ÿWPC  yosã16~/~/v€ïÚD&ºšûR|–“yLGÞ Òçª_5†åýÀ8ö9ÈöœKðþ!b.ùì3üU2„ùïF¼Š¾2ƒæò!¤$Ø{9¤™º0 ÏÂò‘vúYxiÄxDó>ÏPë>\™Qib %\^ b 0ˆnUNöwD4H\ zkÒå· m¹ #ÉÐ UN™ Æç Æ­ ÆsÆ9 0DÿNCrE‡·E>¼@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@büüüüüüüüüüüüüüüüüüüüüüüüüüüüüüüüüüüü 0ë Bïï 0¤  D5° D-å 0K AS]ư 0¤v 0D A«^»%61Ï (`£ª$¡¡Ñ€.ÑÑ8€½­»»d»»d8ÑÑ ý ÑÓ  Ó(í€"  Z6Times New Roman Regular ~‰/TWin103|x ˜C:\PROGRA~1\COREL\WORDPE~1\TEMPLATE\CUSTOM~1\REVISE~1.WPTC:\Program Files\Corel\WordPerfect Office 2000\Template\Custom WP Templates\revised standard opinion.wptÿU‹ÿÀÀÀ˜\\IB01S02\CLERKJACÈÈ,,,,ÈÈ0(ÖÃ9 Z‹6Times New Roman RegularLevel 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5‚Level 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5„Level 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5…Level 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5(#Ã$òòÚ  Ú0Ú  Úóó hÑ À ÑÑ\R3Ø'Avery 5262 Address\Ñ }Ý ƒR*$ÝÓ  Óà  àòòÚ  Ú1Ú  ÚóóÔ€ôîŒò»»ÔÝ  ÝÔ_Ô€We€note€that,€in€its€sentencing€pronouncement,€the€trial€court€stated€that,€if€the€Appellant€successfullyÐ ° Ðcompleted€one€year€in€the€community€corrections€program,€he€would€be€eligible€for€transfer€to€supervised€probation.€Ð qÁ ÐWe€will€not€consider€this€as€part€of€the€Appellantððs€sentence€for€review€purposes,€as€it€is€conditioned€upon€the€successfulÐ 2‚ Ðcompletion€of€one€year€of€community€corrections€service€and€is€not€reflected€on€the€judgment€form.€€ WedemeyerAllmand TBIPappas CrimreweighTuggleAmannsAshbyBledsoe- ù-(|G2*$¤¤Ý ƒ£ª!ÝÑ€.ÑÑ8€Òy»»dXXdé8ÑÑ ý ÑÓ  ÓÝ  Ýà  àòòÚ  Ú0Ú  ÚóóÔ€ôîŒò»»Ô d(|3ø¶$££Ý ƒ£ª!ÝÑ€.ÑÑ8€Òy»»dXXdé8ÑÑ ý ÑÓ  ÓÝ  ÝVVVV)ÿÿ!dxdx)!ÈÈÈÈdxdx( ±þ$’’ò òFigure€Ú  Ú1Ú  Úó ó^_X`YEþÿ<<CÿÿƒLevel 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5(|3ø¶$¢¢Ý ƒ£ª!ÝÑ€.ÑÑ8€Òy»»dXXdé8ÑÑ ý ÑÓ  ÓÝ  Ý($$””ò òÚ  Ú1Ú  Úó óX[Z&OLE 2.0 Box <=8ÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿCÿÿ HKKKKÝ ƒ£ª!ÝÑ€.ÑÑ8€Òy»»ddÈ8ÑÑ ý ÑÓ  ÓÝ  ÝÔ_ÔÑ  ÑÑ  ÑÔ€¼Òy»»»ÔÑ8€‹XXdé»»d8ÑÑ€™Ñà@hhìàÔ‡î%ÒyÔIN€THE€COURT€OF€CRIMINAL€APPEALS€OF€TENNESSEEˆÐ ° Ðà@òò%ìàAT€JACKSONÔ#†¼Òy»îî%#ԈРÓ# ÐÓ  Óà @ àà @` àJune€2,€2004€SessionÐ öF ÐÔ‡X‹X»¼ÒyÔÌò òÔ#†¼Òy»XX‹!#ÔSTATE€OF€TENNESSEEòòóó€v.€TONY€HARPòòóóÔ‡X‹X»¼ÒyÔó óÐ ï? ÐÌà@@½½ìàò òDirect€Appeal€from€the€Circuit€Court€for€Lauderdale€CountyÐ é 9 Ðà@@øøìàNo.€7356€€€€€€Joseph€H.€Walker,€JudgeÐ Ó # ÐÌÌà@@ìì*ìàßA€V) °°` d€÷E<` AßÐ ‘á  ÐÌà@@TTìàNo.€W2003„01655„CCA„R3„CD€€„€Filed€September€21,€Ô_Ô2004Ô_ÔÐ ŠÚ  ÐÌßA€V) °°` dE<]` AßÐ ^®  Ðó óÌÓ  ÓÔ‡ X½XXX‹ÔThe€Appellant,€Tony€Harp,€was€convicted€in€the€Lauderdale€County€Circuit€Court€of€one€count€ofÐ V¦  Ðtheft€of€property€valued€between€$€1,000€and€$€10,000,€a€class€D€felony.€€Following€a€sentencingÐ ? Ðhearing,€the€trial€court€imposed€a€thirty„month€community€corrections€sentence,€with€service€ofÐ (x Ðninety€days€in€the€county€jail.€€On€appeal,€Harp€asserts€that:€(1)€the€evidence€is€insufficient€to€sustainÐ a Ðthe€conviction€and€(2)€the€trial€court€erred€in€denying€him€full€probation.€€After€review€of€the€record,Ð úJ Ðwe€find€no€error€and€affirm€the€judgment€of€conviction€and€resulting€sentence.€Ô#†X‹XX X½È#ÔÔ#†¼Òy»XX‹’#ÔÔ‡X‹X»¼ÒyÔÐ ã3 ÐÓ¼ÓÌò òTenn.€R.€App.€P.€3;€Judgment€of€the€Circuit€Court€Affirmedó óÐ µ ÐÌòòÓ  ÓÔ#†¼Òy»àX‹Ô#ÔÔ‡X‹X.¼ÒyÔDavid€G.€Hayes,€J.óó,€delivered€the€opinion€of€the€court,€in€which€òòDavid€H.€Wellesóó€and€òòRobert€W.Ð ˆØ ÐWedemeyer,€JóóJ.,€joined.Ð qÁ ÐÌJ.€Thomas€Caldwell,€Ripley,€Tennessee,€for€the€Appellant,€Tony€Harp.Ð C“ ÐÌPaul€G.€Summers,€Attorney€General€and€Reporter;€Michael€Moore,€Solicitor€General;€Jennifer€L.Ð e ÐBledsoe,€Assistant€Attorney€General;€Elizabeth€T.€Rice,€District€Attorney€General;€and€Tracey€A.Ð þN ÐBrewer,€Assistant€District€Attorney€General,€for€the€Appellee,€State€of€Tennessee.Ð ç 7  ÐÌÔ#†¼Òy»XX‹¡#ÔÔ‡X‹X»¼ÒyÔÓrÓà@@OO&ìàò òOPINIONó óÔ#†¼Òy»XX‹; #ÔÔ‡X‹X»¼ÒyÔÐ ¹" " ÐÌò òFactual€Backgroundó óÐ Œ$Ü$ ÐòòóóÔ#†¼Òy»XX‹¬ #ÔÓ  ÓÔ€X‹X»¼ÒyÔÌò òÔ‡ X½XXX‹Ôó óà  àIn€July€of€2000,€the€Appellant€was€hired€as€the€manager€of€the€convenience€store€operationÐ _&¯!& Ðat€51€Travel€Center,€a€truck€stop€in€Lauderdale€County.€€Shortly€thereafter,€the€Appellant€wasÐ H'˜"' Ðpromoted€to€general€manager€of€the€truck€stop,€which€also€included€the€sale€of€fuel€and€petroleumÐ 1(#( Ðproducts.€€The€travel€center€was€owned€by€Mike€Allmand.€€Allmand,€who€had€other€businessÐ )j$) Ðinterests,€was€not€involved€in€the€daily€management€of€the€business.€€Allmand€testified€that€he€didÐ *S%* Ðnot€believe€that€the€business€was€in€financial€trouble€when€the€Appellant€was€hired.€€As€manager€ofÐ ì*<&+ Ðthe€travel€center,€the€Appellant€authorized€the€issuance€of€all€checks€for€the€business.€€However,€theÐ Õ+%', Ðbookkeeper,€Ms.€Bowers,€was€the€only€person€who€could€sign€checks€for€payroll€or€for€accountsÐ ¾,(- Ðpayable.€€Ms.€Bowers€testified€that€over€a€period€of€time,€the€Appellant€requested€that€she€sign€aÐ §-÷(.ý ÐÔ_Ônumber€of€checks,€with€the€Appellant€noted€as€the€payee,€which€he€told€her€were€for€reimbursementÐ ° Ðof€personal€funds€he€had€deposited€into€the€travel€centerððs€account€to€make€checks€clear.€€TheseÐ ™é Ðchecks€carried€the€notation€ð ðreimbursement.ðð€€During€this€period,€the€travel€center€was€experiencingÐ ‚Ò Ðfinancial€difficulty,€and€the€bank€was€routinely€calling€to€inform€of€check€overdrafts.€€Ms.€BowersÐ k» Ðstated€that€she€signed€the€checks€as€requested,€although€she€never€saw€any€type€of€receipts€indicatingÐ T¤ Ðthat€the€Appellant€had€deposited€any€of€his€personal€funds€into€the€travel€centerððs€account.Ð =  ÐÌà  àIn€January€2001,€the€Appellant€requested€that€Ms.€Bowers€sign€a€blank€check€so€that€heÐ  _ Ðcould€pay€a€bill€for€the€travel€center.€€The€Appellant€later€made€the€check€payable€to€Covington€PikeÐ ø H ÐDodge€in€the€amount€of€$€6,500€and€used€the€funds€as€down€payment€to€purchase€a€new€DodgeÐ á 1  Ðtruck.€€The€Appellant€told€the€car€salesman€that€he€was€using€a€business€check€because€the€truckÐ Ê   Ðwould€be€used€for€both€personal€and€business€use.€€The€truck€was€then€titled€in€the€AppellantððsÐ ³  Ðname.€€When€Allmand€asked€the€Appellant€about€his€new€truck,€the€Appellant€told€him€that€he€hadÐ œì  Ðused€a€rebate€from€his€mother,€who€worked€at€Chrysler,€as€partial€payment€for€the€truck.Ð …Õ  ÐÌà  àIn€March€2001,€Allmand€began€reviewing€the€bank€account€records€due€to€variousÐ W§  Ðdiscrepancies.€€While€attempting€to€reconcile€the€account,€he€discovered€several€unauthorizedÐ @ Ðchecks,€one€of€which€was€the€$€6,500€check€to€Covington€Pike€Dodge.€€At€this€point,€AllmandÐ )y Ðretained€Billy€Harmon,€a€CPA,€to€examine€the€business€records.€€The€Appellant€met€with€HarmonÐ b Ðand€advised€that€he€had€been€loaning€his€personal€funds€to€the€travel€center€to€keep€the€business€inÐ ûK Ðoperation.€€According€to€the€Appellant,€he€believed€that,€in€January€2001,€he€was€owed€$€6,500€byÐ ä4 Ðthe€business.€€No€documentation€was€ever€provided€to€support€this€assertion,€and€HarmonððsÐ Í Ðexamination€of€the€records€also€failed€to€produce€any€evidence€supporting€this€claim.€€A€TBIÐ ¶ Ðinvestigation€produced€various€inconsistencies€with€regard€to€the€Appellantððs€claim€that€he€had€atÐ Ÿï Ðtimes€financed€the€travel€center€operation.€€Moreover,€a€review€of€the€Appellantððs€financial€statusÐ ˆØ Ðindicated€two€prior€bankruptcies€and€no€available€source€of€funds€to€loan€to€the€travel€center.€€TheÐ qÁ ÐAppellantððs€employment€was€terminated€in€April€2001.€€That€same€month,€the€travel€center€filed€forÐ Zª Ðbankruptcy.Ð C“ ÐÌà  àOn€October€7,€2002,€the€Appellant€was€indicted€by€a€Lauderdale€County€grand€jury€for€oneÐ e Ðcount€of€theft€of€property€over€$€1,000€but€less€than€$€10,000.€€The€charge€stemmed€from€theÐ þN ÐAppellantððs€act€of€writing€the€$€6,500€check€to€Covington€Pike€Dodge.€€The€Appellant€pled€notÐ ç 7 Ðguilty€and€asserted€the€affirmative€defense€of€claim€of€right.€€A€bench€trial€was€held€on€February€11,Ð Ð!   Ð2002,€after€which€the€trial€court€found€the€Appellant€guilty€as€indicted.Ð ¹" ! ÐÌà  àDuring€the€sentencing€hearing,€the€Appellant€requested€that€he€be€granted€judicial€diversionÐ ‹$Û# Ðor€some€form€of€alternative€sentencing.€€After€hearing€the€evidence€presented,€the€trial€court€imposedÐ t%Ä $ Ðâ âa€thirty„month€community€corrections€sentence,€with€service€of€ninety€days€in€the€county€jail.׃×Ý ƒ#ÃÝòòÚ  Ú1Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý×  ×€€Ð ]&­!% ÐAdditionally,€the€Appellant€was€ordered€to€pay€$€6,500€in€restitution.€€The€Appellant€filed€a€motionÐ ° Ðfor€new€trial,€which€was€denied.€€This€appeal€followed.€Ð ™é Ðâ âÌ€à@ƒƒ&ìàò òAnalysisˆÐ k» ÐÌó óà  àOn€appeal,€the€Appellant€raises€two€issues€for€our€review.€€First,€he€asserts€that€the€evidenceÐ A ‘ Ðwas€insufficient€to€support€the€trial€courtððs€finding€of€guilt€beyond€a€reasonable€doubt.€€Second,€heÐ * z Ðargues€that€the€trial€court€erred€in€denying€him€a€sentence€of€full€probation.€Ð  c ÐÌò òI.€€Sufficiency€of€the€EvidenceÐ å 5  ÐÌó óà  àThe€Appellant€specifically€argues€that€the€proof€adduced€at€trial€does€not€establish€that€hisÐ ¹  Ðconduct€constituted€the€crime€of€theft.€€Rather,€he€argues€that€the€case€should€have€ð ðbeen€a€civil€suitÐ ¢ò  Ðfor€an€accountingðð€because€the€proof€established€that€he€had€loaned€the€business€money€and€was,Ð ‹Û  Ðtherefore,€entitled€to€reimbursement.€€Ð tÄ  ÐÌò òó óà  àIn€considering€this€issue,€we€apply€the€rule€that,€where€the€sufficiency€of€the€evidence€isÐ F– Ðchallenged,€the€relevant€question€for€the€reviewing€court€is€€ð ðwhether,€after€viewing€the€evidenceÐ / Ðin€the€light€most€favorable€to€the€[State],€òòanyóó€rational€trier€of€fact€could€have€found€the€essentialÐ h Ðelements€of€the€crime€beyond€a€reasonable€doubt.ðð€€òòJackson€v.€Virginiaóó,€443€U.S.€307,€319,€99€S.Ð Q ÐCt.€2781,€2789€(1979);€òòsee€alsoóó€Tenn.€R.€App.€P.€13(e).€€Moreover,€the€State€is€entitled€to€theÐ ê: Ðstrongest€legitimate€view€of€the€evidence€and€all€reasonable€inferences€which€may€be€drawnÐ Ó# Ðtherefrom.€€òòState€v.€Harrisóó,€839€S.W.2d€54,€75€(Tenn.€1992).€€All€questions€involving€the€credibilityÐ ¼  Ðof€witnesses,€the€weight€and€value€to€be€given€the€evidence,€and€all€factual€issues€are€resolved€byÐ ¥õ Ðthe€trier€of€fact.€€òòState€v.€Pappasóó,€754€S.W.2d€620,€623€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.€1987).€€This€court€willÐ ŽÞ Ðnot€reweigh€or€reevaluate€the€evidence€presented.€€òòState€v.€Cabbageóó,€571€S.W.2d€832,€835€(Tenn.Ð wÇ Ð1978).€Ð `° ÐÌà  àð ðA€guilty€verdict€by€the€jury,€approved€by€the€trial€judge,€accredits€the€testimony€of€theÐ 2‚ Ðwitnesses€for€the€State€and€resolves€all€conflicts€in€favor€of€the€theory€of€the€State.ðð€€òòState€v.€Graceóó,Ð k Ð493€S.W.2d€474,€476€(Tenn.€1973).€€A€jury€conviction€removes€the€presumption€of€innocence€withÐ  T Ðwhich€a€defendant€is€initially€cloaked€and€replaces€it€with€one€of€guilt,€so€that€on€appeal,€a€convictedÐ í = Ðdefendant€has€the€burden€of€demonstrating€that€the€evidence€is€insufficient.€€òòState€v.€Tuggleóó,€639Ð Ö!&  ÐS.W.2d€913,€914€(Tenn.€1982).€€In€a€bench€trial,€the€verdict€of€the€trial€judge€is€entitled€to€the€sameÐ ¿"! Ðweight€on€appeal€as€a€jury€verdict.€€òòState€v.€Holderóó,€15€S.W.3d€905,€911€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.€1999).Ð ¨#ø" ÐThese€rules€are€applicable€to€findings€of€guilt€predicated€upon€direct€evidence,€circumstantialÐ ‘$á# Ðevidence,€or€a€combination€of€both.€€òòState€v.€Matthewsóó,€805€S.W.2d€776,€779€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.Ð z%Ê $ Ð1990).€€Ð c&³!% ÐÌà  àThe€Appellant€was€convicted€of€theft€of€property,€a€class€D€felony.€€A€person€commits€"theftÐ 5(…#' Ðof€property"€if,€"with€intent€to€deprive€the€owner€of€property,€the€person€knowingly€obtains€orÐ )n$( Ðexercises€control€over€the€property€without€the€owner's€effective€consent."€€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€39„Ð *W%) Ð14„103€(2003).€Therefore,€in€order€to€obtain€a€theft€conviction,€the€State€must€establish€"(1)€theÐ ð*@&* Ðdefendant€knowingly€obtained€or€exercised€control€over€property;€(2)€the€defendant€did€not€have€theÐ Ù+)'+ Ðowner's€effective€consent;€and€(3)€the€defendant€intended€to€deprive€the€owner€of€the€property."€Ð ° ÐòòState€v.€Amannsóó,€2€S.W.3d€241,€244„45€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.€1999).€Ð ™é ÐÌà  àAt€trial,€the€Appellant€asserted€the€affirmative€defense€of€claim€of€right,€òòi.e.óó,€that€he€actedÐ k» Ðin€the€honest€belief€that€he€had€the€right€to€obtain€or€exercise€control€over€the€bank€account€forÐ T¤ Ðreimbursement€of€personal€funds€he€had€loaned€to€the€business.€€òòSeeóó€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€39„14„Ð =  Ð107(2)€(2003).€€He€contends€that€the€proof€clearly€established€that€he€advanced€personal€funds€toÐ & v Ðthe€travel€center€and€that€business€checks€were€written€to€reimburse€these€advances.€€He€argues€thatÐ  _ Ðthis€reimbursement€procedure€was€an€ð ðopen€[and]€obvious€transactionðð€and,€thus,€became€anÐ ø H Ðestablished€business€practice.€€While€several€checks€made€payable€to€the€Appellant€and€markedÐ á 1  Ðreimbursement€were€admitted€into€evidence,€there€was€no€proof,€other€than€the€Appellantððs€self„Ð Ê   Ðserving€testimony,€that€he€had€advanced€money€into€the€business€account.€€Ms.€Bowers€testified€that,Ð ³  Ðon€one€occasion€the€Appellant€brought€in€money€for€a€deposit€and€indicated€that€it€was€his€personalÐ œì  Ðmoney.€€On€this€occasion,€the€Appellant€told€Ms.€Bowers€that€the€cash€ð ðcame€from€his€house.ðð€€TheÐ …Õ  Ðproof€also€established€that€the€Appellant€had€access€to€cash€funds€as€he€assisted€in€the€collection€ofÐ n¾  Ðmonies€from€the€various€cash€drawers€of€the€business.€€However,€she€had€only€the€Appellantððs€wordÐ W§  Ðas€to€the€source€of€the€funds.€€At€trial,€the€Appellant€failed€to€produce€any€evidence,€òòi.e.,óó€receipts€orÐ @ Ðdeposit€slips,€indicating€that€he€had€advanced€money€to€aid€the€business.€€The€trial€court€in€itsÐ )y Ðfindings€concluded€that€the€Appellant€ð ðwas€not€credibleðð€and€ð ðhad€an€ongoing€scheme€to€defraudÐ b Ðthe€business€in€several€respects,€in€addition€to€the€check€for€which€the€state€brought€charges.ððÐ ûK ÐÌà  àThe€burden€of€raising€an€affirmative€defense€rests€upon€the€defendant.€€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ððÐ Í Ð39„11„204(d).€€An€affirmative€defense€must€be€established€by€a€preponderance€of€the€evidence.€Ð ¶ ÐTenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€39„11„204(e)€(2003).€€Obviously€by€finding€the€Appellant€guilty€of€theft,€the€trialÐ Ÿï Ðcourt€rejected€the€Appellantððs€assertion€of€claim€of€right€over€the€bank€funds.€€We€agree€that€proofÐ ˆØ Ðof€the€Appellantððs€claim€of€right€to€business€funds€in€the€amount€of€$€6,500€was€not€established€byÐ qÁ Ða€preponderance€of€the€evidence.€€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€39„11„204(e).òòóóÐ Zª ÐÔ#†X‹XX X½f #ÔÔ‡ X½XXX‹Ô€€Ð C“ Ðà  àReturning€to€the€issue€of€the€sufficiency€of€the€evidence,€the€proof€established€that€theÐ ,| ÐAppellant€approached€Ms.€Bowers,€the€bookkeeper,€and€told€her€he€needed€a€check€in€order€to€payÐ e Ða€bill€for€the€business.€€Bowers€signed€check€number€2982€in€blank€and€gave€it€to€the€Appellant.€Ð þN ÐThe€Appellant€then€took€the€check€to€Covington€Pike€Dodge€and€used€it€as€a€down„payment€on€aÐ ç 7 Ðpickup€truck,€which€was€titled€in€his€name.€€Testimony€established€that€this€was€done€without€theÐ Ð!   Ðknowledge€or€effective€consent€of€the€owner.€€Viewed€in€the€light€most€favorable€to€the€State,€thisÐ ¹" ! Ðevidence€was€more€than€legally€sufficient€to€establish€the€elements€of€theft€of€property€beyond€aÐ ¢#ò" Ðreasonable€doubt.€€òòóóThis€issue€is€without€merit.Ð ‹$Û# ÐÌò òÌII.€€Denial€of€ProbationÐ G'—"& ÐÌó óà  àSecond,€the€Appellant€challenges€the€trial€courtððs€denial€of€full€probation.€€After€hearing€theÐ )k$( Ðevidence,€the€trial€court€imposed€the€alternative€sentence€of€community€corrections.€€While€notingÐ *T%) Ðthat€the€Appellant€qualified€for€alternative€sentencing,€the€trial€court€concluded€that€jail€time€wasÐ í*=&* Ðwarranted€by€the€crime€and€ordered€the€Appellant€to€serve€ninety€days€in€the€county€jail€inÐ Ö+&'+ ÐÑ™Ñâ âÑÀ°ÑÑTRXì3Ø'Avery 5262 AddressXà3Ø' Letter3Ø'Letter ÓÝ  ÝÔ_ÔÑ  ÑÑ  Ñÿ3Ø'LetterTÑâ âÑ  Ñconjunction€with€his€placement€in€community€corrections.€€On€appeal,€the€Appellant€does€notÐ ° Ðchallenge€the€length€of€the€sentence€but,€rather,€challenges€only€the€denial€of€full€probation.€€Ð ™é ÐÌà  àWhen€the€sentencing€court€properly€considers€the€relevant€sentencing€considerations,€thisÐ k» Ðcourt€conducts€a€òòde€novoóó€review€with€the€presumption€that€the€determinations€made€by€the€trial€courtÐ T¤ Ðare€correct.€€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€40„35„401(d)€(2003);€òòState€v.€Ashbyóó,€823€S.W.2d€166,€169€(Tenn.Ð =  Ð1991).€€In€this€case,€the€presumption€of€correctness€is€applied€as€we€find€that€the€trial€court€properlyÐ & v Ðconsidered€the€sentencing€principles€and€relevant€facts.€Ð  _ ÐÌà  àThe€defendant€has€the€burden€of€establishing€his€suitability€for€full€probation,€even€if€theÐ á 1  Ðdefendant€is€entitled€to€the€statutory€presumption€of€alternative€sentencing.€€òòIdóó.;€òòState€v.€Boggsóó,€932Ð Ê   ÐS.W.2d€467,€477€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.€1996).€€To€meet€the€burden€of€establishing€suitability€for€totalÐ ³  Ðprobation,€an€appellant€must€demonstrate€that€probation€will€ð ðsubserve€the€ends€of€justice€and€theÐ œì  Ðbest€interest€of€both€the€public€and€the€defendant.ðð€€òòState€v.€Binghamóó,€910€S.W.2d€448,€456€(Tenn.Ð …Õ  ÐCrim.€App.€1995),€òòoverruled€on€other€groundsóó,€òòState€v.€Hooperóó,€29€S.W.3d€1,€9„10€(Tenn.€2000).Ð n¾  ÐWhen€deciding€suitability€for€probation,€although€not€controlling,€the€sentencing€court€should€useÐ W§  Ðthe€following€criteria:€(1)€the€nature€and€circumstances€of€the€criminal€conduct€involved,€TennesseeÐ @ ÐCode€Annotated€section€40„35„210(b)(4)€(2003);€(2)€the€potential€or€lack€of€potential€forÐ )y Ðrehabilitation,€including€the€risk€that€during€the€period€of€probation€a€defendant€will€commit€anotherÐ b Ðcrime,€Tennessee€Code€Annotated€section€40„35„103(5)€(2003);€(3)€whether€a€sentence€of€fullÐ ûK Ðprobation€would€unduly€depreciate€the€seriousness€of€the€offense,€Tennessee€Code€AnnotatedÐ ä4 Ðsection€40„35„103(1)(B);€and€(4)€whether€a€sentence€other€than€full€probation€would€provide€anÐ Í Ðeffective€deterrent€to€others€likely€to€commit€similar€crimes,€Tennessee€Code€Annotated€section€40„Ð ¶ Ð35„103(1)(B).€€òòBinghamóó,€910€S.W.2d€at€456.€€Denial€of€probation€may€be€based€solely€upon€theÐ Ÿï Ðcircumstances€of€the€offense€when€they€are€of€such€a€nature€as€to€outweigh€all€other€factors€favoringÐ ˆØ Ðprobation.€€òòState€v.€Fletcheróó,€805€S.W.2d€785,€789€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.€1991).€€Our€supreme€courtÐ qÁ Ðencourages€the€grant€of€considerable€discretionary€authority€to€our€trial€courts€in€matters€such€asÐ Zª Ðthese.€€òòAshbyóó,€823€S.W.2d€at€171.€€ð ðIt€is€not€the€policy€or€purpose€of€this€court€to€place€trial€judgesÐ C“ Ðin€a€judicial€straight„jacket€in€this€or€any€other€area,€and€we€are€always€reluctant€to€interfere€withÐ ,| Ðtheir€traditional€discretionary€powers.ðð€€òòIdóó.€€Ð e ÐÌà  àUpon€review,€the€record€supports€the€trial€courtððs€denial€of€full€probation.€€The€recordÐ ç 7 Ðdemonstrates,€as€found€by€the€trial€court,€that€the€Appellant€was€placed€in€a€position€of€trust€andÐ Ð!   Ðabused€his€position€by€operating€an€ð ðongoing€scheme€to€defraud€the€business.ðð€€The€criminalÐ ¹" ! Ðconduct€was€not€an€isolated€event€but€extended€over€a€period€of€time.€€At€the€sentencing€hearing,Ð ¢#ò" ÐMike€Allmand€testified€that€the€Appellant€had€taken€a€total€of€$€46,020.41€from€his€business,€whichÐ ‹$Û# Ðwas€later€forced€into€bankruptcy.€€We€find€that€the€facts€and€circumstances€of€this€case€are€such€thatÐ t%Ä $ Ðfull€probation€is€inappropriate.€€Ð ]&­!% ÐÌà@GG%ìàò òCONCLUSIONˆÐ /(#' ÐÌó óà  àAfter€review,€we€find€that€the€evidence€is€sufficient€to€support€the€Appellantððs€convictionÐ *S%) Ðfor€theft€of€property.€€Additionally,€we€find€no€error€in€the€trial€courtððs€denial€of€full€probation.€Ð ì*<&* ÐAccordingly,€we€affirm€the€judgment€of€conviction€and€resulting€sentence.€€Ð Õ+%'+ ÐÐ ¾,(, ÐÔ#†X‹XX X½A<#ÔÌÌÌà  àà ` àà ¸ àà  àà h àà À àà  à___________________________________€Ð k» Ðà  àà ` àà ¸ àà  àà h àà À àà  àDAVID€G.€HAYES,€JUDGE