WPC Al=wSQU6n?K|qB!Y^ƺT\-gup|p Rl'>]>T務7hg錨1zH?{6a{iSm搲d+C㽶Ns.2R~^lkɺy~:̥bbq~L@\ݻ 4̰< ,QwU<.+aK#]#_0䆁BˁC&j]B2Hd0^ ĥ*mixVTwg!ᑏddsrBj?LsɅv,m$zQ)R;/'S0rH3F2q^e޼UckF9RkuWqd1C1 V2Oy9J(0iZAUϓ?8\FMtuXݳo)u=r+86;9`fx>'`' _b %\^ b 0nUNwD4H\ zk m #  _ %NEb 0 B 0 D5i D- 0K ASi 0/ 0D A(/ (`$.8dd8    ("  Z6Times New Roman Regularlk.:i+003|x C:\PROGRA~1\COREL\WORDPE~1\TEMPLATE\CUSTOM~1\REVISE~1.WPTC:\Program Files\Corel\WordPerfect Office 2000\Template\Custom WP Templates\revised standard opinion.wptUHP LaserJet 4000 Series PCL6V,,,,V0Level 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5Level 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5Level 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5Level 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5- -(|G2$ !.8dd8         0   d(|3)$ !.8dd8     VVVV)!dxdx)!dxdx( $ Figure  1  ^_X`YE<<CLevel 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5(|3)$ !.8dd8     ($$   1  X[Z&OLE 2.0 Box <=8C HKKKK !.8dd8     _   8XXdd8@hh:NINTHECOURTOFCRIMINALAPPEALSOFTENNESSEE  @gg$ATNASHVILLE#:N #Ԉ #    @  @` AssignedonBriefsSeptember17,2003 F XX #XX$#MICHAELT.GUTHRIEv.STATEOFTENNESSEEXX  ? @@ DirectAppealfromtheCircuitCourtforLincolnCounty  9 @@No.S0300037CharlesLee,Judge  # @@*AV) ` dE<` A   @@TTNo.M200300832CCAR3PCFiledDecember11,_2003_   AV) ` dE<]` A ^     Thepetitionerappealsthesummarydismissalofhispostconvictionpetition,allegingthatproofof V  counselssubstanceabusewasa latearisingclaimthatinvolveddueprocessconcerns.The ? petitioneralsochallengedhishybridsentenceastovoluntarymanslaughterasillegaland (x unconstitutional.Weaffirmthetrialcourtsdismissal. a  Tenn.R.App.P.3AppealasofRight;JudgmentoftheCircuitCourtAffirmed  3   #XǞ#XX.JohnEverettWilliams,J.,deliveredtheopinionofthecourt,inwhichJosephM.Tiptonand  DavidG.Hayes,JJ.,joined.  MichaelT.Guthrie,Nashville,Tennessee,ProSe. q PaulG.Summers,AttorneyGeneralandReporter;KathyD._Aslinger_,AssistantAttorneyGeneral; C W.Michael_McCown_,DistrictAttorneyGeneral;andAnnL.Filer,AssistantDistrictAttorney ,| General;fortheappellee,StateofTennessee. e @@OO& OPINION #XX.#XX  7    XӀThepetitioner,MichaelT.Guthrie,appealsthesummarydismissalofhisprosepost " " convictionpetition.Thepetitionwasdismissedbasedonanuntimelyfiling.Thepetitioneralleges ## itisa latearisingclaim,whichwouldexcusethelackoftimelinessondueprocessgrounds. $$  u% % OnNovember1,1999,thepetitionerenterednegotiatedguiltypleasontwocharges.A ^&!& chargeofattemptedfirstdegreemurder,originatinginMarshallCounty,wasreducedtoattempted G'"' seconddegreemurderwithasentenceoftenyearsasaRangeI,standard#XX #XXoffender.Afirstdegree 0(#( murdercharge,originatinginLincolnCounty,wasreducedtovoluntarymanslaughterwithahybrid )i$) sentenceoffifteenyearstobeservedasaRangeIoffender.Thesentenceswereorderedtorun *R%* concurrently. *;&+  +$',  , (- Thepetitionallegesfourgroundsasabasisforrelief: -(. $, XX$ X X X1)0 4 Denialofeffectiveassistanceofcounsel;4 4  2)0 4 Denialofdueprocess;4 4  3)0 4 Hewasillegallysentencedonthevoluntarymanslaughterconviction;and4 4  ( X, X($, XX$4)0 4 Hewasnotadvisedoftheintentelementrequiredforanattemptedseconddegree k murderconviction.T4 4   X, X XThepetitionerfiledhisclaimforpostconvictionreliefonMarch6,2003.Theclaimwas & v summarilydismissedbythetrialcourtduetoitsuntimeliness.Thepetitionercharacterizeshisclaim  _ as latearising,duetothefilinginJuly,2002,ofaBoardofProfessionalResponsibilityaction  H concerningthepetitionerscounsel.ThepetitionerclaimsthattheBoardplacedhiscounselon  1  probationarystatusandrequiredhimtoundergotreatmentforsubstanceabuse.Althoughthe    petitionerwasfirstadvisedinSeptemberof1999thathiscounselwasbeingtreatedforchemical   dependency,thepetitionercontendsthathedidnothaveproofuntilthereleaseofthedecisionby   theBoardofProfessionalResponsibility.    n  Wereviewthetimelinessofthepetitionersclaimbyreferencefirsttotheappropriatestatute W  oflimitationsonpostconvictionclaims.TennesseeCodeAnnotatedsection4030202(a)(now @ section4030102(a))providesthatperiodtobeoneyearfromthedateonwhichtheconviction )y becomesfinal.Thestatutesetsforththreeexceptionsinthefollowingcircumstances:iftheclaim b (1)isbasedonafinalrulingofanappellatecourtestablishingaconstitutionalrighttobe K retroactivelyapplied,whichwasnotrecognizedatthetimeofthetrial;(2)isbasedonnewscientific 4 evidenceestablishingthatthepetitioneris actuallyinnocent;or(3)seeksrelieffromasentence  enhancedbypreviousconvictionsthathavesincebeenheldinvalid.Tenn.CodeAnn.4030  202(b)(now4030102(b)).    Inadditiontotheseexceptions,oursupremecourthasrecognizedthatdueprocessprohibits q thestrictapplicationofthepostconvictionstatuteoflimitationswhenthegroundsforreliefarise Z afterthepointatwhichthelimitationsperiodwouldnormallyhavebeguntorun.Burfordv.State, C 845S.W.2d204,207(Tenn.1992). ,|  e Thepetitionercharacterizeshisclaimaslaterarisingduetothelateractionfiledbythe N BoardofProfessionalResponsibility,whichapparentlymadereferencetosubstanceabusebythe  7 petitionerscounsel.Thepetitionersclaimignoresthefactthatthisisaclaimofineffective !   counsel.Issueschallengingguiltypleasandineffectiveassistanceofcounselarenotlaterarising " ! claims.Sealsv.State,23S.W.3d272,279(Tenn.2000). #"  $# Thepetitionermustmeetthestandardofshowingthattheservicesrenderedandadvicegiven t% $ werebelowthe rangeofcompetencedemandedofattorneysincriminalcases,Baxterv.Rose,523 ]&!% S.W.2d930,936(Tenn.1975),andthatthosedeficiencies actuallyhadanadverseeffectonthe F'"& defense._Strickland_Ԁv.Washington,466U.S.668,693(1984).Inregardtohisguiltyplea,the /(#' petitionermustshowareasonableprobabilitythat,butforhiscounselserroneousadvice,hewould )h$( nothavepledguiltybutwouldhavegonetotrial.Hillv._Lockhart_,474U.S.52,59(1985). *Q%)   *:&* Itisnotsufficienttomerelyattachacloudofsuspiciontocounselbyashowingofalcohol   ordrugabuseduringrepresentationofthepetitioner.Ourcourtsandotherjurisdictions,while  deploringtheconduct,haverepeatedlysaidthat alcoholordrugabusebythedefenseattorney,  withoutspecificproofofitseffectonperformance,doesnotmeritrelief._Brimmer_Ԁv.State,29 k S.W.3d497,510(Tenn.Crim.App.1998).Ifinthisinstance,counselsrepresentationwas T deficient,thosedeficienciesexistedatthetimeoftheguiltypleaandwerenotdependentonalater =  actionbytheBoardofProfessionalResponsibility. & v   _ Thepetitioneralsocontendsthathissentencewasillegalinthatthesentencewhichthe  H petitioneracceptedinhispleabargainwasinexcessoftherangeforwhichhewouldordinarily  1  qualify.Thisargumenthasbeenrejectedinthatoffenderclassificationandreleaseeligibilityare    nonjurisdictionalandarelegitimatebargainingtoolsundertheCriminalSentencingReformAct   of1989.McConnellv.State,12S.W.3d795,798(Tenn.2000);Hicksv.State,945S.W.2d706,   709(Tenn.1997).    n  Thepetitionerreliesonthecaseof_Apprendi_Ԁv.NewJersey,530U.S.466,120S.Ct.2348 W  (2000),forthepropositionthatthehybridsentenceinthismatterisunconstitutional.Without @ conceding_Apprendi_sapplicabilitytothesefacts,wenotethatTennesseeCodeAnnotatedsection )y 4030202(b)(nowsection4030102(b))requiresanyclaimbasedonanewlyrecognized b constitutionalrighttobefiledwithoutoneyearoftheruling.Thus,if_Apprendi_wereapplicable, K itwouldhavenecessitatedafilingofthepostconvictionpetitionbyJuneof2001. 4   Thepetitionerhasnotshownthatheisentitledtorelief.Basedontheforegoingandthe  recordasawhole,weaffirmthetrialcourtsdismissalofthepostconvictionpetitionasbeingtime  Єbarred.( X, Xt(#XX #XX   q  Z  C  ,| 0 ` 0 ` (#` (#0 (# (#0h(#(#0h(#h(#0(#(#___________________________________e(#(#  `     h     JOHNEVERETTWILLIAMS,JUDGE