ÿWPCG …# VUNa %¯ 0(µ4Ýñ  w@4 0Jt 0T¾ 0^ 0hp 0rØ 0|J 0†Æ 0L 1uÜ 0dQ U>µ B)ó DCU*_ AM‰ëÖ BÁv~ÞvÓ\ D3/ 0@b AO¢Æñ 0D· D/û B*˜HP LaserJet 4SiHPPCL5MS,ü,,,,,ü0nLhÎ(ÈhH  Z ‹6Times New Roman RegularX($¡¡Úƒç"3|x ÿBYERSÿÿBYERSÿ ùaúUûUüýþÿÓ€2 ÿÿ0Indent1Ô2ÔÔ3  Ô2" ÿÿ0Indent2à0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2, ÿÿ0Indent3à0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô26 ÿÿ0Indent4à0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2@ ÿÿ0Indent5à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2J ÿÿ0Indent6à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2T ÿÿ0Indent7à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2^ ÿÿ0Indent8à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô ÿÿ?AGMSYaioIndent0I.A.1.a.(1)(a)i)a)P ÿÿ8Mac DefaultMac DefaultÓ ` °šXÓ< Œ 9p`(&Times New Roman% Line 7 d 7Border 1dd< Œ 9p`(Arial€-!Cþÿ << Gÿÿ áÝ ƒ!ÝÔ€ÔÝ  ÝÔ€"ÔÔ€"ÔÓ  ÓÔ YYY ÔFILEDÔ€"XÔÌÌò òAugust€27,€1997ÌÌCecil€Crowson,€Jr.ÌÔ€"ôÔAppellate€Court€Clerkó ó dPtPtHHÚ(ÿáÿâùFG(üHHÚ(d'hStyl{WP}01•ÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃà Ãà Ãà Ãà Ãà ÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÐ ÐÐHHÐÐ  ÐÐ2ÐÐÿÿ¸æ$ÿÐÐHHÐÐÐÐÐÐÐÐ  ÐÐ ÐÐ ÐÑÑÑGenevaÑÑ ÑÑ € ÑÑ<Px–ÈÑÒÒÒ443!#4ÒÒ$ *$ÒÒ$*$ÒÒ ÿKK ÒÒ  Geneva ÒÒ  Geneva ÒÓ.,ÓÓÓÓ6ÓÓ ÓßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßÑGenevaÑÑ ÑÒ  h HD: Geneva ÒÒ  h HD: Geneva Ò%%%%'ÿÿdxd("ÿÿ$££Ò  ÒÒ  Ò€-‚ƒCþÿ<< CÿÿƒLevel 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5($$””ò òÚ  Ú1Ú  Úó ó„„'÷ÿ dxdüÿP PdÝ ƒ!ÝÔ . ÔÔ€ÔÝ  ÝÒ ž ÒÒ ° ÒÒ ž ÒÒ £ ÒÑ\R AØ'\ÑÙ€€ÙÓ  ÓÔ€"ÔÑ\R AØ'\ÑßR€#$!A1-j|` Å `€€@ÿRß›Þ ÞÌÌÌÌIN€THE€COURT€OF€CRIMINAL€APPEALS€OF€TENNESSEEÌÌAT€KNOXVILLEÌÌSEPTEMBER€1995€SESSIONÌÌÌÌÒ ž ÒÒ î ÒÓ  ÓJAMES€RONALD€ROLLINS,à àà à)Ìà àà àà àà àà àà à)Ìà àà àAppellant,à àà àà à)à àNO.€03C01„9412„CR„00440Ìà àà àà àà àà àà à)Ìà àà àà àà àà àà à)à àHAMILTON€COUNTY€ÌV.à àà àà àà àà àà à)à àNO.€198332Ìà àà àà àà àà àà à)Ìà àà àà àà àà àà à)à àHON.€RUSSELL€C.€HINSON,ÏJUDGE€ÌSTATE€OF€TENNESSEE,à àà àà à)à àÌà àà àà àà àà àà à)à à(€Post„conviction€on€especially€Ì€à àà àà àà àà àà à)à à€€€aggravated€robbery)Ìà àà àAppellee.à àà àà à)ÌÌÌÌÌòòFOR€THE€APPELLANTóó:à àà àà àà àòòFOR€THE€APPELLEEóó:ÌÌBarton€C.€Solomonà àà àà àà àà àCharles€W.€BursonÌCRUTCHFIELD€&€SOLOMONà àà àà àAttorney€General€and€ReporterÌ100€East€Tenth€Street,€Suite€401à àà à€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€ÌChattanooga,€Tennessee€37402à àà àà àAmy€L.€TarkingtonÌà àà àà àà àà àà àà àAssistant€Attorney€GeneralÌà àà àà àà àà àà àà à450€James€Robertson€ParkwayÌà àà àà àà àà àà àà àNashville,€Tennessee€37243ÌÌà àà àà àà àà àà àà àWilliam€H.€Cox,€IIIÌà àà àà àà àà àà àà àDistrict€Attorney€GeneralÌÒ ž ÒÒ , Òà àà àà àà àà àà àà àÌà àà àà àà àà àà àà àDavid€DennyÌà àà àà àà àà àà àà àAssistant€District€Attorney€GeneralÌà àà àà àà àà àà àà à600€Market€Street,€Suite€310Ìà àà àà àà àà àà àà àChattanooga,€Tennessee€37402ÌÌÌÌOPINION€FILED:€_______________ÌÌÌAffirmedÌÌÌLee€Russell,€Special€JudgeÌÌÌÌÌÒ ž ÒÒ X ÒÓ` °ŽXB'0*ŒXÓÌòòœò òÓ  ÓÌOPINIONó ó›ÌœÌÑ  ÑÑ7€XXdìXXdì7Ñ›ÌÓÓÓ  Óà àóóThe€Petitioner€appeals€from€the€trial€courtððs€dismissal€of€his€Petition€for€Post„Conviction€Relief.€€The€Petitioner€alleges€that€he€was€denied€his€rights€under€theÏSixth€Amendment€to€the€Constitution€of€the€United€States€because€he€receivedÏineffective€assistance€of€counsel€at€his€sentencing€hearing€following€a€plea€of€guiltyÏto€especially€œaggravated€robbery.›€€The€Petitioner€alleges€that€at€the€sentencingÏhearing,€his€attorney€failed€to€challenge€one€of€the€six€prior€convictions€that€formedÏthe€basis€for€the€sentencing€judgeððs€determination€that€the€Petitioner€should€beÏsentenced€as€a€career€offender.€€This€court€finds€that€the€Petitioner€failed€to€meet€hisÏburden€of€proof€to€show€that€he€received€ineffective€assistance€of€counsel,€and€theÏcourt€affirms€the€dismissal€of€the€Petition€for€Post„Conviction€Relief.ÌÓÓÌÓÓà àPetitioner€James€Ronald€Rollins€was€indicted€in€Hamilton€County,€Tennessee,Íin€1990,€on€a€charge€of€especially€aggravated€robbery.€€On€October€9,€1990,€the€dateÏon€which€the€Petitioner€was€scheduled€to€be€tried€by€a€jury€in€Division€II€of€theÏCriminal€Court€of€Hamilton€County,€Tennessee,€the€Petitioner€entered€a€plea€of€guiltyÏto€the€charge€on€which€he€was€indicted.€€A€sentencing€hearing€was€conducted€onÏFebruary€1,€1991,€and€the€Petitioner€was€sentenced€to€sixty€years€at€sixty€percent€asÏa€career€offender.€€The€sentencing€judgeððs€determination€that€the€Petitioner€was€aÏcareer€offender€was€based€upon€Tennessee€Code€Annotated€ðð€40„35„108(a)(1),Ïwhich€requires€a€finding€of€six€prior€convictions€of€class€A,€B,€or€C€€felonies.€€At€theÏsentencing€hearing,€appointed€counsel€for€the€Petitioner€asked€the€trial€judge€to€ruleÏon€whether€the€Stateððs€exhibits€concerning€the€Petitionerððs€prior€convictions€wereÏsufficient€to€prove€six€prior€convictions€of€the€classes€necessary€to€find€the€PetitionerÏto€be€a€career€offender€under€Tennessee€Code€Annotated€ðð€40„35„108(a)(1).€€€ÏCounsel€for€the€Petitioner€also€challenged€the€sufficiency€of€the€Stateððs€Notice€toÏSeek€Enhanced€Sentencing.ÌÓÓœÌÌ›ÌÓÓà àThe€trial€judge€found€that€the€State€had€proved€the€necessary€priorÏconvictions,€and€the€Petitioner€appealed€his€sentence€to€the€Court€of€CriminalÏAppeals.€€The€issue€on€appeal€was€the€sufficiency€of€the€Notice€to€Seek€EnhancedÏSentencing.€€No€issue€was€Ñ7€XXdìXXdì7Ñraised€on€appeal€as€to€the€characterization€of€any€of€theÏsix€prior€felony€convictions.€€The€Court€of€œCriminal€Appeals›€affirmed€the€sentence.€ÏOn€September€23,€1993,€the€Petitioner€filed€a€Petition€for€Post„Conviction€ReliefÍasserting€that€he€had€been€denied€his€right€to€the€effective€assistance€of€counselÏguaranteed€by€the€Sixth€Amendment€to€the€Constitution€of€the€United€States.€€AÏhearing€was€held€in€the€trial€court€on€July€18,€1994,€and€the€trial€judge€dismissed€theÏPetition.€€The€Petitioner€has€appealed€the€dismissal€to€this€court.ÌÓÓÌÓÓà àThe€Petition€initially€alleged€multiple€mistakes€by€the€Petitionerððs€counselÏrelated€to€his€guilty€plea€and€the€subsequent€sentencing€hearing.€€However,€theÏPetitioner€on€appeal€now€pursues€only€a€single€issue€related€to€his€attorneyððsÏcompetence.€€The€Petitioner€claims€that€one€of€his€six€prior€convictions,€a€1980Ïconviction€for€burglary€in€Cook€County,€Illinois,€should€not€have€been€treated€as€aÏclass€A,€B,€or€C€felony€for€purposes€of€determining€the€Petitioner€to€be€a€careerÏoffender.€€None€of€the€other€five€prior€convictions€is€challenged.€€The€PetitionerÏasserts€that€his€counsel€at€the€sentencing€phase€failed€to€investigate€and€researchÏthe€Illinois€conviction€and€failed€to€object€to€its€introduction€at€the€sentencing€hearing.€ÏThe€Petitioner€€asserts€that€his€counsel€failed€to€challenge€on€appeal€the€trial€judgeððsÏdetermination€that€the€1980€Illinois€conviction€was€at€least€a€class€C€felony€forÏpurposes€of€determining€the€Petitionerððs€status€as€a€career€offender.ÌÓÓÌÓÓà àIt€is€undisputed€that€in€1980,€the€Defendant€entered€a€plea€of€guilty€to€burglaryÏin€Cook€County,€Illinois,€and€received€a€sentence€of€three€years.€€The€PetitionerÏasserts€that€in€1980,€the€State€of€Illinois€did€not€distinguish€among€variousÏclassifications€of€burglary€œbased€›€upon€œ€either›œ€›€œthe€›€œnature€›€œof€›€the€structure€entered€orÍœthe€infliction›€of€injury€to€œanÌ›œÌ›€occupant€of€the€structure.€€The€Illinois€judgment€is€in€evidence,€but€it€does€not€reciteÏthe€factual€basis€for€the€plea€to€the€charge€of€burglary.€€The€only€evidence€in€theÏrecord€on€what€the€factual€basis€was€for€the€Illinois€burglary€conviction€is€theÏPetitionerððs€testimony€at€the€œpost„conviction›€hearing.€€The€Petitioner€testified€that€heÏwas€intoxicated,€that€he€believed€himself€to€be€at€the€door€of€his€own€apartmentÏbuilding€(which€was€twenty„five€yards€up€the€street),€€that€he€could€not€get€in€andÏtherefore€broke€the€glass€in€the€door€€to€gain€entry,€and€that€the€building€was€in€factÏan€accounting€office€containing€a€few€tables€and€chairs.€€ÌÓÓÌÓÓà àOnly€two€witnesses€testified€at€the€œpost„conviction›€hearing.€€The€PetitionerÏtestified€that€the€Illinois€incident€occurred€as€described€above.€€The€attorney€who€hadÏrepresented€the€Petitioner€in€his€guilty€plea€and€at€the€sentencing€hearing€andÏappeal€in€the€Tennessee€robbery€case€testified€for€the€State€at€the€post„convictionÏhearing.€€The€attorney€recalled€investigating€the€six€prior€convictions€and€concludingÏthat€they€all€qualified€as€class€A,€B,€or€C€felonies.€€The€trial€judge€at€the€post„conviction€hearing€made€an€express€finding€that€he€did€not€believe€the€PetitionerððsÏtestimony€concerning€the€facts€€that€led€to€the€Illinois€conviction,€and€he€observedÏthat€the€Illinois€judge€must€not€have€believed€the€Petitionerððs€version€of€the€facts€if€heÏaccepted€the€Petitionerððs€guilty€plea€and€sentenced€the€Petitioner€to€three€years.€€TheÏtrial€judge€at€the€œpost„conviction›€hearing€concluded€that€the€Illinois€conviction€hadÍbeen€a€class€C€felony€and€that€the€assistance€by€the€Petitionerððs€counsel€at€theÏsentencing€hearing€had€not€been€ineffective.ÌÓÓÌÓÓà àThe€Sixth€Amendment€of€the€United€States€Constitution€and€Article€1,€ðð€9€ofÏthe€Tennessee€Constitution€require€that€a€defendant€in€a€criminal€case€receiveÏeffective€assistance€of€counsel.€€€€See€òòBaxter€v.€Rose,€óó523€S.W.2d€930€(Tenn.€1995).€ÏThe€appropriate€test€for€determining€whether€counsel€provided€effective€assistance€isÏwhether€his€or€her€performance€was€within€the€range€of€competence€demanded€ofÏattorneys€in€criminal€cases.€€òòId.óó€at€936.€€€In€òòStrickland€v.€Washington,€óó466€U.S.€668Ï(1984),€the€United€States€Supreme€Court€applied€a€two„prong€test€to€determineÏwhether€effective€assistance€had€been€rendered.€€First,€a€petitioner€for€post„conviction€relief€must€show€that€the€representation€was€deficient€by€showing€thatÏcounsel€made€errors€so€serious€that€he€or€she€was€not€functioning€as€ð ðcounselðð€asÏguaranteed€by€the€Sixth€Amendment,€and€second,€that€the€deficient€representationÏprejudiced€the€defense€to€such€an€extent€that€the€petitioner€was€deprived€of€a€fairÏresolution€of€the€charges€against€him€or€her.€€To€succeed,€the€petitioner€must€showÏthat€there€is€a€ð ðreasonable€probability,ðð€that€is,€a€probability€sufficient€to€undermineÏconfidence€in€the€outcome,€that,€but€for€counselððs€unprofessional€errors,€the€results€ofÏthe€proceeding€would€have€been€different.€€òòId.€óóat€694.€€The€defendant€must€establishÏthat€counselððs€performance€fell€below€an€objective€standard€of€reasonablenessÏunder€prevailing€professional€norms.€€òòId.€óóat€687.€€In€post„€conviction€proceedings,€theÏpetitioner€has€the€burden€of€proving€the€allegations€in€his€or€her€petition€by€aÍpreponderance€of€the€evidence.€€See€òòMcBee€v.€Stateóó,€655€S.W.2d€191,€195€(Tenn.ÏCrim.€App.€1983).€€The€findings€of€the€trial€court€in€œpost„conviction›€hearings€areÏconclusive€on€appeal€unless€the€evidence€preponderates€against€the€judgment.€ÏSeeòò€State€v.€Buford,€óó666€S.W.2d€473,€475€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.€1983);€òòClenny€v.€State,Ïóó576€S.W.2d€12,€14€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.€1978).ÌÓÓÌÓÓà àThe€Petitioner€contends€that€his€1980€Illinois€conviction€for€burglary€should€notÏhave€been€counted€as€one€of€the€six€prior€convictions€for€class€A,€B,€or€C€feloniesÏnecessary€to€qualify€the€Defendant€as€a€career€offender.€€Tennessee€CodeÏAnnotated€ðð€40„35„108(b)(5)€provides€as€follows€concerning€including€felonies€inÏjurisdictions€other€than€Tennessee€for€purposes€of€establishing€career€offenderÏstatus:ÌÓÓÌà8 àð ðPrior€convictionsðð€includes€convictions€under€the€laws€of€any€otherÏstate,€government,€or€country€which,€if€committed€in€this€state,€shouldÏhave€constituted€an€offense€cognizable€by€the€laws€of€this€state.€€In€theÏevent€that€a€felony€from€a€€jurisdiction€other€than€Tennessee€is€not€aÏnamed€felony€in€this€state,€the€elements€of€the€offense€shall€be€used€byÏthe€Tennessee€court€to€determine€what€classification€the€offense€isÏgiven.ÌÌÌÓÓà àThe€Petitioner€contends€that€the€offense€in€Illinois€as€it€existed€in€1980€wasÏnamed€simply€ð ðburglary.ðð€€The€Petitioner€contends€therefore€that€the€offense€is€aÏnamed€œfelonyÌÌ›€in€Tennessee€and€that€in€fact€it€is€the€same€offense€that€is€called€burglary€inÍTennessee€Code€Annotated€ðð€39„14„402€entitled€ð ðBurglary.ðð€€The€TennesseeÏoffense€of€simple€burglary€is€a€class€D€or€class€E€felony,€depending€on€whether€theÏentry€is€of€a€building€or€a€motor€vehicle.€€The€Defendant€argues€that€therefore€theÏIllinois€conviction€could€not€be€counted€as€a€class€C€felony€for€purposes€ofÏestablishing€career€offender€status€and€that€to€have€allowed€its€use€was€ineffectiveÏrepresentation€by€defense€counsel€at€the€sentencing€hearing.€€ÌÓÓÌÓÓà àThe€Petitioner€contends€that€in€1980,€Illinois€had€only€one€general€offense€ofÏburglary,€which€proscribed€entry€without€authority€into€a€ð ðbuilding,€house€trailer,Ïwatercraft,€aircraft,€motor€vehicle€.€.€.,€railroad€car,€or€any€part€thereof,€with€intent€toÏcommit€therein€a€felony€or€theft.ðð€€Ill.€Code€39€ðð€19„1.€€The€offense€carried€three€toÏseven€years.€€No€distinction€was€made€œbased€on€›€the€nature€of€the€building€œ(aÏhabitation›€œor€not)›€œor€based€on€the€infliction€of€injury€on€the€victim.€€In€Tennessee,€theÏð ðburglaryðð€defined€in€Tennessee€Code€Annotated€ðð€39„14„402€is€that€of€a€buildingÏð ðother€than€a€habitationðð€or€is€burglary€of€a€motor€vehicle.€€ð ðAggravated€Burglaryðð€asÏdefined€in€Tennessee€Code€Annotated€ðð€39„14„403€is€that€of€ð ðany€structure,Ïincluding€buildings,€model€units,€mobile€homes,€trailers€and€tents,€which€is€designedÏor€adapted€for€the€overnight€accommodation€of€persons€.€.€.€.ðð€€ð ðEspeciallyÏAggravated€Burglaryðð€is€defined€in€Tennessee€Code€Annotated€ðð€39„14„404€as€aÏburglary€of€a€habitation€in€which€the€victim€suffers€bodily€injury.ÌÓÓòòÌÓÓà àóóThere€is€not€merely€a€single€ð ðnamedðð€offense€of€burglary€in€Tennessee€toÍwhich€the€1980€Illinois€burglary€statute€can€be€matched€€under€Tennessee€CodeÏAnnotated€ðð€40„35„108(b)(5)€to€classify€that€prior€conviction.€€The€Petitioner€had€theÏburden€of€proof€to€prove€which€of€the€three€versions€of€burglary€in€Tennessee€has€theÏelements€of€the€offense€committed€by€the€Petitioner€in€Illinois.€€Introduction€of€theÏIllinois€judgment€did€not€meet€this€burden€because€it€did€not€describe€the€crime€as€toÏthe€nature€of€the€structure€entered€or€as€to€whether€there€was€injury€of€an€occupantÏinvolved.€€Therefore€the€Petitioner€had€the€burden€to€prove€by€other€evidence€that€theÏconviction€did€not€involve€the€entry€of€a€habitation.€ÌÓÓÌÓÓà àThe€Petitioner€attempted€to€meet€his€burden€by€testifying€that€his€entry€was€anÏaccidental€entry€into€a€substantially€empty€business.€€The€trial€judge€did€not€believeÏthis€account,€and€the€trial€judgeððs€factual€findings€on€the€credibility€of€this€witness€areÏconclusive€on€appeal€unless€the€evidence€preponderates€against€the€findings.€€SeeÏòòBlade€v.€State,€óó794€S.W.2d€725,€755€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.€1990).€€The€trial€judge€wasÏclearly€correct€when€he€concluded€that€the€Petitionerððs€version€of€the€facts€wasÏincredible,€especially€as€the€trial€judge€in€Illinois€had€accepted€the€Petitionerððs€guiltyÏplea€and€sentenced€him€to€three€years.€€It€is€highly€unlikely€that€the€Petitioner€was,€asÏhe€testified,€too€intoxicated€to€ascertain€the€difference€between€the€front€door€of€hisÏown€residential€building€and€the€front€door€of€an€accounting€business€while€at€theÏsame€time€he€had€the€clarity€of€thought€to€take€note€of€and€recall€the€contents€of€thatÏbuilding,€in€spite€of€being€apprehended€by€officers€as€soon€as€the€glass€of€the€frontÏdoor€was€accidentally€broken.ÌÓÓÌÓÓà àIt€is€also€noted€that€nowhere€in€the€record€of€the€post„conviction€hearing€wasÏthe€Illinois€statute€as€it€existed€in€1980€introduced.€€The€State€did€not€stipulate€theÏcontents€of€that€statute.€€It€is€true€that€the€Petitioner€appended€to€his€brief€on€appealÏwhat€purports€to€be€a€photostatic€copy€of€the€statute,€but€it€was€not€introduced€at€theÏhearing,€and€the€trial€judge€did€not€have€the€benefit€of€it€in€the€record€upon€which€heÏrendered€his€decision.€€Production€of€the€statute€was€again€the€burden€of€theÏPetitioner.ÌÓÓÌÓÓà àBecause€the€Petitioner€has€failed€to€prove€that€the€Illinois€conviction€was€not€aÏclass€C€felony,€he€has€failed€to€meet€his€burden€to€prove€that€defense€counselððsÏrepresentation€was€deficient€or€that€but€for€the€deficiency€the€Petitioner€would€notÏhave€been€sentenced€as€a€career€offender.€€The€dismissal€of€the€Petitionerððs€PetitionÏfor€Post„Conviction€Relief€is€affirmed.€€òòÌÓÓÌÌÌÌà àà àà àà àà àà à€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€Ìà àà àà àà àà àà àóóLEE€RUSSELL,€SPECIAL€JUDGEÌÌÌÌÌÌCONCUR:ÌÌÌÌ____________________________ÌWILLIAM€M.€BARKER,€JUDGEÌÌÌÌ____________________________ÌJOHN€K.€BYERS,€SENIOR€JUDGEÌòòÌÓ  ÓÌóó