ÿWPC# ;# J %U 0Æ[ 0 !4+? 0DN’w@šU:Ú 0J 0T^ ² D3² å 0âå Ç Ç ÆÇ  0^ AOë 0D: ~ 0h~ 0ræ U@X 0|˜ 0† 0š 1u* 0@ŸU,ß B  0d( D/Œ B»U,ØU *B).DCW AMš‚ç]i£ÆÇiv~0vÓ®˜HP LaserJet 4/4MHPPCL5E,,,,0  X(žjÆ$¡¡Ñ` ` ÑÑÜÜÑÒ4°ÒÒX°ÒÑTR[  AØ'ÿ Legal[  AØ'ÿ Legal AØ'ÿ Legal AØ'ÿ LegalTÑÓÓ(º(3eB$¤¤Ý ƒjÆ!ÝÑ` °ÑÑܰÑÒ4°ÒÒX°ÒÑTR[  AØ'ÿ Legal3Ø' AØ'ÿ Legalÿ3Ø'TÑÓÓÝ  Ýà Œ àòòÚ  Ú0Ú  Úóó¨vÙ Í3|x(#Ã$òòÚ  Ú0Ú  Úóó [D[  Ó€   ‚Ó€,c½¬AZ‹"Arial Regular2 ÿÿ0Indent1Ô2ÔÔ3  Ô2" ÿÿ0Indent2à0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô&&&&'ÿÿdxd(º3ú'$¢¢Ý ƒjÆ!ÝÑ` °ÑÑܰÑÒ4°ÒÒX°ÒÑTR[  AØ'ÿ Legal3Ø' AØ'ÿ Legalÿ3Ø'TÑÓÓÝ  ݃Level 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 52, ÿÿ0Indent3à0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô$(Cþÿ<< Cÿÿ($$””ò òÚ  Ú1Ú  Úó ó26 ÿÿ0Indent4à0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2@ ÿÿ0Indent5à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô É¸·`(ZapfCalligr BTTT2J ÿÿ0Indent6à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2T ÿÿ0Indent7à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2^ ÿÿ0Indent8à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô !" ÿÿ?AGMSYaioIndent0I.A.1.a.(1)(a)i)a)("ÿÿ$££Ò  ÒÒ  Ò< Œ 9p`(Modern dP ÿÿ8Mac DefaultMac DefaultÓ ` °šXÓ**'÷ÿ dxdüÿP Pd< Œ 9p`(Monaco< Œ 9p`(Arial% Line 7 d22227Border 1dd$3Cþÿ << Gÿÿ xÝ ƒ!ÝÑ  ÑÑ#€d#ÑÔ€%ÔÔ€1ÔÑ ` ÑÑ Ü ÑÒ 4 ÒÒ X ÒÑ\R AØ'\ÑÓÓÝ  ÝÝ ƒ"ÝÝ  Ýò òÔ€1ÔÓ  ÓÔ eee ÔFILEDÔ€1XÔó óÌò òÔ€1¼ÔAugustÏ2,Ï1996ó óÔ€1XÔÌÌò òCecilÏCrowson,ÏJr.Ô€Ôó óÔ  ÔÌÔ€ÂÔÔ€1ÔÔ eee Ôò òAppellateÏCourtÏClerkó óÔ  ÔÔ€ÔÔ€XÔ SÝ ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€%ÔÔ€1ÔÑ ` ÑÑ Ü ÑÒ 4 ÒÒ X ÒÑ\R AØ'\ÑÓÓÝ  ÝÝ ƒ$Ýà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  ÝÓÓ€The€defendant€also€pled€guilty€to€a€separate€charge€of€possession€withÏintent€to€deliver€a€controlled€substance,€a€Class€D€felony,€and€received€a€Range€I,Ïfive„year€sentence.€€Two€other€drug„related€charges€were€pending€at€the€time€of€theÏdefendantððs€plea.Ì ™Ý ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€%ÔÔ€1ÔÑ ` ÑÑ Ü ÑÒ 4 ÒÒ X ÒÑ\R AØ'\ÑÓÓÝ  ÝÝ ƒ$Ýà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  ÝÓÓ€Brumley€was€a€codefendant€in€this€case€but€is€not€a€party€to€this€appeal.Ì ½Ý ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€%ÔÔ€1ÔÑ ` ÑÑ Ü ÑÒ 4 ÒÒ X ÒÑ\R AØ'\ÑÓÓÝ  ÝÝ ƒ$Ýà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  ÝÓÓThe€trial€court€specifically€found€that€the€defendant€was€in€custody€at€theÏtime€Ms.€Travis€was€called€to€the€scene€because€"the€reasonable€expectationÏwould€be€that€when€[a€person]€is€stopped€on€the€side€of€the€road€and€...€notified€thatÏsomeone€is€on[]€their€way€to€search€[him€or€her,]€that€[person€is]€not€free€to€leave€theÏofficerððs€custody€at€that€time.ððÌPtPtHHÚ(ÿáÿâùFG(üHHØ(d'`Styl{WP}01•ÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃà Ãà Ãà Ãà Ãà ÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÐ ÐÐHHÐÐ  ÐÐ2ÐÐÿÿ¸æ$ÿÐÐHHÐÐÐÐÐÐÐÐ  ÐÐ ÐÐ ÐÑÑÑGenevaÑÑ ÑÑ € ÑÑ<Px–ÈÑÒÒÒ443!#4ÒÒ$ *$ÒÒ$*$ÒÒ ÿKK ÒÒ  Geneva ÒÒ  Geneva ÒÓ.,ÓÓÓÓ6ÓÓ ÓßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßÑMonacoÑÑ ÑÒ  BA Op Monaco ÒÒ  BA Op Monaco ÒÝ ƒ!ÝÔ . ÔÔ€%ÔÓ&€00X„d&ÓÑ#€00Xd#ÑÔ€1ÔÑ ` ÑÑ Ü ÑÒ 4 ÒÒ X ÒÑ\R AØ'\ÑÓÓÝ  ÝÑ7€‚3XdðdÈ7ÑÑ  Ñ€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€òò€IN€THE€COURT€OF€CRIMINAL›€APPEALS€OFÏœTENNESSEEóóÌ€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€Ù€ÙßL€453;+'h|º- `€€L߀€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€òòAT›€œJACKSON€€€€óó›Ìœ€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€MARCH€1996€SESSION€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€›ÌSTATE€OF€TENNESSEE,à àà à*à àC.C.A.€#€02C01„9508„CC„00239€€Ìà àAppellee,à àà àà à*à àMcNAIRY€COUNTYÌVS.à àà àà àà àà à*à àHon.€Joe€H.€Walker,ÏJudgeÌÓÓGRAPEL€SIMPSON,à àà à*à à(Certified€Question€ofÏLaw)ÌÌà àAppellant.ÌÌÌÌÌÌòòFor€Appellantóó:à àà àà àà àòòFor€Appelleeóó:ÌÌLloyd€R.€Tatumà àà àà àà àCharles€W.€BursonÌAttorneyà àà àà àà àà àAttorney€General€andÏReporterÌ124€East€Main€StreetÌP.O.€Box€293à àà àà àà àWilliam€David€BridgersÌHenderson,€Tennessee€€38340€à àà àAssistant€AttorneyÏGeneralÌà àà àà àà àà àà àCriminal€JusticeÏDivisionÌà àà àà àà àà àà à450€James€RobertsonÏParkwayÌà àà àà àà àà àà àNashville,€TN€€37243„0493ÌÌà àà àà àà àà àà àElizabeth€T.€RiceÌà àà àà àà àà àà àDistrict€Attorney€GeneralÌÌà àà àà àà àà àà àEd€McDanielÌà àà àà àà àà àà àAsst.€District€Attorney€GeneralÌà àà àà àà àà àà àJustice€ComplexÌà àà àà àà àà àà àSelmer,€Tennessee€€38340ÌÌÌÌOPINION€FILED:__________________ÌÌÌÌAFFIRMEDÌÌÌÌGARY€R.€WADE,€JUDGEÇÓÓà@ àòòOPINIONóóÌà àà àThe€defendant,€Grapel€Simpson,€pled€guilty€to€possession€of€dilaudid,Ïa€Schedule€II€drug,€with€intent€to€deliver€and€sell.€€She€reserved€the€right€to€appealÏas€a€certified€question€of€law€the€denial€of€both€a€motion€to€dismiss,€based€upon€aÏdouble€jeopardy€claim,€and€a€motion€to€suppress€evidence.€€òòSeeóó€Tenn.€R.€Crim.€P.Ï11(e)€and€37(b)(2).€€The€trial€court€imposed€a€Range€I€sentence€of€five€(5)€years,€toÏbe€served€concurrently€with€any€other€sentences€for€drug„related€charges× ƒ6 ××  ×€pendingÏat€the€time€of€the€defendantððs€plea,€and€assessed€a€fine€of€$2,000.00.ÌÌà àà àIn€this€appeal€of€right,€the€defendant€presents€the€following€issues€forÏour€review:à8 àà8 àÌÓÓà8 àà8 à(1)€€whether€criminal€prosecution€was€barred€by€doubleÏjeopardy€principles€because€a€settlement€agreementÏhad€been€entered€pursuant€to€civil€forfeitureÏproceedings,€andÌÌà8 àà8 à(2)€€whether€the€trial€court€erred€by€denying€theÏdefendantððs€motion€to€suppress€evidence€seized€fromÏthe€defendantððs€person.ÌÌÌÌÓÓà àà àAt€approximately€3:30€p.m.€on€December€30,€1994,€Officer€RodneyÏWeaver€of€the€McNairy€County€Sheriffððs€Department€and€Drug€Task€Force€receivedÏa€call€from€a€confidential€informant€that€the€defendant€and€Jimmy€Brumley× ƒ7 ××  ×€wereÏtransporting€100€dilaudid€pills€from€Memphis€to€McNairy€County.€€Officer€WeaverÏtestified€that€the€informant€told€him€that€the€defendant€and€Brumley€were€travelingÏon€Highway€64€in€a€two„door,€cream„€or€beige„colored€Oldsmobile€and€that€theyÏwere€ð ðdue€[to€arrive€in€Selmer]€...€any€minute.ðð€€The€informant,€who€had€givenÏinformation€on€previous€occasions,€did€not€state€whether€the€defendant€or€BrumleyÏwas€driving€the€vehicle.ÌÌà àà àHe€did€not€explain€how€he€knew€that€the€defendant€was€transportingÏdrugs.€€Officer€Weaver€made€no€specific€inquiries€concerning€the€basis€of€theÏinformantððs€knowledge.ÌÌà àà àOfficer€Weaver,€McNairy€County€Sheriff€Paul€Ervin,€and€a€third€officerÏthen€drove€to€Highway€64,€where€they€saw€Brumley€and€the€defendant€in€theÏvehicle€described€by€the€informant.€€The€car€was€stopped€and€Officer€WeaverÏquestioned€the€defendant€and€Brumley€separately€about€where€they€had€been€andÍfor€what€purpose.€€Each€claimed€that€they€were€returning€from€Memphis€but€gaveÏconflicting€responses€as€to€the€reasons€for€their€trip.€€The€defendant€said€that€theyÏhad€taken€her€niece€back€to€Memphis;€Brumley€claimed€that€he€and€the€defendantÏhad€gone€to€Memphis€by€themselves.€€Officer€Weaver,€who€by€then€had€informedÏthe€defendant€that€he€had€information€that€she€was€transporting€dilaudid€pills,Ïsought€her€permission€to€search€the€car.€€The€defendant€reportedly€replied,€ð ðWell,Ïyou€can€look.€€You€can€search.€€I€donððt€have€anything.ðð€€Officer€Weaver€testified€thatÏBrumley,€the€driver€of€the€car,€also€consented.€€The€officers€searched€the€car,Ïincluding€the€trunk,€but€did€not€find€any€drugs.ÌÌà àà àAfter€the€car€search,€Officer€Weaver€asked€the€defendant€whether€sheÏhad€any€drugs€on€her€person.€€According€to€the€officer,€the€defendant€responded,Ïð ðNo.€€You€can€look€all€you€want.ðð€€Ruth€Travis,€a€female€dispatcher,€was€thenÏsummoned€to€the€scene€to€search€the€defendant.€€Officer€Weaver€claimed€that€theÏdefendant€was€free€to€leave€at€any€time€after€the€search€of€the€car,€even€while€theyÏwaited€for€Ms.€Travis€to€arrive.€€He€did€not,€however,€inform€the€defendant€that€sheÏcould€go.€€ÌÌà àà àMs.€Travis,€the€director€and€dispatcher€of€E„911,€testified€that€she€had€Ïpreviously€been€employed€by€the€Sheriffððs€Department€and€had€conducted€otherÍsearches.€€Upon€her€arrival,€she€escorted€the€defendant€to€an€area€behind€a€patrolÏcar€which€had€been€parked€on€the€opposite€side€of€the€highway.€€Before€theÏdefendant€was€searched,€her€coat€was€removed€and€placed€in€the€seat€of€the€patrolÏcar.€€Claiming€that€she€was€cold,€the€defendant€then€reached€for€her€coat.€€WhenÏMs.€Travis€informed€the€defendant€that€the€coat€would€also€have€to€be€searched,Ïthe€defendant€acknowledged€that€there€were€drugs€in€the€pocket€and€that€sheÏwould€pay€her€to€keep€quiet.€€There€were€one€hundred€(100)€dilaudid€pills€in€theÏdefendantððs€coat.€€€No€drugs€were€found€in€Brumley's€possession.€€€€€€€ÌÌà àà àAt€the€suppression€hearing,€the€defendant€testified€that€the€officers€didÏnot€ask€for€her€permission€and€that€she€did€not€volunteer€her€consent€to€a€search€ofÏeither€the€car€or€her€person.€€She€was€uncertain€as€to€whether€Brumley€had€givenÏpermission€to€the€car€search€and€denied€telling€Ms.€Travis€that€she€would€pay€herÏnot€to€tell€anyone€that€drugs€were€in€her€coat€pocket.€€The€defendant€claimed€thatÏshe€told€Ms.€Travis€that€drugs€were€in€her€pocket€in€order€to€avoid€having€to€takeÏher€clothes€off€while€standing€alongside€the€highway€on€a€cold€day€with€four€or€fiveÏmale€police€officers€on€the€other€side€of€the€road.€ÌÌà àà àAt€the€conclusion€of€the€suppression€hearing,€the€trial€court€madeÏseveral€findings:ÌÓÓà8 àà8 àà àLaw€enforcement€officers€received€a€telephoneÏcall€indicating€that€the€defendant€would€be€in€a€certainÏvehicle,€g[iving]€a€description€of€the€vehicle,€andÏ[providing]€that€the€defendant€would€be€illegallyÏtransporting€a€controlled€substance.€€The€telephone€callÏindicated€the€approximate€location€of€the€vehicle€comingÏback€from€Memphis€to€Selmer€on€Highway€64,€andÏ[gave]€a€good€description€of€the€vehicle.€€LawÏenforcement€went€to€Highway€64,€spotted€the€vehicleÏand€signaled€for€it€to€pull€off.ÌÌà8 àà8 àà àThe€officers€requested€that€the€defendant€step€outÏof€the€car,€and€[they]€called€a€female€officer,€Ms.€Travis,Ïto€come€to€the€scene€in€order€to€conduct€a€search€of€theÏ...€[defendant].ÌÌà8 àà8 àà àWhen€Ms.€Travis€arrived,€she€indicated€that€sheÏwas€to€search€[the€defendant],€and€they€went€across€theÏstreet€for€privacy€reasons.€€[The€defendant]€put€her€coatÏin€the€car,€and€Ms.€Travis€conducted€the€search€of€[theÏdefendantððs]€person.€€After€the€search,€[the€defendant]Ïrequested€her€coat,€and€Ms.€Travis€said€that€she€wouldÏhave€to€pat€the€coat€down€before€giving€it€to€her.€€[TheÏdefendant]€grabbed€for€her€coat,€and€said€that€thereÏwere€drugs€in€the€pocket,€but€she€would€give€Ms.€TravisÏmoney€if€she€would€not€tell€anyone.ÌÌà8 àà8 àà àMs.€Travis€seized€the€pills€from€the€[defendant's]Ïcoat.ÌÌÌ€ÌÓÓà àà àThe€trial€court€ruled€as€follows:ÌÓÓà8 àà8 à(1)€€that€sufficient€probable€cause€supported€the€initialÏstop€of€the€vehicle€in€which€the€defendant€was€aÏpassenger;ÌÌà8 àà8 à(2)€€that€exigent€circumstances€existed€for€an€immediateÏsearch€of€the€vehicle€and€of€the€defendant;ÌÌà8 àà8 à(3)€€that€the€defendant,€although€in€custody,€was€notÏsubject€to€interrogation€at€the€time€she€made€theÏstatement€that€she€would€pay€Ms.€Travis€if€she€would€notÏtell€anyone€that€drugs€were€in€her€coat;€and€ÌÌà8 àà8 à(4)€€that€the€statement€made€by€the€defendant€was€aÏcontemporaneous€statement.ÌÓÓÌà àà àCivil€forfeiture€proceedings€were€also€initiated€seeking€the€forfeiture€ofÏthe€1985€Oldsmobile€Cutlass€driven€by€Brumley€and€cash€in€the€amount€ofÏ$1717.00€which€was€in€the€defendantððs€possession€at€the€time€of€her€arrest.€€TheÏdefendant€testified€that€the€vehicle€driven€by€Brumley€was€owned€by€her€but€wasÏtitled€in€her€deceased€sonððs€name.€€The€defendant€entered€into€a€civil€settlementÏagreement€on€March€10,€1995,€forfeiting€both€the€car€and€the€cash.€€The€settlementÏagreement€was€entered€before€the€entry€of€the€guilty€plea€on€May€31,€1995.€€At€theÏsuppression€hearing,€the€defendant€stated€that€she€did€ð ðnot€reallyðð€think€that€theÏcriminal€proceeding€had€anything€to€do€with€the€civil€forfeiture€proceeding.€ÌÌà@ àIÌà àà àThe€defendantððs€initial€argument€is€that€settlement€of€the€civil€forfeitureÏproceeding€qualified€as€punishment€for€the€offense,€and€thus,€any€subsequentÍprosecution€was€precluded€by€double€jeopardy€principles.€€òòSeeóó€U.S.€Const.Ïamend.€V€("nor€shall€any€person€be€subject€to€the€same€offense€to€be€twice€put€inÏjeopardy€of€life€and€limb");€Tenn.€Const.€art.€I,€ðð€10€("that€no€person€shall,€for€theÏsame€offense,€be€twice€put€in€jeopardy€of€life€or€limb").€€The€defendant€reliesÏprimarily€on€òòUnited€States€v.€Halperóó,€490€U.S.€435€(1989),€and€òòAustin€v.€UnitedÏStatesóó,€œ509›€U.S.€œ602›€(1993).€ÌÌà àà àThe€double€jeopardy€clauses€of€the€United€States€and€TennesseeÏConstitution,€virtually€identical€in€content,€provide€protection€against€(1)€a€secondÏprosecution€for€the€same€offense€after€acquittal;€(2)€a€second€prosecution€for€theÏsame€offense€after€conviction;€and€(3)€multiple€punishments€for€the€same€offense.€ÏòòNorth€Carolina€v.€Pearceóó,€395€U.S.€711€(1969).ÌÌà àà àIn€òòState€v.€Conleyóó,€639€S.W.2d€435€(Tenn.€1982),€our€supreme€courtÏheld€that€prior€convictions€for€driving€under€the€influence€of€an€intoxicant€resultingÏin€the€suspension€of€a€license€did€not€preclude€a€subsequent€conviction€under€theÏMotor€Vehicle€Habitual€Offender's€Act€to€further€bar€the€defendant€from€driving.€ÏFrom€our€reading€of€the€case,€the€ruling€stands€for€the€proposition€that€if€the€stateÏaction€is€remedial€and€not€intended€to€inflict€punishment€as€a€means€of€vindicatingÏpublic€justice,€the€double€jeopardy€clause€serves€as€no€protection.€€òòSeeóó€òòState€v.ÍCoolidgeóó,€915€S.W.2d€820€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.€1995).€€ÌÌà àà àRecently,€the€United€States€Supreme€Court€considered€the€very€issueÏpresented€by€the€defendant€in€this€case.€€Holding€that€òòinóó€òòremóó€forfeitures€are€neitherÏ"punishment"€nor€criminal€for€double€jeopardy€consideration,€the€court€held€in€twoÏseparate€actions€that€the€forfeiture€of€property€as€a€result€of€a€civil€complaint€did€notÏbar€a€subsequent€criminal€prosecution.€€òòUnited€States€v.€Urseryóó€and€òòUnited€StatesÏv.€$405,089.23€in€United€States€Currencyóó,€òòetóó€òòalóó,€œ64€U.S.L.W.€4565€(U.S.€June›€24,Ï1996).€€The€ruling€was€based€in€great€measure€upon€the€rationale€of€òòVarious€ItemsÏof€Personal€Property€v.€United€Statesóó,€282€U.S.€577,€581€(1931):ÌÓÓà8 àà8 à[This]€forfeiture€proceeding€...€is€òòinóó€òòremóó.€€It€is€the€propertyÏwhich€is€proceeded€against,€and,€by€resort€to€a€legalÏfiction,€held€guilty€and€condemned€as€though€it€wereÏconscious€instead€of€inanimate€and€insentient.€€In€aÏcriminal€prosecution€it€is€the€wrongdoer€in€person€who€isÏforfeited€against,€convicted,€and€punished.€€TheÏforfeiture€is€no€part€of€the€punishment€for€the€criminalÏoffense.€€The€provision€of€the€Fifth€Amendment€to€theÏConstitution€in€respect€to€double€jeopardy€does€notÏapply.€€ÌÌÌÌÓÓà àà àSo€long€as€the€forfeiture€proceeding€is€civil€or€remedial€in€nature,€notÏintended€as€an€additional€punishment,€there€is€no€constitutional€protection.€€òòUnitedÏStates€v.€One€Assortment€of€89€Firearmsóó,€465€U.S.€354,€362€(1984).€€We€find€noÍdistinction€between€the€facts€in€this€case€and€the€ruling€in€òòUrseryóó.€€In€our€view,€ourÏstate€constitution€provides€no€greater€protection€than€that€afforded€by€the€doubleÏjeopardy€clause€in€the€United€States€Constitution.€€Thus,€the€forfeitures€here€did€notÏqualify€as€punishment€for€criminal€purposes;€there€is€no€bar€to€either€theÏprosecution€or€the€convictions.€€€€ÌÌà@ àIIÌà àà àNext,€the€defendant€argues€that€the€trial€court€erred€by€refusing€toÏgrant€the€motion€to€suppress.€€The€defendant€makes€two€claims:€€(1)€€the€officersÏlacked€probable€cause€or€reasonable€suspicion€to€stop€the€vehicle;€and€(2)€€theÏofficers€lacked€probable€cause€to€search€the€defendant.€€The€state€asserts€that€theÏevidence€does€not€preponderate€against€the€trial€court's€decision€that€probableÏcause€existed€for€the€initial€stop€of€the€vehicle€and€that€the€search€of€the€defendantÏwas€a€search€incident€to€a€lawful€arrest€or€under€exigent€circumstances.€€The€stateÏfurther€contends€that€even€if€probable€cause€did€not€exist€for€the€initial€stop,€thereÏwas€sufficient€reasonable€suspicion€to€support€an€investigatory€stop€and€theÏdefendant€voluntarily€consented€to€the€subsequent€search€of€the€car€and€of€theÏdefendant's€person.€€We€agree€that€there€was€a€valid€investigatory€stop.€€BecauseÏthe€defendant€consented€to€the€search€of€her€person,€the€illegal€drugs,€in€our€view,Ïwere€properly€admitted€into€evidence.€ÌÌà àà àBoth€the€state€and€federal€constitutions€protect€individuals€fromÏunreasonable€searches€and€seizures.€€An€automobile€stop€constitutes€a€"seizure"Ïwithin€the€meaning€of€both€the€Fourth€Amendment€of€the€United€States€ConstitutionÏand€Article€I,€Section€7€of€the€Tennessee€Constitution.€€òòSeeóó€òòMichigan€Dep't€of€StateÏPolice€v.€Sitzóó,€496€U.S.€444,€450€(1990);€òòDelaware€v.€Prouseóó,€440€U.S.€648,€653Ï(1979);€òòState€v.€Pulleyóó,€863€S.W.2d€29,€30€(Tenn.€1993);€òòState€v.€Binionóó,€900ÏS.W.2d€702,€705€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.€1994);€òòState€v.€Westbrooksóó,€594€S.W.2d€741,Ï743€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.€1979).€€The€fact€that€the€detention€may€be€brief€and€limited€inÏscope€does€not€alter€that€fact.€€òòDelaware€v.€Prouseóó,€440€U.S.€at€653;€òòState€v.€Pulleyóó,Ï863€S.W.2d€at€30;€òòState€v.€Binionóó,€900€S.W.2d€at€705;€òòState€v.€Westbrooksóó,€594ÏS.W.2d€at€743.€€The€basic€question,€as€indicated,€is€whether€the€seizure€wasÏ"reasonable."€€òòState€v.€Binionóó,€900€S.W.2d€at€705€(citing€òòMichigan€Dep't€of€StateÏPolice€v.€Sitzóó,€496€U.S.€444€(1990)).€€The€state€always€carries€the€burden€ofÏestablishing€the€reasonableness€of€any€detention.€€òòSeeóó€òòState€v.€Matthew€Manuelóó,ÏNo.€87„96„III€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.,€at€Nashville,€Nov.€23,€1988).€ÌÌà àà àOur€determination€of€the€reasonableness€of€the€stop€of€the€vehicleÏturns€on€whether€the€officers€had€either€probable€cause€or€an€"articulable€andÏreasonable€suspicion"€that€the€vehicle€or€its€occupants€were€subject€to€seizure€forÍviolation€of€the€law.€€òòSeeóó€òòDelaware€v.€Prouseóó,€440€U.S.€at€€663;€òòState€v.€Colemanóó,Ï791€S.W.2d€504,€505€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.€1989).€€Probable€cause€has€beenÏgenerally€defined€as€a€reasonable€ground€for€suspicion,€supported€byÏcircumstances€indicative€of€an€illegal€act.€€òòSeeóó€òòState€v.€Leaóó,€181€Tenn.€378,€380„81,€181€S.W.2d€351,€352€(1944).€€While€probable€cause€is€not€necessary€for€anÏinvestigative€stop,€it€is€a€requirement€that€the€officer's€suspicion€be€supported€byÏð ðspecific€and€articulable€facts€which,€taken€together€with€rational€inferences€fromÏthose€facts,€reasonably€warrant€that€intrusion.ðð€€òòTerry€v.€Ohioóó,€392€U.S.€1,€21€(1968);ÏòòState€v.€Pulleyóó,€863€S.W.2d€at€30;€òòState€v.€Colemanóó,€792€S.W.2d€at€505.€€Our€courtsÏhave€held€that€the€òòTerryóó€investigatory€stop€doctrine€also€applies€to€those€personsÏriding€in€a€vehicle.€€òòE.g.óó,€òòState€v.€Watkinsóó,€827€S.W.2d€293,€294€(Tenn.€1992).€€InÏdetermining€whether€reasonable€suspicion€exists,€an€important€factor€in€theÏanalysis€is€that:ÌÓÓà8 àà8 à[r]easonable€suspicion€is€a€less€demanding€standardÏthan€probable€cause€not€only€in€the€sense€thatÏreasonable€suspicion€can€be€established€withÏinformation€that€is€different€in€quantity€or€content€thanÏthat€required€to€establish€probable€cause,€but€also€in€theÏsense€that€reasonable€suspicion€can€arise€fromÏinformation€that€is€less€reliable€than€that€required€toÏshow€probable€cause.€€€€€ÌÌÓÓòòState€v.€Pulleyóó,€863€S.W.2d€at€32€(quoting€òòAlabama€v.€Whiteóó,€496€U.S.€325,€330Ï(1990)).ÌÌà àà àIn€òòState€v.€Jacuminóó,€778€S.W.2d€430,€436€(Tenn.€1989),€our€supremeÏcourt€adopted€the€two„prong€test€of€òòAguilar€v.€Texasóó,€378€U.S.€108€(1964),€andÏòòSpinelli€v.€United€Statesóó,€393€U.S.€410€(1960),€regarding€the€adequacy€ofÏinformation€necessary€to€support€the€issuance€of€a€search€warrant.€€In€òòAguilaróó,€theÏUnited€States€Supreme€Court€held€that€there€must€be€a€ð ðbasis€of€knowledgeðð€whenÏthe€officer€relies€on€hearsay€information€from€a€confidential€informant.€€The€secondÏpart€of€the€òòAguilar„Spinellióó€test,€the€ð ðveracity€prong,ðð€requires€a€showing€that€theÏinformant€is€credible€or€the€information€is€reliable.€€The€failure€to€establish€the€basisÏof€knowledge€or€veracity€of€the€confidential€informant,€however,€is€not€necessarilyÏfatal.€€In€òòJacuminóó,€our€supreme€court€held€as€follows:ÌÓÓà8 àà8 à[W]hile€independent€police€corroboration€could€make€upÏdeficiencies€in€either€prong,€each€prong€represents€anÏindependently€important€consideration€ð ðthat€must€beÏseparately€considered€and€satisfied€in€some€way.ððÌÌÓÓIn€òòColemanóó,€our€court€found€òòJacuminóó,€even€though€a€search€warrant€case,€to€beÏhelpful€in€analyzing€the€sufficiency€of€grounds€for€an€investigatory€stop.€€òòSeeóóòòalsoóóÏòòState€v.€Pulleyóó,€863€S.W.2d€at€32.€€ð ðWhen€a€stop€is€based€on€the€tip€of€an€informant,Ïhowever,€the€danger€of€false€reports,€through€police€fabrication€or€from€vindictive€orÏunreliable€informants,€becomes€a€concern.ðð€€òòState€v.€Pulleyóó,€863€S.W.2d€at€31.€ÏHere,€as€in€òòState€v.€Colemanóó,€the€stop€was€made,€not€upon€the€officerððsÍobservations,€but€solely€upon€the€information€supplied€by€a€confidential€informant.€ÏThe€tip€provided€by€the€confidential€informant€is€quite€similar€to€that€given€in€òòStateÏv.€Colemanóó:Ìà8 àà8 àÓÓ[T]hat€between€2:00€and€2:30€P.M.€on€August€10,€a€whiteÏfemale,€between€25€and€35€years€of€age€and€whose€firstÏname€was€Carla,€would€be€en€route€to€RobertsonÏCounty€from€Davidson€County€on€Highway€431€South.€ÏThe€informant€stated€that€she€wold€be€driving€an€olderÏmodel€black€Monte€Carlo,€would€have€in€her€possessionÏseveral€pounds€of€marijuana,€and€would€ultimately€driveÏto€a€location€on€Washington€Road.€€Ìà8 àà8 àÌÌÓÓ791€S.W.2d€at€504€(holding€that€an€investigatory€stop,€while€not€requiring€probableÏcause,€was€nonetheless€improper€because€the€officer€had€been€unable€toÏcorroborate€either€the€veracity€of€the€informant€or€the€basis€of€knowledge€for€his€tip).€ÏSimilar€to€the€informant€in€òòColemanóó,€the€confidential€informant€here€did€notÏexplicitly€state€the€basis€of€knowledge€for€the€information€given,€and€Officer€WeaverÏmade€no€inquiries.€€Also,€the€basis€of€the€informantððs€knowledge€was€notÏð ðimmediately€verifiable€at€the€scene.ðð€€òòSeeóó€òòAdams€v.€Williamsóó,€407€U.S.€143,€146Ï(1972);€òòseeóó€òòalso€State€v.€Colemanóó,€791€S.W.2d€at€507.€€ÌÌà àà àOn€the€other€hand,€in€determining€whether€an€officer€had€reasonableÏsuspicion€to€make€an€investigatory€stop,€a€court€should€also€consider€the€rationaleÍinferences€and€deductions€that€a€trained€officer€may€draw€from€the€facts€andÏcircumstances€known€to€him€or€her.€€òòSeeóó€òòTerry€v.€Ohioóó,€392€U.S.€at€21.€€Here,€theÏconfidential€informant,€a€convicted€felon,€was€known€to€Officer€Weaver.€€Here,ÏOfficer€Weaver€testified€that€he€had€personally€"interview[ed]"€the€informant€onÏother€occasions.€€Moreover,€he€knew€the€informant€"through€previous€contacts€as€aÏconfidential€informant."€€The€officer€did€not€specifically€testify€that€the€informationÏthe€informant€had€given€on€earlier€occasions€had€been€found€reliable€but€didÏindicate€his€belief€that€he€had€acquired€a€credible€tip.€€The€corroboration€of€severalÏfacts€supplied€by€the€informant,€such€as€the€description€of€the€car,€the€location€andÏdirection€of€travel,€and€the€time€of€arrival,€further€supports€the€informantððs€credibility.€ÏòòSeeóó€òòState€v.€Pulleyóó,€863€S.W.2d€at€32.€€These€facts,€we€think,€are€distinguishableÏfrom€those€in€òòColemanóó€where€an€anonymous€informant€called€the€police€andÏclaimed€that€a€vehicle€contained€illegal€drugs.€€While€we€doubt€that€the€state€hadÏestablished€probable€cause€to€arrest,€the€ð ðindicia€of€reliabilityðð€necessary€to€supportÏan€investigatory€stop€was€present.ÌÌà àà àOur€supreme€court€has€held€that€a€report€can€often€be€presumed€to€beÏfirst„hand€and€reliable€ð ð[w]hen€an€informant€reports€an€incident€at€or€near€the€timeÏof€its€occurrence€....ðð€€òòState€v.€Pulleyóó,€863€S.W.2d€at€32€(stating€that€timing€isÏimportant€in€determining€the€reliability€of€an€informant€because€timing€suggestsÍfirst„hand€knowledge).€€Here,€the€confidential€informant€told€Officer€Weaver€that€theÏcar€in€which€the€defendant€was€a€passenger€was€about€to€arrive€in€Selmer€ð ðanyÏminute;ðð€the€police€officers€drove€immediately€to€Highway€64,€finding€the€vehicleÏdescribed€occupied€by€the€defendant€and€her€companion€€and€thus€confirming€theÏcontent€of€the€tip.€€Officer€Weaver€testified€that€following€the€stop,€he€questioned€theÏdefendant€and€Brumley€as€to€their€whereabouts€ð ðto€try€to€figure€out€how€much€of€theÏinformation€[he]€had€was€going€to€be€true....ðð€€Thus,€he€made€a€legitimate€attempt€toÏcorroborate€the€accuracy€of€the€informantððs€tip.€€Different€answers€given€to€routineÏquestions€further€aroused€the€level€of€suspicion.€€While€not€a€strong€showing,€theseÏfacts€permit€an€inference€that€the€informant€had€some€basis€for€his€knowledge.€€ÌÌà àà àWhile€the€United€States€Supreme€Court€has€adopted€a€òòdeóó€òònovoóóÏreview€of€trial€courtððs€determination€of€reasonable€suspicion€and€probable€cause,ÏòòOrnelas€v.€United€Statesóó,€____€U.S.€____,€116€S.Ct.€1657,€1663€(1996),€case€lawÏin€Tennessee€provides€that€a€trial€courtððs€determination€is€conclusive€on€appealÏunless€the€evidence€preponderates€against€the€decision.€€òòState€v.€Longóó,€694ÏS.W.2d€337,€339€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.€1985).€€While€this€is€a€close€issue,€someÏdeference€must€be€given€the€trial€judge€who€heard€and€observed€the€witnessesÏfirsthand,€even€though€he€erroneously€concluded€that€the€information€availableÏrose€to€the€level€of€probable€cause.€€Our€supreme€court€stated€that€theÍð ðreasonableness€of€seizures€less€intrusive€than€a€full„scale€arrest€is€judged€byÏweighing€the€gravity€of€public€concern,€the€degree€to€which€the€seizure€advancesÏthat€concern,€and€the€severity€of€the€intrusion€into€individual€privacy.ðð€€òòState€v.ÏPulleyóó,€863€S.W.2d€at€34.€€Here,€the€content€of€the€tip,€the€corroborativeÏobservations€of€the€officers,€and€the€public€concern€for€the€illegal€possession€andÏdistribution€of€a€Schedule€II€drug€establish€the€reasonableness€of€the€investigatoryÏstop.€ÌÌà àà àThat€conclusion€does€not,€however,€end€our€inquiry.€€When€anÏinvestigatory€stop€of€a€motor€vehicle€is€based€on€ð ðreasonable€suspicion,€supportedÏby€specific€and€articulable€facts,€that€a€criminal€offense€has€been€or€is€about€to€beÏcommitted,ðð€òòState€v.€Watkinsóó,€827€S.W.2d€294,€an€officer€may€detain€the€occupantsÏfor€questioning.€€òòSeeóó€òòTerry€v.€Ohioóó,€392€U.S.€at€30.€€Here,€the€defendant€andÏBrumley€gave€conflicting€stories€about€the€reason€for€their€trip€to€Memphis.€€WhileÏnot€elevating€the€degree€of€suspicion€to€probable€cause,€this€contradiction€elevatedÏthe€degree€of€suspicion.€€Officer€Weaver€testified€€that€he€requested€and€obtainedÏconsent€to€search€the€car.€€While€the€defendantððs€claimed€otherwise,€the€trial€courtÏimplicitly€held€for€the€state€by€refusing€to€suppress€the€evidence€ultimatelyÍobtained.× ƒ8 ××  ×€€On€appeal,€our€scope€of€review€is€limited.€€The€trial€judge's€findings€ofÏfact€on€a€motion€to€suppress€are€generally€binding.€€òòState€v.€Odomóó,€___€S.W.2dÏ___,€slip€op.€at€10€(Tenn.€1996);€òòState€v.€Tateóó,€615€S.W.2d€161,€162€(Tenn.€Crim.ÏApp.€1981).€€While€there€was€contested€evidence€on€the€issue€of€consent,€the€trialÏcourt's€ruling€tends€to€support€the€validity€of€the€car€search.€€In€our€view,€the€greaterÏweight€of€the€evidence€suggests€consent,€even€though€the€officers€ultimately€foundÏno€contraband€in€the€vehicle.€€ÌÌà àà àThe€state€asserts€that€the€defendant€consented€to€the€search€of€herÏperson€after€the€stop.€€The€validity€of€the€search€depends€on€whether,€based€on€theÏtotality€of€the€circumstances,€the€consent€was€ð ðvoluntarily€given€and€not€the€result€ofÏduress€or€coercion.ðð€€òòSchneckloth€v.€Bustamonteóó,€412€U.S.€218,€248€(1973);€òòLimingÏv.€Stateóó,€220€Tenn.€371,€375,€417€S.W.2d€769,€770€(1967).€€A€determinative€factorÏis€whether€the€consent€is€an€ð ðact€of€necessity€rather€than€of€volition.ðð€€òòFox€v.€Stateóó,Ï214€Tenn.€694,€702,€383€S.W.2d€25,€28€(1964),€òòcertóó.€òòdeniedóó,€380€U.S.€933€(1965).€ÏThe€trial€court€accredited€Officer€Weaver's€testimony€that€the€defendant€gave€himÍpermission€to€ð ðlook€all€[he]€want[ed].ðð€€As€indicated,€our€scope€of€review€on€appeal,Ïhowever,€is€limited.€€Here,€the€trial€court€made€no€specific€findings€concerningÏwhether€the€defendant€consented€to€the€search€of€her€person.€€The€implication€ofÏthe€ruling€denying€suppression,€of€course,€is€that€the€defendant€did€consent€to€theÏsearch€of€her€person.€€In€the€words€of€Officer€Weaver,€the€defendant€"openly"Ïconsented.€€The€search€of€her€person€was€within€five€minutes€of€the€stop.€€All€of€thisÏsupports€the€conclusion€that€the€defendant€consented€to€the€search.€€€€ÌÌÓÓà àà àà àà àà àà à________________________________Ìà àà àà àà àà àà àGary€R.€Wade,€Judge€ÇCONCUR:ÌÌÌÌ_____________________________ÌJoe€B.€Jones,€Presiding€JudgeÌÌÌÌ_____________________________ÌWilliam€M.€Barker,€Judge€