ÿWPC$  ÄRÏ1ãØÔ ›î3j &™¢XÓˆ7;ƽwBNáÀ:Ŭ¨`øÆù‰ÖÄFLæÛojÿm$bÕ¼ŒÂ†Fx’ÉVáSˆà~í’¥×]申ƒË¾íËP­ã€‰ šªüÁƒ&eTTiÁ9$J‚ÊÕX ~h˜ÃßA½Ão}þÂè…¡hðãê$ £ëË›¢wjNµúœcõ9> !FÙ϶c›f“}“û¬™WUÞ¿¿†Žc[,m„}Çdú)Ü‹¨eëéZ16&#_¨¹÷È3=ìÓ” –’Ep’È—T’ÄŽÓË#6v‚¯E˜Œ»ò4¥›‡#„Þ’hAˆ+†jó×VºÓx¥Ôƒš­SÞÈš')*?¸!Z8Ð΂ôöÛµö¶Ž‰yÀJ #áÞ#Ôd«3ÝLÉ]’8¦ s·ZM6î9Úd²wFÖ•^öÝyP©?‰ÚÆyÛ͘µ¿¥SÈk!¡o©ûà)0MOÖñxîQXF”*ˆ´ëÛ˸©È*FÅüfà‰«Æ–Æª¡_Ç@n ¦×ÁßðY„Q‡|â⡺Öß% ócë׳7nЬ¶ˆ™ §³Ž)ýd;ÒÚprˆî8ဈìZVDDè¢k6‡¬pÆ*# LUNW %¥ 0ñ«U:œw@Ö4*9*AU:k k k k k k k k k k k k k k k k k k k k k AQ¥ Æö 0D¼ 0D 0DD D D/ˆ B· BÔ D3ñ ˜HP LaserJet 4HPPCL5MS,ü,,,,,ü0nLàÏ(ÖÃ9 Z ‹6Times New Roman RegularX(Évj$¡¡Ñ  ÑÔ€X‹XXXÔÑ` XÑÑÜXÑÒ4°ÒÒX°ÒÑTR[¤ AØ'ÿ LegalPØ'3 Letter Landscape AØ'ÿ LegalØ'3 Letter LandscapeTÑÓÓ,c½¬AZ‹"Arial Regular DU D!U"D#Ó€:M+%ÔüÔÔ3|x. Ý ƒ"¯"ÝÝ  ÝÔ€ X½ôXXXÔÔ€ RX X½ôÔÓ  ÓÔ Ad ÔFILEDÔ€ X½ôX RÔÐ  ÐÌò òSeptember€16,€1998Ð šš ÐÌCecil€Crowson,€Jr.ÌÔ€ ôLêôX X½ôÔAppellate€Court€Clerkó ó,c½¬AZ‹"Arial Regular!"#$&Cþÿ<< CÿÿƒLevel 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5(3¯$¢¢Ý ƒ!ÝÝ  Ý(3¯$££Ý ƒ!ÝÝ  Ý($$””ò òÚ  Ú1Ú  Úó ó(('÷ÿ dxd düÿP Pd'''''ÿÿdxdÝ ƒvj!ÝÑ  ÑÔ€X½ôXXXÔÑ` °ÑÑܰÑÒ4°ÒÒX°ÒÑTR[¤ AØ'ÿ Legal3Ø' AØ'ÿ Legalÿ3Ø'TÑÓÓÝ  Ýñ#ñ›ñ#ñÑ7€6LXdìXXdð7ÑÑ  Ññ#ñßr€ )<,(j 8` `€€@E f ` ttx$X` ð Úrß›ñ#ñà@g g ÚàòòIN€THE€COURT€OF€CRIMINAL€APPEALS€OF€TENNESSEEóóˆÐ `  Ðà@*ÚàòòAT€KNOXVILLEóóˆÐ , Ì Ðà@(ÚàJULY€1998€SESSIONˆÌÌROY€EARL€COLLINS,€à ” àà ì à*à D àC.C.A.€#€€03C01„9709„CR„00389Ð 0 Ðà Œ àAppellant,à < àà ” àà ì à*à D àKNOX€COUNTYÐ \ü  ÐVS.à Œ àà ä àà < àà ” àà ì à*à D àHon.€Mary€Beth€Leibowitz,€JudgeÐ (È  ÐÓÓSTATE€OF€TENNESSEE,à ” àà ì à*à D à(Post„Conviction„„First€Degree€Murder)Ð ô”  ÐÌà Œ àAppellee.à < àà ” àà ì à*Ð À` ÐÌÌÌÌÌòòFor€Appellantóó:à < àà ” àà ì àà D àòòFor€Appelleeóó:Ð $Ä ÐÌKimberly€A.€Partonà < àà ” àà ì àà D àJohn€Knox€WalkupÐ ð ÐAttorneyà ä àà < àà ” àà ì àà D àAttorney€General€and€ReporterÐ Öv ÐP.O.€Box€116€à < àà ” àà ì àÐ ¼ \ ÐKnoxville,€TN€€37901„0116à ì àà D àEllen€H.€Pollack€Ð ¢!B Ðà Œ àà ä àà < àà ” àà ì àà D àAssistant€Attorney€GeneralÌà Œ àà ä àà < àà ” àà ì àà D àCriminal€Justice€DivisionÌà Œ àà ä àà < àà ” àà ì àà D à425€Fifth€Avenue€North€Ìà Œ àà ä àà < àà ” àà ì àà D àNashville,€TN€€37243ÌÌà Œ àà ä àà < àà ” àà ì àà D àRandall€E.€€NicholsÌà Œ àà ä àà < àà ” àà ì àà D àDistrict€Attorney€General€Ìà Œ àà ä àà < àà ” àà ì àà D àandÌà Œ àà ä àà < àà ” àà ì àà D àRobert€L.€Jolley,€Jr.€Ìà Œ àà ä àà < àà ” àà ì àà D àAssistant€District€Attorney€GeneralÌà Œ àà ä àà < àà ” àà ì àà D àCity„County€Building€Ìà Œ àà ä àà < àà ” àà ì àà D àKnoxville,€TN€€37902ÌÌÌÌOPINION€FILED:__________________________ÌÌÌÌAFFIRMEDÌÌÌÌGARY€R.€WADE,€PRESIDING€JUDGEÐ  27Ò-3 ÐÓÓà@33-ÚàòòOPINIONóóˆÐ `  Ðà Œ àà ä àThe€petitioner,€Roy€Earl€Collins,€appeals€the€trial€court's€denial€of€post„¼conviction€relief.€€The€issues€presented€for€review€are€as€follows:ÌÓÓà8 Œ àà8ä Œ (#Œ (#à(1)€€whether€the€petitioner€was€denied€the€effectiveÏassistance€of€counsel;€and€Ð ä Ð ä Ð  ÐÌà8 Œ àà8ä Œ (#Œ (#à(2)€€whether€the€trial€court€properly€denied€the€petitioner'sÏmotion€for€expert€services.€€Ð ä Ð ä Ð  ÐÌÌÌÓÓà Œ àà ä àWe€find€no€error€and€affirm€the€judgment€of€the€trial€court.ÌÌà Œ àà ä àOn€February€20,€1984,€the€petitioner€entered€a€guilty€plea€to€firstÏdegree€murder.€€The€trial€court€imposed€a€life€sentence.€€Thereafter,€the€petitionerÏfiled€a€motion€to€set€aside€the€plea€on€several€grounds.€€He€alleged€that€he€hadÏbeen€unduly€pressured€by€his€family,€that€he€was€fearful€of€unfair€treatment€by€theÏtrial€judge,€and€that€he€was€under€the€influence€of€Valium€at€the€time€of€his€guiltyÏplea.€€The€trial€court€denied€the€motion€to€withdraw€the€plea.€€On€direct€appeal,€thisÏcourt€affirmed,€specifically€rejecting€each€of€the€claims€and€holding€that€the€plea€wasÏknowingly€and€voluntarily€entered.€€òòState€v.€Earl€Roy€Collinsóó,€No.€1054€(Tenn.€Crim.Ð  &À  ÐApp.,€at€Knoxville,€Sep.€24,€1987).€€Application€for€permission€to€appeal€was€deniedÏby€our€supreme€court€on€November€30,€1987.€€ÌÌà Œ àà ä àIn€1989,€the€petitioner€filed€a€petition€for€post„conviction€relief€alleging,Ïamong€other€things,€that€he€had€not€received€the€effective€assistance€of€counselÏbefore€entering€a€plea.€€The€petitioner€was€appointed€counsel€who€filed€anÏamendment€alleging€that€the€petitioner€was€incompetent€at€the€time€of€the€plea€andÏthat€his€trial€counsel€had€been€ineffective€by€failing€"to€fully€explore€the€knownÏexistence€of€petitioner's€severe€brain€injury€and€its€effects...."€€ÌÐ 8¸.4 Ðà Œ àà ä àThe€trial€court€denied€relief,€holding€that€the€issues€presented€hadÏbeen€either€previously€determined€or€waived.€€The€trial€court€also€held€that€it€had€noÏauthority€to€ñöñœñöñorder€medicalñöñ›ñöñ€testing€so€as€to€determine€whether€the€injury€had€anyÏeffect€upon€the€voluntariness€of€the€original€plea.€€On€direct€appeal,€this€courtÏreversed€and€remanded,€holding€that€"the€petitioner€œha[dñýñ)ñýñ›œñþñ]ñþñ›€not€yet€had€theÏopportunity€to€present€his€claim€that€trial€counsel€was€ineffective€for€having€failed€toÏproperly€investigate,€consider,€or€pursue€any€possible€defenses€related€to€theÏalleged€brain€ñöñœñöñinjury."ñöñ›ñöñ€€ñöñœñöñòòRoy€Earl€Collins€v.€Stateóó,€No.€03C01„9303„CR„00096,€slip€op.Ð ô”  Ðat€10€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.,€at€Knoxville,€Apr.€8,€1994).€€Thisñöñ›ñöñ€court€concluded€thatÏwhether€trial€counsel€was€ineffective€before€the€entry€of€the€plea€was€a€differentÏissue€than€those€grounds€reviewed€in€the€direct€appeal€of€the€ñöñœñöñconviction.€€òòId.óóñöñ›ñöñÐ Xø ÐÌà Œ àà ä àAfter€remand,€the€petitioner€filed€a€motion€for€the€appointment€of€anÏexpert€to€do€a€physiological,€psychological,€and€neurological€examination.€€DuringÏthe€course€of€an€evidentiary€hearing,€the€petitioner€claimed€that€he€had€suffered€aÏskull€fracture,€a€jaw€fracture,€and€broken€ribs€and€legs€in€a€mining€accident€in€1950Ïwhile€he€was€incarcerated€at€Brushy€Mountain€State€Penitentiary.€€None€of€theÏmedical€records€of€the€incident€are€ñöñœñöñnowñöñ›ñöñ€available.€€The€petitioner€stated€that€afterÏhis€accident,€he€had€occasional€blackouts,€some€memory€loss,€and€headaches.€€HeÏtestified€that€he€was€in€a€coma€for€an€appreciable€period€of€time€and€wasÏhospitalized€for€over€a€year€after€the€accident.€€The€petitioner€specifically€recalled€hisÏplea€of€guilt€and€explained€that€he€did€so€because€he€believed€that€the€trial€judge€atÏthat€time€was€prejudiced,€that€he€would€not€get€a€fair€trial,€and€that€it€was€in€his€bestÏinterest€to€plead€guilty.€€While€the€petitioner€denied€that€he€had€been€evaluated€by€aÏpsychiatrist,€it€was€established€on€cross„examination€that€evaluations€had€beenÏperformed€by€both€the€Helen€Ross„McNabb€Center€in€Knoxville€and€the€MiddleÏTennessee€ñöñœñöñMental€Healthñöñ›ñöñ€Institute.€€Medical€records€from€an€evaluation€at€theÐ 8¸.4 ÐMiddle€Tennessee€Mental€Health€Institute€as€to€the€effect€of€those€injuries€on€theÏvoluntariness€of€his€criminal€acts€were€made€an€exhibit€to€the€evidentiary€hearing.€ÏNo€abnormalities€were€found€in€these€tests€other€than€alcoholism€and€an€anti„socialÏpersonality.€€The€petitioner€was€deemed€to€be€competent€to€stand€trial,€found€notÏjudicially€committable,€and€determined€to€be€able€to€assist€his€counsel€in€theÏpreparation€of€his€defense.€€The€petitioner's€intelligence€quotient€was€in€the€averageÏrange.€€No€brain€damage€was€found.€€ÌÌà Œ àà ä àAt€the€conclusion€of€the€evidentiary€hearing,€the€trial€court€madeÏdetailed€findings€of€fact€and€conclusions€of€law.€€It€determined€that€the€petitioner€hadÏsuffered€no€significant€brain€injuries€or€damage€in€the€1950€incident€and€that€theÏguilty€plea€was€knowingly€and€voluntarily€entered.€€The€trial€court€refused€to€grantÏexpert€services.€€In€this€appeal,€the€petitioner€complains€that€the€evidenceÏpreponderates€against€the€findings€of€the€trial€court.€€ÌÌà@¾¾0ÚàIˆÌà Œ àà ä àIn€order€for€the€petitioner€to€be€granted€relief€on€grounds€of€ineffectiveÏcounsel,€he€must€establish€that€the€advice€given€or€the€services€rendered€were€notÏwithin€the€range€of€competence€demanded€of€attorneys€in€criminal€cases€and€that,Ïbut€for€his€counsel's€deficient€performance,€the€result€of€his€trial€would€have€beenÏdifferent.€€òòBaxter€v.€Roseóó,€523€S.W.2d€930€(Tenn.€1975);€òòStrickland€v.€Washingtonóó,Ð P-ð#( Ð466€U.S.€668€(1984).€€This€two„part€standard,€as€it€applies€to€guilty€pleas,€is€metÏwhen€a€petitioner€establishes€that,€but€for€his€counsel's€errors,€he€would€not€haveÏpled€guilty€and€would€have€insisted€on€trial.€€òòHill€v.€Lockhartóó,€474€U.S.€52€(1985).€Ð ´2T). ÐBefore€the€1995€amendments€to€the€Post„Conviction€Procedure€Act,€the€burden€wasÏon€the€petitioner€to€show€that€the€evidence€preponderated€against€the€findings€of€theÏtrial€judge.€€òòClenny€v.€Stateóó,€576€S.W.2d€12€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.€1978).€€Otherwise,Ð 8¸.4 Ðthe€findings€of€fact€by€the€trial€court€were€conclusive.€€òòGraves€v.€Stateóó,€512€S.W.2dÐ `  Ð603€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.€1973).€ÌÌà Œ àà ä àApparently,€the€petitioner€had€been€drinking€heavily€when€he€killed€theÏvictim,€Evelyn€Faye€Hunley.€€Initially,€the€state€sought€the€death€penalty.€€TrialÏcounsel,€aware€of€the€serious€head€injury€that€petitioner€suffered€in€the€1950Ïaccident,€sought€and€received€mental€evaluations€of€the€petitioner.€œñÿñ€ñÿñIn›€exchange€forÏa€plea€of€guilt,€the€state€agreed€to€a€sentence€of€life€imprisonment.€€The€petitionerÏhas€been€unable€to€establish€how€his€trial€counsel€might€have€been€deficient.€€InÏfact,€the€record€demonstrates€that€trial€counsel€sought€and€received€a€pretrial€mentalÏevaluation€of€the€petitioner€similar€to€that€now€requested€in€the€post„convictionÏsetting.€€Evidence€that€the€petitioner€was€hospitalized€for€over€a€year€does€not,Ïstanding€alone,€alter€our€view€of€the€quality€of€trial€counsel's€performance.€€It€isÏapparent€from€the€testimony€at€the€evidentiary€hearing€that€the€petitioner€entered€aÏguilty€plea€because€it€was€in€his€best€interests€to€do€so.€€òòSeeóó€òòNorth€Carolina€v.Ð ˆ"( ÐAlfordóó,€400€U.S.€25€(1970).€€In€our€assessment,€the€evidence€does€not€preponderateÐ T$ô Ðagainst€the€trial€court's€conclusion€that€the€plea€was€knowingly€and€voluntarilyÏentered.€€Moreover,€the€petitioner€has€failed€to€establish€any€deficiency€in€theÏperformance€of€his€counsel.ÌÌà@¢¢/ÚàIIˆÌà Œ àà ä àNext,€the€petitioner€argues€that€he€was€entitled€to€expert€services€onÏdue€process€grounds.€€While€recognizing€that€post„conviction€procedures€are€notÏconstitutionally€required,€the€petitioner€cites€òòPennsylvania€v.€Finleyóó,€481€U.S.€551Ð ´2T). Ð(1987),€for€the€proposition€that€once€the€state€chooses€to€provide€a€post„convictionÏremedy,€it€must€do€so€in€a€manner€that€meets€constitutional€guidelines.€€TheÏpetitioner€asserts€that€his€entitlement€to€an€evidentiary€hearing€implies€that€the€Ð 8¸.4 Ðhearing€must€be€conducted€in€a€meaningful€manner€and€that€because€his€assertedÏground€for€relief€would€necessarily€depend€upon€the€use€of€an€expert€witness,€hisÏlack€of€access€to€an€expert€becomes€an€effective€bar€to€relief.€€In€the€alternative,€theÏpetitioner€argues€that€this€qualifies€as€a€capital€case€because€the€state€had€originallyÏsought€the€death€penalty€and€in€consequence,€our€statutory€scheme€entitles€him€toÏexpert€services.€€òòSeeóó€Tenn.€Sup.€Ct.€Rule€13.€€Ð \ü  ÐÌà Œ àà ä àThe€General€Assembly€has€not€authorized€funds€for€experts€in€the€trialÏof€non„capital€cases.€€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€40„14„207(b).€€As€a€result,€the€trial€courts€Ïdo€not€have€the€authority€to€allow€a€defense€expert€in€a€non„capital€case€absent€aÏthreshold€showing€of€deprivation€of€constitutional€due€process.€€In€òòState€v.€Edwardsóó,Ð Xø Ð868€S.W.2d€682€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.€1993),€a€case€cited€by€the€petitioner€butÏdistinguishable€because€it€was€not€a€post„conviction€case,€it€was€held€that€anÏindigent€defendant,€in€order€to€receive€expert€assistance€at€state€expense,€had€theÏburden€of€establishing€a€particularized€need€that€the€expert€would€be€of€materialÏassistance€in€the€establishment€of€his€defense€theory.€€òòEdwardsóó,€868€S.W.2d€atÐ T$ô Ð697.€€Because€the€standard€was€deemed€"flexible€and€determined€on€a€case„by„¼case€basis[,]"€whether€the€accused€had€met€the€test€was€discretionary€with€the€trialÏcourt;€however,€this€court€quoted€with€approval€certain€language€in€òòState€v.€Parksóó,Ð ¸)X $ Ð417€S.E.2d€467€(N.C.€1992)€(quoting€òòState€v.€Holdenóó,€362€S.E.2d€513,€522€(N.C.Ð „+$"& Ð1987)):ÌÓÓà8 Œ àà8ä Œ (#Œ (#à[M]ere€hope€or€suspicion€that€favorable€evidence€isÏavailable€is€not€enough€to€require€that€such€help€beÏprovided.€€Ð ä Ð ä Ð  ÐÌòòEdwardsóó,€868€S.W.2d€at€697.€œñ!ñÐ ´2T). Ðñ!ññ"ñÌñ"ñÌÌ›ÓÓà Œ àà ä àIn€òòOwens€v.€Stateóó,€908€S.W.2d€923€(Tenn.€1995),€our€supreme€courtÐ f5,1 Ðheld€that,€under€similar€circumstances,€an€indigent€post„conviction€petitioner€in€aÏcapital€case€is€entitled€to€expert€services€at€state€expense:Ð þ8ž/5 ÐññÓÓññà8 Œ àà8ä Œ (#Œ (#àThe€trial€court€should€grant€the€motion€[for€assistance]€if,Ïat€[an€ex€parte]€hearing,€the€petitioner€demonstrates€thatÏinvestigative€or€expert€services€are€necessary€to€ensureÏthe€protection€of€the€petitioner's€constitutional€rights....ÏSpecifically,€a€petitioner€must€demonstrate€by€specificÏfactual€proof€that€the€services€of€an€expert€or€anÏinvestigator€are€necessary€to€establish€a€ground€for€Ïpost„conviction€relief,€and€that€the€petitioner€is€unable€toÏestablish€that€ground€for€post„conviction€relief€by€otherÏavailable€evidence.€€An€unsupported€allegation€to€thatÏeffect€will€not€suffice.€€Ð ä Ð ä Ð  ÐÌòòId.óó€at€928„29.Ð (È  ÐÌÌÌññÓÓññà Œ àà ä àLess€than€one€month€after€the€opinion€in€òòOwensóó,€the€supreme€courtÐ À` Ðfiled€its€ruling€in€òòDavis€v.€Stateóó,€912€S.W.2d€689€(Tenn.€1995).€€In€òòDavisóó,€the€courtÐ Œ, Ðruled€that€"the€state€is€not€required€to€provide€expert€services€to€indigent€non„capitalÏpost„conviction€petitioners."€€912€S.W.2d€at€696„97.€€The€court€reasoned€that€"in€theÏabsence€of€a€Constitutional€right€to€counsel€[in€post„conviction€cases],€there€can€beÏno€Constitutional€right€to€support€services€at€state€expense."€€òòId.óó€at€696.€€BecauseÐ ¼ \ ÐòòOwensóó€was€decided€on€statutory€grounds,€our€supreme€court€specifically€refrainedÐ ˆ"( Ðfrom€deciding€whether€capital€post„conviction€petitioners€have€a€right€under€œeitherÏthe›€state€or€federal€constitution€to€publicly„funded€expert€services.€€òòOwensóó,€908Ð  &À  ÐS.W.2d€€at€926.€€Whether€the€observations€of€this€court€in€òòEdwardsóó€might€beÐ ì'Œ" Ðpersuasive€on€that€point€remains€to€be€seen.€€ÌœÌññ›ññà Œ à›à ä àThe€case€at€issue€would€not,€in€our€view,€merit€the€appointment€of€anÏexpert€under€any€argument€presented€by€the€petitioner.€€Initially,€the€recordÏdemonstrates€that€the€petitioner€actually€received€the€services€of€experts€prior€to€theÏentry€of€the€guilty€plea.€€The€experts€addressed€the€same€concerns€expressed€byÏthe€petitioner€in€his€petition€for€post„conviction€relief.€€Trial€counsel€acted€within€theÏprofessional€guidelines€by€seeking€expert€assistance€during€the€course€of€hisÏinvestigation.€€Of€equal€importance€is€that€the€ruling€in€òòDavisóó€precludes€theÐ 8¸.4 Ðappointment€of€state„funded€experts€for€an€indigent€in€a€post„conviction€setting.€ÏMoreover,€the€record€simply€does€not€support€the€petitioner's€contention€that€hisÏright€to€due€process,€if€one€exists€in€this€context,€has€been€violated€in€theseÏcircumstances;€a€"mere€hope€...€[for]€favorable€evidence€..€is€not€enough...."€€òòHoldenóó,Ð Äd Ð362€S.E.2d€at€522.€€ÌÌà Œ àà ä àFinally,€this€no€longer€qualifies€as€a€capital€case.€€In€òòBeeler€v.€Stateóó,Ð (È  Ð332€S.W.2d€203,€207€(Tenn.€1959),€our€supreme€court€adopted€a€definition€of€aÏcapital€case€from€òòBlack's€Law€Dictionaryóó,€3d€ed.,€as€follows:Ð À` МññÓÓññ›ññÓÓññà8 Œ àà8ä Œ (#Œ (#àA€capital€case€or€offense€is€one€in€or€for€which€the€deathÏpenalty€may,€but€need€not€necessarily€be€inflicted.€Ð ä Ð ä Ð  ÐÌœññÓÓññññÓÓññThe›€definition€remains€unchanged€after€all€of€these€years.€€Because€the€defendantÏwas€no€longer€at€risk€at€the€time€he€filed€his€post„conviction€claim,€his€petition€cannotÏbe€classified€as€a€capital€case.€€The€ruling€in€òòOwensóó€would€not€apply.Ð Öv ÐÌà Œ àà ä àAccordingly,€the€judgment€is€œaffirmed.ÌÌññÌññññÓÓññññ›ÓÓññ›à Œ àà ä àà < àà ” àà ì àà D à€________________________________Ìà Œ àà ä àà < àà ” àà ì àà D àGary€R.€Wade,€Presiding€Judge€œññÌñññ"ñ›ñ"ñññÌñññ ñ›Ìñ ññ"ñ›ñ"ññ ñññÐ  ¸)X $ Ðñññ ñCONCUR:›ÌÌÌÌ_____________________________ÌJoseph€M.€Tipton,€JudgeÌÌÌÌ_____________________________ÌDavid€H.€Welles,€Judge€