ÿWPC÷ ŒM„&ÌÞW&…ëÁiM ©4ŸõG¼X8aáW³Ñ$~¸ qpMßø«w–n"|œGÃ{ÅdGÈÈ"kÁ«ÝT2ªá‘c=”Ç "€ywY¦m•«¡.c®Á—;sq¶Žâ‡kT -%^J§È¤+,`~Sþ|¼Éež!4q¼_  ^…mm/ë½–NÄ¢ì…ìK|ß™;eîé0¨w{ôE4ÌÐS~,òÖcÝ»:9´ß×öh»cõB-\Hræ/ûŽÿ„É%rÕÕˆÏf×0²t‘Au…ùÓØ ¶W`+D`±Çjê ñúP8¤õthšéÛ˜cØØŸj9b‡¯ñ ü 2˜{m¶Á{B” Z#‚-ë9nÃ_ Öž¢~£Y07´BGƒª i˜3M×Ô.¾0B3«usÐIˆ˜6TŠ’ù.z „J—ˆÖÒ/ð2tèíÐÂç£q†¢éžÈëjFÐÖgVö„†õ´ÔEæfzBVi󎉇ã#E‰EWMbãǪy¬9XÝó95NO*]ÖÆjɉêçG~€wüXESØJu`«Û]²ˆçÐÅMkCÒfóÚ\DÌ€*Ù´P~(š¨®fŽéŽ%;¹J eﮥ‡rCw¿@*# LUNW %¥ 0(«U :Ób  0‚U:— 0ÔÑU:¥U:ßw@4YmÂ|²> ¬ð –œ ‰2» Ñ<Ú AQ(gU: BÉÆæ 0D¬ 0Dð 0D44 D/xx B§ D3ĘHP LaserJet 4HPPCL5MS,ü,,,,,ü0nLàÏ(ÈhH  Z 6Times New Roman RegularX($¡¡,“í|AZ‹"Arial Regular- ù-(AJ<$Ô€X¯2XXXÔÔ€Š’8ŠXX¯2ÔòòÚ  Ú0Ú  Úóó,c½¬AZ‹"Arial Regular(‚*2df$¤¤Ý ƒ!ÝÝ  ÝÒ°ÒÒ„°ÒÔ€ X’ÁXXXÔÔ€ &†5&X X’ÁÔÓ  Óà ` àòòÚ  Ú0Ú  Úóó€€,c½¬AZ‹"Arial Regular"Arial Regular ® ¯ E° ± E² ³ ´ µ À¶ a· Ó€Wc%3|x  ¸Ý ƒ y^$ÝÒ°ÒÒ„°ÒÔ€ X²¤XXXÔÔ€ &fV&X X²¤ÔÓ  Óà ` àòòÚ  Ú1Ú  Úóó€€Ý  ÝDefendant€filed€her€original€petition€on€November€11,€1996€and€her€amended€petitionÐ `  Ðon€February€8,€1997,€after€the€effective€date€of€the€change€in€burden€of€proof.€€òòSeeóó€Tenn.€CodeÐ 0 Ð ÐAnn.€ðð€40„30„201€(Compilerððs€Notes).€ ¨Ý ƒ y^$ÝÒ°ÒÒ„°ÒÔ€ X²¤XXXÔÔ€ &fV&X X²¤ÔÓ  Óà ` àòòÚ  Ú2Ú  Úóó€€Ý  ÝòòSeeóó€òòóóòòSpinelli€v.€United€Statesóó,€393€U.S.€410€(1969);€òòAguilar€v.€Texasóó,€378€U.S.€108Ð `  Ð(1964);€òòÔ‡&fV&& &fVÔState€v.€Jacuminóó,€778€S.W.2d€430€(Tenn.€1989)Ô#† &fV&&&fV5#Ô. ¢Ý ƒ y^$ÝÒ°ÒÒ„°ÒÔ€ X²¤XXXÔÔ€ &fV&X X²¤ÔÓ  Óà ` àòòÚ  Ú3Ú  Úóó€€Ý  ÝOr,€generally,€an€informant€with€a€criminal€history€or€something€of€value€to€gain€fromÐ `  Ðproviding€the€relevant€information.€€In€this€circumstance,€the€information€possesses€less€inherentÏreliability€and€requires€external€proof.€ ŒÝ ƒ y^$ÝÒ°ÒÒ„°ÒÔ€ X²¤XXXÔÔ€ &fV&X X²¤ÔÓ  Óà ` àòòÚ  Ú4Ú  Úóó€€Ý  ÝAlthough€the€affidavit€recounts€information€from€as€many€as€eleven€unnamedÐ `  Ðinformants,€we€need€not€address€their€reliability€under€either€òòJacuminóó€or€òòMelsonóó.€€We€find€thatÐ 0 Ð Ðthis€portion€of€the€affidavit,€placing€Defendant€at€the€scene€of€the€crime€at€the€approximate€timeÏthe€crime€was€committed,€was€sufficient€to€permit€the€magistrate€to€find€probable€cause€toÏsearch€Defendantððs€home€for€evidence€of€the€robbery€and€killing.€ Ý ƒ y^$ÝÒ°ÒÒ„°ÒÔ€ X²¤XXXÔÔ€ &fV&X X²¤ÔÓ  Óà ` àòòÚ  Ú7Ú  Úóó€€Ý  ÝLikewise,€we€find€no€violation€of€the€Confrontation€Clause,€a€related€matter.€€However,Ð  Ðbecause€Defendant€did€not€complain€of€such€a€violation€in€this€petition,€we€need€not€address€thisÏissue. Ñ  Ñ ÿÝ ƒ y^$ÝÒ°ÒÒ„°ÒÔ€ X²¤XXXÔÔ€ &fV&X X²¤ÔÓ  Óà ` àòòÚ  Ú5Ú  Úóó€€Ý  ÝAt€the€time€of€the€second€trial,€Harveyððs€post„conviction€proceeding€was€pending. 2Ý ƒ y^$ÝÒ°ÒÒ„°ÒÔ€ X²¤XXXÔÔ€ &fV&X X²¤ÔÓ  Óà ` àòòÚ  Ú6Ú  Úóó€€Ý  ÝThe€record€provided€to€this€Court€does€not€reflect€whether€counsel€objected€toÐ `  Ðadmission€of€the€testimony€at€trial.!"#$&Cþÿ<< Cÿÿ Ý ƒ"¯"ÝÝ  ÝÔ€X’ÁXXXÔÔ€ XX’ÁÔÓ  ÓÔ Ad ÔFILEDÔ€X’ÁX ÔÐ  ÐÌò òDecember€1,€1998Ð šš ÐÌCecil€Crowson,€Jr.ÌÔ€ôŽë ôXX’ÁÔAppellate€Court€Clerkó ó,c½¬AZ‹"Arial Regular dƒLevel 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5(3¯$¢¢Ý ƒ!ÝÝ  Ý(3¯$££Ý ƒ!ÝÝ  Ý($$””ò òÚ  Ú1Ú  Úó ó(('÷ÿ dxdüÿP Pd 'ÿÿdxdÝ ƒ!ÝÝ  ÝÑ` °ÑÒ°ÒÒ„°ÒÔ€ŠÀ7ŠXXÔÔ€ŠsZŠŠŠÀ7ÔÑTR[¤ AØ'ÿ Legal3Ø' AØ'ÿ Legalÿ3Ø'TÑÑ€ÑÑ7€l—XXdðXXdð7ÑÑ  ÑÑ  ÑÓ  Óò òñ· ñßr€)<,(j 8` `€€@Eôf ` ttx$,` ð Úrßñ· ñIN€THE€COURT€OF€CRIMINAL€APPEALS€OF€TENNESSEEÐ `  ÐÌAT€KNOXVILLEÌÌJULY€SESSION,€1998ÌÌÌÓ  ÓEMMA€JEAN€BILBREY,à À à)à  àC.C.A.€NO.€03C01„9711„CR„00498Ð ` Ðà ` àà ¸ àà  àà h àà À à)ó óÐ ` Ðà ` àAppellant,à  àà h àà À àò ò)Ð `  Ðà ` àà ¸ àà  àà h àà À à)Ìà ` àà ¸ àà  àà h àà À à)à  àCUMBERLAND€COUNTYÐ `  ÐVS.à ` àà ¸ àà  àà h àà À à)à  àÐ `  Ðà ` àà ¸ àà  àà h àà À à)à  àHON.€JOHN€TURNBULLó óÐ `  Ðò òSTATE€OF€TENNESSEE,ó óà À àò ò)à  àJUDGEó óÐ ` Ðà ` àà ¸ àà  àà h àà À àò ò)ó óÐ ` Ðà ` àAppellee.à  àà h àà À àò ò)à  àó ó(Post„Conviction)ò òÐ ` Ðó óÌÌÓ  Óò òON€APPEAL€FROM€THE€JUDGMENT€OF€THEÐ Pð ÐCRIMINAL€COURT€OF€CUMBERLAND€COUNTYó óÐ Pð ÐÌÌòòÓ  ÓFOR€THE€APPELLANTóó:à h àà À àà  àòòFOR€THE€APPELLEEóó:Ð @ à ÐÌSTEVEN€C.€DOUGLASà h àà À àà  àJOHN€KNOX€WALKUPÐ 0"Ð ÐP.O.€Box€422à  àà h àà À àà  àAttorney€General€and€ReporterÐ (#È ÐCrossville,€TN€38557„0422Ìà ` àà ¸ àà  àà h àà À àà  àELLEN€H.€POLLACKÌà ` àà ¸ àà  àà h àà À àà  àAssistant€Attorney€GeneralÌà ` àà ¸ àà  àà h àà À àà  à425€5th€Avenue€NorthÌà ` àà ¸ àà  àà h àà À àà  àNashville,€TN€37243ÌÌà ` àà ¸ àà  àà h àà À àà  àBILL€GIBSONÌà ` àà ¸ àà  àà h àà À àà  àDistrict€Attorney€GeneralÌÌà ` àà ¸ àà  àà h àà À àà  àDAVID€PATTERSONÌà ` àà ¸ àà  àà h àà À àà  àAssistant€District€Attorney€GeneralÌà ` àà ¸ àà  àà h àà À àà  à145€S.€Jefferson€AvenueÌà ` àà ¸ àà  àà h àà À àà  àCookeville,€TN€38501ÌÌÌÌOPINION€FILED€________________________ÌÌAFFIRMEDÌÌDAVID€H.€WELLES,€JUDGEÐ  €7 ./ ÐÓ  ÓÔ€°ÚD°ŠŠsZÔò òòòÑ7€ >u ˆ ˆdXXdð7ÑOPINIONóóó óÔ€ŠsZа°ÚDÔÐ `  ÐÌÌÌÓ  ÓÓÓà ` àThe€Defendant,€Emma€Jean€Bilbrey,€appeals€the€trial€courtððs€denial€of€post„¼conviction€relief€pursuant€to€Tennessee€Rule€of€Appellate€Procedure€3(b).€€SheÏasserts€that€her€convictions€for€first€degree€murder€and€theft€of€property€less€thanÏ$500€should€be€reversed€because€she€received€ineffective€assistance€of€counselÏat€trial€in€violation€of€her€Sixth€Amendment€right€to€counsel.€€We€affirm€theÏjudgment€of€the€trial€court.€€ÌÌà ` àThe€procedural€history€of€Defendantððs€case€is€unusual.€€After€a€full€day€ofÏtestimony,€the€trial€judge€became€ill€and€was€hospitalized;€and€another€judgeÏcompleted€the€trial.€€Defendant€was€convicted€by€a€jury€on€June€1,€1991€of€firstÏdegree€murder€and€aggravated€robbery.€€A€panel€of€this€Court€reversed€thoseÏconvictions€in€òòState€v.€Bilbreyóó,€858€S.W.2d€911€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.€1993),€becauseÐ n# Ðthe€substituted€judge€had€not€sufficiently€familiarized€himself€with€the€record€toÏallow€him€to€exercise€his€function€as€thirteenth€juror.€€ÌÌà ` àIn€addition,€at€that€first€trial,€Defendantððs€lead€counsel,€James€Jones,Ïbecame€ill€and€was€hospitalized€for€hypertension€and€early€congestive€heartÏfailure.€€Hospital€records€indicated€heavy€alcohol€consumption€by€counsel€overÏthe€course€of€the€preceding€days.€€Counselððs€incapacity€occurred€after€a€lengthy,Ï140„page€cross„examination€of€severed€co„defendant€David€Harvey,€who€testifiedÏfor€the€State.€€Associated€second€and€third€counsel,€including€John€Appman,Ïrepresented€Defendant€throughout€the€remainder€of€the€trial.€€ÌÐ ¾8^/0 Ðà ` àDefendant,€represented€by€Appman,€was€retried€in€January€of€1994;€andÏa€jury€convicted€her€of€first€degree€murder€and€theft€of€property€less€than€$500.€ÏWe€affirmed€the€convictions,€and€the€supreme€court€denied€permission€to€appeal.€ÏòòState€v.€Bilbreyóó,€912€S.W.2d€187€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.€1995),€òòperm.€to€appealÐ 0Ð Ðdeniedóó€(Tenn.€1995).€€She€now€petitions€for€post„conviction€relief€based€upon€fourÐ  À Ðassignments€of€error,€all€of€which,€she€asserts,€constitute€ineffective€assistanceÏof€counsel€prejudicing€her€Sixth€Amendment€rights.ÌÌà ` àTo€be€entitled€to€post„conviction€relief€on€the€basis€of€ineffective€assistanceÏof€counsel,€Defendant€must€show€that€her€counselððs€representation€wasÏð ðdeficientðð€and€that€ð ðthe€deficient€performance€prejudiced€the€defense.ðð€ÏòòStrickland€v.€Washingtonóó,€466€U.S.€668,€687€(1984).€€Under€the€first€prong,Ð °P Ðcounselððs€performance€is€not€deficient€when€ð ðthe€advice€given,€or€the€servicesÏrendered€by€the€attorney,€are€within€the€range€of€competence€demanded€ofÏattorneys€in€criminal€cases.ðð€€òòBaxter€v.€Roseóó,€523€S.W.2d€930,€936€(Tenn.€1975).€Ð €$  ÐThe€second€prong€requires€Defendant€to€show€a€reasonable€probability€that€theÏresult€of€the€trial€would€have€been€different€but€for€the€deficient€representation.€ÏòòWashingtonóó,€466€U.S.€at€694.€€ð ðA€reasonable€probability€is€a€probability€sufficientÐ P*ð " Ðto€undermine€confidence€in€the€outcome.ðð€€òòId.óó€€Ð @,à"$ ÐÌà ` àIf€afforded€a€post„conviction€evidentiary€hearing€by€the€trial€court,€aÏpetitioner€must€do€more€than€merely€present€evidence€tending€to€showÏincompetent€representation€and€prejudice;€she€must€prove€her€factual€allegationsÏby€clear€and€convincing€evidence.€€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€40„30„210(f).׃×Ý ƒJ<ÝÔ€ŠSŠŠŠSÔÔ€ŠSŠŠŠSÔòòÚ  Ú1Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý×  ×€€When€anÐ ð5,. Ðevidentiary€hearing€is€held,€findings€of€fact€made€by€that€court€are€conclusive€andÏbinding€on€this€Court€unless€the€evidence€preponderates€against€them.€€òòCooperÐ P ð Ðv.€Stateóó,€849€S.W.2d€744,€746€(Tenn.€1993)€(citing€òòButler€v.€Stateóó,€789€S.W.2dÐ @ à Ð898,€899€(Tenn.€1990)).€€ÌÌà@. . ®àI.€€MOTION€TO€SUPPRESS€FRUITS€OF€SEARCHˆÌà ` àDefendantððs€first€issue€for€review€is€whether€her€counsel€should€haveÏmoved€to€suppress€the€fruits€of€a€search€conducted€on€April€19,€1990.€€TheÏsearch€was€executed€pursuant€to€a€warrant€that€Defendant€contends€wasÏinsufficient€to€establish€probable€cause.€€Specifically,€she€asserts€that€theÏsupporting€affidavit€sworn€by€Tennessee€Bureau€of€Investigation€Agent€JamesÏMoore€failed€to€identify€informants€from€whom€information€was€obtained€or€vouchÏfor€their€credibility.€€Therefore,€she€argues,€counsel€should€have€(1)€moved€forÏidentification€of€the€informants,€or€(2)€moved€to€suppress€the€evidence€obtainedÏfrom€the€search.€€The€trial€court€did€not€find€ineffective€assistance€of€counsel€andÏthe€evidence€does€not€preponderate€against€that€conclusion.ÌÌà ` àDefendant€cites€only€one€case€to€support€her€argumentð"ðòòState€v.€Lewisóó,Ð P*ð " Ð641€S.W.2d€517€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.€1982).€€Because€òòLewisóó€was€decided€under€theÐ @,à"$ Ðrationale€of€òòAguilaróó„òòSpinellióó,€we€assume€she€contests€the€sufficiency€of€theÐ 0.Ð$& Ðaffidavit€under€what€is€now€the€òòAguilaróó„òòSpinellióó„òòJacuminóó€line€of€cases.׃×Ý ƒJ<ÝÔ€ŠSŠŠŠSÔÔ€ŠSŠŠŠSÔòòÚ  Ú2Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý×  ×€€Such€anÐ  0À&( Ðanalysis,€in€which€the€affiant€must€establish€both€(1)€the€informantððs€basis€of€Ð  2°(* Ðñ¶ ñÑ€DÑñ¶ ñknowledge,€and€(2)€the€reliability€of€either€the€informant€or€the€information,€isÏmisplaced€here,€however,€because€it€presumes€a€confidential,€criminalÏinformant.׃×Ý ƒJ<ÝÔ€ŠSŠŠŠSÔÔ€ŠSŠŠŠSÔòòÚ  Ú3Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý×  ×€€Ð @ à Ðà ` àHere,€rather,€we€need€not€use€the€òòAguilaróó„òòSpinellióó„òòJacuminóó€criteria€becauseÐ 0Ð Ðthe€informant€was€a€private€citizen.€€In€his€affidavit,€Agent€Moore€recounted,€inÏrelevant€part:ÌÓÓà8 ` àà ¸ àOne€of€the€persons€I€interviewed€related€that€he€saw€DavidÏHarvey€and€a€woman€with€bleached,€blond€hair€in€a€light€blue€1984ÏBuick€Regal€automobile€at€a€location€which€is€approximately€twentyÏ(20)€to€thirty€(30)€feet€from€where€the€body€was€found.€€I€personallyÏknow€that€Emma€Jean€Bilbrey€has€bleached,€blond€hair€and€drivesÏa€light€blue,€Buick€Regal,€which€is€about€a€1984€model.€€This€personÏtold€me€that€he€saw€them€on€April€14,€1990€between€10:30€PM€andÏmidnight€at€that€location.€€Furthermore,€this€person€reported€thisÏinformation€to€the€law€enforcement€authorities€after€learning€that€theÏbody€of€U.€J.€Bryant€had€been€found.€€He€stated€that€he€lived€in€theÏGlade€Creek€community€and€was€concerned€about€the€safety€of€theÏcitizens€there.€€To€my€knowledge€he€has€no€connection€with€theÏfamily€of€U.€J.€Bryant,€nor€of€Emma€Jean€Bilbrey€or€David€Harvey,Ïbut€he€is€simply€a€concerned€private€citizen.׃×Ý ƒJ<ÝÔ€ŠSŠŠŠSÔÔ€ŠSŠŠŠSÔòòÚ  Ú4Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý×  ×Ó¨$ÓИ!8` ü!` ü! ÐÌà ` àAccording€to€òòState€v.€Melsonóó,€638€S.W.2d€342€(Tenn.€1982),€twoÐ x% Ðcategories€of€informants€existð"ðcitizen€informants€and€criminal€informants.€€òòId.óó€atÐ h' Ð354.€€In€that€case,€our€supreme€court€recognized€that€informants€ð ðððnot€from€theÏcriminal€milieuðððð€are€more€inherently€reliable€than€professional€informantsð"ðthoseÏwho€receive€some€value€for€their€information.€€òòId.óó€at€354„55€(discussing€òòUnitedÐ 8-Ø#% ÐStates€v.€Bellóó,€457€F.2d€1231,€1238„39€(5th€Cir.€1972);€òòUnited€States€v.€Rollinsóó,Ð (/È%' Ð522€F.2d€160,€164€(2d€Cir.€1975)€Ô‡ŠSŠŠŠSÔ(both€holding€that€the€òòAguilaróó„òòSpinellióó€testÐ 1¸') Ðapplies€only€to€criminal€informants)Ô#†ŠSŠŠŠS¤+#Ô);€òòseeóó€òòState€v.€Cauleyóó,€863€S.W.2d€411,€417Ð `  Ð(Tenn.€1993).€€Therefore,€a€lower€burden€of€production€is€required€for€an€affiantÏwho€attests€to€hearsay€information€given€by€a€citizen€informant;€the€affiant€needÏnot€provide€facts€which€indicate€reliability€or€credibility€of€the€informant.€€òòId.óó;€òòStateÐ 0Ð Ðv.€Dickóó,€872€S.W.2d€938,€943€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.€1993)€(ð ðThe€reliability€of€theÐ  À Ðððcitizen„informantðð€is€judged€by€a€different€standard€than€that€of€the€typical€criminalÏinformant€or€ððtipster.ðððð).ÌÌà ` àIn€òòState€v.€Georgeóó,€706€S.W.2d€91€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.€1985),€this€CourtÐ à€ Ðexplained€in€greater€detail€why€citizen€informants€are€entitled€to€this€presumptionÏof€reliability:ÌÓÓà8 ` àIn€òòState€v.€Melsonóó,€our€own€Supreme€Court€recognized€that€a€citizenÐ °P Ðinformer€who€provides€information€to€police€officers€is€entitled€toÏgreater€belief€in€his€veracity€and€his€credibility€than€would€be€aÏtypical€police€informer€who,€in€some€instances,€are€themselvesÏcriminals.€€Such€a€person€acting€openly,€in€the€aid€of€lawÏenforcement€by€reporting€evidence€of€a€crime€to€the€police,€isÏentitled€to€greater€belief€because€he€has€no€personal€interest€in€theÏdefendantððs€arrest,€nor€does€he€normally€anticipate€any€personalÏbenefit€in€exchange€for€his€information.Ð ` ü!` ü! ÐÌÓÓòòId.óó€at€93€(citation€omitted);€òòseeóóòòState€v.€Smithóó,€867€S.W.2d€343,€345„48€(Tenn.Ð `(  ÐCrim.€App.€1993);€Ô‡ŠSŠŠŠSÔòòState€v.€Sheila€Elaine€Thomasóó,€No.€01C01„9304„CC„00131,Ð P*ð " Ð1996€WL€75980,€at€*10€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.,€Nashville,€Feb.€23,€1996)Ô#†ŠSŠŠŠS™2#Ô€(ð ð[A]nÐ @,à"$ Ðordinary€citizen€is€more€likely€motivated€by€a€concern€for€society€or€his€ownÏsafety,€thus,€the€information€carries€an€indicia€of€reliability.ðð).€€ÌÌà ` àThe€informant€may€not€enjoy€this€heightened€degree€of€reliability,€however,Ïunless€the€face€of€the€affidavit€furnishes€a€basisð"ðdirectly€or€inferentiallyð"ðforÏâ âpresuming€that€reliability€is€deserved:€òòÐ à7€.0 ÐóóÓÓà8 ` àIt€is€incumbent,€we€think,€upon€whoever€seeks€a€search€warrant€toÏâ âinclude€in€the€affidavit€whether€the€informational€source,€named€orÏconfidential,€qualifies€as€a€citizen€informant.€€Otherwise,€the€issuingÏmagistrate€would€not€know€which€standard,€òòJacuminóó€or€òòMelsonóó,€toÐ H è Ðapply.€€Whether€the€affidavit€describes€the€status€of€the€sourceÏdirectly,€by€implication,€or€by€inference,€is€immaterial;€it€must,Ïhowever,€be€apparent€before€the€less€stringent€òòMelsonóó€standard€canÐ 0Ð Ðbe€used€to€test€the€validity€of€the€the€warrant.€€€€Ð ` ü!` ü! ÐÌÓ"5ÓòòÔ‡ŠSŠŠŠSÔSmithóó,€867€S.W.2d€at€348;€òòseeóó€òòCauleyóó,€863€S.W.2d€at€417„18;€òòSheila€ElaineÐ ¸  ÐThomasóó,€1996€WL€75980,€at€*10€(ð ð[A]€search€warrant,€based€upon€a€statementÐ ¨  Ðof€the€citizen€informant,€is€adequate€when€the€information€supplied€by€the€affidavitÏintrinsically€accredits€the€informant.ðð)Ô#†ŠSŠŠŠS¾7#Ô.Ð èˆ ÐÌà ` àIn€the€case€before€us,€Agent€Moore€attested€that€his€informant€was€aÏð ðconcerned€private€citizen.ðð€€In€addition,€the€agent€certified€that,€to€his€knowledge,Ïthe€informant€had€no€connection€with€the€victim,€Defendant,€or€the€co„defendant.€ÏFinally,€Agent€Moore€related€that€the€informant€lived€in€the€community€where€theÏcrime€was€committed,€was€concerned€for€the€safety€of€residents€there,€andÏreported€his€knowledge€to€law€enforcement€officials€immediately€after€learningÏabout€the€crime.€€The€issuing€magistrate€possessed€ample€evidence€to€determineÏthat€òòMelsonóó€was€the€appropriate€standard€and€that€this€informant€was€entitled€toÐ X)ø! Ðthe€presumption€of€reliability€as€a€private€citizen€informant.€€€€€ÌÌà ` àFurthermore,€the€affidavit€does€not€fail€because€Agent€Moore€did€not€nameÏthe€informant,€as€Defendant€claims.€€This€issue€was€squarely€addressed€inÏòòMelsonóó€as€well:€Ð 3¨)+ ÐÓÓà8 ` àWe€have€no€difficulty€in€holding€that€the€name€of€the€source€is€notÏrequired,€as€a€matter€of€law,€to€be€disclosed€in€the€affidavit.€€TheÏreliability€of€the€source€and€the€information€must€be€judged€from€allÏof€the€circumstances€and€from€the€entirety€of€the€affidavit.€€TheÏname€of€the€source€is€only€one€factor€to€be€considered.Ó =ÓÐØ8x/1` ü!` ü! Ð638€S.W.2d€at€356;€òòseeóó€òòCauleyóó,€863€S.W.2d€at€417;€òòLueptow€v.€Stateóó,€909Ð `  ÐS.W.2d€830,€832€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.€1995)€(ð ð[W]hen€the€information€is€suppliedÏby€an€unnamed€citizen€informant€.€.€.€it€is€presumed€reliable.ðð);€òòSmithóó,€867€S.W.2dÐ @ à Ðat€347€(stating€that€ð ðthe€name€of€the€source€need€not€be€disclosed€in€theÏaffidavitðð).€€ÌÌà ` àIn€this€case,€Agent€Moore€was€not€required€to€reveal€the€name€of€hisÏcitizen€informant;€and€judging€the€entirety€of€the€affidavit,€we€find€that€it€indicatesÏsubstantial€reliability.€€According€to€the€law€of€this€state,€Defendantððs€counsel€hadÏno€duty€to€challenge€this€affidavit€in€a€motion€to€suppress€or€motion€to€discloseÏthe€informant.€€Furthermore,€if€counsel€had€so€moved,€Defendant€would€not€haveÏbeen€entitled€to€suppression€of€the€evidence€found€as€a€result€of€the€search.€€ThisÏclaim€has€no€merit.ÌÌà@  ®àII.€INTRODUCTION€OF€DAVID€HARVEYððS€TESTIMONYˆÌà ` àNext,€Defendant€argues€her€counsel€was€ineffective,€to€her€prejudice,€whenÏhe€conceded€that€co„defendant€David€Harveyððs€testimony€at€Defendantððs€first€trialÏwas€admissible€at€her€second€trial.€€As€discussed,€Harvey€testified€and€wasÏexhaustively€cross„examined€at€the€initial€trial€of€this€matter.€€The€resultingÏconviction€was€reversed,€however;€and€upon€Defendantððs€second€trial,€HarveyÏrefused€to€testify,€asserting€his€Fifth€Amendment€privilege€against€self„¼incrimination.׃×Ý ƒJ<ÝÔ€ŠSŠŠŠSÔÔ€ŠSŠŠŠSÔòòÚ  Ú5Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý×  ×€€Defendant€now€contends€that€counsel€was€deficient€when€heÐ 2°(* Ðâ âagreed€on€direct€appeal€from€the€second€trial€that€Harveyððs€testimony€wasÐ 4 *, Ðadmissible€as€a€hearsay€exception€under€Tennessee€Rule€of€EvidenceÏ804(b)(1).׃×Ý ƒJ<ÝÔ€ŠSŠŠŠSÔÔ€ŠSŠŠŠSÔòòÚ  Ú6Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý×  ×Ð P ð Ðâ âÌà ` àTennessee€Rule€of€Evidence€804(b)(1)€provides:ÌÓÓà8 ` àà ¸ àThe€following€are€not€excluded€by€the€hearsay€rule€if€theÏdeclarant€is€unavailable€as€a€witness:Ð ` ü!` ü! Ðà8 ` àà ¸ à.€.€.€Testimony€given€as€a€witness€at€another€hearing€of€theÏsame€or€a€different€proceeding€or€in€a€deposition€taken€inÏcompliance€with€law€in€the€course€of€the€same€or€anotherÏproceeding,€if€the€party€against€whom€the€testimony€is€now€offeredÏhad€both€an€opportunity€and€a€similar€motive€to€develop€theÏtestimony€by€direct,€cross,€or€redirect€examination.Ð ` ü!` ü! ÐÌÓÓTenn.€R.€Evid.€804(b)(1).€€A€declarant€is€ð ðunavailableðð€under€the€rule€if€theÏwitness€ð ð[i]s€exempted€by€ruling€of€the€court€on€the€grounds€of€privilege€fromÏtestifying€concerning€the€subject€matter€of€the€declarantððs€statement.ðð€€Tenn.€R.ÏEvid.€804(a)(1).ÌÌà ` àDefendant€does€not€contest€that€David€Harvey€was€ð ðunavailableðð€at€theÏsecond€trial€within€the€meaning€of€Rule€804(a)(1).€€Rather,€she€asserts€that€Ô‡ŠSŠŠŠSÔÐ x% ÐÔ#†ŠSŠŠŠS K#ÔÔ‡ŠSŠŠŠSÔunder€Rule€804(b)(1)Ô#†ŠSŠŠŠScK#Ô,€she€did€not€have€a€ð ðsimilar€motive€to€develop€theÐ h' Ðtestimonyðð€by€crossñ¯ ñ€ñ¯ ññ° ñ„ñ° ñexamination€during€the€first€trial.€€In€particular,€DefendantÏargues€in€her€brief:ÌÓÓà8 ` àà ¸ àDid€Mr.€Appman€[lead€counsel€at€second€trial]€have€anÏopportunity€to€cross„examine€Mr.€Harvey€at€the€first€trial?€€No.€€AtÏthe€second€trial?€€No.€€Did€he€know€Mr.€Jones€[lead€counsel€at€firstÏtrial]€was€sick€when€he€attempted€to€cross„examine€Mr.€Harvey?€ÏNo,€and€by€then€the€damage€was€done.Ð ` ü!` ü! Ðà8 ` àà ¸ àDid€Mr.€Appman€have€a€similar€motive€to€develop€theÏtestimony?€€Yes€and€no.à8À` ü!` ü!à€€€€Ð3¨)+À¤À¤ ÐÌâ âÓÓÐ ø4˜+- Ðà ` àWith€respect€to€Defendantððs€first€questionð"ðwhether€Appman€had€noÏâ âopportunity€to€cross„examine€Harvey€at€the€first€trial,€we€note€that€Rule€804(b)(1)€Ïrequires€the€ð ðpartyðð€to€have€had€an€opportunity€to€develop€the€testimony.€ÏRegardless€of€whether€Appman€or€another€acted€as€Defendantððs€representative,Ïshe€developed€Harveyððs€testimony€through€cross„examination.€€ÌÌà ` àFurther,€regarding€Defendantððs€third€questionð"ðwhether€Appman€knewÏJones€was€sick€during€the€cross„examination€at€the€first€trial,€we€find€thatÏAppmanððs€knowledge€of€Jonesððs€illness€is€irrelevant.€€Appman€served€asÏDefendantððs€ð ðthird„chairðð€representative€during€her€first€trial.€€If,€as€AppmanÏtestified,€the€crossñ± ñ€ñ± ññ² ñ„ñ² ñexamination€of€Harvey€was€deficient,€he€had€both€anÏopportunity€and€a€duty€to€cause€it€to€be€concluded,€regardless€of€the€reason€forÏany€poor€advocacy.€€However,€Jonesððs€conduct€at€the€first€trial,€in€whichÏDefendantððs€conviction€was€reversed,€does€not€affect€the€conviction€at€her€secondÏtrial,€from€which€she€now€seeks€relief.€€€ÌÌà ` àFinally,€Defendant€relies€on€her€third€questionð"ðwhether€Appman€had€aÏsimilar€motive€to€develop€the€testimony.€€We€agree€with€Defendantððs€assertion€Ïthat€he€did€and€disagree€with€Defendantððs€assertion€that€he€did€not.€€In€both€trials,ÏDefendant€was€charged€with€first€degree€murder.€€Defendant€argues,€however,Ïthat€because€the€supreme€court€published€òòState€v.€Brownóó,€836€S.W.2d€530Ð  0À&( Ð(Tenn.€1992),€after€the€first€trial€and€prior€to€the€second€trial,€ð ðthere€was€aÏdifference€in€how€one€would€develop€the€examination€of€a€witness€in€a€murderÏcase.ðð€€While€we€agree€with€this€statement,€we€also€agree€with€Defendant€thatÏð ð[t]he€distinction€is€subtle.ðð€€If€this€Court€were€to€adopt€Defendantððs€position,€weÏwould€fail€to€recognize€a€difference€in€language€between€ð ðsimilarðð€and€ð ðsame.ðð€Ð Ð9p02 ÐÑD ÑÑ` ÑÑ  ÑRule€804(b)(1)€does€not€mandate€an€identical€motive€to€develop€theÏtestimonyð"ðonly€a€ð ðsimilarðð€motive.€€We€find€a€similar€motive€here.׃×Ý ƒJ<ÝÔ€ŠSŠŠŠSÔÔ€ŠSŠŠŠSÔòòÚ  Ú7Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý×  ×€€Counsel€wasÐ øð Ðnot€ineffective€for€conceding€admissibility€of€David€Harveyððs€testimony€fromÏDefendantððs€first€trial€under€Rule€804(b)(1).€ÌÌà@  ®àIII.€CROSS„EXAMINATION€OF€DAVID€HARVEY€€€€€ˆÌà@bb®àòòA.€Attorney€Jonesððs€Cross„ExaminationóóˆÐ ¨   Ðà ` àDefendant€argues€her€third€issue€in€the€alternative.€€First,€she€asserts€thatÏshe€suffered€ineffective€assistance€of€counsel€due€to€a€deficient€performance€byÏAttorney€Jones€during€the€cross„examination€of€David€Harvey€in€her€first€trial,Ïresulting€in€prejudice€to€her€during€the€second€trial€because€of€HarveyððsÏunanticipated€refusal€to€testify.€€We€find€no€merit€in€this€argument.ÌÌà ` àñ³ ñThis€Court€reversed€Defendantððs€first€conviction€because€the€trial€judgeÏfailed€to€make€himself€adequately€familiar€with€the€proceedings,€resulting€in€hisÏinability€to€function€as€the€thirteenth€juror.€€Thereafter,€Defendant€was€entitled€toÏand€received€an€entirely€new€trial.€€This€Court€can€no€longer€review€allegationsÏof€error€in€the€initial€trial€of€this€matter.€€Although€it€may€be€unfortunate€thatÏHarvey€could€not€be€cross„examined€in€the€second€trial,€we€may€not€review€theÏeffectiveness€of€counsel€in€the€first€trial,€even€in€terms€of€the€effect,€if€any,€on€theÏtrial€actually€resulting€in€the€conviction€before€us.€€€€€Ìñ³ ññ´ ñÔ‡ ŠÞ% ŠŠŠSÔñ´ ññµ ññ´ ñÔ‡ Xõ X Š ŠÞ%Ôñ´ ññµ ññ´ ñThis€Court€reversed€Defendantððs€first€conviction€because€the€trial€judgeÐ 8 0 Ðfailed€to€make€himself€adequately€familiar€with€the€proceedings,€resulting€in€hisÏinability€to€function€as€the€thirteenth€juror.€€Thereafter,€Defendant€was€entitled€toÏand€received€an€entirely€new€trial.€€This€Court€can€no€longer€review€allegationsÏof€error€in€the€initial€trial€of€this€matter.€€Although€it€may€be€unfortunate€thatÏHarvey€could€not€be€cross„examined€in€the€second€trial,€the€relevant€issue€at€theÏsecond€trial€was€whether€Harveyððs€prior€testimony€was€admissible€as€evidence.€ÏCounselððs€effectiveness€in€cross„examining€Harvey€at€the€first€trial€is€relevant€toÏthe€resolution€of€this€issue,€but€ineffective€assistance€of€counsel€at€the€first€trialÏwill€not€provide€a€basis€for€post„conviction€relief€from€the€conviction€in€the€secondÏtrial.ñ´ ññ¶ ññµ ñÔ‡ Xõ X Š ŠÞ%Ôñµ ññ¶ ññ´ ñÔ#†ŠSŠ Š ŠÞ%]#Ôñ´ ññ¶ ññ´ ñÔ#†ŠSŠXX²¤×`#Ôñ´ ññ¶ ñÐ ˆ4€-. ЇÌòòà@µ µ ®àB.€Attorney€Appmanððs€Decision€Not€to€Introduce€TestimonyóóˆÐ øð Ðà ` àAlternatively,€Defendant€argues€that€Appman,€counsel€at€the€second€trial,Ïshould€have€introduced€and€read€Harveyððs€cross„examination€from€the€first€trialÏinto€the€record€of€the€second€trial.€€As€previously€mentioned,€Appman€consideredÏthe€cross„examination€performed€by€Jones€to€be€unskillfulð"ðweak€and€lengthy.€ÏThough€the€State€introduced€Harveyððs€direct€testimony€from€the€initial€trial,ÏAppman€decided€to€waive€reading€the€cross„examination.€€We€find€no€ineffectiveÏassistance€of€counsel€in€this€determination.ÌÌà ` àWith€respect€to€rationalization€of€attorney€conduct€in€an€effectiveÏassistance€of€counsel€case,€the€Supreme€Court€of€the€United€States€instructed,ÌÓÓà8 ` àà ¸ àJudicial€scrutiny€of€counselððs€performance€must€be€highlyÏdeferential.€€It€is€all€too€tempting€for€a€defendant€to€second„guessÏcounselððs€assistance€after€conviction€or€adverse€sentence.€.€.€.€€AÏfair€assessment€of€attorney€performance€requires€that€every€effortÏbe€made€to€eliminate€the€distorting€effects€of€hindsight,€toÏreconstruct€the€circumstances€of€counselððs€challenged€conduct,€andÏto€evaluate€the€conduct€from€counselððs€perspective€at€the€time.Ó¨dÓÐ ` ü!` ü! ÐòòStrickland€v.€Washingtonóó,€466€U.S.€668,€689€(1984)€(citation€omitted).€€The€courtsÐ &  Ðof€this€state€also€have€long€ð ðrecognized€that€it€is€not€our€function€to€ððsecond„¼guessðð€tactical€and€strategical€choices€pertaining€to€defense€matters€or€measureÏa€defense€attorneyððs€representation€by€ðð20/20€hindsightðð€when€deciding€theÏeffectiveness€of€trial€counsel.ðð€€òòCooper€v.€Stateóó,€849€S.W.2d€744,€746€(Tenn.Ð È-À&( Ð1993)€(quoting€òòHellard€v.€Stateóó,€629€S.W.2d€4,€9€(Tenn.€1982)).€€Ð ¸/°(* ÐÌà ` àAt€Defendantððs€second€trial,€counsel€was€faced€with€a€decision€ofÏjudgment:€to€introduce€a€cross„examination€that€he€considered€ineffectual€or€toÏwaive€cross„examination.€€From€the€testimony€at€Defendantððs€evidentiary€hearing,Ïwe€find€that€counselððs€primary€objection€to€the€examination€was€its€length€andÐ h9`24 Ðuselessness.€€Counsel€did€not€cite€Jonesððs€inability€to€make€points€that€shouldÏhave€been€highlighted;€rather,€he€stated€that€Jones€should€have€ended€theÏexamination€much€sooner.€€Furthermore,€the€second€trial€court€permittedÏDefendant€to€introduce€and€play€an€audiotape€recording€of€David€Harvey€in€whichÏhe€recanted€much€of€his€former€testimony.€€Therefore,€we€find€the€decision€notÏto€introduce€the€crossñª ñ€ñª ññ« ñ„ñ« ñexamination€reasonable€and€well€within€counselððsÏstrategical€discretion.€€ÌÌÌà@Ï Ï ®àIV.€CROSSñ¬ ñ€ñ¬ ññ­ ñ„ñ­ ñEXAMINATION€OF€DELORES€TANNERˆÌà ` àDefendantððs€final€issue€concerns€counselððs€allegedly€ineffective€crossñ® ñ„ñ® ñÏexamination€of€Delores€Tanner,€a€witness€for€the€State.€€Tanner,€bartender€at€theÏRed€Dog€Saloon,€reported€to€Tennessee€Bureau€of€Investigation€Agent€MooreÏthat€David€Harvey€told€her€he€shot€a€man€seven€times€and€asked€her€not€to€tellÏDefendant.€€Tanner€apparently€did€not€testify€inconsistently€at€trial;€she€simply€didÏnot€mention€this€portion€of€her€prior€statement.€€Defendant€argues€that€herÏtestimony€would€have€contradicted€the€Stateððs€theoryð"ðand€David€Harveyððs€directÏtestimonyð"ðthat€Defendant€not€only€had€knowledge,€but€also€participated€in€theÏkilling€by€firing€several€of€the€bullets€that€hit€the€victim.ÌÌà ` àAt€the€evidentiary€hearing,€counsel€stated€that€he€did€not€believe€theÏtestimony€would€have€been€beneficial€to€the€defense.€€From€our€review€of€theÏrecord,€we€find€no€deficiency€in€failing€to€elicit€Tannerððs€testimony€of€statementsÏmade€by€Harvey.€€Furthermore,€the€Defendant€has€failed€to€demonstrateÏprejudice€on€this€issue.€€Defendantððs€argument€lacks€merit.ÌÐ Ð9p02 Ðà ` àBecause€we€find€no€merit€in€Defendantððs€claims€of€ineffective€assistanceÏof€counsel,€we€affirm€the€judgment€of€the€trial€court€denying€the€Defendant€post„¼conviction€relief.€€ÌÌÌÓÓà0 ` àà0¸ ` T$` T$àà0¸ T$¸ T$àà0hT$T$àà0ÀhT$hT$àà0ÀT$ÀT$àà p à_________________________Ð T$T$ Ðà ` àà ¸ àà  àà h àà À àà  àà p àDAVID€H.€WELLES,€JUDGEÌÌÌÌCONCUR:ÌÌÌÌ_______________________________ÌGARY€R.€WADE,€PRESIDING€JUDGEÌÌÌÌ________________________________ÌJOSEPH€M.€TIPTON,€JUDGE