ÿWPC¥ ¦¶A#ÁîjÄtÈ¥K㤒…<¡’s‘Z fÔý(ÓWê¿[¶ÞÂqˆ§.â?öÏöÏÃ<÷Ú’9ù䍿ñz£ZbÂÁêàÛbçL\Y2Þ©Šÿ?G™FþïÍ–,¾±ÆüØ0r"¿…Ý*S“B¾¾–©®I=èøŠœZ†h9¢söÉ ÓýC³¿Ãõ{B„£$*p2˜gHÒ«Q5»ÑHFÚ3¦æH§)_f;"ñ†3o•¦èdØ?³Äß{·é}˱ô‡P–1+¯€ÕþTf/¦dâ÷¥Î7"ǪƠÝìD“´¹RSpë6$-ójœ,ÁÅÒ[¯¡de$¤õ.¦ý›wp3Ý›öÙCÄKPtÁî͉܋"ꇹ~ròÐrØíOJìÙû=¸÷#«lço¯%LÐá²Vv‡O …~v¥•è5Ä—¨¤`×íqƒéh”ÓÄî)btÃF@¸Ù,Ù;Që ƒ‰zå³ÙHÙÕ¥íêõf(—ö²ç$»P[ªsêÇû.óØøoáÎU¹ÐgüMGUôànfÄØª°Ö1åQ,Œä;Eå®M,)véxë¶GKßÊÎËF ™Ô¤Hì­’^¸•ÏŸma·ä¨â§äïïú Ž%#†U>Œ %Ê 0ÆÐ4–ª}¹U:6 U:p 0 ª 0D´ sø U:k ¥ Ê$U:îU:(U:bU:œ[Öb1V9U:…ÉU:NNNNNNNNNNN Bˆ˜HP LaserJet 4Si/4SiMX PS 600dpiPSCRIPTÀÌÀääÀÀÌ0ÙP Lê7<·^>ŸX> <@ˆÐ9Z &Courier RegularX(ž,†$¡¡Ñ` °ÑÑܰÑÒ4°ÒÒX°ÒÑTR[  AØ'ÿ Legal3Ø' AØ'ÿ Legalÿ3Ø'TÑÓÓ:yT3|xÊ sÝ ƒ bRÿÝÑ@` °ÑÑ@ܰÑÒ4°ÒÒX°ÒÑT@R[  AØ'ÿ Legal3Ø' AØ'ÿ Legalÿ3Ø'TÑÓÓà Œ àòòÚ  Ú4Ú  ÚóóÝ  ÝÔ€Xd_XXXÔÔ€òÅØòXXd_ÔòòButóó€òòseeóó€òòRickman€v.€Duttonóó,€864€F.Supp.€686,€709€(M.D.€Tenn.€1994).,c½¬AZ‹"Arial Regular,c½¬AZ‹"Arial Regular(º(3bR$¤¤Ý ƒ,†!ÝÑ` °ÑÑܰÑÒ4°ÒÒX°ÒÑTR[  AØ'ÿ Legal3Ø' AØ'ÿ Legalÿ3Ø'TÑÓÓÝ  Ýà Œ àòòÚ  Ú0Ú  Úóó(#Ã$òòÚ  Ú0Ú  Úóó iÝ ƒ bR$ÝÒ4°ÒÒX°ÒÓÓà Œ àòòÚ  Ú5Ú  ÚóóÝ  ÝÓÓÔ€Xd_XXXÔÔ€òÅØòXXd_ÔLikewise€without€merit€is€the€Defendant's€claim€that€similar€instructions€used€during€theÐ `  Ðà Œ àsentencing€phase€were€constitutionally€infirm., øð AZ‹"Arial Regular uÝ ƒ bRÿÝÑ@` °ÑÑ@ܰÑÒ4°ÒÒX°ÒÑT@R[  AØ'ÿ Legal3Ø' AØ'ÿ Legalÿ3Ø'TÑÓÓà Œ àòòÚ  Ú7Ú  ÚóóÝ  ÝÔ€XYXXXÔÔ€ò•âòXXYÔòòButóó€òòseeóó€òòHouston€v.€Duttonóó,€No.€3:86„0749€(M.D.€Tenn.,€May€19,€1994). ÀÝ ƒ bR$ÝÒ4°ÒÒX°ÒÓÓà Œ àòòÚ  Ú1Ú  ÚóóÝ  ÝÔ€Xd_XXXÔÔ€òÅØòXXd_ÔÓÓIn€a€recent€decision€which€follows€a€line€of€Tennessee€cases€that€provide€a€basis€forÐ `  Ðconcluding€that€evidence€to€negate€the€element€of€intent€is€admissible€in€Tennessee,€€this€courtÏconcluded€that€"evidence,€including€expert€testimony,€on€an€accused's€mental€state€is€admissible€inÏTennessee€to€negate€the€elements€of€specific€intent,€including€premeditation€and€deliberation€in€a€first„¼degree€murder€case."€€òòState€v.€Phippsóó,€883€S.W.2d€138,€149€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.€1994).€€òòSeeóó€òòalsoóó€òòDavisÐ t   Ðv.€Stateóó,€161€Tenn.€23,€28€S.W.€2d€993,€997€(1930);€òòDrye€v.€Stateóó,€181€Tenn.€633,€184€S.W.2d€101Ð `  Ð(1944);€òòState€v.€Sheltonóó,€854€S.W.2d€116€€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.€1992)€òòpermóó.€òòtoóó€òòappóó.€òòdeniedóó€(Tenn.€1993).€Ð $ Ä ÐAlthough€òòPhippsóó€was€decided€subsequent€to€the€trial€of€this€case,€we€find€that€the€history€and€rationaleÐ è ˆ Ðcited€in€òòPhippsóó€is€helpful€in€dealing€with€this€issue., øð AZ‹"Arial Regular, øð AZ‹"Arial Regular, øð AZ‹"Arial Regular, øð AZ‹"Arial Regular QÔ€ Xd_XXXÔÔ€ òÅØòX Xd_ÔÝ ƒ bRÿÝÑ@` °ÑÑ@ܰÑÒ4°ÒÒX°ÒÑT@R[  AØ'ÿ Legal3Ø' AØ'ÿ Legalÿ3Ø'TÑÓÓà Œ àòòÚ  Ú6Ú  ÚóóÝ  ÝÓÓThe€State€concedes€that€the€factors€"the€offense€involved€more€than€one€victim,"€"at€least€oneÐ `  Ðof€the€victims€was€particularly€vulnerable€because€of€age,"€and€"the€crime€was€committed€underÏcircumstances€under€which€the€potential€for€bodily€injury€to€a€victim€was€great,"€were€improperlyÏapplied€to€the€aggravated€assault€charge.€€It€also€concedes€that€all€of€the€factors€except€"that€theÏdefendant€had€no€hesitation€about€committing€a€crime€when€the€risk€to€human€life€was€high"€wereÏimproperly€applied€to€the€arson€charge.- ù- LÝ ƒ bR$ÝÒ4°ÒÒX°ÒÓÓà Œ àòòÚ  Ú2Ú  ÚóóÝ  ÝÔ€Xd_XXXÔÔ€òÅØòXXd_ÔÓÓThe€State€objected€to€neither€this€line€of€questioning€nor€the€officer's€testimony.€€Accordingly,Ð `  Ðany€argument€that€the€testimony€was€inadmissible€as€hearsay€was€waived.€€òòSeeóó€òòTeague€v.€Stateóó,€772Ð ( È ÐS.W.2d€915,€926€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.€1988);€òòState€v.€Killebrewóó,€760€S.W.2d€228,€235€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.Ð ì Œ Ð1988);€T.R.A.P.€36(a)., øð AZ‹"Arial Regular {Ý ƒ bR$ÝÒ4°ÒÒX°ÒÓÓà Œ àòòÚ  Ú3Ú  ÚóóÝ  ÝÔ€Xd_XXXÔÔ€òÅØòXXd_ÔÓÓHowever,€because€the€statement€would€be€admissible€only€to€impeach€Officer€Farris's€priorÐ `  Ðtestimony,€Tennessee€law€would€require€that€the€court€instruct€the€jury€that€it€could€consider€Mr.ÏStone's€testimony€only€for€purposes€of€impeachment€and€not€as€substantive€evidence.€€òòSeeóó€òòState€v.Ð ì Œ ÐReeceóó,€637€S.W.2d€858,€861€(Tenn.€1982);€òòMcFarlin€v.€Stateóó,€214€Tenn.€613,€381€S.W.2d€922€(1964)., øð AZ‹"Arial Regular dÝ ƒ,†!ÝÑ` °ÑÑܰÑÒ4°ÒÒX°ÒÑTR[  AØ'ÿ Legal3Ø' AØ'ÿ Legalÿ3Ø'TÑÓÓÝ  ÝÑ` Ý ÑѰÜÑÒ4ÒÒ„XÒÑ  ÑÑ€ÑÑ7€—²XXdðdÈ7ÑÑ  ÑÓ  ÓÔ€ Xd_XXXÔà@( ( ®àò òIN€THE€COURT€OF€CRIMINAL€APPEALSÔ€Xd_XX Xd_Ô€OF€TENNESSEEˆÐ `  Ðà@ÐÐ(®àAT€KNOXVILLEó óˆÐ @ à ÐÓ  Óò òAPRIL€1995€SESSIONó óÐ  À ÐÓ  ÓÌò òÓÓSTATE€OF€TENNESSEE,à h àà À à)ó óà  àò òC.C.A.€NO.€03C01„9406„CR„00198ó óÐ à€ Ðà ` àà ¸ àà  àà h àà À àò ò)Ð Ðp Ðó óà ` àAppellee,à  àà h àà À àò ò)ó óà  àà p àà È àà  àÐ À`  Ðà ` àà ¸ àà  àà h àà À àò ò)à  àMcMINN€COUNTYÐ °P  ÐVS.à ` àà ¸ àà  àà h àà À à)ó óÐ  @  Ðà ` àà ¸ àà  àà h àà À àò ò)à  àHON.€R.€STEVEN€BEBBÐ 0  ÐRICKY€THOMPSON,à h àà À à)à  àJUDGEÐ €  Ðà ` àà ¸ àà  àà h àà À à)Ìó óà ` àAppellant.à  àà h àà À àò ò)ó óà  à(First€Degree€Murder,€Aggravated€Assault,Ð `  Ðà ` àà ¸ àà  àà h àà À àò ò)à  àó óArson)Ð Pð  ÐÌÌÓ  Óà @Œ àà @ä àON€APPEAL€AS€OF€RIGHT€FROM€THE€JUDGMENT€OF€THEÌCRIMINAL€COURT€OF€CARTER€COUNTYÌÌÌÓ  ÓòòFOR€THE€DEFENDANT:à h àà À àà  àFOR€THE€APPELLEE:Ð à€ ÐÌóóJOHN€G.€OLIVAà  àà h àà À àà  àCHARLES€W.€BURSONÐ À!` Ð(Appellate€Counsel)à h àà À àà  àAttorney€General€&€ReporterÐ °"P ÐCAPITAL€CASE€RESOURCE€CENTERà  àÐ  #@ Ð1225€17th€Avenue€Southà h àà À àà  àCECIL€H.€ROSSÐ $0 ÐNashville,€TN€€37212à h àà À àà  àAssistant€Attorney€GeneralÐ €%  Ðà ` àà ¸ àà  àà h àà À àà  à450€James€Robertson€Pkwy.ÌJAMES€H.€STUTTSà h àà À àà  àÐ `' ÐAssistant€Public€Defenderà h àà À àà  àJERRY€N.€ESTESÐ P(ð ÐP.O.€Box€629à  àà h àà À àà  àDistrict€Attorney€GeneralÐ @)à ÐSweetwater,€TN€€37874Ìà ` àà ¸ àà  àà h àà À àà  àSTEVE€HAWKINSÌJERRI€S.€BRYANTà  àà h àà À àà  àAssistant€District€Attorney€GeneralÐ ,°"! ÐCARTER,€HARROD€&€CUNNINGHAMà  à203€Madison€Ave.Ð - #" Ð1€Madison€Ave.à  àà h àà À àà  àP.O.€Box€647Ð ð-$# ÐP.O.€Box€885à  àà h àà À àà  àAthens,€TN€€37303„0647Ð à.€%$ ÐAthens,€TN€€37371„€0885ÌÌISAIAH€S.€GANTÌCAPITAL€CASE€RESOURCE€CENTERÌ1225€17th€Avenue€SouthÌNashville,€TN€€37212ÌÌOPINION€FILED:òò€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€Ð `6-, ÐÌóóò òREVERSED€&€REMANDEDÐ @8à.. ÐÌDAVID€H.€WELLES,€JUDGEó óòòÐ  :À00 ÐÔ€„°„XXd_Ôò òÓÓÓ  ÓÐ  ;°11  ÐOPINIONó óóóÐ `  ÐÌÓ  ÓÔ€Xd_X„„°Ôà ` àIn€this€capital€case,€the€Defendant,€Ricky€Thompson,€was€convicted€of€firstÐ   Ðdegree€murder,€aggravated€assault,€and€arson.€€After€the€sentencing€hearing,€the€juryÏfound€two€aggravating€circumstances:€€(1)€€that€the€defendant€knowingly€created€aÏgreat€risk€of€death€to€two€or€more€persons,€other€than€the€victim€murdered,€during€theÏact€of€murder;€and€€(2)€€that€the€murder€was€extremely€heinous,€atrocious,€or€cruel€inÏthat€it€involved€torture€or€serious€physical€abuse€beyond€that€necessary€to€produceÏdeath.€€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€€ðð€39„13„204(i)(3)€and€(5)€(1991).€€The€jury€found€that€theÏState€had€proven€beyond€a€reasonable€doubt€that€the€aggravating€circumstancesÏoutweighed€any€mitigating€circumstances€and€sentenced€the€Defendant€to€death€byÏelectrocution.€€The€Defendant€was€also€sentenced€to€six€years€and€four€years,Ïrespectively,€for€the€aggravated€assault€and€arson€convictions.ÌÌà ` àOn€appeal,€the€Defendant€raises€numerous€issues€for€our€review€which€involveÏerrors€occurring€during€both€the€guilt€and€sentencing€phases€of€the€trial.€€HavingÏcarefully€considered€the€Defendant's€contentions€as€to€errors€occurring€during€the€guiltÏphase,€we€conclude€that€the€trial€court€erred€in€excluding€expert€and€certainÏimpeachment€testimony€concerning€the€defendant's€mental€state€at€the€time€of€theÏmurder.€€€We,€therefore,€reverse€the€Defendant's€conviction€for€first€degree€murder,Ïaggravated€assault,€and€arson€and€remand€this€matter€to€the€trial€court€for€a€new€trial.€ÏAlso,€as€to€the€alleged€errors€occurring€during€the€sentencing€phase,€in€an€advisoryÏcapacity,€we€conclude€that€the€trial€court€erred€in€sentencing€the€Defendant€on€theÏaggravated€assault€and€arson€convictions€by€failing€to€comply€with€the€mandate€ofÏòòState€v.€Pearsonóó,€858€S.W.2d€879€(Tenn.€1993),€failing€to€make€findings€as€to€whichÐ @8à., Ðenhancement€factors€applied€to€which€convictions,€and€failing€to€make€findings€as€toÐ  :À0. Ðwhy€the€Defendant€deserved€consecutive€sentences,€and€direct€that€on€remand,€if€theÏDefendant€is€convicted€of€these€offenses,€the€trial€court€comply€with€theseÏrequirements.€€ÌÌÓ  Óò òBACKGROUNDó óÐ à€ ÐÌÓ  Óà ` àThe€state's€proof€introduced€at€the€guilt€phase€of€the€trial€demonstrated€that€onÏthe€afternoon€of€October€25,€1989,€the€Defendant,€accompanied€by€his€two€children,ÏVanessa€and€Ricky,€took€his€wife,€Nina,€to€work€at€a€Jiffy€convenience€store€atÏapproximately€2:00€p.m.€€The€Defendant€and€the€two€children€sat€in€a€booth€andÏordered€hot€dogs.€€Around€3:30€p.m.,€the€manager€of€the€store€told€Nina€to€tell€herÏfamily€that€they€would€have€to€leave€because€"we€can't€allow€your€family€to€hangÏaround€here€while€you['re]€on€the€job."€€Nina€told€the€Defendant€that€he€would€have€toÏleave,€but€at€4:00€p.m.,€he€was€still€there.€€Nina€again€told€the€Defendant€that€he€wouldÏhave€to€leave.€€When€the€Defendant€finally€left€at€approximately€4:30€p.m.,€he€told€NinaÏand€the€manager€that€"you€bitches€will€pay."ÌÌà ` àThe€Defendant€left€Vanessa,€age€five,€with€Nina,€and€he€took€Ricky,€age€nineÏmonths,€with€him.€€He€returned€to€the€store€a€few€minutes€after€he€left€to€bringÏVanessa's€medicine€as€she€had€been€sick€earlier€in€the€day.€€Vanessa€went€home€withÏone€of€Nina's€co„workers,€and€Nina€finished€working€her€shift.ÌÌà ` àChristy€Rominger,€Nina's€niece,€stopped€by€the€Jiffy€store€to€check€on€her€auntÏlater€that€evening.€€Nina€received€a€phone€call€from€the€Defendant€while€Christy€wasÏat€the€store,€and€during€the€conversation€Nina€asked€the€Defendant€if€she€could€pickÏup€"little€Ricky."€€The€Defendant€refused€permission,€and€Nina€became€very€upset.€ÏChristy€stayed€with€her€aunt,€and€they€called€the€McMinn€County€Sheriff's€Department.€Ð  :À0, ÐOfficers€responded,€but€no€report€was€filed.€€After€Vanessa€was€brought€back€to€theÏstore,€Christy,€Nina,€and€Vanessa€left€in€Christy's€car€to€spend€the€night€at€Christy'sÏfather's€house€because€Christy€felt€that€nobody€would€look€for€Nina€there.ÌÌà ` àIn€the€early€morning€hours€of€the€next€day,€around€2:00€or€2:30€a.m.,€theÏDefendant€returned€to€the€Jiffy€store€and€asked€the€clerk,€Kevin€Helms,€if€he€knewÏwhere€Nina€was.€€As€instructed€by€Nina€before€she€left,€he€told€the€Defendant€that€heÏthought€Nina€had€left€with€the€Defendant.€€The€Defendant€offered€Kevin€some€pills€andÏshowed€him€a€clip€of€gun€cartridges.€€Around€4:00€a.m.,€the€Defendant€returned€to€theÏJiffy€store€and€bought€a€paper€and€two€gallons€of€gasoline.€€Around€4:30€a.m.,€heÏreturned€a€third€and€final€time,€and€he€motioned€for€Kevin€to€come€outside.€€He€showedÏKevin€a€rifle€and€said€"something€about€he€was€mad€enough€to€shoot€somebody,"€butÏhe€never€mentioned€his€wife€specifically.ÌÌà ` àThe€Defendant€also€went€to€the€home€of€Nina's€mother,€Elizabeth€Vann,€in€theÏearly€morning€hours€of€October€26.€€According€to€Ms.€Vann,€the€Defendant€asked€ifÏNina€was€there€and€then€went€to€the€car€and€got€little€Ricky,€holding€him€up€in€front€ofÏMs.€Vann€and€threatening€to€"blow€his€damn€brains€out"€and€"kill€that€bitch€Nina."ÌÌà ` àLater€that€morning,€Christy,€Nina,€and€Vanessa€drove€to€the€Defendant's€trailer.€ÏNina€told€Christy€and€Vanessa€to€stay€in€the€car€while€she€talked€to€the€Defendant.€ÏHowever,€after€only€a€few€minutes,€Vanessa€got€out€of€the€car€and€Christy€followed.€ÏThe€girls€heard€Nina€and€the€Defendant€arguing,€but€came€to€the€door€anyway.€€NinaÏlet€the€girls€in,€and€they€went€to€Vanessa's€room€to€get€some€clothes.€€Little€Ricky€wasÏin€a€play€pen€in€the€kitchen,€and€Nina€and€the€Defendant€were€talking.€€At€some€point,ÏNina€picked€up€little€Ricky,€and€when€Christy€and€Vanessa€returned€to€the€kitchen,€NinaÏmotioned€with€her€eyes€for€Christy€and€Vanessa€to€run.€€The€three€of€them€ran€out€theÐ  :À0. Ðdoor€to€Christy's€car,€with€Nina€carrying€little€Ricky€in€her€arms.€€Nina€jumped€in€theÏfront€seat€on€the€passenger's€side,€Christy€sat€on€the€front€seat€on€the€driver's€side,€andÏVanessa€laid€on€the€floorboard€in€the€back€seat,€directly€behind€Christy.ÌÌà ` àWhen€Nina€ran€from€the€trailer€with€little€Ricky,€the€Defendant€picked€up€anÏassault€rifle,€which€had€been€laying€in€the€living€room,€and€followed.€€He€tapped€on€theÏpassenger€side€window€and€ordered€Nina€to€get€out€of€the€car.€€Nina€got€out€with€littleÏRicky€in€her€arms.€€According€to€Christy,€Christy€began€blowing€the€car€horn€andÏscreaming€for€help.€€The€Defendant€told€her€to€"shut€the€f__k€up,"€and€then€he€shot€herÏin€the€right€leg.€€The€Defendant€turned€the€gun€on€Nina.€€Christy€managed€to€open€theÏcar€door,€grab€Vanessa,€and€run€across€the€street.ÌÌà ` àThough€accounts€of€the€following€events€vary€slightly,€testimony€from€three€ofÏthe€Defendant's€neighbors€who€witnessed€the€shooting€relates€that€Nina€was€holdingÏlittle€Ricky€and€facing€the€Defendant€from€approximately€five€to€six€feet€away€when€sheÏturned€and€started€to€walk€away.€€The€Defendant€fired€the€rifle,€striking€Nina€in€theÏbuttocks.€€She€fell€to€the€ground,€begging€the€Defendant€not€to€shoot.€€Little€RickyÏcrawled€out€from€under€her€as€the€Defendant€approached,€and€the€Defendant€"kickedÏor€moved€Nina€with€his€foot."€€He€then€fired€several€more€shots€directly€into€Nina'sÏbody.€€One€of€the€neighbors€stated€that€after€shooting€her,€the€Defendant€"turned€hisÏwife€over€and€shook€her€and€acted€like€he€was€talking€to€her."€€Another€witness€testifiedÏthat€as€the€Defendant€started€to€walk€away,€he€told€his€dead€wife€that€he€would€see€herÏlater.ÌÌà ` àThe€Defendant€then€picked€up€little€Ricky€and€fired€several€more€shots€into€carsÏand€into€the€air.€€Carrying€little€Ricky€and€the€rifle,€he€walked€back€toward€his€trailer,Ïand€within€a€few€minutes,€neighbors€witnessed€black€smoke€coming€from€the€trailer.€Ð  :À0. ÐThe€Defendant€carried€little€Ricky€across€the€street€to€an€auto€parts€store€where€theÏDefendant€bought€a€soft€drink,€took€some€pills,€and€waited€for€the€police€to€arrive.ÌÌà ` àAt€trial,€Dr.€William€E.€Foree,€Jr.,€McMinn€County€Medical€Examiner,€testified€thatÏNina€Thompson€had€died€as€a€result€of€"massive€bleeding€and€blood€vessel€disruption,Ïand€massive€internal€damage"€from€multiple€gunshot€wounds€to€the€body.€€Nina€hadÏbeen€shot€five€times€in€the€arm,€the€chest,€and€the€buttocks.ÌÌà ` àThe€murder€weapon,€a€Russian€self„loading€semi„automatic€rifle€that€was€foundÏinside€the€burned€trailer,€was€introduced€into€evidence€at€trial.€€Mike€Donnelly,€stateÏarson€investigator,€testified€that€based€upon€his€investigation€and€examination€of€theÏburn€patterns€at€the€scene€of€the€trailer€fire,€it€was€his€opinion€that€a€combustible€liquidÏhad€been€poured€in€the€bathroom,€the€bedroom,€the€hallway,€the€kitchen,€and€the€livingÏroom€of€the€trailer€and€subsequently€ignited.€€He€stated€that€the€fire€had€probablyÏignited€on€the€front€steps€because€this€was€consistent€with€the€"pour€pattern€andÏaccess€to€the€pour€pattern."€€Dr.€Robert€C.€Bernstorf,€an€emergency€room€physician€atÏAthens€Community€Hospital,€testified€that€he€had€treated€the€infant€Ricky€M.€ThompsonÏfor€first€and€second€degree€burns€on€the€day€of€the€fire€and€that€the€baby's€hair€wasÏsinged,€blisters€were€on€the€tip€of€his€nose,€the€front€part€of€his€lower€leg€was€burned,Ïand€a€bloody€blister€wound€was€on€his€right€leg.ÌÌà ` àThe€Defendant's€proof€consisted€of€testimony€from€Marvin€Farris,€a€detectiveÏwith€the€McMinn€County€Sheriff's€Department.€€Officer€Farris€had€interviewed€severalÏof€the€witnesses€at€the€trailer€court€and€had€interviewed€the€Defendant€at€the€McMinnÏCounty€Jail.€€The€defense€attempted€to€introduce€the€statement€that€the€Defendant€hadÏgiven€Officer€Farris,€and€the€State€objected€on€the€ground€that€the€statement€was€self„¼ñÈñ¼ñÈñserving€hearsay.€€The€objection€was€sustained,€and€defense€counsel€attempted€toÐ  :À0. Ðexplain€that€they€needed€to€let€Mr.€Farris€examine€the€statement€to€show€that€he€hadÏnot€written€down€everything€that€the€Defendant€had€said.€€Defense€counsel€told€theÏcourt€that€the€defense€had€a€witness€who€would€testify€that€Officer€Farris€had€told€himÏsome€additional€things€that€the€Defendant€had€said€that€did€not€appear€in€theÏstatement.€€The€state€complained€that€the€defense€was€attempting€to€impeachÏsomething€that€was€inadmissible.€€Defense€counsel€then€asked€Officer€Farris€whetherÏhe€had€told€a€news€reporter€that€the€Defendant€had€seemed€concerned€about€his€wife'sÏwelfare€when€he€had€taken€the€Defendant's€statement.€€Officer€Farris€responded,€"IÏdon't€remember."€€When€asked€whether€he€had€told€the€news€reporter€that€theÏDefendant€had€not€seemed€to€know€that€his€wife€was€dead,€Officer€Farris€replied,€"IÏmight€have."€€The€defense€later€attempted€to€call€David€Stone,€the€news€reporter€whoÏhad€spoken€to€Officer€Farris,€in€order€to€impeach€the€officer's€testimony,€but€the€trialÏcourt€ruled€that€the€testimony€was€inadmissible€hearsay.ÌÌà ` àThe€defense€also€attempted€to€call€Dr.€Roger€Meyer,€a€clinical€psychologist€andÏfounder€of€Brainerd€Psychological€Services,€to€testify€as€to€the€Defendant's€mentalÏcondition,€but€the€state€objected€because€of€a€lack€of€notice.€€The€trial€court€sustainedÏthe€objection.ÌÌà ` àDavid€Vann,€son€of€Elizabeth€Vann€and€brother€of€the€victim,€testified€that€hisÏmother€had€never€told€him€that€the€Defendant€had€come€to€her€house€in€the€earlyÏmorning€hours€of€October€26€and€threatened€to€kill€little€Ricky€and€Nina.€€Two€of€theÏDefendant's€neighbors€testified€that€the€Defendant€had€always€appeared€to€have€beenÏgood€with€his€children.€€Nancy€Smith,€cousin€of€the€Defendant,€testified€that€theÏDefendant€had€been€the€primary€caretaker€of€the€children€and€that€he€had€not€workedÏbecause€of€mental€problems.€€She€also€testified€that€she€had€never€heard€theÏDefendant€threaten€his€wife.Ð  :À00 Їà ` àThe€last€witness€for€the€defense€was€the€Defendant€himself.€€He€testified€that€heÏand€Nina€had€married€in€1987€and€that€they€had€"argued€a€lot"€from€the€beginning.€€TheÏDefendant€admitted€that€he€had€gone€to€the€home€of€Elizabeth€Vann€on€the€morningÏof€October€26€but€denied€making€any€threats.€€He€also€denied€making€threats€in€frontÏof€Kevin€Helms€at€the€Jiffy€store€but€admitted€that€he€had€told€Mr.€Helms€that€the€policeÏwould€"have€a€war€on€their€hands"€if€they€tried€to€take€his€child.€€He€denied€threateningÏthe€store€manager,€Vicky€Devaney.€€ÌÌà ` àThe€Defendant€testified€that€he€had€drunk€about€sixteen€wine€coolers€and€hadÏtaken€some€Valium€on€the€evening€before€the€shooting.€€When€Christy,€Vanessa,€andÏNina€came€by€the€trailer€the€next€morning,€the€Defendant€and€Nina€went€into€the€trailerÏto€discuss€her€job.€€According€to€the€Defendant,€Nina€told€him€that€she€would€quit€if€thatÏwas€what€he€wanted.€€The€Defendant€told€her€that€the€only€problem€was€the€way€thatÏshe€treated€him€when€he€came€to€the€store.€€He€described€the€discussion€as€more€ofÏa€"spat"€than€an€argument.ÌÌà ` àThe€Defendant€testified€that€Vanessa€and€Christy€had€gone€to€the€bedroom,€butÏwhen€they€had€returned,€Nina€had€asked€him€if€she€could€pick€up€little€Ricky.€€The€nextÏthing€the€Defendant€knew,€the€three€of€them€were€running€to€the€car€with€his€son.€€TheÏDefendant€stated€that€he€had€picked€up€his€rifle€but€that€it€had€not€been€his€intentionÏto€kill€anyone,€rather€he€had€only€wanted€to€stop€Nina€from€taking€little€Ricky.€€HeÏtestified€that€he€had€tapped€on€the€car€window€to€get€Nina's€attention,€and€when€NinaÏhad€opened€the€car€door,€the€door€had€hit€the€barrel€of€his€gun€and€the€gun€had€goneÏoff,€hitting€Christy€in€the€leg.€€The€Defendant€testified€that€during€this€time,€the€mainÏthought€going€through€his€head€had€been€that€Nina€had€once€tried€to€kill€little€Ricky€byÏpunching€him€in€the€back€of€the€head.€€He€stated€that€he€could€not€remember€anythingÏthat€had€happened€after€the€gun€went€off€the€first€time.Ð  :À00 Їà ` àOn€cross„examination,€the€Defendant€admitted€that€he€had€been€jealous€of€hisÏwife€and€that€the€jealousy€was€part€of€the€reason€he€had€gone€to€the€Jiffy€store€soÏmuch.€€The€Defendant€admitted€showing€the€rifle€to€Kevin€Helms€on€the€morning€of€theÏmurder€but€stated€that€the€reason€he€had€taken€the€gun€with€him€was€because€he€wasÏdrunk€and€high€on€pills.€€He€testified€that€he€had€bought€the€gasoline€to€mow€lawns€andÏthat€he€couldn't€remember€whether€he€had€set€the€trailer€on€fire.€ÌÌà ` à€Based€on€this€evidence€in€the€guilt€phase,€the€jury€found€the€Defendant,€RickyÏThompson,€guilty€of€first€degree€murder,€aggravated€assault,€and€arson.ÌÌà ` àIn€the€sentencing€phase€of€the€trial,€the€State's€first€witness€was€ChristyÏRominger.€€She€testified€that€Nina's€five„year„old€daughter,€Vanessa,€had€been€lyingÏin€the€floorboard€directly€behind€the€driver's€seat€when€the€Defendant€had€shot€Christy.€ÏMargaret€Grady,€a€neighbor€of€the€Defendant,€testified€that€she€had€been€at€herÏmailbox€when€a€visitor€had€pulled€in€her€driveway€and€yelled€at€her€to€"duck."€€SheÏtestified€that€she€had€then€heard€shots€and€had€raised€her€head€to€see€the€DefendantÏshoot€his€wife€and€then€turn€the€gun€and€start€shooting€in€her€direction.€€ÌÌà ` àIn€mitigation,€the€Defendant's€cousin,€Nancy€Smith,€testified€concerning€theÏDefendant's€background.€€She€stated€that€the€Defendant€had€lived€with€his€parents€inÏDetroit,€Michigan,€until€he€was€approximately€thirteen€years€old.€€She€described€theÏDefendant€as€being€"different€from€the€other€kids."€€He€was€slower€and€was€not€allowedÏto€go€outside€because€he€would€run€away.€€He€was€not€able€to€learn€with€the€rest€of€theÏclass,€and€at€the€age€of€twelve,€he€was€diagnosed€as€schizophrenic.€€ÌÌà ` àThe€Defendant's€parents€divorced€when€he€was€about€thirteen€years€old,€andÏhe€was€raised€by€his€father€and€his€grandparents.€€The€Defendant's€father€had€beenÐ  :À0, Ðan€alcoholic,€and€Ms.€Smith€recalled€one€instance€in€which€he€had€punished€theÏDefendant€for€playing€with€matches€by€burning€his€hand€with€a€cigarette€lighter.€€TheÏDefendant's€mother€had€also€drunk€excessively,€and€Ms.€Smith€remembered€hisÏmother€choking€him€on€one€occasion.ÌÌà ` àMs.€Smith€testified€that€the€Defendant€had€been€hospitalized€numerous€timesÏfor€mental€problems.€€While€living€in€Michigan,€the€Defendant€was€confined€toÏEllaveese,€a€state€mental€hospital,€for€more€than€a€year€and€a€half.€€When€he€movedÏto€Tennessee€sometime€during€the€seventies,€the€Defendant€was€again€admitted€toÏhospitals€due€to€his€mental€problems.€€On€one€occasion,€the€Defendant€staged€aÏmotorcycle€accident€as€a€suicide€attempt€and€suffered€a€head€injury.€€Ms.€SmithÏrecalled€at€least€one€other€automobile€accident€in€which€he€sustained€a€head€injury.€ÏShe€testified€that€the€Defendant€had€been€on€prescription€medicine€for€schizophreniaÏfor€many€years.ÌÌà ` àDr.€Thomas€Williams€took€the€stand€to€testify€that€he€had€treated€the€DefendantÏfor€head€injuries€sustained€from€various€causes,€but€on€cross„examination,€he€statedÏthat€he€did€not€think€there€had€been€any€neurological€damage€as€a€result€of€the€injuries.€ÏDr.€Steven€Ross€Rogers€testified€that€in€1988€he€had€diagnosed€the€Defendant€asÏsuffering€from€Graves€disease,€an€autoimmune€disorder€which€affects€€the€thyroid€glandÏcausing€an€elevated€thyroid€hormone€level.€€The€Defendant€suffered€from€fevers€atÏnight,€and€Dr.€Rogers€prescribed€Valium€to€counteract€the€anxiety€associated€with€thisÏdisease.ÌÌà ` àThe€last€witness€for€the€defense€was€Dr.€Roger€Meyer,€a€clinical€psychologist.€ÏDr.€Meyer€testified€that€medical€records€of€the€Defendant€revealed€that€in€1970€he€hadÏbeen€seen€by€a€therapist€for€over€a€year€and€a€half€for€mental€and€emotional€problems.€Ð  :À0. ÐHe€had€attempted€suicide€on€numerous€occasions€and€had€exhibited€signs€of€schizoidÏaffected€schizophrenia,€chronic€and€differentiated€schizophrenia,€and€paranoidÏschizophrenia.€€In€1977,€the€Defendant€was€evaluated€and€put€on€social€securityÏdisability€for€his€mental€condition.€€ÌÌà ` àAfter€conducting€psychological€and€neuropsychological€tests€on€the€Defendant,ÏDr.€Meyer€determined€that€the€Defendant€suffers€from€a€passive„aggressive€personalityÏdisorder,€drug€and€alcohol€abuse,€and€neuropsychological€problems.€€He€concludedÏthat€the€Defendant€may€not,€in€fact,€remember€what€he€did€on€October€26.€€He€furtherÏconcluded€that€the€Defendant€suffers€from€hyperactivity,€schizophrenia,€and€brainÏdamage€from€alcohol€abuse€and€head€injuries€and€that€these€conditions€would€haveÏimpaired€his€ability€to€think€and€handle€problems€effectively.€€On€cross„examination,€Dr.ÏMeyer€admitted€that€the€Defendant€had€apparently€exaggerated€some€of€his€symptomsÏand€that€the€results€from€the€Minnesota€Multiphasic€Personality€Inventory€had€beenÏthrown€out€for€this€reason.ÌÌà ` àBased€on€the€proof,€the€jury€found€the€existence€of€the€following€two€aggravatingÏcircumstances€beyond€a€reasonable€doubt:€€(1)€€that€the€defendant€knowingly€createdÏa€great€risk€of€death€to€two€(2)€or€more€persons,€other€than€the€victim€murdered,€duringÏthe€act€of€the€murder;€and€(2)€that€the€murder€was€especially€heinous,€atrocious,€orÏcruel€in€that€it€involved€torture€or€serious€physical€abuse€beyond€that€necessary€toÏproduce€death.€€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€€ðð€39„13„204(i)(3)€and€(5)€(1991).€€In€addition,€theÏjury€found€that€the€State€had€proven€beyond€a€reasonable€doubt€that€the€aggravatingÏcircumstances€outweighed€any€mitigating€circumstances€and€as€a€result,€sentenced€theÏDefendant€to€death.ÌÌÓ  Óò òÐ  :À0. ÐPART€I.ÌÌGUILT€PHASE€„€TRIAL€ERRORSÌA.€€Sufficiency€of€the€ProofÌÓ  Óó óÌà ` àThe€Defendant€first€contends€that€the€State€failed€to€present€sufficient€evidenceÏto€demonstrate€that€the€killing€of€Nina€Thompson€was€committed€with€"premeditationÏand€deliberation"€as€required€under€Tennessee€law€to€convict€someone€of€first€degreeÏmurder.€€Rather,€the€Defendant€argues€that€he€acted€without€cool€purpose,€in€the€heatÏof€passion€and€provocation,€without€time€to€reflect,€and€on€impulse.€€He€claims€that€theÏkilling€was€committed€while€he€was€in€an€"emotional€frenzy,"€drunk,€high€on€Valium,Ïstressed,€and€involved€in€a€heated€dispute€with€the€victim€over€his€child.€€He€also€claimsÏthat€there€was€no€preconceived€design€to€kill€but€rather€that€the€crime€was€precipitatedÏby€the€victim€taking€his€child.ÌÌà ` àWhen€an€accused€challenges€the€sufficiency€of€the€convicting€evidence,€thisÏcourt€must€review€the€record€to€determine€if€the€evidence€adduced€during€the€trial€wasÏsufficient€"to€support€the€finding€by€the€trier€of€fact€of€guilt€beyond€a€reasonable€doubt."€ÏT.R.A.P.€13(e).€€This€rule€is€applicable€to€findings€of€guilt€predicated€upon€directÏevidence,€circumstantial€evidence,€or€a€combination€of€direct€and€circumstantialÏevidence.€€òòState€v.€Matthewsóó,€805€S.W.2d€776,€779€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.€1990).Ð à.€%! ÐÌà ` àIn€determining€the€sufficiency€of€he€evidence,€this€court€does€not€reweigh€orÏreevaluate€the€evidence.€€òòState€v.€Cabbageóó,€571€S.W.2d€832,€835€(Tenn.€1978).€€NorÐ €4 +% Ðmay€this€court€substitute€its€inferences€for€those€drawn€by€the€trier€of€fact€fromÏcircumstantial€evidence.€€òòLiakas€v.€Stateóó,€199€Tenn.€298,€305,€286€S.W.2d€856,€859Ð @8à.) Ð(1956).€€This€court€is€required€to€afford€the€state€the€strongest€legitimate€view€of€theÐ  :À0+ Ðevidence€contained€in€the€record€as€well€as€all€reasonable€and€legitimate€inferencesÏwhich€may€be€drawn€therefrom.€€òòState€v.€Herrodóó,€754€S.W.2d€627,€632€(Tenn.€Crim.Ð @ à ÐApp.€1988).ÌÌà ` àQuestions€concerning€the€credibility€of€witnesses,€the€weight€and€value€to€beÏgiven€the€evidence,€as€well€as€factual€issues€raised€by€the€evidence€are€resolved€by€theÏtrier€of€fact,€not€this€court.€€òòCabbageóó,€571€S.W.2d€at€835.€€A€guilty€verdict€rendered€byÐ  @  Ðthe€jury€and€approved€by€the€trial€judge€accredits€the€testimony€of€the€witnesses€for€theÏstate,€and€a€presumption€of€guilt€replaces€the€presumption€of€innocence.€€òòState€v.Ð ` ÐGraceóó,€493€S.W.2d€474,€476€(Tenn.€1973).Ð @à ÐÌà ` àA€Defendant€challenging€the€sufficiency€of€the€proof€has€the€burden€of€illustratingÏto€this€court€why€the€evidence€is€insufficient€to€support€the€verdict€returned€by€the€trierÏof€fact€in€his€or€her€case.€€This€court€will€not€disturb€a€verdict€of€guilt€for€lack€of€sufficientÏevidence€unless€the€facts€contained€in€the€record€and€any€inferences€which€may€beÏdrawn€from€the€facts€are€insufficient,€as€a€matter€of€law,€for€a€rational€trier€of€fact€to€findÏthe€defendant€guilty€beyond€a€reasonable€doubt.€€òòState€v.€Tuggleóó,€639€S.W.2d€913,€914Ð `' Ð(Tenn.€1982).€ÌÌà ` àTennessee€Code€Annotated€section€39„13„201(a),€(b)€(1991)€provides€that€aÏdeliberate€act€is€"one€performed€with€a€cool€purpose"€and€a€premeditated€act€is€"oneÏdone€after€the€exercise€of€reflection€and€judgment."€€The€existence€of€premeditationÏand€deliberation€is€a€question€of€fact€that€may€be€inferred€from€the€manner€andÏcircumstances€of€the€homicide.€€òòState€v.€Tuneóó,€872€S.W.2d€922,€925€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.Ð €4 +( Ð1993).€€In€òòTuneóó,€this€court€held€that€"[w]hile€willful€killing€with€a€deadly€weapon€is€notÐ `6-* Ðâ âsufficient€by€itself€to€support€an€inference€of€premeditation,€there€were€otherÏcircumstances€before€the€jurors€from€which€they€could€infer€the€existence€of€bothÐ  :À0. Ðpremeditation€and€deliberation€in€this€Defendant's€mind."€€òòIdóó.Ð `  Ðâ âÌà ` àIn€the€light€most€favorable€to€the€state,€the€evidence€reflected€that€severalÏwitnesses€heard€the€Defendant€threaten€to€kill€his€wife€before€the€shooting.€€ArleanÏWalden€testified€that€she€had€heard€the€Defendant€threaten€Nina€on€several€occasions.€ÏVicky€Devaney€testified€that€the€Defendant€had€told€both€her€and€Nina€that€"you€bitchesÏwill€pay."€€Elizabeth€Vann,€the€victim's€mother,€testified€that€in€the€early€morning€hoursÏon€the€day€of€the€murder,€the€Defendant€had€told€her€that€he€was€going€to€"kill€that€bitchÏNina."€€Kevin€Helms€testified€that€on€the€evening€before€the€murder,€the€Defendant€hadÏshown€him€a€rifle€and€had€stated€that€anyone€who€tried€to€get€his€baby€"would€have€aÏwar€on€their€hands."€€The€Defendant€carried€a€loaded€assault€rifle€around€in€his€carÏwhile€he€was€looking€for€his€wife€on€October€25€and€26.€€He€left€the€loaded€gun€in€theÏliving€room€of€his€trailer,€easily€accessible€if€anyone€came€to€"get€his€baby."€€The€juryÏcould€have€easily€found€that€the€Defendant€had€formed€an€intent€or€design€to€kill€priorÏto€the€actual€killing.€€òòSeeóó€òòState€v.€Brownóó,€836€S.W.2d€530,€540€(Tenn.€1992);€òòsee€alsoóóÐ  #@ ÐòòState€v.€Westóó,€844€S.W.2d€144,€147€(Tenn.€1992).Ð €%  ÐÌà ` àThe€evidence€also€supports€the€finding€that€the€Defendant€acted€withÏdeliberation€in€that€the€circumstances€suggest€that€he€reflected€upon€the€manner€andÏconsequences€of€his€act.€€The€Defendant€fired€his€first€shot€into€Christy€Rominger.€€HeÏthen€shot€Nina€as€she€turned€to€walk€across€the€street.€€After€falling€to€the€ground,€NinaÏbegged€him€not€to€shoot,€but€the€Defendant€stepped€towards€her€and€proceeded€to€fireÏseveral€more€shots€into€her€body.€€We€are€satisfied€that€the€evidence€in€this€case€wasÏsufficient€to€establish€the€elements€of€premeditation€and€deliberation€so€as€to€warrantÏthe€jury's€verdict.ÌÌÓ  Óò òÐ  :À0. ÐB.€€Right€to€Present€a€Full€DefenseÌÌÓ  Óó óà ` àThe€Defendant€next€insists€that€he€was€denied€his€right€to€present€a€defenseÐ  À Ðwhen€the€trial€court€refused€to€allow€him€to€present€evidence€which€would€negate€theÏmens€rea€of€first€degree€murder.€€Specifically,€he€contests€the€trial€court's€preclusionÏof€the€testimony€of€Dr.€Roger€Meyer€and€the€testimony€of€a€news€reporter€which€theÏDefendant€contends€would€have€impeached€the€testimony€of€an€investigating€officerÏand€would€have€shown€that€the€officer€had€observed€the€Defendant's€disturbed€mentalÏstate€at€the€time€of€the€offense.ÌÌà ` àDuring€the€guilt€phase€of€the€trial,€the€Defendant€sought€to€call€Dr.€Roger€Meyer,Ïa€clinical€psychologist,€who,€under€òòexóó€òòparteóó€orders€from€the€trial€court,€had€examinedÐ   Ðthe€Defendant.€€The€State€objected€on€the€ground€that€the€defense€had€not€givenÏwritten€notice€pursuant€to€Tennessee€Rule€of€Criminal€Procedure€12.2(b)€whichÏrequires€the€€following:ÌÓÓà8 ` àà ¸ àIf€a€defendant€intends€to€introduce€expert€testimony€relating€to€aÏmental€disease€or€defect€or€any€other€mental€condition€of€the€defendantÏbearing€upon€the€issue€of€his€guilt,€he€shall,€within€the€time€provided€forÏthe€filing€of€pretrial€motions€or€at€such€later€time€as€the€court€may€direct,Ïnotify€the€district€attorney€in€writing€of€such€intention€and€file€a€copy€ofÏsuch€notice€with€the€clerk.Ð ` ü!` ü! ÐÌÓÓIf€there€is€failure€to€comply€with€this€requirement,€"the€court€may€exclude€the€testimonyÏof€any€expert€witness€offered€by€the€defendant€on€the€issue€of€his€mental€condition."€ÏTenn.€R.€Crim.€P.€12.2(d).ÌÌà ` àThe€defense€argued€that€it€had€arrived€at€its€decision€to€use€the€testimony€of€Dr.ÏMeyer€only€after€hearing€testimony€from€other€witnesses,€who€brought€the€Defendant'sÏmental€condition€at€the€time€of€the€shooting€into€question,€and€therefore,€notice€had€notÏbeen€given.€€The€trial€court€agreed€with€the€State€and€excluded€the€testimony.€€TheÐ 09Ð/, Ðdefense€also€argued€that€although€written€notice€pursuant€to€Tenn.€R.€Crim.€P.€12.2(b)Ïhad€not€been€given,€the€State€had€actual€notice.€€The€defense€noted€that€Dr.€Meyer€hadÏsent€his€first€bill€to€the€court€when€he€had€examined€the€Defendant€under€the€court's€òòexóóÐ  À Ðòòparteóó€orders€and€that€the€bill€had€been€placed€in€the€court's€file.€€The€defense€alsoÐ   Ðnoted€that€the€State€had€its€own€expert€on€call€for€the€sentencing€phase€of€the€trial€andÏargued€that€this€expert€could€be€used€to€rebut€the€testimony€of€Dr.€Meyer.ÌÌà ` àThe€Compulsory€Process€Clause€of€the€Sixth€Amendment€guarantees€everyÏcriminal€defendant€"the€right€.€.€.€to€have€compulsory€process€for€obtaining€witnessesÏin€his€favor."€€Exercise€of€the€right€assists€the€adversarial€process€in€its€truth„seekingÏfunction€by€ensuring€that€the€trial€court€hears€all€admissible€facts€pertinent€to€the€case.€ÏòòBowling€v.€Voseóó,€3€F.3d€559,€561€(1st€Cir.€1993).€€However,€as€the€Supreme€CourtÐ   Ðnoted€in€òòTaylor€v.€Illinoisóó,€484€U.S.€400,€408,€108€S.Ct.€646,€652,€98€L.Ed.2d€798Ð à€ Ð(1988),€"[i]t€is€not€an€absolute€right."€€The€Court€found€that€a€trial€court€may€exclude€aÏdefense€witness€for€a€discovery€violation€without€trampling€on€his€constitutional€rights.€Ï€The€Court€issued€no€hard€test,€but€rather€listed€various€considerations€that€a€judgeÏshould€use€as€a€guide€in€balancing€a€defendant's€right€to€have€witnesses€testify€in€hisÏor€her€behalf€against€"countervailing€public€interests."€€484€U.S.€at€414„15,€108€S.Ct.Ïat€656.€€These€include€the€"integrity€of€the€adversary€process,€which€depends€both€onÏthe€presentation€of€reliable€evidence€and€the€rejection€of€unreliable€evidence,€theÏinterest€in€the€fair€and€efficient€administration€of€justice,€and€the€potential€prejudice€toÏthe€truth„determining€function€of€the€trial€process."€€òòIdóó.Ð À0`'( ÐÌà ` àIn€applying€this€test€to€the€case€at€bar,€we€agree€with€the€Defendant€€that€theÏpsychological€testimony€of€Dr.€Meyer,€an€expert€witness,€could€be€considered€reliable.€ÏIn€assessing€the€fairness€of€the€trial€court's€decision,€we€look€to€defense€counsel'sÏreason€for€failing€to€notify€the€State€of€its€intention€to€present€Dr.€Meyer's€testimony,Ð  :À00 Ðand€we€conclude€that€the€reason€is€plausible.€€It€is€quite€possible€that€the€decision€toÏintroduce€the€psychological€testimony€was€not€reached€until€testimony€was€heard€fromÏcertain€State's€witnesses.€€Moreover,€the€State€had€actual€notice€that€Dr.€Meyer€hadÏbeen€retained€by€the€defense,€and€the€State€had€contacted€its€own€expert€witness€toÏprepare€for€a€rebuttal.€€Lastly,€we€conclude€that€the€"truth„determining€function"€of€theÏtrial€process€was€not€at€risk.€€As€his€only€rational€defense,€the€Defendant€was€entitledÏto€present€evidence€which€would€negate€the€Defendant's€ability€to€form€the€requiredÏmens€rea€for€the€offense.ÌÌà ` àThe€Defendant€also€cites€a€large€body€of€federal€authority€which€holds€thatÏexclusion€of€testimony€is€constitutionally€permissible€only€if€the€defendant€has€willfullyÏdefied€discovery€rules€at€the€expense€of€the€integrity€of€the€judicial€process.€€òòSeeóó€òòUnitedÐ   ÐStates€v.€Mitanóó,€966€F.2d€1165,€1175„76€(7th€Cir.€1992);€òòHorton€v.€Zantóó,€941€F.2d€1449,Ð à€ Ð1467€(11th€Cir.€1991);€òòEckert€v.€Tansyóó,€936€F.2d€444,€446€(9th€Cir.€1991);€òòEscalera€v.Ð À!` ÐCoombeóó€852€F.2d€45,€47„48€(2d€Cir.€1988);€òòChappee€v.€Voseóó,€843€F.2d€25,€29„32€(1stÐ  #@ ÐCir.€1988).€€In€òòChappeeóó,€the€First€Circuit€held€that€"[e]xclusionary€sanctions€mustÐ €%  Ðappropriately€be€reserved€for€hard„core€transgressions."€€843€F.2d€at€31.ÌÌà ` àNothing€in€the€record€in€this€case€indicates€that€the€Defendant's€failure€to€provideÏnotice€was€willful€and€deliberate.€€Rather,€the€trial€court€seemed€to€base€its€decision€onÏthe€fact€that€the€State€would€not€have€an€opportunity€to€rebut€the€expert's€testimony.€ÏÌà ` àIn€the€case€at€bar,€the€Defendant€was€attempting€to€present€evidence€relatingÏto€the€Defendant's€mens€rea€at€the€time€he€committed€this€crime.׃×Ý ƒ #ÃÝòòÚ  Ú1Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý×  ×€€Alternative€sanctionsÐ €4 +) Ðwere€available.€€The€trial€court€could€have€granted€a€reasonable€continuance€to€allowÏthe€State€time€to€interview€Dr.€Meyer€and€to€have€its€own€expert€present€for€rebuttal.€ÏWe€conclude€that€the€trial€court's€exclusion€of€Dr.€Meyer's€testimony€was€error.ÌÌà ` àThe€State€argues€that€even€if€the€trial€court€committed€error,€such€error€wasÏharmless€beyond€a€doubt€because€the€Defendant€was€allowed€to€introduce€theÏtestimony€of€Dr.€Meyer€during€the€sentencing€phase€of€the€trial,€and€the€jury,Ïnevertheless,€returned€a€death€sentence.€€Although,€admittedly,€Dr.€Meyer's€testimonyÏduring€the€sentencing€phase€included€several€strong€assertions€that€the€DefendantÏlacked€the€necessary€capacity€to€form€the€requisite€intent€for€first€degree€murder€andÏthe€jury€still€sentenced€the€Defendant€to€death,€it€is€for€this€same€reason€that€we€cannotÏdeem€the€error€to€be€harmless.€€ÌÌà ` àThe€evidence€conclusively€established€that€the€Defendant€shot€his€wife.€€AÏprimary€issue€was€whether€the€Defendant,€at€the€time€of€the€shooting,€possessed€theÏrequired€mental€state€to€warrant€a€first€degree€murder€conviction.€€Because€Dr.€Meyer'sÏtestimony,€which€focused€solely€on€the€Defendant's€mental€status,€was€excluded€in€theÏguilt€phase,€the€jury€did€not€hear€nor€was€it€instructed€to€consider€this€evidence€inÏrelation€to€the€Defendant's€ability€to€form€the€requisite€intent.€€The€Defendant's€medicalÏhistory€revealed€that€he€had€been€diagnosed€as€schizophrenic€at€the€age€of€twelve,€thatÏhe€had€been€hospitalized€numerous€times€for€mental€problems,€that€he€had€attemptedÏsuicide€on€numerous€occasions,€and€that€he€had€been€receiving€social€securityÏdisability€payments€due€to€his€mental€condition€since€1977.€€At€the€sentencing€phaseÏof€the€trial,€Dr.€Meyer€testified€that€after€conducting€numerous€tests€on€the€Defendant,Ð €4 +* Ðhe€had€determined€that€the€Defendant€suffered€from€a€passive„aggressive€personalityÏdisorder,€drug€and€alcohol€abuse,€and€neuropsychological€problems€and€that€thoseÏconditions€would€have€impaired€his€ability€to€think€and€handle€problems€effectively.€€WeÏcannot€say€that€we€are€convinced€that€exclusion€of€this€evidence€was€harmless.€€òòSeeóóÐ   ÐT.€R.€A.€P.€36(b);€Tenn.€R.€Crim.€P.€52(a).€€This€case€must€therefore€be€reversed€andÏremanded€for€a€new€trial.ÌÌà ` àThe€Defendant€also€argues€that€he€was€denied€the€opportunity€to€present€vitalÏevidence€concerning€his€mental€status€when€he€was€precluded€from€presentingÏevidence€that€a€police€officer€observed€that€the€Defendant€was€mentally€disturbed€onÏthe€day€of€the€killing.€€At€trial,€the€defense€recalled€Officer€Marvin€Farris€during€its€case„¼ñÈñ¼ñÈñin„chief.€€Officer€Farris€testified€concerning€the€Defendant's€demeanor€after€theÏshooting€when€he€had€interviewed€him€at€the€McMinn€County€Jail,€stating€that€he€hadÏnot€noticed€anything€unusual€about€the€Defendant's€demeanor€or€speech.€€When€askedÏwhether€after€the€interview€he€had€told€David€Stone,€a€news€reporter,€that€theÏDefendant€"had€seemed€concerned€about€his€wife's€welfare,"€Officer€Farris€replied,€"IÏdon't€remember."€€When€asked€whether€he€had€told€Mr.€Stone€that€the€Defendant€hadÏwanted€to€know€how€she€was€getting€along€and€didn't€seem€to€know€that€she€was€dead,ÏOfficer€Farris€replied,€"I€might€have.€€I€do€not€remember."׃×Ý ƒ #ÃÝòòÚ  Ú2Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý×  ×Ð  +À!" ÐÌà ` àDavid€Stone€was€subpoenaed€by€the€Defendant€in€an€attempt€to€impeach€OfficerÏFarris.€€A€motion€to€quash€the€subpoena€was€filed€by€Mr.€Stone,€and€the€State€objectedÏto€Mr.€Stone's€testimony€on€the€ground€that€his€testimony€would€be€inadmissibleÏhearsay.€€After€hearing€argument,€the€trial€court€ruled€that€the€Mr.€Stone's€testimonyÐ €4 +* Ðcould€not€be€used€as€an€inconsistent€statement€to€impeach€Officer€Farris€because€atÏtrial€Officer€Farris€had€not€absolutely€denied€making€such€statement€and€his€priorÏstatement€could€not€therefore€be€used€to€impeach€him.€ÌÌà ` àAlthough€the€State€contends€that€Tennessee€follows€the€minority€view€that€directÏcontradiction€is€required€when€one€seeks€to€impeach€a€witness,€this€court€finds€noÏauthority€for€such€a€contention.€€Tennessee€Rule€of€Evidence€613€authorizes€the€useÏof€a€prior€inconsistent€statement€to€impeach,€but€does€not€define€"inconsistent."€€€InÏòòReagan€v.€Mabryóó,€67€Tenn.€168,€169€(1874),€our€supreme€court€held€that€when€aÐ ` Ðwitness€has€been€asked€whether€he€made€a€contradictory€statement€and€neither€admitsÏnor€denies€but€claims€that€he€doesn't€remember,€the€statement€is€admissible€becauseÏsuch€statement€when€proven€may€have€been€such€as€to€amount€to€a€directÏcontradiction€of€the€witness€and€may€also€convince€the€jury€that€the€witness€did€notÏspeak€the€truth€in€saying€that€he€did€not€remember€making€the€statement.€€òòSeeóó€òòalsoóóÐ À!` ÐòòState€v.€Cateóó,€746€S.W.2d€727,€730€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.€1987);€€òòState€v.€Billy€Joe€Bourffóó,Ð  #@ ÐNo.€03C01„9305„CR„00162,€Campbell€County€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.,€Knoxville,€June€23,Ï1994);€Neil€Cohen€et.€al,€òòTennessee€Law€of€Evidenceóó,€ðð€613.2€€(2d€ed.€1990€&€Supp.Ð `' Ð1993).€€Such€is€the€case€before€us.€€Officer€Farris€neither€admitted€nor€denied€that€heÏhad€made€the€statement€to€Mr.€Stone,€but€rather€told€the€court€that€he€"might€have.€€IÏdon't€remember."€€Accordingly,€€the€trial€court€committed€error€in€precluding€thisÏtestimony.׃×Ý ƒ #ÃÝòòÚ  Ú3Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý×  ×Ð à.€%& Ðà ` àÌÓ  ÓÌÐ €4 +) ÐC.€€Instructional€ErrorsÌÌÓ  Óà ` àThe€Defendant€challenges€the€jury€instructions€given€at€the€guilt€phase€on€threeÏgrounds.€€He€first€€argues€that€the€trial€court's€jury€instruction€on€voluntary€intoxicationÏrelieved€the€State€from€its€burden€of€proof€and€precluded€the€Defendant€fromÏpresenting€a€full€defense.€€ÌÌà ` àAt€trial,€the€court€gave€the€following€instruction€on€involuntary€intoxication:ÌÓÓà8 ` àà ¸ àVoluntary€drunkenness€or€intoxication.€€You€have€heard€evidenceÏconcerning€the€alleged€drunkenness€of€the€defendant€at€the€time€of€thisÏoffense.€€You€are€instructed€that€voluntary€drunkenness€is€generally€noÏdefense€to€a€criminal€charge.€€If€a€person€voluntarily€drinks€and€becomesÏintoxicated,€and€while€in€that€condition€commits€an€act€which€would€be€aÏcrime€if€he€were€sober,€he€is€fully€responsible€for€his€conduct.€€This€is€soÏunless€his€drunkenness€had€continued€for€such€a€long€period€of€time€soÏas€to€result€in€settled€insanity€by€the€time€of€the€offense.€€It€is€the€duty€ofÏpersons€to€refrain€from€placing€themselves€in€a€condition€which€poses€aÏdanger€to€others.Ð ` ü!` ü! ÐÌà8 ` àà ¸ àHowever,€as€an€exception€to€this€rule,€voluntary€drunkenness€canÏbe€a€defense€to€the€crime€of€murder€in€the€first€degree,€depending€uponÏthe€fact€whether€the€drunkenness€prevented€the€deliberation€andÏpremeditation€essential€to€constitute€the€crime€of€murder€in€the€firstÏdegree.Ð ` ü!` ü! ÐÌà8 ` àà ¸ àThe€voluntary€drunkenness€of€one€charged€with€taking€the€life€ofÏanother€can€be€looked€to€only€for€the€purpose€of€determining€whetherÏsuch€drunkenness€had€so€affected€the€mind€of€the€person€so€chargedÏthat,€at€the€time,€he€was€incapable€[sic]€of€forming€in€his€mind€aÏpremeditated€and€deliberate€design€to€kill.€€But€in€legal€estimation€aÏdrunken€man€may€be€guilty€of€murder€in€the€first€degree€as€if€he€wereÏsober,€if€it€shall€appear€from€the€facts€that€the€killing€was€willful,Ïdeliberate,€malicious,€and€premeditated.Ð ` ü!` ü! ÐÌà8 ` àà ¸ àTherefore,€it€is€your€duty€to€consider€the€defendant's€drunkenness,Ïif€any,€in€connection€with€all€the€other€facts€and€circumstances€in€proof,Ïin€deciding€whether€the€act€was€done€with€premeditation€and€deliberation.€ÏIf€you€find€that€the€defendant's€drunkenness€was€to€such€an€extent€thatÏhe€was€incapable€at€the€time€of€foaming€[sic]€in€his€mind€a€premeditatedÏand€deliberate€design€to€kill,€or€if€you€have€a€reasonable€doubt€as€to€thisÏquestion,€then€you€must€find€the€defendant€not€guilty€of€murder€in€the€firstÏdegree.Ð ` ü!` ü! ÐÌâ âÐ 09Ð/. ÐÓ¾£Óà ` àSpecifically,€the€Defendant€contends€that€this€instruction€was€erroneous€becauseÏâ âit€unconstitutionally€permitted€the€jury€to€consider€intoxication€evidence€only€if€theÏDefendant€was€"incapable€of€forming€a€premeditated€and€deliberate€design€to€kill."€€HeÏargues€that€a€reasonable€juror€would€have€understood€this€instruction€to€mean€thatÏintoxication€could€only€preclude€a€finding€of€first€degree€murder€if€the€Defendant€wasÏin€such€a€state€that€he€had€no€mental€capacity€to€form€such€an€intent,€i.e.,€that€he€wasÏmentally€unable€to€premeditate€and€deliberate.ÌÌà ` àWe€conclude€that€the€instruction,€taken€directly€from€Tennessee€Pattern€JuryÏInstructions„„Criminal€ðð€36.08,€did€not€mislead€the€jury.€€The€fourth€paragraph€of€theÏinstruction€states€that€it€is€the€jury's€duty€to€"consider€the€defendant's€drunkenness,€ifÏany,€in€connection€with€all€the€other€facts€and€circumstances€in€proof,€in€decidingÏwhether€the€act€was€done€with€premeditation€and€deliberation."€€The€second€paragraphÏstated€that€voluntary€drunkenness€can€be€a€defense€to€first€degree€murder€if€"theÏdrunkenness€prevented€the€deliberation€and€premeditation€essential€to€constitute€theÏcrime."€€Though€the€instruction€referred€to€the€capacity€of€the€Defendant€to€form€theÏ"premeditated€and€deliberate€design€to€kill,"€the€instruction€also€informed€the€jury€thatÏit€must€consider€whether€the€drunkenness€actually€"prevented€the€deliberation€andÏpremeditation€essential€to€constitute€the€crime€.€.€.€."€€This€issue€is€without€merit.ÌÌà ` àThe€Defendant€next€contends€that€the€jury€instruction€on€the€element€of€maliceÏimpermissibly€shifted€the€burden€of€proof€on€an€essential€element€of€the€crime€inÏviolation€of€the€Supreme€Court€decision€in€òòSandstrom€v.€Montanaóó,€422€U.S.€510,€99Ð  2@)( ÐS.Ct.€2450,€61€L.Ed.2d€39€(1979).€€The€contested€portion€of€the€charge€reads€asÏfollows:ÌÓÓà8 ` àà ¸ àMalice€is€an€essential€ingredient€of€this€offense,€and€it€may€beÏeither€express€or€implied.€€A€case€of€homicide€cannot€be€murder€unlessÏat€and€before€the€killing€the€wicked€intent,€constituting€malice€aforethoughÐ  :À0/ Ð[sic],€exists€in€the€mind€of€the€slayer.€€Malice€is€an€intent€to€do€injury€toÏanother,€a€design€formed€in€the€mind€of€doing€mischief€to€another.Ð ` ü!` ü! ÐÌà8 ` àà ¸ àExpress€malice€is€actual€malice€against€the€party€slain€and€existsÏwhere€a€person€actually€contemplates€the€injury€or€wrong€he€inflicts.€ÏImplied€malice€is€malice€not€against€the€party€slain,€but€malice€in€general,Ïor€that€condition€of€mind€which€indicates€a€wicked,€depraved€andÏmalignant€spirit€and€heart€regardless€of€social€duty€and€fatally€bent€onÏmischief.€€Implied€malice€may€be€found€to€exist€where€the€wrongdoer€didÏnot€intend€to€slay€the€persn€[sic]€killed€but€death€resulted€from€aÏconsciously€unlawful€act€done€intentionally€and€with€knowledge€on€theÏwrongdoer's€part€that€the€act€was€directly€perilous€to€human€life.€€In€thisÏevent,€there€is€implied€such€a€high€degree€of€conscious€and€willfulÏrecklessness€as€to€amount€to€that€malignity€of€heart€constitution€malice.Ð ` ü!` ü! ÐÌà8 ` àà ¸ àLikewise,€if€a€deadly€weapon€is€handled€in€a€manner€so€as€toÏmake€the€killing€a€natural€or€probable€result€of€such€conduct,€then€youÏmay€infer€malice€sufficient€to€support€a€conviction€of€murder€in€theÏsecond€degree,€but€agan€[sic]€this€inference€may€be€rebutted€by€eitherÏdirect€or€circumstantial€evidence€or€by€both€regardesls€[sic]€of€whetherÏthe€same€be€offered€by€the€defendant€or€exists€in€the€evidence€of€theÏstate.€€A€"deadly€weapon"€is€any€weapon€or€instrument€which€from€theÏmanner€in€which€it€is€used€or€attemptped€[sic]€to€be€used€is€likely€toÏproduce€death€or€cause€great€bodily€injury.Ð ` ü!` ü! ÐÌà8 ` àà ¸ àMalice€cannot€be€inferred€from€deadly€intent€only,€because€theÏdeadly€intent€may€be€justifiable€under€the€law,€as€where€one€willfully€killsÏanother€to€save€his€own€life€or€to€save€himself€from€great€bodily€harm€andÏthe€danger€is€imminent€and€immediate,€or€when€the€intent€to€kill€isÏproduced€by€anger,€for€if€it€were€sudden€and€upon€reasonableÏprovocation€the€killing€might€or€might€not€be€manslaughter,€but€it€wouldÏnot€be€murder.Ð ` ü!` ü! ÐÌà8 ` àà ¸ àYou€are€reminded€that€the€state€always€has€the€burden€of€provingÏevery€element€of€the€crime€charged€beyond€a€reasonable€doubt.€€AÏpermissible€inference€may€or€may€not€be€drawn€from€an€elemental€factÏfrom€proof€by€the€state€of€a€basic€fact.€€However,€all€inferences€permittedÏto€be€drawn€may€be€rebutted.€€An€ifnerence€[sic]€does€not€place€anyÏburden€of€proof€of€any€kind€upon€the€defendant.Ð ` ü!` ü! ÐÌÌLater,€the€jury€instructions€provided€as€follows:ÌÌÌà8 ` àà ¸ àIf€the€state€has€proven€beyond€a€reasonable€doubt€that€a€killingÏhad€occurred,€the€[sic]€you€may€infer€that€the€killing€was€done€maliciously,Ïbut€this€inference€may€be€rebutted€by€either€direct€or€circumstantialÏevidence,€or€by€both,€regardless€of€whether€the€same€be€offered€by€theÏdefendant,€or€exists€in€the€evidence€of€the€state.Ð ` ü!` ü! ÐÌâ âÐ @8à.2 ÐÓÓà ` àIn€òòSandstromóó,€the€United€States€Supreme€Court€held€that€jury€instructions€whichÐ `  Ðâ âcan€be€interpreted€as€a€conclusive€presumption€or€that€shift€the€burden€of€persuasionÏto€the€defendant€violated€the€defendant's€constitutional€right€to€due€process.€€442€U.S.Ïat€522„24.€€In€determining€whether€a€jury€instruction€meets€constitutional€muster,€courtsÏmust€ascertain€whether€the€challenged€charge€creates€a€mandatory€presumption€or€aÏpermissive€inference.€€òòSeeóó€òòFrancis€v.€Franklinóó,€471€U.S.€307,€105€S.Ct.€1965,€85Ð À`  ÐL.Ed.2d€344€(1985).€€A€mandatory€presumption€violates€due€process€because€it€shiftsÏthe€burden€to€the€defendant.€€A€permissive€inference,€however,€does€not€violate€theÏConstitution€because€the€State€must€still€prove€facts€from€which€an€element€such€asÏmalice€might€be€reasonably€inferred.ÌÌà ` àIn€òòFrancisóó,€in€determining€whether€or€not€a€given€charge€embodied€aÐ   Ðpresumption€or€a€permissive€inference,€the€Court€noted€the€following:ÌÓÓà8 ` àà ¸ àIf€a€specific€portion€of€the€jury€charge,€considered€in€isolation,Ïcould€reasonably€have€been€understood€as€creating€a€presumption€thatÏrelieves€the€State€of€its€burden€of€persuasion€on€an€element€of€theÏoffense,€the€potentially€offending€words€must€be€considered€in€theÏcontext€of€the€charge€as€a€whole.€€Other€instructions€might€explain€theÏparticular€infirm€language€to€the€extent€that€a€reasonable€juror€could€notÏhave€considered€the€charge€to€have€created€a€[sic]€unconstitutionalÏpresumption.Ð ` ü!` ü! ÐÌ471€U.S.€at€315,€105€S.Ct.€at€1971.ÌÌÌÓÓà ` àIn€the€jury€instructions€given€in€the€case€at€bar,€the€court€told€the€jury€that€theÏState€always€has€the€burden€of€proving€every€element€of€the€charge€beyond€aÏreasonable€doubt.€€The€court€also€told€them€that€a€permissible€inference€"may€or€mayÏnot"€be€drawn€from€proof€by€the€State€of€a€basic€fact.€€Finally,€the€court€told€the€jury€thatÏ"[a]n€inference€does€not€place€any€burden€of€proof€of€any€kind€upon€the€defendant."ÌÌà ` àIn€considering€what€the€Defendant€argues€is€"presumption€of€malice"€in€theÏcontext€of€the€entire€charge,€we€conclude€that€a€reasonable€juror€could€not€haveÐ  :À0/ Ðconsidered€the€charge€to€have€created€an€unconstitutional€presumption.€€This€issue€isÏwithout€merit.ÌÌà ` àLastly,€the€Defendant€contends€that€the€jury€was€unconstitutionally€instructed€onÏthe€meaning€of€€"reasonable€doubt"€at€both€the€guilt€phase€and€the€sentencing€phaseÏof€the€trial.€€During€the€guilt€phase,€the€court€gave€the€following€instruction:ÌÓÓà8 ` àà ¸ àThe€state€has€the€burden€of€proving€the€guilt€of€the€defendantÏbeyond€a€reasonable€doubt....Ð ` ü!` ü! ÐÌà8 ` àà ¸ àReasonable€doubt€is€that€doubt€engendered€by€an€investigation€ofÏall€the€proof€in€the€case€and€an€inability,€after€such€investigation,€to€let€theÏmind€rest€easily€as€to€the€certainty€of€guilt.€€Reasonable€doubt€does€notÏmean€a€captious,€possible€or€imaginary€doubt.€€Absolute€certainty€of€guiltÏis€not€demanded€by€the€law€to€convict€of€any€criminal€charge,€but€moralÏcertainty€is€required€as€to€every€proposition€of€proof€requisite€to€constituteÏthe€offense.Ð ` ü!` ü! ÐÌÌÓÓà ` àThe€Defendant€argues€that€the€use€of€the€expression€"moral€certainty"€in€thisÏinstruction€was€unconstitutional€pursuant€to€the€United€States€Supreme€Court€decisionÏin€òòVictor€v.€Nebraskaóó€and€òòSandoval€v.€Californiaóó,€òò€€€€€€óó€U.S.€òò€€€€€€óó,€114€S.Ct.€1239,€127Ð  #@ ÐL.Ed.2d€583€(1994).€€In€òòVictoróó,€the€Supreme€Court€ruled€that€the€phrase€"moralÐ €%  Ðcertainty"€may€have€lost€its€historical€meaning€and€that€a€modern€jury€mightÏ"understand€it€to€allow€conviction€on€proof€that€does€not€meet€the€reasonable€doubtÏstandard."€€114€S.Ct.€at€1247.€€It€reasoned€that€"'moral€certainty'€standing€alone,€mightÏnot€be€recognized€by€modern€jurors€as€a€synonym€for€'proof€beyond€a€reasonableÏdoubt,'"€but€"something€less€than€the€very€high€level€of€probability€required€by€theÏConstitution€in€criminal€cases."€€òòIdóó.€€Yet€the€court€upheld€the€conviction€in€òòVictoróóÐ À0`'' Ðbecause€the€jurors€were€told€that€they€must€have€"an€abiding€conviction,€to€a€moralÏcertainty,€of€the€truth€of€the€charge,"€and€the€court€concluded€that€the€instructionÏ"impress[ed]€upon€the€fact€finder€the€need€to€reach€a€subjective€state€of€near€certitudeÏof€the€guilt€of€the€accused."€€òòIdóó.€(citing€òòJackson€v.€Virginiaóó,€443€U.S.€307,€315,€99€S.Ct.Ð @8à./ Ð2781,€2786,61€L.Ed.2d€560€(1979)).€€Ð  :À01 Їà ` àIn€the€present€case,€the€trial€court€used€the€phrase€"moral€certainty"€inÏconjunction€with€an€explanation€that€reasonable€doubt€is€"that€doubt€engendered€by€anÏinvestigation€of€all€the€proof€in€the€case€and€an€inability,€after€such€investigation,€to€letÏthe€mind€rest€easily€as€to€the€certainty€of€guilt."€€On€several€occasions,€TennesseeÏcourts€have€held€that€identical€and€similar€instructions€were€consistent€withÏconstitutional€principles.€€òòState€v.€Nicholsóó,€877€S.W.2d€722,€734€(Tenn.€1994);€€òòStateÐ À`  Ðv.€Hallockóó,€875€S.W.2d€285,€294€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.€1993);€òòRichard€Caldwell€v.€Stateóó,Ð  @  ÐNo.€02C01„9405„CC„00099,€Madison€County€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.,€Jackson,€Dec.€28,Ï1994).׃×Ý ƒ #ÃÝòòÚ  Ú4Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý×  ×€€As€in€these€cases,€we€conclude€that€the€instruction€as€given,€adequatelyÐ ` Ðdefined€the€degree€of€doubt€necessary€for€a€guilty€verdict.׃ X×Ý ƒ #ÃÝòòÚ  Ú5Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý×  ׀Р@à ÐÌò òÓ  ÓD.€€Voir€Dire€and€Jury€SelectionÐ   ÐÌÓ  Óó óà ` àThe€Defendant€next€complains€that€the€trial€court€violated€his€rights€during€voirÐ À!` Ðdire€and€jury€selection€by€:€€(1)€precluding€the€exercise€of€the€Defendant's€"for€cause"Ïand€peremptory€challenges€by€improperly€limiting€the€scope€of€voir€dire;€(2)€erroneouslyÏfailing€to€exclude€jurors€for€"cause;"€(3)€prohibiting€individual€voir€dire€of€the€entireÏpanel;€and€(4)€improperly€excluding€jurors€who€expressed€scruples€concerning€theÏdeath€penalty.ÌÌà ` àThe€Defendant€first€contends€that€because€he€was€denied€the€right€to€individuallyÏquestion€potential€jurors€concerning€their€opinions€and€knowledge€of€the€offense,€heÏwas€denied€his€right€to€establish€necessary€grounds€for€cause€or€for€his€peremptoryÏstrikes.€€Specifically,€when€two€of€the€jurors€gave€limited€responses€when€asked€aboutÐ €4 +( Ðtheir€opinions€concerning€the€Defendant's€guilt€and€the€defense€requested€individualÏvoir€dire€to€probe€the€exact€nature€of€the€prospective€jurors'€knowledge€of€the€facts,€theÏtrial€court€denied€the€motion€because€he€contended€that€the€procedure€would€beÏphysically€impossible€with€limited€space€and€manpower,€and€there€would€be€no€way€toÏkeep€a€record.€€Because€of€this€denial,€the€Defendant€asserts€that€he€was€forced€to€useÏtwo€peremptory€challenges€to€remove€these€jurors.ÌÌà ` àTennessee€Rule€of€Criminal€Procedure€24(a),€in€pertinent€part,€states€that€theÏtrial€court€"shall€permit€questioning€by€the€parties€for€the€purpose€of€discovering€basesÏfor€challenge€for€cause€and€enabling€an€intelligent€exercise€of€peremptory€challenges."€ÏIt€further€states€that€"[t]he€court€.€.€.€€may€direct€that€any€portion€of€the€questioning€ofÏa€prospective€juror€be€conducted€out€of€the€presence€of€the€tentatively€selected€jurorsÏand€other€prospective€jurors."€€Although€the€rule€provides€no€test€for€determiningÏwhether€the€scope€of€questioning€is€adequate€to€fulfill€the€rule's€purpose,€TennesseeÏcourts€have€held€that€"the€scope€and€extent€of€voir€dire€is€entrusted€to€the€discretion€ofÏthe€trial€judge,€and€his€actions€will€not€be€disturbed€unless€clear€abuse€of€discretion€isÏshown."€€òòState€v.€Harrisóó,€839€S.W.2d€54,€65€(Tenn.€1992).Ð `' ÐÌà ` àThe€trial€judge€in€this€case€indicated€a€disposition€to€focus€the€voir€dire€onÏwhether€prospective€jurors€had€formed€opinions€about€the€case,€and€if€so,€whether€theyÏcould€set€their€opinions€aside.€€He€twice€asked€them€if€there€were€any€of€them€"who€feelÏlike€because€what€you€have€read€or€heard€that€you€could€not€grant€Mr.€Thompson€thatÏpresumption€of€innocence€at€this€point,"€and€the€two€jurors€mentioned€above€did€notÏrespond€affirmatively.€€The€trial€judge's€inquiry€was€sufficient,€and€he€did€not€abuse€hisÏdiscretion€in€limiting€voir€dire.Ìâ âÐ @8à.- Ðà ` àThe€Defendant€next€contends€that€the€trial€court's€failure€to€excuse€a€prospectiveÏâ âjuror€for€cause€when€her€answers€did€not€"unequivocally"€show€that€she€could€beÏimpartial€was€reversible€error.€€During€voir€dire,€Shirley€Evans€was€called€as€aÏprospective€juror,€and€when€asked€if€she€had€read€anything€about€the€killing,€sheÏreplied€that€she€"had€read€it€yesterday€and€when€it€happened."€€When€asked€if€she€hadÏformed€an€opinion,€she€replied,€"When€I€first€read€it€it€[sic]€did."€€When€asked€if€herÏopinions€would€keep€her€from€giving€the€Defendant€the€presumption€of€innocence,€sheÏstated€that€she€"would€try€to€be€fair."€€When€further€questioned€about€whether€sheÏwould€start€out€with€any€preconceived€opinions€or€ideas€that€would€keep€her€fromÏpresuming€that€the€Defendant€is€innocent,€she€admitted,€"I€guess€I€would."€€Later€in€theÏquestioning,€when€asked€whether€her€opinion€was€so€strongly€held€that€it€would€affectÏher€ability€to€listen€to€the€proof€in€the€case,€Ms.€Evans€stated,€"No,€I€can€listen€to€it.€€IÏbelieve€everybody€deserves€a€fair€trial."€€And€finally,€when€questioned€about€whetherÏher€opinion€would€go€back€into€the€jury€room€with€her€and€be€a€part€of€her€decision,€sheÏreplied,€"No.€€I€think€I€can€be€fair."ÌÌà ` àTennessee€Rule€of€Criminal€Procedure€24(b)(2)€provides€in€part€that€"[i]f€[a€juror]Ïadmits€to€having€formed€an€opinion,€he€shall€be€subject€to€challenge€for€cause€unlessÏthe€examination€shows€unequivocally€that€he€can€be€impartial."€€In€her€answers,€Mrs.ÏEvans€stated€that€her€opinion€would€not€affect€her€ability€to€listen€to€the€proof€in€theÏcase€and€that€her€opinion€would€not€be€a€part€of€her€decision.€€Again,€the€trial€judge€didÏnot€abuse€his€discretion€in€failing€to€excuse€Ms.€Evans€for€cause.ÌÌà ` àThe€Defendant€next€faults€the€trial€judge€for€denying€repeated€requests€forÏindividual€sequestered€voir€dire€of€prospective€jurors€based€on€possible€exposure€toÏprejudicial€pretrial€publicity.ÌÐ  :À0/ Ðà ` àIn€òòState€v.€Porterfieldóó,€746€S.W.2d€441,€447€(Tenn.€1988),€the€TennesseeÐ `  ÐSupreme€Court€held€that€individual€voir€dire€is€mandated€only€when€there€is€aÏ"significant€possibility"€that€a€juror€has€been€exposed€to€potentially€prejudicial€material.€ÏHowever,€in€òòPorterfieldóó,€where€the€trial€judge€inquired€of€every€prospective€jurorÐ   Ðwhether€they€could€set€aside€their€recollection€and€render€a€decision€based€only€uponÏthe€evidence€presented€at€trial,€the€court€found€that€there€had€been€no€abuse€ofÏdiscretion€in€denying€individual€voir€dire.€€òòIdóó.Ð  @  ÐÌà ` àAs€noted€above,€the€trial€court€twice€asked€the€prospective€jurors€about€theirÏability€to€set€their€opinions€aside.€€He€instructed€them€that€if€they€were€chosen€as€jurors,Ïthey€would€have€to€decide€the€case€based€upon€the€evidence€presented€at€trial.€€WeÏconclude€that€under€these€circumstances,€there€was€no€abuse€of€discretion€in€denyingÏindividual€voir€dire.ÌÌà ` àLastly,€the€Defendant€argues€that€the€trial€judge€erred€in€excusing€certain€jurorsÏfor€cause€and€in€limiting€the€attempts€of€defense€counsel€to€rehabilitate€suspect€jurorsÏduring€voir€dire.€€Specifically,€the€Defendant€challenges€the€voir€dire€of€four€prospectiveÏjurors.ÌÌà ` àIn€òòWainwright€v.€Wittóó,€469€U.S.€412,€425,€105€S.Ct.€844,€852,€83€L.Ed.2d€841Ð - #  Ð(1985),€the€United€States€Supreme€Court€reaffirmed€as€the€proper€standard€forÏdetermining€when€a€prospective€juror€may€be€excluded€for€cause€because€of€his€or€herÏviews€on€capital€punishment€the€test€of€€"whether€the€juror's€views€would€prevent€orÏsubstantially€impair€the€performance€of€his€duties€as€a€juror€in€accordance€with€hisÏinstructions€and€his€oath."€€In€òòState€v.€Alleyóó,€776€S.W.2d€506,€518€(Tenn.€1989),€theÐ `6-* ÐTennessee€Supreme€Court€held€that€"the€trial€court's€finding€of€bias€of€a€juror€becauseÏof€his€views€of€capital€punishment€shall€be€accorded€a€presumption€of€correctness€andÐ  :À0. Ðthe€burden€shall€rest€upon€the€Defendant€to€establish€by€convincing€evidence€that€thatÏdetermination€was€erroneous."€ÌÌà ` àWhen€questioned€by€the€state€as€to€whether€any€of€the€jurors€had€a€"religiousÏor€moral€or€philosophical€view€that€would€keep€[them]€from€returning€a€death€penaltyÏeven€though€the€facts€[might]€show€that€it€[was]€warranted,"€one€of€the€prospectiveÏjurors€responded,€"I€can't."€€Upon€further€questioning,€the€juror€stated€that€she€couldn'tÏ"live€with"€herself€if€she€voted€to€impose€such€a€penalty.€€The€trial€court€allowed€defenseÏcounsel€to€attempt€to€rehabilitate€her,€to€no€avail.€€This€prospective€juror€was€properlyÏexcluded€for€cause.ÌÌà ` àAnother€prospective€juror€told€defense€counsel€that€he€could€listen€to€theÏevidence€and€give€his€opinion€as€to€guilt,€€but€stated€that€"for€me€to€'give€him€death,'€IÏcouldn't€do€that."€€The€juror€remained€staunch€in€his€position,€despite€furtherÏquestioning€by€defense€counsel.€€Finally,€the€trial€court€instructed€that€the€juror'sÏanswer€should€be€accepted€and€that€defense€counsel€should€"move€on."€€ThisÏprospective€juror€was€also€properly€excluded€for€cause.ÌÌà ` àA€third€prospective€juror€was€questioned€by€the€court€as€to€whether€she€wouldÏ"listen€to€the€evidence€and€consider€both€the€death€penalty€and€life€imprisonment€asÏalternative€punishment."€€She€responded,€"Yes."€€Defense€counsel€then€attempted€toÏquestion€her€regarding€what€kinds€of€cases€would€warrant€the€death€penalty.€€The€StateÏobjected,€and€the€trial€court€sustained€the€objection.€€Counsel€approached€the€bench,Ïand€out€of€the€hearing€of€the€jury,€the€trial€court€informed€defense€counsel€that€no€moreÏquestions€regarding€what€kinds€of€cases€warranted€the€death€penalty€would€be€allowedÏbecause€that€type€of€questioning€would€"open€the€door€to€some€speculation€outside€theÏlaw."Ð  :À0. Їà ` àDefense€counsel€then€asked€the€juror€if€she€would€say€that€the€DefendantÏdeserved€the€death€penalty€if€she€heard€that€the€victim€in€this€case€"lost€her€life€as€aÏresult€of€having€been€shot€with€an€assault€rifle."€€She€replied,€"No.€€I€would€have€to€hearÏthe€circumstances."€€This€prospective€juror€was€not€struck€for€cause€but€rather€with€aÏperemptory€challenge€from€the€defense.ÌÌà ` àDefense€counsel€questioned€a€fourth€prospective€juror€as€to€whether€he€wouldÏautomatically€apply€the€death€penalty€if€he€heard€that€the€defendant€had€used€aÏweapon€to€kill€the€victim.€€The€juror€replied,€"No."€€However,€when€defense€counselÏquestioned€the€juror€concerning€whether€he€could€give€a€presumption€of€innocence€ifÏsmall€children€were€involved,€he€at€first€stated€that€"[i]t€would€be€hard€to€do€knowingÏthat€there€is€small€children€involved,"€but€later€told€the€court€that€he€could€apply€theÏpresumption€of€innocence€"at€this€moment."€€This€juror€was€also€excluded€with€aÏperemptory€challenge€by€the€defense.ÌÌà ` àApplying€the€standard€as€set€forth€in€òòAlleyóó,€the€Defendant€has€failed€to€establishÐ €%  Ðby€convincing€evidence€that€the€court's€actions€were€erroneous.€€In€the€case€of€the€twoÏjurors€who€were€excluded€for€cause,€to€allow€repetitious€questioning€would€have€beenÏpointless.€€The€trial€court's€restrictions€in€all€instances€were€justifiable,€and€this€issueÏis€without€merit.ÌÌò òÓ  ÓE.€€Amended€Indictmentó óÐ À0`'$ ÐÌÓ  Óà ` àThe€Defendant€next€complains€that€the€trial€court€erred€by€permitting€the€StateÏto€amend€the€second€count€of€the€indictment€by€deleting€the€word€"serious"€from€theÏlanguage€charging€aggravated€assault.€€Count€two€of€the€indictment,€in€its€original€form,Ïcharged€that€the€Defendant€"on€or€about€the€26th€day€of€October,€1989€.€.€.€didÐ  :À0, Ðunlawfully,€willfully€and€feloniously€make€an€aggravated€assault€on€Christy€RomingerÏby€shooting€Christy€Rominger€in€her€leg€with€a€deadly€weapon,€to„wit:€€a€rifle€causingÏserious€bodily€injury€.€.€.€."€€Upon€motion€of€the€State,€and€over€objections€of€theÏDefendant,€the€trial€court€entered€an€order€allowing€the€State€to€amend€the€wording€ofÏthe€second€count€by€deleting€the€word€"serious"€before€the€phrase€"bodily€injury."€€TheÏDefendant€contends€that€by€allowing€the€State€to€prove€"bodily€injury"€rather€thanÏserious€bodily€injury€pursuant€to€Tennessee€Code€Annotated€section€39„2„101(b)Ï(Supp.€1988),€the€state€was€allowed€to€diminish€its€burden€of€proof.ÌÌà ` àTennessee€Code€Annotated€section€39„2„101(a)€(Supp.€1988)€differentiatesÏbodily€injury€from€serious€bodily€injury,€while€subsection€(b)€states€the€following:ÌÓÓà8 ` àà8¸ ` ü!` ü!à(b)€€A€person€is€guilty€of€the€offense€of€aggravated€assaultÏ.€.€.€.€if€such€person:Ð ¸ ¤¸ ¤ ÐÌà8 ` àà8¸ ` ü!` ü!à(1)€€Attempts€to€cause€or€caused€serious€bodily€injury€toÏanother€willfully,€knowingly€or€recklessly€underÏcircumstances€manifesting€extreme€indifference€to€theÏvalue€of€human€life;€[or]Ð ¸ ¤¸ ¤ ÐÌà8 ` àà8¸ ` ü!` ü!à(2)€€Attempts€to€cause€or€willfully€or€knowingly€causesÏbodily€injury€to€another€with€a€deadly€weapon;€.€.€.€.Ð ¸ ¤¸ ¤ ÐÌÓÓà ` àThe€law€was€changed€in€1989€to€delineate€one€who€commits€aggravated€assaultÏas€one€who:Ìà8 ` àà8¸ ` ü!` ü!à(1)€€Commits€an€assault€as€defined€in€ðð€39„13„101,€and:Ð ¸ ¤¸ ¤ Ðà8 ` àà8¸ ` ü!` ü!àà  à(A)€€Causes€serious€bodily€injury€to€another;€orÐ ¸ ¤¸ ¤ Ðà8 ` àà8¸ ` ü!` ü!àà  à(B)€€Uses€or€displays€a€deadly€weapon€.€.€.€.Ð ¸ ¤¸ ¤ ÐTenn.€Code€Ann.€€ðð€39„13„102(a)(1)€(1991).€€€ÌÌ€€€à ` àThe€Defendant€argues€that€the€State€was€allowed€to€delete€the€word€"serious"Ð p5,& Ðbecause€it€was€surplusage€to€conform€to€the€1989€law.€€The€State,€however,€contendsÏthat€the€Defendant's€argument€is€based€upon€a€misreading€of€the€charge€and€theÐ 09Ð/* Ðrecord€in€that€the€indictment€does€not€specify€the€section€of€the€1982€statute€uponÏwhich€it€relied.€€The€State€asserts,€and€we€agree,€that€the€record€reflects€that€the€StateÏwas€intending€to€proceed€under€Tennessee€Code€Annotated€section€39„2„101(b)(2)Ïrather€than€(b)(1)€in€proving€aggravated€assault.€€In€arguing€the€motion€to€amend€theÏindictment,€the€prosecutor€remarked€that€"the€statute€states€that€if€a€deadly€weapon€isÏused€that€only€bodily€injury€must€occur,"€and€requested€that€the€court€delete€the€wordÏ"serious"€as€surplusage.€€The€aggravated€assault€charge€was€founded€not€on€theÏDefendant€causing€serious€bodily€injury€but€rather€on€his€use€of€a€deadly€weapon.€ÏThus,€the€change€in€the€indictment€did€not€lessen€his€burden€of€proof.€€This€issue€isÏwithout€merit.ÌÌò òÓ  ÓF.€€Admission€of€Evidenceó óÐ   ÐÌÓ  Óà ` àThe€Defendant€argues€that€evidence€concerning€the€burns€his€child€receivedÏduring€the€trailer€fire€was€irrelevant€to€the€Defendant's€guilt€or€innocence€on€the€arsonÏcharge,€or€if€relevant,€should€nonetheless€have€been€excluded€under€Rule€403€of€theÏTennessee€Rules€of€Evidence€as€being€unfairly€prejudicial.€€ÌÌà ` àAt€trial,€the€State€attempted€to€elicit€testimony€from€the€emergency€roomÏphysician€who€treated€little€Ricky€for€burns€on€the€day€of€the€shooting.€€The€testimonyÏconcerned€the€treatment€of€little€Ricky,€and€defense€counsel€objected€on€grounds€ofÏrelevancy€and€prejudice.€€The€trial€court€overruled€the€motion,€agreeing€with€the€StateÏthat€the€testimony€was€circumstantial€evidence€that€the€Defendant€committed€arson.ÌÌà ` àTennessee€Rule€of€Evidence€401€defines€relevant€evidence€as€"evidence€havingÏany€tendency€to€make€the€existence€of€any€fact€that€is€of€consequence€to€theÏdetermination€of€the€action€more€probable€or€less€probable€than€it€would€be€without€theÐ  :À0, Ðevidence."€€Three€of€the€Defendant's€neighbors€testified€that€they€had€seen€theÏDefendant€take€little€Ricky€behind€his€trailer€and€that€the€trailer€had€erupted€into€flamesÏa€few€minutes€later.€€The€evidence€that€little€Ricky€sustained€burns€while€he€was€behindÏthe€trailer€with€his€father€would€tend€to€make€the€"existence€of€the€fact"€that€theÏDefendant€had€set€the€fire€"more€probable€than€it€would€be€without€the€evidence."ÌÌà ` àIn€the€alternative,€the€Defendant€contends€that€the€evidence€was€undulyÏprejudicial€under€Tennessee€Rule€of€Evidence€403€which€states€that€"evidence€may€beÏexcluded€if€its€probative€value€is€substantially€outweighed€by€the€danger€of€unfairÏprejudice,€confusion€of€the€issues,€or€misleading€the€jury,€or€by€considerations€of€undueÏdelay,€waste€of€time,€or€needless€presentation€of€cumulative€evidence."€€TheÏphysician's€testimony€did€not€rise€to€the€level€of€"unfair€prejudice."€€It€was€brief€and€notÏparticularly€graphic€or€emotional.€€This€issue€is€also€without€merit.ÌÌò òÓ  ÓPART€II.Ð  #@ ÐSENTENCING€PHASE€„€TRIAL€ERRORSÌA.€€Aggravating€Circumstancesó óà @D àÐ `' ÐÌÓ  Óà ` àThe€Defendant€first€contends€that€the€evidence€was€not€sufficient€to€proveÏbeyond€a€reasonable€doubt€that€any€person€other€than€the€victim€and€the€Defendant'sÏson,€little€Ricky,€were€at€risk€during€the€murder.€€He€argues€that€because€the€expressÏterms€in€the€aggravating€circumstance€of€Tennessee€Code€Annotated€section€39„2„¼ñÈñ¼ñÈñ203(i)(3)€(1982)€state€that€the€defendant€must€have€created€a€risk€of€death€to€two€orÏmore€persons€other€than€the€victim€"during€his€act€of€murder,"€Christy€Rominger,ÏVanessa,€or€Margaret€Grady€could€not€be€considered€as€persons€to€whom€a€"great€riskÏof€death€was€created,"€because€the€danger€to€which€they€were€exposed€did€not€occurÏ"during€his€act€of€murder."Ð  :À0, Їà ` àIn€òòState€v.€Coneóó,€665€S.W.2d€87,€95€(Tenn.€1984),€the€Tennessee€SupremeÐ `  ÐCourt€held€that€this€aggravator€is€applicable€if€the€risks€to€another€person€occurred€"atÏor€shortly€prior€to€or€shortly€after€an€act€of€murder€upon€which€a€prosecution€is€based."€ÏIn€the€case€at€bar,€the€Defendant€shot€at€Christy€Rominger€within€minutes€of€theÏmurder.€€Vanessa,€the€victim's€daughter,€was€sitting€directly€behind€Christy€in€the€lineÏof€fire.€€After€the€Defendant€fatally€shot€his€wife,€he€purportedly€shot€in€the€direction€ofÏMargaret€Grady's€trailer,€forcing€her€to€duck.€€Under€our€sufficiency€of€the€evidenceÏanalysis,€the€jury€could€have€easily€concluded€that€this€statutory€aggravator€wasÏapplicable.€Ìà ` àÌÓ  Óò òB.€€Prosecutorial€Misconductó óÐ  À ÐÌÓ  Óà ` àThe€Defendant€next€contends€that€the€State€engaged€in€numerous€instances€ofÏprosecutorial€misconduct€in€the€sentencing€phase,€especially€in€its€closing€argument.€ÏSpecifically,€he€claims€that€in€closing€argument€the€prosecutor€repeatedly€inflamed€theÏpassions€of€the€jury,€asked€for€a€death€sentence€based€upon€the€wishes€of€the€victim'sÏfamily,€told€the€jury€that€he,€the€judge,€and€the€police€wanted€the€death€penalty,€arguedÏthat€deterrence€could€be€used€as€a€basis€for€the€death€penalty,€and€argued€aboutÏmatters€not€in€the€record.ÌÌà ` àIn€successful€claims€of€prosecutorial€misconduct,€the€Defendant€must€show€thatÏthe€argument€was€so€inflammatory€or€the€conduct€so€improper€that€it€affected€theÏverdict€to€his€detriment.€€òòHarrington€v.€Stateóó,€385€S.W.2d€758,€759€(Tenn.€1965).€€InÐ  2@)& Ðreviewing€an€allegation€of€improper€conduct,€this€court€should€consider€several€factorsÏincluding€the€intent€of€the€prosecutor,€the€curative€measures€undertaken€by€the€court,Ïthe€improper€conduct€viewed€in€context€and€in€light€of€the€facts€and€circumstances€ofÏthe€case,€the€cumulative€effect€of€the€remarks€with€any€other€errors€in€the€record,€andÐ  :À0. Ðthe€relative€strengths€and€weaknesses€of€the€case.€€òòJudge€v.€Stateóó,€539€S.W.2d€340,Ð `  Ð344€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.€1976).€€The€trial€judge€has€wide€discretion€in€controlling€theÏargument€of€counsel.€€This€discretion€will€not€be€interfered€with€on€appeal€in€theÏabsence€of€abuse€thereof.€€òòSmith€v.€Stateóó,€527€S.W.2d€737,€739€(Tenn.€1975).Ð   ÐÌà ` àThe€Defendant€contends€that€during€closing€argument€and€throughout€theÏsentencing€phase€of€the€trial,€the€prosecutor€referred€to€the€victim€as€"little€mama"€andÏto€the€Defendant's€son€as€"little€Ricky"€solely€to€inflame€the€jury.€€No€objection€wasÏmade€to€these€references€at€trial,€and€even€if€there€had€been,€we€find€that€theÏprosecutor's€conduct€was€not€improper.€€The€victim€was€the€mother€of€the€Defendant'sÏson,€and€the€son€was€called€"little€Ricky"€by€all€who€knew€him€because€the€DefendantÏhad€the€same€name.€ÌÌà ` àThe€Defendant€also€argues€that€the€prosecutor€unconstitutionally€argued€that€theÏdeath€penalty€should€be€imposed€because€the€prosecutor,€the€judge,€and€the€policeÏwanted€it.€€This€type€of€argument€has€been€held€to€be€improper.€òòSeeóó€òòBrooks€v.€Kempóó,Ð €%  Ð762€F.2d€1383,€1410€(11th€Cir.€1985).€€However,€in€the€case€at€bar,€the€remark€of€theÏprosecutor€was€actually,€"I€can't€sentence€the€defendant€to€death,€the€judge€can'tÏsentence€the€defendant€to€death,€law€enforcement€can't,€that€remains€the€province€ofÏthe€jury€as€it€should€be."€€It€appears€that€the€prosecutor€was€merely€focusing€theÏattention€of€the€jury€on€their€responsibility,€and€his€argument,€in€this€respect,€was€notÏimproper.ÌÌà ` àThe€Defendant€next€claims€that€by€telling€the€jury€that€a€person€who€is€facing€theÏdeath€penalty€"will€exaggerate€and€won't€tell€the€whole€facts€to€the€good€doctor,"€theÏprosecutor€was€arguing€facts€outside€the€record€in€an€attempt€to€discredit€the€testimonyÏof€the€Defendant's€expert€witness.€€Although€we€agree€that€this€statement€may€haveÐ  :À0. Ðbeen€improper,€we€do€not€find€that,€standing€alone€and€in€cognizance€of€the€òòJudgeóóÐ `  Ðfactors,€it€is€sufficient€to€warrant€reversal.ÌÌà ` àThe€Defendant€next€contends€that€remarks€by€the€prosecutor€constitutedÏreferences€to€"the€[victim's]€family€and€opinions€and€characterizations€of€the€crimes€andÏthe€defendant"€of€the€type€found€impermissible€in€òòBooth€v.€Marylandóó,€482€U.S.€496,Ð À`  Ð502,€107€S.Ct.€2529,€2533,€96€L.Ed.2d€440€(1987).ÌÌà ` àDuring€closing€argument€the€prosecutor€made€the€following€remarks:ÌÓÓà8 ` àà ¸ àLadies€and€gentlemen€of€the€jury,€the€defense€argued€aboutÏwhether€little€Vanessa€and€little€Ricky€will€do€later,€and€of€course€that's,Ïwe€don't€know€what€they€are€going€to€say€later,€but€I€say€to€you€as€thatÏas€they€get€older€and€they€want€ato€[sic]€know€what€happened€to€theirÏmother€and€how€she€died€and€all€the€facts€with€regard€to€that€they€will€askÏabout€the€jury€and€they€will€ask€about€this€case€and€they€will€want€to€knowÏwhat€this€jury€did€with€the€man€that€cold€bloodily€cut€down€the€youngÏmother,€did€the€jury€give€him€the€death€penalty„„Ð ` ü!` ü! ÐÌÌÓÓà ` àIn€òòPayne€v.€Tennesseeóó,€501€U.S.€808,€827,€111€S.Ct.€2597,€2609,€115€L.Ed.2dÐ  #@ Ð720€(1991),€the€United€States€Supreme€Court€essentially€overruled€the€òòBoothóó€doctrineÐ €%  Ðin€holding€that€a€jury€may€constitutionally€consider€evidence€about€the€effect€of€theÏvictim's€death€upon€his€or€her€survivors.€€However,€in€a€footnote,€the€Court€stated€theÏfollowing:ÌÓÓà8 ` àà ¸ àOur€holding€today€is€limited€to€the€holdings€of€òòBooth€v.€Marylandóó,Ð - #  Ð482€U.S.€496,€107€S.Ct.€2529,€96€L.Ed.2d€440€(1987),€and€òòSouthÐ ð-$! ÐCarolina€v.€Gathersóó,€490€U.S.€805,€109€S.Ct.€2207,€104€L.Ed.2d€876Ð à.€%" Ð(1989),€that€evidence€and€argument€relating€to€the€victim€and€the€impactÏof€the€victim's€death€on€the€victim's€family€are€inadmissible€at€a€capitalÏsentencing€hearing.€€òòBoothóó€also€held€that€the€admission€of€a€victim'sÐ °1P(% Ðfamily€members'€characterizations€and€opinions€about€the€crime,€theÏdefendant,€and€the€appropriate€sentence€violates€the€Eighth€Amendment.€ÏNo€evidence€of€the€latter€sort€was€presented€at€the€trial€in€this€case.Ð ` ü!` ü! ÐÌ111€S.Ct.€at€2611.ÌÌâ âÐ @8à., ÐÓÓà ` àEven€if€the€òòPayneóó€decision€did€not€overrule€òòBooth'sóó€holding€that€evidence€of€theÐ `  Ðâ âvictim's€family€members'€opinions€concerning€the€appropriate€sentence€is€inadmissible,Ïthe€prosecutor's€argument€in€this€case€could€not€be€regarded€as€a€family€member'sÏopinion€about€the€appropriate€sentence.€€The€prosecutor,€in€rebutting€the€defense'sÏargument€that€the€children€would€someday€want€to€know€who€their€father€is,€argued€theÏsame€issue€in€that€the€children€would€someday€want€to€know€what€happened€to€theÏman€that€killed€their€mother.€€This€issue€is€without€merit.ÌÌà ` àLastly,€the€Defendant€contends€that€the€prosecutor€improperly€argued€that€theÏdeath€penalty€should€be€imposed€as€a€deterrence€to€others.€€In€closing€arguments,€theÏprosecutor€told€the€jury€that€the€death€penalty€was€similar€to€a€"lighthouse"€in€that€itÏhelps€society€"get€back€on€course."€€He€continued€by€stating€that€"those€folks€out€thereÏcontemplating,€premeditating,€can€see€that€in€proper€cases€in€the€state€of€TennesseeÏa€jury€will€render€the€death€penalty„„."€€The€defense€objected,€and€the€trial€judgeÏsustained€the€objection,€but€gave€no€curative€instructions.ÌÌà ` àIn€Tennessee,€it€has€usually€been€held€improper€for€an€attorney€to€argue€that€aÏparticular€penalty€will€be€either€a€specific€or€a€general€deterrence.€€òòSeeóó€òòState€v.€Henleyóó,Ð @)à Ð774€S.W.2d€908,€913€(Tenn.€1989);€òòState€v.€Irickóó,€762€S.W.2d€121,€129„31€(Tenn.Ð  +À!  Ð1981).€€However,€in€òòHenleyóó,€the€supreme€court€refused€to€reverse€because€it€did€notÐ - #" Ðappear€that€the€argument€had€influenced€the€jury.€€774€S.W.2d€at€913.€€ÌÌà ` àThough€this€argument€may€have€been€improper,€in€the€context€of€the€record€asÏa€whole,€we€cannot€conclude€that€it€affected€the€verdict€and€prejudiced€the€Defendant.€ÏThis€issue€is€also€without€merit.ÌÌò òÓ  ÓÐ   :À0, ÐC.€€Instructional€Errorsó óÐ `  ÐÌÓ  Óà ` àThe€Defendant€challenges€the€jury€instructions€given€at€sentencing€on€eightÏgrounds.€€He€first€argues€that€the€jury€instructions€precluded€the€jury€from€consideringÏmitigating€evidence€of€mental€or€emotional€disturbance€which€did€not€rise€to€the€levelÏof€"extreme"€mental€or€emotional€disturbance.€€In€its€instructions,€the€trial€judge€quotedÏfrom€the€language€in€Tennessee€Code€Annotated€section€39„2„203(j)(2)€(1982)€that€inÏarriving€at€the€punishment€the€jury€shall€consider€the€mitigating€factors€including,€butÏnot€limited€to€"[t]he€murder€was€committed€while€the€defendant€was€under€the€influenceÏof€extreme€mental€or€emotional€disturbance."€€The€Defendant€contends€that€theÏmodifier€"extreme"€misled€the€jury€in€its€consideration€of€the€evidence.ÌÌà ` àThe€Tennessee€Supreme€Court€has€repeatedly€rejected€this€argument.€€òòSeeóóÐ à€ ÐòòState€v.€Cazesóó,€875€S.W.2d€253,€268€(Tenn.€1994);€òòState€v.€Smithóó,€857€S.W.2d€1,€16„Ð À!` ÐñÈñÐ À!` ÐñÈñ17€(Tenn.€1993).€€This€issue€is€without€merit.ÌÌà ` àEqually€without€merit€is€the€Defendant's€argument€that€the€jury€instructionsÏprecluded€the€jury€from€considering€mitigating€evidence€of€mental€illness€andÏintoxication€which€did€not€rise€to€the€level€of€"substantially"€affecting€the€Defendant'sÏability€to€conform€his€conduct€to€the€law€pursuant€to€the€language€in€Tennessee€CodeÏAnnotated€section€39„2„203(j)(8)€(1982).€€This€argument€was€also€rejected€in€òòSmithóó,Ð à.€%" Ð857€S.W.2d€at€16„17.ÌÌà ` àNext€the€Defendant€contends€that€trial€court€erred€in€failing€to€charge€the€jury€onÏapplicable€statutory€mitigating€factors€in€Tennessee€Code€Annotated€section€39„2„¼ñÈñ¼ñÈñ203(j)€(1982).€€Specifically,€the€Defendant€contests€the€trial€court's€failure€to€charge€theÏjury€on€the€statutory€mitigating€circumstance€which€states€that€"[t]he€defendant€has€noÐ  :À0, Ðsignificant€history€of€prior€criminal€activity."€€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€€ðð€39„2„203(j)(1)€(1982).€ÏÌà ` àThe€Defendant's€argument€ignores€basic€Tennessee€law€that€the€trial€court€is€notÏrequired€to€instruct€on€matters€not€fairly€raised€by€the€evidence.€€òòState€v.€Davisóó,€649Ð   ÐS.W.2d€12,€14€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.€1982).€€To€the€contrary,€Tennessee€courts€have€heldÏthat€the€giving€of€instructions€for€which€there€is€no€evidence€in€the€record€is€to€beÏavoided.€€òòWhitwell€v.€Stateóó,€520€S.W.2d€338,€344€(Tenn.€1975).€€In€this€case,€theÐ  @  Ðdefense€put€on€no€evidence€concerning€the€Defendant's€past€criminal€history€during€theÏsentencing€phase.€€Accordingly,€the€trial€judge€was€not€required€to€instruct€on€thisÏstatutory€mitigating€factor.ÌÌà ` àThe€Defendant€also€contends€that€because€the€trial€judge€instructed€the€jury€thatÏit€should€make€no€distinction€between€"mitigating€circumstances€that€I€have€read€youÏand€those€otherwise€raised€by€the€evidence€which€are€specifically€raised€by€either€theÏstate€or€the€defense,"€and€then€refused€to€give€any€special€instructions€on€mitigatingÏfactors€raised€by€the€defense,€the€trial€judge€misled€the€jury€about€their€duty€to€fullyÏconsider€mitigating€evidence.€€The€Defendant€argues€that€the€jury€could€have€construedÏthe€instructions€and€the€lack€thereof€as€indicative€that€the€Defendant€had€no€furtherÏmitigating€evidence.€ÌÌà ` àThe€Defendant€submitted€a€large€number€of€proposed€special€instructions€onÏmitigating€circumstances.€€The€trial€judge€refused€to€include€these€instructions,€relyingÏon€the€Tennessee€Supreme€Court€decision€in€òòState€v.€Hartmanóó,€703€S.W.2d€106,€118Ð  2@)' Ð(Tenn.€1985),€which€held€the€following:ÌÓÓà8 ` àthe€only€mandatory€instructions€with€respect€to€mitigating€circumstancesÏare€that€those€statutory€circumstances€which€are€raised€by€the€evidenceÏshall€be€expressly€charged,€and€the€jury€must€be€told€that€they€shallÏweigh€and€consider€any€facts€or€circumstances€that€are€raised€by€theÏevidence€that€they€find€to€be€mitigating€circumstances,€in€making€theÐ  :À0. Ðdetermination€of€which€circumstances,€aggravating€or€mitigating,Ïoutweigh€the€other.Ð ` ü!` ü! Ðà ` àÌÓÓà ` àThe€trial€judge€adhered€to€the€holding€in€òòHartmanóó,€instructing€the€jury€on€theÐ 0 Ð Ðapplicable€statutory€mitigating€factors€set€forth€in€Tennessee€Code€Annotated€sectionÏ39„13„204(j)€(1991),€including€an€instruction€on€(j)(9):ÌÓÓà8 ` àAny€other€mitigating€factor€which€is€raised€by€the€evidence€produced€byÏeither€the€prosecution€or€the€defense€at€either€the€guilt€or€sentencingÏhearing;€that€is,€you€shall€consider€any€aspect€of€the€defendant'sÏcharacter€or€record,€or€any€aspect€of€the€circumstances€of€the€offenseÏfavorable€to€the€defendant€which€is€supported€by€the€evidence.Ð ` ü!` ü! ÐÌÌÓÓà ` àThe€trial€judge€then€added€the€following€instructions,€following€the€language€usedÏin€Tennessee€Pattern€Jury€Instructions„„Criminal€ðð€7.04:ÌÓÓà8 ` àà ¸ àNo€distinction€shall€be€made€between€mitigating€circumstancesÏthat€I€have€read€to€you€and€those€otherwise€raised€by€the€evidence€whichÏare€specifically€requested€by€the€state€or€the€defense.Ð ` ü!` ü! ÐÌà8 ` àà ¸ àThe€defendant€does€not€have€the€burden€of€proving€a€mitigatingÏcircumstance.€€If€there€is€some€evidence€that€a€mitigating€circumstanceÏexists,€then€the€burden€of€proof€is€upon€the€sate€[sic]€to€prove,€beyond€aÏreasonable€doubt,€that€mitigating€circumstance€does€not€exist.Ð ` ü!` ü! ÐÌÌÓÓà ` àIn€òòState€v.€Richard€Odomóó,€No.€02C01„9305„CR„00080,€Shelby€County€(Tenn.Ð €%  ÐCrim.€App.,€Jackson,€Oct.€19,€1994),€òòpermóó.€òòtoóó€òòappealóó€òògrantedóó,€(Tenn.,€Feb.€6,€1995),Ð `' Ðthis€court€held€that€the€trial€judge€did€not€err€in€giving€these€same€instructions€and€byÏrefusing€to€grant€the€Defendant's€request€for€special€instructions€on€specific€non„¼ñÈñ¼ñÈñstatutory€mitigating€circumstances.€€Likewise,€we€conclude€that€the€jury€was€not€misledÏby€these€instructions.€€This€issue€is€without€merit.ÌÌà ` àThe€Defendant€next€contends€that€he€was€entitled€to€other€requested€juryÏinstructions€in€order€to€properly€instruct€the€jury€on€its€duties.€€Specifically,€theÏDefendant€contests€the€trial€judge's€refusal€to€give€a€special€instruction€which€told€theÏâ âjury€that€"[w]hatever€your€sentence€is€in€this€case,€whether€it€is€death€by€electrocutionÐ @8à.. Ðor€imprisonment€for€life,€the€responsibility€for€making€this€decision€rests€entirely€withÏyou,€as€individual€jurors."Ìâ âÌà ` àThe€record€reveals€that€the€trial€judge€instructed€the€jury€that€"[I]t€is€now€yourÏduty€to€determine,€within€the€limits€prescribed€by€law,€the€penalty€which€shall€beÏimposed€as€punishment€for€this€offense."€€Such€instruction€was€certainly€sufficient€toÏinstruct€the€jury€on€its€duty.€€This€issue€is€also€without€merit.ÌÌà ` àThe€Defendant€next€assigns€as€error€the€trial€judge's€instruction€on€theÏaggravating€circumstance€concerning€the€"heinous,€atrocious,€or€cruel"€nature€of€theÏcrime.€€Tennessee€Code€Annotated€section€39„2„203(i)(5)€(1982)€provided€as€anÏaggravating€factor€that€"[t]he€murder€was€especially€heinous,€atrocious,€or€cruel€in€thatÏit€involved€torture€or€depravity€of€mind."€€With€the€1989€revisions,€this€statute'sÏcounterpart€now€reads€that€"[t]he€murder€was€especially€heinous,€atrocious,€or€cruel€inÏthat€it€involved€torture€or€serious€physical€abuse€beyond€that€necessary€to€produceÏdeath."€€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€39„13„204(1)(5)€(Supp.€1995).€€The€offense€was€committedÏon€October€26,€1989,€and€the€trial€court€erroneously€instructed€the€jury€under€the€latterÏdefinition.ÌÌà ` àThe€Defendant€cites€òòState€v.€Stephensonóó,€878€S.W.2d€533€(Tenn.€1994),€andÐ - #  ÐòòState€v.€Keenóó,€òò€€€€€€óó€S.W.2d€òò€€€€€€óó,€No.€02S01„9112„CR„00064,€Shelby€County€(Tenn.,Ð à.€%" ÐJackson,€May€23,€1994),€for€the€proposition€that€a€reversal€is€required€if€a€jury€is€notÏinstructed€with€the€law€as€it€existed€at€the€time€of€the€offense.€€In€both€of€these€cases,Ïhowever,€the€jury€was€instructed€on€old€law.€€In€the€case€at€bar,€the€jury€was€given€theÏdefinition€of€"heinous,€atrocious,€or€cruel"€under€the€new€statute,€which€placed€a€higherÏâ âburden€on€the€State€to€prove€the€act€involved€torture€or€serious€physical€abuse.€€WeÐ @8à., Ðconclude€that€the€error€is€harmless€beyond€a€doubt.€€T.€R.€A.€P.€36(b);€Tenn.€R.€Crim.ÏP.€52(a).Ìâ âÌà ` àThe€Defendant€also€argues€that€the€use€of€the€disjunctive€"or"€in€this€juryÏinstruction€deprived€the€Defendant€of€his€right€to€a€unanimous€jury€verdict€becauseÏsome€of€the€jurors€could€have€found€the€crime€to€be€"heinous,"€while€others€found€it€toÏbe€"atrocious"€or€"cruel."€€However,€our€supreme€court€has€held€that€"[a]s€used€inÏcircumstance€(i)(5),€the€three€adjectives€'heinous,'€'atrocious,'€and€'cruel'€areÏcomplimentary.€€Although€listed€disjunctively,€they€state€a€unitary€concept€defined€andÏlimited€by€'torture€or€depravity€of€mind.'"€€òòState€v.€Van€Tranóó,€864€S.W.2d€465,€479Ð @à Ð(Tenn.€1993).€€This€issue€is€without€merit.ÌÌà ` àEqually€without€merit€is€the€Defendant's€argument€that€this€jury€instruction€wasÏunconstitutionally€vague.€€Our€supreme€court€has€repeatedly€held€that€under€eitherÏdefinition€of€"heinous,€atrocious,€or€cruel,"€the€statutory€aggravating€circumstance€is€notÏunconstitutionally€vague.€€òòSeeóó€òòState€v.€Cazesóó,€875€S.W.2d€at€267;€òòState€v.€Blackóó,€815Ð €%  ÐS.W.2d€166,€181€(Tenn.€1991).ÌÌò òÓ  ÓD.€€Sentencing€CriteriaÐ  +À! ÐÌó óÓ  Óà ` àThe€Defendant€first€contends€that€the€trial€court€erred€in€sentencing€him€on€theÐ à.€%  Ðaggravated€assault€and€arson€counts€by€failing€to€comply€with€the€mandate€of€òòState€v.Ð À0`'" ÐPearsonóó,€858€S.W.2d€879€(Tenn.€1993).€€In€òòPearsonóó,€our€supreme€court€held€that€if€aÐ  2@)$ Ðcrime€is€committed€when€the€Criminal€Sentencing€Act€of€1982€governed,€but€sentenceÏis€imposed€when€the€Criminal€Sentencing€Reform€Act€of€1989€governs,€the€trial€courtÏmust€calculate€the€sentence€which€would€be€imposed€under€both€acts€and€impose€theÏlesser€of€the€two€sentences.€€òòIdóó.€at€884.€€Ð  :À0, Їà ` àIn€this€case,€the€crime€was€committed€on€October€26,€1989,€and€the€DefendantÏwas€sentenced€on€May€15,€1992.€€The€trial€court€failed€to€calculate€the€sentence€underÏboth€acts,€and€the€State€concedes€this€error.€€We€must€therefore€remand€this€cause€forÏresentencing€on€the€aggravated€assault€and€arson€convictions.€€ÌÌà ` àThe€Defendant€also€contends€that€the€trial€court€misapplied€enhancement€factorsÏon€both€the€aggravated€assault€and€the€arson€charge.€€In€sentencing€the€Defendant€toÏsix€years€on€the€aggravated€assault€charge€and€four€years€on€the€arson€charge,€theÏtrial€court€did€not€delineate€which€enhancement€factors€it€applied€to€which€offense.€€TheÏtrial€court€simply€listed€the€following€factors€as€applicable:ÌÓÓà8 ` à(1)€€the€previous€history€of€criminal€convictions€or€criminal€behavior;Ð ` ü!` ü! ÐÌà8 ` à(2)€€the€offense€involved€more€than€one€victim;Ð ` ü!` ü! ÐÌà8 ` à(3)€€at€least€one€of€the€victims€was€particularly€vulnerable€because€of€age;Ð ` ü!` ü! ÐÌà8 ` à(4)€€the€defendant€treated€or€allowed€a€victim€to€be€treated€withÏexceptional€cruelty;Ð ` ü!` ü! ÐÌà8 ` à(5)€€the€personal€injuries€inflicted€was€[sic]€particularly€great;Ð ` ü!` ü! ÐÌà8 ` à(6)€€the€defendant€had€no€hesitation€about€committing€a€crime€when€theÏrisk€to€human€life€was€high;€andÐ ` ü!` ü! ÐÌà8 ` à(7)€€the€crime€was€committed€under€circumstances€under€which€theÏpotential€for€bodily€injury€to€a€victim€was€great.Ð ` ü!` ü! ÐÌÌÓÓà ` àThe€Sentencing€Reform€Act€of€1989€provides€that€"[w]henever€the€court€imposesÏa€sentence,€it€shall€place€on€the€record€either€orally€or€in€writing,€what€enhancement€orÏmitigating€factors€it€found,€if€any,€as€well€as€findings€of€fact€as€required€by€ðð€40„35„209."€ÏTenn.€Code€Ann.€€ðð€40„35„210(f)€(1991).€€These€findings€by€the€trial€judge€must€beÏâ ârecorded€in€order€to€allow€an€adequate€review€on€appeal.€€Because€the€trial€court€failedÐ €4 ++ Ðto€specify€to€which€count€the€enhancing€factors€applied,€we€again€must€remand€forÏresentencing.׃×Ý ƒ #ÃÝòòÚ  Ú6Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý×  ×Ð @ à Ðâ âÌà ` àLastly€the€Defendant€argues€that€the€trial€court€erred€in€finding€the€Defendant€toÏbe€a€"dangerous€offender"€pursuant€to€òòState€v.€Grayóó,€538€S.W.2d€391€(Tenn.€1976),Ð à€ Ðand€òòState€v.€Woodsóó,€814€S.W.2d€378,€380€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.€1991),€òòpermóó.€òòtoóó€òòappealóóÐ À`  Ðòòdeniedóó,€òòidóó.€€(Tenn.€1991),€and€ordering€the€Defendant's€sentences€to€be€servedÐ  @  ÐconsecutivelñÊñyñÊñ.€€The€trial€court€made€no€findings€other€than€simply€ruling€that€theÏDefendant€was€a€"dangerous€offender."€€Accordingly,€this€case€should€be€remandedÏfor€the€trial€court€to€make€appropriate€findings€as€to€this€issue,€and€to€do€so€consideringÏour€supreme€court's€recent€opinion€of€òòState€v.€Wilkersonóó,€__€S.W.2d€__€(Tenn.€1995).Ð  À ÐÌò òÓ  ÓE.€€Proportionality€Reviewó óÐ à€ ÐÌÓ  Óà ` àThe€Defendant€contends€that€pursuant€to€Tennessee€Code€Annotated€sectionÏ39„13„206(c)(1)(D)€(1991),€€the€sentence€of€death€is€excessive€and€disproportionateÏto€the€penalty€imposed€in€other€cases€similar€to€this€case.€€Tennessee€Code€AnnotatedÏsection€39„13„206(c)(1)(D)€(1991)€requires€this€court€to€review€the€sentence€of€deathÏto€make€that€determination,€considering€both€the€nature€of€the€crime€and€of€theÏdefendant.€€In€view€of€the€necessity€to€remand€this€case€for€a€new€trial,€we€choose€toÏomit€this€statutory€review.€€òòSeeóó€òòState€v.€Stephensonóó,€878€S.W.2d€530,€558€(Tenn.Ð à.€%" Ð1994);€òòState€v.€Richard€Odomóó,€No.€02C01„9305„CR„00080,€Shelby€County€(Tenn.Ð À0`'$ ÐCrim.€App.,€Jackson,€Oct.€19,€1994),€òòpermóó.€òòtoóó€òòappealóó€€òògrantedóó,€(Tenn.,€Feb.€6,€1995).€Ð  2@)& ÐHowever,€we€note€that€the€trial€court€did€not€file€a€report€with€the€Clerk€of€the€SupremeÏCourt€in€Knoxville€or€include€one€in€the€technical€record€as€required€by€TennesseeÏSupreme€Court€Rule€12.€€Accordingly,€the€trial€court€is€instructed€to€comply€with€thisÏrule.ÌÌÓ  Óò òCONSTITUTIONAL€CHALLENGESó óÐ À`  ÐÓ  ÓÌà ` àThe€Defendant€first€contends€that€the€sentence€of€death€unconstitutionallyÏinfringes€upon€the€Defendant's€right€to€life.€€Specifically,€he€argues€that€because€theÏright€to€life€is€fundamental,€the€punishment€of€death€is€not€necessary€to€promote€anyÏcompelling€state€interest,€and€there€are€less€restrictive€means€of€achieving€any€stateÏinterest€in€punishing€the€Defendant.€€Although€this€argument€is€somewhat€novel€in€itsÏapproach,€the€Tennessee€Supreme€Court€has€held€that€the€State's€death€penaltyÏstatute,€òòperóó€òòseóó,€meets€due€process€requirements.€€òòSeeóó€òòState€v.€Blackóó,€815€S.W.2d€atÐ À!` Ð190.ÌÌà ` àThe€Defendant€next€contends€that€by€seeking€the€death€penalty€at€trial€butÏoffering€the€Defendant€a€life€sentence€if€he€pleaded€guilty,€the€State€burdened€theÏDefendant's€right€to€a€trial€by€jury.€€The€Defendant€cites€the€United€States€SupremeÏCourt€decision€in€òòUnited€States€v.€Jacksonóó,€390€U.S.€570,€583,€88€S.Ct.€1209,€1217,Ð - #  Ð20€L.Ed.2d€138€(1968),€for€the€proposition€that€the€United€States€Constitution€prohibitsÏsuch€a€practice.ÌÌà ` àThe€Court's€ruling€in€òòJacksonóó€involved€statutes€which€prohibited€the€impositionÐ €4 +& Ðof€the€death€penalty€on€defendants€who€pleaded€guilty.€€In€òòJacksonóó,€the€Supreme€CourtÐ `6-( Ðconcluded€that€the€Federal€Kidnapping€Act,€which€allowed€imposition€of€the€deathÏpenalty€solely€by€means€of€a€jury€verdict,€was€unconstitutional€because€it€infringed€uponÐ  :À0, Ðthe€defendant's€Fifth€Amendment€right€not€to€plead€guilty€and€his€Sixth€AmendmentÏright€to€a€jury€trial.€€The€Court€noted€that€"[u]nder€the€Federal€Kidnapping€Act,€therefore,Ïthe€defendant€who€abandons€the€right€to€contest€his€guilt€before€a€jury€is€assured€thatÏhe€cannot€be€executed;€the€defendant€who€is€ingenious€enough€to€seek€a€jury€acquittalÏstands€forewarned€that,€if€the€jury€finds€him€guilty€and€does€not€wish€to€spare€his€life,Ïhe€will€die."ÌÌà ` àTennessee's€death€penalty€statute€has€no€provision€which€allows€the€impositionÏof€the€death€penalty€solely€by€means€of€a€jury€verdict.€€This€issue€is€without€merit.ÌÌà ` à€The€Defendant€next€argues€that€the€trial€court€unconstitutionally€limited€theÏconsideration€of€mitigating€evidence€by€requiring€the€jury€to€unanimously€agree€on€theÏsentence€of€life€or€death.€€The€Tennessee€Supreme€Court€has€specifically€rejected€thisÏargument€in€òòState€v.€Smithóó,€857€S.W.2d€at€18.׃×Ý ƒ #ÃÝòòÚ  Ú7Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý×  ×€€This€issue€is€also€without€merit.Ð À!` ÐÌà ` àThe€Defendant€next€raises€a€number€of€issues€that€he€contends€either€render€ÏTennessee's€death€penalty€statute€unconstitutional€or€result€in€its€arbitrary€andÏcapricious€imposition.€€Each€of€these€challenges€has€been€previously€addressed€andÏrejected€by€this€court€and€the€Tennessee€Supreme€Court€in€prior€opinions.€€We,Ïtherefore,€find€it€unnecessary€to€discuss€in€detail€the€reasons€for€our€holdings.€€WeÏspecifically€reject€the€following€arguments,€relying€upon€the€authority€cited€below.ÌÓÓà8 ` àà8¸ ` ü!` ü!à(1)€€The€death€penalty€statute€does€not€narrow€the€class€ofÏdeath€eligible€defendants.€€€òòSeeóó€òòState€v.€Smithóó,€868€S.W.2dÐ °1P($ Ðat€582;€òòState€v.€Van€Tranóó,€864€S.W.2d€at€482;€òòState€v.Ð  2@)% ÐMiddlebrooksóó,€840€S.W.2d€317,€341„47€(Tenn.€1992).Ð30*&¸ ¤¸ ¤ ÐÌà8 ` àà8¸ ` ü!` ü!à(2)€€The€prosecutor's€unlimited€discretion€in€selectingÏcandidates€for€the€death€penalty€results€in€arbitrary€andÏcapricious€infliction€of€the€death€penalty.€€òòSeeóó€òòState€v.Ð P7ð-* ÐBrimmeróó,€876€S.W.2d€75,€86€(Tenn.€1994);€òòState€v.€Cazesóó,Ð `  Ð875€S.W.2d€at€268.Ð ¸ ¤¸ ¤ ÐÌà8 ` àà8¸ ` ü!` ü!à(3)€€The€death€penalty€in€unconstitutional€because€it€isÏimposed€in€a€discriminatory€manner€based€on€economics,Ïrace,€geography,€and€gender.€€òòSeeóó€òòState€v.€Smithóó,€857Ð ° ÐS.W.€2d€at€23;€òòState€v.€Evansóó,€838€S.W.2d€185,€196€(Tenn.Ð   Ð1992).Ð ¸ ¤¸ ¤ ÐÌà8 ` àà8¸ ` ü!` ü!à(4)€€The€lack€of€uniform€procedures€mandating€individualÏsequestered€voir€dire€during€jury€selection€renders€theÏimposition€of€the€death€penalty€arbitrary€and€capricious.€ÏòòSeeóó€òòState€v.€Cazesóó,€875€S.W.2d€at€269.Р@ ¸ ¤¸ ¤ ÐÌà8 ` àà8¸ ` ü!` ü!à(5)€€By€excluding€jurors€who€have€scruples€against€theÏdeath€penalty,€the€jury€selection€process€skews€the€make„¼ñÇñ¼ñÇñup€of€the€jury€to€make€it€prosecution„prone€and€therebyÏviolates€the€Defendant's€constitutional€rights.€€òòSeeóó€òòState€v.Ð Pð ÐCaughronóó,€855€S.W.2d€526,€542€(Tenn.€1993);€òòState€v.Ð @à ÐRichard€Odomóó,€No.€02C01„9305„CR„00080,€Shelby€CountyÐ 0Ð Ð(Tenn.€Crim.€App.,€Jackson,€Oct.€19,€1994),€òòappóó.€òògrantedóó,Ð  À Ð(Tenn.,€Feb.€6,€1995).Ð ¸ ¤¸ ¤ ÐÌà8 ` àà8¸ ` ü!` ü!à(6)€€The€death€penalty€is€imposed€in€an€arbitrary€andÏcapricious€manner€because€the€defendant€is€prohibitedÏfrom€addressing€jurors'€misconceptions€concerning€paroleÏeligibility,€cost€of€execution€versus€cost€of€lifeÏimprisonment,€deterrence,€and€method€of€execution.€€òòSeeóóÐ °"P ÐòòState€v.€Cazesóó,€875€S.W.2d€at€268;€òòState€v.€Blackóó,€815Ð  #@ ÐS.W.2d€at€179.Ð ¸ ¤¸ ¤ ÐÌà8 ` àà8¸ ` ü!` ü!à(7)€€Because€the€jury€is€instructed€that€it€must€unanimouslyÏagree€to€impose€a€life€sentence€but€is€not€instructed€as€toÏthe€effect€of€a€non„unanimous€verdict,€the€Defendant'sÏconstitutional€rights€are€violated.€€òòSeeóó€òòState€v.€Brimmeróó,Ð @)à" Ð876€S.W.2d€at€87;€òòState€v.€Richard€Odomóó,€No.€02C01„Ð 0*Ð # ÐñÇñÐ 0*Ð # ÐñÇñ9305„CR„00080,€Shelby€County€(Tenn.€Crim€App.,ÏJackson,€Oct.€19,€1994),€òòappóó.€òògrantedóó,€(Tenn.,€Feb.€6,Ð ,°"% Ð1995).Ð ¸ ¤¸ ¤ ÐÌà8 ` àà8¸ ` ü!` ü!à(8)€€The€jury€instructions€created€the€likelihood€that€theÏjurors€were€led€to€believe€that€they€were€required€toÏunanimously€agree€on€mitigating€circumstances.€€òòSeeóó€òòStateÐ À0`'* Ðv.€Brimmeróó,€876€S.W.2d€at€87;€òòState€v.€Harrisóó,€839€S.W.2dÐ °1P(+ Ðat€74„75.Ð ¸ ¤¸ ¤ ÐÌà8 ` àà8¸ ` ü!` ü!à(9)€€The€jury€is€not€required€to€make€the€ultimateÏdetermination€that€death€is€the€appropriate€penalty.€€òòSeeóóÐ p5,/ ÐòòState€v.€Brimmeróó,€876€S.W.2d€at€87;€òòState€v.€RichardÐ `6-0 ÐOdomóó,€No.€02C01„9305„CR„00080,€Shelby€County€(Tenn.Ð P7ð-1 ÐCrim.€App.,€Jackson,€Oct.€19,€1994),€òòappóó.€òògrantedóó,€(Tenn.,Ð @8à.2 ÐFeb.€6,€1995).Ð ¸ ¤¸ ¤ ÐÐ  :À04 Ðà8 ` àà8¸ ` ü!` ü!à(10)€€The€death€penalty€is€arbitrary€and€capricious€becauseÏthe€Defendant€is€denied€the€right€to€final€closing€argumentÏat€the€penalty€phase€of€the€trial.€€òòSeeóó€òòState€v.€Brimmeróó,€876Ð @ à ÐS.W.2d€at€87;€òòState€v.€Caughronóó,€855€S.W.2d€at€542.Ð0 и ¤¸ ¤ ÐÌà8 ` àà8¸ ` ü!` ü!à(11)€€Electrocution€is€a€cruel€and€unusual€punishment,Ïthereby€violating€the€Defendant's€constitutional€rights.€€òòSeeóóÐ   ÐòòState€v.€Cazesóó,€875€S.W.2d€at€268;€òòState€v.€Blackóó,€815Ð ð ÐS.W.2d€at€179.Ð ¸ ¤¸ ¤ ÐÌÌÓÓò òÓ  ÓCONCLUSIONÐ °P  ÐÌÓ  Óó óà ` àWe€have€carefully€considered€the€Defendant's€contentions€as€to€the€allegedÐ p  Ðerrors€occurring€during€the€guilt€phase€of€the€trial€and€conclude€that€the€trial€court€erredÏin€excluding€the€testimony€of€Dr.€Meyer€and€Mr.€Stone.€€It€is€impossible€for€this€court€toÏsay€that€the€exclusion€of€this€evidence€did€not€affect€the€jury's€decision€as€to€the€guiltÏof€the€Defendant€on€these€charges.€€Accordingly,€this€case€is€remanded€for€a€new€trialÏon€the€convictions€for€first€degree€murder,€aggravated€assaultñÈñ,ñÈñ€and€arson,€inÏaccordance€with€this€opinion.ÌÌÌÓÓà ` àà ¸ àà  àà h àà À àà  àòò€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€óóÐ P(ð Ðà ` àà ¸ àà  àà h àà À àà  àDAVID€H.€WELLES,€JUDGEÌÐ  0*Ð  ÐCONCUR:ÌÌÌÌÌòò€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€óóÐ ° ÐDAVID€G.€HAYES,€JUDGEÌÌÌÌòò€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€óóÐ À`  ÐJOHN€A.€TURNBULL,€SPECIAL€JUDGEÌÌà ` àÌà ` à€ÌÌÌ€€€€€€€Ì€€€€€€€€ò òà ` à€€€€Ð @à ÐÌ€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€Ìó óà ` à