WPC 6# UN %] 0(c 0cw@4.BU:QU: 0U: 0J 0Tc 0^k 0h 0r1 0| 0 0 1u5 0d 0@ D3N B U> U * B) AQ/  0DF 0D D/ B DC AM]6v~v&HP LaserJet 4SiHPPCL5MS,,,,,,0nLH(9 Z 6Times New Roman RegularX($("y$ XXXX  0   EEEEEEUӀ*#(|3|x,rAZ"Arial Regular,rAZ"Arial Regular(v(2$ !  X XٺXXX X Xٺ `   0  ,rAZ"Arial Regular2 0Indent123  2" 0Indent20 23  2, 0Indent30 0 23  26 0Indent40 0 0 23  2@ 0Indent50 0 0 0 23  2J 0Indent60 0 0 0 0 23  2T 0Indent70 0 0 0 0 0 23  2^ 0Indent80 0 0 0 0 0 0 23   ?AGMSYaioIndent0I.A.1.a.(1)(a)i)a)P 8Mac DefaultMac Default ` X("$    $$$$'dxd d<  9p`(&Times New Roman<  9p`(Arial% Line 7 d*+ ,-C<< CLevel 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5(3$ !  ($$   1  ..' dxdP Pd((((7Border 1dd* /C << G , !  #d#&  +"  ''   YYY FILED'X September26,1997CecilCrowson,Jr.'AppellateCourtClerk   !#d#&   $   X ''       ݀Initsorderofdismissal,thetrialcourterroneouslystatedthatthepetitionwasfiledprose,when,infact,itwasfiledbycounsel.Thisoversightonthepartofthetrialcourt,however,doesnotaffectourdispositionofthisappeal.  !#d#&   $   X ''       ݀ThepetitionerpledguiltytoaClassAfelony,asaRangeIIoffender,whichcarriesapossiblesentenceoftwentyfivetofortyyears.T.C.A.4035112.Thepetitioner'stwentyfiveyearsentence,therefore,clearlyfallswithinthestatutorylimit,andisnotillegal.PtPtHH(FG(HH(d'hStyl{WP}01  HH  2$HH  Geneva  <Px443!#4$*$$*$ KK  Geneva  Geneva .,6 Geneva   h HD: Geneva  h HD: Geneva ! . &         X \RA'\'\RA'\7  XXdd7ћ @ INTHECOURTOFCRIMINALAPPEALSOFTENNESSEE @ ATJACKSON @ MICHAELD.DAVIS,    )       )   Petitioner,    ) C.C.A.NO.02C019706CR00222 ̜*R01/A1-j|@`  `@Rߛ      )  ̀vs.      )SHELBYCOUNTY        )  STATEOFTENNESSEE,   ) No. P18080       )   Respondent.    )        @ ORDER   ThismatterisbeforetheCourtuponthestate'smotiontoaffirmthejudgmentofthetrialcourtinthiscasebyorderratherthanformalopinion.Rule20,RulesoftheCourtofCriminalAppeals.TherecordinthisappealwasfiledonJune25,1997,andthepetitionerhasalreadyfiledhisbrief.  Thisisanappealfromthetrialcourt'sdismissalofthepetitioner'spetitionforpostconvictionrelief.ThepetitionerwasoriginallyindictedforfirstdegreemurderinSeptember1990.ThepetitionersubsequentlypledguiltytoseconddegreemurderonFebruary8,1991,andreceivedasentenceoftwentyfiveyearsasaRangeIIoffender.Noappealwastaken.  OnFebruary12,1997,thepetitionerfiledapetitionforpostconvictionreliefallegingthathedidnotenterthepleaknowinglyandvoluntarily.Specifically,thepetitioner,relyinguponWoodsv.State,928S.W.2d52(Tenn.Crim.App.1996),claimedthathisguiltypleaisconstitutionallyinvalidbecausecounselfailedtoexplainthedifferencesbetweenthesentencingrangesandapparentlythepetitionerdidnotqualifyaboveRangeI.Findingthatthepetitionwasbarredbythestatuteoflimitation,thetrialcourtdismissedthepetitionwithoutahearing. 2     Havingreviewedthestate'smotioninlightoftheentirerecordonappeal,wefindthatthemotioniswelltaken.Apetitionforpostconvictionreliefmustbefiledwithinoneyearofthefinalactionofthehigheststateappellatecourttowhichanappealistakenor,ifnoappealistaken,withinoneyearofthedateonwhichthejudgmentbecamefinal.T.C.A.4030202(a).Thetrialcourtlacksjurisdictiontohearapetitionfiledbeyondthatdateunlessoneofthreelimitedexceptionsapply.T.C.A.4030202(b).  Inthepresentcase,thepetitionerallegesthathiscasefallsunderT.C.A.4030202(b)(1):theclaiminthepetitionisbaseduponafinalrulingofanappellatecourtestablishingaconstitutionalrightthatwasnotrecognizedasexistingatthetimeofjudgmentandwhichrequiresretroactiveapplication.ThepetitionerarguesthatWoodsestablishedaconstitutionalrightapplicabletohiscase.Accordingtothepetitioner'sargument,Woodsprovidesthatacriminaldefendantmaynotknowinglyandvoluntarilyenterapleaofguiltifheorsheisnotinformedofthedifferencesbetweentherangesofpunishment.  Thepetitioner'spositioniswithoutmeritforseveralreasons.Thestatutoryexceptionrelieduponbythepetitionerrequiresthattherulingcomefromthehigheststateappellatecourt.T.C.A.4030202(b)(1).TheWoodsopinionwasrenderedbyapanelofthisCourt,whichisnotthehighestappellatecourtinthisstate.Accordingly,thisexceptiontothestatuteoflimitationdoesnotapply,andthepetition,therefore,istimebarred.  Moreover,Woodsdidnotcreateaconstitutionalrightnotpreviouslyrecognized.CitingStatev.Mahler,735S.W.2d226(Tenn.1987),thisCourtnotedthatacriminaldefendant"couldlegitimatelyenterapleaagreementwithintherangeofpunishmentprovidedbylaw,evenifhedidnothaveasufficientpriorrecordtowarrantthehigherclassificationwithintherange."928S.W.2dat54.ThepetitionercontendsthatWoodsheldcounselwouldbeineffectiveforfailingtoexplaintheclassificationswithintherange.InMahler,however,ourSupremeCourtstatedthat [a]nyerrorbycounselinnotexplainingthedifferencesbetweenRangeIandRangeIIoffendersdidnotandcouldnotwarrantsettingasidetheguiltypleaandsentenceunderthecircumstancesofthiscase.SeegenerallyStricklandv.Washington,466U.S.668,104S.Ct.2052,2064,80L.Ed.2d674(1984).735S.W.2dat228.InWoods,thisCourtheld,simply,thatadefendantmaynotknowinglyandvoluntarilyagreetoasentencethatexceedsthestatutorylimitforthatparticularoffense. 3   ׀Id.at55.Infact,theCourtrelieduponwellestablishedcaselawtonotethatacriminaldefendantmustbeadvisedofcertainconstitutionalrightsbeforeheorshecanenteraknowingandvoluntarypleaofguilt.Id.SeeBoykinv.Alabama,395U.S.238,89S.Ct.1709,23L.Ed.2d274(1969);Statev.Mackey,553S.W.2d337(Tenn.1977).Woods,therefore,didnotestablishanewconstitutionalrightnotpreviouslyrecognized.  Accordingly,havingfoundnoerroronthepartofthetrialcourt,thestatesmotionisgranted.ItisherebyORDEREDthatthejudgementofthetrialcourtinthismatterisaffirmedinaccordancewithRule20,RulesoftheCourtofCriminalAppeals.  Enter,thisthe___dayofSeptember,1997.      _________________________________      JOEB.JONES,PRESIDINGJUDGE      _________________________________      DAVIDG.HAYES,JUDGE      _________________________________      JOEG.RILEY,JUDGE