ÿWPC° …# VUNa %¯ 0(µU:Ý4 + : w : 0JD 0TŽ 0^â 0h@ 0r¨ 0| 0†– 0 1u¬ U,! 0dM U,± U>Ý U *B)EDCn B± AMÎ,v~GvÓÅ D3˜ 0@Ë AO ÆZ 0D  D/d B“˜HP LaserJet 4Si/4SiMX PS 600dpiPSCRIPTÀÌÀääÀÀÌ0†(ÖÃ9 Z ‹6Times New Roman RegularX($¡¡<þ6X9`("Courier NewTTà~| r‰3|x<1Ó€2 ÿÿ0Indent1Ô2ÔÔ3  Ô2" ÿÿ0Indent2à0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2, ÿÿ0Indent3à0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô26 ÿÿ0Indent4à0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2@ ÿÿ0Indent5à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2J ÿÿ0Indent6à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2T ÿÿ0Indent7à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2^ ÿÿ0Indent8à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô ÿÿ?AGMSYaioIndent0I.A.1.a.(1)(a)i)a)< Œ 9p`(ModernP ÿÿ8Mac DefaultMac DefaultÓ ` °šXÓ< Œ 9p`(Monaco< Œ 9p`(&Times New Roman< Œ 9p`(Arial% Line 7 d####7Border 1dd d€-$Cþÿ << Gÿÿ "Ý ƒ!ÝÑ  ÑÑ#€d#ÑÔ€ÔÔ€!ÔÝ  ÝÔ€"ÔÔ€"ÔÓ  ÓÔ YYY ÔFILEDÔ€"XÔÌÌò òApril€2,€1996ÌÌCecil€Crowson,€Jr.ÌÔ€"ôÔAppellate€Court€Clerkó óPtPtHHÚ(ÿáÿâùFG(üHHÚ(d'@Styl{WP}01•ÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃà Ãà Ãà Ãà Ãà ÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÐ ÐÐHHÐÐ  ÐÐ2ÐÐÿÿ¸æ$ÿÐÐHHÐÐÐÐÐÐÐÐ  ÐÐ ÐÐ ÐÑÑÑGenevaÑÑ ÑÑ € ÑÑ<Px–ÈÑÒÒÒ443!#4ÒÒ$ *$ÒÒ$*$ÒÒ ÿKK ÒÒ  Geneva ÒÒ  Geneva ÒÓ.,ÓÓÓÓ6ÓÓ ÓßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßÑMonacoÑÑ ÑÒ  BA:Op Monaco ÒÒ  BA:Op Monaco Ò%%%%'ÿÿdxd("ÿÿ$££Ò  ÒÒ  Ò€-‚ƒCþÿ<< CÿÿƒLevel 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5($$””ò òÚ  Ú1Ú  Úó ó„„'÷ÿ dxdüÿP PdÝ ƒ!ÝÔ . ÔÔ€ÔÓ&€  X„d&ÓÑ#€  Xd#ÑÔ€!ÔÝ  ÝÒ   ÒÒ ° ÒÑ\R AØ'\ÑÑ7€V%XXdìdÈ7ÑÑ  ÑÓ  ÓòòÔ€"ÔÑ  ÑÙ€€ÙßL€&'$;+'h|` Å `€€LßIN€THE€COURT€OF€CRIMINAL€APPEALS€OFÏTENNESSEEÌÌAT€KNOXVILLEÌÌFEBRUARY€SESSION,€1994óóÌÌÌÌÓ  ÓSTATE€OF€TENNESSEEà àà à)Ìà àà àà àà àà à)Ìà àà àAPPELLEEà àà à)à àNO.€03C01„9302„CR„00050Ìà àà àà àà àà à)Ìà àà àà àà àà à)à àHAMILTON€COUNTYÌà àà àà àà àà à)ÌV.à àà àà àà àà à)à àHON.€STEPHEN€M.€BEVIL,€JUDGEÌà àà àà àà àà à)Ìà àà àà àà àà à)à à(First€Degree€Murder;€AttemptedÌà àà àà àà àà à)à à€Second€Degree€Murder)ÌROBERT€WILLIAMSà àà à)Ìà àà àà àà àà à)Ìà àà àAPPELLANTà à)ÌÌÌÌòòFOR€THE€APPELLANTóó:à àà àà àòòFOR€THE€APPELLEEóó:ÌÌJames€G.€Greenleyà àà àà àà àCharles€W.€BursonÌAttorney€at€Lawà àà àà àà àAttorney€GeneralÌ(On€appeal€only)ÌP.O.€Box€5255à àà àà àà àKimbra€R.€SpannÌSevierville,€TN€37862à àà àà àAssistant€Attorney€GeneralÌà àà àà àà àà àà à450€James€Robertson€ParkwayÌJohn€W.€McClartyà àà àà àà àNashville,€TN€37403„0493ÌMcClarty€&€Taylorà àà àà àà àÌAttorneys€at€Lawà àà àà àà àGary€D.€GerbitzÌ(At€trial€only)à àà àà àà àà àDistrict€Attorney€GeneralÌ822€McCallie€AvenueÌChattanooga,€TN€37403à àà àà àRodney€StrongÌà àà àà àà àà àà àAsst.€Dist.€Attorney€GeneralÌKarla€G.€Gothardà àà àà àà à310€Courts€Bldg.ÌAsst.€Public€Defenderà àà àà à600€Market€StreetÌ(At€trial€only)à àà àà àà àà àChattanooga,€TN€37402Ì701€Cherry€Street,€Suite€300ÌChattanooga,€TN€37402Ìà àà àà àà àà àÌÌAFFIRMED€AS€MODIFIEDÌÌÌOPINION€FILED:€________________________ÌÌÌJERRY€SCOTT,€PRESIDING€JUDGEÓÓÇÑ7€äXXdÖXXdì7Ñò òÓ  ÓòòO€P€I€N€I€O€Nó óóóà àÌÓ  Óà àThe€appellant€was€convicted€of€first€degree€murder€and€attemptedÏsecond„degree€murder€in€violation€of€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€39„13„202(a)(1)€and€ððÏ39„12„101(a).€€Judgment€was€entered€and€following€a€sentencing€hearing,€theÏappellant€was€sentenced€to€death€by€electrocution€for€the€first€degree€murderÏand€to€thirty€(30)€years€imprisonment€for€€the€attempt€to€commit€second„degreeÏmurder,€to€be€served€consecutively.€€On€appeal,€the€following€issues€areÏpresented€for€our€review:ÌÓ  ÓÓÓò òI.ó óÌÓ  ÓÌà8 àWhether€the€evidence€was€sufficient€to€show€premeditation€andÏdeliberation€in€the€killing€of€Janet€Milligan,€and€therefore,€toÏsupport€a€verdict€of€first€degree€murder?ÌÌÓ  Óò òII.ó óÌÓ  ÓÌà8 àWhether€the€court€erred€during€the€jury€selection€process€byÏdenying€the€appellant€individual€sequestered€voir€dire,€or€byÏviolating€the€principles€of€òòBatson€v.€Kentuckyóó€or€òòWitherspoon€v.ÏIllinoisóó?ÌÓ  Óò òÌIII.ó óÌÓ  ÓÌà8 àWhether€the€state's€mere€introduction€of€records€of€conviction€of€aÏ"Robert€Williams"€sufficiently€establishes€the€prior„convictionÏaggravating€factor€for€this€appellant?ÌÌÓ  Óò òIV.ó óÌÓ  ÓÌà8 àWhether€the€state's€reference€to€the€victim's€death€during€theÏsentencing€hearing€was€improper€argument€resulting€in€prejudiceÏto€the€appellant?ÌÌÓ  Óò òV.ó óÌÓ  Óà8 àÌà8 àWhether€the€jury€instructions€given€at€the€sentencing€hearing€wereÏconstitutional?ÌÌÓ  Óò òVI.ó óÌÓ  ÓÌà8 àWhether€the€Tennessee€death€penalty€statutory€scheme€isÏunconstitutional€on€its€face€or€as€applied?ÌÌÓ  Óò òVII.ó óÌÓ  ÓÌà8 àWhether€the€trial€court€erred€in€failing€to€charge€the€jury€withÏspecial€instructions€relating€to€the€appellant's€intoxication€as€aÏmitigating€factor?ÌÌÓ  Óò òÌÌÌVIII.ó óÌÓ  ÓÌà8 àWhether€the€trial€court€erred€by€instructing€the€jury€first€of€theÏindicted€offense,€first€degree€murder,€and€following€it€inÏdescending€order€of€severity€with€the€lesser„included€offenses?€ÌÌÌÓ  ÓÓÓò òI.ó óÓ  Óà àWe€first€address€the€appellant's€contention€that€the€evidence€wasÏinsufficient€to€support€the€verdict€of€€first€degree€murder.€€The€evidence€of€theÏevents€surrounding€the€crime€came€solely€from€the€surviving€victim,€DavidÏMilligan,€who€was€the€husband€of€the€murder€€victim,€Janet€Milligan.€€HeÏtestified€that€the€appellant,€who€had€previously€lived€with€Ms.€Milligan,€came€toÏtheir€home€on€the€night€of€the€crime€and€told€Mr.€Milligan€that€he€came€by€toÏpick€up€some€of€his€belongings€and€would€like€to€"holler"€at€Ms.€Milligan.ÌÌà àMr.€Milligan€said€the€appellant€had€a€"nice€attitude"€€and€he€agreeably€letÏthe€appellant€in€and€directed€him€to€the€bedroom€where€Ms.€Milligan€wasÍwatching€television€with€her€young€daughter.€€When€the€appellant€got€to€theÏbedroom,€he€reached€in€his€coat€pocket,€pulled€out€a€pistol€and€ordered€Mr.ÏMilligan€into€the€bedroom.€€After€Mr.€Milligan€told€the€appellant€that€he€had€noÏproblem€with€him€taking€all€of€his€belongings,€the€appellant€shot€him€in€the€sideÏof€the€face.€€Mr.€Milligan€testified€that,€after€being€shot,€he€raised€up€and€saw€theÏappellant€pull€back€his€wife's€head€and€shoot€her.€€The€evidence€showed€thatÏMs.€Milligan€died€from€multiple€gunshot€wounds€after€being€shot€three€times,€inÏthe€head,€the€elbow€and€the€wrist.Ìà àÌà àMr.€Milligan€testified€that€his€wife€had€recently€purchased€a€pistol€andÏkept€it€under€her€pillow,€but€that€she€had€not€pulled€it€out€when€the€appellantÏentered€the€bedroom.€€Indeed,€he€said€that€no€conversation€occurred€betweenÏthe€appellant€and€Ms.€Milligan€before€the€shootings€began€but€that€Ms.€MilliganÏhad€begun€to€scream€as€soon€as€she€first€saw€the€appellant€in€her€home.ÌÌÌÌÌ€€€à àThe€principles€which€govern€this€court's€review€of€a€conviction€by€a€juryÏare€well€established.€€This€court€must€review€the€record€to€determine€if€theÏevidence€adduced€at€trial€was€sufficient€"to€support€the€finding€of€the€trier€of€factÏof€guilt€beyond€a€reasonable€doubt."€Tenn.€R.€App.€P.€13(e).€€This€rule€isÏapplicable€to€determinations€of€guilt€predicated€upon€direct€evidence,Ícircumstantial€evidence,€or€a€combination€thereof.€òòState€v.€Matthewsóó,€805ÏS.W.2d€776,€779€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.€1990).ÌÌà àA€jury€verdict€of€guilty,€approved€by€the€trial€judge,€accredits€theÏtestimony€of€the€state's€witnesses€and€resolves€all€conflicts€in€favor€of€the€theoryÏof€the€state.€òòState€v.€Williamsóó,€657€S.W.2d€405,€410€(Tenn.€1983);€òòState€v.ÏHatchettóó,€560€S.W.2d€627,€630€(Tenn.€1978).€€On€appeal,€the€state€is€entitled€toÏthe€strongest€legitimate€view€of€the€evidence€and€all€reasonable€and€legitimateÏinferences€which€may€be€drawn€therefrom.€òòState€v.€Cabbageóó,€571€S.W.2d€832,Ï835€(Tenn.€1978).€€Moreover,€a€verdict€against€a€criminal€defendant€removesÏthe€presumption€of€innocence€and€raises€a€presumption€of€guilt€on€appeal,ÏòòState€v.€Graceóó,€493€S.W.2d€474,€476€(Tenn.€1973),€which€theÏdefendant/appellant€has€the€burden€of€overcoming.€òòState€v.€Brownóó,€551€S.W.2dÏ329,€330€(Tenn.€1977).ÌÌà àIn€examining€the€sufficiency€of€the€evidence,€this€court€does€notÏreevaluate€the€weight€or€credibility€of€the€witnesses'€testimony€as€those€areÏmatters€entrusted€exclusively€to€the€jury€as€the€triers€of€fact.€òòState€v.€Sheffieldóó,Ï676€S.W.2d€542,€547€(Tenn.€1984);€òòState€v.€Wrightóó,€836€S.W.2d€130,€134Ï(Tenn.€Crim.€App.€1992).€€Nor€may€this€court€substitute€its€inferences€for€thoseÏdrawn€by€the€trier€of€fact€from€circumstantial€evidence.€òòLiakas€v.€Stateóó,€199ÏTenn.€298,€305,€286€S.W.2d€856,€859€(1956).€€The€relevant€question€on€appealÏis€whether,€after€viewing€the€evidence€in€the€light€most€favorable€to€the€State,Íany€rational€trier€of€fact€could€have€determined€that€the€essential€elements€ofÏthe€crime€were€established€beyond€a€reasonable€doubt.€Tenn.€R.€App.€P.€13(e);ÏòòJackson€v.€Virginiaóó,€443€U.S.€307,€314„324,€99€S.Ct.€2781,€2786„2792,€61ÏL.Ed.2d€560€(1979).€€ÌÌà àFirst€degree€murder€is€"[a]n€intentional,€premeditated,€and€deliberateÏkilling€of€another."€€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€39„13„202(a)(1)€(1991).€€€In€òòState€v.ÏBrownóó,€836€S.W.2d€530,€540€(Tenn.€1992),€the€Supreme€Court€recently€dealtÏwith€this€crime€holding€that,€"even€if€intent€(or€'purpose€to€kill')€andÏpremeditation€('design')€may€be€formed€in€an€instant,€deliberation€requiresÏsome€period€of€reflection,€during€which€the€mind€is€'free€from€the€influence€ofÏexcitement,€or€passion.'€"€€€"In€order€to€establish€first„degree€murder,€theÏpremeditated€killing€must€also€have€also€been€done€deliberately,€that€is,€withÏcoolness€and€reflection."€€òòIdóó.€at€539.€€€Here,€the€defendant€came€to€Ms.ÏMilligan's€home€armed€with€a€pistol€and€entered€the€home,€ostensibly€in€anÏamicable€frame€of€mind.€€He€shot€Mr.€Milligan€and€then€Ms.€Milligan€not€onceÏbut€three€times.€Given€the€above€stated€facts€and€the€narrow€confines€of€thisÏreview,€we€find€the€evidence€to€be€more€than€sufficient€to€prove€the€defendantÏguilty€€of€€first€degree€murder€beyond€a€reasonable€doubt.ÌÌÓ  Óò òII.ó óÌÓ  Óà àThe€appellant€raises€several€issues€which€relate€to€the€selection€of€theÏjurors.€€Specifically,€he€insists€that€the€trial€€judge€erred€by€denying€his€requestÍfor€individual€sequestered€voir€dire,€and€that€the€jury€selection€process€wasÏviolative€of€both€òòBatson€v.€Kentuckyóó,€476€U.S.€79,€106€S.Ct.€1712,€90€L.Ed.2dÏ69€(1986),€and€òòWitherspoon€v.€Illinoisóó,€391€U.S.€510,88€S.Ct.€1770,€20€L.Ed.2dÏ776€(1968).€€€€The€ultimate€goal€of€voir€dire€€is€to€see€that€the€jurors€areÏcompetent,€unbiased,€and€impartial,€and€the€decision€of€how€to€conduct€€voirÏdire€of€prospective€jurors€rests€within€the€sound€discretion€of€the€trial€court.€€ÏòòState€v.€Howell,€8óó68€S.W.2d€238,€247€(Tenn.€1993)(òòcitingóó€òòState€v.€Harrisóó,€839ÏS.W.2d€54,€65€(Tenn.€1992)).€€This€goal€was€attained€in€this€case€and€the€trialÏjudge€did€not€abuse€his€discretion.ÌÌà àFirst,€as€to€the€trial€court's€denial€of€individual€sequestered€voir€dire,€our€ÏSupreme€Court€has€consistently€adhered€to€the€position€that€death€qualificationÏin€a€capital€case€does€not€necessitate€sequestration€during€voir€dire.€òòState€v.ÏSmithóó,€€857€S.W.2d€1,€20€(Tenn.€1993);€(citing€òòState€v.€Johnsonóó,€698€S.W.2dÏ63l,€633€(Tenn.€l985)€and€òòState€v.€Porterfieldóó,€746€S.W.2d€441,€447€(Tenn.Ï1988));€òòState€v.€Stephensonóó,€878€S.W.2d€530,€540€(Tenn.€1994)€(citing€òòSmithóóÏand€òòPorterfieldóó).€€Indeed,€our€Court€has€said€that,€"[i]ndividual€voir€dire€isÏmandated€only€when€there€is€a€'significant€possibility'€that€a€juror€has€beenÏexposed€to€potentially€prejudicial€material."€€òòState€v.€Harrisóó,€839€S.W.2d€54,€65Ï(Tenn.€1992)€€(òòquotingóó€òòState€v.€Porterfieldóó,€supra).€€The€defendant€here€arguesÏthat€group€voir€dire€focussed€the€jurors€on€the€issue€of€punishment€andÏpredisposed€€them€to€the€view€that€the€death€penalty€is€appropriate.€€He€alsoÏcontends€that€it€hindered€€the€ability€of€defense€counsel€to€know€who€to€excludeÍand€thus€how€to€intelligently€exercise€the€peremptory€challenges.€€TheseÏassertions€are€speculative€and€are€not€factually€supported€by€anything€in€theÏrecord.€€The€defendant€has€therefore€failed€to€establish€€that€group€voir€direÏprejudiced€him€to€the€extent€that€the€entire€voir€dire€and€the€impartiality€of€theÏjury€were€invalidated.€€òòSeeóó€òòState€v.€Keenóó,€___S.W.2d€___,€No.€02S01„9112„CR„00064€Slip€Op.€at€28€(Tenn.€1994);€€òò€State€v.€Stephensonóó,€supra.ÌÌà àNext,€the€defendant€asserts€that€the€state€violated€òòBatson€v.€Kentuckyóó,Ï476€U.S.€79,€106€S.Ct.€1712,€90€L.Ed.2d€69€(1986),€in€its€exercise€four€of€€fiveÏperemptory€challenges€used€to€excuse€black€prospective€jurors.€€As€this€CourtÏhas€noted,€a€challenge€to€the€unconstitutional€exercise€of€a€peremptoryÏchallenge€must€be€made€in€a€timely€fashion.€€òòState€v.€Bogleóó,€No.€86„258„IIIÏ(Tenn.€Crim.€App.€filed€Aug.€7,€1987);€€òòState€v.€Petersóó,€No.€230€(Tenn.€Crim.ÏApp.€filed€Feb.€24,€1987).€€In€this€case,€no€objection€was€interposed€until€theÏappellant€filed€his€motion€for€a€new€trial.€€By€that€time€the€trial€judge€could€noÏlonger€take€corrective€action,€which€in€this€case€would€have€been€demanding€aÏracially„neutral€basis€for€the€peremptory€challenges.€€To€hold€otherwise€wouldÏpermit€€defendants€to€withhold€objections€as€a€tactical€matter€in€order€to€haveÏgrounds€for€reversal€in€the€event€of€a€guilty€verdict,€resulting€in€total€chaos€inÏour€system€of€criminal€justice.€€This€court€€has€recognized€such€a€danger€andÏheld€that€timely€objections€must€be€made€even€when€constitutional€issues€areÏat€stake.€€òòState€v.€Simerlyóó,€612€S.W.2d€196,€197€(Tenn.€Crim.€App€1980).ÌÌà àEven€if€the€objections€had€been€timely,€it€appears€that€no€violation€ofÏòòBatsonóó€occurred.€€Two€of€the€excused€black€jurors€€had€criminal€records,Ïanother€had€indicated€that€he€might€not€be€able€to€vote€for€the€death€penalty,Ïand€the€fourth€knew€one€of€the€then„potential€witnesses€for€the€sentencingÏphase€of€the€trial.€€Those€racially„neutral€reasons€for€the€prosecution's€use€of€itsÏperemptory€challenges€negate€any€constitutional€problem.€ÌÌà àThe€third€issue€with€regard€to€the€jury€selection€involves€the€defendant'sÏclaim€that€the€jury€selection€process€violated€òòWitherspoon€v.€Illinoisóó,€supra.€ÏSpecifically,€he€argues€that€the€statements€by€two€of€the€prospective€jurors€Ïconcerning€the€death€penalty€did€not€justify€their€excusal€for€cause.€€Both€of€theÏjurors€indicated€that€they€were€strongly€opposed€to€the€death€penalty€and€wouldÏconsider€imposing€it€under€no€circumstances.€€One€of€the€jurors€had€talked€toÏthe€state€representative€from€her€district€about€trying€to€eliminate€the€deathÏpenalty€from€Tennessee€law.€€The€other€said€she€did€not€think€she€could€liveÏwith€herself€if€she€voted€for€the€death€penalty.€€The€òòWitherspoonóó€standard€wasÏclarified€in€òòWainwright€v.€Witt,óó€469€U.S.€412,€424,€105€S.Ct.€844,€852,€83ÏL.Ed.2d€841(1985):ÌÓÓà8 àThat€standard€is€whether€the€juror's€views€would€"prevent€orÏsubstantially€impair€the€performance€of€his€duties€as€a€juror€inÏaccordance€with€his€instructions€and€his€oath."€€We€note€that,€inÏaddition€to€dispensing€with€òòWitherspoonóó's€reference€to€"automatic"Ïdecisionmaking,€this€standard€likewise€does€not€require€that€aÏjuror's€bias€be€proved€with€"unmistakable€clarity."ÌÓÓÌThe€Court€also€recognized€that€the€questions€asked€and€answers€given€duringÏthe€voir€dire€process€do€not€always€reveal€a€juror's€bias€with€absolute€certainty;Ï"however,€there€will€be€situations€where€the€trial€judge€is€left€with€the€definiteÏimpression€that€a€prospective€juror€would€be€unable€to€faithfully€and€impartiallyÏapply€the€law."€òòWainwrightóó,€469€U.S.€at€425.€€Therefore,€'deference€must€beÏpaid€to€the€trial€judge€who€sees€and€hears€the€juror."€òò€Id.óó€€In€this€case€the€trialÏjudge€believed€that€those€two€jurors€were€adamantly€opposed€to€the€deathÏpenalty€€and€the€record€absolutely€supports€that€conclusion.€€The€constitutionalÏstandard€for€excusing€jurors€due€to€their€views€on€the€death€penalty€was€met.€ÌÌÓ  Óò òIII.ó óÌÓ  Óà àIn€the€sentencing€phase€of€the€trial,€the€state€introduced€certified€copiesÏof€the€judgments€of€convictions€of€three€prior€€violent€felonies€committed€byÏ"Robert€Williams,"€including€voluntary€manslaughter,€second€degree€murder,Ïand€felonious€assault€with€bodily€injury.€€There€was€no€other€evidence€linkingÏthe€appellant€with€the€prior€€felonies€other€than€the€name,€"Robert€Williams."€ÏThe€appellant€contends€that€the€prosecution,€by€merely€introducing€thoseÏrecords,€did€€not€satisfy€its€burden€of€proof€as€to€the€aggravating€circumstanceÏthat€he€had€been€previously€convicted€of€one€or€more€felonies€other€than€theÏpresent€charge€whose€statutory€elements€involved€the€use€of€violence€to€theÏperson.€€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€39„13„204(i)(2).ÌÌà àThe€trial€judge€denied€the€appellant's€motion€for€judgment€of€acquittalÏregarding€the€death€penalty.€€A€trial€judge€may€set€aside€a€verdict€and€grant€aÏjudgment€€of€acquittal€pursuant€to€Rule€29€(c),€Tenn.€R.€Crim.€P.,€upon€€€findingÏthat€the€evidence€is€legally€insufficient€to€establish€the€elements€of€the€offenseÏbeyond€a€reasonable€doubt.€€òòState€v.€Davisóó€,€872€S.W.2d€950,€955€(Tenn.€Crim.ÏApp.€1993);€€òòseeóó€òòalsoóó€òòJackson€v.€Virginiaóó,€supra.ÌÌà àThe€trial€judge€ÓÓthoroughly€and€accurately€instructed€the€jury€that:ÌÌà8 àThe€State€is€required€to€adduce€sufficient€proof€to€establish€theÏidentification€of€the€person€named€in€the€judicial€records€as€beingÏthe€same€person€as€the€defendant€on€trial€beyond€a€reasonableÏdoubt.€€In€short,€the€proof€supplied€by€the€records€is€nothing€moreÏthan€circumstantial€evidence,€and€if€the€jury€is€satisfied€from€theÏevidence€regarding€the€identification€question,€then€the€jury€mayÏdetermine€the€defendant€is€one€and€the€same€person.Ìà8 àÌà8 àà àThe€identity€of€the€defendant€as€the€person€named€in€theÏdocuments€introduced€into€evidence€must€be€established€by€theÏproof€€beyond€a€reasonable€doubt.€€If€you€have€a€reasonableÏdoubt€as€to€whether€the€defendant€has€been€identified€as€theÏperson€named€in€the€documents,€it€will€be€your€duty€to€fix€theÏpunishment€at€life€imprisonment.ÌÌà8 àà àYou€may€not€assume€the€identity€of€the€defendant€as€theÏperson€named€in€the€documents,€this€must€be€proven€to€youÏbeyond€a€reasonable€doubt.ÌÌà8 àà àYou€may€take€into€account€the€commonalty€[sic]€of€the€Ïname€contained€in€the€documents,€the€lack€of€a€middle€name,€andÏthe€lack€of€any€other€identifying€factors.ÌÓÓÌThe€appellant€never€alleged€that€he€did€not€commit€the€prior€felonies,€nor€€didÏhe€interpose€an€objection€to€the€introduction€of€the€documents€reflecting€theÍprior€convictions.€€The€presentence€investigation€report,€the€accuracy€of€whichÏthe€appellant€has€not€challenged,€sets€forth€the€prior€convictions,€but€that€reportÏwas€not€presented€to€the€jury€and€there€was€simply€insufficient€evidenceÏòòpresentedóó€òòtoóó€òòtheóó€òòjuryóó€that€the€appellant€was€the€same€"Robert€Williams"€whoÏwas€convicted€of€the€other€felonies.ÌÌà àOur€Supreme€Court€looked€at€this€issue€in€a€recent€case€involving€ÏTennessee's€former€habitual€criminal€statute€which€had€at€that€time€beenÏsuperseded€by€the€provisions€of€the€Tennessee€Criminal€Sentencing€ReformÏAct€of€1989.€€The€statute€provided€that€"a€judgment€of€conviction€of€any€person€.Ï.€.€under€the€same€name€as€that€by€which€such€person€is€charged€with€theÏcommission€or€attempt€at€commission€,€of€a€felony€under€the€terms€of€€thisÏchapter,€shall€be€prima€facie€evidence€that€the€identity€of€such€person€is€theÏsame."€€Tenn.Code€Ann.€ðð€39„1„804€(1982).€€The€Court€found€that€this€statuteÏwas€not€unconstitutional€per€se,€but€passed€constitutional€muster€so€long€as€theÏjury€was€instructed€that€the€prior€conviction€did€not€shift€the€burden€to€theÏdefendant€but€merely€created€a€permissive€inference€that€the€defendant€is€theÏsame€person.€€òòLowe€v.€Stateóó,€805€S.W.2d€368,€372€(Tenn.€1991).€€Here,€the€jury€Ìreceived€very€adequate€instructions€regarding€how€to€weight€the€evidence€andÏreturned€a€sentencing€verdict€pursuant€to€the€evidence.€€However,€the€evidenceÏwas€not€sufficient€to€show€that€the€"Robert€Williams"€on€trial€in€this€case€was€theÏsame€"Robert€Williams"€convicted€in€the€other€cases.€€This€issue€has€merit.€€TheÍsentence€of€death€is€set€aside€and€the€judgment€is€modified€to€set€theÏappellant's€punishment€at€life€imprisonment.Ì€ÌÓ  Óò òIV.ó óÌÓ  Óà àNext,€the€appellant€contends€that€his€sentence€should€be€reversedÏbecause€of€improper€jury€argument€by€the€prosecutor€during€the€closingÏargument€at€the€sentencing€hearing.€€Specifically,€he€refers€to€the€followingÏargument€by€the€state:€€"Yes,€she€still€had€his€T.V.,€is€that€a€mitigatingÏcircumstance?€€Does€that€outweigh€her€death?"€€These€words€were€followed€byÏan€objection€from€the€appellant's€counsel€with€the€explanation€that€€"[h]er€deathÏis€not€an€aggravating€circumstance."€€The€trial€judge€sustained€the€objection.€ÏThe€appellant€did€not€request€a€limiting€instruction€and€none€was€given.€ÏHowever,€the€judge€clearly€instructed€the€jury€not€to€consider€any€factors€orÏcircumstances€to€be€aggravating€circumstances€other€than€the€appellant's€priorÏfelonies€.ÌÌà àThe€sentencing€statute€provides€that€"[n]o€death€penalty€.€.€.€shall€beÏimposed€but€upon€a€unanimous€finding€that€the€state€has€proven€beyond€aÏreasonable€doubt€the€existence€of€one(1)€or€more€of€the€statutory€aggravatingÏcircumstances"€and€limits€consideration€to€the€twelve€aggravatingÏcircumstances€set€forth€in€the€statute.€€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€39„13„204(i)€(Supp.Ï1995).€€Additionally,€the€statute€provides€€that€"[i]n€the€sentencing€proceeding,Ïevidence€may€be€presented€as€to€any€matter€that€the€court€deems€relevant€toÍthe€punishment€and€may€include,€but€not€be€limited€to,€the€nature€andÏcircumstances€of€the€crime;"€the€defendant's€character,€background€history,€andÏphysical€condition;"€and€evidence€establishing€or€rebutting€the€existence€of€theÏenumerated€aggravating€circumstances€and€any€mitigating€factors.€Tenn.€CodeÏAnn.€ðð€39„13„204€(c)€(Supp.€1995).€€In€a€recent€case€where€the€jury€revealedÏthat€they€had€considered€the€death€of€the€victim€and€the€surroundingÏcircumstances€in€imposing€a€death€€sentence,€our€Supreme€Court€stated€thatÏ"[o]nce€a€capital€sentencing€jury€finds€that€a€defendant€falls€within€theÏlegislatively„defined€category€of€persons€eligible€for€the€death€penalty,€the€juryÏis€free€to€consider€a€myriad€of€factors€to€determine€whether€death€is€the€Ïpunishment€appropriate€to€the€offense€and€the€individual€defendant."€€òòState€v.ÏNicholsóó,€877€S.W.2d€722,€731€(Tenn.€1994).€(citing€cases€from€the€UnitedÏStates€Supreme€Court).ÌÌà àAssuming€òòarguendoóó€that€the€remark€was€improper€in€its€suggestion€thatÏthe€jury€should€weigh€the€victim's€death€against€the€mitigating€factors,€it€wasÏharmless€error.€€"A€court€reviewing€the€propriety€of€argument€in€a€capitalÏsentencing€proceeding€must€determine€whether€the€prosecutor's€commentsÏaffected€the€sentencing€decision."€€òòState€v.€Irickóó,€762€S.W.2d€121,€131€(Tenn.Ï1988).€€The€standard€set€forth€by€this€Court€in€reviewing€such€an€allegationÏrequires€the€consideration€of€five€factors€in€determining€whether€any€improperÏconduct€was€prejudicial:€€(1)€the€conduct€complained€of€viewed€in€the€contextÏand€in€light€of€the€facts€and€circumstances€of€the€case;€(2)€any€curativeÍmeasures€undertaken€by€the€court€and€the€prosecution;€€(3)€€the€intent€of€theÏprosecutor€€in€making€the€improper€statement;€€(4)€€the€cumulative€effect€of€theÏimproper€conduct€and€any€other€errors€in€the€record;€€(5)€€the€relative€strength€orÏweakness€of€the€case.€€òòJudge€v.€Stateóó,€539€S.W.2d€340,€344€(Tenn.€Crim.€AppÏ1976).€€Applying€those€factors€to€this€remark,€we€find€that€the€verdict€could€notÏhave€been€affected€to€the€prejudice€of€the€appellant€by€the€isolated€remark.€€ÏThe€prosecutor's€remark€€was€moderate€at€most€and€the€trial€judge€gave€theÏjury€clear€and€accurate€instructions€as€to€the€law.€€This€issue€is€without€merit.€ÏFurthermore,€in€view€of€our€action€on€the€previous€issue,€this€issue€is€of€noÏimportance.ÌÌÓ  Óò òV.ó óÌÓ  Óà àThe€appellant€has€raised€several€constitutional€challenges€to€the€juryÏinstructions€given€at€the€end€of€the€sentencing€hearing.€€He€first€submits€that€it€isÏconstitutional€error€to€instruct€juries€that€they€must€agree€unanimously€in€orderÏto€impose€a€life€sentence€and€then€to€prohibit€juries€from€being€told€the€effect€ofÏa€non„unanimous€verdict.€€The€argument€that€the€jury€should€be€told€the€effectÏof€failing€to€agree€has€been€addressed€and€repeatedly€rejected€by€theÏSupreme€Court.€€òòSeeóó€€òòState€v.€Brimmeróó,€876€S.W.2d€75,€87€(Tenn.€1994);€€òòStateÏv.€Cazesóó,€875€S.W.2d€253,€268€(Tenn.€1994);€€òòState€v.€Keenóó,€supra,€at€36;€ÏòòState€v.€Smithóó,€857€SW.2d€1,€22„23€(Tenn.€1993);€€òòState€v.€Barberóó,€753€S.W.2dÏ65,€670„71€(Tenn.€1988).ÌÌà àThe€appellant€argues€that€requiring€the€jury€to€agree€unanimously€to€aÏlife€verdict€violated€the€holdings€in€òòMcKoy€v.€North€Carolinaóó,€494€U.S.€433,€110ÏS.Ct.€1227,€108€L.Ed.€369€(1990),€and€òòMills€v.€Marylandóó,€486€U.S.€367,€108ÏS.Ct.€1860,€100€L.Ed.2d€384€(1988).€€Our€Supreme€Court€has€repeatedlyÏrejected€this€argument.€€òòSeeóó€òòState€v.€Brimmeróó,€876€S.W.2d€75,€87€(Tenn.€1994);€ÏòòState€v.€Thompsonóó,€768€S.W.2d€239,€252€(Tenn.€1989);€€òòState€v.€Kingóó,€718ÏS.W.2d€€241,€249€(Tenn.€1986).€€Specifically,€in€òòBrimmeróó,€the€Court€noted€thatÏòòMcKoyóó€and€òòMillsóó€stand€for€the€principle€that€any€requirement€that€the€jury€mustÏunanimously€find€a€mitigating€circumstance€before€it€can€be€considered€violatesÏthe€Eighth€Amendment.€€However,€the€requirement€of€a€unanimous€òòverdictóó€doesÏnot€violate€those€principles.€€òòBrimmer,€óó876€S.W.2d€at€87.ÌÌà àAdditionally,€the€appellant€argues€that€the€Tennessee€Pattern€JuryÏInstructions€create€a€reasonable€likelihood€that€jurors€are€led€to€believe€thatÏthey€must€unanimously€agree€on€the€existence€of€any€mitigating€factors.€€TheÏSupreme€Court€has€also€repeatedly€rejected€this€argument.€€òòSeeóó€€òòState€v.ÏBrimmeróó,€supra;€òòState€v.€Cazesóó,€supra.€€Moreover,€the€trial€judge€specifically€Ïinstructed€the€jury€in€this€case€that€"[t]here€is€no€requirement€of€jury€unanimity€asÏto€any€particular€mitigating€circumstance,€or€that€you€agree€on€the€sameÏmitigating€circumstance."€€It€is€a€well„established€rule€in€Tennessee€that€a€jury€is€Ìpresumed€to€have€followed€the€instructions€of€the€trial€court.€€òòState€v.€Lawsonóó,Ï695€S.W.2d€202,€204€(Tenn.€1985).€ÌÌÓ  Óò òVI.ó óÌÓ  Óà àThe€appellant's€next€challenge€relates€to€the€constitutionality€ofÏTennessee's€death€penalty€statute.€€Specifically,€he€contends€that€Tenn.€CodeÏAnn.€ðð€39„13„204€(i)(2)€(Supp.€1995),€the€aggravating€factor€for€previous€violentÏfelony€convictions,€does€not€sufficiently€narrow€the€class€of€persons€eligible€forÏthe€death€penalty.€€He€argues€that€this€aggravating€factor€presumes€thatÏpersons€convicted€of€felonies€with€violent€elements€are€violent,€and€thusÏunfairly€makes€aiders€and€abettors€eligible€for€capital€punishment.ÌÌà àThe€Tennessee€Supreme€Court€recently€addressed€this€concern€andÏfound€that€the€clear€language€of€the€statute€did€not€require€that€this€aggravatingÏfactor€be€limited€to€convictions€where€the€defendant€directly€used€threats€orÏviolence€against€another€person.€€òòState€v.€Smithóó,€857€S.W.2d€1,€10€(Tenn.Ï1993).€€"We€are€of€€the€opinion€that€the€degree€of€a€defendant's€involvement€inÏan€aggravated€felony€goes€to€the€weight€the€jury€is€to€give€aggravatingÏcircumstances€when€determining€whether€they€outweigh€mitigatingÏcircumstances."€€òòId.óó€€Moreover,€the€United€States€Supreme€Court€has€upheld€aÏsimilar€provision€in€the€Georgia€death€penalty€statute.€€òòZant€v.€Stephensóó,€462ÏU.S.€862,€103€S.Ct.€2733,€2744,€77€L.Ed.2d€235€(1983).€€There€a€defendant'sÏprior€record€of€conviction€for€a€capital€felony€was€held€to€be€a€valid€aggravatingÏfactor€and€to€effectively€€narrow€the€eligible€class.€€òòId.óó€€Additionally,€we€point€outÏthat€our€Supreme€Court€has€consistently€upheld,€in€general,€the€constitutionalityÏof€Tennessee's€death€penalty€statute€under€both€state€and€federal€constitutions.€òòÍState€v.€Harrisóó,€839€S.W.2d€54,€76€(Tenn.€1992);€òòState€v.€Nicholsóó,€877€S.W.2dÏat€737.ÌÌà àThe€appellant€also€attacks€Tennessee's€death€penalty€statute€asÏunconstitutional€on€the€ground€that€it€is€imposed€in€an€arbitrary€and€capriciousÏmanner.€€Initially,€he€asserts€that€unlimited€discretion€is€vested€in€the€prosecutorÏas€to€whether€or€not€to€seek€the€death€penalty.€€In€òòState€v.€Cazesóó,€supra,€ourÏSupreme€Court€directly€addressed€the€issue€of€€prosecutorial€discretion,€findingÏthat€no€constitutional€problems€result€from€the€mere€opportunity€for€discretion.€ÏThe€court€cited€and€applied€the€United€States€Supreme€Court€case€of€òòGregg€v.ÏGeorgiaóó,€428€U.S.€153,€199,€96€S.Ct.€2909,€2937,€49€L.E.2d€859€(1976),€"inÏwhich€the€Court€held€that€opportunities€for€discretionary€action€occurring€duringÏthe€processing€of€a€murder€case,€including€the€authority€of€the€state€prosecutorÏto€select€those€persons€for€whom€he€wishes€to€seek€capital€punishment€do€notÏrender€the€death€penalty€unconstitutional€on€the€theory€that€the€opportunities€forÏdiscretionary€action€render€imposition€of€the€death€penalty€arbitrary€or€freakish."ÌÌà àHe€next€points€to€the€disproportionate€infliction€of€capital€punishment€onÏthe€basis€of€geography,€economic€status€and€gender.€€The€State€responds€thatÏthese€allegations€are€based€on€statistics€and€studies€which€were€not€placed€inÏthe€record€and€that€this€court€may€not€take€judicial€notice€of€those€documents.€ÏAppellate€courts€may€only€review€what€is€in€the€record€and€not€what€might€haveÏbeen€or€should€have€been€included.€€òòDearborne€v.€Stateóó,€575€S.W.2d€259,€264Í(Tenn.€1978).€€In€relevant€part,€Tenn.€R.€App.€P.€13(c)€limits€consideration€by€thisÏCourt€to€"those€facts€established€by€the€evidence€in€the€trial€court€and€set€forthÏin€the€record€and€any€additional€facts€that€may€be€judicially€noticed.€.€.€."€€€AsideÏfrom€the€impropriety€of€appellate€consideration€of€materials€not€introduced€atÏtrial,€the€Tennessee€Supreme€Court€has€summarily€dismissed€claims€regardingÏeconomic,€gender€and€geographic€discrimination€in€the€imposition€of€the€deathÏpenalty.€€€€òòCazesóó,€875€S.W.2d€at€268;€€òòaccordóó€òòBrimmeróó,€876€S.W.2d€at€87,€€òòStateÏv.€Thompsonóó,€No.€02C01„9308„CR„00195,€Slip€Op.€at€17,€18€€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.€Ïfiled€March€9,€1994).ÌÌÓ  Óò òVII.ó óà àÌÓ  Óà àThe€Defendant's€next€argument€is€that€the€trial€court€erred€by€failing€toÏinstruct€the€jury€regarding€mitigating€circumstances€raised€by€the€evidence.€€HeÏrefers€specifically€to€the€mitigating€factor€set€forth€at€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€Ô€!ÔððÔ€"Ô€39„13„204€(j)(8)(Supp.1995),€i.e.,€that€"[t]he€capacity€of€the€defendant€to€appreciate€theÏwrongfulness€of€the€defendant's€conduct€or€to€conform€the€defendant's€conductÏto€the€requirements€of€the€law€was€substantially€impaired€as€a€result€of€mentalÏdisease€or€defect€or€intoxication€which€was€insufficient€to€establish€a€defense€toÏthe€crime€but€which€substantially€affected€the€defendant's€judgment."€€The€trialÏjudge€declined€to€instruct€the€jury€on€this€factor€because€he€did€not€find€thatÏthere€was€sufficient€proof€to€show€its€applicability.€€He€stated€that€he€"did€notÏsee€any€proof€of€that€whatsoever€before€this€jury."€€Indeed,€the€only€pertinentÏtestimony€that€could€possibly€raise€the€issue€of€the€applicability€of€that€factorÍwas€the€testimony€of€the€victim,€Mr.€Milligan,€that€when€the€appellant€came€toÏthe€door,€he€had€red€eyes€and€looked€like€he€had€been€drinking,€and€testimonyÏfrom€a€police€detective€that€three€hours€after€the€crime,€that€when€he€saw€theÏappellant,€he€could€smell€alcohol€but€the€appellant€"did€not€seem€like€he€wasÏoverly€intoxicated€or€so€forth."ÌÌà àIn€interpreting€the€language€of€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€Ô€!ÔððÔ€"Ô€39„13„204€(e)€(1995),Ïthe€Supreme€Court€had€stated€that€it€is€the€trial€judge's€duty€to€determine€whichÏof€the€mitigating€circumstances€have€been€raised€by€the€evidence€and€thusÏshould€be€submitted€to€the€jury€for€determination.€€òòState€v.€Buckóó,€670€S.W.2dÏ600,€608€(Tenn.€1984).€€And,€the€"mitigating€circumstances€which€[are]€notÏraised€by€the€evidence€should€not€€[be]€mentioned€in€the€charge."€òòAccordóó€€òòStateÏv.€Cazesóó,€supra,€875€S.W.€at€267.ÌÌà àIn€òòState€v.€Brimmeróó,€supra,€876€S.W.2d€at€82,€our€Supreme€Court€upheldÏthe€trial€court's€decision€not€to€instruct€the€jury€as€to€this€same€statutoryÏmitigator,€Ô€!ÔððÔ€"Ô€39„13„204(j)(8),€or€Ô€!ÔððÔ€"Ô€39„13„204(j)(2),€that€the€murder€was€committedÏwhile€the€defendant€was€under€the€influence€of€extreme€mental€or€emotionalÏdisturbance.€€There,€even€though€the€defendant's€evidence€consisted€of€theÏtestimony€of€a€psychologist€that€the€defendant€was€angry,€impulsive,€and€proneÏto€outbursts€as€a€result€of€a€personality€disorder,€the€trial€judge€found€this€was€aÏcommon€disorder€and€absent€proof€of€causation,€no€special€jury€instruction€Ïwas€warranted.ÌÌà àIn€this€case,€the€limited€evidence€that€the€appellant€may€have€consumedÏsome€alcohol€is€not€evidence€that€he€was€intoxicated€to€such€a€degree€that€hisÏcapacity€€to€appreciate€the€wrongfulness€of€his€conduct€or€conform€his€conductÏto€the€law€was€impaired.€€Such€mitigating€facts€and€circumstances€were€simplyÏnot€raised€by€the€evidence,€and,€therefore,€the€trial€judge€did€not€err€in€chargingÏthe€jury€as€to€the€mitigating€factors.ÌÌÓ  Óò òVII.ó óÌÓ  Óà àIn€the€appellant's€final€issue,€he€contends€that€the€trial€court€erred€inÏcharging€the€jury€first€with€the€indicted€offense,€obviously€the€most€severe,€andÏproceeding€in€descending€order€of€severity€ending€with€the€least€severe€lesser„included€offense.€€He€argues€that€the€sequence€allowed€the€jury€to€return€aÏverdict€of€first€degree€murder€even€if€they€made€findings€that€should€haveÏresulted€in€a€lesser€degree€of€murder.€€This€Court€recently€rejected€thisÏargument€in€òòState€v.€Rutherfordóó,€876€S.W.2d€118,€119€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.€1993);Ïwhere€it€was€held€that€€€"(t)he€sequential€jury€instruction€did€not€preclude€theÏjury€from€considering€the€lesser€€charges."€€€This€Court€also€pointed€out€that€theÏ"Tennessee€Pattern€Jury€Instruction€41.01€suggests€the€type€of€sequential€juryÏinstruction€that€was€given€by€the€judge."€€€òòId.óó€€€This€issue€is€without€merit.ÌÌÓ  Óò òCONCLUSIONó óÌÓ  Óà àWe€have€carefully€considered€the€defendant's€contentions€as€to€theÏalleged€errors€occurring€during€the€guilt€and€sentencing€phases€and€concludeÏthat€the€defendant's€conviction€of€first„degree€murder€must€be€affirmed.€ÏHowever,€the€sentence€of€death€is€set€aside€and€the€punishment€is€fixed€at€lifeÏimprisonment.ÌÌà àThe€judgment€is€affirmed,€except€as€modified€herein.ÌÌÌÓÓà àà àà àà àà àà à______________________________Ìà àà àà àà àà àà àJERRY€SCOTT,€PRESIDING€JUDGEÌÌÌCONCUR:ÌÌÌÌ__________________________________ÌJOHN€H.€PEAY,€JUDGEÌÌÌÌ__________________________________ÌJOHN€P.€COLTON,€SPECIAL€JUDGEÌÓ  Ó€€€€Ó  Ó