ÿWPCd ¤x—dob0F½ŸáÔ8¬¶Dx)jN¬’Äb•«È·„5m_…K¡PF2‡\&£Ü ƒ‘^†Iê=A‚KÑkU+^(´+ò}c£>œ?²"ˆÉ‘ÞñÍðHÈ@`6%ýHs}%ìüùÏÆ–_? µ¨ù†>ª+¾2Xeô•#ÌÍ–ÍÚq^,s’7µœ¸‚Ž×X›hÏ¿lÊÑv]˜È®ò¸1g9@÷ddZp UÜ1N!R\±B›KÖ4]^¨CGek»ZqÀoqÆ“ÁsüLø¸*ÅŸ¦3S‘”r Uè”=i «S/ø›UK›GáãŽ<ª;¨q[eT¨‚îÜ.À¨)Q@ß4±qm7Mìê ¹­´ UA®Øó•¸8o²‡Db8á%VZàã2ùø©×þl‘,R…ý7“A€4[õ-œ(ù¨’‘§š¡"+1÷2z4+>‹@@qVžæ*yiºcJzâ6†:àü%Ȧ$ɤh¡JQ…# F UNQ %Ÿ 0(¥ U:Í b w@ 4O c 0Ær 0D8 æ| ¦b RU:h¦¢U:H‚U:U:ÊåéU:ñññññññ B+++++++++++ D3HHH 0D{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{{ AO¿Æ 0DÔ D/ BG˜HP LaserJet 4SiHPPCL5MS,ü,,,,,ü0nLhÎ(ÖÃ9 Z ‹6Times New Roman RegularX($¡¡,“í|AZ‹"Arial Regular- ù- 9E:;D<U=>?@DAÓ€KuM%3|xP(v(2;$¤¤Ý ƒ!ÝÝ  ÝÒ°ÒÒX°ÒÔ€X€XXXÔÔ€ôwÔôXX€Ôà ` àòòÚ  Ú0Ú  Úóó(#Ã$òòÚ  Ú0Ú  Úóó ÜÔ€X€XXXÔÔ€í! XX€ÔÓ  Óò òÔ Ad ÔFILEDÔ€X€X í!ÔÐ  ÐÌAugust€3,€1999ÌÌCecil€W.€CrowsonÌAppellate€Court€ClerkÔdAMÔó ó œÝ ƒ ëÿ$ÝÒ°ÒÒX°ÒÔ€Xx¹XXXÔÔ€ôç‹ôXXx¹Ôà ` àòòÚ  Ú1Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý€All€judges€from€the€Eighteenth€Judicial€District€recused€themselves€from€the€matter.€€TheÐ `  ÐHonorable€Seth€Norman,€Criminal€Court€Judge,€Division€Four,€for€the€Twentieth€Judicial€District€wasÏappointed€to€hear€the€matter€by€interchange. Ý ƒ ëÿ$ÝÒ°ÒÒX°ÒÔ€Xx¹XXXÔÔ€ôç‹ôXXx¹Ôà ` àòòÚ  Ú2Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý€This€Court€does€not€find€that€such€allegations€were€established€in€this€record.€€The€onlyÐ `  Ðð ðevidenceðð€that€this€prosecution€was€politically€motivated€consists€of€a€letter€submitted€by€defense€counselÏalleging€various€instances€of€unprosecuted€fraudulent€conduct€committed€by€other€individuals€within€theÏEighteenth€Judicial€District. HÝ ƒ ëÿ$ÝÒ°ÒÒX°ÒÔ€Xx¹XXXÔÔ€ôç‹ôXXx¹Ôà ` àòòÚ  Ú3Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý€Because€this€Court€must€reverse€the€trial€courtððs€decision,€the€issue€regarding€the€propriety€of€aÐ `  Ðretroactive€diversionary€period€is€pretermitted.,c½¬AZ‹"Arial Regular œÝ ƒ „`$ÝÒ°ÒÒX°ÒÔ€X“ XXXÔÔ€ôGÔ ô XX“Ôà ` àòòÚ  Ú1Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý€All€judges€from€the€Eighteenth€Judicial€District€recused€themselves€from€the€matter.€€TheÐ `  ÐHonorable€Seth€Norman,€Criminal€Court€Judge,€Division€Four,€for€the€Twentieth€Judicial€District€wasÏappointed€to€hear€the€matter€by€interchange.,c½¬AZ‹"Arial Regular Ý ƒ „`$ÝÒ°ÒÒX°ÒÔ€X“ XXXÔÔ€ôGÔ ô XX“Ôà ` àòòÚ  Ú2Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý€This€Court€does€not€find€that€such€allegations€were€established€in€this€record.€€The€onlyÐ `  Ðð ðevidenceðð€that€this€prosecution€was€politically€motivated€consists€of€a€letter€submitted€by€defense€counselÏalleging€various€instances€of€unprosecuted€fraudulent€conduct€committed€by€other€individuals€within€theÏEighteenth€Judicial€District.,c½¬AZ‹"Arial Regular,c½¬AZ‹"Arial Regular ÛÔ€X€XXXÔÔ€í! XX€ÔÓ  Óò òÔ Ad ÔFILEDÔ€X€X í!ÔÐ  ÐÌJuly€30,€1999ÌÌCecil€W.€CrowsonÌAppellate€Court€ClerkÔdAMÔó ó,c½¬AZ‹"Arial Regular d'ÿÿdxd(3¯$££Ý ƒ!ÝÝ  Ý€-‚ƒCþÿ<< CÿÿƒLevel 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5($$””ò òÚ  Ú1Ú  Úó ó„„'÷ÿ dxdüÿP PdÝ ƒ!ÝÝ  ÝñAñ›ñAñÑ` °ÑÒ°ÒÒ„°ÒÔ€Š’‡ŠXXÔÔ€ŠsPŠŠŠ’‡ÔÑTR[  AØ'ÿ Legal3Ø' AØ'ÿ Legalÿ3Ø'TÑÑ€ÑÑ7€&%XXdìdÈ7ÑÑ  ÑÑ  ÑÓ  Óò òñKññAñßr€ *<,(j 8` `€€@Eôf ` 8ttxP,` ð  rßñAññKññKñßr€*<,(j 8` `€€@Eôf ` 8ttxP,` ð  rßñKññAñ›ñAñIN€THE€COURT€OF€CRIMINAL€APPEALS€OF€TENNESSEEÌÌAT€NASHVILLEÌÌMAY€SESSION,€1999ÌÌÌÓ  ÓSTATE€OF€TENNESSEE,à À à)à  àC.C.A.€NO.€01C01„9804„CR„00159Ð ` Ðà ` àà ¸ àà  àà h àà À àó ó)Ð ` Ðà ` àAppellant,à  àà h àà À àò ò)Ð Xø  Ðà ` àà ¸ àà  àà h àà À à)Ìà ` àà ¸ àà  àà h àà À à)à  àDAVIDSON€COUNTYÐ Xø  ÐVS.à ` àà ¸ àà  àà h àà À à)à  àÐ Xø  Ðà ` àà ¸ àà  àà h àà À à)à  àHON.€SETH€NORMANó óÐ Xø  Ðò òJOSEPHINE€SKIDMORE,ó óà À àò ò)à  àJUDGEó óÐ Xø  Ðà ` àà ¸ àà  àà h àà À àò ò)ó óÐ Xø Ðà ` àAppellee.à  àà h àà À àò ò)à  à(Pretrial€Diversion)Ð Xø Ðó óÌÌÓ  ÓÌÌòòÓ  ÓFOR€THE€APPELLANTóó:à h àà À àà  àòòFOR€THE€APPELLEEóó:Ð 8Ø ÐÌJOHN€KNOX€WALKUPà h àà À àà  àCHARLES€R.€RAYÐ ( È ÐAttorney€General€and€Reporterà  àJEFFERY€S.€FRENSLEYÐ  !À Ðà ` àà ¸ àà  àà h àà À àà  à211€Third€Avenue€NorthÌDARYL€J.€BRANDà h àà À àà  àP.€O.€Box€198288Ð #° ÐAssociate€Solicitor€Generalà À àà  àNashville,€TN€€37219„8288Ð $¨ Ð425€Fifth€Avenue€NorthÌNashville,€TN€€37243ÌÌVICTOR€S.€JOHNSONÌDistrict€Attorney€GeneralÌÌKATRIN€MILLERÌAssistant€District€AttorneyÌ222€Second€Avenue€NorthÌNashville,€TN€€37201„1649ÌÌÌÌOPINION€FILED€________________________ÌÌœREVERSEDñ>ñ€AND€REMANDEDñ>ñ›ÌÌJERRY€L.€SMITH,€JUDGEÐ  x5,-§ ÐÓ  ÓÔ€°JD°ŠŠsPÔò òòòÔ‡„¶ „°°JDÔOPINIONÔ#†°JD° „„¶ˆ #Ôóóó óÔ€ŠsPа°JDÔÐ `  ÐÌÓ  ÓÓÓÑ7€&%XXdìXXdì7ÑÌà ` àThe€appellee,€Josephine€Skidmore,€was€indicted€by€the€Sumner€CountyÏgrand€jury€with€one€(1)€count€of€forgery€and€one€(1)€count€of€making,€presentingÏor€using€a€false€document€with€the€intent€that€it€be€taken€as€a€genuineÏgovernmental€record.€€She€applied€for€pretrial€diversion,€which€was€denied€by€theÏdistrict€attorney.€€Skidmore€subsequently€filed€a€petition€for€writ€of€certiorari€withÏthe€trial€court€to€review€the€district€attorneyððs€denial€of€pretrial€diversion.€€The€trialÏcourt€found€that€the€assistant€district€attorney€abused€her€discretion€and€placedÏthe€appellee€on€pretrial€diversion€for€a€period€of€one€(1)€year,€which€would€runÏretroactively€from€the€date€of€the€indictment.€€The€state€appeals,€claiming€that€theÏtrial€court€erred€in€(1)€reversing€the€district€attorneyððs€decision€to€deny€pretrialÏdiversion,€and€(2)€ordering€a€retroactive€diversionary€period.€€After€a€thoroughÏreview€of€the€record€before€this€Court,€we€conclude€that€the€trial€court€erred€inÏfinding€that€the€district€attorney€abused€her€discretion€and,€accordingly,€reverseÏthe€judgment€of€the€trial€court.ÌÌà@rr-®àò òI.ó óˆÐ ¼*\!" ÐÌà ` àThe€appellee€is€an€alderman€for€the€City€of€Hendersonville,€as€well€as€aÏSumner€County€commissioner.€€In€June€1996,€Karen€Martin€obtained€a€petitionÏfrom€the€appellee€in€support€of€Ray€Rollins€to€be€appointed€to€a€vacant€seat€onÏthe€county€commission.€€Skidmore€prepared€the€petition€by€photocopying€sevenÏ(7)€pages€from€an€earlier€petition€which€opposed€a€zoning€change.€€She€thenÏchanged€the€heading€of€the€petition€to€support€Rollins€as€county€commissioner.€Ð \8ü.0 ÐInitials€were€added€in€the€margins€alongside€several€names,€according€toÏSkidmore,€to€indicate€those€individuals€who€assented€to€use€their€names€inÏsupport€of€Rollinsðð€nomination.€€Martin€presented€this€petition€to€the€countyÏcommission€on€June€17.Ìà ` àSubsequently,€District€Attorney€General€Lawrence€Ray€Whitley€requestedÏthat€the€Tennessee€Bureau€of€Investigation€conduct€an€investigation€into€theÏmatter.€€TBI€Agent€Richard€Stout€contacted€many€of€the€individuals€listed€on€theÏRollins€petition€to€verify€whether€these€individuals€agreed€to€support€Rollins€in€theÏpetition.€€Nearly€all€of€the€individuals€contacted€denied€signing€or€initialing€theÏRollins€petition€and€could€not€recall€being€contacted€in€regards€to€the€RollinsÏpetition.€Ìà ` àGeneral€Whitley€recused€himself€and€his€office€from€the€matter,€and€VictorÏS.€Johnson,€III€was€appointed€as€special€prosecutor€in€this€case.€€The€SumnerÏCounty€grand€jury€indicted€the€appellee€with€one€(1)€count€of€forgery€and€one€(1)Ïcount€of€making,€presenting,€or€using€a€false€document€with€the€intent€that€it€beÏtaken€as€a€genuine€governmental€record.€€The€appellee€subsequently€applied€forÏpretrial€diversion.Ìà ` àAt€the€time€of€her€application,€the€appellee€was€sixty„seven€(67)€years€oldÏwith€no€prior€criminal€record.€€She€is€a€widow€and€has€two€(2)€living€children.€€SheÏworked€in€her€daughterððs€law€office€and€has€held€positions€as€an€alderman€for€theÏcity€of€Hendersonville€and€a€Sumner€County€commissioner.€€In€support€of€herÏapplication,€the€appellee€submitted€approximately€fifty€(50)€letters€from€neighbors,Ïcolleagues€and€friends€attesting€to€her€good€moral€character€and€activeÏcommunity€involvement.Ìà ` àThe€appellee€also€intimated€that€her€prosecution€was€initiated€as€part€of€aÏð ðpolitical€vendettaðð€against€her.€€In€support€of€this€position,€defense€counselÐ Ð9p02 Ðsubsequently€submitted€a€letter€which€detailed€other€instances€of€falsification€ofÏgovernmental€documents€which€were€not€prosecuted€by€the€District€AttorneyððsÏOffice€for€the€Eighteenth€Judicial€District.€Ìà ` àIn€her€letter€denying€pretrial€diversion,€Assistant€District€Attorney€KatrinÏNovak€Miller€recognized€the€factors€favorable€to€the€appellee,€including€her€lackÏof€a€criminal€record.€€Miller€stated,€ð ðMs.€Skidmore€appears€to€be€an€emotionallyÏstable€and€responsible€individual.€€She€has€no€history€of€substance€abuse.€€SheÏis€a€responsible€and€respected€member€of€her€community.€€The€likelihood€of€herÏever€becoming€involved€in€a€criminal€matter€again€seems€unlikely.ðð€Ìà ` àHowever,€General€Miller€denied€diversion€based€upon:€(1)€theÏcircumstances€of€the€offense;€(2)€the€deterrent€effect€of€punishment€on€otherÏcriminal€activity;€and€(3)€the€likelihood€that€pretrial€diversion€will€serve€the€bestÏinterests€of€the€public€and€the€appellee.€€Miller€determined€that€the€reasons€forÏdenying€diversion€ð ðfar€outweigh[ed]ðð€the€relevant€factors€in€the€appelleeððs€favor.€ÏSpecifically,€she€stated:ÌÓÓà8 ` àThis€office€finds€that€her€actions€in€altering€and€causing€a€fraudulentÏdocument€to€be€submitted€to€a€public€office€undermines€the€publicÏconfidence€in€the€governmental€process.€€Petitions€supportingÏwhatever€view€submitted€to€whatever€body€are€the€public€speakingÏin€its€purest€form€next€to€the€actual€live€voice.€€If€the€integrity€of€aÏpublic€petition€is€not€maintained,€what€assurance€do€any€citizensÏhave€in€the€future€of€knowing€if€a€signature€they€willingly€give€toÏsupport€one€cause€wonððt€be€used€to€espouse€another€cause?€€WhatÏMs.€Skidmore€did€was€to€manufacture€a€petition€which€falselyÏindicated€a€public€position.€€Because€she€is€an€elected€official,€sheÏis€in€a€position€of€leadership€and€trust.€€As€she€is€an€example€ofÏgood€works€in€her€community,€she€must€also€be€an€example€of€theÏconsequences€of€misconduct.€€In€reviewing€cases€of€pre„trialÏdiversion€denial,€the€appellate€courts€have€repeatedly€held€that€theÏdeterrent€effect€of€punishment€upon€other€criminal€activity€is€a€factorÏwhich€the€district€attorney€should€consider,€.€.€.€€Cases€in€which€fraudÏis€involved,€including€forgery€cases,€seem€to€compose€such€aÏcategory€of€offense€which€by€their€very€nature,€need€no€extrinsicÏproof€to€establish€the€deterrent€value€of€punishment.Ð ` ü!` ü! Ðâ âÐ Ø8x/1 ÐÓÓMiller€noted€that€even€though€the€appellee€admitted€altering€the€petition,€ð ðshe€didÏâ ânot€seem€to€appreciate€the€wrongfulness€of€her€actions.ðð€€In€addition,€MillerÏrejected€the€appelleeððs€allegations€that€the€prosecution€was€politically€motivatedÏin€light€of€the€fact€that€the€Davidson€County€District€Attorneyððs€Office,€rather€thanÏthe€local€district€attorney,€decided€to€submit€the€matter€to€the€grand€jury.€€Ìà ` àThe€appellee€filed€a€petition€for€writ€of€certiorari€to€the€trial€courtñ5ñ׃ ×ñ5ññ5ñ׃×ñ5ñÝ ƒ #ÃÝòòÚ  Ú1Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý×  ×€to€reviewÐ °  Ðthe€district€attorneyððs€denial€of€pretrial€diversion.€€At€the€hearing,€Assistant€DistrictÏAttorney€Miller€testified€as€to€her€reasons€for€denying€diversion.€€When€defenseÏcounsel€intimated€that€ADA€Miller€was€influenced€by€the€Mayor€of€HendersonvilleÏin€her€decision€to€deny€diversion,€the€trial€court€interjected,€ð ðI€will€tell€you,€theÏCourt€knows€General€Miller€[well]€enough€to€know€that€nobody€is€going€toÏinfluence€her€decision.€€I€full€well€understand€General€Miller.€€Both€as€judge€andÏas€a€former€trial€lawyer,€I€know€how€General€Miler€is€about€her€opinion€inÏmatters.ðð€Ìà ` àThe€trial€court€took€the€matter€under€advisement,€but€subsequentlyÏreleased€an€opinion€expressing€its€concern€that€the€prosecution€was€politicallyÏmotivated.€€The€trial€court€further€stated€that€it€was€ð ðaware€of€the€requirementsððÏof€òòState€v.€Hammersleyóó,€650€S.W.2d€352€(Tenn.€1983),€ð ðhowever€the€Court€isÐ P*ð " Ðconcerned€that€a€criminal€prosecution€might€have€been€motivated€by€localÏpolitics.€€This€the€Court€cannot€allow.€€This€Court€believes€that€this€is€anÏappropriate€case€for€diversion.ðð€In€a€subsequent€order,€the€trial€court€found€thatÏthe€prosecutor€had€abused€her€discretion€in€denying€diversion€and,€therefore,Ïruled€that€the€appellee€be€placed€on€diversion€for€a€period€of€one€(1)€year.€€TheÏtrial€court€further€determined€that€ð ð[d]ue€to€[the€appellantððs]€cooperation€with€lawÐ ð5,. Ðenforcement€and€her€conduct€during€the€pendency€of€this€matter,€.€.€.€theÏdiversionary€period€shall€be€retroactive€to€the€filing€of€the€indictment,ððÏapproximately€one€(1)€year€prior€to€the€filing€of€the€order.€€Therefore,€the€trialÏcourt€ordered€that€the€prosecution€against€the€appellee€be€dismissed,€contingentÏupon€her€payment€of€court€costs.€Ìà ` àFrom€the€trial€courtððs€order,€the€State€of€Tennessee€brings€this€appeal.ÌÌà@TT-®àò òII.ó óˆÐ ð  ÐÌà ` àThe€Pretrial€Diversion€Act€provides€a€means€of€avoiding€the€consequencesÏof€a€public€prosecution€for€those€who€have€the€potential€to€be€rehabilitated€andÏavoid€future€criminal€charges.€€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€40-15-105.€€Pretrial€diversionÏis€extraordinary€relief€for€which€the€defendant€bears€the€burden€of€proof.€€òòStateÐ ° P Ðv.€Baxteróó,€868€S.W.2d€679,€681€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.€1993).Ð  "@ Ðà ` àThe€decision€to€grant€pretrial€diversion€rests€within€the€discretion€of€theÏdistrict€attorney.€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€40-15-105(b)(3);€òòseeóó€òòState€v.€Curryóó,€988Ð €&  ÐS.W.2d€153,€157€(Tenn.€1999).€€In€exercising€that€discretion,€the€TennesseeÏSupreme€Court€has€offered€this€guidance:€ÌÓÓà8 ` àà ¸ àWhen€deciding€whether€to€enter€into€a€memorandum€ofÏunderstanding€under€the€pretrial€diversion€statute€a€prosecutorÏshould€focus€on€the€defendantððs€amenability€to€correction.€€AnyÏfactors€which€tend€to€accurately€reflect€whether€a€particularÏdefendant€will€or€will€not€become€a€repeat€offender€should€beÏconsidered.€.€.€.€€Among€the€factors€to€be€considered€in€addition€toÏthe€circumstances€of€the€offense€are€the€defendantððs€criminalÏrecord,€social€history,€the€physical€and€mental€condition€of€aÏdefendant€where€appropriate,€and€the€likelihood€that€pretrialÏdiversion€will€serve€the€ends€of€justice€and€the€best€interest€of€bothÏthe€public€and€the€defendant.Ð ` ü!` ü! ÐÌÓÓòòState€v.€Hammersleyóó,€650€S.W.2d€352,€355€(Tenn.€1983).€€However,€ð ðthe€focusÐ ð7.0 Ðon€amenability€to€correction€is€not€an€exclusive€one.ðð€€òòState€v.€Carróó,€861€S.W.2dÐ à9€02 Ð850,€855€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.€1993).€€Deterrence€of€the€defendant€and€others€isÏalso€a€proper€factor€to€consider.€€òòHammersleyóó,€650€S.W.2d€at€354.€€In€fact,€theÐ P ð Ðcircumstances€of€the€crime€and€the€need€for€deterrence€may€outweigh€otherÏapplicable€factors€and€justify€the€denial€of€pretrial€diversion.€€òòState€v.€Lutryóó,€938Ð 0Ð ÐS.W.2d€431,€434€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.€1996).Ìà ` àWhen€deciding€whether€to€grant€pretrial€diversion,€the€district€attorneyÏshould€consider€the€following€factors:€(1)€the€circumstances€of€the€offense;€(2)€theÏdefendantððs€criminal€record,€social€history,€and€present€condition,€includingÏmental€and€physical€conditions€if€appropriate;€(3)€the€deterrent€effect€ofÏpunishment€on€other€criminal€activity;€(4)€the€defendantððs€amenability€toÏcorrection;€and€(5)€the€likelihood€that€pretrial€diversion€will€serve€the€ends€ofÏjustice€and€the€best€interests€of€both€the€public€and€the€defendant.€€òòState€v.Ð °P ÐWashingtonóó,€866€S.W.2d€950,€951€(Tenn.€1993).Ð   @ Ðà ` àWhen€denying€an€application€for€pretrial€diversion,€the€District€AttorneyÏmust€clearly€articulate€the€specific€reasons€for€denial€in€the€record€in€order€toÏprovide€for€meaningful€appellate€review.€€òòState€v.€Hammersleyóó,€650€S.W.2d€atÐ p& Ð355.€€As€stated€by€the€Tennessee€Supreme€Court,€the€requirement€that€theÏdistrict€attorney€consider€all€relevant€factors:ÌÓÓà8 ` àentails€more€than€an€abstract€statement€in€the€record€that€the€districtÏattorney€general€has€considered€these€factors.€€He€must€articulateÏwhy€he€believes€a€defendant€in€a€particular€case€does€not€meet€theÏtest.€€If€the€attorney€general€bases€his€decision€on€less€than€the€fullÏcomplement€of€factors€enumerated€in€this€opinion€he€must,€for€theÏrecord,€state€why€he€considers€that€those€he€relies€on€outweigh€theÏother€submitted€for€his€consideration.Ð ` ü!` ü! ÐÌÓÓòòState€v.€Herronóó,€767€S.W.2d€151,€156€(Tenn.€1989).€€The€failure€of€the€record€toÐ 4 *, Ðreflect€that€the€District€Attorney€considered€all€of€the€applicable€factors€wouldÏallow€a€reviewing€court€to€find€an€abuse€of€discretion.€€òòSeeóó€òòState€v.€Carróó,€861Ð à7€.0 ÐS.W.2d€at€858.Ð Ð9p02 Ðà ` àThe€district€attorneyððs€decision€to€grant€or€deny€pretrial€diversion€isÏpresumptively€correct€and€shall€be€reversed€only€when€the€appellant€establishesÏthat€there€has€been€an€abuse€of€prosecutorial€discretion.€€òòState€v.€Curryóó,€988Ð @ à ÐS.W.2d€at€158.€€In€order€to€establish€such€an€abuse€of€discretion,€the€record€mustÏshow€an€absence€of€any€substantial€evidence€to€support€the€district€attorneyððsÏrefusal€to€grant€pretrial€diversion.€€òòId.óó€€Therefore,€in€a€close€case€where€theÐ °  ÐDistrict€Attorney€could€have€legitimately€granted€or€denied€the€application,€theÏtrial€judge€must€defer€to€the€judgment€of€the€District€Attorney.€€òòState€v.€Carróó,€861Ð ð  ÐS.W.2d€at€856.Ìà ` àOn€appellate€review€of€the€judgment€of€the€trial€court€in€diversion€cases€theÏtrial€courtððs€findings€of€fact€are€binding€on€an€appellate€court€unless€the€evidenceÏpreponderates€against€those€findings.€€òòState€v.€Lutryóó,€938€S.W.2d€at€434.€Ð °P ÐTherefore,€we€review€to€determine€whether€the€trial€courtððs€decision€is€supportedÏby€a€preponderance€of€the€evidence.€€òòState€v.€Curryóó,€988€S.W.2d€at€158;€òòStateÐ "0 Ðv.€Pinkhamóó,€955€S.W.2d€956,€960€(Tenn.€1997).€€When€reviewing€a€denial€ofÐ €$  Ðpretrial€diversion,€this€Court€may€not€substitute€its€judgment€for€that€of€the€districtÏattorneyððs€even€if€we€would€have€preferred€a€different€result.€€òòState€v.€Houstonóó,Ð `(  Ð900€S.W.2d€712,€714€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.€1995).ÌÌà@66,®àò òIII.ó óˆÐ 0.Ð$& ÐÌà ` àIn€her€letter€denying€diversion,€the€assistant€district€attorney€recognizedÏthat€the€appellee€was€ð ðan€emotionally€stable€and€responsible€individual.€€She€hasÏno€history€of€substance€abuse.€€She€is€a€responsible€and€respected€member€ofÏher€community.€€The€likelihood€of€her€ever€becoming€involved€in€a€criminal€matterÏagain€seems€unlikely.ðð€€However,€the€assistant€district€attorney€determined€thatÐ à9€02 Ðpretrial€diversion€should€be€denied€based€upon€(1)€the€circumstances€of€theÏoffense,€(2)€the€deterrent€effect€of€punishment€on€other€criminal€activity,€and€(3)Ïthe€likelihood€that€pretrial€diversion€will€serve€the€best€interests€of€the€public€andÏthe€appellee.€€Miller€determined€that€the€reasons€for€denying€diversion€ð ðfarÏoutweigh[ed]ðð€the€relevant€factors€in€the€appelleeððs€favor.€€She€expressed€concernÏover€the€fact€that€the€appellee€is€a€public€official,€and€her€actions€served€toÏð ðundermine[]€the€public€confidence€in€the€governmental€process.ðð€€€Further,€theÏassistant€district€attorney€found€that€because€this€case€involved€fraud,€theÏdeterrent€effect€of€punishment€upon€other€criminal€activity€was€a€significant€factorÏweighing€against€pretrial€diversion.€€Moreover,€she€observed€that€even€though€theÏappellee€admitted€altering€the€petition,€ð ðshe€did€not€seem€to€appreciate€theÏwrongfulness€of€her€actions.ððÌà ` àIn€its€written€opinion€and€subsequent€order,€the€trial€court€found€that€theÏassistant€district€attorney€abused€her€discretion€in€denying€pretrial€diversion.€€TheÏtrial€court€based€its€decision€solely€on€its€determination€that€the€subjectÏprosecution€ð ðmight€have€been€motivated€by€local€politics.ðð€€We€believe€that€theÏevidence€in€the€record€preponderates€against€the€trial€courtððs€findings.Ìà ` àFirst,€even€if€the€record€fully€supported€the€appelleeððs€allegations€thatÏDistrict€Attorney€General€Lawrence€Ray€Whitley€was€ð ðpolitically€motivatedðð€inÏinitiating€the€investigation€and€subsequent€charges€against€the€appellee,ñ5ñ׃×ñ5ññ5ñ׃×ñ5ñÝ ƒ #ÃÝòòÚ  Ú2Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý×  ×€theÐ 0.Ð$& Ðsubjective€motivations€of€the€prosecution€are€irrelevant€if,€in€fact,€there€isÏprobable€cause€to€believe€that€the€appellee€committed€the€criminal€acts€asÏâ âcharged.€€à ¸ àœñ<ñÐ 4 *, Ðà ` àñ<ñSecondly,›€once€the€TBI€had€concluded€its€investigation€into€these€matters,Ïâ âthe€entire€case€was€transferred€to€the€Davidson€County€District€Attorneyððs€OfficeÏwho€decided€to€submit€the€case€to€the€Sumner€County€grand€jury.€€The€grand€juryÏthen€returned€an€indictment€charging€the€appellee€with€one€(1)€count€of€forgeryÏand€one€(1)€count€of€making,€presenting€or€using€a€false€document€with€the€intentÏthat€it€be€taken€as€a€genuine€governmental€record.Ìà ` àFinally€and,€most€importantly,€there€is€no€evidence€in€the€record€to€supportÏœñ6ñtheñ6ññ7ññ,ñanñ,ññ7ñ›€allegation€that€the€decision€to€deny€pretrial€diversion€was€politically€motivated.€ÏDuring€his€examination€of€Assistant€District€Attorney€Miller,€defense€counselÏquestioned€her€about€phone€calls€she€had€received€from€the€Mayor€ofÏHendersonville€in€connection€with€this€matter.€€When€defense€counsel€impliedÏthat€Miller€might€have€been€influenced€by€the€mayor€in€her€decision€to€denyÏdiversion,€the€trial€court€interjected,€ð ðI€will€tell€you,€the€Court€knows€General€MillerÏ[well]€enough€to€know€that€nobody€is€going€to€influence€her€decision.€€I€full€wellÏunderstand€General€Miller.€€Both€as€judge€and€as€a€former€trial€lawyer,€I€knowÏhow€General€Miler€is€about€her€opinion€in€matters.ðð€€Thus,€the€trial€court€made€aÏspecific€finding€of€fact€that€the€decision€to€deny€diversion€was€not€politicallyÏmotivated.Ìà ` àAllegations€of€prosecutorial€vindictiveness€or€selective€prosecution€in€theÏinstitution€of€a€prosecution,€have€constitutional€implications€that,€if€proven,€mayÏwarrant€dismissal€of€the€indictment.€€òòSeeóó€òòBlackledge€v.€Perryóó,€417€U.S.€21,€27,Ð  0À&( Ð94€S.Ct.€2098,€2102,€40€L.Ed.2d€628€(1974)€(due€process€may€be€implicated€ifÏa€prosecutor€vindictively€increases€a€charge€to€a€felony€after€a€misdemeanant€hasÏinvoked€an€appellate€remedy);€òòWayte€v.€United€Statesóó,€470€U.S.€598,€608,€105Ð ð5,. ÐS.Ct.€1524,€1531,€84€L.Ed.2d€547€(1985)€(equal€protection€standards€preventÏselective€prosecution€on€the€basis€of€race,€religion,€or€other€arbitraryÐ Ð9p02 Ðclassification).€€However,€as€long€as€the€prosecutor€has€probable€cause€toÏbelieve€that€an€accused€committed€an€offense,€the€determination€whether€toÏprosecute€rests€entirely€within€the€prosecutorððs€discretion,€subject€to€theseÏconstitutional€limitations.€€òòState€v.€Superior€Oil,€Inc.óó,€875€S.W.2d€658,€660€(Tenn.Ð 0Ð Ð1994);€òòQuillen€v.€Crockettóó,€928€S.W.2d€47,€51€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.€1995).€€à (# àÐ  À Ðà ` àIn€any€event,€the€trial€courtððs€review€under€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€40„15„¼105(b)(3)€is€limited€to€the€question€of€abuse€of€discretion€ñ5ññ,ñconceringñ,ññ5ññ5ñconcerningñ5ñ€the€pretrialÏdiversion€decision,€not€subjective€motives€concerning€the€ñ5ññ,ñinstitutinñ,ññ5ññ5ñinstitutionñ5ñ€of€theÏprosecution.€€The€trial€court€must€find€an€abuse€of€discretion€with€regard€to€theÐ à€ Ðòòdenial€of€diversionóó.€€On€this€point€€the€trial€court€specifically€found€that€politicalÐ Ðp Ðmotivations€played€no€part€in€Assistant€District€Attorney€Millerððs€decision€to€denyÏdiversion.Ìà ` àThe€trial€court€found€that€this€case€was€ð ðan€appropriate€case€for€diversionððÏand€granted€diversion€on€this€basis.€€The€trial€court€is€not€at€liberty€to€substituteÏits€own€judgment€for€that€of€the€district€attorney€in€its€review€for€an€abuse€ofÏdiscretion.€€òòSeeóó€òòState€v.€Houstonóó,€900€S.W.2d€at€714.€€In€this€case,€the€assistantÐ p& Ðdistrict€attorney€outlined€her€reasons€for€denying€diversion€in€a€detailed,€four€(4)Ïpage€letter.€€She€recognized€the€appelleeððs€lack€of€criminal€record,€her€favorableÏsocial€and€work€history€and€her€amenability€to€rehabilitation.€€However,€sheÏdetermined€that€the€unfavorable€factors€outweighed€the€favorable€ones€and€gaveÏa€detailed€explanation€as€to€why€the€unfavorable€factors€were€given€more€weight.€ÏòòSeeóó€òòState€v.€Curryóó,€988€S.W.2d€at€158.Ð 2°(* Ðà ` àAlthough€we€believe€œñ8ñthe€question€of€thñ8ññ9ññ8ñ€ñ8ññ9ññ:ñe€appellantððs€suitability€for€diversionÏiñ:ññ?ñsñ?ññ@ññ:ñnñ:ññ@ññ:ñ€a€close€call,€ñ:ññ;ñthis›€to›€be›€a›€close›€case,›€ñ;ñwe›€conclude€that€the€trial€court€should€have€deferred€to€theÏdiscretion€of€the€prosecutor€in€her€refusal€to€divert.€€As€stated€by€this€Court€inÏòòState€v.€Carróó,Ð Ð9p02 Ðñ=ñÓ€Óñ=ññ=ñÓÓñ=ñà8 ` àIt€is€not€the€trial€courtððs€function€to€disapprove€the€denial€wheneverÏit€disagrees€with€the€prosecutor.€€It€is€obligated€to€defer€to€theÏprosecutorððs€discretion€when€the€record€contains€any€substantialÏevidence€to€support€the€decision.€€Thus,€if€the€record€would€supportÏeither€a€grant€or€a€denial€of€pretrial€diversion,€the€trial€court€mustÏdefer€to€the€prosecutorððs€discretionary€decision.€€As€our€SupremeÏCourt€has€previously€stated€regarding€a€discretionary€decision€inÏanother€context,€if€ð ðthe€evidence€would€support€either€conclusion€.Ï.€.€it€cannot€be€an€abuse€of€discretion€to€decide€the€case€either€way.ððÐ ` ü!` ü! Ðñ=ñÓ€Î]Óñ=ññ=ñÓÉ]Óñ=ñÌ861€S.W.2d€at€856€(quoting€òòState€v.€Grearóó,€568€S.W.2d€285,€286€(Tenn.€1978)).Ð ¨  ÐÌà@**-®àò òIV.ó óˆÐ èˆ ÐÌà ` àThe€evidence€in€the€record€preponderates€against€the€trial€courtððs€findingsÏthat€the€district€attorney€abused€her€discretion€in€denying€pretrial€diversion.׃×Ý ƒ #ÃÝòòÚ  Ú3Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý×  ׀РÈh ÐAccordingly,€the€judgment€of€the€trial€court€is€reversed,€and€the€case€is€remandedÏfor€further€proceedings€consistent€with€this€opinion.ÌÓ  ÓÌÓÓà ` àà ¸ àà  àà h àà À à____________________________________Ìà ` àà ¸ àà  àà h àà À àJERRY€L.€SMITH,€JUDGEÌÌÌÌCONCUR:ÌÌÌÌ___________________________________ÌDAVID€G.€HAYES,€JUDGEÌÌÌ___________________________________ÌNORMA€MCGEE€OGLE,€JUDGE