ÿWPCH …# VUNa %¯ 0(µbÝw@å4% 9 H 0JP 0Tš 0^î 0hL 0r´ 0|& 0†¢ 0( 1u¸ 0d- U>‘ U*Ï B)ù DC" AMe² BÂv~ßvÓ] D30 0@c AO£Æò 0D¸ D/ü B+˜HP LaserJet 4SiHPPCL5MS,ü,,,,,ü0nLhÎ(ÈhH  Z ‹6Times New Roman RegularX($¡¡- ù- JUKLHMNOEPQHReSÓ€Ô¡¨ 3|x\2 ÿÿ0Indent1Ô2ÔÔ3  Ô2" ÿÿ0Indent2à0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2, ÿÿ0Indent3à0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô26 ÿÿ0Indent4à0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2@ ÿÿ0Indent5à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2J ÿÿ0Indent6à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2T ÿÿ0Indent7à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2^ ÿÿ0Indent8à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô ÿÿ?AGMSYaioIndent0I.A.1.a.(1)(a)i)a)P ÿÿ8Mac DefaultMac DefaultÓ ` °šXÓ< Œ 9p`(&Times New Roman< Œ 9p`(Arial% Line 7 d!!!!7Border 1dd€-"Cþÿ << Gÿÿ Ý ƒ!ÝÑ  ÑÑ#€d#ÑÔ€ÔÝ  ÝÔ€ ÔÔ€ ÔÓ  Óò òÔ YYY ÔFILEDÔ€ XÔÌÌNovember€5,€1997ÌÌCecil€W.€CrowsonÌAppellate€Court€ClerkÔ  Ôó ó dPtPtHHÚ(ÿáÿâùFG(üHHØ(d'`Styl{WP}01•ÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃà Ãà Ãà Ãà Ãà ÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÐ ÐÐHHÐÐ  ÐÐ2ÐÐÿÿ¸æ$ÿÐÐHHÐÐÐÐÐÐÐÐ  ÐÐ ÐÐ ÐÑÑÑGenevaÑÑ ÑÑ € ÑÑ<Px–ÈÑÒÒÒ443!#4ÒÒ$ *$ÒÒ$*$ÒÒ ÿKK ÒÒ  Geneva ÒÒ  Geneva ÒÓ.,ÓÓÓÓ6ÓÓ ÓßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßÑGenevaÑÑ ÑÒ  ion-F Geneva ÒÒ  ion-F Geneva Ò%%%%'ÿÿdxd("ÿÿ$££Ò  ÒÒ  Ò€-‚ƒCþÿ<< CÿÿƒLevel 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5($$””ò òÚ  Ú1Ú  Úó ó„„'÷ÿ dxdüÿP PdÝ ƒ!ÝÔ . ÔÔ€ÔÝ  Ý›Ñ ` ÑÒ  ÒÒ ° ÒÒ  ÒÒ „ ÒÑ\R AØ'\ÑÔ€ŠÔÔ€ ÔÑ\R AØ'\ÑÑ€ÑÑ7€yXXdìdÈ7ÑÑ  ÑÑ  ÑÓ  Óò òœÙ€€ÙßR€#$"A1-j|` ç `€€@ÿRß›Þ ÞÌà0 à€IN€THE€COURT€OF€CRIMINAL€APPEALS€OF€TENNESSEEÌÌAT€NASHVILLEÌÌJUNE€SESSION,€1997ÌÌÌÌÓ  ÓÓ` °†XDp”XÓVERNON€BEARD,à àà à)à àC.C.A.€NO.€01C01„9607„CC„00324Ìà àà àà àà àà à)à àó óÌà àAppellant,à àà àà àò ò)à àÌà àà àà àà àà à)à àWILLIAMSON€COUNTYÌà àà àà àà àà à)à àÌV.à àà àà àà àà à)à àÌà àà àà àà àà à)à àHON.€HENRY€DENMARK€BELL,€€€€€€€ÌSTATE€OF€TENNESSEE,à à)à àJUDGEó ó€€Ìà àà àà àà àà àò ò)à àó óÌà àAppellee.à àà àà àò ò)à à(POST€CONVICTION)ÌÓ ` °œXÓó óÌÌÓ  ÓÌòòÓ  ÓFOR€THE€APPELLANTóó:à àà àà àòòFOR€THE€APPELLEEóó:ÌÌò òJ.€TIMOTHY€STREETà àà àà àJOHN€KNOX€WALKUP€Ìó ó136€Fourth€Avenue,€Southà àà àAttorney€General€&€ReporterÌFranklin,€TN€37064€Ìà àà àà àà à€à àà àò òEUGENE€J.€HONEAó óÌà àà àà àà àà àà àAssistant€Attorney€GeneralÌà àà àà àà àà àà à2nd€Floor,€Cordell€Hull€BuildingÌà àà àà àà àà àà à425€Fifth€Avenue€North€Ìà àà àà àà àà àà àNashville,€TN€€37243ÌÌà àà àà àà àà àà àò òJOSEPH€D.€BAUGH,€JR.€Ìà àà àà àà àà àà àó óDistrict€Attorney€GeneralÌÌà àà àà àà àà àà àò òMARK€L.€PURYEAR,€IIIó óÌà àà àà àà àà àà àAssistant€District€Attorney€GeneralÌà àà àà àà àà àà àWilliamson€County€Courthouse,€Ste.€G„6Ìà àà àà àà àà àà àP.O.€Box€937€Ìà àà àà àà àà àà àFranklin,€TN€37065„0937ÌÌÌÌÌOPINION€FILED€________________________ÌÌAFFIRMED€IN€PART;€REVERSED€AND€REMANDED€IN€PARTÌÌTHOMAS€T.€WOODALL,€JUDGEò ò€Ìó óÇò òòòÓ  ÓÔ€ °ÔOPINIONóóó óÔ€ ŠÔÌÌÌÌÓÓÓ  Óà àThe€Petitioner,€Vernon€Beard,€appeals€from€the€trial€courtððs€dismissal€ofÏhis€petition€for€post„conviction€relief.€€Petitioner€raises€two€issues:€(1)€whether€theÏtrial€court€erred€in€denying€him€a€delayed€appeal€under€Tennessee€CodeÏAnnotated€section€40„30„120€(repealed€1995)€and€(2)€whether€the€trial€courtÏerred€in€denying€post€conviction€relief€on€the€grounds€that€he€received€ineffectiveÏassistance€of€counsel.€€We€affirm€in€part€and€reverse€and€remand€in€part.ÌÌà àSince€the€petition€was€filed€March€9,€1995,€the€law€prior€to€the€enactmentÏof€the€ð ðPost„Conviction€Procedure€Act,ðð€effective€May€10,€1995€(Tenn.€CodeÏAnn.€ðð€40„30„201€et€seq.)€is€applicable.€€A€brief€history€of€the€events€leading€toÏPetitionerððs€conviction€and€this€action€for€post„conviction€relief€is€necessary.€€OnÏAugust€12,€1993,€a€grocery€store€in€Franklin,€Tennessee,€was€robbed.€€€TheÏowners€of€the€store€reported€the€missing€items€as€beer,€cigarettes€and€cigaretteÏlighters,€as€well€as€insurance€papers.€€Several€days€later,€the€Franklin€PoliceÏDepartment€received€a€tip€from€an€anonymous€phone€caller€that€the€police€couldÏlocate€some€of€the€missing€merchandise€at€173€Spring€Street.€€When€the€policeÏarrived€at€that€address,€Glen€Bennett,€Petitionerððs€half€brother€and€resident€of€theÏhome€at€173€Spring€Street,€invited€the€police€to€come€inside.€€After€they€followedÍhim€in,€he€led€them€to€the€bedroom€and€showed€them€some€of€the€missingÏmerchandise.€€ÌÌà àBennett€was€questioned€at€the€police€station€later€that€day,€and€he€gaveÏa€statement€which€implicated€himself€and€the€Petitioner.€€When€Petitioner€wasÏbrought€to€the€station€for€questioning,€Sergeant€Barbara€Derricks€read€him€theÏòòMirandaóó€rights.€€Petitioner€signed€a€waiver,€and€then€Derricks€wrote€out€hisÏstatement.€€In€the€statement,€Petitioner€admitted€his€involvement€in€the€burglaryÏand€theft.€€Petitioner€was€charged€and€was€appointed€an€attorney.€€Prior€to€trial,Ïthe€attorney€met€with€Petitioner€several€times.€€Petitioner€requested€his€counsel€toÏfile€a€motion€to€suppress€the€statement.€€Counsel€responded€that€his€filing€theÏmotion€to€suppress€would€be€futile€when€Petitioner€had€signed€the€MirandaÏwaiver€of€rights.€€Following€a€jury€trial,€Petitioner€was€convicted€of€burglary€andÏtheft€under€$500.00.€ÌÌà àPrior€to€the€sentencing€hearing,€counsel€received€a€letter€from€PetitionerÏadvising€counsel€that€Petitioner€wanted€to€appeal€the€conviction.€€On€the€day€ofÏthe€sentencing€hearing€Petitioner€indicated€that€he€did€not€want€to€appeal,€butÏcounsel€informed€Petitioner€that€there€was€some€time€to€decide€whether€or€not€toÏappeal.€€Counsel€further€testified€that€Petitioner€became€ambivalent€and€wasÏnot€exactly€sure€whether€or€not€he€wanted€to€appeal.€€The€State€attempted€toÍelicit€testimony€at€the€post„conviction€hearing€that€Petitionerððs€motherÏsubsequently€called€counsel€and€advised€that€Petitioner€did€not€want€to€appeal.€ÏThe€objection€of€Petitionerððs€attorney,€based€upon€hearsay,€was€sustained.€ÏThe€State€then€specifically€argued€that€it€was€not€attempting€to€elicit€thisÏtestimony€to€prove€the€truth€of€the€matter€asserted,€but€to€show€the€ð ðstate€ofÏmindðð€of€trial€counsel€when€he€was€deciding€whether€or€not€to€proceed€with€anÏappeal€on€behalf€of€Petitioner.€€The€trial€court€then€allowed,€for€that€limitedÏpurpose,€the€testimony€from€counsel€that€Petitionerððs€mother€advised€thatÏPetitioner€did€not€want€to€appeal.€€ÌÌà àTrial€counsel€did€not€file€a€motion€for€new€trial€or€otherwise€pursue€anÏappeal€of€Petitionerððs€conviction.€€On€December€30,€1994,€Petitioner€sent€trialÏcounsel€a€letter€regarding€the€status€of€his€appeal.€€After€learning€that€no€appealÏhad€been€filed,€Petitioner€then€filed€his€petition€for€post„conviction€relief.ÌÌà@ àI.€€DELAYED€APPEALÌÌà àPetitioner€argues€the€trial€court€erred€in€denying€him€a€delayed€appeal.ÏUnder€Tennessee€Code€Annotated€section€40„30„120€(repealed€1995),€aÏpetitioner€denied€the€right€to€an€appeal€from€his€original€conviction€in€violation€ofÏhis€constitutional€rights€may€be€granted€a€delayed€appeal€by€the€trial€judge.€€OnÍappeal,€we€are€bound€by€the€trial€courtððs€findings€of€fact€in€a€post„convictionÏcase€unless€we€conclude€that€the€evidence€in€the€record€preponderates€againstÏthose€findings.€€òòBlack€v.€Stateóó,€794€S.W.2d€752,€755€(Tenn.€Crim.€€App.€1990).€€ÌÌà àUnder€Tennessee€Code€Annotated€section€40„35„401€and€Rule€37€of€theÏTennessee€Rules€of€Criminal€Procedure,€the€Petitioner€was€entitled€to€appealÏhis€sentence.€€While€the€record€reflects€there€is€no€dispute€as€to€whetherÏpetitioner€was€advised€as€to€his€rights€to€an€appeal,€there€is€a€lack€of€evidenceÏto€prove€that€counsel€was€effective€with€regards€to€pursuing€Petitionerððs€appeal.€ÏòòSeeóó€òòState€v.€Blackóó,€No.€03C01„9201„CR„00001€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.,€Jackson,ÏMay€12,€1993)€(No€Rule€11€application€filed).€€Tennessee€Code€AnnotatedÏsection€40„14„203€requires€petitionerððs€appointed€counsel€to€represent€petitionerÏon€appeal.€€The€record€reflects€that€Petitionerððs€attorney€never€received€definiteÏinformation€from€Petitioner€that€he€wished€to€waive€his€right€to€appeal.€€Since€theÏState€offered€the€testimony€regarding€the€telephone€call€from€Petitionerððs€motherÏonly€to€show€the€ð ðstate€of€mindðð€of€trial€counsel,€this€is€no€substantive€evidenceÏthat€Petitioner€decided€to€waive€his€right€to€appeal.€€At€best,€the€record€showsÏthat€Petitioner€ð ðwasnððt€exactly€sureðð€as€to€whether€or€not€he€wanted€to€appealÏas€of€the€date€of€the€sentencing€hearing.€€Furthermore,€there€is€no€written€waiverÏfiled€by€Petitionerððs€attorney€regarding€the€right€to€Petitionerððs€appeal.€€òòSeeóó€RuleÏ37(d),€T.R.Cr.P.€€The€record€does€not€show€that€Petitioner€definitely€waived€hisÍright€to€appeal,€and€therefore€the€evidence€preponderates€against€the€findings€ofÏthe€trial€court.€€òòBlackóó,€slip€op.€at€3.€€òòCfóó.€òòSean€Rainer€v.€Stateóó,€No.€02C01„9603„CR„00103,€Shelby€County€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.,€Jackson,€March€27,€1997)€(RuleÏ11€application€denied€Sept.€15,€1997).ÌÌà àThe€petitioner€was€entitled€to€an€appeal€as€of€right€from€his€conviction.€ÏTenn.€R.€Crim.€P.€37;€T.R.A.P.€3(b).€€Likewise,€he€was€entitled€to€the€effectiveÏassistance€of€counsel€in€pursuit€of€that€right.€€òòSeeóó€òòEvitts€v.€Luceyóó,€469€U.S.€387Ï(1985).€€Petitioner€is€entitled€to€proceed€with€a€motion€for€new€trial€and€delayedÏappeal€in€compliance€with€Tennessee€Code€Annotated€section€40„30„120Ï(repealed€1995).ÌÌÓÓÌÌÌÌÌÓÓà@ àII.€€INEFFECTIVE€ASSISTANCE€OF€COUNSELÌÌà@ àA.€€òòmotion€to€suppress€confessionóóÌÌà àPetitioner€argues€the€trial€court€erred€by€denying€his€request€for€post„conviction€relief€on€the€issue€of€ineffective€assistance€of€counsel€at€the€trial.€ÍPetitioner€asserts€that€counsel€should€have€filed€a€motion€to€suppress€hisÏconfession.€€In€reviewing€the€Petitionerððs€Sixth€Amendment€claim€of€ineffectiveÏassistance€of€counsel,€this€Court€must€determine€whether€the€advice€given€orÏservices€rendered€by€the€attorney€are€within€the€range€of€competenceÏdemanded€by€attorneys€in€criminal€cases.€€òòBaxter€v.€Roseóó,€523€S.W.2d€930,Ï936€(Tenn.€1975).€€To€prevail€on€a€claim€of€ineffective€assistance€of€counsel,€aÏpetitioner€ð ðmust€show€that€counselððs€representation€fell€below€an€objectiveÏstandard€of€reasonablenessðð€and€that€this€performance€prejudiced€the€defenseÏin€that€there€must€be€a€reasonable€probability€that€but€for€counselððs€error€theÏresult€of€the€proceeding€would€have€been€different.€€òòStrickland€v.€Washingtonóó,Ï466€U.S.€668,€687„88,€692,€694€(1984);€òòBest€v.€Stateóó,€708€S.W.2d€421,€422Ï(Tenn.€Crim.€App.€1985).ÌÌà àDuring€the€post„conviction€proceeding,€trial€counsel€testified€that€he€refusedÏto€file€a€motion€to€suppress€Petitionerððs€confession€because€he€felt€there€wasÏð ðno€chanceðð€of€getting€the€confession€overturned.€€Counsel€knew€that€PetitionerÏhad€signed€the€waiver€of€his€Miranda€rights€prior€to€giving€his€confession.€ÏPetitioner€claimed€that€the€medication€he€was€taking€affected€his€ability€toÏunderstand€the€waiver€of€rights.€€Counsel€verified€the€medication€Petitioner€wasÏtaking€with€Petitionerððs€physician€and€the€effect€it€would€have€upon€him.€€TheÏphysician€told€counsel€that€the€medication€would€not€have€affected€PetitionerððsÍjudgment,€and€counsel€concluded€that€he€could€not€argue€that€PetitionerððsÏconfession€was€not€knowingly€made.€€Rather€than€file€a€motion€to€suppress,Ïcounsel€stated€that€his€trial€strategy€was€ð ðbased€on€all€the€evidence€the€juryÏshould€not€treat€the€evidence€as€having€any€substantial€weight€because€it€wasÏcoerced,€and€that€he€was€forced€to€sign€it€[confession]€and€that€he€denied€thatÏwhat€was€in€the€statement€ever€happened.ððÌÌà àThe€trial€court€found€that€Petitionerððs€counsel€was€not€ineffective€due€to€hisÏfailure€to€file€a€motion€to€suppress.€€Counsel€could€have€filed€a€motion€toÏsuppress€the€confession€in€addition€to€his€ð ðtrial€strategyðð€of€arguing€to€the€juryÏthat€the€statement€lacked€ð ðsubstantial€weight,ðð€but€legitimate€trial€tactics€basedÏupon€adequate€preparation€do€not€give€rise€to€second„guessing€in€the€context€ofÏan€ineffective€assistance€of€counsel€claim.€€òòHellard€v.€Stateóó,€629€S.W.2d€4,€9„10Ï(Tenn.€1982).€€ÌÌà àWhile€Petitioner€claims€that€his€statement€should€be€suppressed€just€asÏBennettððs€confession€was€suppressed,€the€circumstances€surroundingÏPetitionerððs€confession€were€not€similar.€€Derricks€testified€that€while€she€read€theÏð ðadmonition€and€waiver€of€rightsðð€to€Petitioner,€he€told€her€it€was€not€necessaryÏto€read€the€rights€to€him€as€ð ðhe€understood€them€and€[knew]€all€about€that.ðð€ÏFollowing€her€reading€of€rights€to€Petitioner,€he€signed€the€waiver€and€then€gaveÍa€confession.€€€Derricks€also€stated€that€Petitioner€voluntarily€talked€with€her.€ÏPetitioner€attempts€to€persuade€this€court€that€his€statement€was€given€underÏthe€same€circumstances€as€Bennettððs€statement.€€However,€the€trial€court€foundÏthat€Bennettððs€ð ðobvious€limitations,ðð€including€his€lack€of€education€and€possibleÏmild€retardation,€under€the€totality€of€the€circumstances,€made€Bennettððs€waiverÏof€rights€invalid.€€There€was€no€evidence€that€this€Petitioner€suffered€from€theÏsame€limitations.€€ÌÌà àIt€is€apparent€to€this€court€that€under€the€standards€of€òòStricklandóó€thatÏPetitioner€did€not€suffer€any€prejudice€by€counselððs€failure€to€file€a€motion€toÏsuppress.€€This€issue€is€without€merit.ÌÌà@ àòòB.€€Alibi€defenseóóÌÌà àPetitioner€also€argues€counsel€was€ineffective€based€upon€his€failure€toÏinvestigate€and€present€alibi€defense€witnesses€on€Petitionerððs€behalf€at€trial.€€IfÏpetitioner€contends€that€trial€counsel€failed€to€interview€or€present€witnesses€inÏsupport€of€his€defense,€ð ðthese€witnesses€should€be€presented€by€petitioner€atÏthe€evidentiary€hearing.ðð€€òòBlack€v.€Stateóó,€794€S.W.2d€752,€757€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.Ï1990).€€In€addition€to€establishing€that€a€material€witness€existed€and€was€notÏinterviewed€due€to€counselððs€neglect€in€investigation,€petitioner€must€alsoÍestablish€that€such€failure€inured€to€his€prejudice€or€resulted€in€the€denial€of€criticalÏevidence€which€caused€prejudice€of€the€petitioner.€€òòIdóó.€at€757.ÌÌà àWhile€Petitioner€properly€presented€his€alibi€witnesses€at€the€hearing€onÏthe€post„conviction€petition,€the€alibi€evidence€failed€to€establish€eitherÏineffectiveness€of€counsel€or€prejudice€to€Petitioner.€€During€the€trial,€PetitionerÏtestified€that€on€the€evening€of€August€12,€1993,€he€was€asleep€with€his€€wifeÏat€his€mother„in„lawððs€home.€€During€the€post„conviction€evidentiary€hearing,Ïboth€Petitionerððs€mother€and€brother€testified€that€he€was€at€their€home€asleepÏon€the€evening€of€August€12,€1993.€€There€is€also€conflicting€evidence€regardingÏtheir€testimony€as€to€whether€Petitioner€was€separated€from€his€wife€on€thatÏdate.€€As€the€alibi€testimony€of€Petitionerððs€whereabouts€on€the€evening€ofÏAugust€12,€1993€is€contradicted€by€Petitionerððs€own€testimony€at€trial,€the€trialÏjudge€properly€discredited€the€alibi€proof.ÌÌà àTrial€counsel€testified€that€he€interviewed€both€Petitionerððs€mother€andÏbrother€and€that€he€received€conflicting€information€regarding€the€alibi€defense.€ÏEven€Petitionerððs€mother€was€not€clear€in€whether€she€had€told€counsel€of€thisÏalibi€information€prior€to€trial.€€The€burden€of€proving€the€allegations€at€a€post„conviction€proceeding€by€a€preponderance€of€the€evidence,€including€ineffectiveÏassistance€of€counsel,€is€on€the€petitioner.€€òòClenny€v.€Stateóó,€576€S.W.2d€12,€14Í(Tenn.€Crim.€App.€1978).€€From€the€record,€we€find€that€counselððs€representationÏdid€not€fall€below€an€objective€standard€of€reasonableness.€€òòStrickland€v.ÏWashingtonóó,€466€U.S.€668,€687„88,€692,€694€(1984).ÌÌà àWe€affirm€the€trial€courtððs€denial€of€post„conviction€relief€in€the€matter€ofÏineffective€assistance€of€counsel€at€the€trial,€but€reverse€the€trial€courtððs€denial€ofÏa€delayed€appeal.€€This€cause€is€remanded€to€the€trial€court€to€allow€PetitionerÏto€file€a€motion€for€new€trial€and€pursue€a€direct€appeal€of€the€judgments€ofÏconviction€and€sentence€in€accordance€with€the€time€limitations€set€forth€inÏTennessee€Code€Annotated€section€40„30„120€(repealed€1995).ÌÌà àà àà àà àÌÓÓÓ  ÓÌà àà àà àà àà à____________________________________Ìà àà àà àà àà àTHOMAS€T.€WOODALL,€Judge€ÌÌÌÌCONCUR:ÌÌÌÌ___________________________________ÌJOSEPH€B.€JONES,€Presiding€JudgeÌÌÌ___________________________________ÌWILLIAM€M.€BARKER,€Judge