ÿWPC¡ 0w÷dÇk}ÄÇe*ÅÛé=5«ÐY#ò˜Õ ÑT1$\ÒÐlòs_i'œ+i¦xe®—°ŒÍÏ4–ú×äÐÚÁå´Y3©ü²Ï0“nTÝËÍмÔq¢Ð?þœ‘RuÛµùƒezålá“×DÒÑÄið}/ŸxÁ}á©¿ÒLeÃ*(a,ë§ç±Ö­–ùµÞž¯ð¸xHAKaˆfÁúkl´'qq“-ÞÀžî]ŸÙúk#Š$ ¡‚ujEª¥V…±qõ t$‹çƒô\Ø—APMlˆw#bh:êÆ_ƒ¢ôÃß®$‘ujìoqóZÁ{3Þ™\”xµ‰~ÞC¼™/³¢åGÆvUœ•—ö¤S|ÓZQ±‰”7ã’¬RP.,Ñ«ùi#T£ Ô­Q5]Ÿi]‡¡‡YrH‰3Ð!Xj•Ö ïd×DV†)Û7 €/"½ù£üºú†³¬ÏOŽïô;ÒZ Ht?tG,Û wMÖq[Af>{3´<©è± ó±Gf$"Ò›!@”#ƇZiã-&Oñ@ãRº©>k)Sì[u¥O&¦%â5K4GHVGì 'ˆ×"sc꽄ɎsÒÁÚaüÉø$ \jb %\^ b 0ˆnUNöwD4H\ zkÒå· m¹ #ÁÐ U@‘ ÆÑ Æ— Æ] Æ##Né 0Dë/E77]9999999999999999999999b–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 0ëžžžž B‰‰ 0¤¦ D3J D-} 0Kªª ASõÆH 0¤ 0D² A«ö»KŽA+ (`£ª$¡¡Ñ€.ÑÑ8€½­»»d»»d8ÑÑ ý ÑÓ  Ó(í€"  Z6Times New Roman RegularÖJ~'Øä¥3|x ˜C:\PROGRA~1\COREL\WORDPE~1\TEMPLATE\CUSTOM~1\REVISE~1.WPTC:\Program Files\Corel\WordPerfect Office 2000\Template\Custom WP Templates\revised standard opinion.wptÿU‹ÿÀÀÀ˜HP LaserJet 4050 Series PCL 5eÈÈ,,,,ÈÈ0(ÖÃ9 Z‹(Times New Roman Level 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5‚Level 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5„Level 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5…Level 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5(#Ã$òòÚ  Ú0Ú  Úóó  SÝ ƒR&«$ÝÓ  Óà  àòòÚ  Ú1Ú  ÚóóÔ€ôµýò»»ÔÝ  ÝÔ_ÔThe€defendant€was€also€convicted€on€three€counts€of€misdemeanor€theft;€however,€these€convictions€wereÐ ° Ðsubsequently€set€aside€by€the€trial€court€as€being€barred€by€the€statute€of€limitations.€€- ù-(|G2&«$¤¤Ý ƒ£ª!ÝÑ€.ÑÑ8€»»dd8ÑÑ ý ÑÓ  ÓÝ  Ýà  àòòÚ  Ú0Ú  ÚóóÔ€ôµýò»»Ô d(|3ÿ_$££Ý ƒ£ª!ÝÑ€.ÑÑ8€»»dd8ÑÑ ý ÑÓ  ÓÝ  ÝVVVV'ÿÿdxd)!ÈÈÈÈdxdx( ±þ$’’ò òFigure€Ú  Ú1Ú  Úó ó^_X`YEþÿ<<CÿÿƒLevel 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5(|3ÿ_$¢¢Ý ƒ£ª!ÝÑ€.ÑÑ8€»»dd8ÑÑ ý ÑÓ  ÓÝ  Ý($$””ò òÚ  Ú1Ú  Úó óX[Z&OLE 2.0 Box <=8ÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿCÿÿ HKKKKÝ ƒ£ª!ÝÑ€.ÑÑ8€»»ddÈ8ÑÑ ý ÑÓ  ÓÝ  ÝÔ_ÔÑ  ÑÑ8€DXXdì»»d8ÑÑ  ÑÔ€î4î»»Ôà@ttìàIN€THE€COURT€OF€CRIMINAL€APPEALS€OF€TENNESSEEˆÐ ° Ðà@kk$ìàAT€NASHVILLEˆÐ Ö& ÐÓ  ÓÔ€¼»îî4ÔAssigned€on€Briefs€August€15,€2001Ô‡XDX»¼ÔÐ üL Ðò òÔ#†¼»XXDÐ#ÔÌSTATE€OF€TENNESSEE€òòóóv.€ANTHONY€S.€Ô_ÔCARIEÔ_ÔÔ‡XDX»¼Ôó óÐ " r ÐÌò òDirect€ó óà@@½½ìàò òAppeal€from€the€Criminal€Court€for€Williamson€CountyÐ " r Ðà@@øøìàNo.€I„899„275à0 @ àà0 @ à€€€€€Timothy€L.€Easter,€JudgeÐ  ^ ÐÌÌà@@ìì*ìàßA€V) °°` d€÷E<Ñ` AßÐ Ò"  ÐÌà@@TTìàNo.€M2000„02942„CCA„R3„CD€„€Filed€October€1,€Ô_Ô2001Ô_ÔÐ Í  ÐÌßA€V) °°` dE<¤` AßÐ ¥õ  Ðó óÌÓ  ÓÓÓÌÓÓThe€defendant,€Anthony€S.€Ô_ÔCarieÔ_Ô,€appeals€his€bench€trial€convictions€for€burglary€of€a€building€otherÐ xÈ Ðthan€a€habitation€and€theft€over€$1,000.€€This€case€presents€three€issues€for€our€determination:€(1)Ð d´ Ðwhether€the€evidence€was€sufficient€to€support€the€defendant's€convictions;€(2)€whether€the€trial€courtÐ P  Ðerred€in€not€examining€the€defendant€in€open€court€regarding€his€right€to€testify;€and€(3)€whether€theÐ <Œ Ðdefendant€received€effective€assistance€of€counsel€at€trial.€€For€the€reasons€set€forth€below,€weÐ (x Ðconclude€there€is€no€reversible€error;€therefore,€we€affirm€the€judgment€of€the€trial€court.€Ð d ÐÓ½ÓÌò òTenn.€R.€App.€P.€3€Appeal€as€of€Right;€Judgment€of€the€Criminal€Court€Affirmedó óÐ ì< ÐÌòòÓ  ÓÔ#†¼»àXDw#ÔÔ‡XDX.¼ÔJoe€G.€Riley,óó€J.,€delivered€the€opinion€of€the€court,€in€which€òòDavid€H.€Wellesóó€and€òòJamesÐ Ä ÐÔ_ÔCurwoodÔ_Ô€Ô_ÔWittÔ_Ô,€Jr.,€JJ.óó,€joined.Ð ° ÐÌJohn€H.€Henderson,€District€Public€Defender;€C.€Diane€Crosier,€Assistant€District€Public€DefenderÐ ˆØ Ð(at€trial);€and€C.€Edward€Ô_ÔFowlkesÔ_Ô,€Nashville,€Tennessee€(on€appeal),€for€the€appellant,€Anthony€S.Ð t Ä ÐÔ_ÔCarieÔ_Ô.€€Ð `!°  ÐÌPaul€G.€Summers,€Attorney€General€and€Reporter;€Laura€Ô_ÔMcMullenÔ_Ô€Ford,€Assistant€AttorneyÐ 8#ˆ" ÐGeneral;€Ronald€L.€Davis,€District€Attorney€General;€and€Derek€K.€Smith,€Assistant€DistrictÐ $$t# ÐAttorney€General,€for€the€appellee,€State€of€Tennessee.€€Ð %` $ ÐÓ^ÓÌò òÌOPINIONÐ Ô'$#' ÐÓ  Óó óÔ#†¼»XXD#ÔÔ‡XDX»¼ÔÌà  àOn€March€21,€1998,€the€employees€of€Ô_ÔHoudeshellÔ_Ô€Tire,€an€auto€repair€business€in€Brentwood,Ð ¬)ü$) ÐTennessee,€arrived€at€work€to€find€a€break„in€had€occurred€while€the€business€was€closed€overnight.€Ð ˜*è%* ÐTools€belonging€to€several€employees€were€stolen,€some€of€which€were€valued€at€over€$1,000.€€TheÐ „+Ô&+ Ðapparent€point€of€entry€was€the€bottom€left€panel€of€a€òòóóÔ#†¼»XXD• #ÔÔ€XDX»¼Ôdoor€to€a€service€bay,€which€had€beenÐ p,À', Ðdamaged.€€The€police€concluded€the€panel€was€kicked€and€then€pushed€in€to€allow€entry€into€theÐ \-¬(-ý ÐÔ_Ôbuilding.€€The€police€conducted€an€investigation€and€found€a€shoe€print€and€five€fingerprints€closeÐ ° Ðtogether€on€the€panel.€€The€fingerprints€were€later€identified€as€belonging€to€the€defendant.€€Ð œì ÐÌà  àThe€proof€showed€the€defendant€had€been€a€customer€at€Houdeshell€Tire€on€at€least€two€Ð tÄ Ðoccasions€prior€to€the€burglary.€€He€had€also€stopped€by€the€business€to€visit€€friends€who€workedÐ `° Ðthere.€€Employee€John€Reeves,€a€close€friend€of€the€defendantððs,€testified€for€the€defense€that€theÐ L œ Ðdefendant€had,€once€or€twice,€performed€work€on€his€own€car€in€the€garage.€€However,€John€Stickler,Ð 8 ˆ Ðwho€worked€at€Houdeshell€Tire€from€1997€until€1999,€€testified€that€only€technicians€were€allowedÐ $ t Ðto€work€on€vehicles€and€so,€to€the€best€of€his€knowledge,€the€defendant€was€not€allowed€to€work€onÐ  ` Ðhis€vehicle€there.€€Former€service€manager€Christopher€Hockin,€who€worked€at€the€business€fromÐ ü L  Ð1997€until€1999,€testified€that,€to€his€knowledge,€the€defendant€did€not€work€on€vehicles€at€the€garageÐ è 8  Ðprior€to€the€burglary.€€David€Jason€Kasinger,€another€former€employee,€testified€that€he€worked€atÐ Ô$  Ðthe€shop€during€the€time€of€the€burglary€and€did€not€recall€the€defendant€working€on€vehicles€there.€Ð À  ÐAfter€the€burglary,€the€defendant€went€to€work€at€Houdeshell€Tire€for€two€brief€periods€of€time.€€€€Ð ¬ü  ЀÌà  à€€John€Stickler€testified€that€the€garage€door€opened€from€the€inside.€€Stickler€also€stated€thatÐ „Ô  Ðif€it€was€necessary€to€open€the€door€from€the€outside,€one€would€push€up€on€the€center€of€the€doorÐ pÀ Ðand€then€reach€underneath€the€door€to€push€it€open.€€He€opined€that€there€would€never€be€a€need€toÐ \¬ Ðopen€the€door€by€pushing€on€the€damaged€€panel€because€the€panels,€which€were€not€"sturdy,"€wouldÐ H˜ Ðpull€out€if€used€for€lifting€the€door.€€Stickler€further€testified€on€cross„examination€that€a€personÐ 4„ Ðwould€not€need€to€touch€the€door€from€the€outside€when€closing€it€because€there€is€nothing€to€ð ðgrabÐ  p Ðon€toðð€on€the€outside€of€the€door.€€Stickler€also€testified€that€the€doors€to€the€service€bays€wereÐ  \ Ðcleaned€twice€each€month.€€Hockin€testified€that€no€one€would€ever€need€to€touch€the€damaged€panelÐ øH Ðin€order€to€open€the€door€from€the€outside.€€John€Reeves€testified€for€the€defendant€that,€prior€to€theÐ ä4 Ðburglary,€€he€had€observed€the€defendant€assisting€with€the€opening€and€closing€of€the€bay€door.€€Ð Ð  ÐÌà  àAt€trial,€the€defendantððs€statements€to€the€police€were€read€into€evidence.€€In€an€interviewÐ ¨ø Ðwith€Detective€Thomas€Campsey,€the€defendant€denied€that€he€was€involved€in€the€crime.€€He€statedÐ ”ä Ðthat€the€only€knowledge€he€had€of€the€burglary€came€from€his€friend€John€Reeves,€who€in€AprilÐ €Ð Ð1998,€after€defendant€had€accepted€a€job€at€the€business,€advised€him€to€lock€up€his€tools€at€nightÐ l¼ Ðbecause€there€had€been€a€burglary.€€The€defendant€told€the€detective€that€prior€to€his€employment€atÐ X ¨ ÐHoudeshell€Tire,€he€had€been€a€customer€in€the€shop€on€two€or€three€occasions.€€The€defendant€alsoÐ D!” Ðsaid€that€during€1998€he€had€changed€his€own€oil€and€checked€his€brakes€at€the€business.€€€€€Ð 0"€  Ðà  àÌà  àDetective€Campsey€testified€that€during€the€interview,€he€could€not€get€the€defendant€to€Ð $X" Ðspecify€by€date,€month,€or€season€the€times€he€was€present€in€Houdeshell€Tire€before€hisÐ ô$D # Ðemployment.€€The€detective€said€the€defendant€would€change€the€subject€by€mentioning€anotherÐ à%0!$ Ðoccasion€when€he€could€have€been€present€in€the€business€each€time€the€detective€would€try€to€pinÐ Ì&"% Ðdown€the€times€when€the€defendant€was€present€in€the€business.€€Ð ¸'#& ÐÌà  àElizabeth€Reid,€a€forensic€scientist€for€the€TBI,€testified€the€latent€fingerprints€collected€€fromÐ )à$( Ðthe€panel€matched€the€defendantððs.€€She€further€testified€that€while€a€fingerprint€can€last€indefinitely,Ð |*Ì%) Ðenvironmental€factors€such€as€heat€and€humidity€can€make€it€dissipate.€€She€stated€that€if€aÐ h+¸&* Ðfingerprint€were€outside€where€it€was€exposed€to€the€elements,€it€would€be€less€likely€to€remain€thanÐ ° Ðif€it€were€inside.€€Ð œì Ðà  àÌà  àFollowing€a€bench€trial,€the€defendant€was€convicted€of€burglary€and€theft€over€$1,000.׃×Ý ƒ#ÃÝòòÚ  Ú1Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý×  ×Ð tÄ ÐÌÌò òÌà@1 1 ìàI.€SUFFICIENCY€OF€THE€EVIDENCEˆÐ $ t Ðó óÌà  àThe€defendant€attacks€the€sufficiency€of€the€stateððs€proof,€claiming€that€the€evidence€againstÐ ü L  Ðhim€consisted€solely€of€circumstantial€evidence;€namely,€the€fingerprints€linking€him€to€the€sceneÐ è 8  Ðof€the€crime.€€The€defendant€also€argues€that€the€trial€court€applied€an€incorrect€standard€of€proof€inÐ Ô$  Ðconsidering€the€circumstantial€evidence€because€the€trial€judge,€acting€as€the€finder€of€fact€at€theÐ À  Ðbench€trial,€articulated€he€had€a€doubt€but€questioned€whether€the€doubt€was€reasonable.€€He€furtherÐ ¬ü  Ðclaims€the€trial€court€incorrectly€made€an€inference€from€an€inference€when€it€found,€based€on€theÐ ˜è  Ðfact€that€the€defendantððs€fingerprints€were€on€the€panel,€that€he€had€committed€the€burglary€and€Ð „Ô  Ðtheft.€€Since€all€these€issues€raised€by€the€defendant€in€his€brief€relate€to€whether€the€stateððs€proof€wasÐ pÀ Ðlegally€sufficient€to€support€his€convictions,€we€will€address€them€together.Ð \¬ Ѐ€Ð H˜ Ðò òà@$$ ìàA.€Standard€of€ReviewˆÐ 4„ Ðó óÌà  àÔ‡ XDXXXDÔAlthough€the€evidence€of€the€defendantððs€guilt€is€circumstantial€in€nature,€circumstantialÐ  \ Ðevidence€alone€may€be€sufficient€to€support€a€conviction.€€òòState€v.€Tharpeóó,€726€S.W.2d€896,€899„900Ð øH Ð(Tenn.€1987);€€òòState€v.€Gregoryóó,€862€S.W.2d€574,€577€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.€1993).€€However,€in€orderÐ ä4 Ðfor€this€to€occur,€the€circumstantial€evidence€must€be€not€only€consistent€with€the€guilt€of€the€accusedÐ Ð  Ðbut€it€must€also€be€inconsistent€with€innocence€and€must€exclude€every€other€reasonable€theory€orÐ ¼  Ðhypothesis€except€that€of€guilt.€€òòTharpeóó,€726€S.W.2d€at€900.€€€In€addition,€ð ðit€must€establish€such€aÐ ¨ø Ðcertainty€of€guilt€of€the€accused€as€to€convince€the€mind€beyond€a€reasonable€doubt€that€[theÐ ”ä Ðdefendant]€is€the€one€who€committed€the€crime.ðð€€òòId.óó€(quoting€òòPruitt€v.€Stateóó,€460€S.W.2d€385,€390Ð €Ð Ð(Tenn.€Crim.€App.€1970)).Ð l¼ ÐÌà  àWhile€following€the€above€guidelines,€this€court€must€remember€that€the€finder€of€factÐ D!” Ðdecides€the€weight€to€be€given€to€circumstantial€evidence€and€the€inferences€to€be€drawn€from€suchÐ 0"€  Ðevidence,€and€the€extent€to€which€the€circumstances€are€consistent€with€guilt€and€inconsistent€withÐ #l! Ðinnocence€are€questions€primarily€for€the€finder€of€fact.€€òòóó€òòMarable€v.€Stateóó,€313€S.W.2d€451,€457Ð $X" Ð(Tenn.€1958);€òòsee€alsoóó€€òòGregoryóó,€862€S.W.2d€at€577;€òòState€v.€Couryóó,€697€S.W.2d€373,€377€(Tenn.Ð ô$D # ÐCrim.€App.€1985);€òòPruittóó,€460€S.W.2d€at€391.€€Ô#†XDXX XD¬'#ÔÐ à%0!$ ÐÌà  àIn€a€bench€trial,€the€verdict€of€the€trial€judge€is€entitled€to€the€same€weight€on€appeal€as€a€juryÐ ¸'#& Ðverdict.€€òòState€v.€Holderóó,€15€S.W.3d€905,€911€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.€1999).€€Ð ¤(ô#' Їò òà@  %ìàB.€AnalysisˆÐ ° Ðó óÌà  àViewing€the€evidence€in€a€light€most€favorable€to€the€state,€the€defendantððs€fingerprints€atÐ ˆØ Ðthe€point€of€entry€of€the€burglary€are€consistent€with€the€defendantððs€guilt,€inconsistent€with€hisÐ tÄ Ðinnocence,€and€exclude€every€other€reasonable€theory€or€hypothesis€except€guilt.€€The€stateððs€proofÐ `° Ðestablished€that€it€was€unlikely€a€person€would€have€touched€the€outside€of€the€bottom€left€panel€ofÐ L œ Ðthe€door€to€the€service€bay€while€opening€or€shutting€the€door.€€One€witness€also€testified€that€theÐ 8 ˆ Ðdoors€to€the€service€bays€were€cleaned€routinely.€€TBI€forensic€scientist€Elizabeth€Reid€stated€thatÐ $ t Ðwhile€fingerprints€can€remain€indefinitely,€they€are€less€likely€to€remain€if€they€are€outside€whereÐ  ` Ðthey€are€exposed€to€the€elements.€€Viewing€the€evidence€in€a€light€most€favorable€to€the€state,€theÐ ü L  Ðevidence€was€sufficient€to€support€the€finding€of€guilty.€€Ð è 8  ÐÌà  àThe€defendant€contends€the€trial€judge€failed€to€apply€the€proper€ð ðbeyond€a€reasonable€doubtÐ À  Ðstandardðð€to€the€circumstantial€evidence€presented€by€the€state.€€The€basis€for€this€contention€is€foundÐ ¬ü  Ðin€the€following€remarks€made€by€the€trial€judge€just€prior€to€issuing€the€verdict:Ð ˜è  ÐÌà8  àItððs€interesting€every€time€Iððm€put€in€this€position€of€trying€a€bench€trial,€its€usuallyÐ pÀ Ðon€a€close€call€like€this.€.€.€.€€What€it€normally€requires€me€to€do€in€my€own€mind€isÐ \¬ Ðto€revisit€the€whole€theory€of€proof€beyond€a€reasonable€doubt€.€.€.€and€what€thatÐ H˜ Ðreally€means.€.€.€.€€Occasionally,€in€cases€like€this,€I€might€have€a€doubt,€but€again€IÐ 4„ Ðgo€back€to€the€theory€of,€well,€is€it€based€on€a€reason,€a€reasonable€doubt?ðð€€Ð pÐ Ð  ÐÌWe€disagree€with€the€defendantððs€contentions€and€find€nothing€in€the€trial€courtððs€comments€thatÐ øH Ðindicate€the€misapplication€of€the€proper€standard€of€proof.€€€Ð ä4 ÐÌà  àThe€defendant€òòóóargues€the€trial€court€inferred€the€defendantððs€fingerprints€were€left€on€the€doorÐ ¼  Ðat€the€time€of€the€burglary€and€then,€based€on€that€inference,€€improperly€inferred€that€he€entered€theÐ ¨ø Ðbuilding€through€the€panel€and€stole€the€tools.€€A€fact€may€be€inferred€from€circumstantial€evidenceÐ ”ä Ðand€from€the€fact€thus€inferred,€another€fact€may€be€inferred.€€òòBenton€v.€Snyderóó,€825€S.W.2d€409,Ð €Ð Ð415€(Tenn.€1992).€€The€finder€of€fact€may€arrive€at€ð ða€factðð€by€indirect€or€circumstantial€evidenceÐ l¼ Ðwhich€is€ð ðof€such€a€character€and€so€strong€that€it€justifies€a€conclusion€or€a€finding€of€fact€whichÐ X ¨ Ðbecomes€a€proper€basis€for€another€inference.ðð€€òòIdóó.€€Then,€this€fact€may€serve€as€a€basis€for€anÐ D!” Ðinference.€€òòIdòòóóóó.€€Ð 0"€  ÐÌà  àIn€this€case,€the€trial€court€properly€arrived€at€a€fact,€that€the€defendant€entered€the€business,€Ð $X" Ðthrough€circumstantial€evidence,€the€defendantððs€fingerprints€found€on€the€damaged€panel€of€theÐ ô$D # Ðdoor.€€We€conclude€the€trial€courtððs€finding€that€the€defendant€committed€the€burglary€was€alsoÐ à%0!$ Ðsufficient€to€properly€support€the€inference€that€the€defendant€committed€the€theft€as€well.€Ð Ì&"% ÐÌà  àFor€the€foregoing€reasons,€we€conclude€that€the€evidence€was€legally€sufficient€to€support€Ð ¤(ô#' Ðthe€trial€courtððs€judgments€of€conviction.€€This€issue€is€without€merit.à  àÐ )à$( ÐÌÐ h+¸&* Ðò òà@¸ ¸ ìàII.€€DEFENDANTððS€RIGHT€TO€TESTIFYˆÐ ° ÐÌó óà  àThe€defendant€also€claims€the€trial€court€erred€by€failing€to€examine€him€in€open€courtÐ ˆØ Ðregarding€his€decision€not€to€testify.€€òòóóIn€òòóóa€decision€issued€shortly€before€the€defendantððs€trial,€theÐ tÄ ÐTennessee€Supreme€Court€announced€requirements€to€be€implemented€prospectively€in€order€toÐ `° Ðprotect€the€accusedððs€right€to€testify.€€Our€supreme€court€stated:€€Ð L œ ÐÌà8  àà ` àAt€any€time€before€conclusion€of€the€proof,€defense€counsel€shall€request€aÐ $ t Ðhearing€.€.€.€to€inquire€of€the€defendant€whether€the€defendant€has€made€a€knowing,Ð  ` Ðvoluntary,€and€intelligent€waiver€of€the€right€to€testify.€€This€hearing€shall€be€placedÐ ü L  Ðon€the€record€and€shall€be€in€the€presence€of€the€trial€judge.€€Defense€counsel€is€notÐ è 8  Ðrequired€to€engage€in€any€particular€litany,€but€counsel€must€show€at€a€minimum€thatÐ Ô$  Ðthe€defendant€knows€and€understands€that:ÐÀ Ð Ð  ÐÌà8  àà8` Ð Ð à(1)€the€defendant€has€the€right€not€to€testify,€and€if€the€defendant€doesÐ ˜è  Ðnot€testify,€then€the€jury€(or€court)€may€not€draw€any€inferences€fromÐ „Ô  Ðthe€defendantððs€failure€to€testify;ÐpÀ` x` x ÐÌà8  àà8` Ð Ð à(2)€the€defendant€has€the€right€to€testify€and€that€if€the€defendantÐ H˜ Ðwishes€to€exercise€that€right,€no€one€can€prevent€the€defendant€fromÐ 4„ Ðtestifying;Ð p` x` x ÐÌà8  àà8` Ð Ð à(3)€the€defendant€has€consulted€with€his€or€her€counsel€in€making€theÐ øH Ðdecision€whether€or€not€to€testify;€that€the€defendant€has€been€advisedÐ ä4 Ðof€the€advantages€and€disadvantages€of€testifying;€and€that€theÐ Ð  Ðdefendant€has€voluntarily€and€personally€waived€the€right€to€testify.м ` x` x ÐòòÌMomon€v.€Stateóó,€18€S.W.3d€152,€162€(Tenn.€òòóó1999).€€Our€supreme€court€went€on€to€state€that€theÐ ”ä Ðmere€failure€to€follow€these€guidelines€will€not,€in€and€of€itself,€support€a€claim€for€the€deprivationÐ €Ð Ðof€the€right€to€testify€where€there€is€evidence€in€the€record€to€establish€the€defendant€otherwiseÐ l¼ Ðpersonally€waived€the€right.€€òòIdóó.€at€163.€€Ð X ¨ ÐÌà  àIn€the€case€before€this€court,€the€testimony€of€the€defendant€at€the€motion€for€new€trialÐ 0"€  Ðhearing€established€he€personally€waived€his€right€to€testify.€€He€testified€that€his€attorney€advisedÐ #l! Ðhim€of€his€right€to€testify,€and,€after€a€discussion€with€her,€he€decided€that€he€would€not€testify€basedÐ $X" Ðupon€her€advice.€€This€is€unlike€the€situation€in€òòMomonóó€where€defense€counsel€unilaterally€decidedÐ ô$D # Ðthe€defendant€would€not€testify.€€òòIdóó.€€Therefore,€we€conclude€the€defendant€was€not€deprived€of€hisÐ à%0!$ Ðright€to€testify.€€Ð Ì&"% ÐÌÌò òÌÌÐ h+¸&* Ðà@Ü Ü ìàIII.€EFFECTIVE€ASSISTANCE€OF€COUNSELˆÐ ° Ðó óà  àà ` àà ¸ àÌà  àThe€defendant€also€argues€that€he€did€not€receive€effective€assistance€of€counsel€at€trialÐ ˆØ Ðbecause€his€trial€counsel€(1)€failed€to€object€to€the€introduction€of€evidence€referencing€theÐ tÄ Ðdefendantððs€prior€conviction,€(2)€failed€to€properly€advise€the€defendant€regarding€his€decision€notÐ `° Ðto€testify,€and€(3)€failed€to€argue€the€law€regarding€the€standard€of€proof€required€in€circumstantialÐ L œ Ðevidence€cases.€€We€respectfully€disagree.Ð 8 ˆ ÐÌò òà@$$ ìàA.€Standard€of€ReviewˆÐ  ` Ðó óÌà  àÔ‡ XDXXXDÔThis€court€reviews€a€claim€of€ineffective€assistance€of€counsel€under€the€standards€of€òòBaxterÐ è 8  Ðv.€Roseóó,€523€S.W.2d€930€(Tenn.€1975),€and€òòStrickland€v.€Washingtonóó,€466€U.S.€668,€104€S.€Ct.Ð Ô$  Ð2052,€80€L.€Ed.€2d€674€(1984).€The€petitioner€has€the€burden€to€prove€that€(1)€the€attorneyððsÐ À  Ðperformance€was€deficient,€and€(2)€the€deficient€performance€resulted€in€prejudice€to€the€defendantÐ ¬ü  Ðso€as€to€deprive€him€of€a€fair€trial.€€òòStricklandóó,€466€U.S.€at€687,€104€S.€Ct.€at€2064;€òòGoad€v.€Stateóó,Ð ˜è  Ð938€S.W.2d€363,€369€(Tenn.€1996);€òòOverton€v.€Stateóó,€874€S.W.2d€6,€11€(Tenn.€1994);€òòButler€v.€Stateóó,Ð „Ô  Ð789€S.W.2d€898,€899€(Tenn.€1990).€€In€order€to€establish€prejudice,€the€petitioner€must€establish€aÐ pÀ Ðð ðreasonable€probability€that,€but€for€counselððs€unprofessional€errors,€the€result€of€the€proceedingÐ \¬ Ðwould€have€been€different.€€A€reasonable€probability€is€a€probability€sufficient€to€undermineÐ H˜ Ðconfidence€in€the€outcome.ðð€€òòStricklandóó,€466€U.S.€at€694,€104€S.€Ct.€at€2068.€€Ð 4„ ÐÌò òà@  %ìàB.€AnalysisˆÐ  \ Ðó óà  àÌà  àÔ#†XDXX XDoN#Ô€At€trial,€the€state€read€into€evidence€a€transcript€of€the€defendantððs€statement€to€police.€€AÔ‡ XDXXXDÔÐ ä4 ÐÔ#†XDXX XD"T#Ôportion€of€the€statement€made€reference€to€a€prior€criminal€conviction.€€Trial€counsel€objected€to€thisÐ Ð  Ðportion€of€the€statement,€and€the€trial€court€sustained€the€objection.€€When€the€state€moved€to€enterÐ ¼  Ðthe€transcript€of€the€statement€as€an€exhibit,€trial€counsel€requested€that€the€portion€of€the€transcriptÐ ¨ø Ðrelating€to€the€prior€conviction€be€redacted.€€The€state€conceded€that€portion€of€the€transcript€shouldÐ ”ä Ðnot€be€considered€by€the€trial€court,€and€the€trial€court€specifically€stated€that€it€would€not€considerÐ €Ð Ðit.€€Ô‡ XDXXXDÔTherefore,€trial€counsel€was€not€ineffective€for€failing€to€object€to€the€entry€of€the€transcript€intoÐ l¼ Ðevidence.Ð X ¨ ÐÌÔ#†XDXX XDëV#Ôà  àAccording€to€the€testimony€of€the€defendant€at€the€motion€for€new€trial€hearing,€trial€counselÐ 0"€  Ðadvised€him€during€trial€that€if€he€testified,€his€prior€criminal€history€could€be€€ð ðbrought€up.ðð€Ð #l! ÐTherefore,€it€was€her€recommendation€that€he€not€testify.€€The€defendant€said€that,€based€upon€herÐ $X" Ðadvice,€he€decided€he€would€not€testify.€€Following€this€discussion,€the€state€presented€theÐ ô$D # Ðdefendantððs€statement€into€evidence.€€The€defendant€claims€that€since€the€trial€court€was€aware€thatÐ à%0!$ Ðhe€had€a€prior€criminal€history,€his€trial€counsel€should€have€suggested€that€defendant€testify.€Ð Ì&"% ÐHowever,€as€previously€set€forth,€the€trial€court€specifically€said€it€would€not€consider€theÐ ¸'#& Ðinformation€contained€in€the€transcript€regarding€the€defendantððs€criminal€history.€€Had€the€defendantÐ ¤(ô#' Ðchosen€to€testify,€his€prior€convictions€for€burglary€of€an€automobile€and€theft€could€have€been€used€Ð )à$( Ðâ âÐ |*Ì%) Ðto€impeach€his€credibility.€€òòSeeóó€Tenn.R.€Evid.€609.€€Therefore,€we€are€unable€to€conclude€that€trialÐ ° Ðâ âcounsel€was€deficient.€€Her€actions€in€this€regard€do€not€constitute€ineffective€assistance€of€counsel.€Ð œì ÐÌà  àThe€defendant€finally€contends€the€trial€court€applied€the€incorrect€standard€of€proofÐ tÄ Ðregarding€circumstantial€evidence,€and€trial€counsel€was€ineffective€for€failing€to€argue€theÐ `° Ðappropriate€standard.€€As€€previously€stated€in€this€opinion,€we€do€not€find€that€the€trial€court€appliedÐ L œ Ðan€incorrect€standard€of€proof€to€the€evidence.€€Accordingly,€trial€counsel€was€not€deficient.€Ð 8 ˆ ÐÌà  àDefendant€has€failed€to€establish€his€claim€of€ineffective€assistance€of€counsel.€€Ð  ` ÐÌÌÒû°ÒÓ  Óò òà @S ààH@SSSààH@ÏÏ SàCONCLUSIONó óÐ Ô$  ÐÌÓŽ_Óà S àAccordingly,€we€affirm€the€judgment€of€the€trial€court.Ð ¬ü  Ðà S àÌÌÌà0 S àà0« S(#S(#àà0 « (#« (#àà0[ (# (#àà0³[(#[(#àà0 ³(#³(#àà0c (# (#à_____________________________€Ð\¬c(#c(# Ðà S àà « àà  àà [ àà ³ àà  àà c àJOE€G.€RILEY,€JUDGE