WPC'!  %Vw@\ 0U:x 4   0  0D 0JA 0T 0^ 0h= 0r 0| 0 0 1u 0dU* BB)DC AM5)#v~v< D3 0@B AO 0D D/ B !X ghDijDklDmneopӀ(`$TR[A' Legal3'A' Legal3'T7GXXdXXd7  ,cAZ"Arial Regular;$3|xy((3$ `!TR[A' Legal3'A' Legal3'T7XXdd7    `   0  (#$  0  2 0Indent123  2" 0Indent20 23  2, 0Indent30 0 23  26 0Indent40 0 0 23  2@ 0Indent50 0 0 0 23  2J 0Indent60 0 0 0 0 23  2T 0Indent70 0 0 0 0 0 23  2^ 0Indent80 0 0 0 0 0 0 23    ?AGMSYaioIndent0I.A.1.a.(1)(a)i)a)P 8Mac DefaultMac Default ` X<  9p`(Arial d% Line 7 d 7Border 1dd-!C << G  !  #d#    ! \RA'\#d#      YYY FILEDXJuly22,1998CecilW.CrowsonAppellateCourtClerk    !#d#     \RA'\#d#          Inhisapplication,theappellantdidacknowledgethathewaspreparedtomakescheduledmonthlyrestitutionpaymentsof $200/monthfor1styearthen$300/month.  !#d#     \RA'\#d#          Theappellantseligibilityfordiversionwasnotthedispositivegrounduponwhichthetrialcourtfoundnoabuseofdiscretion.Thetrialcourtsorderincorporatesthefollowinglanguage, [a]fterreviewingallthetestimony,thecourtfileandargumentsofcounselinthiscase,noabuseofdiscretionisfound.PtPtHH(FG(HH(d'hStyl{WP}01  HH  2$HH  Geneva  <Px443!#4$*$$*$ KK  Geneva  Geneva .,6 Geneva   h HD: Geneva  h HD: Geneva 'dxd("$    -C<< CLevel 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5($$   1  ' dxdP Pd ! .      \RA'\#Xd##Xd#        R"#!A1-j|`   `@Rߛ @ INTHECOURTOFCRIMINALAPPEALSOFTENNESSEE@ ATNASHVILLE@ MAYSESSION,1998STATEOFTENNESSEE,  )     ) No.01C019703CR00078 Appellee   )     ) SUMNERCOUNTYvs.     )     ) Hon.JaneWheatcraft,JudgeLONNIERUSSELL"RUSTY" )GRAY,    )     ) (DenialofPretrialDiversion) Appellant   ) FortheAppellant:    FortheAppellee: AllenBarnes     JohnKnoxWalkup 207ThirdAvenueNorth   AttorneyGeneralandReporterThirdFloor Nashville,TN372011610  KarenM.Yacuzzo       AssistantAttorneyGeneral        CriminalJusticeDivision      450JamesRobertsonParkway      Nashville,TN372430493                LawrenceRayWhitley       DistrictAttorneyGeneral      ThomasDean       Asst.DistrictAttorneyGeneral      113WestMainStreet      Gallatin,TN37066OPINIONFILED:򀀀AFFIRMED DavidG.Hayes Judge@ OPINION  Theappellant,LonnieRussell RustyGray,appeals,pursuanttoRule10,Tenn.R.App.P.,fromthedecisionofthetrialcourtaffirmingtheassistantdistrictattorneygeneralsdenialofhisapplicationforpretrialdiversion.TheappellantseekstodivertfourclassDfelonycountsoftheftofproperty.Onappeal,theappellantarguesthatthetrialcourterredinfindingthattheprosecutordidnotabusehisdiscretionindenyingdiversion. Afterreviewoftherecord,weaffirmthejudgmentofthetrialcourt.@ FACTUALBACKGROUND  OnJuly3,1996,afourcountindictmentwasreturnedagainsttheappellantcharginghimwiththeftofpropertyasfollows:countone,theftof$5,000onthedateofMay29,1995;counttwo,theftof$1,000onMay31,1995;countthree,theftof$2,000onJune7,1995;andcountfour,theftof$6,000onJune8,1995.Onthedatesoftheseallegedoffenses,theappellantwasamartialartsinstructorandthevictimsofthetheftwereparentsofoneofhisstudents.Theproofestablishedthattheappellantconvincedthevictimstoinvesttheirmoneybypurchasing pointsinacorporationcalledthe AmericanDream.Thevictimswere downlinedistributorsunderneaththeappellantinthemarketingscheme.Ratherthaninvestingthevictims$14,000aspromised,theappellantdepositedtheentiresumintohispersonalaccount,spendingthemoneytosupporthisneeds.Hecontendsthathehadintendedtorepaytheamountfromthethousandsofdollarshehadbeenpromisedfromthemarketingscheme.Thesefundsnevermaterialized. Theappellantadmitsthatheusedpoorjudgment inspendingmoneythatwasnotmine,but, ifitwerenotforheavydrinkinganddepressionIwasexperiencingduetothedissolutionofmymarriage,thiswouldnothaveoccurred.Theproofindicatesthatforoveraperiodofoneyear,theappellant strungthevictimsalongwithexcusesandallegationsthatothersweredelayingtheprocessinrecoveringtheirfunds.Asofthedateoftheapplicationfordiversion,October1,1996,noattempttomakerestitutioninanyformhadbeenmadebytheappellant. $    Theassistantdistrictattorneydeniedtheapplication,citing,inpart,thefollowingreasons:8 Defendantwasallowedtoenterapleaonaworthlesscheckchargein1991underTenn.CodeAnn.4035313.Adefendantwhopreviouslyusedthediversionstatutestoavoidcriminalliabilityisnoteligiblefordiversionagain.8 Yourclientischargedwithfourcountsoffelonytheft.Thenumberofchargesagainstadefendantisonefactrelevanttodeterminingtheappellantsstabilityforpretrialdiversion.8 Defendantutilizedapositionoftrusttofacilitatethethefts.8 Themoneywasusedtopaydefendantspersonalobligations.8 Thecrimeandcoverupandfailuretosatisfythevictimswentonformorethanayear.Defendantsactionsdidnotappearimpulsiveandspontaneous.8 Onlyaftercriminalchargeswerefiledhastherebeenevidenceofawillingnesstopayreparationstothevictims.8 Noshowingofremorseoranyattempttorectifythesituation. Therecordreflectsthattheassistantdistrictattorneygeneralconsideredthe positivefactorssubmittedbytheappellantinseekingdiversionconcluding,however,thatthesefactorswereoutweighedbytheinterestofthepublic. OnJanuary14,1997,thetrialcourtdismissedthepetitionforwritofcertiorari,findingnoabuseofdiscretionbytheassistantdistrictattorneygeneral.@ ANALYSIS  Theappellantcontendsthatthetrialcourterredinfailingtofindthattheassistantdistrictattorneygeneralabusedhisdiscretionindenyingtheappellantsapplicationforpretrialdiversion.Thedecisiontograntpretrialdiversionrestswithinthediscretionofthedistrictattorneygeneral.Tenn.CodeAnn.4015105(b)(3)(1994Supp.);seealsoStatev.Hammersley,650S.W.2d352,353(Tenn.1983);Statev.Houston,900S.W.2d712,714(Tenn.Crim.App.),perm.toappealdenied,(Tenn.1995);Statev.Carr,861S.W.2d850,855(Tenn.Crim.App.1993).Whendecidingwhethertograntanapplicationforpretrialdiversion,thedistrictattorneygeneralshouldconsiderthecircumstancesoftheoffense;thecriminalrecord,socialhistory,andpresentconditionofthedefendant,includinghismentalandphysicalconditionswhereappropriate;thedeterrenteffectofpunishmentuponothercriminalactivity;thedefendant'samenabilitytocorrection;thelikelihoodthatpretrialdiversionwillservetheendsofjusticeandthebestinterestsofboththepublicandthedefendant;andtheapplicant'sattitude,behaviorsincearrest,priorrecord,homeenvironment,currentdrugusage,emotionalstability,pastemployment,generalreputation,maritalstability,familyresponsibility,andattitudeoflawenforcement.Statev.Washington,866S.W.2d950,951(Tenn.1993)(citationsomitted).SeealsoHouston,900S.W.2dat714.̀ Thedistrictattorneygeneral'sdecisionregardingpretrialdiversionispresumptivelycorrect,andthetrialcourtwillonlyreversethedecisionwhentheappellantestablishesthattherehasbeenapatentorgrossabuseofprosecutorialdiscretion.Houston,900S.W.2dat714(citingHammersley,650S.W.2dat356).Inordertoestablishabuseofdiscretion,"therecordmustshowanabsenceofanysubstantialevidencetosupportthedistrictattorneygeneral'srefusaltograntpretrialdiversion."Id.Thetrialcourtmayonlyconsiderevidenceconsideredbythedistrictattorneygeneralinthedecisiondenyingpretrialdiversion,Statev.Winsett,882S.W.2d806,810(Tenn.Crim.App.1993),perm.toappealdenied,(Tenn.1994),andthetrialcourtmaynotsubstituteitsjudgmentforthatofthedistrictattorneygeneralwhenhisdecisionissupportedbytheevidence.Statev.Watkins,607S.W.2d486,489(Tenn.Crim.App.),perm.toappealdenied,(Tenn.1980). Forpurposesofourreview,thefindingsofthetrialcourtarebindingonthiscourtunlesstheevidencepreponderatesagainstsuchfindings.Houston,900S.W.2dat715.Wereviewthecase,nottodetermineifthetrialjudgehasabusedhisdiscretion,buttodetermineiftheevidencepreponderatesagainstthefindingofthetrialjudgewhoholdsthattheassistantdistrictattorneygeneralhasorhasnotabusedhisdiscretion.Watkins,607S.W.2dat489.Thus,theunderlyingissueforourdeterminationremainswhetherornot,asamatteroflaw,theprosecutorabusedhisdiscretionindenyingpretrialdiversion.Carr,861S.W.2dat856. Theappellantarguesthattheassistantdistrictattorneyplaced undueweightonthecircumstancesoftheoffenseandfailedtoconsiderthepositivefactorsofhis currentsoberanddiligentlifestyle.Additionally,hearguesthattheassistantdistrictattorneywasinerrorinconcludingthathewasineligibleforpretrialdiversionduetothefactthathehadpreviouslybeengrantedjudicialdiversion,Tenn.CodeAnn.4035313,froma1991criminalprosecution. %    TheprovisionsofTenn.CodeAnn.4035313(c),commonlyreferredtoasjudicialdiversion,providethat, [d]ischargeanddismissalunderthissubsectionmayoccuronlyoncewithrespecttoanyperson.(emphasisadded).Thepretrialdiversionstatute,Tenn.CodeAnn.4015105(a),similarlyprovidesthat adefendantmaybegrantedpretrialdiversionone(1)timeundertheprovisionsofthischapter.(emphasisadded).Thus,fromaplainreadingofthestatutes,itisclearthatadefendantwhohaspreviouslybeengrantedjudicialdiversionisnotstatutorilyineligibleforpretrialdiversion.Moreover,thegrantingofpretrialdiversionwillnot,perse,disqualifythedefendantfromeligibilityforjudicialdiversion.Nonetheless,thefactthatadefendantseekingpretrialdiversionwaspreviouslygrantedjudicialdiversionisappropriateindeterminingwhetherthedefendantisamenabletocorrection.Accordingly,inthepresentcase,althoughtheappellantremainedstatutorilyeligibleforpretrialdiversion,thefactthathehadbeenpreviouslygrantedjudicialdiversionwasanappropriatefactorconsideredbytheprosecutorindenyingpretrialdiversion. Thecircumstancesofthiscase,asevidencedbythemultipletheftsandtheappellantsattemptstothwartresponsibilityforhisconduct,indicatethatthiswasnotacrimeofimpulse.Clearlytheappellantabusedapositionoftrust.Noattemptorprofferofrestitutionwasmadetothevictimsuntilcriminalchargeswerebrought.Inappropriatecases,thecircumstancesoftheoffenseandtheneedfordeterrencemayoutweighallotherrelevantfactorsandjustifyadenialofpretrialdiversion.Carr,861S.W.2dat855. Beforeareviewingcourtcanfindanabuseofdiscretion,therecordmustshowanabsenceofanysubstantialevidencetosupportthedistrictattorneygeneral'sdenialofpretrialdiversion.Hammersley,650S.W.2dat356(emphasisadded).Uponreviewofthiscase,therecordprovidessubstantialevidencetoaffirmthetrialcourt'sjudgmentthattheassistantdistrictattorneygeneraldidnotabusehisdiscretionindenyingpretrialdiversion. Thejudgmentofthetrialcourtisaffirmed.     ____________________________________     DAVIDG.HAYES,JudgeCONCUR:_____________________________________GARYR.WADE,PresidingJudge_____________________________________JERRYL.SMITH,Judge