ÿWPC€9 …UBV %˜U.žÌnXÜ 0P4 4„ ˜ 0 ”  0D4 w@x U:¸ 0lò ^ 0Jd 0T® 0^ 0h` 0rÈ B: 0|W n­Ó € 0†ˆ D3 0A 1uÑ 0@F 0d†U6êB) DCI AMŒ2Ù¶ ÁñÃñ´”¥†9!¿%šO'Ùé*fÂ,'(-;O.v~Š0vÓ2 AOÛ7Æ*8 0Dð8 D/49 Bc9<þ6X9`(*Courier 12pt10cpiX%ä2¼A`ArialTT3|XÖ«<þ6X9`(*Courier 12pt10cpiXXxþ6X@ÉJQX@%ä2¼A`ArialTTt10cpiXXXä2¼P±ŠQXP((­À$¡¡ÒD°ÒÒ¦°ÒÓ  ÓÚƒç"((D(3¾Á$¤¤Ý ƒ­À!ÝÒD°ÒÒ¦°ÒÓ  ÓÝ  Ýà œ àòòÚ  Ú0Ú  Úóó(5Ã$òòÚ  Ú9Ú  Úóó ÍÎÏUÐÑÒÓÔÓ€Õ+UÖ,î,c½¬AZ‹"Arial Regular(D3u$©©Ý ƒ­À!ÝÒD°ÒÒ¦°ÒÓ  ÓÝ  ÝH2 ÿÿ0Indent1Ô2ÔÔ3  Ô2" ÿÿ0Indent2à0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2, ÿÿ0Indent3à0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô26 ÿÿ0Indent4à0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2@ ÿÿ0Indent5à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô d2J ÿÿ0Indent6à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô«<þ6X9`(*Courier 12pt10cpiXXxþ6X@ÉJQX@2T ÿÿ0Indent7à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô$$$$'ÿÿdxd2^ ÿÿ0Indent8à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô%)+ ÿÿ?AGMSYaioIndent0I.A.1.a.(1)(a)i)a)("ÿÿ$££Ò  ÒÒ  ÒP ÿÿ8Mac DefaultMac DefaultÓ ` °šXÓ< Œ 9p`(Courier New% Line 7 d99997Border 1dd€-:Cþÿ << Gÿÿ (Ý ƒ!ÝÑ  ÑÑ#€d#ÑÔ€8ÔÒ D ÒÒ ¦ ÒÝ  ÝÔ€ÔÔ€ÔÓ  ÓÔ YYY ÔFILEDÔ€XÔÌÌò òOctoberÏ31,Ï1997ÌÌCecilÏCrowson,ÏJr.ÌÔ€ôÔAppellateÏCourtÏClerkó ó ¬Ý ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€8ÔÒ D ÒÒ ¦ ÒÝ  ÝÝ ƒ $Ýà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  ÝÔ€8ôÔÔ€ÔThe€defendant€was€charged€with€ð ðmaliciously,€deliberately€and€premeditatedly€mak[ing]€anÏassault€upon€the€body€of€[the€victim]€with€the€felonious€intent€then€and€there€to€unlawfully,€feloniously,Ïmaliciously,€deliberately€and€premeditatedly€to€kill€and€murder€the€[victim]€and€to€commit€the€crime€ofÏmurder€in€the€first€degree€by€use€of€a€deadly€weapon,€to€wit:€€a€knife,€and€did€thereby€cause€bodily€injuryÏto€the€victim€.€.€.€all€in€violation€of€TCA€39„2„103.ðð€€T.C.A.€ðð€39„2„103€(Repl.€1982)€is€titled€ð ðAssault€withÏintent€to€murderðð€and€provides€ð ð(a)€Whoever€shall€feloniously€and€with€malice€aforethought€assault€anyÏperson,€with€intent€to€commit€murder€in€the€first€degree,€.€.€.€though€death€shall€not€ensue,€shall,€onÏconviction,€be€imprisoned€in€the€state€penitentiary€for€not€less€than€five€(5)€nor€more€than€twenty„fiveÏ(25)€years.€€(b)€If€bodily€injury€to€the€victim€occurs€as€a€result€of€such€an€assault€in€violation€of€subsectionÏ(a),€the€punishment€shall€be€a€determinate€sentence€of€confinement€in€the€state€penitentiary€for€life€orÏfor€a€period€of€not€less€than€five€(5)€years.€€(c)€In€the€case€of€bodily€injury€to€the€victim,€the€offenseÏdefined€in€subsection€(b)€of€this€section€is€a€Class€X€felony.ððÌ øÝ ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€8ÔÒ D ÒÒ ¦ ÒÝ  ÝÝ ƒ $Ýà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  ÝÔ€8ôÔÔ€ÔThe€Sixth€Amendment€to€the€United€States€Constitution€provides,€ð ðIn€all€criminal€prosecutions,Ïthe€accused€shall€enjoy€the€right€to€a€speedy€and€public€trial€.€.€.€.ðð€€This€right€has€been€applied€to€stateÏcriminal€prosecutions€through€the€Fourteenth€Amendment€to€the€U.S.€Constitution.€€òòKlopfer€v.€NorthÏCarolinaóó,€386€U.S.€213€(1967).€€The€Tennessee€Constitution€similarly€provides€ð ðThat€in€all€criminalÏprosecutions€[by€indictment€or€presentment],€the€accused€hath€the€right€to€.€.€.€a€speedy€public€trial.€.€.€ðð€ÏArt.€I,€Sec.€9.Ì çÝ ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€8ÔÒ D ÒÒ ¦ ÒÝ  ÝÝ ƒ $Ýà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  ÝÔ€8ôÔÔ€ÔIndeed,€the€record€contains€an€August€3,€1995,€letter€from€the€defendant€to€his€lawyer€stating,Ïamong€other€things,€ð ðIt€is€my€thoughts€that€avoiding€trial€is€the€best€way€for€all€parties€involved.€€I€have€aÏnumber€of€ideas€to€keep€a€trial€delayed€for€a€period€of€time.ððÌ çÝ ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€8ÔÒ D ÒÒ ¦ ÒÝ  ÝÝ ƒ $Ýà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  ÝÔ€8ôÔÔ€ÔThe€maximum€sentence€to€which€the€defendant€is€subject€under€the€1982€Act€is€lifeÏimprisonment€rather€than€twenty„five€years€because€his€assault€with€intent€to€commit€first„degree€murderÏresulted€in€bodily€injury€to€the€victim.€€òòSeeóó€T.C.A.€ðð39„2„103(b)€(Repl.€1982).Ì ŠÝ ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€8ÔÒ D ÒÒ ¦ ÒÝ  ÝÝ ƒ $Ýà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  ÝÔ€8ôÔÔ€ÔAssault€with€intent€to€commit€first„degree€murder€is€a€Class€A€felony€under€the€1989€Act,€T.C.A.Ïðð€40„35„118€(Supp.€1995),€and€the€defendant€was€sentenced€as€a€Range€I€offender.€€Ì |Ý ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€8ÔÒ D ÒÒ ¦ ÒÝ  ÝÝ ƒ $Ýà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  ÝÔ€ÔÔ€ôÔAs€pointed€out€in€Judge€Tiptonððs€concurring€opinion,€it€is€possible€that,€under€the€1982€Act,Ïthe€trial€court€may€find€the€defendant€to€have€committed€an€ð ðespecially€aggravated€offense.ðð€€òòSeeóó€T.C.A.Ïðð€40„35„107.€€If€the€court€below€finds€him€to€have€committed€an€especially€aggravated€offense,€then€heÏwould€receive€a€Range€II€sentence€under€the€1982€Act.€€T.C.A.€ðð€40„35„107(7).€€A€Range€II€sentence€forÏthe€crime€of€assault€with€intent€to€commit€first„degree€murder,€accompanied€by€bodily€injury,€would€beÏ›thirty„three€years.€€T.C.A.€ðððð€40„35„109(b),(d)(1)€and€(e)(2);€39„2„103(b).€€Thus,€if€the€court€belowÏdetermines€the€defendant€to€have€committed€an€especially€aggravated€offense,€then€we€agree€withÏJudge€Tipton€that€no€further€òòPearsonóó€analysis€is€necessary.€€However,€we€disagree€with€Judge€TiptonÏthat€this€Court€should€make€the€initial€finding€that€the€defendant€committed€such€an€offense..€œÌ †Ý ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€8ÔÒ D ÒÒ ¦ ÒÝ  ÝÝ ƒ $Ýà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  ÝÔ€ÔÔ€ôÔChapter€493€of€the€Tennessee€Public€Acts€amended€this€section€of€the€code€to€provide€for€aÏmid„range€presumptive€sentence€for€Class€A€felonies€occurring€on€or€after€July€1,€1995.Ì Ý ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€8ÔÒ D ÒÒ ¦ ÒÝ  ÝÝ ƒ $Ýà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  ÝÔ€8ôÔÔ€ÔThe€title€to€this€section€of€the€defendantððs€brief€also€includes€as€error€the€courtððs€application€asÏan€enhancement€factor,€ð ðno€hesitation€when€there€was€a€high€risk€to€others.ðð€€The€defendant€did€notÏbrief€this€factor,€however,€and€it€is€therefore€waived.€€Ct.€Crim.€App.€R.€10(b).€€We€note€that€theÏsentencing€court€did€apply€as€an€enhancement€factor€that€ð ð[t]here€w[ere]€risks€to€other€individuals.ðð€€ThisÏis€not€an€enhancement€factor€listed€in€either€the€1982€or€1989€Act.€€òòSeeóó€T.C.A.€ðððð€40„35„111€(Repl.Ï1982)€and€40„35„114€(Supp.€1995).€€On€remand,€we€suggest€that€the€sentencing€court€set€forth€itsÏfindings€of€enhancement€factors€in€the€language€of€the€statute.€Ì ÏÝ ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€8ÔÒ D ÒÒ ¦ ÒÝ  ÝÝ ƒ $Ýà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  ÝÔ€8ôÔÔ€Ôð ðDuring€the€commission€of€the€felony,€the€defendant€willfully€inflicted€bodily€injury€uponÏanother€person,€or€the€actions€of€the€defendant€resulted€in€the€death€of€or€serious€bodily€injury€to€aÏvictim€or€a€person€other€than€the€intended€victim.ððÌ \Ñ\R AØ'\Ñ Ý ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€8ÔÒ D ÒÒ ¦ ÒÝ  ÝÔ€ÔÔ€ÔÓ  ÓÔ YYY ÔFILEDÔ€XÔÌÌò òOctoberÏ31,Ï1997ÌÌCecilÏCrowson,ÏJr.ÌÔ€ôÔAppellateÏCourtÏClerkó ó 1Ý ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€8ÔÒ D ÒÒ ¦ ÒÝ  ÝÒ  ÒÒ X ÒÔ€ÔÔ€ôÔÒ D ÒÒ ¦ Òà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  Úóó€In€fact,€this€court€affirmed€the€defendantððs€Range€II,€especially€aggravated€offender€sentenceÏin€the€direct€appeal€after€the€defendantððs€first€conviction€in€this€case.€€òòSeeóó€òòState€v.€James€David€Harrisóó,ÏNo.€211,€Anderson€County€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.€Feb.€27,€1990),€òòapp.óó€òòdeniedóó€(Tenn.€Aug.€27,€1990).ÌPtPtHHÚ(ÿáÿâùFG(üHHØ(d'`Styl{WP}01•ÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃà Ãà Ãà Ãà Ãà ÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÐ ÐÐHHÐÐ  ÐÐ2ÐÐÿÿ¸æ$ÿÐÐHHÐÐÐÐÐÐÐÐ  ÐÐ ÐÐ ÐÑÑÑGenevaÑÑ ÑÑ € ÑÑ<Px–ÈÑÒÒÒ443!#4ÒÒ$ *$ÒÒ$*$ÒÒ ÿKK ÒÒ  Geneva ÒÒ  Geneva ÒÓ.,ÓÓÓÓ6ÓÓ ÓßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßÑGenevaÑÑ ÑÒ  ion-F Geneva ÒÒ  ion-F Geneva Ò€-‚ƒCþÿ<< CÿÿƒLevel 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5($$””ò òÚ  Ú1Ú  Úó ó„„'÷ÿ dxdüÿP PdÝ ƒ!ÝÔ . ÔÔ€8ÔÒ D ÒÒ ¦ ÒÝ  ÝÑ ` ÑÑ X ÑÑ7€‚0XXdÈdÈ7ÑÑ  ÑÑ\R AØ'\ÑÓ  ÓÔ€ÔÙ€€ÙßR€;<:A1-j|` 81 `€€@ÿRß›Þ ÞÌà àà àò òIN€THE€COURT€OF€CRIMINAL€APPEALS€OF€TENNESSEEÌÌà@ àAT€KNOXVILLEÌÌÓ  Óà@ àJUNE€1997€SESSIONÌÌÌÌó óÌò òSTATE€OF€TENNESSEE,à àà àà à)ó óÌà àà àà àà àà àà àò ò)ó óà àò òC.C.A.€NO.€03C01„9611„CR„00428ó óÌà àà àAppellee,à àò ò€€€€€à àà à)Ìà àà àà àà àà àà à)à àANDERSON€COUNTYó óÌVS.à àà àà àà àà àà àò ò)Ìà àà àà àà àà àà à)à àHON.€D.€KELLY€THOMAS,€JR.,ÌJAMES€DAVID€HARRIS,à àà àà à)à àJUDGEÌà àà àà àà àà àà à)Ìà àà àó óAppellant.ò òà àà àà à)à àó ó(Assault€with€intent€to€commitÌà àà àà àà àà àà àà à€€first„degree€murder)ò òÌó óÌÌÌòòFOR€THE€APPELLANT:óóà àà àà à€€€€€òòà àFOR€THE€APPELLEE:óóÌÌÌò òMART€S.€CIZEKó óà àà àà àà àà àò òJOHN€KNOX€WALKUPó óÌ245€North€Main€St.,€Suite€100à àà àà àAttorney€General€&€Reporterò òÌó óClinton,€TN€€€37716ò òÌó ó€€€€€(On€appeal)à àà àò òà àà àà àTIMOTHY€F.€BEHANó óÌà àà àà àà àà àà àà àAsst.€Attorney€GeneralÌò òTOM€MARSHALLó óà àà àà àà àà à450€James€RobertsonÏPkwy.à àDistrict€Public€Defenderà àà àà àà àNashville,€TN€€37243„0493Ì101€S.€Main€St.à àà àà àà àÌClinton,€TN€€€37716à àà àò òà àà àà àJAMES€N.€RAMSEYó óÌ€€€€€(At€trial)à àà àà àà àà àà àDistrict€Attorney€GeneralÌÌà àà àà àà àò òà àà àà àJAN€HICKSó óÌà àà àà àà àà àà àà àAsst.€District€Attorney€GeneralÌà àà àà àà àà àà àà àAnderson€County€CourthouseÌà àà àà àà àà àà àà àClinton,€TN€€€37716Ìà àà àà àà àà àà àà àà àÌÌà àà àà àà àà àà àà àÌà àà àà àà àÌOPINION€FILED:____________________ÌÌÌÌò òCONVICTION€AFFIRMED;€REMANDEDÌFOR€RESENTENCINGó óÌÌÌò òJOHN€H.€PEAY,ó óÌJudgeÌÇÑ  ÑÓ  Óà@ àò òòòO€P€I€N€I€O€NÌÌÌó óóóÌÓÓà àà àThe€defendant€was€initially€convicted€in€1988€of€attempted€first„degreeÏmurder€with€bodily€injury.€€He€was€granted€post„conviction€relief€in€June€1991€on€theÏbasis€of€ineffective€assistance€of€counsel.€€Following€the€Stateððs€appeal€through€ourÏSupreme€Court€of€that€decision€and€appointment€of€a€new€trial€judge,€he€was€retriedÏin€November€1995€and€convicted€of€assault€with€intent€to€commit€first„degreeÏmurder.× ƒ= ××  ×€€After€a€hearing€he€was€sentenced€as€a€Range€I€standard€offender€toÏtwenty„three€years€incarceration.€€In€this€appeal€as€of€right,€he€raises€the€followingÏissues:ÌÒ ô ÒÒ ¦ ÒÒ ô ÒÒ Ü ÒÓÓ1.à àThe€trial€court€abused€its€discretion€when€it€rejected€hisÏà àplea€bargain;ÌÌ2.à àThe€four€and€one„half€year€delay€between€the€grant€ofÏà àpost„conviction€relief€and€his€second€trial€violated€hisÍà àright€to€a€speedy€trial;ÌÌ3.à àThe€trial€court€erred€in€its€instruction€to€the€jury€aboutÏà àthe€range€of€his€punishment€for€the€indicted€offense;Ïand€€Ì4.à àThe€trial€court€erred€in€sentencing€him.ÌÌÒ D ÒÒ Ü ÒÒ D ÒÒ ¦ ÒÓÓAfter€our€review€of€the€record,€we€find€no€merit€to€the€first€three€of€the€defendantððsÏcontentions.€€However,€because€the€trial€court€erred€in€sentencing€him,€we€remandÏthis€matter€for€resentencing.ÌÌà àà àOn€October€19,€1987,€the€defendant€and€the€victim,€his€ex„wife,€had€aÏcustody€hearing€in€conjunction€with€their€divorce.€€Following€the€hearing,€the€victimÏwent€to€the€offices€of€the€pediatric€dentist€for€whom€she€worked€as€a€dental€assistant.€ÏWhile€she€was€preparing€to€treat€a€five„year€old€girl€who€was€seated€in€the€dentalÏchair,€the€defendant€entered€the€area€and€attacked€the€victim€with€a€knife.€€He€cut€theÏvictimððs€neck,€causing€a€wound€approximately€five€inches€long€and€at€least€an€inchÏdeep.€€The€dentist,€hearing€the€commotion,€came€in€and€disarmed€the€defendant.€ÏThe€police€arrived€shortly€thereafter.ÌÌà àà àPrior€to€the€first€trial,€the€State€made€a€plea€bargain€offer€to€theÏdefendantððs€attorney€of€aggravated€assault€with€a€sentence€of€five€yearsÍincarceration.€€This€plea€offer€was€never€communicated€to€the€defendant.€€Upon€trial,Ïthe€jury€convicted€the€defendant€of€attempted€first„degree€murder€with€bodily€injuryÏand€he€was€sentenced€to€thirty„five€years€incarceration.€€The€defendant€wasÏsubsequently€granted€post„conviction€relief€on€the€basis€that€his€lawyer€wasÏineffective€for€failing€to€present€the€plea€offer€to€him,€and€that€he€was€therebyÏprejudiced.€€Following€the€Stateððs€appeals,€our€Supreme€Court€ordered€ð ð[t]he€cause€.Ï.€.€€remanded€to€the€trial€court€for€a€hearing€by€a€new€judge€in€which€the€State€isÏdirected€to€reinstate€its€original€guilty€plea€offer€and€negotiate€in€good€faith.€€IfÏaccepted€by€defendant,€the€trial€court€may€utilize€its€discretion€to€accept€or€reject€thisÏor€any€other€plea€agreement€which€may€be€negotiated.€€Otherwise,€the€case€willÏstand€for€trial€in€due€course.ðð€€The€State€did€as€ordered,€the€defendant€accepted€theÏplea€offer,€and€it€was€presented€to€a€new€trial€judge€who,€after€a€hearing,€rejected€it.€ÏThe€defendant€was€then€retried€and€reconvicted.ÌÌà àà àIn€his€first€issue,€the€defendant€contends€that€the€trial€court€abused€itsÏdiscretion€when€it€rejected€the€plea€agreement€of€aggravated€assault€with€a€five€yearÏsentence€of€incarceration.€€The€defendant€is€particularly€concerned€with€the€trialÏcourtððs€reliance€on€facts€which€would€not€have€been€available€at€the€time€the€originalÏplea€offer€was€made.€€At€the€plea€hearing,€the€victim€testified€that,€following€theÍdefendantððs€release€on€bond€upon€his€successful€bid€for€post„conviction€relief,€heÏhad€harassed€her€over€the€phone€and€had€ð ðtried€to€perform€oral€sexðð€on€their€minorÏdaughter.€€In€taking€the€plea€bargain€under€consideration,€the€trial€court€stated,€ð ðIÏthink€it€has€to€be€analyzed€in€part€from€the€situation€as€it€would€have€existed€back€atÏthat€time€and€then€I€think€also€thereððs€a€certain€amount€of€the€present€facts€that€haveÏto€be€considered€in€deciding€what€still€is€in€the€best€interest€of€the€people€involved€inÏthis€case€and€.€.€.€the€overall€administration€of€justice€and€the€best€interest€of€theÏpublic.ðð€€In€then€rejecting€the€plea€bargain,€the€trial€court€stated:ÌÒ ô ÒÒ ¦ ÒÒ ô ÒÒ Ü ÒÓÓI€would€not€have€accepted€a€guilty€plea€to€a€felony€like€thisÏreduced€as€much€as€this€one€was€had€the€victim€not€come€inÏand€really€persuaded€me€that€her€best€interest[s]€were€moreÏimportant€than€the€overall€interest€of€society€in€having€casesÏsuch€as€this€prosecuted€if€thereððs€reasonable€grounds€toÏsupport€the€indictment.€€And€I€donððt€think€that€[the€victim]€backÏthen€would€have€been€successful€with€that€and€I€donððt€thinkÏshe€would€have€tried€too€hard€from€what€Iððve€heard€her€sayÏhere€today.Ì.€.€.€Ì[I]t€is€not€in€the€best€interest€of€society€or€the€public€that€[theÏdefendant]€go€back€to€the€penitentiary€and€as€soon€as€theÏpaperwork€is€completed€be€released€under€no€supervision.€ÏThat€makes€him€free€to€pursue€any€sort€of€conduct€that€heÏwants€to€pursue€short€of€criminal€activity€and€he€has€shownÏfrom€the€testimony€Iððve€heard€here€today€œthat€that›ððs€exactlyÏwhat€he€intends€to€do.€€And€thatððs€not,€that€canððt€be€tolerated,Ïthatððs€just€a€lesser€version€of€the€same€state€of€mind€thatÏcaused€this€situation€to€occur€in€the€first€place.€€I€mean,€itððs€aÏdangerous,€dangerous€thing.€€It€shows€that€no€real€closure€toÍthis€case€has€happened€in€his€mind,€no€real€rehabilitation€asÏfar€as€his€attitude€about€his€former€wife€is€concerned€by€thisÏwhole€offense.€€And€I€canððt€say€at€all€that€itððs,€would€help€theÏadministration€of€justice€or€the€interest€of€the€public€to€take€thisÏ[five]€year€plea.€€And€Iððm€not€going€to.ÌÌÒ D ÒÒ Ü ÒÒ D ÒÒ ¦ ÒÓÓClearly,€then,€the€trial€court€gave€some€consideration€to€events€which€had€occurredÏafter€the€defendant€had€been€convicted€in€determining€to€reject€the€plea€agreement.€ÏHowever,€we€do€not€agree€with€the€defendant€that€the€trial€court€thereby€abused€itsÏdiscretion.ÌÌà àà àThis€Court€has€previously€held€that,€ð ð[b]ecause€a€trial€court€is€affordedÏdiscretion€in€the€acceptance€of€a€plea,€the€judgment€cannot€be€set€aside€unless€thereÏhas€been€a€plain€abuse€of€authority.ðð€€òòGoosby€v.€Stateóó,€917€S.W.2d€700,€705€(Tenn.ÏCrim.€App.€1995).€€Moreover,€ð ð[t]o€find€that€a€trial€court€has€abused€its€authority,€itÏmust€appear€that€no€substantial€evidence€supports€the€conclusion€of€the€trial€judge.ðð€ÏòòId.óó€€In€the€instant€case,€substantial€evidence€does€support€the€trial€courtððs€conclusion.€ÏIn€response€to€being€questioned€about€whether€she€had€wanted€to€go€through€a€trialÏinitially,€the€victim€testified€that,€prior€to€the€original€trial,€she€ð ðreally€didnððt€know€whatÏ[she]€wanted€to€do.€€[She]€was€scared,€and€.€.€.€had€two€small€children€and€.€.€.€wasÏconcerned€about€how€they€would€feel.ðð€€She€admitted€that€the€original€plea€bargainÏhad€initially€been€ð ðokayðð€with€her.€€No€further€testimony€indicative€of€how€the€pleaÍbargain€would€have€served€the€victimððs€ð ðbest€interestsðð€was€elicited,€from€the€victim€orÏanyone€else.€€On€the€other€hand,€the€proof€available€prior€to€the€original€trial€was€thatÏthe€defendant€had€brutally€attacked€the€victim€at€her€place€of€employment€while€inÏthe€presence€of€a€child.€€The€trial€court€was€concerned€about€the€ð ðoverall€interest€ofÏsocietyðð€and€the€fact€that€the€defendantððs€charge€of€assault€with€intent€to€commit€first„degree€murder€had€been€ð ðreduced€as€much€as€this€one.ðð€€That€is,€the€trial€court€wasÏconcerned€that€the€proposed€plea€bargain€was€simply€too€mild.€€Our€Supreme€CourtÏhas€held€that€ð ð[o]ne€valid€reason€for€rejecting€a€plea€agreement€is€that€the€proposedÏsentence€is€considered€too€lenient€under€the€circumstances.ðð€€òòState€v.€Hinesóó,€919ÏS.W.2d€573,€578€(Tenn.€1995).€€ÌÌà àà àGiven€the€victimððs€less€than€persuasive€testimony€about€how€the€pleaÏwould€have€served€her€best€interests,€and€given€the€trial€courtððs€stated€concern€withÏthe€significant€reduction€of€the€charge,€we€find€that€the€trial€court€did€not€abuse€itsÏdiscretion€in€rejecting€the€proposed€plea€agreement,€irrespective€of€the€courtððs€Ïconsideration€of€post„trial€facts.€€This€issue€is€without€merit.ÌÌà àà àThe€defendant€next€contends€that€his€right€to€a€speedy€trial€was€violatedÏfollowing€his€successful€bid€for€post„conviction€relief.€€On€June€3,€1991,€the€courtÍwhich€heard€the€defendantððs€petition€for€post„conviction€relief€entered€an€orderÏvacating€his€conviction€and€granting€relief€ð ðas€specified€at€the€postconvictionÏhearing.ðð€€On€June€27,€1991,€the€State€filed€its€notice€of€appeal€from€this€order.€€ThisÏCourt€affirmed€the€post„conviction€courtððs€decision€by€order€filed€June€3,€1992.€€OnÏNovember€30,€1992,€our€Supreme€Court€granted€the€Stateððs€application€forÏpermission€to€appeal€from€this€Courtððs€order.€€On€April€18,€1994,€our€Supreme€CourtÏaffirmed€this€Court€on€the€issue€of€ineffective€assistance€of€counsel€and€remandedÏthe€matter€to€the€trial€court€as€set€forth€above.€€Following€the€lower€courtððs€rejection€ofÏthe€reinstated€plea€bargain,€the€defendantððs€new€trial€began€in€mid„November,€1995.€ÏThus,€the€defendant€waited€for€a€period€of€almost€four€and€one„half€years€for€hisÏsecond€trial€while€the€State€pursued€its€appeals.ÌÌà àà àIn€òòUnited€States€v.€Loud€Hawkóó,€474€U.S.€302€(1986),€the€United€StatesÏSupreme€Court€was€faced€with€the€issue€of€whether€delays€caused€by€interlocutoryÏappeals€of€certain€pretrial€decisions€violated€the€defendantððs€constitutional€right€to€aÏspeedy€trial.× ƒ> ××  ×€€To€determine€the€issue,€the€Court€adopted€the€four„part€balancing€testÍset€forth€in€òòBarker€v.€Wingoóó,€407€U.S.€514€(1972).€€That€test€includes€four€factors:€€a)Ïthe€length€of€the€delay;€b)€the€reason€for€the€delay;€c)€the€defendantððs€assertion€of€hisÏright€to€a€speedy€trial;€and€d)€prejudice€to€the€defendant€resulting€from€the€delay.€€òòId.óóÏat€530.€€òòSee€alsoóó€òòState€v.€Bishopóó,€493€S.W.2d€81€(Tenn.€1973).€€Although€òòLoudÏHawkóó€dealt€with€interlocutory€appeals€rather€than€an€appeal€following€the€grant€ofÏpost„conviction€(or€habeas€corpus)€relief,€we€think€the€same€approach€is€appropriateÏhere.€€Thus,€we€analyze€the€defendantððs€claim€using€the€òòBarkeróó€test.ÌÌà àà àA€delay€of€four€and€one„half€years€is,€we€think,€ð ðclearly€sufficient€toÏtrigger€an€inquiry€into€the€remaining€three€factors.ðð€€òòState€v.€Wallaceóó,€648€S.W.2dÏ264,€266€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.€1980).€€òòSee€alsoóó€òòDoggett€v.€United€Statesóó,€505€U.S.€647,Ï652€n.€1(1992)€(recognizing€that€a€delay€approaching€one€year€ð ðmarks€the€point€atÏwhich€[lower]€courts€[generally]€deem€the€delay€unreasonable€enough€to€trigger€theÏòòBarkeróó€inquiryðð);€òòState€v.€James€Sylvester€Coureóó,€C.C.A.€No.€85„149„III,€Perry€CountyÏ(Tenn.€Crim.€App.€filed€Nov.€21,€1985,€at€Nashville)€(ð ðdelay€of€over€three€and€one„halfÏ(3€ðð)€years€from€indictment€to€trial€is€unusual€and€requires€us€to€examine€the€otherÏthree€(3)€factors€set€forth€in€òòBarkeróó.ðð)€€Thus,€we€must€examine€the€reason(s)€for€theÏdelay.ÌÌà àà àMost€of€the€delay,€from€June€of€1991€to€April€of€1994,€resulted€from€theÏStateððs€decision€to€appeal€from€the€post„conviction€courtððs€order€granting€relief.€€TheÏdefendant€contends€that€this€appeal€was€ð ðweak€from€the€onset,ðð€ð ðfruitless,Ïnonmeritorious,€tangential€and€therefore€frivolous.ðð€€In€support€of€his€contention,€theÏdefendant€points€to€a€letter€from€the€assistant€attorney€general€to€the€prosecutingÏattorney€requesting€her€to€dismiss€the€appeal€on€the€grounds€that,€in€his€opinion,Ïð ðpursuing€an€appeal€on€this€record€is€futile.ðð€€The€State€responds€that€the€author€ofÏthe€letter€ð ðdid€not€understand€the€two€pronged€analysis€for€ineffective€assistance€ofÏcounsel€claimsðð€and€rhetorically€asks,€ð ðif€the€issue€is€so€meritless,€why€did€ourÏSupreme€Court€grant€the€Stateððs€Rule€11€application€on€the€prejudice€issue?ðð€€ÌÌà àà àWhen€considering€the€interlocutory€appeals€before€it€in€the€òòLoud€HawkóóÏcase,€the€Supreme€Court€stated€that€such€an€appeal€ð ðordinarily€is€a€valid€reason€thatÏjustifies€delay.ðð€€474€U.S.€at€315.€€The€Court€continued:€€ð ðIn€assessing€the€purposeÏand€reasonableness€of€such€an€appeal,€courts€may€consider€several€factors.€€TheseÏinclude€the€strength€of€the€Governmentððs€position€on€the€appealed€issue,€theÏimportance€of€the€issue€in€the€posture€of€the€case,€and€„„€in€some€cases€„„€theÏseriousness€of€the€crime.€€For€example,€a€delay€resulting€from€an€appeal€wouldÍweigh€heavily€against€the€Government€if€the€issue€were€clearly€tangential€orÏfrivolous.ðð€€òòId.óó€at€315„16€(citation€omitted).€€In€the€case€òòsubóó€òòjudiceóó,€the€importance€ofÏthe€issue€in€the€posture€of€the€case€was€profound:€€unless€it€successfully€appealed,Ïthe€State€lost€a€conviction€of€attempted€first„degree€murder€and€faced€the€unhappyÏprospect€of€having€to€try€the€defendant€a€second€time.€€Likewise,€the€seriousness€ofÏthe€crime€was€extreme.€€It€was€undisputed€that€the€defendant€attacked€the€victimÏwhile€at€her€place€of€employment€and€slit€her€throat,€all€in€the€presence€of€a€five„yearÏold€child.€€€Both€of€these€factors€weigh€in€favor€of€the€reasonableness€of€the€StateððsÏappeal.ÌÌà àà àWith€respect€to€the€strength€of€the€Stateððs€position,€we€respectfullyÏdisagree€with€both€the€defendant€and€the€assistant€attorney€general€who€advised€theÏprosecuting€attorney€to€dismiss€her€appeal.€€As€pointed€out€by€the€State,€a€claim€ofÏineffective€assistance€of€counsel€involves€two€issues,€both€of€which€must€be€provedÏby€the€defendant.€€First,€the€defendant€must€prove€that€his€lawyer€failed€to€renderÏcompetent€legal€representation.€€Once€the€defendant€proves€incompetence,€he€mustÏthen€prove€that€the€incompetent€representation€prejudiced€him€to€the€extent€ofÏundermining€confidence€in€the€outcome€of€the€trial.€€òòSeeóó€òòStrickland€v.€Washingtonóó,Ï466€U.S.€668€(1984).€€Obviously,€the€post„conviction€court€was€satisfied€that€theÍdefendant€in€this€case€had€proved€both€prongs€of€the€òòStricklandóó€test.€€The€StateÏcontended€on€appeal,€however,€that€the€post„conviction€court€had€erred€in€itsÏdetermination€of€the€prejudice€issue.€€As€it€states€in€its€brief,€ð ðThe€State€maintainedÏthat€[the€defendant]€suffered€no€prejudice€because€the€original€trial€judge€stated€heÏwould€not€have€accepted€the€plea.ðð€€That€is,€even€if€the€defendantððs€lawyer€hadÏconveyed€the€plea€offer€to€him,€and€even€if€the€defendant€had€accepted€it,€theÏoriginal€trial€court€would€have€rejected€it.€€Therefore,€the€State€reasoned,€theÏdefendant€lost€nothing€by€his€lawyerððs€mistake.€€ÌÌà àà àIn€its€opinion€affirming€the€post„conviction€courtððs€decision,€this€CourtÏsaid€simply,€ð ðAlbeit€implicitly,€the€trial€judge€found€that€Harris€was€prejudiced€by€[hisÏlawyerððs]€ineffectiveness.€€We€agree.ðð€€Our€Supreme€Court,€however,€decided€thatÏthis€issue€merited€further€consideration.€€Thus,€it€granted€the€Stateððs€Rule€11Ïapplication€in€order€to€determine,€in€part,€ð ðwhether€the€petitioner€established€theÏnecessary€prejudice€to€sustain€a€claim€of€ineffective€assistance€of€counsel.ðð€€òòHarris€v.ÏStateóó,€875€S.W.2d€662,€663€(Tenn.€1994).€€We€agree€with€the€State€that€the€SupremeÏCourtððs€grant€of€its€Rule€11€application€in€order€to€address€this€very€issue€indicatesÏthat€its€appeal€was€neither€meritless€nor€frivolous€notwithstanding€the€StateððsÏeventual€defeat.€€Nor€has€the€defendant€shown€any€bad€faith€or€dilatory€purpose€onÍthe€part€of€the€State€in€pursuing€its€appeal.€€òòSeeóó€òòLoud€Hawkóó,€474€U.S.€at€316.€ÏTherefore€we€find€that€the€reason€for€the€initial€period€of€delay€was€justified€under€theÏcircumstances€of€this€case.ÌÌà àà àThe€four€and€one„half€year€period€of€delay€also€includes€a€fifteen€monthÏdelay€between€our€Supreme€Courtððs€order€that€the€original€plea€offer€be€reinstatedÏand€the€eventual€presentation€of€that€offer€to€the€new€trial€court.€€The€record€does€notÏreveal€the€reasons(s)€for€this€delay,€but€both€the€defendant€and€the€State€proffer€theÏexplanation€that€there€was€some€difficulty€in€finding€a€judge€unfamiliar€with€the€case.€ÌÌà àà àIn€òòWallaceóó,€this€Court€recognized€ð ðthree€categories€into€which€a€delayÏbetween€indictment€and€trial€might€fall:€€(1)€deliberate€attempt€to€delay€the€trial€inÏorder€to€hamper€the€defense€.€.€.€;€(2)€a€more€neutral€reason€such€as€negligence€orÏovercrowded€dockets;€and€(3)€a€valid€reason,€such€as€a€missing€witness,€whichÏshould€serve€to€justify€appropriate€delay.ðð€€648€S.W.2d€at€269€(internal€quotationsÏomitted).€€We€think€the€fifteen€month€delay€in€this€case€falls€within€either€the€secondÏor€third€category.€€ð ð[I]n€dealing€with€the€second€category,€that€is,€with€a€question€ofÏnegligent€delay,€Tennessee€law€requires€a€determination€of€the€òònecessityóó€of€thatÏdelay,€or€.€.€.€whether€it€was€reasonably€avoidable.ðð€€òòId.óó€(internal€quotations€omitted)Í(emphasis€in€original).€€The€initial€trial€judge€in€this€case€recused€himself€upon€theÏpetition€for€post„conviction€relief€because€ð ð[he]€kn[e]w,€in€retrospect,€that€[he]€wouldÏhave€rejected€the€plea€agreement€addressed€in€the€Post€Conviction€Petition€and€thusÏput€the€defendant€to€trial.ðð€€Therefore,€it€was€in€the€defendantððs€best€interest€to€have€aÏnew€judge€appointed€to€consider€the€proposed€plea€bargain.€€There€is€no€proof€in€theÏrecord€as€to€why€it€took€so€long€to€find€a€judge,€but€we€are€painfully€aware€of€theÏovercrowded€nature€of€most€trial€courtsðð€dockets.€€We€find,€therefore,€that€this€delayÏwas€necessary,€not€reasonably€avoidable,€and/or€for€a€valid€reason.€€ÌÌà àà àThe€next€factor€is€whether€the€defendant€asserted€his€right€to€a€speedyÏtrial.€€He€did€not.€€However,€a€defendant€does€not€waive€his€or€her€right€to€a€speedyÏtrial€by€failing€to€assert€it.€€Rather,€the€defendantððs€assertion€of,€or€failure€to€assert,€thisÏright€is€a€factor€in€the€balancing€test.€€òòBarkeróó,€407€U.S.€at€528.€€Since€the€State€hasÏthe€burden€of€proving€guilt€beyond€a€reasonable€doubt,€delay€will€often€help€ratherÏthan€hurt€the€defendant.€€Thus,€the€defendant€may€not€necessarily€want€a€speedy€trialÏand€may€make€a€tactical€decision€not€to€assert€his€right€to€it.€€As€a€consequence,Ïfailure€to€assert€the€right€to€a€speedy€trial€will€make€it€difficult€for€the€defendant€to€laterÏprove€that€this€right€was€denied.€€òòId.óó€at€532.€ÌÌà àà àIn€this€case,€the€defendant€was€not€merely€trying€to€avoid€a€speedy€trial:€Ïhe€was€trying€to€avoid€a€trial€altogether€because€he€wished€to€plead€guilty€pursuantÏto€the€original€plea€offer.€€We€think€his€raising€of€the€issue€at€this€late€date€is€a€directÏresult€of€the€fact€that€his€plea€bargain€was€rejected€and€he€was€convicted€again€of€theÏindicted€offense.€€That€is,€there€is€no€indication€that€he€wanted€a€speedy€trial€until€theÏslow€trial€he€eventually€got€resulted€in€a€conviction€and€a€twenty„three€yearÏsentence.× ƒ? ××  ×€€While€we€certainly€do€not€fault€his€appellate€attorney€for€raising€thisÏissue,€we€think€the€defendantððs€failure€to€raise€it€until€appeal€weighs€against€himÏunder€the€circumstances€of€this€case.€ÌÌà àà àFinally,€we€must€determine€what,€if€any,€prejudice€the€defendantÏsuffered€as€a€result€of€the€delay€in€his€second€trial.€€He€admits€that€his€ability€toÏconduct€his€defense€was€not€impaired€and€that€he€was€out€on€bond€throughout€theÏfour€and€one„half€year€period€but€contends€that€he€was€prejudiced€by€a€ð ðcloud€ofÏanxiety€accompanying€the€unresolved€criminal€chargesðð€and€by€the€curtailment€ofÏcertain€liberties€as€a€condition€of€bond.€€Specifically,€he€could€not€leave€the€state€andÏhis€personal€associations€were€curtailed.€However,€if€given€the€opportunity,€theÍdefendant€would€have€pled€guilty€to€aggravated€assault€pursuant€to€the€plea€offer.€ÏHence,€the€cause€for€his€anxiety€was€not€the€fear€of€a€criminal€conviction€(which€heÏwanted),€but€the€fear€that€a€new€jury€would€again€convict€him€of€the€more€seriousÏcrime€with€which€he€was€charged.€ÌÌà àà àOverall,€the€factors€when€taken€together€weigh€against€the€defendantððsÏclaim€that€his€constitutional€right€to€a€speedy€trial€was€violated.€€€The€minor€prejudiceÏhe€suffered€while€awaiting€trial€is€outweighed€by€the€fact€that€there€were€validÏreasons€to€justify€the€delay.€€An€important€public€interest€was€served€by€permitting€theÏState€to€appeal€a€legitimate€issue€in€a€case€as€serious€as€this€one,€and€theÏdefendantððs€rights€were€protected€by€the€effort€to€find€an€impartial€judge€to€decideÏwhether€to€accept€the€reinstated€plea.€€This€issue€is€without€merit.€€€€€€ÌÌà àà àIn€this€third€issue,€the€defendant€contends€that€the€trial€court€erred€whenÏit€instructed€the€jury€that€the€punishment€for€assault€with€intent€to€commit€first„degreeÏmurder€ranged€from€five€to€twenty„five€years.€€At€sentencing,€the€court€determinedÏthat€the€minimum€sentence€for€this€crime€was€twenty€years.€€Thus,€the€defendantÏcontends,€he€was€ð ðsubjected€to€punishment€not€known€or€contemplated€by€hisÏconvicting€jurorsðð€and€that,€since€the€jury€was€ð ðmisinstructed€that€the€actualÍconsequences€of€their€verdict€w[ere]€less€severe€than€they€actually€were,ðð€theÏerroneous€instruction€ð ðhad€a€dramatic€[e]ffect€on€their€verdict.ðð€€That€is,€had€the€juryÏbeen€properly€instructed,€it€likely€would€have€convicted€him€of€a€lesser€offense.ÌÌà àà àWe€think€the€defendantððs€allegation€of€error€is€misplaced.€€This€crimeÏwas€committed€in€1987;€the€defendant€was€sentenced€in€1995.€€Our€Supreme€CourtÏhas€ruled€that,€ÌÓÓà àà8 àin€order€to€comply€with€the€ex€post€facto€prohibitions€of€theÏU.S.€and€Tennessee€Constitutions,€trial€court€judgesÏimposing€sentences€after€the€effective€date€of€the€1989Ïstatute,€for€crimes€committed€prior€thereto,€must€calculateÏthe€appropriate€sentence€under€both€the€1982€statute€andÏthe€1989€statute,€òòin€their€entiretyóó,€and€then€impose€theÏlesser€sentence€of€the€two.ÌÌÓÓòòState€v.€Pearsonóó,€858€S.W.2d€879,€884€(Tenn.€1993)€(emphasis€added).€€Under€theÏ1982€Act,€the€defendant€was€subject€to€ð ða€determinate€sentence€of€confinement€inÏthe€state€penitentiary€for€life€or€for€a€period€of€not€less€than€five€(5)€years.ðð€€T.C.A.€ððÏ39„2„103(b)€(Repl.€1982).× ƒ@ ××  ×€€Under€the€1989€Act,€he€was€subject€to€a€range€of€fifteenÍto€twenty„five€years.€€T.C.A€ðð€40„35„112(a)(1)€(Repl.€1990).× ƒA ××  ×€€Because€the€defendantÏwas€entitled€to€the€lesser€of€the€two€sentences€calculated€under€each€act,€hisÏminimum€sentence€was€five€years€and€his€maximum€sentence€was€twenty„five€years.€ÏThus,€the€trial€courtððs€instruction€to€the€jury€was€correct.ÌÌà àà àHowever,€the€trial€court€did€commit€error€when€it€calculated€theÏdefendantððs€sentence€solely€under€the€1989€Act.€€Therefore,€this€matter€must€beÏremanded€for€resentencing€in€accordance€with€our€Supreme€Courtððs€opinion€inÏòòPearsonóó.œ× ƒB ××  ×›ÌÌà àà àThe€defendant€also€contends€that€the€court€below€erred€when,€inÏcalculating€his€sentence€under€the€1989€Act,€it€determined€the€presumptive€sentenceÍto€be€the€midpoint€of€the€range€rather€than€minimum.€€The€court€below€found€bothÏenhancement€and€mitigating€factors.€€Accordingly,€the€1989€Act€required€the€court€toÏð ðstart€at€the€minimum€sentence€in€the€range,€enhance€the€sentence€within€the€rangeÏas€appropriate€for€the€enhancement€factors,€and€then€reduce€the€sentence€within€theÏrange€as€appropriate€for€the€mitigating€factors.ðð€€T.C.A.€ðð€40„35„210(e)€(Supp.€1995).€ÏAs€argued€by€the€defendant,€the€court€below€appears€to€have€begun€at€the€mid„range€point€of€twenty€years.€€This€was€error.× ƒC ××  ×€€On€remand,€assuming€the€sentencingÏcourt€again€finds€both€enhancement€and€mitigating€factors,€it€shall€start€at€theÏminimum€sentence€of€fifteen€years€when€calculating€the€defendantððs€sentence€underÏthe€1989€Act.ÌÌÔ% € Ôà àà àFinally,€the€defendant€contends€that€the€sentencing€court€erred€when€itÏapplied€as€enhancement€factors€under€the€1989€Act€that€he€had€a€history€of€criminalÏbehavior€and€that€the€injuries€to€the€victim€were€particularly€great.× ƒD ××  ×€€òòSeeóó€T.C.A.€Ìðð€40„35„114(1)€and€(6)€(Supp.€1995).€€He€contends€that€particularly€great€personalÏinjuries€to€the€victim€are€an€element€of€the€offense€committed€and€therefore€cannotÏbe€used€to€enhance€his€sentence,€relying€on€òòState€v.€Makokaóó,€885€S.W.2d€366Ï(Tenn.€Crim.€App.€1994).€€We€disagree.€€The€defendant€was€convicted€of€assault€withÏintent€to€commit€first„degree€murder.€€Because€the€crime€resulted€in€bodily€injury€„„Ïwhich€was€both€alleged€in€the€indictment€and€proved€at€trial€„„€it€was€a€Class€XÏfelony.€€T.C.A.€Ìðð39„2„103(c)€(Repl.€1982).€€The€comparable€offense€under€current€law€is€attemptedÏfirst„degree€murder,€a€Class€A€felony.€€€T.C.A.€ðð€40„35„110,€Sentencing€CommissionÏComments.€€In€òòMakokaóó,€a€panel€of€this€Court€ruled€that€the€enhancement€factor€forÏserious€bodily€injury€resulting€from€the€defendantððs€actions,€T.C.A.€ðð€40„35„114(12)× ƒE ××  ×,Ïshould€not€be€applied€to€an€attempt€to€commit€first„degree€murder€on€the€basis€that€itÏwould€constitute€double€enhancement.€€885€S.W.2d€at€374€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.€1994).€ÏHowever,€in€òòState€v.€Freemanóó,€943€S.W.2d€25€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.€1996),€anotherÏpanel€of€this€Court€disagreed€with€òòMakokaóó€on€the€basis€of€our€Supreme€CourtððsÏfinding€in€òòState€v.€Trustyóó€that€ð ðan€attempted€murder€does€not€necessarily€requireÍeither€contact€with€the€victim€or€bodily€injury.ðð€€919€S.W.2d€305,€313€n.7€(Tenn.€1996).€€ÌÌà àà àIn€òòFreemanóó,€this€Court€held€ð ðthat€because€bodily€injury€is€not€anÏessential€element€of€the€offense€of€attempted€second„degree€murder,€the€trial€courtÏproperly€enhanced€the€defendantððs€sentence€for€that€offense€with€regard€to€the€victimÏwho€was€actually€wounded.ðð€€943€S.W.2d€at€32.€€We€think€the€same€reasoningÏshould€apply€in€this€case.€€The€victim€of€an€attempted€murder€does€not€necessarilyÏsuffer€particularly€great€personal€injuries.€€Accordingly,€there€is€no€doubleÏenhancement€from€the€application€of€this€factor€where€the€victim€does€suffer€suchÏinjuries.€€Therefore,€if€on€remand€the€sentencing€court€finds€that€the€victim€in€this€caseÏsuffered€such€injuries,€application€of€this€factor€would€be€appropriate€under€the€1989ÏAct.€€Ì€à àà àÌà àà àWith€respect€to€calculating€the€defendantððs€sentence€under€the€1982ÏAct,€it€also€provides€for€certain€enhancement€factors.€€òòSeeóó€T.C.A.€ðð€40„35„111(Repl.Ï1982).€€One€of€them€is€that€ð ð[t]he€personal€injuries€inflicted€upon€.€.€.€the€victim€[were]Ïparticularly€great.ðð€€T.C.A.€ðð€40„35„111(6)€(Repl.€1982).€€The€crime€of€assault€withÏintent€to€murder€is€automatically€enhanced€under€T.C.A.€ðð€39„2„103(b)€and€(c)€(Repl.Ï1982)€ð ð[i]f€bodily€injury€to€the€victim€occurs€as€a€resultðð€of€the€assault.€€ParticularlyÍgreat€personal€injuries€are€significantly€greater€in€degree€than€simple€bodily€injury.€ÏAccordingly,€this€enhancement€factor€is€not€a€necessary€element€of€the€offense.€€NorÏis€it€one€of€the€criteria€for€establishing€an€especially€aggravated€offense.€€òòSeeóó€T.C.A.Ïðð€40„35„107€(Supp.€1987).€€Therefore,€we€find€that€this€enhancement€factor,€ifÏsupported€by€the€proof€at€the€resentencing€hearing,€may€properly€be€applied€in€thisÏcase€in€determining€the€œÌÓÓÌÓÓdefendantððs›€sentence€under€the€1982€Act.ÌÌà àà àThe€court€below€also€found€as€an€enhancement€factor€ð ða€history€ofÏcriminal€behavior.ðð€€This€is€an€enhancement€factor€under€both€the€1982€and€1989ÏActs.€€òòSeeóó€T.C.A.€ðð€40„35„111(1)€(Repl.€1982);€T.C.A.€ðð€40„35„114(1)€(Supp.€1995).€ÏThe€court€did€not€specify€what€this€history€consisted€of,€other€than€to€note€ð ð[òòaóó]òòlsoóóÏthose€[two€misdemeanor]€convictionsðð€(emphasis€added).€€Obviously,€the€court€had€inÏmind€some€history€other€than€the€two€misdemeanor€convictions,€which€it€stated€ð ðdonððtÏweigh€very€heavily,ðð€but€its€findings€are€insufficient€for€this€Court€to€determineÏwhether€that€history€was€appropriately€considered€or€not.€€On€remand,€we€remind€theÏsentencing€court€that€it€ð ðshall€place€on€the€record€either€orally€or€in€writing€whatÏenhancement€or€mitigating€factors€it€found,€if€any,€as€well€as€[specific]€findings€of€factÍ[upon€which€application€of€the€sentencing€principles€was€based.]ðð€€T.C.A.€ðððð€40„35„210(f)€(Supp.€1995).€€òòSee€alsoóó€T.C.A.€ðððð€40„35„209(c)€(Supp.€1987)€(ð ðThe€record€ofÏthe€sentencing€hearing€is€part€of€the€record€of€the€case€and€shall€include€specificÏfindings€of€fact€upon€which€application€of€the€sentencing€principles€w[as]€basedðð)€andÏ40„35„210(c)€(Repl.€1982)€(ð ðWhenever€the€court€imposes€a€sentence,€it€shall€placeÏon€the€record€either€orally€or€in€writing€its€findings€of€fact€and€reasons€as€required€byÏðð€40„35„209ðð).ÌÌà àà àThe€defendantððs€conviction€is€affirmed€and€his€sentence€is€vacated.€ÏThis€matter€is€remanded€for€resentencing€in€accordance€with€this€opinion.€ÌÌœ›ÓÓÌà àà àà àà àà àà àà à_________________________________Ìà àà àà àà àà àà àà àJOHN€H.€PEAY,€œJudgeÇCONCUR:›ÌÌÌÌ______________________________ÌJOSEPH€M.€TIPTON,€JudgeÌÌÌÌ______________________________ÌCURWOOD€WITT,€œJudgeÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÑ€FÑÇ›Ñ  ÑÑ Ü ÑÒ  ÒÒ ¦ ÒÒ  ÒÒ X ÒÓÓÑ7€ – XXdæXXdÈ7ÑœßJ€;G;+'b|` ´- `€@ÿJß›€à8 àà@ àIN€THE€COURT€OF€CRIMINAL€APPEALS€OF€TENNESSEEÌà@ àAT€KNOXVILLEà@ à€€€€€€€€€Ìà àà à€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€JUNE€1997€SESSIONÌÌÓÓSTATE€OF€TENNESSEE,à àà à)à àÌ€à àà àà àà à)Ìà àAppellee,€à àà à)à àNo.€03C01„9611„CR„00428Ìà à€€€€€à àà à€€à à)Ìà àà àà àà à)à à€Anderson€CountyÌv.à àà àà àà à)€€€€€€€€€Ìà àà àà àà à)à à€Honorable€D.€Kelly€Thomas,€Jr.,€Judge€Ìà àà àà àà à)ÌJAMES€DAVID€HARRIS,à à€€€à à)à à€(Assault€with€intent€to€commitÌà àà àà àà à)€€€€€€€€€€€€€first€degree€murder)Ìà àAppellant.à àà à)ÌÌÌÌÓÓà@ àò òòòCONCURRING€OPINIONó óóóÌÌà àI€concur€in€the€remand€of€this€case,€but€I€do€not€believe€that€further€review€underÏthe€òòPearsonóó€guidelines€is€necessary.€€This€is€because€œthe›€minimum€sentence€thatÏcould€be€imposed€under€the€pre„1989€sentencing€law€is€greater€than€the€maximumÏsentence€available€under€the€1989€Sentencing€Act.ÌÌà àUnder€T.C.A.€ðð€40„35„107(2)€(repealed€1989),€a€Range€II,€especiallyÏaggravated€offender€is€defined€as€one€who€willfully€inflicts€serious€bodily€injury€uponÏanother€person.€€In€œsubsection›€(5)(B)€of€section€„107,€serious€bodily€injury€œincludes›Íð ðbodily€injury€which€involves€a€substantial€risk€of€death;€unconsciousness;€extremeÏphysical€pain;€protracted€and€obvious€disfigurement;€or€protracted€loss€or€impairmentÏof€the€function€of€a€bodily€member€or€organ.ðð€€€€ÌÌà àThe€evidence€in€the€record€reflects€that€the€victim€received€a€deep,€œfive„›€inch€cutÏin€her€neck€that€the€treating€physician€called€life€threatening,€essentially€because€of€itsÏdepth€and€location.€€She€has€a€permanent€scar€on€her€neck.€€Also,€the€victim€hadÏtendons€cut€in€two€of€her€fingers,€one€of€which€remains€functionally€impaired.€€UnderÏthese€circumstances€and€the€facts€surrounding€the€offense,€I€would€conclude€beyond€aÏreasonable€doubt€that€the€defendant€willfully€inflicted€serious€bodily€injury€so€as€toÏwarrant€him€being€sentenced€as€a€Range€II,€especially€aggravated€œoffender.× ƒH ××  ×›ÌÌà àThis€means€that€under€the€pre„1989€law,€the€defendant€is€exposed€to€aÏsentencing€range€of€thirty„four€years€to€life€in€œprison.€€òòSeeó󛀜T.C.A.€ðð€39„2„103(b);€40„35„109(b),€(c)€and€(e)(2)€(repealed€1989).€€Thus,€given›€the€fact€that€the€maximumÏsentence€to€which€the€defendant€is€exposed€under€the€1989€Act€is€twenty„five€years,Ïno€òòPearsonóó€analysis€is€needed.€€In€fact,€the€trial€court€indicated€that€it€actually€did€theÏòòPearsonóó€analysis€by€its€statement€that€the€defendant,€under€the€new€act,€was€subject€toÏð ðless€than€the€minimum€were€he€sentenced€under€the€old€act€anyway.ðð€€ÌÌà àAs€for€the€sentence€that€was€actually€imposed,€the€trial€court€found€that€theÏfollowing€enhancement€factors,€as€listed€in€T.C.A.€ðð€40„35„114,€applied:€€ÌÒ ¸ ÒÒ X ÒÒ ¸ ÒÒ  ÒÓÓ(1)€Previous€history€of€criminal€convictions€or€criminalÏbehavior;ÌÌ(6)€Infliction€of€particularly€great€personal€injuries€upon€theÏvictim;ÌÌ(9)€Possession€œof€a›€deadly€weapon€during€commission€ofÏthe€offense;€andÌÌ(10)€No€hesitation€about€committing€a€crime€when€the€risk€toÏhuman€life€was€high.ÌÌÒ  ÒÒ  ÒÒ  ÒÒ X ÒÓÓÓ  ÓThe€trial€court€stated€that€factor€(1)€applied€because€the€defendant€had€two€oldÏmisdemeanor€convictions,€although€it€did€not€weigh€the€factor€heavily.€€It€found€thatÏfactor€(6)€applied,€not€so€much€for€the€lasting€injuries,€but€for€the€great€risk€of€death€thatÏwas€involved€according€to€the€proof.€€As€for€factor€(9),€the€trial€court€stated€that€it€did€notÏweigh€heavily€in€its€determinations.€€Finally,€the€trial€court€stated€that€factor€(10)Ïapplied€because€other€persons,€including€a€child,€were€at€risk€by€the€defendantððsÏassault€upon€the€victim,€although€it€indicated€that€these€facts€did€not€ð ðweigh€as€heavilyððÏin€its€consideration.€€The€trial€court€also€determined€that€his€work€record€ð ðweighedÏlightly€in€mitigationðð€and€that€his€mental€and€physical€condition€were€grounds€forÏœmitigation›€but€did€not€significantly€reduce€his€culpability.€€The€trial€court€sentenced€theÏdefendant€to€twenty„three€years€as€a€Range€I,€standard€offender.€ÌÌà àAs€the€majority€opinion€œnotes,€though,›€the€record€reflects€that€the€trial€courtððsÏsentencing€process€began€with€a€starting€point€of€twenty€years,€not€fifteen€years€asÏrequired€by€law.€€Thus,€the€presumption€of€correctness€that€attaches€to€trial€courtÏsentencing€œdeterminations›€œfalls›€and€we€are€to€review€the€sentencing€òòdeóó€œòònovoóó.€ÏHowever,€the€presentence€report€is€not€in€the€record€on€appeal,€thereby€preventing€usÏfrom€considering€all€matters€required€for€sentencing.€€òòSeeóó€T.C.A.€ðð€40„35„210(b).€ÏThus,›€I€concur€in€the€case€being€remanded€for€resentencing,€with€the€presumptiveÏsentence€being€the€minimum€sentence€of€fifteen€years.€€ÌÌÓÓà àà àà àà àà àà à____________________________Ìà àà àà àà àà àà àJoseph€M.€Tipton,€Judge€ÌÌÌ€€ÌÌ