ÿWPCò /# ¢UN­ %û 0(b)w@14q… 0J” 0TÞ 0^2 0h 0rø 0|j 0†æ 0l 1uü 0dqU>ÕU* B)= 0@f D3¦ BÙ DCö AM9 0† v~¶ vÓ4 AQÆX 0D 0Db D/¦ BÕ˜HP LaserJet 4SiHPPCL5MS,ü,,,,,ü0nLHÎ(ÖÃ9 Z ‹6Times New Roman RegularX($¡¡- ù- XYZD[D\]^V_V`Ó€läzz!3|xl2 ÿÿ0Indent1Ô2ÔÔ3  Ô2" ÿÿ0Indent2à0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2, ÿÿ0Indent3à0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô26 ÿÿ0Indent4à0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2@ ÿÿ0Indent5à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2J ÿÿ0Indent6à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2T ÿÿ0Indent7à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2^ ÿÿ0Indent8à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô  ÿÿ?AGMSYaioIndent0I.A.1.a.(1)(a)i)a)P ÿÿ8Mac DefaultMac DefaultÓ ` °šXÓ< Œ 9p`(&Times New Roman< Œ 9p`(Arial% Line 7 d("ÿÿ$££Ò  ÒÒ  Ò""""'ÿÿdxd d7Border 1dd* #Cþÿ << Gÿÿ &Ý ƒ!ÝÑ  ÑÑ#€d#ÑÔ€ÔÝ  ÝÝ ƒ+"ÝÝ  ÝÔ€ÔÔ€ÔÓ  ÓÔ YYY ÔFILEDÔ€XÔÌÌò òJuly€3,€1997ÌÌCecil€Crowson,€Jr.ÌÔ€ôÔAppellate€Court€Clerkó óPtPtHHLÿôÿô XG(üHHLd'hStyl{WP}01•ÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃà Ãà Ãà Ãà Ãà ÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÐ ÐÐHHÐÐ  ÐÐ2ÐÐÿÿ¸æ$ÿÐÐHHÐÐÐÐÐÐÐÐ  ÐÐ ÐÐ ÐÑÑÑGenevaÑÑ ÑÑ € ÑÑ<Px–ÈÑÒÒÒ443!#4ÒÒ$ *$ÒÒ$*$ÒÒ ÿKK ÒÒ  Geneva ÒÒ  Geneva ÒÓ.,ÓÓÓÓ6ÓÓ ÓßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßÑGenevaÑÑ ÑÒ  h HD: Geneva ÒÒ  h HD: Geneva Ò*+ ,-Cþÿ<< CÿÿƒLevel 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5(3¯$¢¢Ý ƒ!ÝÝ  Ý($$””ò òÚ  Ú1Ú  Úó ó..'÷ÿ dxdüÿP PdÝ ƒ!ÝÔ . ÔÔ€ÔÝ  ÝÑ ` ÑÒ  ÒÒ ° ÒÒ  ÒÒ „ ÒÑ\R AØ'\ÑÔ€ÔÑ\R AØ'\ÑÑ€ÑÑ7€†XXdìdÈ7ÑÑ  ÑÑ  ÑÓ  Óò òÞ ÞÌIN€THE€COURT€OF€CRIMINAL€APPEALS€OF€TENNESSEEÌÌAT€JACKSONÌÌJUNE€SESSION,€1996ÌÌÌÓ  ÓSTATE€OF€TENNESSEE,à àà à€€€€€)à àC.C.A.€NO.€02C01„9508„CC„00226Ìà àà àà àà àà à€€€€€)Ìó óà àAppellee,à àà àà àò ò€€€€€)Ìà àà àà àà àà à€€€€€)Ìà àà àà àà àà à€€€€€)à àFAYETTE€COUNTYÌVS.à àà àà àà àà à€€€€€)à àÌÙ€*ÙßR€$%#A1-j|?ã` Å `€€@ÿRßà àà àà àà àà à€€€€€)à àHON.€KERRY€BLACKWOODó óÌò òTERRON€BLEDSOE,€aka€ð ðTONY,ó óðð€€ò ò)à àJUDGEó óÌà àà àà àà àà àò ò€€€€€)ó óÌà àAppellant.à àà àà àò ò€€€€€)à à(Direct€Appeal)Ìó óÌÌÓ  ÓÌÌòòÓ  ÓFOR€THE€APPELLANTóó:à àà àà àòòFOR€THE€APPELLEEóó:ÌÌLESLIE€I.€BALLINà àà àà àà àCHARLES€W.€BURSONÌMARK€A.€MESLERà àà àà àà àAttorney€General€and€ReporterÌ200€Jefferson€Avenue,€Suite€1250ÌMemphis,€TN€€38103à àà àà àCLINTON€J.€MORGANÌà àà àà àà àà àà àAssistant€Attorney€GeneralÌà àà àà àà àà àà à450€James€Robertson€ParkwayÌà àà àà àà àà àà àNashville,€TN€€37243ÌÌà àà àà àà àà àà àELIZABETH€RICEÌà àà àà àà àà àà àDistrict€Attorney€GeneralÌÌà àà àà àà àà àà àPERRY€HAYESÌà àà àà àà àà àà àAssistant€District€AttorneyÌà àà àà àà àà àà à302€Market€StreetÌà àà àà àà àà àà àSomerville,€TN€€38068ÌÌÌOPINION€FILED€________________________ÌÌAFFIRMEDÌÌJERRY€L.€SMITH,€JUDGEÇòòò òÓ  ÓÔ€„ÔOPINIONó óóóÔ€ŠÔÌÌÓÓÓ  Óà àÌà àA€Fayette€County€Circuit€Court€jury€convicted€Appellant€Terron€Bledsoe,Ïaka€ð ðTony,ðð€of€four€counts€of€knowingly€delivering€a€controlled€substance.€€As€aÏRange€I€standard€offender,€Appellant€received€an€effective€sentence€of€nineÏyears€in€the€Tennessee€Department€of€Correction.€€In€this€appeal,€AppellantÏpresents€the€following€issues:€(1)€whether€the€trial€court€erred€in€refusing€to€grantÏhis€motion€to€dismiss€for€failure€to€provide€a€speedy€trial,€and€(2)€whether€theÏevidence€presented€at€trial€is€legally€sufficient€to€sustain€convictions€forÏknowingly€delivering€a€controlled€substance.Ìà àAfter€a€review€of€the€record,€we€affirm€the€judgment€of€the€trial€court.ÌÌà@ àò òI.€FACTUAL€BACKGROUNDó óÌà àAs€accredited€by€the€juryððs€verdict,€the€proof€shows€that,€on€March€25,Ï1993,€Sandy€Gooden,€a€confidential€informant,€introduced€Tennessee€HighwayÏPatrol€Officer€Wendall€Miller€to€Appellant.€€During€the€course€of€an€undercoverÏdrug€operation,€Officer€Miller€purchased€crack€cocaine€from€Appellant€on€MarchÏ25,€May€4,€May€6,€and€July€6€of€1993.€€Each€transaction€was€tape€recorded.Ìà àOn€July€23,€1993,€a€Fayette€County€Grand€Jury€returned€an€indictmentÏcharging€Appellant€with€four€counts€of€knowingly€delivering€a€controlledÏsubstance€in€violation€of€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€Sec.€39„17„417(a)(2).€€AppellantÍwas€arrested€pursuant€to€the€indictment€and€capias€on€July€12,€1994.€€OnÏAugust€5,€1994,€Appellant€filed€a€motion€to€dismiss€alleging€that€he€had€beenÏdeprived€of€a€speedy€trial€in€violation€of€the€Sixth€Amendment€to€the€UnitedÏStates€Constitution.€€Following€a€hearing,€the€trial€court€denied€the€motion.€€OnÏDecember€5,€1994,€Appellant€was€tried€before€a€jury€in€the€Fayette€CountyÏCircuit€Court.€€The€jury€returned€a€verdict€of€guilty€on€all€four€counts€of€theÏindictment.ÌÌà@ àò òII.€€SPEEDY€TRIALó óÌà àAppellant€first€alleges€that€the€trial€court€erred€in€refusing€to€grant€hisÏmotion€to€dismiss€for€the€alleged€failure€to€provide€him€a€speedy€trial.€€The€right€toÏa€speedy€trial€is€guaranteed€by€the€Sixth€Amendment€to€the€United€StatesÏConstitution.€€òòBarker€v.€Wingoóó,€407€U.S.€514€(1972).€€It€is€also€guaranteed€byÏArticle€1,€Sec.€9€of€the€Constitution€of€Tennessee.€€In€òòBarkeróó€the€United€StatesÏSupreme€Court€enunciated€the€four€following€considerations€to€be€taken€intoÏaccount€in€determining€whether€a€criminal€defendant€has€been€deprived€of€his€orÏher€right€to€a€speedy€trial:ÌÓÓà àà à(1)à àthe€length€of€the€delay,Ìà àà à(2)à àthe€reason€for€the€delay,Ìà àà à(3)à àwhether€the€defendant€demanded€a€speedy€trial,€andÌà àà à(4)à àwhether€the€defendant€was€prejudiced€by€the€delay.ÌÓÓòòIdóó.€at€530.Ìà àIn€òòState€v.€Bishopóó,€493€S.W.2d€81€(Tenn.€1973),€the€TennesseeÏSupreme€Court€adopted€the€test€enunciated€in€òòBarkeróó€for€adjudicating€claims€ofÏalleged€speedy€trial€deprivations.€€Therefore,€we€will€address€each€of€the€fourÏconsiderations€listed€above€seriatim.Ìà@ àò òA.€Length€of€Delayó óÌà àThe€first€factor,€length€of€delay,€is€the€triggering€mechanism€thatÏnecessitates€the€consideration€of€the€other€three€factors.€€òòState€v.€Woodóó,€924ÏS.W.2d€342,€346€(Tenn.€1996).€€Until€the€delay€in€bringing€the€accused€isÏpresumptively€prejudicial,€it€is€not€necessary€to€consider€the€other€factors.€ÏòòBarkeróó,€407€U.S.€at€530;€òòState€v.€Bakeróó,€614€S.W.2d€352,€355€(Tenn.€1981).Ìà àIn€the€case€òòsubóó€òòjudiceóó€Appellant€was€indicted€on€July€26,€1993.€€ThisÏformal€accusation€against€Appellant€in€this€matter€began€the€time€running€for€theÏState€to€afford€Appellant€a€speedy€trial.€€òòIdóó.€at€353.€€He€was€not€tried€untilÏDecember€5,€1994,€approximately€a€year€and€five€months€following€indictment.€ÏThe€United€States€Supreme€Court€has€noted€that€a€delay€after€formalÏaccusation€is€presumptively€prejudicial€as€it€approaches€one€year.€€òòDoggett€v.ÏUnited€Statesóó,€505€U.S.€647,€652€(1992).€Ìà àThus,€a€delay€of€almost€one€and€a€half€years€between€indictment€andÏtrial€appears€sufficient€to€trigger€an€analysis€of€the€other€three€considerations€inÏòòBarkeróó.Ìà@ àò òB.€Reason€for€the€Delayó óÌà àThe€second€factor,€reason€for€delay,€usually€falls€into€one€of€fourÏcategories:ÌÓÓà8 àà8 à(a)€intentional€delay€to€gain€tactical€advantage€overÏthe€defense€or€to€harass€the€defendant,ÌÌà8 àà8 à(b)€€bureaucratic€indifference€or€negligence,ÌÌà8 àà8 à(c)€€delay€that€is€necessary€for€the€fair€and€effectiveÏprosecution€of€the€case,€or€ÌÌà8 àà8 à(d)€€delay€caused€or€acquiesced€in€by€the€defendant.ÌÌÓÓà àAppellant€claims€that€the€negligence€or€indifference€of€Fayette€CountyÏauthorities€caused€the€delay€in€his€case.€€He€claims€his€name€had€been€enteredÏin€the€National€Crime€Information€Center€(NCIC)€computer€following€his€indictmentÏand€that€he€has€lived€at€the€same€address€all€his€life.€€He€claims€he€could€haveÏeasily€been€arrested€and€brought€to€trial€much€sooner.€€The€record€reflects€thatÏwhen€Appellant€was€indicted€the€State€had€no€information€about€him€other€thanÏhis€name.€€Appellantððs€name€was€entered€into€NCIC,€however€a€name€withoutÏa€date€of€birth,€driving€license€number€or€social€security€number€is€apparentlyÏinsufficient€to€obtain€an€address€over€NCIC.€€In€August€1993€Fayette€CountyÏauthorities€obtained€a€date€of€birth€for€Appellant,€but€were€apparently€stillÏunable€to€obtain€his€address.€€The€Fayette€County€jail€administrator€admittedÏshe€did€at€some€point€receive€an€F.B.I.€fingerprint€file€number€for€Appellant,€andÏthat€given€Appellantððs€prior€criminal€record€an€address€recorded€at€the€time€of€aÏprevious€arrest€could€ð ðprobablyðð€have€been€located€using€the€F.B.I.€number.€€NoÍexplanation€was€offered€as€to€why€this€avenue€was€left€unexplored.€€In€April€ofÏ1994€Appellant€was€arrested€on€unrelated€charges€in€Shelby€County€and€itÏwas€discovered€he€was€wanted€in€Fayette€County€on€the€charges€which€areÏthe€subject€of€this€appeal.€€Fayette€County€lodged€a€detainer€against€AppellantÏand€when€the€Shelby€County€charges€were€resolved€Appellant€was€returned€toÏFayette€County€for€arraignment€on€July€27,€1994.Ìà àFayette€County€authorities€did€make€some€effort€to€secure€the€arrest€andÏprosecution€of€Appellant.€€His€name€was€immediately€entered€in€NCIC,€someÏefforts€were€made€to€obtain€an€address€for€Appellant,€and€once€he€was€locatedÏprocedures€were€immediately€instituted€to€return€him€to€Fayette€County€for€trial.€ÏWhile€it€does€appear€that€Fayette€County€authorities€could€have€been€moreÏaggressive€in€their€efforts€to€locate€Appellant,€their€actions€do€not€amount€toÏnegligence€or€a€lack€of€due€diligence€so€as€to€warrant€weighing€this€factorÏagainst€the€State.Ìà@ àò òÌÇà@ àC.€Demand€for€Speedy€Trialó óÌà àThe€third€factor€for€our€consideration€is€whether€Appellant€asserted€hisÏright€to€a€speedy€trial€by€making€a€demand€for€one.€€The€uncontradictedÏtestimony€of€Appellate€established€that€he€was€not€aware€of€the€existence€ofÏFayette€County€charges€against€him€until€he€was€returned€to€Fayette€County€inÏJuly€1994,€approximately€one€year€from€the€time€of€his€indictment.€€He€has€neverÏmade€a€demand€for€a€speedy€trial.€€However,€under€the€circumstances€weÏdecline€to€weigh€this€fact€against€him.€€Appellant€cannot€be€expected€to€make€aÏdemand€for€trial€on€charges€he€did€not€know€existed.Ìà@ àò òD.€Prejudice€From€the€Delayó óÌà àPossible€prejudice€to€Appellant€is€the€fourth€factor€taken€into€account€inÏdetermining€whether€he€has€been€deprived€of€a€speedy€trial.€€This€considerationÏis€given€the€greatest€weight€of€all€the€factors.€€òòWoodóó,€924€S.W.2d€at€349.€€TheÏonly€proof€in€the€record€that€as€a€result€of€the€delay€Appellant€was€hampered€inÏhis€ability€to€defend€himself€are€his€statements€that€he€could€not€remember€hisÏwhereabouts€on€the€dates€he€was€accused€of€delivering€cocaine€in€FayetteÏCounty.€€On€appeal€Appellant€argues€that€the€delay€in€bringing€him€to€trialÏincreased€the€chances€he€was€misidentified€since€the€undercover€officer€had,Ïduring€the€period€of€delay,€handled€so€many€other€narcotics€cases€involvingÏother€individuals.Ìà àNeither€of€Appellantððs€arguments€as€to€possible€prejudice€are€convincing.€ÏAppellant€made€no€attempt€to€establish€an€alibi,€and€never€claimed€he€was€notÏin€Fayette€County€on€the€dates€of€the€offenses.€€He€only€claimed€he€could€notÏremember€where€he€was€on€those€dates.€€Secondly,€the€possibility€ofÏmisidentification€is€fairly€remote.€€Two€eyewitnesses€positively€Çdentified€Appellant€as€the€perpetrator€of€the€offenses€in€question.€€One€of€theseÏwitnesses€had€known€Appellant€for€fifteen€years.€€In€addition,€AppellantððsÏexpert€witness,€a€professor€of€speech€pathology,€compared€a€tape€recording€ofÏone€of€the€drug€transactions€allegedly€involving€Appellant€with€a€known€tapeÏrecording€of€Appellantððs€voice.€€The€expert€testified€in€his€professional€opinionÏthere€was€an€eighty€to€eighty„five€percent€chance€the€speakers€on€the€tapesÏwere€two€different€people.€€This€testimony€was€apparently€rejected€by€the€jury.€ÏUnder€the€circumstances€the€ability€of€Appellant€to€defend€himself€does€notÏappear€to€have€been€impaired€by€the€delay€between€indictment€and€trial.€€ThisÏfactor€weighs€against€Appellant.Ìà àIn€summary,€although€the€delay€of€approximately€one€and€a€half€yearsÏfrom€indictment€to€trial€is€sufficient€to€trigger€an€analysis€of€the€other€factors€in€anÏinquiry€as€to€whether€Appellant€was€denied€a€speedy€trial,€this€is€not€anÏextraordinary€delay.€€The€reason€for€the€delay€appears€to€have€arisen€moreÏfrom€a€lack€of€specific€information€concerning€the€Appellant€than€from€any€sort€ofÏnegligence€or€indifference.€€The€lack€of€a€demand€for€a€speedy€trial€results€fromÏAppellantððs€ignorance€of€the€charges€against€him€and€should€not€be€heldÏagainst€him.€€Finally,€this€record€simply€does€not€establish€that€the€ability€ofÏAppellant€to€defend€himself€was€hampered.€€Due€consideration€of€all€theseÏrelevant€factors€compels€us€to€conclude€that€Appellant€was€not€deprived€of€hisÏconstitutional€right€to€a€speedy€trial.Ìò òòòà@ àóóIII.€€SUFFICIENCY€OF€THE€EVIDENCEòòÌó óóóà àAppellant€also€alleges€that€the€evidence€presented€at€trial€is€insufficient€toÏsustain€his€convictions€for€knowingly€delivering€a€controlled€substance.€€WhenÏan€appeal€challenges€the€sufficiency€of€the€evidence,€the€standard€of€review€isÏwhether,€after€viewing€the€evidence€in€the€light€most€favorable€to€the€State,€anyÏrational€trier€of€fact€could€have€found€the€essential€elements€of€the€crime€beyondÏa€reasonable€doubt.€€òòJackson€v.€Virginiaóó,€443€U.S.€307,€318€(1979);€òòState€v.ÏEvansóó,€838€S.W.2d€185,€190„91€(Tenn.€1992);€Tenn.€R.€App.€P.€13(e).€€OnÏappeal,€the€State€is€entitled€to€the€strongest€legitimate€view€of€the€evidence€andÏall€reasonable€or€legitimate€inferences€which€may€be€drawn€therefrom.€€òòState€v.ÏCabbageóó,€571€S.W.2d€832,€835€(Tenn.€1978).€€This€Court€will€not€reweigh€theÏevidence,€re„evaluate€the€evidence,€or€substitute€its€evidentiary€inferences€forÏthose€reached€by€the€jury.€€òòState€v.€Careyóó,€914€S.W.2d€93,€95€(Tenn.€Crim.ÏApp.€1995).€€Furthermore,€in€a€criminal€trial,€great€weight€is€given€to€the€resultÏreached€by€the€jury.€€òòState€v.€Johnsonóó,€910€S.W.2d€897,€899€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.Ï1995).ÌÌà àOnce€approved€by€the€trial€court,€a€jury€verdict€accredits€the€witnessesÏpresented€by€the€State€and€resolves€all€conflicts€in€favor€of€the€State.€€òòState€v.ÏWilliamsóó,€657€S.W.2d€405,€410€(Tenn.€1983).€€The€credibility€of€witnesses,€theÏweight€to€be€given€their€testimony,€and€the€reconciliation€of€conflicts€in€the€proofÍare€matters€entrusted€exclusively€to€the€jury€as€trier€of€fact.€€òòState€v.€Sheffieldóó,Ï676€S.W.2d€542,€547€(Tenn.€1984).€€A€juryððs€guilty€verdict€removes€theÏpresumption€of€innocence€enjoyed€by€the€defendant€at€trial€and€raises€aÏpresumption€of€guilt.€€òòState€v.€Tuggleóó,€639€S.W.2d€913,€914€(Tenn.€1982).€€TheÏdefendant€then€bears€the€burden€of€overcoming€this€presumption€of€guilt€onÏappeal.€€òòState€v.€Blackóó,€815€S.W.2d€166,€175€(Tenn.€1991).€€ÌÌà àIn€order€to€sustain€convictions€in€this€case,€the€proof€must€show€thatÏAppellant€knowingly€delivered€a€controlled€substance€to€Officer€Miller.€€AppellantÏargues€that€he€was€not€the€individual€who€sold€the€cocaine€to€Officer€Miller€andÏpoints€to€the€expert€testimony€regarding€the€audio€tapes€of€the€transactions€toÏsupport€his€claim.€€Dr.€William€H.€Manning€of€the€University€of€Memphis€testifiedÏthat,€based€upon€the€fundamental€pitch€test€that€he€performed€on€the€tape€ofÏthe€fourth€incident,€he€was€eighty€to€eighty„five€percent€sure€that€the€speaker€onÏthe€tape€was€not€Appellant.€€However,€the€evaluation€and€accreditation€ofÏexpert€testimony€are€matters€within€the€sole€province€of€the€jury€as€the€trier€ofÏfact.€òòEdwards€v.€Stateóó,€540€S.W.2d€641,€647€(Tenn.€1976).€€Furthermore,€asÏstated€previously,€determining€the€credibility€of€witnesses€and€the€weight€to€beÏgiven€their€testimony€as€well€as€resolving€conflicts€in€the€proof€are€mattersÏentrusted€exclusively€to€the€jury€as€trier€of€fact.€€òòSheffieldóó,€676€S.W.2d€at€547.€ÏThis€Court,€even€if€it€wished€to€do€so,€may€not€substitute€its€evidentiaryÍinferences€for€those€drawn€by€the€jury.€€òòCareyóó,€914€S.W.2d€at€95.€€Here,€itÏappears€that€the€jury€gave€greater€weight€to€the€testimony€of€Officer€Miller€andÏMr.€Gooden€regarding€the€cocaine€sales€than€to€the€testimony€of€Appellant€andÏhis€expert€witness.€€Under€well„settled€Tennessee€law,€the€jury€was€within€itsÏprovince€in€doing€so.€€Thus,€we€conclude€that,€when€viewed€in€a€light€mostÏfavorable€to€the€State,€the€evidence€presented€at€trial€is€legally€sufficient€toÏsustain€Appellantððs€convictions€for€knowingly€delivering€a€controlled€substance.ÌÌà àAccordingly,€the€judgment€of€the€trial€court€is€affirmed.ÌÌÓÓà àà àà àà àà à____________________________________Ìà àà àà àà àà àJERRY€L.€SMITH,€JUDGEÌÌÌÌCONCUR:ÌÌÌÌ___________________________________ÌJOSEPH€M.TIPTON,€JUDGEÌÌÌ___________________________________ÌDAVID€H.€WELLES,€JUDGE