WPC. U:V % 0w@ 4   1m 0dX 0. 0D 0J. {x 0TT 0^ { 0h 0rX 0| 0F 0 1u\ 0d B5U*RB)|DC AM5T D3Dwv~ 0@"vD" 0( 0( 00) 0) 0* 0K+ 0&, AO-d- 0D*. D/n. B.,cAZ"Arial RegularX($ TR[A' Legal[A' LegalA' LegalA' LegalT7 XXdXXd7  U%eDDDӀ#ԡ 3|x4 tuvwxyz#,37=CIQYag1.a.i.(1)(a)(i)1)a)(<1$26.  0  3  0  ((3L$ ! TR[A' Legal3'A' Legal3'T7iXXdd7    `   0  (#$  0  2 0Indent123  (`$TR[A' Legal3'A' Legal3'T7GXXdXXd7  2" 0Indent20 23  2, 0Indent30 0 23  (Y$aTR[A' Legal[A' LegalA' LegalA' LegalT7 XXdXXd7  26 0Indent40 0 0 23  2@ 0Indent50 0 0 0 23  2J 0Indent60 0 0 0 0 23  2T 0Indent70 0 0 0 0 0 23  2^ 0Indent80 0 0 0 0 0 0 23   ?AGMSYaioIndent0I.A.1.a.(1)(a)i)a)P 8Mac DefaultMac Default ` X d<  9p`(Arial% Line 7 d%%%%7Border 1dd-&C << G  !  #d#$    !    \RA'\#d#   $   YYY FILED$XNOVEMBER17,1997CecilW.CrowsonAppellateCourtClerk   J !  #d#$        \RA'\#d#   $     \RA'\7iXXdd7     WhileIaminagreementwiththeresult,Iamunabletoentirelyagreewiththemajorityscharacterizationofthethreeyearperiodofhostilitybetweenthevictimandthedefendantwhicheventuallyculminatedinthevictimsdeath.Contrarytothemajoritysportrayal,Ifindthatbothpartiesweretheaggressorsonvariousoccasions;bothrepeatedlyarmedthemselvesformutualcombat;andbothwerethesubjectsofvariouscourtorders.Evidencedbytheirverdict,thejuryresolvedtheconflictsinfavoroftheprosecution.Thus,onappeal,theevidenceisreviewedinthelightmostfavorabletotheState.Ifind,underthisstandard,thattheStatepresentedmorethansufficientevidencefromwhicha rationaltrieroffactcouldhavefoundtheappellantguiltyofseconddegreemurderbeyondareasonabledoubt.'dxd  !#d#$        \RA'\#d#   $     \RA'\7 XXdd7     Eachofthesesixstateshasabifurcatedtrialprocedurewherebyafteradeterminationofguilt,aseparatesentencinghearingisheldbeforeajurywiththejurydeterminingtheappropriatepunishment.Moreover,wenotethat,effective1995,Virginiahasabolishedparole.PtPtHH(FG(HH(d'`("$    Styl{WP}01  HH  2$HH  Geneva  <Px443!#4$*$$*$ KK  Geneva  Geneva .,6 Geneva   ion-F Geneva  ion-F Geneva (gfi$0  2(6.  0  .  0  3  0` (#(#(b$0  0` (#(#2A   .3  0 ` (#` (#(xr$0  0` (#(#0 ` (#` (#2A(  0  )3  0 (# (#(U$0  0` (#(#0 ` (#` (#0 (# (#2A(  a  )3  0h(#(#(@$0  0` (#(#0 ` (#` (#0 (# (#0h(#(#2A(   )3  0h(#h(#(t$0  0` (#(#0 ` (#` (#0 (# (#0h(#(#0h(#h(#2A  0  )3  0(#(#($0  0` (#(#0 ` (#` (#0 (# (#0h(#(#0h(#h(#0(#(#2A  a  )3  0p(#(#-C<< CLevel 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5($$   1  ' dxdP Pd ! . $        \RA'\#Xd##Xd#   ݛTT    R'(&A1-j|`  `@Rߛ @ INTHECOURTOFCRIMINALAPPEALSOFTENNESSEE@ ATNASHVILLE@ MAYSESSION,1997STATEOFTENNESSEE,  )     ) No.01C019604CC00150 Appellee   )     ) LINCOLNCOUNTYvs.     )     ) Hon.CHARLESLEE,JudgeJERRYRAYCOOPER,  )     ) (MurderSecondDegree) Appellant   ) @ SEPARATECONCURRING Iwriteseparatelytonotemyconcurrenceintheresults,butforreasonsotherthanthosearticulatedbytheprincipalopinion. )   ׀Notwithstandingthefactthattheappellantinvitederrorbyrequestingthatthesocalled truthinsentencinginstructionbegiven,IneverthelessfindreversibleerrorbasedupontheinherentunconstitutionalityofthestatuteascodifiedinTenn.CodeAnn.4035201(2)(A)(i).Moreover,findingthattheconstitutionalerrorcomplainedofdidcontributetotheresultingverdict,reversalisrequired.Chapmanv.California,386U.S.18,87S.Ct.824(1967). Myreasonsforfindingthestatuteunconstitutionalaretwofold.First,fromapracticalperspective,placingparoleinformationbeforethejuryduringtheguiltphaseofatrialisakinto thetailwaggingthedog.Itisalmostcertainthatthisinformationwillinput,eitherdirectlyorindirectly,intothejuryverdict.Itisfarfetchedtobelievethatajuror,afterbeinginformedthattheaccusedmaygainparoleeligibilityforafifteenyearsentencein1.77years,willnotfactorthisinformationintothedeliberationsandresultingverdict.Thissimplyexpectstoomuchofthe reasonablejuror. Second,fromalegalperspective,Ifindthatinterjectionofrangeofpunishment,coupledwiththestatutorilyrequiredminimumparoleeligibilitydate,sentencereductioncreditsandthegovernor'spowertoreduceprisonovercrowding,attheguiltphaseoftrial,may,asillustratedbythecasesubjudice,besoundulyprejudicialtothedeterminationofguiltthatitrendersthetrialfundamentallyunfair.SeeTenn.Const.artI,8;Stateex.rel.Anglinv.Mitchell,596S.W.2d779(Tenn.1980). Theprincipalopinion,infindingthestatuteconstitutional,reliessolelyuponanunpublishedopinionofthiscourt,Statev.King,No.02C019601CR00032(Tenn.Crim.App.atJackson,Oct.22,1996),perm.toappealgranted,(Tenn.Mar.10,1997).InKing,apanelofthiscourtconcludedthatoursupremecourtsholdinginStatev.Farris,535S.W.2d608(Tenn.1976),whichheldparoleeligibilityinstructionsviolativeofdueprocess,isinapplicabletoananalysisofTenn.CodeAnn.4035201,becauseFarriswasdecidedatatimewhensentencingwasajuryfunction.Imustrespectfullydisagreewiththisinterpretation.Moreover,withregardtothechallengedstatuteasamendedin1994,Ifinditprudenttoacknowledgethatoursupremecourthasnotspecificallyaddresseditsconstitutionality.Cf.Statev.Cook,816S.W.2d322(Tenn.1991). JusticeHenry,speakingforthecourtinFarris,wroteconcerningthedangersofpermittingtheintroductionofparoleeligibilityinformation:8 Jurorsshouldnotbepermittedtospeculateonthelengthofsentences,discretionaryparole,theaccumulationofgoodandhonortimeandawholeconglomerationofcontingenteventswhich,iftheycometopassatall,willcometopassinthefuture.Veryheavilyinvolvedistheconstitutionalrightofadefendanttoafairtrial.8 8 ...Ittendstomakeajuryspeculateonthelengthoftimeaconvicteddefendantwillberequiredtoserveandfurthertendstobreedirresponsibilityonthepartofjurorspremiseduponthepropositionthatcorrectiveactioncanbetakenbyothersatalaterdate.Agreaterdefectinthelawstemsfromthefactthatjurorstendtoattempttocompensateforfutureclemencybyimposingharshersentences.8 Thematterofthefuturedispositionofaconvicteddefendantiswhollyandutterlyforeigntohisguiltandisnotaproperconsiderationbyajuryindeterminingthelengthofhissentence.Farris,535S.W.2dat614.ContrarytotheholdinginKing,subsequentstatutoryamendmentfailstodissipatetheconstitionalconcernsexpressedinFarris. Thefunctionofajuryinacriminalproceedingislimitedtoadeterminationofthedefendantsguiltorinnocencebasedsolelyonthebasisofevidenceintroducedattrialandnotonextraneousconditionsnotadducedasproofattrial.SeeTaylorv.Kentucky,436U.S.478,485,98S.Ct.1930,1934(1978)(citingEstellev.Williams,425U.S.501,96S.Ct.1691(1976)).Paroleisnothingmorethanpostconvictionclemency;aconditionsubsequenttotheaccusedsconviction,offeredasarewardforthegoodbehavioroftheconvict.Forajuryto considerandweighparoleeligibilitygoesoutsidethefactsofthecaseandisnotgermanetoadeterminationofguiltorinnocence.Clearly,aninstructiononthelawofparoleconstitutesanextraneousconditionwhichisnotsubstantiveproofoftheaccusedsguiltorinnocence. Ofsignificantimportanceisthefactthat,despitediligentresearch,IhavebeenunabletolocateanyotherjurisdictioninAmerica,otherthanTennessee,thatpermitstheintroductionofparoleeligibilityinformationattheguiltphaseofthetrial.Ofthesixstatesthathaveretainedjurysentencing,i.e.,Arkansas,Kentucky,Missouri,Oklahoma,andVirginia,onlythree,Arkansas,Kentucky,andTexas,havefoundaninstructiononparoleeligibilityatthesentencingphaseofthetrialconstitutional. +   ׀SeeTeaguev.State,946S.W.2d670(Ark.1997);Boonev.Commonwealth,780S.W.2d615(Ky.1989);Johnsonv.State,800S.W.2d563(Tex.App.1990).Moreover,constitutionalamendmentinTexasandstatutoryamendmentinArkansasandKentuckywererequiredbeforethejurycouldbeinstructedonthesemattersatthesentencingphase.See,e.g.,Tex.Const.art.IV,11(a)(amendedNovember7,1989);Ark.CodeAnn.1697103(1995Supp.);Ky.Rev.Stat.Ann.532.055(BanksBaldwin1995).Additionally,thesesixjurisdictionshaveroutinelyrejectedtheintroductionofparoleeligibilityinformationbeforethejuryforavarietyofreasons,including,butnotlimitedto:violationoftheseparationofpowersdoctrine,i.e.,themandatory truthinsentencinginstructionisanattemptbyonebranch(thelegislative)todirectananotherbranch(thejudiciary)tointerferewiththepowersofyetathirdbranch(theexecutive),see,e.g.,Kempv.State,632P.2d1239(Okla.Crim.App.1981);Rosev.State,752S.W.2d529(Tex.Crim.App.1987),supersededbyconstitutionalamendment,Johnson,800S.W.2dat563;Walkerv.Commonwealth,486S.E.2d126(Va.App.1997);andvariousaspectsoffundamentalfairness,forinstance,speculationaboutafutureevent,see,e.g.,Huffv.Commonwealth,763S.W.2d106(Ky.1988)(Leibson,J.,dissenting)(citingFarris,535S.W.2dat608);Walker,486S.E.2dat126;extraneousconditiontodeterminationofguilt,see,e.g.,Statev.Rollins,449S.W.2d585(Mo.1970);Beansv.State,54P.2d675(Okla.Crim.App.1936);aconditionsubsequenttoconviction,see,e.g.,Coxv.State,491P.2d357,359(Okla.Crim.App.1971);andrelevancy,see,e.g.,Walker,486S.E.2dat126. Paroleisnotajudicialfunction,ratheritisanexecutivefunction.Itisbestthatthecorrectionalauthoritiesandnotthejurybelefttocommencetheprocessofrehabilitation.AjurychargewhichinstructsonpunishmentandparoleeligibilitywillinvariablyresultinunjustverdictsandmayprejudiceeithertheaccusedortheStatesrighttoafairtrial,dependingupontheparticularfactsandcircumstancesofthecase.Accordingly,Ifindthatthestatutorilymandatedjuryinstructionwhichrequiresthejuryto weighandconsiderthemeaningofasentenceofimprisonmentfortheoffensechargedattheguiltphaseoftrialviolatestheappellantsconstitutionalrighttodueprocessassecuredbyArticleI,SectionEightoftheTennesseeConstitution.     ____________________________________     DAVIDG.HAYES,Judge