ÿWPC  0# °UN» %  0(b7w@?4“¢ 0Jª 0Tô 0^H 0h¦ 0r 0|€ 0†ü 0‚ 1u 0d‡U>ë 0@) D3i Bœ U *¹ B)ã DC AMO 3œ v~Ï AQM Æž 0Dd 0D¨ D/ì BvÓ8˜HP LaserJet 4SiHPPCL5MS,ü,,,,,ü0nLHÎ(ÖÃ9 Z ‹6Times New Roman RegularX($¡¡- ù- ¦§D¨©ªE«¬D­®Ó€ºŒƒ*#3|xº2 ÿÿ0Indent1Ô2ÔÔ3  Ô2" ÿÿ0Indent2à0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2, ÿÿ0Indent3à0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô26 ÿÿ0Indent4à0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2@ ÿÿ0Indent5à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2J ÿÿ0Indent6à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2T ÿÿ0Indent7à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2^ ÿÿ0Indent8à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô ÿÿ?AGMSYaioIndent0I.A.1.a.(1)(a)i)a)P ÿÿ8Mac DefaultMac DefaultÓ ` °šXÓ< Œ 9p`(&Times New Roman("ÿÿ$££Ò  ÒÒ  Ò""""'ÿÿdxd d< Œ 9p`(Arial% Line 7 d$$$$7Border 1dd* %Cþÿ << Gÿÿ )Ý ƒ!ÝÑ  ÑÑ#€d#ÑÔ€ÔÝ  ÝÝ ƒ+"ÝÝ  ÝÔ€#ÔÔ€#ÔÓ  ÓÔ YYY ÔFILEDÔ€#XÔÌÌò òOctober€9,€1997ÌÌCecil€Crowson,€Jr.ÌÔ€#ôÔAppellate€Court€Clerkó óPtPtHHÚ(ÿáÿâùFG(üHHØ(d'`*+ ,-Cþÿ<< CÿÿƒLevel 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5(3¯$¢¢Ý ƒ!ÝÝ  Ý($$””ò òÚ  Ú1Ú  Úó ó..'÷ÿ dxdüÿP PdStyl{WP}01•ÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃà Ãà Ãà Ãà Ãà ÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÐ ÐÐHHÐÐ  ÐÐ2ÐÐÿÿ¸æ$ÿÐÐHHÐÐÐÐÐÐÐÐ  ÐÐ ÐÐ ÐÑÑÑGenevaÑÑ ÑÑ € ÑÑ<Px–ÈÑÒÒÒ443!#4ÒÒ$ *$ÒÒ$*$ÒÒ ÿKK ÒÒ  Geneva ÒÒ  Geneva ÒÓ.,ÓÓÓÓ6ÓÓ ÓßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßÑGenevaÑÑ ÑÒ  ion-F Geneva ÒÒ  ion-F Geneva ÒÝ ƒ!ÝÔ . ÔÔ€ÔÝ  ÝÑ ` ÑÒ  ÒÒ ° ÒÒ  ÒÒ „ ÒÑ\R AØ'\ÑÔ€#ÔÑ\R AØ'\ÑÑ€ÑÑ7€æXXdìdÈ7ÑÑ  ÑÑ  ÑÓ  Óò ò›Þ ÞÌIN€THE€COURT€OF€CRIMINAL€APPEALS€OF€TENNESSEEÌÌAT€JACKSON̜ـ*ÙßR€&'%A1-j|ŸÐ` Å `€€@ÿRß›ÌDECEMBER€SESSION,€1996ÌÌÌÓ  ÓSTATE€OF€TENNESSEE,à àà à)à àC.C.A.€NO.€02C01„9605„CC„00184Ìà àà àà àà àà à)Ìó óà àAppellee,à àà àà àò ò)Ìà àà àà àà àà à)Ìà àà àà àà àà à)à àHENRY€COUNTYÌVS.à àà àà àà àà à)à àÌà àà àà àà àà à)à àHON.€JULIAN€P.€GUINNó óÌò òBRENDA€ANNE€BURNS,ó óà àà àò ò)à àJUDGEó óÌà àà àà àà àà àò ò)ó óÌà àAppellant.à àà àà àò ò)à à(Direct€Appeal)Ìó óÌÌÓ  ÓÌòòÓ  ÓFOR€THE€APPELLANTóó:à àà àà àòòFOR€THE€APPELLEEóó:ÌÌDAVID€L.€RAYBINà àà àà àà àJOHN€KNOX€WALKUPÌHollins,€Wagster€&€Yarbrough,€P.C.à àAttorney€General€and€ReporterÌ2210€SunTrust€CenterÌ424€Church€Streetà àà àà àà àWILLIAM€DAVID€BRIDGERSà àÌNashville,€TN€€37219à àà àà àAssistant€Attorney€GeneralÌà àà àà àà àà àà à450€James€Robertson€ParkwayÌà àà àà àà àà àà àNashville,€TN€€37243„0493ÌÌà àà àà àà àà àà àROBERT€RADFORDÌà àà àà àà àà àà àDistrict€Attorney€GeneralÌà àà àà àà àà àà àP.€O.€Box€686Ìà àà àà àà àà àà àHuntingdon,€TN€€38344ÌÌÌÌOPINION€FILED€________________________ÌÌREVERSED€AND€REMANDEDÌÌJERRY€L.€SMITH,€JUDGEÇòòò òÓ  ÓÔ€#„ÔOPINIONóóó óÔ€#ŠÔÌÌÓÓÓ  Óà àOn€October€19,€1995,€a€Henry€County€Circuit€Court€jury€found€AppellantÏBrenda€Anne€Burns€guilty€of€first„degree€murder.€€Appellant€received€a€sentenceÏof€life€imprisonment.€€On€appeal,€Appellant€raises€the€following€issues€forÏreview:ÌÒ  ÒÒ  ÒÓÓà0 à1)€Whether€the€evidence€is€sufficient,€as€a€matter€of€law,€toÏà0 àsupport€her€conviction€for€first„degree€murder;Ìà0 à2)€Whether€the€trial€court€erred€by€failing€to€instruct€the€jury€onÏà0 àfacilitation€to€commit€first„degree€murder€and€solicitation€ofÏfirst„degree€murder;Ìà0 à3)€Whether€the€trial€court€erred€by€prohibiting€AppellantððsÏà0 àattorney€from€fully€cross„examining€a€Stateððs€witness;Ìà0 à4)€Whether€the€trial€court€erred€in€denying€Appellantððs€motion€forÏœa›€new€trial€based€on€newly€discovered€evidence€or€ineffectiveÏassistance€of€counsel;€andÌà0 à5)€Whether€the€cumulative€effect€of€trial€errors€deprived€AppellantÏof€a€fair€trial.ÌÌÒ  ÒÒ „ ÒÓÓÌà àAfter€a€painstaking€review€of€the€record,€we€have€concluded€that€ÏAppellant€was€denied€the€effective€assistance€of€counsel€and€that€this€caseÏmust€be€reversed€and€remanded€for€a€new€trial.ÌÌò òÓ  ÓFactual€Backgroundó óÌÓ  Óà àOn€December€15,€1994,€the€Benton€County€Sheriffððs€Department€foundÏthe€body€of€Paul€Burns,€Appellantððs€ex„husband,€in€the€woods€beside€MountÏCarmel€Road€near€Camden,€Tennessee.€€The€evidence€submitted€at€trial€andÍaccredited€by€the€jury€verdict€revealed€that€Michael€Spadafina€and€Vito€LicariÏmurdered€Mr.€Burns€at€the€request€of€Appellant€and€in€exchange€for€$10,000.ÌÌà àAt€the€time€of€the€murder,€Appellant€and€Burns€were€divorced.€€Burns,€aÏmember€of€the€Columbo€organized€crime€family,€was€living€in€Camden€as€partÏof€the€federal€witness€protection€program.€€Burns€was€approximately€sixty„twoÏyears€of€age€and€suffered€partial€paralysis€as€the€result€of€a€stroke.€€SpadafinaÏtook€care€of€Burns.€€The€two€had€lived€in€Spadafinaððs€girlfriendððs€house€butÏBurns€later€moved€into€the€Wismer€Hotel,€owned€by€Appellant.€€Licari€andÏSpadafina€knew€each€other€from€prison€where€they€had€become€friends.€€LicariÏwas€living€in€New€York€when€Spadafina€invited€him€to€come€to€Tennessee€toÏlive€with€him.€€Licari€moved€to€Tennessee€in€October€of€1994€during€the€timeÏBurns€was€living€with€Spadafina.ÌÌ€à àAccording€to€Licari€who€testified€for€the€State,€in€late€November€or€earlyÏDecember,€1994,€Spadafina,€Licari,€and€Appellant€met€at€the€Wismer€Hotel€toÏdiscuss€the€murder€of€Burns.€€The€parties€agreed€that€Spadafina€and€LicariÏwould€murder€Burns€and,€in€return,€Appellant€would€pay€them€$10,000,€to€beÏpaid€in€monthly€installments€of€$800€per€month.ÌÌà àOn€the€morning€of€December€13,€Spadafina€and€Appellant€went€to€collectÏchecks€in€the€amount€of€$29,750€from€an€insurance€settlement€that€Burns€hadÏreceived€as€the€result€of€a€house€owned€by€Burnððs€having€burned.€€Later€in€theÏday,€Spadafina,€Licari,€and€Burns€met€in€Burnsðð€hotel€room.€€AlthoughÏSpadafina€had€picked€up€all€three€insurance€settlement€checks,€he€told€BurnsÏthat€he€had€only€two€of€the€checks€and€that€he€could€not€pick€up€the€third€checkÏuntil€the€following€day.€€The€three€men€then€went€to€the€bank€to€negotiate€theÏchecks.€€Burns€paid€the€bank€for€a€loan,€gave€Spadafina€approximately€$1139Ïand€deposited€$2000€into€his€minor€sonððs€account.€€After€Burns€was€dropped€offÏat€his€hotel€room,€Spadafina€told€Licari€that€he€had€one€of€the€insurance€checksÏwhich€was€made€out€for€$5000.€€Spadafina€contacted€Appellant€and€told€herÏthat€if€she€could€cash€the€check,€she€could€keep€$3500€and€he€would€keepÏ$1500€as€a€down€payment€for€the€murder€of€Burns.€€Appellant€signed€BurnsððÏname€on€the€back€of€the€check,€paying€the€bank€$3500€for€her€mortgage€on€theÏWismer€Hotel€and€giving€$1500€to€Spadafina.ÌÌà àSpadafina€and€€Licari€then€dropped€Appellant€off€at€the€hotel€and€went€toÏsee€Burns.€€After€visiting,€the€three€men€and€Burnsðð€son€went€to€the€liquor€store.€ÏAfter€returning€Burnsðð€son€to€the€hotel,€the€three€men€went€to€dinner.€€On€theÏway€back€from€dinner,€Spadafina€gave€Licari,€who€was€sitting€in€the€back€seatÏof€the€car,€a€signal€to€strangle€Burns.€€Licari€tried€to€strangle€Burns€but€was€notÍstrong€enough€to€do€so.€€Spadafina€stopped€the€car,€came€around€to€theÏpassenger€side€of€the€car,€and€slashed€Burnsðð€throat.€€Spadafina€and€LicariÏthen€dragged€Burnsðð€body€up€an€embankment€and€left€him.ÌÌà àSpadafina€and€Licari€then€went€to€a€car€wash€to€clean€the€car€andÏdispose€of€the€knife.€€They€next€visited€Appellant€who€washed€their€clothes.€€AtÏtrial,€Appellant€denied€any€involvement€with€her€ex„husbandððs€murder.€€SheÏadmitted€that€she€signed€the€check€made€out€to€her€husband€but€claimed€thatÏBurns€had€called€her€earlier€in€the€day€saying€that€he€was€sending€SpadafinaÏwith€the€insurance€check€for€her€to€cash€at€the€bank.€€She€claimed€that€heÏinstructed€her€to€give€Spadafina€$1500.€ÌÌ̛̜Ìò òÓ  ÓI.€€Sufficiency€of€the€Evidenceó óÌÓ  Óà àAppellant€first€alleges€that€the€evidence€presented€at€trial€is€legallyÏinsufficient€to€sustain€her€conviction€for€first„degree€murder.€€Specifically,€sheÏclaims€that€there€is€no€evidence,€independent€of€the€testimony€of€Licari,€whoÏwas€an€accomplice€as€a€matter€of€law,€to€corroborate€Licariððs€testimony.€€WhenÏan€appeal€challenges€the€sufficiency€of€the€evidence,€the€standard€of€review€isÍwhether,€after€viewing€the€evidence€in€the€light€most€favorable€to€the€State,€anyÏrational€trier€of€fact€could€have€found€the€essential€elements€of€the€crime€beyondÏa€reasonable€doubt.€€òòJackson€v.€Virginia,óó€443€U.S.€307,€318€(1979);€òòState€v.ÏEvansóó,€838€S.W.2d€185,€190„91€(Tenn.€1992),€òòcert.€deniedóó,€114€S.€Ct.€740Ï(1994);€Tenn.€R.€App.€P.€13(e).€€On€appeal,€the€State€is€entitled€to€the€strongestÏlegitimate€view€of€the€evidence€and€all€reasonable€or€legitimate€inferences€whichÏmay€be€drawn€therefrom.€€òòState€v.€Cabbageóó,€571€S.W.2d€832,€835€(Tenn.Ï1978).€€This€Court€will€not€reweigh€the€evidence,€re„evaluate€the€evidence,€orÏsubstitute€its€evidentiary€inferences€for€those€reached€by€the€jury.€€òòState€v.ÏGraceóó,€493€S.W.2d€474,€476€€(Tenn.€1973).€€As€the€Supreme€Court€ofÏTennessee€said€in€òòBolin€v.€Stateóó:ÌÒ  ÒÒ  ÒÓÓà8 àà8 àThis€well„settled€rule€rests€on€a€soundÏfoundation.€€The€trial€judge€and€the€jury€seeÏthe€witnesses€face€to€face,€hear€theirÏtestimony€and€observe€their€demeanor€onÏthe€stand.€€Thus€the€trial€judge€and€jury€areÏthe€primary€instrumentality€of€justice€toÏdetermine€the€weight€and€credibility€to€beÏgiven€to€the€testimony€of€witnesses.€€In€theÏtrial€forum€alone€is€there€human€atmosphereÏand€the€totality€of€the€evidence€cannot€beÏreproduced€with€a€written€record€in€this€Court.€€ÌÌÒ  ÒÒ „ Ò405€S.W.2d€768€(1966).€€ÓÓThus,€a€jury€verdict€is€entitled€to€great€weight.Ô€#ôÔÌÔ€#ŠÔÌà àOnce€approved€by€the€trial€court,€a€jury€verdict€accredits€the€witnessesÏpresented€by€the€State€and€resolves€all€conflicts€in€favor€of€the€State.€€òòState€v.ÍHatchettóó,€560€S.W.2d€627€(Tenn.€1978);€òòState€v.€Townsendóó,€525€S.W.2d€842Ï(Tenn.€1975).€€The€credibility€of€witnesses,€the€weight€to€be€given€their€testimony,Ïand€the€reconciliation€of€conflicts€in€the€proof€are€matters€entrusted€exclusively€toÏthe€jury€as€trier€of€fact.€€òòState€v.€Sheffieldóó,€676€S.W.2d€542,€547€(Tenn.€1984).€€AÏjuryððs€guilty€verdict€removes€the€presumption€of€innocence€enjoyed€by€theÏdefendant€at€trial€and€raises€a€presumption€of€guilt.€€òòState€v.€Tuggleóó,€639ÏS.W.2d€913,€914€(Tenn.€1982).€€The€defendant€then€bears€the€burden€ofÏovercoming€this€presumption€of€guilt€on€appeal.€€òòState€v.€Brownóó,€551€S.W.2dÏ329,€331€(Tenn.€1977).ÌÌà àA€conviction€may€not€be€based€upon€an€accompliceððs€testimony€unlessÏthere€is€some€fact€testified€to,€entirely€independent€of€the€accompliceððs€testimony,Ïwhich€taken€by€itself€creates€an€inference€not€only€that€a€crime€has€beenÏcommitted€but€also€that€the€accused€is€implicated€in€the€crime.€€òòMathis€v.€Stateóó,Ï590€S.W.2d€449,€455€(Tenn.€1979)€(citing€òòMcKinney€v€Stateóó,€552€œ€S.W.2d›€787,Ï789€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.€1977)).€€The€corroborative€evidence€may€be€direct€orÏentirely€circumstantial,€and€it€need€not€of€itself€be€adequate€to€support€aÏconviction.€€It€is€sufficient€to€meet€the€requirements€of€the€rule€if€it€fairly€andÏlegitimately€tends€to€connect€the€defendant€with€the€commission€of€the€crimeÏcharged.€€òòSherrill€v.€Stateóó,€321€S.W.2d€811,€815€(Tenn.€1959).ÌÌà àThe€record€reveals€the€following€corroborating€evidence.€€Appellant€signedÏthe€name€of€her€husband€to€an€insurance€check€hours€before€his€death.€€SheÏtestified€that€before€she€cashed€the€check,€Burns€called€her€and€said€he€wasÏsending€her€a€check€for€her€to€cash€and€to€give€$1500€of€the€check€toÏSpadafina.€€However,€a€bank€officer€testified€that€when€Spadafina€and€BurnsÏcame€into€the€bank€earlier€that€day,€he€heard€Spadafina€tell€Burns€that€he€didÏnot€have€the€$5000€insurance€check€and€that€he€would€pick€it€up€the€followingÏday.€€€According€to€the€bank€officerððs€testimony,€Burns€would€not€have€had€theÏthird€insurance€check€until€the€following€day.€€Furthermore,€Licari€claimed€thatÏAppellant€gave€Spadafina€$1500€as€a€down€payment€for€murdering€her€ex„husband.€€Appellant€admitted€giving€$1500€to€Spadafina.€€€She€also€admittedÏthat€the€killers€visited€her€at€the€hotel€around€10:15€p.m.€after€committing€theÏmurder.€€She€tried€to€explain€the€visit€by€stating€that€she€thought€they€had€comeÏto€talk€about€Mr.€Burns.€€Finally,€there€was€evidence€that€Appellant€had€aÏmotive€to€kill€Burns.€€While€Appellant€and€Burns€were€married,€they€owned€theÏWismer€Hotel.€€As€part€of€the€divorce€settlement,€Appellant€bought€BurnsððÏinterest€in€the€hotel€and€was€indebted€to€him€for€$50,000.€€She€also€assumedÏthe€debt€obligations€of€the€hotel.€€Her€total€debt€was€$300,000.€€At€the€time€ofÏBurnsðð€murder,€she€was€behind€in€her€payments€to€the€bank.€€The€prosecutionÏtheorized€that€Appellant€believed€that,€with€Burnsðð€death,€she€would€not€only€beÏable€to€make€her€delinquent€payments€to€the€bank€with€the€$3500€from€the€thirdÍinsurance€check€but€also€would€no€longer€be€indebted€to€him€for€$50,000.€€WeÏfind€that€there€was€adequate€corroboration€of€Licariððs€testimony€and,€therefore,Ïthat€the€evidence€is€sufficient,€as€a€matter€of€law,€to€sustain€AppellantððsÏconviction€for€first„degree€murder.ÌÌÌÌò òÓ  ÓII.€€Failure€to€Instructó óÌÓ  Óà àNext€Appellant€challenges€the€failure€of€the€trial€judge€to€instruct€the€jury€onÏfacilitation€of€first„degree€murder€and€solicitation€of€first„degree€murder.€€A€trialÏjudge€has€a€mandatory€duty€to€instruct€the€jury€on€all€lesser€grades€and€lesserÏincluded€offenses€of€the€offense€charged€which€are€supported€by€the€evidence.€ÏòòState€v.€Trustyóó,€919€S.W.2d€305,€311€(Tenn.€1996).€€A€criminal€defendant€hasÏthe€right€to€a€correct€and€complete€charge€of€the€law€given€to€the€jury€by€the€trialÏjudge.€€òòState€v.€Stephensonóó,€878€S.W.2d€530,€555€(Tenn.€1994)€(citing€òòState€v.ÏTeelóó,€793€S.W.2d€236,€249€(Tenn.€1990));€òòState€v.€Bryantóó,€654€S.W.2d€389,€390Ï(Tenn.€1983)).ÌÌà àAn€offense€is€a€lesser€grade€of€a€charged€offense€if€it€is€classified€alongÏwith€the€charged€offense€in€the€statutory€section€outlining€the€charged€offense.€ÏòòTrustyóó,€919€S.W.2d€at€310.€€For€instance,€in€Tennessee€Code€AnnotatedÍSections€39„13„201€through€213,€the€legislature€has€divided€criminal€homicide€intoÏthe€grades€of€first„degree€murder,€second„degree€murder,€voluntaryÏmanslaughter,€criminally€negligent€homicide,€and€vehicular€homicide.€€Thus,€oneÏcan€immediately€determine€whether€an€offense€is€a€lesser€grade€by€looking€atÏthe€statutes.€€An€offense€qualifies€as€a€lesser€included€offense€if€the€elements€ofÏthe€included€offense€are€a€subset€of€the€elements€of€the€charged€offense€andÏonly€if€the€greater€offense€cannot€be€committed€without€also€committing€theÏlesser€offense.€€òòTrustyóó,€919€S.W.2d€at€310€(citing€òòSchmuck€v.€United€Statesóó,€109ÏS.€Ct.€1443,€1450„51€(1989)).ÌÌà àAppellant€was€charged€with€and€found€guilty€of€criminal€responsibility€forÏthe€conduct€of€another€in€the€commission€of€first„degree€murder€pursuant€toÏTennessee€Code€Annotated€Section€39„11„402€(1991).€€Under€that€section,€aÏdefendant€is€criminally€responsible€for€the€conduct€of€another€if,€ð ð[a]cting€withÏintent€to€promote€or€assist€the€commission€of€the€offense,€or€to€benefit€in€theÏproceeds€or€results€of€the€offense,€the€person€solicits,€directs,€aids,€or€attempts€toÏaid€another€person€to€commit€the€offense€.€.€.€.ðð€€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€39„11„402(2).€€Tennessee€Code€Annotated€Section€39„11„403€provides€that€a€personÏis€criminally€responsible€for€the€facilitation€of€a€felony€if,€ð ðknowing€that€anotherÏintends€to€commit€a€specific€felony,€but€without€the€intent€required€for€criminalÍresponsibility€under€ðð€39„11„402(2),€the€person€knowingly€furnishes€substantialÏassistance€in€the€commission€of€the€felony.ðð€€ÌÌà àThe€Sentencing€Commission€Comments€to€Section€39„11„403€and€òòStateÏv.€Lewisóó,€919€S.W.2d€62,€67€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.€1995),€indicate€criminalÏresponsibility€for€the€facilitation€of€a€felony€is€properly€understood€as€a€lesserÏincluded€offense€of€a€completed€offense€where€the€conviction€is€based€upon€theÏcriminal€responsibility€for€conduct€of€another.€€The€Sentencing€CommissionÏComments€state€that€ð ð[t]his€section€recognizes€a€lesser€degree€of€criminalÏresponsibility€than€that€of€a€party€under€ðð€39„11„401.€.€.€.€A€defendant€chargedÏas€a€party€may€be€found€guilty€of€facilitation€as€a€lesser€included€offense€if€theÏdefendantððs€degree€of€complicity€is€insufficient€to€warrant€conviction€as€a€party.ðð€ÏIn€òòLewisóó,€we€concluded€that€ð ðvirtually€every€time€one€is€charged€with€a€felony€byÏway€of€criminal€responsibility€for€the€conduct€of€another,€facilitation€of€the€felonyÏwould€be€a€lesser€included€offense.ðð€€919€S.W.2d€at€67.ÌÌà àHere,€however,€facilitation€of€murder€was€not€fairly€raised€by€any€proofÏsubmitted€at€trial€and€there€is€therefore€no€duty€to€instruct€the€jury€with€respect€toÏit.€€òòTrustyóó,€919€S.W.2d€at€311.€€According€to€the€State,€Licari€and€SpadafinaÏmurdered€Burns€at€the€direction€of€Appellant€and€in€exchange€for€$10,000.€ÏAlthough€she€did€not€wield€the€murder€weapon,€evidence€was€presented€thatÍshe€directed€the€murder€and€intended€to€benefit€by€it.€€On€the€other€hand,ÏAppellant€denied€any€involvement€at€all€in€Burnsðð€death.€€Therefore,€we€find€thatÏit€was€not€erroneous€for€the€trial€court€to€fail€to€instruct€the€jury€on€the€lesserÏincluded€offense€of€facilitation.ÌÌà àPursuant€to€Tennessee€Code€Annotated€Section€39„12„102(a),€a€personÏis€guilty€of€the€offense€of€solicitation€when€that€person:€ð ðby€means€of€oral,€writtenÏor€electronic€communication,€directly€or€through€another,€intentionally€commands,Ïrequests€or€hires€another€to€commit€a€criminal€offense,€or€attempts€to€command,Ïrequest€or€hire€another€to€commit€a€criminal€offense,€with€the€intent€that€theÏcriminal€offense€be€committed€.€.€.€.ðð€€Ordinarily€solicitation€of€first„degree€murder€isÏneither€a€lesser€included€offense€nor€a€lesser€grade€of€first€degree€murder.€ÏCertainly€it€cannot€be€said€that€one€can€be€found€guilty€of€first„degree€murderÏthrough€criminal€responsibility€for€the€conduct€of€another€only€if€there€is€solicitationÏof€murder.€€Further,€solicitation€of€first€degree€murder€is€not€a€lesser€grade€of€first„degree€murder€since€it€is€not€part€of€the€statutory€scheme€criminalizing€homicideÏand€it€is€not€codified€in€proximity€to€first„degree€murder.€€This€however€does€notÏend€our€inquiry.ÌÌà àIn€the€case€of€òòHoward€v.€Stateóó,€578€S.W.2d€83,85€(Tenn.€1979);€theÏTennessee€Supreme€Court€held€that€for€jury€instruction€purposes,€a€lesserÍincluded€offense€is€determined€in€the€context€of€the€greater€offense€as€the€greaterÏoffense€is€charged€in€the€indictment.€€In€the€instant€case,€the€indictment€providesÏthat€Appellantððs€criminal€responsibility€is€premised€upon€her€allegedly€havingÏsolicited€Licari€and€Spadafina€to€murder€the€victim.€€As€the€charge€of€criminalÏresponsibility€is€alleged€in€this€particular€indictment€it€includes€the€crime€ofÏsolicitation€as€a€lesser€included€œoffense.€€However,›€since€there€is€no€evidence€toÏraise€a€doubt€about€the€fact€that€the€homicide€was€first€degree€murder,€theÏoffense€of€solicitation€would€merge€with€the€completed€crime.€€òòSeeóó€Tenn.€CodeÏAnn.€Sec.€39„12„102,€Sentencing€Commission€Comments.€€Thus,€AppellantÏwas€not€entitled€to€a€jury€instruction€regarding€solicitation€as€a€lesser€includedÏoffense.€€€ÌÌò òÓ  ÓIII.€Cross„Examination€of€Licarió óÌÓ  Óà àNext€Appellant€takes€issue€with€the€trial€courtððs€limitation€of€defenseÏcounselððs€cross„examination€of€Licari.€€At€trial,€during€the€cross„examination€ofÏLicari,€defense€counsel€attempted€to€question€Licari€about€several€threateningÏletters€he€sent€to€Spadafina€while€they€were€incarcerated.€€In€those€letters,€LicariÏstated€in€very€offensive€terms€that€he€planned€to€kill€Spadafina€for€ð ðsnitchingðð€onÏhim.€€A€segment€of€one€of€the€letters€reads€as€follows:€ÌÓÓà8 àà8 à[b]eing€a€snitch€and€getting€revenge€is€a€big€difference.€ÏYou€and€me€know€the€real€deal€so€I€got€my€revengeÏafter€you€set€me€up.€€How€does€it€feel€to€know€thatÍyou€will€never€see€the€street€again?€€Your€bitchÏgirlfriend€is€the€talk€of€Camden.€€It€seems€Tommy€isnððtÏthe€only€one€fucking€her€.€.€.€.ÌÌÓÓThe€trial€judge€allowed€questioning€concerning€the€letters€under€Tennessee€RuleÏof€Evidence€608(b)€which€permits€the€credibility€of€a€witness€to€be€attacked€withÏcharacter€evidence€in€the€form€specific€instances€of€conduct.€€However,€whenÏdefense€counsel€began€asking€Licari€what€he€meant€by€certain€statementsÏsuch€as€ð ðAss„hole,€when€I€catch€up€to€you€we€will€see€how€tough€you€are,ðð€theÏState€objected.€€Defense€counsel€was€allowed€to€continue,€but€the€letters€wereÏnot€put€before€the€jury.€€ÌÌà àThe€propriety,€scope,€manner,€and€control€of€the€examination€ofÏwitnesses€is€a€matter€within€the€sound€discretion€of€the€trial€judge.€€òòState€v.ÏMeeksóó,€876€S.W.2d€121,€128€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.€1993).€€Such€discretion€will€notÏbe€interfered€with€absent€a€showing€of€abuse.€€ÌÌà àAppellant€emphasizes€in€her€brief€that€Licariððs€letters€were€admissibleÏunder€Tennessee€Rule€of€Evidence€608€for€the€purpose€of€attacking€LicariððsÏcredibility.€€However,€Rule€608(b)€states€that€extrinsic€evidence€may€not€beÏused€to€prove€specific€acts.€€Appellant€also€argues€that€the€letters€areÏadmissible€to€prove€prejudice€or€bias.€€Tennessee€Rule€of€Evidence€616€permitsÏimpeachment€with€extrinsic€evidence€to€demonstrate€a€witnessðð€bias€orÍprejudice.€€Thus,€these€threatening€letters€were€admissible€to€attack€LicariððsÏcredibility.€€Although€Licari€had€been€impeached€through€his€criminal€record€andÏhis€admitted€desire€for€revenge,€the€letters€express€Licariððs€anger,€ill€motive,€andÏviciousness€in€graphic€terms.€€Given€the€closeness€of€this€case€and€theÏoverwhelming€importance€of€Licariððs€testimony€to€the€prosecutionððs€case,€weÏbelieve€the€exclusion€of€the€letters€constitutes€error.€€Upon€retrial€of€this€causeÏAppellant€should€be€allowed€greater€leeway€in€the€use€of€these€letters€to€cross„examine€Licari.ÌÌò òÓ  ÓIV.€€Newly€Discovered€Evidence€and€Ineffective€Assistance€of€Counsel.ó óÌÓ  Óà àIn€her€fourth€issue,€Appellant€contends€that€information€contained€in€twoÏaffidavits€entitle€her€to€a€new€trial€either€because€it€constitutes€newly€discoveredÏevidence€or,€in€the€alternative,€her€trial€counsel€was€constitutionally€defective€inÏfailing€to€pursue€the€information.€€The€first€affidavit€contains€a€statement€takenÏfrom€a€woman€named€Ruby€œBlankenship.›€€In€her€statement€and€at€the€hearingÏon€Appellantððs€motion€for€new€trial,€she€stated€that€she€worked€for€œBurns€andÏBurnsðð€son,€Paul€Frappola,€as€a€housekeeper.€€She€claimes€that€she€overheardÏa€conversation€where€Frappola€said€that€he€brought€Spadafina€to€TennesseeÏto€kill€burns.€€She›€also€claimed€she€heard€Frappola€tell€Spadafina€to€ð ðgo€aheadÏand€kill€him.ðð€€The€second€affidavit€was€taken€from€Cathy€Sue€Decker,€RubyÏœBlankenshipððs›€mother.€€In€it,€Ms.€Decker€stated€that€she€overheard€FrappolaÍsay€ð ðwe€got€to€whack€this€old€man,ðð€and€we€have€to€ð ðget€rid€of€Paul€Burns.ðð€ÏThe€trial€court€found€that€this€evidence€was€not€newly€discovered€and€that€trialÏcounselððs€failure€to€call€these€two€witnesses€did€not€constitute€ineffectiveÏassistance€of€counsel.ÌÌà àTo€justify€a€new€trial€based€on€newly€discovered€evidence,€the€defendantÏmust€show€that€the€evidence€could€not€have€been€discovered€with€reasonableÏdiligence,€the€evidence€was€material,€and€the€evidence€was€likely€to€change€theÏresult€of€the€trial€if€accepted€by€the€jury.€€òòState€v.€Goswickóó,€656€S.W.2d€355,Ï358„59€(Tenn.€1983).€€The€evidence€contained€in€the€œBlankenship›€and€DeckerÏaffidavits€was€not€newly€discovered.€€During€pretrial€discovery,€trial€counselÏreceived€a€copy€of€an€interview€of€an€investigator€Smith€with€the€Camden€policeÏdepartment,€taken€by€the€Tennessee€Bureau€of€Investigation.€€It€showed€thatÏMr.€Smith€had€interviewed€Ms.€Decker€who€had€called€the€police€months€beforeÏBurns€died€because€she€was€concerned€for€his€safety.€€Another€documentÏcontained€an€interview€of€Ms.€Decker.€€It€stated€that€she€had€heard€FrappolaÏand€Spadafina€talking€about€ð ðwhacking€Paul€Burns.ðð€ÌÌà àWe€do€however€find€that€trial€counselððs€failure€to€interview€these€twoÏpotential€defense€witnesses€and€to€present€their€testimony€to€the€jury€deprivedÏAppellant€of€the€effective€assistance€of€counsel.€€When€an€appeal€challengesÍthe€sixth€Amendment€right€to€effective€assistance€of€counsel,€the€appellant€hasÏthe€burden€of€establishing€that€the€advice€given€or€services€rendered€by€theÏattorney€fell€below€the€range€of€competence€demanded€of€attorneys€in€criminalÏcases.€€òòBaxter€v.€Roseóó,€523€S.W.2d€930€(Tenn.€1975).€€Under€òòStrickland€v.ÏWashingtonóó,€466€U.S.€668,€687€(1984),€there€is€a€two„prong€test€which€placesÏthe€burden€on€the€appellant€to€show€that€(1)€the€representation€was€deficient,Ïrequiring€a€showing€that€counsel€made€errors€so€serious€that€he€or€she€was€notÏfunctioning€as€ð ðcounselðð€as€guaranteed€a€defendant€by€the€Sixth€Amendment,Ïand€(2)€the€deficient€representation€prejudiced€the€defense€to€the€point€ofÏdepriving€the€appellant€of€a€fair€trial€with€a€reliable€result.€€Prejudice€is€shown€byÏdemonstrating€a€reasonable€probability€that,€but€for€counselððs€unprofessionalÏerrors,€the€result€of€the€proceeding€would€have€been€different.€€òòId.óó€at€694.€€UnderÏthe€òòStricklandóó€test,€a€reviewing€courtððs€scrutiny€ð ðmust€be€highly€deferential.€€It€isÏall€too€tempting€for€a€defendant€to€second„guess€counselððs€assistance€afterÏconviction€or€adverse€sentence€.€.€.€.ðð€€òòId.óó€at€689.€€In€fact,€a€petitioner€challengingÏhis€counselððs€representation€faces€a€ð ðstrong€presumption€that€counselððs€conductÏfalls€within€the€wide€range€of€reasonable€professional€assistant€.€.€.€.ðð€€òòId.óó€atÏ689.ÌÌà àAs€noted€above,€at€the€hearing€on€the€motion€for€a€new€trial,€trial€counselÏtestified€that€during€discovery€he€received€a€copy€of€a€Tennessee€Bureau€ofÍInvestigation€memorandum€referencing€Ms.€Deckerððs€statement€that€she€hadÏheard€Frappola€threaten€the€victim.€€The€memorandum€also€states€that€Ms.ÏDeckerððs€daughter,€Ms.€Blankenship,€developed€a€short,€romantic€relationshipÏwith€Frappola.€€Finally,€the€memorandum€indicates€that€Ms.€Blankenship€hasÏcriminal€charges€against€her€and€would€be€willing€to€exchange€information€forÏsome€type€of€ð ðdeal.ðð€€Trial€counsel€testified€that€he€did€not€interview€Ms.€DeckerÏbecause€her€statements€did€not€exclude€Appellant€as€a€suspect.€€€HeÏexplained€that€his€failure€to€interview€Ms.€Blankenship€was€because€there€wasÏno€statement€by€her€in€the€T.B.I.€material.€€Trial€counsel€admitted€that€when,€atÏthe€behest€of€Appellantððs€current€attorney,€Ms.€Decker€and€Ms.€BlankenshipÏwere€interviewed€in€preparation€for€the€new€trial€hearing,€the€affidavits€theyÏprovided€consisted€of€proof€tending€to€show€that€Paul€Frappola€rather€thanÏAppellant€procured€the€murder€of€Mr.€Burns.€€Counsel€stated€that€had€he€hadÏthis€information€prior€to€trial€he€would€certainly€have€used€it€in€his€defense€ofÏAppellant.ÌÌà àIn€òòState€v.€Harbisonóó,€704€S.W.2d€314,€319€(Tenn.€1986),€our€SupremeÏCourt€stated:ÌÓÓà8 àà8 àDefense€counsel€has€a€duty€to€make€reasonableÏinvestigations€or€to€make€a€reasonable€decision€thatÏmakes€particular€investigations€unnecessary.€€AÏparticular€decision€not€to€investigate€must€be€directlyÏassessed€for€reasonableness€in€all€the€circumstances,Íapplying€a€heavy€measure€of€deference€to€counselððsÏjudgments.ÌÌÓÓEven€in€light€of€the€above„quoted€standard€of€review€in€cases€such€as€this,€weÏare€compelled€to€conclude€that€the€decision€not€to€pursue€interviews€with€Ms.ÏDecker€and€Ms.€Blankenship€was€not€reasonable€when€assessed€inÏconnection€with€the€facts€of€this€case.ÌÌà àTrial€counsel€knew€or€should€have€known€that€four€(4)€months€beforeÏAppellantððs€trial€Spadafina€had€been€convicted€of€first€degree€murder€for€hisÏparticipation€in€the€murder€of€Paul€Burns.€€òòSeeóó€òòState€v.€Spadafinaóó,€No.€02C01„9601„CC„00001,€1997€WL€1239€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.€Jan.€2,€1997).€€He€alsoÏknew€that€Vito€Licari€had€pled€guilty€to€the€murder€charge€against€him€and€thatÏLicari€would€testify€against€Appellant.€€The€Stateððs€theory€of€the€case€was€thatÏSpadafina€and€Licari€had€been€hired€by€Appellant€to€kill€Mr.€Burns.€€The€StateððsÏcase€rested€almost€entirely€on€the€testimony€of€€Licari€who€testified€out€ofÏrevenge€and€pursuant€to€a€plea€bargain.€€Although€Licariððs€testimony€isÏsufficiently€corroborated€under€the€accomplice€corroboration€rule,€the€corroborativeÏtestimony€is€not€great,€nor€would€it,€standing€alone,€be€sufficient€to€convictÏAppellant€of€murder.€€Trial€counsel€had€also€received€during€discovery€T.B.I.Ïmaterials€indicating€that€Ms.€Decker€had€both€seen€and€heard€threats€byÏFrappola€and€that€Ms.€Blankenship€might€have€information€to€exchange€inÍreturn€for€a€ð ðdealðð€on€her€own€criminal€charges.€€Given€Licariððs€reprehensibleÏbackground€and€the€relative€paucity€of€evidence€other€than€his€testimony€thatÏAppellant€procured€the€murder€of€Burns,€evidence€that€Mr.€Frappola€had€aÏmotive€and€a€stated€desire€to€kill€or€have€Spadafina€kill€Burns€would€have€beenÏa€powerful€tool€in€raising€a€reasonable€doubt€as€to€Appellantððs€allegedÏparticipation€in€the€crime.€€Indeed,€trial€counsel€admitted€that€had€he€developedÏthe€information€contained€in€the€affidavit€of€Ms.€Decker€and€Ms.€BlankenshipÏprior€to€Appellantððs€trial,€he€would€have€used€that€information€in€her€defense.€ÏWe€do€not€typically€judge€counselððs€decisions€in€hindsight;€however,€we€cannotÏconceive,€based€on€the€record€before€us,€why€counsel€would€not€haveÏdeveloped€information€such€as€this€and€used€it€at€trial.€€We€must€thereforeÏconclude€counselððs€failure€in€this€regard€is€not€reasonable.ÌÌà àIn€addition€we€believe€Appellant€has€demonstrated€a€reasonableÏprobability€that€the€result€of€the€trial€would€have€been€different€had€evidence€ofÏFrappolaððs€threats€been€put€before€they€jury.€€It€must€be€kept€in€mind€that€theÏdefense€in€a€criminal€case€need€only€raise€a€reasonable€doubt€in€the€mind€ofÏthe€jury€in€order€to€avoid€a€conviction.€€Given€that€the€Stateððs€case€againstÏAppellant€rested€almost€entirely€on€the€disreputable€figure€of€Vito€Licari,€thatÏmany€of€the€players€in€this€drama€come€from€the€organized€crime€milieu,€and€thatÏthe€deceased€was€involved€in€fraudulent€schemes€at€the€time€of€his€murder,€weÍbelieve€showing€that€a€person€other€than€Appellant€had€motive€and€expressedÏthe€desire€to€kill€the€victim€might€very€well€have€created€a€reasonable€doubt€asÏto€Appellantððs€guilt.ÌÌà àWe€therefore€reverse€this€case€due€to€our€conclusion€that€Appellant€wasÏdenied€the€effective€assistance€of€counsel€in€violation€of€the€Sixth€Amendment€toÏthe€United€States€Constitution€and€Article€I,€Section€9€of€the€Constitution€ofÏTennessee.€€In€view€of€our€holding,€it€is€unnecessary€to€address€the€claim€thatÏcumulative€errors€deprived€Appellant€of€due€process€of€law.€€This€case€isÏremanded€to€the€trial€court€for€a€new€trial.Ìà àà àà àà àà àà àÌÓÓà àà àà àà àà à____________________________________Ìà àà àà àà àà àJERRY€L.€SMITH,€JUDGEÌÌÌÌCONCUR:ÌÌÌÌ___________________________________ÌJOE€B.€JONES,€PRESIDING€JUDGEÌÌÌ___________________________________ÌJOSEPH€M.€TIPTON,€JUDGE