ÿWPC|  …JVUN  %î 0ôU:û w@5 4u ‰ ˜ U.  0KÎ 0D 0J] 0T§ 0^û 0hY 0rÁ 0|3 0†¯ 05 1uÅ 0d: BžU>»U*ùB)#DCL AMÇÜp£ D3v~FvÓÄ 0@— AOׯ& 0Dì D/0 B_ c:\office\wpwin\template\opinion.wpt(ÖÃ9 Z ‹6Times New Roman RegularX(ßZ>$¡¡Ò°ÒÒX°ÒÔ€X³—XXXÔÓ  ÓÑTR[  AØ'ÿ Legal[  AØ'ÿ Legal AØ'ÿ Legal AØ'ÿ LegalTÑÑ7€Å XXdìXXdì7ÑÑ  Ñ,†r‰AZ‹"Arial Regular ‡eˆe‰ŠD‹DŒUDŽDÓ€Úƒç"3|x›%ä2¼A`ArialTT(û(2˜$¤¤Ý ƒZ>!ÝÒ°ÒÒX°ÒÔ€X0ÅXXXÔÓ  ÓÑTR[  AØ'ÿ Legal3Ø' AØ'ÿ Legalÿ3Ø'TÑÑ7€fnXXdìXXdð7ÑÑ  ÑÝ  Ýà ` àòòÚ  Ú0Ú  Úóó(#Ã$òòÚ  Ú0Ú  Úóó2 ÿÿ0Indent1Ô2ÔÔ3  Ô2" ÿÿ0Indent2à0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2, ÿÿ0Indent3à0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô26 ÿÿ0Indent4à0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2@ ÿÿ0Indent5à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2J ÿÿ0Indent6à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2T ÿÿ0Indent7à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2^ ÿÿ0Indent8à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô ÿÿ?AGMSYaioIndent0I.A.1.a.(1)(a)i)a)P ÿÿ8Mac DefaultMac DefaultÓ ` °šXÓ d< Œ 9p`(&Times New Roman< Œ 9p`(Times% Line 7 d%%%%7Border 1dd€-&Cþÿ << Gÿÿ ½Ý ƒ!ÝÑ  ÑÑ#€d#ÑÔ€#ÔÒ  ÒÒ X ÒÔ€ ÔÓ  ÓÑ\R AØ'\ÑÑ#€d#ÑÑ  ÑÝ  ÝÔ€ ÔÓ  ÓÔ YYY ÔFILEDÔ€ XÔÌÌò òOctoberÏ31,Ï1997ÌÌCecilÏCrowson,ÏJr.ÌÔ€ ôÔAppellateÏCourtÏClerkó ó fÝ ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€#ÔÒ  ÒÒ X ÒÔ€ ÔÓ  ÓÑ\R AØ'\ÑÑ#€d#ÑÑ  ÑÝ  ÝÝ ƒ $Ýà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  ÝThe€petitioner€went€to€the€district€attorney€generalððs€office€on€more€than€oneÏoccasion€to€try€and€explain€what€had€occurred.€€He€even€went€after€counsel€wasÏappointed€to€represent€him.€€He€also€talked€to€a€law€enforcement€official€and€attemptedÏto€explain€what€occurred.Ì""""'ÿÿdxdPtPtHHÚ(ÿáÿâùFG(üHHØ(d'`Styl{WP}01•ÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃà Ãà Ãà Ãà Ãà ÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÐ ÐÐHHÐÐ  ÐÐ2ÐÐÿÿ¸æ$ÿÐÐHHÐÐÐÐÐÐÐÐ  ÐÐ ÐÐ ÐÑÑÑGenevaÑÑ ÑÑ € ÑÑ<Px–ÈÑÒÒÒ443!#4ÒÒ$ *$ÒÒ$*$ÒÒ ÿKK ÒÒ  Geneva ÒÒ  Geneva ÒÓ.,ÓÓÓÓ6ÓÓ ÓßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßÑGenevaÑÑ ÑÒ  ion-F Geneva ÒÒ  ion-F Geneva Ò("ÿÿ$££Ò  ÒÒ  Ò€-‚ƒCþÿ<< CÿÿƒLevel 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5($$””ò òÚ  Ú1Ú  Úó ó„„'÷ÿ dxdüÿP PdÝ ƒ!ÝÔ . ÔÔ€#ÔÒ  ÒÒ X ÒÔ€ ÔÓ  ÓÑ\R AØ'\ÑÑ#€$$Xd#ÑÑ#€$$Xd#ÑÑ  ÑÝ  Ý›œÙ€€ÙÓ  ÓßR€'(&A1-j|` à. `€€@ÿRß›Þ ÞÌIN€THE€COURT€OF€CRIMINAL€APPEALS€OF€TENNESSEEÌÌAT€KNOXVILLEÌÌMAY€1997€SESSIONÌÓ  ÓÌÌÌÌCHARLES€GATES,à àà àà àà à)Ìà àà àà àà àà àà à)Ìà àà àAPPELLANT,à àà à)Ìà àà àà àà àà àà à)à àNo.€03„C„01„9510„CC„00313Ìà àà àà àà àà àà à)Ìà àà àà àà àà àà à)à àBradley€CountyÌv.à àà àà àà àà àà à)Ìà àà àà àà àà àà à)à àMayo€L.€Mashburn,€JudgeÌà àà àà àà àà àà à)Ìà àà àà àà àà àà à)à à(Post„Conviction€Relief)ÌSTATE€OF€TENNESSEE,à àà àà à)Ìà àà àà àà àà àà à)Ìà àà à€€APPELLEE.à àà à)ÌÌÌÌFOR€THE€APPELLANT:à àà àà àà àFOR€THE€APPELLEE:ÌÌMary€Ann€Stackhouseà àà àà àà àJohn€Knox€WalkupÌAttorney€at€Lawà àà àà àà àà àAttorney€General€&€ReporterÌ9509€Ravenel€Laneà àà àà àà àà à500€Charlotte€AvenueÌKnoxville,€TN€37922à àà àà àà àNashville,€TN€37243„0497ÌÌà àà àà àà àà àà àà àSarah€M.€BranchÌà àà àà àà àà àà àà àAssistant€Attorney€GeneralÌà àà àà àà àà àà àà à450€James€Robertson€ParkwayÌà àà àà àà àà àà àà àNashville,€TN€37243„0497ÌÌà àà àà àà àà àà àà àJerry€N.€EstesÌà àà àà àà àà àà àà àDistrict€Attorney€GeneralÌà àà àà àà àà àà àà àP.O.€Box€647Ìà àà àà àà àà àà àà àAthens,€TN€37371ÌÌà àà àà àà àà àà àà àJohn€A.€RehyanskyÌà àà àà àà àà àà àà àAssistant€District€Attorney€GeneralÌà àà àà àà àà àà àà àP.O.€Box€1351Ìà àà àà àà àà àà àà àCleveland,€TN€37364„1351ÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌOPINION€FILED:______________________________ÌÌÌAFFIRMEDÌÌÌJoe€B.€Jones,€Presiding€JudgeÌÌò òÓ  ÓÔ€ „ÔO€P€I€N€I€O€Nó óÌÓ  ÓÔ€ XÔÌÌÌÓÓà àThe€appellant,€Charles€Gates€(petitioner),€appeals€as€of€right€from€a€judgment€ofÏthe€€trial€court€dismissing€his€action€for€post„conviction€relief€following€an€evidentiaryÏhearing.€€In€this€Court,€the€petitioner€contends€the€evidence€contained€in€the€recordÏpreponderates€against€the€judgment€rendered€by€the€trial€court.€€He€argues€he€wasÏdenied€his€constitutional€right€to€the€effective€assistance€of€counsel€because€(a)Ïcounsel€permitted€him€to€plead€guilty€in€view€of€the€evidence,€(b)€counsel€failed€to€fileÏan€appropriate€post„plea€motion€after€permitting€him€to€plead€guilty,€and€(c)€counselÏgave€erroneous€advice€which€resulted€in€pleas€of€guilty€that€were€not€voluntarily,Ïunderstandingly,€and€knowingly€entered.€€€After€a€thorough€review€of€the€record,€theÏbriefs€submitted€by€the€parties,€and€the€law€governing€the€issues€presented€for€review,Ïit€is€the€opinion€of€this€Court€that€the€judgment€of€the€trial€court€should€be€affirmed.Ìà à€On€January€7,€1993,€the€petitioner€entered€pleas€of€guilty€to€the€offenses€ofÍrape,€aggravated€kidnapping,€and€kidnapping.€€Pursuant€to€a€plea€bargain€agreement,Ïthe€trial€court€sentenced€the€petitioner€to€serve€eight€(8)€years€in€the€Department€ofÏCorrection€for€the€offenses€of€rape€and€aggravated€œkidnapping,›€and€six€(6)€years€in€theÏDepartment€of€Correction€for€the€offense€of€kidnapping.€€The€sentences€are€to€beÏserved€concurrently.€€No€appeal€was€taken€to€this€Court.Ìà àThe€petitioner€commenced€this€action€on€October€18,€1993.€The€State€ofÏTennessee€filed€a€response€seeking€dismissal€of€the€petitionerððs€action€on€October€26,Ï1993.€€The€trial€court€summarily€dismissed€the€action€on€June€28,€1994.€€The€petitionerÏappealed€as€of€right€to€this€Court€from€the€judgment€of€dismissal.€€Subsequently,€thisÏCourt€reversed€the€judgment€of€the€trial€court€and€remanded€this€cause€for€anÏevidentiary€hearing.€€òòCharles€Gates€v.€Stateóó,€Bradley€County€No.€03„C„01„9408„CR„00303,€1995€WL€457970€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.,€Knoxville,€August€1,€1995).€€The€trial€courtÏconducted€an€evidentiary€hearing€on€March€15,€1996.€€The€findings€of€fact€andÏconclusions€of€law€were€filed€on€March€21,€1996.€€The€trial€court€denied€the€reliefÏsought€by€the€petitioner.€€In€ruling,€the€court€said,€ð ð[i]n€resolving€the€conflicts€betweenÏPetitioner€and€Mr.€Carter€[defense€counsel],€this€Court€totally€accredits€the€testimony€ofÏMr.€Carter€and€rejects€outright€any€conflicting€testimony€of€the€Petitioner.ðð€€In€short,€theÏtrial€court€did€not€believe€the€petitionerððs€testimony.ÌÌò òÓ  ÓI.ó óÌÓ  ÓÌà àWhen€the€trial€court€has€conducted€an€evidentiary€hearing€to€permit€a€petitionerÏto€ventilate€the€grounds€raised€in€support€of€post„conviction€relief,€the€trial€courtððsÍfindings€of€fact€are€afforded€the€weight€of€a€jury€verdict,€òòDixon€v.€Stateóó,€934€S.W.2d€69,Ï71„72€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.€1996);€òòTeague€v.€Stateóó,€772€S.W.2d€932,€933„34€(Tenn.€Crim.ÏApp.€1988),€òòcertóó.€òòdeniedóó,€493€U.S.€874,€110€S.Ct.€210,€107€L.Ed.2d€163€(1989).€ÏConsequently,€this€Court€is€bound€by€the€trial€courtððs€findings€of€fact€unless€theÏevidence€adduced€at€the€hearing€preponderates€against€the€trial€courtððs€findings.€ÏòòButler€v.€Stateóó,€789€S.W.2d€898,€899€(Tenn.€1990);€òòAdkins€v.€Stateóó,€911€S.W.2d€334,Ï354€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.€1994).€€Ìà àThere€are€several€well„established€rules€which€govern€appellate€review€in€post„conviction€œcases.›€€As€this€Court€said€in€òòBlack€v.€Stateóó,€794€S.W.2d€752,€755€(Tenn.ÏCrim.€App.),€òòperóó.€òòappóó.€òòdeniedóó€(Tenn.€1990):ÌÒ ¸ ÒÒ X ÒÒ ¸ ÒÒ  ÒÓÓÌFirst,€this€Court€cannot€reweigh€or€reevaluate€the€evidence;Ïnor€can€we€substitute€our€inferences€for€those€drawn€by€theÏtrial€judge.€€Second,€questions€concerning€the€credibility€ofÏthe€witnesses,€the€weight€and€value€to€be€given€theirÏtestimony,€and€the€factual€issues€raised€by€the€evidence€areÏresolved€by€the€trial€judge,€not€this€Court.€€Third,€theÏappellant€has€the€burden€in€this€Court€of€illustrating€why€theÏevidence€contained€in€the€record€preponderates€against€theÏjudgment€of€the€trial€judge.ÌÌÌÒ  ÒÒ  ÒÒ  ÒÒ X ÒÓÓà àThis€Court€will€now€proceed€to€consider€the€merits€of€the€petitionerððsÏcontentions.€€In€doing€so,€this€Court€will€apply€the€aforementioned€principles€governingÏappellate€review€in€post„conviction€cases€to€determine€whether€the€evidence€adducedÏat€the€hearing€preponderates€against€the€trial€courtððs€findings€of€fact.€€òòSeeóó€€òòClenny€v.ÏStateóó,€576€S.W.2d€12,€14€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.€1978),€òòcertóó.€òòdeniedóó,€441€U.S.€947,€99€S.Ct.Ï2170,€60€L.Ed.2d€1050€(1979).€€Ìò òÓ  ÓII.ÌÌà àà àó óÓ  Óà àWhen€the€petitioner€seeks€to€vitiate€a€conviction€on€the€groundÏcounselððs€representation€was€ineffective,€the€petitioner€must€prove€by€aÏpreponderance€of€the€evidence€(a)€the€services€rendered€or€advice€given€by€counselÏfell€below€ð ðthe€range€of€competence€demanded€of€attorneys€in€criminal€casesðð€and€(b)Ïthe€unprofessional€conduct€or€errors€of€counsel€ð ðactually€had€an€adverse€effect€on€theÏdefense.ðð€òòStrickland€v.€Washingtonóó,€466€U.S.€668,€693,€104€S.Ct.€€2052,€2067,€80ÏL.Ed.2d€674,€697€(1984);€òòBaxter€v.€Roseóó,€523€S.W.2d€930,€936€(Tenn.€1975).€€This€isÏrequired€regardless€of€whether€the€petitioner€was€convicted€following€a€trial€on€theÏmerits€or€the€entry€of€a€guilty€plea.€€òòHill€v.€œLockhartóó,›€474€U.S.€52,€106€S.Ct.€366,€88ÏL.Ed.2d€203€(1985).€€However,€in€òòHillóó€the€Supreme€Court€modified€the€prejudiceÏrequirement€of€òòStricklandóó€by€requiring€a€petitioner€who€was€convicted€after€the€entry€ofÏa€guilty€plea€to€establish€there€was€a€reasonable€probability€that,€but€for€defenseÏcounselððs€errors,€he€would€not€have€entered€the€guilty€plea.€€Instead,€the€petitionerÏneeded€to€demonstrate€that€he€would€have€insisted€upon€a€trial€by€a€jury.€€474€U.S.€atÏ59,€106€S.Ct.€at€370.Ìà àIn€resolving€this€issue,€this€Court€is€governed€by€certain€well„establishedÏstandards.€€First,€the€standards€established€in€òòStricklandóó€and€followed€in€òòHillóó€do€notÏrequire€perfect€representation.€€òòHellard€v.€Stateóó,€629€S.W.2d€4,€9€(Tenn.€1982).€ÏSecond,€it€is€not€the€function€of€an€appellate€court€to€ð ðsecond€guessðð€trial€counselððsÏtactical€and€strategic€choices€pertaining€to€matters€of€defense€unless€these€choices€areÏmade€without€knowledge€of€the€relevant€facts€or€the€law€applicable€to€the€issues.€ÏòòHellardóó,€629€S.W.2d€at€9;€òòState€v.€Swansonóó,€680€S.W.2d€487,€490€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.),Íòòperóó.€òòappóó.€òòdeniedóó€(Tenn.€1984).€€As€the€supreme€court€said€in€òòHellardóó:€ð ð[T]he€defenseÏattorneyððs€representation,€when€questioned,€is€not€to€be€measured€by€ðð20„20Ïhindsight.ðððð€629€S.W.2d€at€9.€€Third,€a€petitioner€is€not€deprived€of€his€constitutionalÏright€to€the€effective€assistance€of€counsel€because€a€different€procedure€or€strategyÏmight€have€produced€a€different€result.€€òòWilliams€v.€Stateóó,€599€S.W.2d€276,€279€(Tenn.ÏCrim.€App.€1980).Ìà àThis€Court€will€now€undertake€to€resolve€the€issues€presented€for€review€whichÏare€predicated€upon€a€claim€he€was€denied€his€constitutional€right€to€the€effectiveÏassistance€of€counsel.€€Ìò òÓ  ÓÇIII.ó óÌÌÓ  Óà àThe€petitioner€argues€defense€counsel€was€ineffective€because€he€failed€ð ðto€fileÏthe€appropriate€post€trial€motionsðð€after€counsel€received€the€ð ðrecantation€from€theÏalleged€victim€within€thirty€days€of€the€plea.ðð€€He€also€argues€defense€counsel€wasÏineffective€because€he€allowed€the€petitioner€to€plead€guilty€when€(a)€he€knew€thereÏwas€ample€evidence€to€raise€a€reasonable€doubt,€demonstrating€the€defendant€mightÏnot€be€guilty,€(b)€he€failed€to€interview€the€victim€face„to„face€before€the€petitionerÏentered€his€pleas€of€guilty,€and€(c)€he€failed€to€analyze€an€incriminating€tape„recording.ÌÌò òÓ  ÓA.ó óÌÌÓ  Óà àThe€petitionerððs€claim€that€defense€counsel€failed€to€file€an€appropriate€post„plea€motion€is€predicated€upon€a€false€premise.€€The€statement€defense€counselÏreceived€from€the€victim€after€the€petitioner€entered€his€pleas€of€guilty€did€not€constituteÏa€recantation€of€what€€the€victim€had€previously€stated€to€the€police€or€the€allegationsÏincluded€in€the€affidavit€of€complaint€given€to€support€the€arrest€warrants€issued€for€theÏpetitioner.€€Nor€did€the€statement€contradict€the€recitation€of€facts€given€by€the€assistantÏdistrict€attorney€general€at€the€submission€hearing.Ìà àThe€affidavit€executed€by€the€victim€related€she€had€seen€the€petitioner€whileÏher€husband€was€serving€overseas€in€the€military.€€It€appears€he€was€sent€to€SaudiÏArabia€during€Desert€Storm.€€She€denied€having€consensual€sexual€relations€with€theÏpetitioner.€€She€described€her€relationship€with€the€petitioner€as€a€ð ðfriendship.ðð€€WhenÍher€husband€returned,€she€attempted€to€terminate€this€friendship€with€the€petitioner.€ÏThe€bulk€of€the€statement€concerned€the€petitionerððs€sentence.€€The€victim€felt€theÏpetitioner€should€have€received€full€probation.€€In€addition,€she€wanted€to€obtainÏpsychiatric€assistance€for€the€petitioner.€€According€to€the€record,€the€petitionerÏbecame€violent€when€he€was€angry.€€The€victim€never€stated€the€petitioner€wasÏinnocent.€€She€referred€to€the€events€in€question,€i.e.,€the€kidnapping€of€the€victim,€theÏkidnapping€of€the€victimððs€small€son,€and€the€rape€of€the€victim,€as€ð ðthe€incident.ðð€€GivenÏthese€circumstances,€counsel€filed€a€motion€pursuant€to€Rule€35,€Tennessee€Rules€ofÏCriminal€Procedure,€to€modify€the€sentences€imposed€pursuant€to€the€plea€agreement.€ÏThe€trial€court€dismissed€the€motion€without€an€evidentiary€hearing.Ìà àThe€petitioner€argues€defense€counsel€should€have€filed€a€motion€to€withdrawÏthe€pleas€of€guilty,€a€motion€for€new€trial,€and/or€a€motion€in€arrest€of€judgment.€€HeÏstates€in€his€brief:€ð ðSuch€motions€would€have€been€timely€and€would€have€been€theÏproper€vehicle€for€obtaining€relief€for€Mr.€Gates€at€that€time,€post„plea,€in€light€of€[theÏvictimððs]€recantation.ðð€€He€also€faults€defense€counsel€for€not€obtaining€an€evidentiaryÏhearing€on€the€motion€to€modify€his€sentences.Ìò òÓ  Ó(1)ó óÌÓ  Óà àÌà àThe€post„plea€remedies€alluded€to€by€the€petitioner€were€either€not€available€toÏthe€petitioner€or€he€has€failed€to€establish€why€he€was€entitled€to€relief.€€Therefore,Ïcounsel€was€not€ineffective€because€he€did€not€pursue€these€remedies.Ìà àThe€motion€for€a€new€trial€is€governed€by€Rule€33,€Tennessee€Rules€of€CriminalÏProcedure.€€This€rule€limits€€the€scope€of€the€motion€to€cases€where€the€accused€hasÍbeen€tried€either€by€a€jury€or€the€€trial€court.€€Tenn.€R.€Crim.€P.€33(a).€€In€this€case,€theÏpetitioner€entered€pleas€of€guilty€to€the€offenses€pursuant€to€a€plea€agreement.€ÏConsequently,€the€filing€of€a€motion€for€a€new€trial€would€have€been€frivolous.€€CounselÏis€not€required€to€file€a€frivolous€motion.Ìà àThe€scope€of€the€motion€for€arrest€of€judgment€is€limited.€€Rule€34,€Tenn.€R.ÏCrim.€P.€€The€rule€states€a€trial€court€ð ðshall€arrest€judgment€if€the€indictment,Ïpresentment€or€information€does€not€charge€an€offense€or€if€the€court€was€withoutÏjurisdiction€of€the€offense€charged.ðð€€Neither€of€these€grounds€were€established€by€theÏevidence€adduced€at€the€evidentiary€hearing.€€Nor€does€the€petitioner€set€forth€in€hisÏbrief€a€basis€for€arresting€the€judgment€of€the€trial€court.€€Again,€the€filing€of€a€motion€forÏarrest€of€judgment€would€have€been€frivolous€in€this€case.Ìà àThe€withdrawal€of€guilty€pleas€is€governed€by€Rule€32(f),€Tennessee€Rules€of€ÏCriminal€€Procedure.€€Once€the€accused€has€entered€a€plea€of€guilty€and€the€trial€courtÏhas€imposed€sentence,€the€accused€may€seek€to€withdraw€the€guilty€plea€before€theÏjudgment€has€become€final.€€Tenn.€R.€Crim.€€P.€32(f).€€The€trial€court€may€permit€theÏwithdrawal€of€the€guilty€plea€to€correct€ð ðmanifest€injustice.ðð€€In€òòState€v.€Turneróó,€919ÏS.W.2d€346€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.€1995),€this€Court€set€forth€scenarios€illustrating€whatÏdoes€and€does€not€constitute€manifest€injustice.€€In€this€case,€there€is€no€evidence€inÏthe€record€establishing€manifest€injustice.€€Therefore,€the€petitioner€was€not€entitled€toÏthe€withdrawal€of€his€guilty€pleas.€ÌÌò òÓ  Ó(2)ó óÌÓ  Óà àÌà àRule€35(b),€Tennessee€Rules€of€Criminal€Procedure,€authorizes€a€trial€court€toÏreduce€a€sentence€upon€the€motion€of€a€party€within€120€days€from€the€date€sentenceÏwas€imposed.€€As€the€comments€to€this€rule€indicate,€the€purpose€of€the€rule€is€to€allowÏalteration€of€a€sentence€when€it€is€in€the€interests€of€justice.€€This€rule€does€not€vest€theÏdefendant€with€a€remedy€of€right.€€òòState€v.€Deborah€Crabtree€Martinóó,€Anderson€Co.ÏNo.173,€1987€WL€14941€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.,€Knoxville,€July€31,€1987).€€To€the€contrary,Ïthe€rule€commits€the€granting€of€relief€to€the€sound€discretion€of€the€trial€court.€ÏMoreover,€the€trial€court€may€dismiss€a€Rule€35€motion€without€a€hearing.€€Rule€35(b),ÏTenn.€R.€Crim.€P.€€òòSeeóó€òòState€v.€Katrina€L.€Harrisóó,€Anderson€County€No.€202,€1989€WLÏ54580€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.,€Knoxville,€May€23,€1989).€Ìà àDefense€counsel€properly€filed€a€Rule€35€motion€to€modify€the€sentencesÏimposed€by€the€trial€court€notwithstanding€the€petitioner€entered€pleas€of€guilty€andÏwas€sentenced€pursuant€to€a€plea€bargain€agreement.€€òòSeeóó€òòState€v.€McDonaldóó,€893ÏS.W.2d€945€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.€1994).€€There€was€no€agreement€between€the€State€ofÏTennessee€and€the€petitioner€regarding€the€applicability€of€probation€or€the€impositionÏof€a€community€corrections€sentence.€€Defense€counsel€testified€the€petitioner€wasÏaware€that€if€he€accepted€the€plea€agreement€he€would€not€receive€a€sentencingÏhearing€through€which€alternative€sentencing€could€be€sought.€€However,€it€wasÏpossible€the€trial€court€may€have€given€consideration€to€an€alternative€sentence€givenÏthe€feelings€of€the€victim.Ìà àAs€previously€stated,€the€trial€court€is€authorized€by€Rule€35€to€dismiss€a€motionÏwithout€granting€the€moving€party€a€hearing€on€the€motion.€òòSeeóó€òòState€v.€Katrina€L.ÏHarrisóó,€òòsupraóó;€òòState€v.€Deborah€Crabtree€Martinóó,€òòsupraóó.€€The€conduct€of€the€trial€court€inÍdismissing€the€motion€was€simply€a€reaffirmation€of€the€sentences€previously€imposed.€ÏòòState€v.€Bilbreyóó,€816€S.W.2d€71€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.€1991).€€€Thus,€defense€counsel€canÏnot€be€considered€ineffective€because€the€trial€court€exercised€its€discretion€pursuantÏto€Rule€35.Ìà àThe€record€indicates€the€trial€court€did€not€abuse€its€discretion€in€dismissing€theÏmotion€for€modification€of€the€sentences.€€Contrary€to€the€argument€advanced€by€theÏpetitioner,€there€were€no€material€changes€between€the€date€the€sentences€wereÏimposed€and€the€filing€of€the€motion.€€òòSeeóó€òòState€v.€Deborah€Crabtree€Martinóó,€òòsupraóó.ÌÌò òÓ  ÓB.ó óÌÓ  ÓÌà àThe€petitioner€also€contends€defense€counsel€was€ineffective€because€heÏpermitted€him€to€plead€guilty.€€He€argues€counsel€should€not€have€permitted€him€toÏplead€guilty€knowing€that€there€was€sufficient€evidence€to€raise€a€reasonable€doubt.€ÏHe€also€argues€counsel€was€ineffective€because€he€failed€to€interview€the€prosecutrixÏface„to„face,€and€he€failed€to€have€a€tape„recording€of€a€telephone€conversation€withÏthe€prosecutrix€analyzed.Ìà àDefense€counsel€was€prepared€to€try€the€petitionerððs€case.€€He€had€theÏstatements€previously€made€by€the€prosecutrix.€€He€talked€to€her€by€telephone€andÏattempted€to€establish€an€appointment€to€talk€to€her€in€person.€€The€prosecutrixÏdeclined€to€meet€with€defense€counsel.€€Defense€counsel€cannot€compel€aÏprosecution€witness€to€meet€with€him€so€he€can€discuss€his€clientððs€case.€€Since€theÏprosecutrix€would€not€make€herself€available€for€a€live€interview,€defense€counsel€wasÍprudent€by€calling€the€witness€and€talking€to€her€on€the€telephone.Ìà àThe€petitioner€and€counsel€listened€to€the€telephone€conversation€between€theÏprosecutrix€and€himself€regarding€what€had€occurred.€€The€petitioner€incriminatedÏhimself€€during€the€conversation.× ƒ) ××  ×€€Defense€counsel€asked€the€petitioner€if€the€voice€onÏthe€tape€was€his€voice.€€He€advised€counsel€it€was€his€voice.€€Counsel€also€asked€theÏpetitioner€if€œÌÌthe›€content€of€the€conversation€was€accurate.€€The€petitioner€assured€counsel€it€wasÏaccurate.€€Thus,€there€was€no€reason€to€have€the€audio€tape€analyzed€for€any€purpose.Ìà àOnce€the€petitioner€heard€the€taped€conversation,€he€approached€counsel€and€Ïadvised€him€he€wanted€to€plead€guilty€and€accept€the€offer€which€had€previously€beenÏcommunicated€by€the€assistant€district€attorney€general.€€Defense€counsel€explained€toÏthe€petitioner€the€significance€of€pleading€guilty€and€the€rights€the€petitioner€would€loseÏif€he€entered€guilty€pleas.€€Defense€counsel€was€satisfied€the€petitioner€fullyÏunderstood€the€significance€and€consequences€of€his€change€of€plea.€Ìà àCertain€decisions€during€a€criminal€prosecution€are€to€be€made€by€the€accused.€ÏOne€of€these€rights€is€what€plea€the€accused€will€enter.€€òòSeeóó€ABA€Standards€forÏCriminal€Justice€(2nd€ed.€1980),€The€Defense€Function€ðð€4„5.2(a).€€The€petitionerÏmade€this€decision€after€being€informed€of€the€evidence€against€him€and€the€lawÏgoverning€the€prosecution€if€he€went€to€trial.€€When€he€made€the€decision€to€pleadÍguilty,€counsel€advised€the€petitioner€of€the€consequences€of€pleading€guilty.Ìà àIn€this€case,€the€entire€defense€was€predicated€upon€the€ability€of€counsel€toÏimpeach€the€prosecutrix.€€The€petitioner€did€not€dispute€what€had€occurred.€€HeÏcontended€he€had€consensual€sex€with€the€prosecutrix.€€She€contended€she€neverÏhad€a€sexual€relationship€with€the€petitioner.€€She€described€the€petitioner€as€aÏð ðfriend.ðð€€The€prosecutrix€was€married€and€the€mother€of€a€small€child.€€Given€theseÏcircumstances,€defense€counsel€was€not€ineffective€because€he€permitted€theÏpetitioner€to€œenter›€pleas€of€guilty.€€The€petitioner€was€properly€advised€of€his€rights€andÏthe€consequences€of€the€change€of€pleas.€€He€made€the€decision€to€change€his€plea.€ÏThis€was€all€that€was€required€of€counsel€in€view€of€the€evidence€against€the€petitioner.ÌÌò òÓ  ÓIV.ó óÌÓ  ÓÌà àThe€petitioner€contends€his€pleas€of€guilty€were€not€knowingly€or€voluntarilyÏentered€because€the€pleas€were€entered€on€the€advice€of€counsel.€€He€argues€defenseÏcounsel€was€ineffective€due€to€counselððs€failure€to€fully€investigate€the€facts,€and€thatÏthe€pleas€were€entered€on€misinformation€conveyed€by€counsel€regarding€theÏevidence€which€was€available€to€the€state€and€the€defense.Ìà àThis€Court€agrees€with€the€petitioner€that€pleas€of€guilty€must€meet€certainÏrequirements€to€pass€constitutional€muster.€€Certainly,€if€defense€counselððsÏrepresentation€fell€below€the€level€of€competency€required€in€criminal€cases,€theÏpetitioner€would€be€entitled€to€relief€if€he€could€establish€the€second€prong€in€òòHillóó.€ÏHowever,€the€problem€the€petitioner€faces€is€that€the€trial€courtððs€findings€of€factÍregarding€this€issue€are€binding€in€this€case,€and€the€evidence€contained€in€the€recordÏdoes€not€preponderate€against€these€findings.€€As€previously€stated,€the€trial€court€didÏnot€believe€the€testimony€given€by€the€petitioner.€€He€accredited€the€testimony€ofÏdefense€counsel.Ìà àDefense€counsel€stated€the€petitioner€approached€him€a€few€days€before€theÏscheduled€trial€and€advised€counsel€he€desired€to€plead€guilty€to€the€offense.€€In€otherÏwords,€counsel€did€not€tell€the€petitioner€to€enter€the€pleas€of€guilty€nor€did€counselÏattempt€to€convince€him€to€enter€the€pleas.€€When€defense€counsel€learned€of€theÏchange€in€plea,€counsel€met€with€the€petitioner€and€explained€the€significance€andÏconsequences€of€pleading€guilty.€€Counsel€was€satisfied€the€petitioner€understoodÏwhat€was€explained€to€him,€and€that€the€petitioner€voluntarily,€knowingly,€andÏunderstandingly€entered€the€pleas€of€guilty.Ìà àThe€trial€court€reviewed€with€the€petitioner€what€occurred€at€the€submissionÏhearing.€€The€petitioner€admitted€the€trial€court€asked€all€the€questions€necessary€toÏdetermine€whether€the€petitioner€was€voluntarily,€knowingly€and€understandinglyÏentering€the€respective€pleas.€€The€petitioner€also€admitted€he€answered€the€questionsÏand€indicated€he€had€in€fact€voluntarily,€knowingly,€and€understandingly€entered€theÏpleas.€€However,€the€petitioner€stated€he€answered€the€questions€untruthfully.€€WhenÏasked€whether€he€told€the€truth€at€the€submission€hearing€or€during€the€evidentiaryÏhearing,€the€petitioner€stated€he€entered€the€pleas€on€the€advice€of€counsel.€€HeÏrefused€to€admit€the€pleas€were€voluntarily,€knowingly,€and€understandingly€enteredÏas€indicated€by€his€answers€at€the€submission€hearing.Ìà àThe€trial€court€and€defense€counsel€both€believed€the€petitioner€entered€theÍguilty€pleas€voluntarily,€knowingly,€and€understandingly.€€Further,€the€litany€ofÏquestions€asked€the€petitioner€passed€constitutional€muster.€€Since€the€trial€courtÏfound€the€petitioner€was€untruthful€and€did€not€believe€his€testimony,€the€evidenceÏcontained€in€the€record€does€not€preponderate€against€the€findings€of€fact€made€by€theÏtrial€court.ÌÌÌÌÓÓÌÌà àà àà àà àà à____________________________________________Ìà àà àà àà àà àà à€€JOE€B.€JONES,€PRESIDING€JUDGEÌÌÌÌCONCUR:ÌÌÌÌ€€Ì______________________________________Ìà à€€JOSEPH€M.€TIPTON,€JUDGEÌÌÌÌ______________________________________Ìà à€€€CURWOOD€WITT,€JUDGE