilyÏsurrendered€his€California€law€license,€Mr.€Pinkham€engaged€inÏthe€criminal€and€egregious€conduct€which€led€to€his€currentÏindictments.€€ÌÌà8 à(4)€There€is€an€overwhelming€need€for€deterrence€in€this€case.€ÏThrough€Mr.€Pinkhamððs€actions,€innocent€victims€have€sufferedÏenormous€pecuniary€and€emotional€losses.€€We€must€deterÏindividuals€from€unlawfully€engaging€in€the€unauthorized€practiceÏof€law.€.€.€.€We€shall€not€send€a€message€that€the€Attorney€GeneralÏcondones€a€defendantððs€intentionally€lying€to€a€œJudge.Ì›ÌÓÓÌà àNo€evidentiary€hearing€was€conducted€due€to€the€partiesðð€agreement€thatÏthe€determinative€issue€would€be€submitted€to€the€court€upon€the€record.€€OnÏNovember€4,€1994,€the€trial€court€entered€its€order€finding€that€the€districtÏattorney€general€did€not€abuse€his€discretion€in€denying€pretrial€diversion€to€theÏappellant.€€The€appellant€appeals€from€the€trial€courtððs€order.ÌÌÌà@ àò òII.€€Denial€of€œDiversionÌó ó›Ìà àà àThe€appellant€contends€that€the€trial€court€erred€in€failing€to€findÏthat€the€district€attorney€general€abused€his€discretion€in€denying€the€appellantððsÏapplication€for€pretrial€diversion.€€The€decision€to€grant€pretrial€diversion€restsÏwithin€the€discretion€of€the€district€attorney€general.€€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€40„15„105(b)(3)€(1994€Supp.);€òòsee€alsoóó€€òòState€v.€Hammersleyóó,€650€S.W.2d€352,€353Ï(Tenn.€1983);€€òòState€v.€Houstonóó,€900€S.W.2d€712,€714€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.),€òòperm.€Ìœto›€appeal€deniedóó,€(Tenn.€1995);€€òòState€v.€Carróó,€861€S.W.2d€850,€855€(Tenn.ÏCrim.€App.€1993).€€When€deciding€whether€to€grant€an€application€for€pretrialÏdiversion,€the€district€attorney€general€should€consider€€the€circumstances€of€theÏoffense;€the€criminal€record,€social€history,€and€present€condition€of€theÏdefendant,€including€his€mental€and€physical€conditions€where€appropriate;€theÏdeterrent€effect€of€punishment€upon€other€criminal€activity;€the€defendant'sÏamenability€to€correction;€the€likelihood€that€pretrial€diversion€will€serve€theÏends€of€justice€and€the€best€interests€of€both€the€public€and€the€defendant;€andÏthe€applicant's€attitude,€behavior€since€arrest,€prior€record,€home€environment,Ïcurrent€drug€usage,€emotional€stability,€past€employment,€general€reputation,Ïmarital€stability,€family€responsibility,€and€attitude€of€law€enforcement.€€€òòState€v.ÏWashingtonóó,€866€S.W.2d€950,€951€(Tenn.€1993)€(citing€òòState€v.€Markhamóó,€755ÏS.W.2d€850,€852„53€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.€1988)€(citing€òòPace€v.€Stateóó,€566€S.W.2dÏ861€(Tenn.€1978)€and€òòHammersleyóó,€650€S.W.2d€at€352).€€òòSee€alsoóó€€òòHoustonóó,Ï900€S.W.2d€at€714.Ì€€€€Ìà àThe€district€attorney€general's€decision€regarding€pretrial€diversion€isÏpresumptively€correct,€and€the€trial€court€will€only€reverse€the€decision€when€theÏappellant€establishes€that€there€has€been€a€patent€or€gross€abuse€ofÏprosecutorial€discretion.€€€òòHoustonóó,€900€S.W.2d€at€714€(citing€òòHammersleyóó,€650ÏS.W.2d€at€356).€€In€order€to€establish€abuse€of€discretion,€"the€record€must€showÏan€absence€of€any€substantial€evidence€to€support€the€district€attorney€general'sÏrefusal€to€grant€pretrial€diversion."€€òòIdóó.€The€trial€court€may€only€considerÏevidence€considered€by€the€district€attorney€general€in€the€decision€denyingÏpretrial€diversion,€€òòState€v.€Winsettóó,€882€S.W.2d€806,€810€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.Ï1993),€òòperm.€to€appeal€deniedóó,€(Tenn.€1994),€and€the€trial€court€may€notÏsubstitute€its€judgment€for€that€of€the€district€attorney€general€when€his€decisionÏis€supported€by€the€evidence.€€òòState€v.€Watkinsóó,€607€S.W.2d€486,€489€(Tenn.ÏCrim.€App.),€òòperm.€to€appeal€deniedóó,€(Tenn.€1980).ÌÌà àFor€purposes€of€our€review,€the€findings€of€the€trial€court€are€binding€onÏthis€court€unless€the€evidence€preponderates€against€such€findings.€€òòHoustonóó,Ï900€S.W.2d€at€715.€€We€review€the€case,€not€to€determine€if€the€trial€judge€hasÏabused€his€discretion,€but€to€determine€if€the€evidence€preponderates€againstÏthe€finding€of€the€trial€judge€who€holds€that€the€district€attorney€general€has€orÏhas€not€abused€his€discretion.€€òòWatkinsóó,€607€S.W.2d€at€489.€€Thus,€theÏunderlying€issue€for€our€determination€remains€whether€or€not,€as€a€matter€ofÍlaw,€the€prosecutor€abused€his€discretion€in€denying€pretrial€diversion.€€òòCarróó,Ï861€S.W.2d€at€856.ÌÌà àIn€the€present€case,€the€district€attorney€general€considered€the€relevantÏfactors.€€In€denying€diversion,€the€district€attorney€general€conceded€that:€ÌÓÓà8 àMr.€Pinkham€is€a€fifty€year€old€man€with€no€criminal€record.€€I€haveÏconsidered€his€exemplary€social€history.€€I€have€considered€thatÏMr.€Pinkham€appears€to€be€a€leader€in€his€community.€.€.€.€€I€haveÏconsidered€all€of€the€parameters€of€Mr.€Pinkham's€social,€family,Ïpersonal,€educational€and€professional€background.€ÌÌÓÓ€However,€the€district€attorney€general€concluded€that€these€factors€wereÏoutweighed€by€the€"interests€of€the€public."ÌÌà àAlthough€the€appellantððs€application€indicates€that€he€is€an€excellentÏcandidate€for€pretrial€diversion€based€upon€his€social€history€and€amenability€toÏrehabilitation,€œthe€focus€of€diversion€does€not€rest€solely€upon€the€allegedÏoffender.›€€In€appropriate€cases,€the€circumstances€of€the€offense€and€the€needÏfor€deterrence€may€outweigh€all€other€relevant€factors€and€justify€a€denial€ofÏpretrial€diversion.€€òòCarróó,€861€S.W.2d€at€855.€€The€circumstances€of€this€caseÏindicate€that€this€was€not€a€crime€of€impulse,€but€one€of€planning.€€The€œappellantÌ›ÌÌ€had€œnumerous›€opportunities€to€reflect€upon€his€conduct€and€rectify€his€wrongs.€ÍHe€failed€to€do€so.€The€appellant€maintained€his€misrepresented€status€as€aÏlicensed€attorney€throughout€his€contact€with€the€testatrix€and€her€beneficiariesÏand€during€his€testimony€at€the€will€contest€hearing.ò ò€ó óÌÌà àThe€district€attorney€general€also€denied€the€appellant€diversion€basedÏupon€the€need€to€deter€others€from€committing€similar€offenses.€€The€appellantÏargues€that€the€district€attorney€general€offered€no€statistics€or€facts€which€wouldÏsupport€a€need€for€deterrence.€€The€appellantððs€argument€is€misplaced.€€ThisÏcourt€has€repeatedly€held€that€the€deterrent€effect€of€punishment€upon€otherÏcriminal€activity€is€a€factor€which€the€district€attorney€should€consider.€€òòSeeÏgenerallyóó,€òòHammersleyóó,€650€S.W.2d€at€355;€òòState€v.€Kirkóó,€868€S.W.2d€739,€743Ï(Tenn.€Crim.€App.€1993);€òòMarkhamóó,€755€S.W.2d€at€853.€€Moreover,€ourÏsentencing€laws€recognize€that€the€punishment€of€certain€offenses€is€particularlyÏsuited€to€provide€an€effective€deterrent€to€others€likely€to€commit€similarÏoffenses.€€òòSeeóó€€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€40„35„103(1)(B)€(1990).€€We€have€held€thatÏthese€offenses,€by€their€very€nature,€need€no€extrinsic€proof€to€establish€theÏdeterrent€value€of€punishment.€€òòState€v.€Millsapsóó,€No.€03C01„9211„CR„00374Ï(Tenn.€Crim.€App.€at€Knoxville,€December€12,€1995).€€Clearly,€the€offenses€ofÏpracticing€law€without€a€license€and€perjury€would€fall€into€this€category.€€OurÏsystem€of€justice€rests€upon€the€premise€that€a€witness€will€speak€the€truth.€€TheÏcondonation€of€behavior€such€as€the€appellantððs€would€often€result€in€frequentÏmiscarriages€of€justice,€thereby€making€a€mockery€of€our€judicial€system.€€òòSee,Íe.g.óó,€òòState€v.€Perryóó,€882€S.W.2d€357,€360€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.),€òòperm.€to€appealÏdeniedóó,€(Tenn.€1994).€€€Moreover,€the€licensing€of€professionals€is€necessary€toÏprotect€the€unsuspecting€public€from€those€who€would€prey€on€theirÏvulnerabilities.€€òòSeeóó€òòUnion€City€&€Obion€County€Bar€Assn.€v.€Waddellóó,€30€Tenn.ÏApp.€263,€205€S.W.2d€573€(1947).€€We€conclude€that€the€district€attorneyÏgeneralððs€consideration€of€deterrence€was€proper.€ÌÌà àThe€district€attorney€general€also€referred€to€the€magnitude€of€the€victims'Ïlosses€and€the€appellant's€past€conduct.€€Although€the€amount€of€the€actualÏlosses€is€disputed,€ranging€between€ninety€thousand€and€two€hundredÏthousand€dollars,€we€conclude€that€either€amount€is€excessive€and€wasÏappropriately€considered€by€the€district€attorney€general.€€òòSee,€e.g.óó,€€òòCarróó,€861ÏS.W.2d€at€854€(losses€amounted€to€$23,370);€òòState€v.€Adkinsóó,€No.€01C01„9210„CC„00324€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.€at€Nashville,€April€7,€1994).€€Additionally,€theÏdistrict€attorney€general€noted€that€the€appellant€was€involved€in€similar€œconduct›Ïin€California€which€resulted€in€disciplinary€charges€by€the€California€State€Bar.€ÏThe€appellant€argues€that€these€allegations€were€improperly€considered.€€WeÏdisagree.€€òòSeeóó€òòinfraóó€Section€III:€Exclusion€of€Evidence€from€Consideration.€ÏMoreover,€the€appellant€has€demonstrated€an€unwillingness€to€tell€the€truthÏbased€upon€misrepresentations€proffered€in€the€probate€court€and€his€statementÏto€an€investigator,€after€being€informed€of€his€constitutional€right€against€self„incrimination,€that€"he€could€not€remember"€telling€the€probate€judge€that€heÍwas€a€licensed€Tennessee€lawyer.€€Diversion€should€be€granted€to€defendantsÏwhose€criminal€conduct€is€òòuncharacteristicóó€of€their€prior€history.€€òòState€v.€Neaseóó,Ï713€S.W.2d€90,€92€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.€1986)€(emphasis€added).€€We€agree€withÏthe€district€attorney€general's€conclusion€that€the€appellant's€conduct,€in€certainÏrespects,€was€not€uncharacteristic€of€his€prior€behavior.ÌÌà àBefore€a€reviewing€court€can€find€an€abuse€of€discretion,€the€record€mustÏshow€an€absence€of€òòanyóó€substantial€evidence€to€support€the€district€attorneyÏgeneral's€denial€of€pretrial€diversion.€€òòHammersleyóó,€650€S.W.2d€at€356Ï(emphasis€added).€€Upon€review€of€this€case,€the€record€provides€substantialÏevidence€to€affirm€the€trial€court's€judgment€that€the€district€attorney€general€didÏnot€abuse€his€discretion€in€denying€pretrial€diversion.€€ÌÌÌà@ àò òIII.ó ó€€ò òExclusion€of€Evidence€from€Considerationó óÌÌà àThe€appellant€contends€that€the€trial€court€erred€in€failing€to€excludeÏcertain€evidence€from€consideration€for€the€purposes€of€pretrial€diversion€andÏwrit€of€certiorari€hearing.× ƒ. ××  ×€€Specifically,€the€appellant€contends€that€reference€toÍthe€uncharged€offense€should€be€excluded€on€the€grounds€that€"it€is€soÏambiguous€that€the€defense€has€had€no€opportunity€to€explain€or€deny€theÏcharges."€€Furthermore,€the€appellant€contends€that€the€California€State€BarÏreport€should€be€excluded€from€consideration.€€In€support€of€this€contention,€heÏargues€that€the€report€is€unreliable,€that€no€adjudication€of€guilt€was€ever€made,Ïand€that€the€alleged€events€are€remote€in€time.× ƒ/ ××  ×€€The€appellant€does€not€denyÏthe€allegations€in€the€bar€report€or€the€uncharged€offense.€€Rather,€heÏchallenges€their€admissibility.€€Thus,€the€relevant€question€for€our€determinationÏis€what€evidence€may€the€district€attorney€general€consider€in€either€granting€orÏdenying€an€applicant€diversion.ÌÌà@ àòòò òA.€€Exclusion€Based€upon€Evidentiary€Rulesó óóó€ÌÌà àInitially,€we€note€that€pretrial€diversion€does€not€involve€a€determinationÏof€guilt€or€innocence.€€Moreover,€diversion€may€not€be€viewed€as€a€sentencingÏalternative€or€as€a€specialized€form€of€probation.€× ƒ0 ××  ×€€€€In€the€probation€context,€theÍState€has€already€obtained€a€judicial€determination€of€the€accusedððs€guilt.€ÏThus,€societyððs€interest€in€convicting€the€accused€has€been€achieved.€ÏRecognizing€that€no€adjudicative€element€is€present€within€the€pretrial€context,Ïwe€conclude€that€reliable€hearsay€evidence€may€be€considered€by€the€districtÏattorney€general€in€arriving€at€his€decision€to€grant€or€deny€diversion.€€Thus,Ïevidence€that€is€deemed€trustworthy€and€relevant€to€the€issue€of€diversion€mayÏbe€considered€by€the€district€attorney€general,€regardless€of€its€admissibilityÏunder€exclusionary€rules€of€evidence.€€òòCfóó.€€òòState€v.€Mackeyóó,€553€S.W.2d€337,Ï344€(Tenn.€1977);€€òòState€v.€Flynnóó,€675€S.W.2d€494,€498€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.Ï1984).€€Accordingly,€if€the€appellant€contends€that€information€considered€by€theÏdistrict€attorney€general€is€materially€false€or€is€unconstitutionally€obtained,€theÍburden€is€upon€the€appellant€to€challenge€such€information.ÌÌÌà àà àIn€the€present€case,€the€appellant€did€not€deny€either€theÏuncharged€offense€or€the€allegations€contained€in€the€California€State€BarÏreport.€€Nor€did€the€appellant€seek€an€opportunity€to€refute€the€accuracy€of€theÏevidence.€€€Accordingly,€we€conclude€that€the€uncharged€offense€and€theÏCalifornia€Bar€Report€were€properly€considered€by€the€district€attorney€general.€ÏThis€issue€is€without€merit.ÌÌà@ àòòò òB.€€Exclusion€Based€upon€ð ðDisputed€Factsððóóó óÌÌà àIn€a€somewhat€related€argument,€the€appellant€contends€that€the€trialÏcourt€improperly€considered€the€California€State€Bar€Report€and€the€unchargedÏoffense€in€affirming€the€district€attorney€generalððs€denial€of€diversion.ÌThe€appellant€argues€that€these€facts€were€improperly€considered€due€to€theirÏunreliability.× ƒ1 ××  ×€ÌÌà àThe€appellantððs€argument€is€grounded€upon€what€he€contends€is€aÏprocedural€violation€of€òòState€v.€Winsettóó,€882€S.W.2d€at€806.€€In€òòWinsettóó,€a€panelÏof€this€court€identified€three€criteria€which€òòshouldóó€be€included€in€the€districtÏattorney€generalððs€written€response€denying€diversion.× ƒ2 ××  ×€€òòIdóó.€at€810.€€TheÏappellant€contends€that€the€district€attorney€general€failed€to€comply€with€theÏthird€criterion€of€òòWinsettóó€which€suggests€that€the€district€attorney€general€identifyÏð ðany€disputed€issue€of€factðð€in€his€letter€denying€diversion.€€òòIdóó.€€The€trial€courtÏmay€then€hold€an€evidentiary€hearing,€if€necessary,€to€clarify€matters€already€inÏthe€record€about€which€there€may€be€some€dispute.ÌÌà àWe€agree€that€the€district€attorney€generalððs€letter€denying€diversion€didÏnot€identify€disputed€issues€of€fact.€€It€would€be€instructive€at€this€juncture€toÏreview€the€procedural€aspects€of€an€application€for€diversion.€€As€a€practicalÏmatter,€the€district€attorney€general€rarely€will€be€in€a€position€to€identifyÏdisputed€facts€when€advising€the€applicant,€via€letter,€of€his€denial€of€diversion.€ÏFactual€disputes€typically€arise€after€communication€of€the€denial€has€beenÏmade.€€Indeed,€this€scenario€occurred€in€the€instant€case.€The€request€toÏexclude€evidence€was€made€òòafteróó€the€district€attorney€general€had€denied€theÍappellantððs€request€for€diversion.× ƒ3 ××  ×€€Generally,€it€is€only€upon€the€release€of€theÏletter€that€an€applicant€becomes€aware€of€any€disputed€fact.€€Therefore,€it€isÏincumbent€upon€the€appellant€to€affirmatively€identify€and€contest€disputed€factsÏin€his€petition€for€writ€of€certiorari€hearing.× ƒ4 ××  ×€€This€was€not€done€in€the€presentÏcase.ÌÌà àAs€we€have€previously€determined,€the€district€attorney€generalððsÏdecision€regarding€diversion€is€presumed€correct.€€òòHoustonóó,€900€S.W.2d€at€714.€ÏThe€burden€of€establishing€entitlement€to€pretrial€diversion€rests€with€theÏappellant.€€òòWinsettóó,€882€S.W.2d€at€810.€€Likewise,€the€burden€of€presentingÏð ðdisputed€factsðð€before€the€trial€court€also€rests€with€the€appellant.ÌÌà àThe€only€evidence€that€the€trial€court€may€consider€at€the€certiorariÏhearing€is€that€evidence€considered€by€the€district€attorney€general€in€theÏdecision€denying€pretrial€diversion.€òòWinsettóó,€882€S.W.2d€at€810.€€If€the€trial€courtÏfinds€that€the€district€attorney€general€considered€false€or€misleading€facts€inÍarriving€at€œhis€or€her›€decision,€the€trial€court€may€œfind€that›€œð ðabuse€of›€œdiscretionðð›Ïœhas€occurred€and€order€diversion€of€the€applicant,€unless›€there€exists€otherÏð ðsubstantial€evidenceðð€to€support€the€district€attorney€generalððs€denial€ofÏdiversion.€€òòSeeóó€òòHoustonóó,€900€S.W.2d€at€714.ÌÌà àIn€the€present€case,€neither€the€uncharged€offense€nor€the€allegations€ofÏthe€California€Bar€report€are€in€dispute.€€Moreover,€the€appellant€neither€deniedÏthe€veracity€of€such€facts€before€the€trial€court€nor€sought€an€evidentiary€hearingÏto€challenge€the€alleged€facts€in€dispute.€€The€appellant€only€challenges€theirÏadmissibility€in€accordance€with€evidentiary€standards.€Therefore,€we€concludeÏthat€the€uncharged€offense€and€the€allegations€of€the€California€Bar€Report€wereÏappropriate€for€consideration.€€This€issue€is€likewise€without€merit.ÌÌà@ àÌà@ àò òV.€CONCLUSIONó óÌÌà àAfter€conducting€the€appropriate€review€of€such€matters,€we€conclude€thatÏthe€trial€court€was€correct€in€finding€that€the€district€attorney€general€did€notÏabuse€his€discretion€in€denying€pretrial€diversion.€€Additionally,€we€hold€thatÏreliable€hearsay€may€be€considered€by€the€district€attorney€general€in€reviewingÏapplications€for€pretrial€diversion.€€Thus,€the€trial€court€properly€overruled€theÏappellant's€motion€to€exclude€evidence€from€consideration.€€Moreover,€weÍconclude€that€the€burden€is€upon€the€diversion€applicant€to€identify€andÏaffirmatively€contest€any€disputed€fact€prior€to€the€trial€courtððs€review€of€theÏdistrict€attorney€generalððs€decision.€€œ›€Accordingly,€the€decision€of€the€trial€court€isÏaffirmed.€€ÌÌœÌÌ›ÌÓÓà àà àà àà àà à____________________________________Ìà àà àà àà àà àDAVID€G.€HAYES,€JudgeÌÌÌÌÌCONCUR:ÌÌÌ____________________________ÌPAUL€G.€SUMMERS,€JudgeÌÌÌÌ____________________________ÌLYNN€W.€BROWN,€Special€JudgeÌ