ÿWPCH …# VUNa %¯ 0(µbÝw@å4% 9 H 0JP 0Tš 0^î 0hL 0r´ 0|& 0†¢ 0( 1u¸ 0d- U>‘ U*Ï B)ù DC" AMe² BÂv~ßvÓ] D30 0@c AO£Æò 0D¸ D/ü B+˜HP LaserJet 4SiHPPCL5MS,ü,,,,,ü0nLhÎ(ÈhH  Z ‹6Times New Roman RegularX($¡¡- ù- D£[À Oe U U U Ó€Ô¡¨ 3|x2 ÿÿ0Indent1Ô2ÔÔ3  Ô2" ÿÿ0Indent2à0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2, ÿÿ0Indent3à0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô26 ÿÿ0Indent4à0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2@ ÿÿ0Indent5à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2J ÿÿ0Indent6à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2T ÿÿ0Indent7à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2^ ÿÿ0Indent8à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô ÿÿ?AGMSYaioIndent0I.A.1.a.(1)(a)i)a)P ÿÿ8Mac DefaultMac DefaultÓ ` °šXÓ< Œ 9p`(&Times New Roman< Œ 9p`(Arial% Line 7 d!!!!7Border 1dd€-"Cþÿ << Gÿÿ Ý ƒ!ÝÑ  ÑÑ#€d#ÑÔ€ÔÝ  ÝÔ€ ÔÔ€ ÔÓ  Óò òÔ YYY ÔFILEDÔ€ XÔÌÌDecember€4,€1997ÌÌCecil€W.€CrowsonÌAppellate€Court€ClerkÔ  Ôó ó dPtPtHHÚ(ÿáÿâùFG(üHHØ(d'`Styl{WP}01•ÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃà Ãà Ãà Ãà Ãà ÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÐ ÐÐHHÐÐ  ÐÐ2ÐÐÿÿ¸æ$ÿÐÐHHÐÐÐÐÐÐÐÐ  ÐÐ ÐÐ ÐÑÑÑGenevaÑÑ ÑÑ € ÑÑ<Px–ÈÑÒÒÒ443!#4ÒÒ$ *$ÒÒ$*$ÒÒ ÿKK ÒÒ  Geneva ÒÒ  Geneva ÒÓ.,ÓÓÓÓ6ÓÓ ÓßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßÑGenevaÑÑ ÑÒ  ion-F Geneva ÒÒ  ion-F Geneva Ò%%%%'ÿÿdxd("ÿÿ$££Ò  ÒÒ  Ò€-‚ƒCþÿ<< CÿÿƒLevel 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5($$””ò òÚ  Ú1Ú  Úó ó„„'÷ÿ dxdüÿP PdÝ ƒ!ÝÔ . ÔÔ€ÔÝ  ÝÒ  ÒÒ „ ÒÑ ` ÑÔ€ŠÔÔ€ ÔÑ\R AØ'\ћрÑÑ7€EhXXdìdÈ7ÑÑ  ÑÑ  ÑÓ  Óò òœÙ€€ÙßR€#$"A1-j|` ç `€€@ÿRß›Þ ÞÌIN€THE€COURT€OF€CRIMINAL€APPEALS€OF€TENNESSEEÌÌAT€NASHVILLEÌÌSEPTEMBER€SESSION,€1997̛̜ÌÌÓ  ÓRODNEY€CAROTHERS,à à)à àC.C.A.€NO.€01C01„9610„CR„00455Ìà àà àà àà àà à)à àó óÌà àAppellant,à àà àà àò ò)à àÌà àà àà àà àà à)à àDAVIDSON€COUNTYÌà àà àà àà àà à)à àÌV.à àà àà àà àà à)à àÌà àà àà àà àà à)à àHON.€THOMAS€H.€SHRIVER,ÏJUDGEÌSTATE€OF€TENNESSEE,à à)à àó óÌà àà àà àà àà àò ò)à àó óÌà àAppellee.à àà àà àò ò)à à(POST€CONVICTION)Ìó óÌÌÓ  ÓÌÓ  ÓòòFOR€THE€APPELLANTóó:à àà àà àòòFOR€THE€APPELLEEóó:ÌÌò òRODNEY€CAROTHERS,Ô€ XÔ€òòpro€seÔ€ ŠÔóóà àJOHN€KNOX€WALKUP€Ìó ó#223901,€SCCF/CCAà àà àà àAttorney€General€&€ReporterÌP.O.€Box€279€ÌClifton,€TN€38425à àà à€à àà àò òELLEN€H.€POLLACKó óÌà àà àà àà àà àà àAssistant€Attorney€GeneralÌà àà àà àà àà àà à2nd€Floor,€Cordell€Hull€BuildingÌà àà àà àà àà àà à425€Fifth€Avenue€North€Ìà àà àà àà àà àà àNashville,€TN€€37243ÌÌà àà àà àà àà àà àò òVICTOR€S.€JOHNSON,€IIIÌà àà àà àà àà àà àó óDistrict€Attorney€GeneralÌÌà àà àà àà àà àà àò òNICK€BAILEY€ó óÌà àà àà àà àà àà àAssistant€District€Attorney€GeneralÌà àà àà àà àà àà àWashington€Square,€Suite€500€Ìà àà àà àà àà àà à222€Second€Avenue€SouthÌà àà àà àà àà àà àNashville,€TN€37201€ÌÌœÌÌ›ÌOPINION€FILED€________________________ÌÌAFFIRMED€ÌÌTHOMAS€T.€WOODALL,€JUDGEò ò€Ìó óÇÓ  ÓÓÓÔ€ °Ôò òòòOPINIONóóó óÔ€ ŠÔÌÓ  Óà àThe€Petitioner,€Rodney€Carothers,€appeals€the€order€of€the€DavidsonÏCounty€Criminal€Court€dismissing€his€òòproóó€òòseóó€petition€for€post„conviction€relief.€ÏThe€trial€court€found€that€the€petition€was€filed€outside€the€statute€of€limitations.€ÏIn€this€appeal,€Petitioner€raises€numerous€issues€which€can€collectively€beÏsummarized€as€challenging€the€trial€courtððs€ruling€that€his€petition€for€post„conviction€relief€is€time„barred.€€After€a€review€of€the€record,€we€affirm€the€trialÏcourtððs€denial€of€post„conviction€relief.€€ÌÌà àOn€July€8,€1993,€Petitioner€pled€guilty€and€was€convicted€of€attemptedÏespecially€aggravated€robbery,€for€which€he€was€sentenced€to€ten€(10)€years,Ïand€aggravated€burglary,€for€which€he€was€sentenced€to€three€(3)€years.€€TheÏsentences€were€ordered€to€be€served€concurrently.€€According€to€the€OrderÏentered€by€the€trial€court,€the€Petitioner€waived€appeal€during€the€pleaÏproceedings.€ÌÌà àOn€July€1,€1996,€Petitioner€filed€his€first€petition€for€post„conviction€relief.€ÏHe€alleged€ineffective€assistance€of€counsel€and€that€he€had€not€knowingly€andÏvoluntarily€entered€his€guilty€pleas.€€The€trial€court€subsequently€dismissed€theÏpetition€without€an€evidentiary€hearing€because€it€was€filed€outside€the€one„yearÍstatute€of€limitations€and€because€it€fit€none€of€the€exceptions€to€the€one„yearÏfiling€requirement.€€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€40„30„202(a)€and€(b).ÌÌà àAt€the€time€the€Petitionerððs€convictions€became€final,€the€statute€ofÏlimitations€applicable€to€post„conviction€proceedings€was€three€years.€€Tenn.ÏCode€Ann.€ðð€40„30„102€(repealed€1995).€€In€1995,€the€legislature€reduced€theÏstatutory€period€for€filing€post„conviction€petitions€from€three€(3)€years€to€one€(1)Ïyear.€€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€40„30„202(a).€€The€new€1995€Post„ConvictionÏProcedure€Act€governs€this€petition€and€all€petitions€filed€after€May€10,€1995.€ÏBecause€the€previous€three„year€statute€of€limitations€had€not€expired€for€theÏPetitioner€at€the€time€the€new€Act€took€effect,€his€right€to€petition€for€post„conviction€relief€survived€under€the€new€Act.€€òòSeeóó€òòCarter€v.€Stateóó,€__S.W.2d__,ÏC.C.A.€No.€03„S„01„9612„CR„00117,€Monroe€County€(Tenn.,€Knoxville,€Sept.€8,Ï1997).€€ÌÌà àAs€a€result,€the€Petitioner€had€one€year€from€the€effective€date€of€the€newÏAct,€May€10,€1995,€to€file€for€post„conviction€relief.€€òòSeeóó€Compilerððs€Notes€toÏTenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€40„30„201;€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€40„30„202(a).€€The€PetitionerÏfiled€his€petition€for€post„conviction€relief€on€July€1,€1996,€a€few€weeks€after€theÏexpiration€for€the€one„year€period.€€The€Petitioner€has€not€alleged€that€his€claimsÏfit€within€one€of€the€enumerated€exceptions€to€the€one„year€statute€of€limitations.€ÍTenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€40„30„202(b).€€Accordingly,€we€conclude€that€the€trial€courtÏcorrectly€found€that€the€petition€was€barred€by€the€statute€of€limitations,€andÏtherefore,€a€summary€dismissal€of€the€petition€was€appropriate.€€Tenn.€CodeÏAnn.€ðð€40„30„206(b).€€€ÌÌà àThe€Petitioner€raises€the€issue€that€the€Act's€one„year€statute€of€limitationsÏviolates€due€process€guarantees.€òòSeeóó€U.S.€Const.€amend.€XIV,€ðð€1;€Tenn.ÏConst.€art.€I,€ðð€8.€The€State,€on€the€other€hand,€argues€that€it€was€within€theÏlegislature's€power€to€enact€the€one„year€statute€of€limitations€and€that€theÏstatute€does€not€violate€due€process€because€it€provides€a€reasonable€periodÏof€time€in€which€post„conviction€claims€can€be€asserted.€ÌÌà àIt€is€well„established€that€the€identification€of€the€precise€dictates€of€dueÏprocess€requires€consideration€of€both€the€governmental€interests€involved€andÏthe€private€interests€affected€by€the€official€action.€òòBurford€v.€Stateóó,€845€S.W.2dÏ204,€207€(Tenn.€1992)€(òòcitingóó€òòFusari€v.€Steinbergóó,€419€U.S.€379,€389,€(1975)).ÏWith€regard€to€post„conviction€proceedings,€the€governmental€interestÏrepresented€by€the€statute€of€limitations€is€the€prevention€of€the€litigation€of€staleÏand€groundless€claims,€with€the€accompanying€cost.€òòIdóó.€€The€private€interest€atÏstake€is€a€prisoner's€opportunity€to€attack€his€or€her€conviction€and€incarcerationÍon€the€grounds€that€he€or€she€was€deprived€of€a€constitutional€right€during€theÏconviction€process.€òòIdóó.€ÌÌà àAlthough€freedom€from€bodily€restraint€and€punishment€by€the€StateÏwithout€due€process€of€law€is€a€fundamental€right,€it€is€clear€that€states€have€noÏconstitutional€duty€to€provide€post„conviction€relief€procedures.€òòIdóó.€(citationsÏomitted).€Thus,€as€our€supreme€court€held€in€òòBurfordóó,€the€opportunity€toÏcollaterally€attack€constitutional€violations€which€occurred€during€the€convictionÏprocess€is€not€a€fundamental€right€entitled€to€heightened€due€process€protection.ÏòòIdóó.ÌÌà àIt€is€clear€that€the€State€has€a€legitimate€interest€in€preventing€the€litigationÏof€stale€or€fraudulent€claims.€òòIdóó.€at€208€(òòcitingóó€òòJimenez€v.€Weinbergeróó,€417€U.S.Ï628,€636€(1974)).€The€State€may€therefore€ð ðerect€reasonable€proceduralÏrequirements€for€triggering€the€right€to€an€adjudication,€such€as€statutes€ofÏlimitations,€and€[the]€[S]tate€may€terminate€a€claim€for€failure€to€comply€with€aÏreasonable€procedural€rule€without€violating€due€process€rights.ðð€òòIdóó.€(citing€òòLoganÏv.€Zimmerman€€Brush€Co.óó,€455€U.S.€422,€437€(1982)).€Before€a€state€mayÏterminate€a€claim€for€failure€to€comply€with€procedural€requirements€such€asÏstatutes€of€limitations,€however,€due€process€requires€that€potential€litigants€beÍgiven€an€opportunity€to€present€claims€at€a€meaningful€time€and€in€a€meaningfulÏmanner.€òòIdóó.€ÌÌà àAs€was€the€case€in€òòBurfordóó,€when€our€supreme€court€considered€theÏconstitutionality€of€the€three„year€statute€of€limitations,€the€question€before€us€isÏ"whether€the€[S]tate's€policy€as€reflected€in€the€statute€affords€a€fair€andÏreasonable€opportunity€for€...€bringing€...€suit."€òòIdóó.€(òòquotingóó€òòPickett€v.€Brownóó,€638ÏS.W.2d€369,€376€(Tenn.€1982),€òòrev'd€on€equal€protection€groundsóó,€462€U.S.€1Ï(1983)).€The€test€is€whether€the€time€period€provides€a€petitioner€a€reasonableÏopportunity€to€have€the€claimed€issue€heard€and€determined.€òòIdóó.€(òòcitingóó€òòMichel€v.ÏLouisianaóó,€350€U.S.€91,€93€(1955)).€Having€considered€the€private€andÏgovernmental€interests€at€stake,€we€conclude€that€the€one„year€statute€ofÏlimitations€contained€in€Tennessee€Code€Annotated€section€40„30„202€providesÏa€reasonable€opportunity€for€the€presentation€of€post„conviction€claims.€òòCfóó.ÏòòBurfordóó,€845€S.W.2d€at€208€(concluding€that€the€three„year€statute€of€limitationsÏprovided€a€reasonable€opportunity€for€the€presentation€of€post„convictionÏclaims).€€Accordingly,€we€believe€that€the€one„year€statute€of€limitations€onÏpetitions€for€post„conviction€relief€does€not€violate€the€due€process€guarantees€ofÏthe€United€States€and€Tennessee€Constitutions.€ÌÌà àMoreover,€we€do€not€believe€that€the€application€of€the€one„year€statuteÏof€limitations€in€the€present€case€violated€this€Petitioner's€due€process€rights.€AsÏwe€stated€above,€the€Petitioner's€conviction€became€final€on€July€8,€1993.€AtÏthat€time,€the€previous€three„year€statute€of€limitations€applied€to€the€Petitioner,Ïmeaning€that€he€would€ordinarily€have€had€until€July€8,€1996€to€file€forÏpost„conviction€relief.€The€new€Post„Conviction€Procedure€Act€took€effect€on€MayÏ10,€1995,€and€governed€all€petitions€filed€after€that€date,€including€the€Petitioner's,Ïwhich€was€filed€on€July€1,€1996.€The€new€Act€had€the€effect€of€shortening€theÏstatutory€period€applicable€to€the€Petitioner€from€July€of€1996€to€May€of€1996.€ÏHowever,€even€though€the€new€Act€shortens€the€previous€statute€of€limitations,€itÏdoes€provide€those€prisoners€who€were€still€within€the€prior€three„year€statutoryÏperiod,€such€as€the€Petitioner€in€the€case€at€bar,€a€reasonable€opportunity€to€fileÏfor€post„conviction€relief€after€the€effective€date€of€the€new€one„year€statutoryÏperiod.€òòSeeóó€Compiler's€Notes€to€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€40„30„201€(referring€to€ActsÏ1995,€ch.€207,€ðð€3);€òòcfóó.€òòPacific€E.€Corp.€v.€Gulf€Life€Holding€Co.óó,€902€S.W.2d€946,Ï956„57€(Tenn.€App.€1995)€(citations€omitted)€(concluding€that€applying€shortenedÏstatute€of€limitations€to€causes€of€action€for€usury€not€unjust).€€We€can€onlyÏconclude€that€the€application€of€the€one„year€statute€of€limitations€did€not€violateÏthis€Petitioner's€due€process€rights.ÌÌà àAccordingly,€we€affirm€the€judgment€of€the€trial€court€and€hold€that€theÏPetitionerððs€constitutional€rights€were€not€violated,€and€that€his€petition€for€post„conviction€relief€was€time„barred€by€the€applicable€one„year€statute€of€limitationsÏunder€the€1995€Act.ÌÌÌÓ  ÓÓÓà àà àà àà àà à____________________________________Ìà àà àà àà àà àTHOMAS€T.€WOODALL,€Judge€ÌÌÌÌCONCUR:ÌÌÌÌ___________________________________ÌGARY€R.€WADE,€JudgeÌÌÌ___________________________________ÌJ.€CURWOOD€WITT,€JR.,€Judge