WPC ,dd$9|HY/% (x 9 _ bE q+ @a2 4 g W| Ẁ BẄ́ ZWx $W͈ JWt kW̐ W` W̨ W͜ ;W UW W W kW W! W" W# RW% W& W ' "W( QW) W* W0D W4 8Wx pWWT W{WP}10{WP}12{WP}11{WP}22WP 6.0 caption{WP}16{WP}01"Hl.' '" tU{WP}10 <<KK ..,,..,, tU HelveticaHHl6HHH(d(    ٬A 7XXdd7A " tU   Arial Regular" Э      tU@2"HHlm'$'" tU{WP}10 <<KK  tU HelveticaHHl6HHH(d( tU{WP}22 tV tU tU Helvetica tU $Y@Y@Y@F'$' tWI$$'$' tXLHH'$' tYEll'$'D$ 0' '0$' '$ tZA' ' t[u t\g t]u t^st t_21, t`1 ta9 tb98 tcC tde tec tfil tgC thr tio tjw tks tlon, tmJ tnr.$('  '$  toA'  ' tpp tqp tre tsl ttl tua tvte twC txo tyu tzrt'  ' t{C^^'  ' t|ljj'  ' t}evv'  ' t~r'  'k     tU tU tU0' '0A tUIN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEAL %  S OF TENNESSEE*AT JACKSON*88FAUGUST 1998 SESSIONFTTbbp  p~  ~ܪЫSTATE OF TENNESSEE,$$) C.C.A. NO. 02C019707CC00262  $$$$$$)   $Appellee$$$) DYER COUNTY  $$$$$$)v.$$$$$) HON. J. STEVEN STAFFORD, $$$$$$) JUDGEWILLIAM PAUL BOGUS, $$)$$$$$$) POSTCONVICTION RELIEF !Defendant/Appellant $)   &&44BFOR THE APPELLANT:$$$FOR THE APPELLEE:BPP^William K. Randolph"$$$John Knox Walkup^l120 N. Mill Street, Suite 303$$Attorney General & ReporterlzP.O. Box 611zDyersburg, TN 380250611$$Clinton J. Morgan$$$$$$$425 Fifth Avenue North$$$$$$$2d Floor, Cordell Hull Building$$$$$$$Nashville, TN 372430493"  $$$$!!""##$$%%&&''"(("0J))0> 00))> Jܿ*N\ܿ*N\+\j,jx-x./01OPINION FILED   2 3 4AFFIRMED 5JOHN K. BYERS 6SENIOR JUDGE78 $9 .' '$ tUͪ  Ы tU tU   tUO P I N I O N0:.<.' '0 tUͪЫ tU tU tU$;<J' '$ tUͪ  Ы tU tU   tU$The defendant, William Paul Bogus, appeals as of right pursuant to Rule 3 ofJ' 'the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure from the denial of his petition for post  conviction relief by the Dyer County Circuit Court. >J$On May 9, 1994, the defendant was convicted of selling cocaine in a jurytrial. He was sentenced as a Range II, multiple offender to eight years and fined$2,000.00. The trial court ordered the defendant to serve this sentenceconsecutive to his prior sentences and parole revocation. The trial courtsjudgment became final on May 9, 1994.$C"' '$$The defendant filed a pro se petition for postconviction relief on November"' '1, 1996. The petition alleged that the defendant was entitled to a new trial becauseN= =E" ' 'Nhis trial counsel was ineffective tU9{WP}11  1   b tU**"Hl.' '" tU{WP}10 <<KK  tU HelveticaHHl6HHH(d( tUx{WP}12$  1   The defendant did not present the matter of the ineffectiveness of his trial' 'counsel as an issue for our review, and we see no reason to review this issuebased on the record before us. Rule 13(b) Tenn. R. App. P. *b֭ and because the trial court erred in not allowingh' 'him to represent himself at trial.G"$A hearing on the petition was held in the trial court on February 10, 1997. On March 13, 1997, the trial court denied the defendants petition for post  conviction relief in an order which set out its findings of fact and conclusions of law.J$In this appeal, the defendant raises the issue that the denial of his petition forpostconviction relief is based on the error of not being allowed to represent himselfat trial.MD$The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.ND_$The transcript shows that on December 21, 1993 a hearing was held duringwhich the defendant asked the trial judge to be allowed to represent himself at trial. The trial judge engaged the defendant in a colloquy to determine the reasons whyhe wanted to represent himself. After hearing the defendants responses, the trialjudge asked the defendant if he would agree to counsel being appointed for thirty(d(JS_ cS< J tUͪHHHЫ tUͭ tUHH tUdays, at the end of which the defendant could come back if he still wanted torepresent himself. The defendant agreed to work with the appointed counsel for athirty day period and never appeared before the trial court during the trial phase tocomplain about the appointment of counsel.Wb$At the postconviction hearing, the defendant testified that he agreed to thetrial judges appointment of counsel because he thought the appointed counselwould only serve as elbow counsel. On crossexamination, the defendant admittedthat he never brought the subject of selfrepresentation up again until he filed amotion for new trial after his conviction. The record also reveals that the defendantnever raised the issue of selfrepresentation in his direct appeal to this Court. ]b$In a postconviction proceeding, the burden of proof rests upon the petitioner' 'to prove his allegations by a preponderance of the evidence. Sherrill v. State, 772)' 'S.W.2d 60, 62 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1988). Furthermore, the findings of the trial courtin a postconviction hearing are conclusive on appeal unless the evidence' 'preponderates against the judgment. Campbell v. State, 904 S.W.2d 594, 596pz' '(Tenn. 1995); Adkins v. State, 911 S.W.2d 334, 341 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1994). 0c' '0$In denying the petition for postconviction relief, the trial judge found that thedefendant withdrew his request to represent himself when he agreed to work withthe appointed counsel for thirty days and never raised the request again during the' 'trial phase. See State v. Herrod, 754 S.W.2d 627, 629630 (Tenn. Crim. App.' '1988). After a thorough review of the record, we agree with the trial judge that thedefendant waived the right to represent himself. Tenn. Code. Ann.  4030210(f).6 -7i~ H6Furthermore, the evidence does not preponderate against the judgment of the trialcourt. k$The judgment of the trial court denying the defendant postconviction relief isaffirmed. The cost of this appeal is taxed to the defendant.m tU tU tU tU$n' '$ tUͪ  Ы tU tU   tU$$$$$$ ' '$$$$$$John K. Byers, Senior Judgepq r s  %t % 3 tUͪ tU   tUͫ tU tU   tU u 3 A v A OCONCUR: w O ] x ] k y k yz y  { David H. Welles, Judge| } ~   tU tU tU tU        Jerry L. Smith, Judge