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ÆfïÏežÌ™ó¦ÜL޲—Ìy1ÓaHö‚S×Ì:Yþ“·¿L…#RÌð_ ¬¨k3 86ҸãÇF?ÏoúIý£IÒÌÜpq(KÜ {oÍÅ‹›VªÅÅr‹®X|F¯\ZV‚¥WÔ—ª¹é§SÎM†Lš¢¶Ý͈vGð2ØìÕ8ôˆñ/däÒ?—»{=BdLèºÞÃà¨B®V+zL¨·WoéÆó BóEãê„ùEñ»ùFÞɱtÙ`ɘÍ÷(áFj8…tqj$½RÃ…jaà@YhÏ×¼(G©˜‰ño=í:°ÈA®ë½+Z4ôJm™³¦»ìðÇÎmù!Ñžùv¾¨2ú f¢VkOÊÖl>½ ö)qÌî ¡­‰Ñù% %iý®o9.A‰¥>qég~Ë'b %\^ b 0ˆnU NöwD4H\ zkÒå· m¹ #ÁÐ 1‡‘ Æ ÆÞ Ƥ Æj 1‡0N· 1u¹ 72.E` 1‡bUNé 1‡7 72¾ 0cðS 1k 72ø 0w* 1¡ 72. 1` 72í 1 72¬ 1Þ 72mŸ§U@½½½½býýýýýýýýýýýýýýýýýýýýýýýýýýýýýýýýýýýý 0ë Bðð 0¤  D3± D-ä 0K AS\Ư 0¤u 0D A«]»¦%-s (`£ª$¡¡Ñ€.ÑÑ8€½­»»d»»d8ÑÑ ý ÑÓ  Ó(í€"  Z6Times New Roman Regular3j1,ê:i¢Ø+003|x ˜C:\PROGRA~1\COREL\WORDPE~1\TEMPLATE\CUSTOM~1\REVISE~1.WPTC:\Program Files\Corel\WordPerfect Office 2000\Template\Custom WP Templates\revised standard opinion.wptÿU‹ÿÀÀÀ˜HP LaserJet 4050ÈÈÈÈÈÈÈÈ0(5hCEKQW]cioAutoList1I.I.I.I.I.I.I.I.Level 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5‚Level 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5„Level 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5…Level 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5(UfCEKQW]cioAutoList3I.I.I.I.I.I.I.I.3#37=CIQYag­­1.a.i.(1)(a)(i)1)a)i)(ehCEKQW]cioAutoList4I.I.I.I.I.I.I.I.(ÖÃ9 Z‹6Times New Roman Regular(uhCEKQW]cioAutoList5I.I.I.I.I.I.I.I.I.(;3£$´´Ô2#ÔÚ  Ú0Ú  Ú.Ô3  Ôà0  à ØØ0&þCEMU]emu}AutoList6(a)(1)(a)(a)(a)(a)(a)(a)(a)(Oé;$µµà0  àÔ2#ÔÚ  ÚaÚ  Ú.Ô3  Ôà0` (#(#à(ÚCEMU]emu}AutoList7(1)(1)(1)(1)(1)(1)(1)(1) (1)(ÚCEMU]emu}AutoList8(1)(1)(1)(1)(1)(1)(1)(1)"(1)(&ÚCEMU]emu}AutoList9(1)(1)(1)(1)(1)(1)(1)(1)$(1)(W%EGOW_gowAutoList10(A)(A)(A)(A)(A)(A)(A)(A)&(A)  Ñ e Ñ(ÖÃ9 Z‹(Times New Roman - ù-(|G2¤$¤¤Ý ƒ£ª!ÝÑ€.ÑÑ8€­»»dd8ÑÑ ý ÑÓ  ÓÝ  Ýà  àòòÚ  Ú0Ú  ÚóóÔ€ô¤Õò»»Ô d(|3ÿs$££Ý ƒ£ª!ÝÑ€.ÑÑ8€­»»dd8ÑÑ ý ÑÓ  ÓÝ  ÝVVVV'ÿÿdxd)!ÈÈÈÈdxdx( ±þ$’’ò òFigure€Ú  Ú1Ú  Úó ó^_X`YEþÿ<<CÿÿƒLevel 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5(|3ÿs$¢¢Ý ƒ£ª!ÝÑ€.ÑÑ8€­»»dd8ÑÑ ý ÑÓ  ÓÝ  Ý($$””ò òÚ  Ú1Ú  Úó óX[Z&OLE 2.0 Box <=8ÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿCÿÿ HKKKKÝ ƒ£ª!ÝÑ€.ÑÑ8€­»»ddÈ8ÑÑ ý ÑÓ  ÓÝ  ÝÔ_ÔÑ  ÑÑ8€JXXdì»»d8ÑÔ‡îLî»»ÔÑ€×+ÑÑ€)ïWÑà@ttìàIN€THE€COURT€OF€CRIMINAL€APPEALS€OF€TENNESSEEˆÐ ° Ðà@WW$ìàAT€KNOXVILLEˆÐ Ö& ÐÔ#†»­»îîLÏ#Ôà@¼ ¼ ìàAssigned€on€Briefs€May€21,€2002ˆÐ üL ÐÌò òà@Å Å ìàSTATE€OF€TENNESSEE€v.€DONALD€E.€BRYANTó óˆÐ  p ÐÌà@ƒ ƒ ìàÔ€XJX»»­Ôò òDirect€Appeal€from€the€Circuit€Court€for€Ô_ÔBlountÔ_Ô€CountyˆÐ F – Ðà@Ï Ï ìàNo.€C„12446€&€C„12447€€€€€D.€Kelly€Thomas,€Jr.,€JudgeˆÐ 2 ‚ ÐÌÌà@ìì*ìàßA€V) °°` d€÷E<õ` A߈Ð öF  ÐÌà@ÕÕìàNo.€E2001„01255„CCA„R3„CDˆÐ ñA  Ðà  àà ` àà ¸ à€€€€€€€€€€€à  àà h à€€Ô_ÔSeptemberÔ_Ô€5,€2002Ð Ý-  ÐßA€V) °°` dE<È` AßÐ É  Ðó óÌFollowing€a€bench€trial,€Defendant,€Donald€E.€Bryant,€was€found€guilty€of€two€counts€of€aggravatedÐ Ä Ðassault€and€one€count€of€misdemeanor€theft.€€He€was€sentenced€as€a€persistent€Range€III€offender€toÐ ° Ðserve€twelve€years€for€each€aggravated€assault,€and€eleven€months€and€twenty„nine€days€for€theÐ œì Ðmisdemeanor€theft;€all€sentences€were€ordered€to€be€served€concurrently.€€In€this€appeal,€DefendantÐ ˆØ Ðchallenges€the€sufficiency€of€the€evidence€to€support€the€two€convictions€for€aggravated€assault.€Ð tÄ ÐAfter€reviewing€the€record€and€the€applicable€law,€we€affirm€the€judgments€of€the€trial€court.Ð `° ÐÌà@——ìàò òTenn.€R.€App.€P.€3€Appeal€as€of€Right;€Judgment€of€the€Circuit€Court€Affirmed.ó óˆÐ 8ˆ ÐÌòòThomas€T.€Ô_ÔWoodallÔ_Ô,€J.óó,€delivered€the€opinion€of€the€court,€in€which€òòJohn€Everett€Williams€óóandÐ ` ÐòòNorma€McGee€Ogleóó,€JJ.,€joined.Ð üL ÐÌJulie€A.€Rice,€Knoxville,€Tennessee€(on€appeal€only);€Mack€Garner,€District€Public€Defender,Ð Ô$ ÐÔ_ÔMaryvilleÔ_Ô,€Tennessee€(on€appeal€and€at€trial);€and€Shawn€Graham,€Assistant€Public€Defender,Ð À ÐÔ_ÔMaryvilleÔ_Ô,€Tennessee€(at€trial€only)€for€the€appellant,€Donald€E.€Bryant.Ð ¬ü ÐÌPaul€G.€Summers,€Attorney€General€and€Reporter;€Helena€Walton€Ô_ÔYarbroughÔ_Ô,€Assistant€AttorneyÐ „!Ô  ÐGeneral;€Michael€L.€Flynn,€District€Attorney€General;€and€William€R.€Reed,€Assistant€DistrictÐ p"À! ÐAttorney€General,€for€the€appellee,€State€of€Tennessee.Ð \#¬" ÐÌà@66'ìàò òòòOPINIONóóó óˆÐ 4%„ $ ÐÌò òà@¥¥(ìàFACTSó óˆÐ  '\"& ÐÌà  àThe€Stateððs€proof€showed€that€on€October€18,€1999,€Defendant€entered€the€Loweððs€HomeÐ ä(4$( ÐImprovement€Warehouse€in€Ô_ÔBlountÔ_Ô€County€to€return€four€items.€€Defendant€was€issued€an€in„storeÐ Ð) %) Ðcredit.€€After€the€transaction€was€completed,€the€merchandise€return€clerk€notified€Stacy€Ô_ÔIveyÔ_Ô,€theÐ ¼* &* Ðstoreððs€Loss€Prevention€Specialist,€that€Defendantððs€conduct€was€suspicious€and€the€return€wasÐ ¨+ø&+ Ðð ðquestionable.ðð€€The€clerk€communicated€with€Ô_ÔIveyÔ_Ô€via€a€two„way€radio€contained€in€a€cellularÐ ”,ä', Ðtelephone€unit.€€Defendant€had€just€left€the€service€desk€and€was€headed€toward€Loweððs€electronicsÐ €-Ð(-ýÄ ÐÔ_Ôdepartment€when€Ivey€received€the€clerkððs€alert.€€He€then€observed€a€man€fitting€the€clerkððsÐ ° Ðdescription€of€Defendant€enter€the€electronics€department.€€The€man€was€carrying€no€merchandiseÐ œì Ðat€the€time.Ð ˆØ ÐÌà  àIvey€hurried€to€his€office€and€watched€Defendant€with€the€storeððs€hidden€camera€surveillanceÐ `° Ðsystem.€€David€Dockery,€a€managerial€employee€of€the€store,€observed€Ivey€dart€past€him€andÐ L œ Ðfollowed€him€into€the€camera€room.€€The€two€men€observed€Defendant€lingering€in€aisle€six,€whereÐ 8 ˆ Ðthe€telephones€were€located.€€Defendant€appeared€nervous;€he€was€looking€back€and€forth,€seeminglyÐ $ t Ðto€make€sure€that€no€one€was€watching€him.€€The€men€saw€Defendant€pick€up€a€packaged€telephone,Ð  ` Ðopen€the€box,€and€begin€to€remove€various€items€from€it.€€€Defendant€took€a€battery€and€another€itemÐ ü L  Ðfrom€the€box€and€placed€them€inside€his€coat.€€Defendant€momentarily€stepped€away€from€the€shelfÐ è 8  Ðcontaining€the€merchandise,€and€then€stepped€back€and€took€a€power€charger€and€an€additional€itemÐ Ô$  Ðfrom€the€box,€also€placing€these€items€inside€his€coat.€€At€this€point,€Dockery€left€the€camera€roomÐ À  Ðand€entered€the€main€floor€sales€area.€€Ivey€remained€in€the€camera€room€and€continued€watchingÐ ¬ü  ÐDefendant€with€the€surveillance€system.Ð ˜è  ÐÌà  àShortly€thereafter,€Defendant€picked€up€a€telephone€on€display€(which€was€not€inside€of€aÐ pÀ Ðbox)€and€walked€toward€the€front€of€the€store.€€Defendant€then€exited€the€Loweððs€store,€withoutÐ \¬ Ðmaking€any€effort€to€pay€for€the€merchandise€in€his€possession.€€Ivey€left€his€office€at€once€and€ranÐ H˜ Ðoutside€the€store.€€Dockery€was€ahead€of€him,€and€the€two€men€approached€Defendant€to€confrontÐ 4„ Ðhim€about€the€apparent€theft€of€property.€€Ivey€testified€at€trial€that€he€heard€Dockery€say,€ð ðExcuseÐ  p Ðme€or€something€to€that€effect,ðð€as€Dockery€drew€near€Defendant.Ð  \ ÐÌà  àDefendant€immediately€spun€around€to€face€Ivey€and€Dockery.€€According€to€Ivey,€DefendantÐ ä4 Ðassumed€a€ð ðdefensive€posture,ðð€opened€a€lock„blade€knife,€and€held€it€toward€them€in€a€threateningÐ Ð  Ðmanner.€€The€blade€on€the€knife€was€approximately€three€inches€long.€€With€the€knife€extended,Ð ¼  ÐDefendant€told€Ivey€and€Dockery€that€he€was€ð ðgoing€to€cut€their€f„„„ing€heads€off.ðð€€The€two€menÐ ¨ø Ðstarted€backing€away.€€Ivey€and€Dockery€testified€at€trial€that,€at€this€point,€they€were€in€fear€ofÐ ”ä ÐDefendant€and€of€being€harmed€by€the€knife.Ð €Ð ÐÌà  àDefendant€then€began€running€in€the€general€direction€of€the€victims,€with€the€knife€still€inÐ X ¨ Ðhis€hand.€€Ivey€and€Dockery€turned€to€run,€but€Defendant€proceeded€past€them€toward€his€vehicle.€Ð D!” ÐThey€noted€the€license€tag€number€of€the€vehicle.€€In€addition,€Ivey€and€Dockery€identifiedÐ 0"€  ÐDefendant€from€the€picture€on€his€driverððs€license,€which€the€merchandise€return€clerk€had€obtainedÐ #l! Ða€copy€of€earlier,€when€the€return€transaction€was€made.€€Ð $X" ÐÌà  àThe€incident€was€reported€promptly€to€the€police.€€During€the€subsequent€investigation,€twoÐ à%0!$ Ðof€Defendantððs€fingerprints€were€lifted€from€the€package€containing€the€telephone€he€had€handledÐ Ì&"% Ðwhile€inside€the€store.€€The€victims,€Ivey€and€Dockery,€each€picked€Defendant€as€the€thief/assailantÐ ¸'#& Ðfrom€a€photo€line„up€€conducted€later€by€a€police€detective,€and€each€victim€also€identified€DefendantÐ ¤(ô#' Ðas€the€thief/assailant€during€the€bench€trial€which€followed.€€Dockery€testified€that€he€wasÐ )à$( Ðapproximately€one€foot€away€from€Defendant€when€he€said€ð ðexcuse€meðð€to€Defendant.€€Ivey€statedÐ |*Ì%) Ðthat€he€was€approximately€six€feet€from€Defendant€when€the€knife€was€pulled€out.€€Ð h+¸&* ÐÑ)ïWÑâ )âÑe°Ñâ )âÑ  ÑÌà  àDuring€his€testimony€at€trial,€Defendant€denied€that€he€stole€anything€from€Loweððs.€€HeÐ œì Ðadmitted€that€he€was€the€person€observed€on€the€security€tape€who€had€been€looking€at€a€telephoneÐ ˆØ Ðinside€the€store.€€However,€he€claimed€that€he€did€not€hide€or€remove€any€items€from€the€packageÐ tÄ Ðcontaining€the€telephone.€€Ð `° ÐÌà  àDefendant€further€admitted€picking€up€the€telephone€on€display€and€carrying€it€to€the€nextÐ 8 ˆ Ðaisle,€but€he€claimed€that€he€left€it€on€a€shelf€because€he€had€decided€not€to€purchase€it.€€DefendantÐ $ t Ðtestified€that€later,€as€he€was€walking€to€his€car,€he€heard€someone€running€toward€him.€€Before€heÐ  ` Ðcould€turn€around,€however,€Dockery€had€jumped€upon€him€and€grabbed€him€around€the€neck.€Ð ü L  ÐWhen€Defendant€wrested€away€from€Dockery€and€asked€the€two€men€what€they€wanted,€they€saidÐ è 8  Ðnothing.€€Defendant€claimed€that€he€then€got€into€his€car€and€left.€€A€videotape€of€the€incident€in€theÐ Ô$  Ðparking€lot€is€not€available€because€it€occurred€outside€the€scope€of€the€exterior€security€cameras.€Ð À  ÐÌà  àDefendant€also€admitted€that€he€had€a€knife€in€his€pocket€when€he€talked€to€Ivey€andÐ ˜è  ÐDockery,€but€he€denied€pulling€it€out€in€the€parking€lot.€€He€also€denied€that€he€made€threateningÐ „Ô  Ðremarks€to€the€victims.€€Defendant€additionally€testified€that,€as€he€drove€away,€a€third€man€cameÐ pÀ Ðat€him€and€started€kicking€the€side€window€of€his€car.€€Ð \¬ ÐÌò òà@òò&ìàANALYSISó óˆÐ 4„ ÐÌà  àDefendant€contends€that€the€evidence€was€insufficient€to€convict€him€of€aggravated€assaultÐ  \ Ðbecause€ð ðreasonableðð€persons€would€not€have€feared€imminent€bodily€injury€under€the€circumstancesÐ øH Ðpresented€in€this€case.€€Defendant€further€argues€that,€even€if€there€was€sufficient€proof€to€find€thatÐ ä4 Ðthe€victims€had€a€reasonable€fear€of€injury,€his€convictions€cannot€stand€because€the€victimsÐ Ð  Ðeffectively€consented€to€his€conduct.€€We€disagree.Ð ¼  ÐÌÔ‡XJXXXJÔà  àOn€appeal,€we€must€determine€ð ðwhether,€after€viewing€the€evidence€in€the€light€mostÐ ”ä Ðfavorable€to€the€prosecution,€any€rational€trier€of€fact€could€have€found€the€essential€elements€of€theÐ €Ð Ðcrime€beyond€a€reasonable€doubt.ðð€€òòJackson€v.€Virginiaóó,€443€U.S.€307,€319,€99€S.€Ct.€2781,€2789,Ð l¼ Ð61€L.€Ed.€2d€560€(1979).€€Accordingly,€we€will€not€reweigh€the€evidence,€but€instead,€we€willÐ X ¨ Ðpresume€that€the€trier€of€fact€has€resolved€all€conflicts€in€the€testimony€and€drawn€all€reasonableÐ D!” Ðinferences€from€the€evidence€in€favor€of€the€state.€€òòSeeóó€òòState€v.€Sheffieldóó,€676€S.W.2d€542,€547Ð 0"€  Ð(Tenn.€1984);€òòState€v.€Cabbageóó,€571€S.W.2d€832,€835€(Tenn.€1978).€€Questions€about€witnessÐ #l! Ðcredibility€are€resolved€by€the€trier€of€fact.€€òòSeeóó€òòState€v.€Blandóó,€958€S.W.2d€651,€659€(Tenn.€1997).€Ð $X" ÐAlthough€the€defendant€was€convicted€in€a€bench€trial,€the€findings€of€the€trial€judge€carry€the€sameÐ ô$D # Ðweight€as€a€jury€verdict.€€òòState€v.€Holderóó,€15€S.W.3d€905,€911€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.€1999).Ð à%0!$ ÐÔ#†XJXXXJe)#ÔÔ‡*XJXXXJÔÌÔ#†XJXX*XJk.#Ôò òó óà  àDefendant€was€convicted€of€one€count€of€aggravated€assault€against€Ivey,€and€one€count€ofÐ ¸'#& Ðaggravated€assault€against€Dockery.€€As€charged€in€the€indictment,€aggravated€assault€is€committedÐ ¤(ô#' Ðwhen€a€person€ð ð[i]ntentionally€or€knowingly€commits€an€assault€as€defined€in€ðð€39„13„101,€and€.€.Ð )à$( Ð.€uses€or€displays€a€deadly€weapon.ðð€€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€39„13„102(a)(1)(B)€(1997).€€As€relevantÐ |*Ì%) Ðâ âhere,€Tennessee€Code€Annotated€section€39„13„101€provides€that€ð ð[a]€person€commits€assault€whoÐ h+¸&* Ð.€.€.€intentionally€or€knowingly€causes€another€to€reasonably€fear€imminent€bodily€injury.ðð€€Tenn.Ð ° ÐCode€Ann.€ðð€39„13„101(a)(2).Ð œì Ðâ âÌà  à€First,€we€find€that€the€evidence€was€indeed€sufficient€for€a€rational€jury€to€conclude€thatÐ tÄ ÐDefendant€pulled€a€knife€and€threatened€the€victims,€Ivey€and€Dockery,€and€that€they€in€turn€fearedÐ `° Ðimminent€bodily€injury€under€the€circumstances€presented€in€this€case.€€Ð L œ ÐÌà  àDefendantððs€second€argument,€concerning€a€defense€of€ð ðeffective€consent,ðð€is€based€on€hisÐ $ t Ðassertion€that€the€victims,€Ivey€and€Dockery,€effectively€consented€to€his€alleged€criminal€conductÐ  ` Ðby€being€involved€with€store€security€as€part€of€their€employment.€€Defendant€cites€Tennessee€CodeÐ ü L  ÐAnnotated€section€39„13„104,€which€provides:Ð è 8  ÐÌÒ°ÒÒ°ÒEffective€consent.€€ð!ð€When€conduct€is€charged€to€constitute€an€offense€under€this€partÐ À  Ðbecause€it€causes€or€threatens€bodily€injury,€effective€consent€to€such€conduct€or€toÐ ¬ü  Ðthe€infliction€of€such€injury€is€a€defense€if:Ð ˜è  Ðà8 ` à(1)€à0¸ ` x` xàThe€bodily€injury€consented€to€or€threatened€by€the€conductÐ „Ô  Ðconsented€to€is€not€serious€bodily€injury;€orÐpÀ¸ x¸ x Ðà8 ` à(2)€à0¸ ` x` xàòòThe€conduct€and€the€harm€are€reasonably€foreseeableÐ \¬ Ðhazardsóó:ÐH˜¸ x¸ x Ðà8 ` àà ¸ à(A)à0` x` xàOf€joint€participation€in€a€lawful€athletic€contest€orÐ 4„ Ðcompetitive€sport;€orÐ pxx Ðà8 ` àà ¸ à(B)à0` x` xàFor€any€concerted€activity€of€a€kind€not€forbidden€byÐ  \ Ðlaw.ÐøHxx ÐÒ°ÒÒ°Ò(Emphasis€added.)Ð ä4 ÐÌà  àDefendant€argues€that€his€conduct€in€the€parking€lot,€and€the€alleged€harm€which€resulted,Ð ¼  Ðshould€be€considered€a€ð ðreasonably€foreseeable€hazardðð€to€those€employees€of€Loweððs€whose€jobÐ ¨ø Ðentails€the€possibility€of€dealing€with€shoplifters.€€Ð ”ä ÐÌà  àDefendantððs€reliance€upon€this€defense€is€misplaced.€€Tennessee€Code€Annotated€section€39„Ð l¼ Ð11„106(a)(9)€defines€ð ðeffective€consentðð€as€ð ðassent€in€fact,€whether€express€or€apparent,€includingÐ X ¨ Ðassent€by€one€legally€authorized€to€act€for€another.€€Consent€is€not€effective€when€.€.€.òò[g]iven€solelyÐ D!” Ðto€detect€the€commission€of€an€offense.óóðð€€(Emphasis€added.)€€As€stated€above,€Defendantððs€theorizesÐ 0"€  Ðthat€the€victims€gave€their€effective€consent€to€the€conduct€committed€by€Defendant€by€acceptingÐ #l! Ðresponsibility€for€confronting€persons€who€allegedly€commit€theft.€€However,€Ivey€and€Dockery€wereÐ $X" Ðobviously€in€the€process€of€òòdetecting€whether€or€not€a€criminal€offense€had€been€committedóó.€Ð ô$D # ÐTherefore,€by€statutory€definition,€ð ðeffective€consentðð€is€not€a€defense€in€this€case.€€Based€upon€theÐ à%0!$ Ðproof€contained€in€the€record,€we€further€find€that€a€reasonable€juror€could€clearly€reject€DefendantððsÐ Ì&"% Ðtheory.€€Ð ¸'#& ÐÌà  àAs€previously€noted,€the€State€is€entitled€to€the€strongest€legitimate€view€of€the€evidence€andÐ )à$( Ðall€reasonable€inferences€that€may€be€drawn€therefrom.€€òòState€v.€Cabbageóó,€571€S.W.2d€832,€835Ð |*Ì%) Ð(Tenn.€1978).€€In€determining€whether€the€evidence€was€sufficient,€the€relevant€question€is€whether,Ð h+¸&* Ðafter€viewing€the€evidence€in€the€light€most€favorable€to€the€State,€any€rational€trier€of€fact€couldÐ T,¤'+ Ðhave€found€the€essential€elements€of€the€crime€beyond€a€reasonable€doubt.€€òòState€v.€Evansóó,€838Ð ° ÐS.W.2d€185,€190-91€(Tenn.€1992).€€Our€review€of€the€proof,€taken€in€the€light€most€favorable€to€theÐ œì ÐState,€clearly€shows€that€€Defendantððs€guilt€of€both€offenses€of€aggravated€assault€were€provenÐ ˆØ Ðbeyond€a€reasonable€doubt,€and€that€a€reasonable€trier€of€fact€could€come€to€that€conclusion.€€TheÐ tÄ Ðdefense€of€effective€consent€does€not€apply€here.€€Accordingly,€Defendant€is€not€entitled€to€relief€inÐ `° Ðthis€appeal.Ð L œ ÐÌò òà@FF%ìàCONCLUSIONó óˆÐ $ t ÐÌà  àFor€the€foregoing€reasons,€we€affirm€the€judgments€of€the€trial€court€regarding€the€twoÐ ü L  Ðconvictions€for€aggravated€assault,€the€one€conviction€for€misdemeanor€theft,€and€the€sentencesÐ è 8  Ðimposed€thereon.€Ð Ô$  ÐÌÌà  àà ` àà ¸ àà  àà h àà À àà  à___________________________________€Ð ˜è  Ðà  àà ` àà ¸ àà  àà h àà À àà  àTHOMAS€T.€WOODALL,€JUDGE