ÿWPC  0# °UN» %  0(b7w@?4“¢ 0Jª 0Tô 0^H 0h¦ 0r 0|€ 0†ü 0‚ 1u 0d‡U>ë 0@) D3i Bœ U*¹ B)ã DC AMO 4œ v~Ð AQN ÆŸ 0De 0D© D/í BvÓ9˜HP LaserJet 4SiHPPCL5MS,ü,,,,,ü0nLHÎ(ÈhH  Z ‹6Times New Roman RegularX($¡¡- ù- ŒŽD‘’U“Ó€Ÿ¢B\J#3|x¢2 ÿÿ0Indent1Ô2ÔÔ3  Ô2" ÿÿ0Indent2à0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2, ÿÿ0Indent3à0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô26 ÿÿ0Indent4à0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2@ ÿÿ0Indent5à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2J ÿÿ0Indent6à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2T ÿÿ0Indent7à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2^ ÿÿ0Indent8à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô ÿÿ?AGMSYaioIndent0I.A.1.a.(1)(a)i)a)P ÿÿ8Mac DefaultMac DefaultÓ ` °šXÓ< Œ 9p`(&Times New Roman("ÿÿ$££Ò  ÒÒ  Ò""""'ÿÿdxd d< Œ 9p`(Arial% Line 7 d$$$$7Border 1dd* %Cþÿ << Gÿÿ *Ý ƒ!ÝÑ  ÑÑ#€d#ÑÔ€ÔÝ  ÝÝ ƒ+"ÝÝ  ÝÔ€#ÔÔ€#ÔÓ  ÓÔ YYY ÔFILEDÔ€#XÔÌÌò òDecember€2,€1997ÌÌCecil€Crowson,€Jr.ÌÔ€#ôÔAppellate€Court€Clerkó óPtPtHHÚ(ÿáÿâùFG(üHHØ(d'`*+ ,-Cþÿ<< CÿÿƒLevel 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5(3¯$¢¢Ý ƒ!ÝÝ  Ý($$””ò òÚ  Ú1Ú  Úó ó..'÷ÿ dxdüÿP PdStyl{WP}01•ÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃà Ãà Ãà Ãà Ãà ÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÐ ÐÐHHÐÐ  ÐÐ2ÐÐÿÿ¸æ$ÿÐÐHHÐÐÐÐÐÐÐÐ  ÐÐ ÐÐ ÐÑÑÑGenevaÑÑ ÑÑ € ÑÑ<Px–ÈÑÒÒÒ443!#4ÒÒ$ *$ÒÒ$*$ÒÒ ÿKK ÒÒ  Geneva ÒÒ  Geneva ÒÓ.,ÓÓÓÓ6ÓÓ ÓßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßÑGenevaÑÑ ÑÒ  ion-F Geneva ÒÒ  ion-F Geneva ÒÝ ƒ!ÝÔ . ÔÔ€ÔÝ  ÝÒ  ÒÒ „ ÒÑ ` ÑÔ€ŠÔÔ€#ÔÑ\R AØ'\ÑÑ€ÑÑ7€UXXdìdÈ7ÑÑ  ÑÑ  ÑÓ  Óò òÙ€*ÙßR€&'%A1-j|à` Å `€€@ÿRß›Þ ÞÌIN€THE€COURT€OF€CRIMINAL€APPEALS€OF€TENNESSEEÌÌAT€JACKSONÌÌAUGUST€SESSION,€1997ÌÌ€ÌÌÓ  ÓKENNETH€LEE€CLAY,à àà àà à)€€€€€C.C.A.€NO.€02C01„9610„CC„00323à àà àà àà àà àà à)à àó óÌà àà àAppellant,ò òà àà àà à)€€€€€€€Ìà àà àà àà àà àà à)€€€€€LAKE€COUNTYÌà àà àà àà àà àà à)à àÌV.à àà àà àà àà àà à)€€€€€€€Ìà àà àà àà àà àà à)€€€€€€HON.€JOE€G.€RILEY,€JR.,ÏJUDGEó ó€€ò òSTATE€OF€TENNESSEE,à àà à)€€€€€€€ó óà àÌà àà àà àà àà àò òà à)ó ó€€€€€€€Ìà àà àAppellee.à àà àò òà à)€€€€€(POST„CONVICTION)€Ìó óÌÌÌÓ  ÓÌÓ  ÓòòFOR€THE€APPELLANTóó:à àà àà àòòFOR€THE€APPELLEEóó:ÌÌò òLANCE€E.€WEBB€à àà àà àJOHN€KNOX€WALKUP€Ìó óP.O.€Box€26€à àà àà àà àAttorney€General€&€ReporterÌUnion€City,€TN€38261€Ìà àò òà àà àà àà àà àCLINTON€J.€MORGAN€Ìó óà àà àà àà àà àà àAssistant€Attorney€GeneralÌà àà àà àà àà àà à2nd€Floor,€Cordell€Hull€BuildingÌà àà àà àà àà àà à425€Fifth€Avenue€North€Ìà àà àà àà àà àà àNashville,€TN€€37243ÌÌà àà àà àà àà àà àò òC.€PHILLIP€BIVENS€Ìà àà àà àà àà àà àó óDistrict€Attorney€GeneralÌÌà àà àà àà àà àà àò òJOHNNY€VAUGHN€ó óÌà àà àà àà àà àà àAssistant€District€Attorney€GeneralÌà àà àà àà àà àà à115€East€Market€Ìà àà àà àà àà àà àP.O.€Box€E€Ìà àà àà àà àà àà àDyersburg,€TN€38025à0 àÌÌÌÌœÌOPINION›€FILED€________________________ÌÌAFFIRMED€ÌÌTHOMAS€T.€WOODALL,€JUDGEÇÓ  ÓÔ€#°Ôò òòòOPINIONóóó óÔ€#ŠÔÌÌÌÌÓ  ÓÓÓà àPetitioner,€Kenneth€Lee€Clay,€appeals€the€trial€courtððs€denial€of€his€petitionÏfor€post„conviction€relief.€€On€July€20,€1994,€Petitioner€was€convicted€of€twoÏcounts€each€of€burglary€and€theft€of€property€following€a€jury€trial€in€the€CircuitÏCourt€of€Lake€County.€€He€was€sentenced€to€four€(4)€years€for€each€count,€withÏcounts€one€(1)€and€two€(2)€to€be€served€concurrently€and€counts€three€(3)€andÏfour€(4)€to€be€served€concurrently.€€Counts€one€(1)€and€two€(2)€were€to€beÏserved€consecutive€to€the€sentences€imposed€in€counts€three€(3)€and€four€(4),€forÏa€total€sentence€of€eight€(8)€years.€€Petitioner€contends€that€he€was€denied€hisÏSixth€Amendment€right€to€the€effective€assistance€of€counsel€because€ofÏCounselððs:€(1)€failure€to€present€an€alibi€defense;€(2)€failure€to€exerciseÏperemptory€challenges€during€voir€dire€of€the€jury;€(3)€deprivation€of€PetitionerððsÏright€to€testify;€and€(4)€failure€to€appeal€the€issue€of€consecutive€sentencing.€€WeÏaffirm€the€judgment€of€the€trial€court.ÌÌà àIn€determining€whether€counsel€provided€effective€assistance€at€trial,€theÏcourt€must€decide€whether€counselððs€performance€was€within€the€range€ofÏcompetence€demanded€of€attorneys€in€criminal€cases.€€òòBaxter€v.€Roseóó,€523ÏS.W.2d€930,€936€(Tenn.€1975).€€To€succeed€on€a€claim€that€his€counsel€wasÍineffective€at€trial,€a€petitioner€bears€the€burden€of€showing€that€his€counselÏmade€errors€so€serious€that€he€was€not€functioning€as€counsel€as€guaranteedÏunder€the€Sixth€Amendment€and€that€the€deficient€representation€prejudiced€theÏpetitioner€resulting€in€a€failure€to€produce€a€reliable€result.€€òòStrickland€v.ÏWashingtonóó,€466€U.S.€668,€687,€òòrehððgóó€òòdeniedóó,€467€U.S.€1267€(1984);€òòCooper€v.ÏStateóó,€849€S.W.2d€744,€747€(Tenn.€1993);€òòButler€v.€Stateóó,€789€S.W.2d€898,€899Ï(Tenn.€1990).€€To€satisfy€the€second€prong€the€petitioner€must€show€aÏreasonable€probability€that,€but€for€counselððs€unreasonable€error,€the€fact€finderÏwould€have€had€reasonable€doubt€regarding€petitionerððs€guilt.€€òòStricklandóó,€466ÏU.S.€at€695.€€This€reasonable€probability€must€be€ð ðsufficient€to€undermineÏconfidence€in€the€outcome.ðð€€òòHarris€v.€Stateóó,€875€S.W.2d€662,€665€(Tenn.€1994).ÌÌà àWhen€reviewing€trial€counselððs€actions,€this€court€should€not€use€theÏbenefit€of€hindsight€to€second„guess€trial€strategy€and€criticize€counselððs€tactics.€ÏòòHellard€v.€Stateóó,€629€S.W.2d€4,€9€(Tenn.€1982).€€Counselððs€alleged€errors€shouldÏbe€judged€at€the€time€they€were€made€in€light€of€all€facts€and€circumstances.€ÏòòStricklandóó,€466€U.S.€at€690;€òòseeóó€œòòCooperóó,€849›€S.W.2d€at€746.ÌÌà àThe€Petitioner€called€trial€counsel€to€testify€at€the€evidentiary€hearing.€ÏCounsel€was€appointed€to€represent€Petitioner€for€charges€of€burglary€and€theftÏarising€out€of€two€separate€incidents.€€One€of€the€burglaries€was€committed€onÍJanuary€6,€1994,€and€the€second€burglary€occurred€on€February€20,€1994.€€BothÏof€the€theft€charges€were€felonies€because€the€amount€stolen€was€over€fiveÏhundred€dollars€($500.00).€€€The€first€jury€trial€on€these€charges€against€PetitionerÏended€in€a€mistrial,€but€he€was€convicted€of€all€charges€at€the€second€trial.€€ÌÌà àCounsel€stated€that€he€initially€met€with€Petitioner€briefly€on€the€day€heÏwas€appointed,€and€that€œhe€and€his›€investigator€met€with€the€œPetitioner€on€laterÏdates.€€During›€those€meetings,€they€discussed€Petitionerððs€defense€and€anyÏalibi€witnesses€he€named.€€A€plea€offer€was€made€to€Petitioner,€and€both€theÏinvestigator€and€counsel€talked€to€Petitioner€regarding€the€terms€and€ramificationsÏof€the€offer.€€The€offer€made€by€the€District€Attorneyððs€office€was€four€(4)€yearsÏfor€each€charge,€all€sentences€to€run€concurrently€but€consecutive€to€all€priorÏsentences.€€Counsel€did€not€recall€any€other€offers€being€made€to€Petitioner.€ÏTrial€counsel€obtained€copies€of€statements€given€to€the€police€regarding€theÏburglaries.€€From€the€time€counsel€was€appointed€to€the€time€of€trial,€he€and€hisÏinvestigator€met€with€the€Petitioner€several€times.€€ÌÌà àThe€alibi€witnesses€Petitioner€named€were€subpoenaed€for€the€first€trial,Ïand€counsel€spoke€with€each€of€them.€€All€three€of€the€witnesses€could€not€beÏof€any€help€to€Petitioner€because€of€the€time€frame€in€which€the€burglaryÏoccurred.€€While€all€of€them€had€been€with€the€Petitioner€earlier€in€the€evening€onÍthe€night€of€the€burglary,€they€did€not€know€anything€of€his€whereabouts€fromÏthat€time€until€the€next€day.€€Counsel€decided€that€the€witnesses€would€not€helpÏPetitionerððs€defense,€but€would€hurt€him€and€did€not€call€them€to€testify.€ÏBecause€of€this,€these€witnesses€were€not€subpoenaed€for€the€second€trial.€ÏCounsel€discussed€with€Petitioner€his€right€to€testify€at€both€trials,€butÏrecommended€that€he€not€testify€due€to€his€prior€record.€€The€final€decision€wasÏleft€to€the€Petitioner,€and€he€chose€not€to€testify€on€both€occasions.ÌÌà àCounsel€stated€that€jury€selection€was€very€important€in€both€trials,€andÏthat€he€exercised€three€of€his€peremptory€challenges€at€the€second€trial.€€WhileÏone€of€the€members€of€the€jury€which€convicted€Petitioner€had€previously€workedÏat€the€store€that€was€robbed,€counsel€personally€knew€the€juror€and€ð ðdidnððt€feelÏlike€that€would€have€mattered€to€her.ðð€€While€counsel€could€not€specifically€recallÏif€he€asked€the€juror€if€she€could€be€unbiased,€the€Petitioner€did€not€object€to€herÏbeing€a€juror.€€When€questioned€regarding€his€cross„examination€of€theÏPetitionerððs€live„in€girlfriend,€whose€testimony€at€the€second€trial€contradicted€herÏtestimony€from€the€first€trial,€counsel€stated€that€he€cross„examined€her€and€ð ðtriedÏat€some€point€to€get€her€on€line€with€the€second€burglary€.€.€.€because€she€hadÏto€me€conveyed€a€wrong€statement€to€the€jury.€€I€canððt€remember€exactly€what€itÏwas€but€I€thought€she€had€corrected€it,€but€I€doubt€if€the€jury€.€.€.€knew€whatÏwas€happening.ðð€€ÌÌà àLloyd€Price,€a€purported€alibi€witness€for€the€Petitioner,€testified€that€heÏwas€subpoenaed€to€the€first€trial,€but€he€did€not€remember€talking€to€PetitionerððsÏcounsel.€€Price€could€not€recall€being€with€Petitioner€on€January€6,€1994.€€HeÏstated€that€he€had€been€drinking€that€night.ÌÌà àPetitioner€testified€that€he€could€not€recall€meeting€with€his€trial€counsel,€butÏhe€did€meet€with€the€investigator.€€He€gave€the€investigator€the€names€ofÏpotential€alibi€witnesses€for€the€first€burglary€of€January€6,€1994.€€At€anotherÏmeeting,€the€investigator€discussed€the€implications€of€the€plea€agreement€offerÏwith€him,€but€he€did€not€understand€what€he€would€have€been€pleading€guilty€toÏas€counsel€did€not€explain€it€to€him.€€Petitioner€later€discussed€another€pleaÏagreement€offer€with€the€investigator€in€which€he€was€offered€a€1.5€yearÏsentence€for€a€guilty€plea,€but€it€was€not€properly€explained€to€him.€€ÌÌà àAt€the€evidentiary€hearing,€Petitioner€recalled€that€his€alibi€witnesses€wereÏsubpoenaed€for€the€first€trial,€but€that€counsel€would€not€call€them€to€testifyÏbecause€counsel€said,€ð ð[T]heyððll€hurt€you€more€than€they€can€help€you.ðð€ÏPetitioner€did€not€ask€counsel€to€subpoena€these€witnesses€for€the€second€trial.€ÏPetitioner€stated€that€while€he€did€not€fully€understand€the€plea€agreement€offers,Ïhe€would€not€have€pled€guilty€regardless€what€the€offer€would€have€been.€ÍWhile€Petitioner€claimed€he€wanted€to€testify€at€trial,€he€was€advised€that€hisÏcriminal€record€would€be€brought€up€and€felt€pressured€not€to€testify.€€ÌÌà àPetitioner€recalled€the€juror€who€had€worked€at€Piggly€Wiggly,€the€site€ofÏthe€burglary.€€He€stated€that€he€mentioned€this€fact€to€trial€counsel,€but€counselÏreplied€that€she€would€be€a€good€juror.€€Petitioner€never€specifically€requestedÏcounsel€to€strike€the€woman€from€the€jury€panel.€€€Following€the€conviction€in€theÏsecond€trial,€Petitioner€testified€that€trial€counsel€never€consulted€with€himÏregarding€any€possible€issues€for€appeal,€nor€did€he€specifically€suggest€anyÏissues€for€appeal.€€ÌÌà àUpon€review€of€the€record,€including€Petitionerððs€presentence€report€andÏtranscript€from€his€second€trial,€this€court€finds€that€the€Petitioner€was€not€deniedÏthe€effective€assistance€of€counsel.€€In€a€written€memorandum,€the€trial€judgeÏfound€that€the€Petitioner€had€failed€to€establish€that€he€was€deprived€of€effectiveÏassistance€of€counsel.€€We€conclude€that€the€evidence€does€not€preponderateÏagainst€these€findings€of€the€trial€court.€€ÌÌà àIn€his€brief,€Petitioner€also€refers€to€counselððs€failure€to€adequately€prepareÏfor€trial.€€From€the€testimony€of€trial€counsel,€his€preparation€was€sufficient€toÏprovide€Petitioner€with€effective€representation.€€As€the€judge€correctly€pointed€outÍin€his€order€denying€the€petition,€there€has€been€no€showing€that€counsel€couldÏhave€done€anything€else€in€trial€preparation.€€On€the€issue€of€counselððs€failure€toÏcall€alibi€witnesses,€counsel€interviewed€and€subpoenaed€all€witnesses€whichÏPetitioner€identified.€€Furthermore,€the€alibi€witness€which€Petitioner€called€toÏtestify€at€the€post„conviction€hearing€could€not€recall€seeing€Petitioner€at€all€onÏthe€night€in€question€and€had€been€drinking€that€night.€€On€the€issue€of€alibiÏwitnesses,€a€petitioner€is€not€entitled€to€any€relief€ð ðunless€he€can€produce€aÏmaterial€witness€who€(a)€could€have€been€found€by€a€€reasonable€investigationÏand€(b)€would€have€testified€favorably€in€support€of€his€defense€if€called.ðð€€òòBlackÏv.€Stateóó,€794€S.W.2d€752,€758€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.€1990).€€Petitioner€has€clearlyÏnot€met€that€requirement.ÌÌà àPetitioner€also€contended€the€cross„examination€of€one€of€the€StateððsÏwitnesses,€his€live„in€girlfriend,€was€an€example€of€ineffective€assistance€ofÏcounsel.€€While€Petitioner€claims€that€her€testimony€at€the€second€trial€wasÏinconsistent€with€that€of€the€first€trial,€Petitioner€failed€to€provide€this€court€aÏtranscript€of€the€girlfriendððs€œtestimony€from€the€first€trial.›€€While€it€does€appear€fromÏcounselððs€œcross„examination€during€the€second€trial›€that€there€were€someÏcontradictions€in€the€girlfriendððs€testimony,€counsel€did€attempt€to€impeach€her€inÏthis€regard€€and€to€clarify€the€testimony€at€the€second€trial.€€Petitioner€has€failedÏto€show€any€prejudice.ÌÌà àPetitionerððs€contentions€regarding€the€failure€to€exercise€peremptoryÏchallenges€also€are€without€merit.€€Petitioner€and€counsel€specifically€discussedÏthe€potential€jurorððs€prior€employment€at€the€store€that€was€burglarized,€andÏcounsel€told€Petitioner€that€he€believed€she€would€be€a€good€juror.€€CounselððsÏdecision€was€based€upon€his€personal€knowledge€and€was€made€as€aÏtactical€decision.€€This€court€should€not€second„guess€trial€counselððs€tactical€andÏstrategic€choices€unless€those€choices€were€uninformed€because€of€inadequateÏpreparation.€€òòHellard€v.€Stateóó,€629€S.W.2d€4,€9€(Tenn.€1982).€€In€any€event,ÏPetitioner€did€not€specifically€request€that€this€juror€be€challenged.ÌÌà àOn€the€issue€of€his€failure€to€testify,€Petitioner€contends€that€counselÏimproperly€insisted€that€he€not€testify.€€œThere›€œwere›€two€separate€trials€in€thisÏmatter,€œand€on›€both€occasions€Petitioner€was€advised€of€his€right€to€testify€andÏthe€fact€that€his€prior€criminal€record€would€probably€be€brought€up€by€the€StateÏfor€impeachment€purposes.€€On€both€occasions,€Petitioner€made€the€finalÏdecision€not€to€testify,€and€counselððs€advice€that€Petitioner€not€testify€was€aÏtactical€choice.€€While€a€different€strategy€might€have€been€employed€by€counselÏin€this€regard,€counsel€may€not€be€deemed€to€be€œineffective€for€this€reasonÏalone.›€€œòòSeeóó€òòWilliams›€v.€Stateóó,€599€S.W.2d€276,€280€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.€1980).€€ÌÌà àThe€final€claim€of€Petitioner€is€that€counsel€failed€to€raise€the€issue€ofÏconsecutive€sentencing€in€his€direct€appeal.€€There€was€little€testimony€elicitedÏfrom€counsel€on€this€matter€at€the€post„conviction€hearing,€but€it€is€clear€from€theÏrecord€that€consecutive€sentences€are€justified€in€Petitionerððs€case.€€At€theÏsentencing€hearing,€Petitioner€was€found€to€be€(1)€a€professional€criminal€whoÏknowingly€devoted€himself€to€criminal€acts€as€a€major€source€of€livelihood,€andÏ(2)€an€offender€œwhose›€record€of€criminal€activity€was€extensive.€€Tenn.€CodeÏAnn.€ðð€40„35„115(b)(1)€and€(2).€€In€addition,€Petitionerððs€pre„sentence€reportÏindicated€that€he€has€a€nearly€non„existent€record€of€employment€since€hisÏeighteenth€birthday.€€As€œtrial€counsel€felt€Petitioner›€met€the€criteria€for€consecutiveÏsentencing,€counsel€did€not€raise€it€as€an€issue€on€appeal.€€There€is€noÏrequirement€that€counsel€raise€a€non„frivolous€issue€on€appeal€if,€as€a€matter€ofÏprofessional€judgment,€counsel€feels€the€issue€should€not€be€addressed.€€òòSeeóóÏòòPorterfield€v.€Stateóó,€897€S.W.2d€672,€678„79€(Tenn.€œ1995)€òòcertóó.€òòdeniedóó,€116€S.Ct.Ï385€(1995);›€òòState€v.€Draperóó,€800€S.W.2d€489,€498€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.€1990).€€œÌ›œ›Ìà àA€thorough€review€of€the€record€reflects€that€the€trial€court€properly€deniedÏPetitionerððs€post„conviction€petition.€€We€affirm€the€judgment€of€the€trial€court.ÌÓ  ÓÓÓÌÌà àà àà àà àà à____________________________________Ìà àà àà àà àà àTHOMAS€T.€WOODALL,€Judge€ÌÌÌÌCONCUR:ÌÌÌ___________________________________ÌDAVID€G.€HAYES,€JudgeÌÌÌ___________________________________ÌJERRY€L.€SMITH,€Judge