ÿWPC/G >U:t %® 0Ü´w@4Ðäó 0 û 0D 0J_ 0T© 0^ý 0h[ 0rà 0|5 0†± 07 1uÇ 0d< AQ  0@ñ B1 D3N U!* B)« DCÔ AMÏdG3Æz 0D@ 0D„ D/È B÷è]üsYŸÌðk!q[$šÌ&‚f)†è+%n.“1e •3äú<v~Þ?vÓ\A,c½¬AZ‹"Arial RegularX(´`$¡¡Ñ°ÑÒ°ÒÑTR[  AØ'ÿ Legal3Ø' AØ'ÿ Legalÿ3Ø'TÑÑ7€‰GXXdðXXdð7ÑÑ  Ñ ìíEîïEðñòDóDôÓ€ B\J#3|x(Ð(3n˜$¤¤Ý ƒ`!ÝѰÑÒ°ÒÑTR[  AØ'ÿ Legal3Ø' AØ'ÿ Legalÿ3Ø'TÑÑ7€9íXXdædæ7ÑÑ  ÑÝ  Ýà ` àòòÚ  Ú0Ú  Úóó(#Ã$òòÚ  Ú0Ú  Úóó2 ÿÿ0Indent1Ô2ÔÔ3  Ô2" ÿÿ0Indent2à0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2, ÿÿ0Indent3à0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô26 ÿÿ0Indent4à0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2@ ÿÿ0Indent5à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2J ÿÿ0Indent6à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2T ÿÿ0Indent7à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2^ ÿÿ0Indent8à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô  ÿÿ?AGMSYaioIndent0I.A.1.a.(1)(a)i)a)P ÿÿ8Mac DefaultMac DefaultÓ ` °šXÓ*+,-Cþÿ<< Cÿÿ("ÿÿ$££Ò  ÒÒ  Ò d'ÿÿdxd< Œ 9p`(Arial% Line 7 d%%%%7Border 1dd*&Cþÿ << Gÿÿ ÅÝ ƒ!ÝÑ  ÑÑ#€d#ÑÔ€$ÔÑ  ÑÒ  ÒÒ ! ÒÑ\R AØ'\ÑÑ#€d#ÑÑ  ÑÝ  ÝÝ ƒ+"ÝÝ  ÝÔ€$ÔÓ  ÓÔ YYY ÔFILEDÔ€$XÔÌÌò òOcto…berÏ24,Ï1997ÌÌCecilÏCrowson,ÏJr.ÌÔ€$ôÔAp…pellateÏCourtÏClerkó ó =Ý ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€$ÔÑ  ÑÒ  ÒÒ ° ÒÑ\R AØ'\ÑÑ#€d#ÑÑ  ÑÝ  ÝÔ€$ôÔÑ\R AØ'\ÑÑ7À9íXXdædæ7Ñà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóThe€appellant€was€also€convicted€of€resisting€arrest,€a€class€A€misdemeanor.€€ThisÏconviction€was€not€appealed.̃Level 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5(3¯$¢¢Ý ƒ!ÝÝ  Ý($$””ò òÚ  Ú1Ú  Úó ó..'÷ÿ dxdüÿP Pd ÞÝ ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€$ÔÑ  ÑÒ  ÒÒ ° ÒÑ\R AØ'\ÑÑ#€d#ÑÑ  ÑÝ  ÝÔ€$ôÔÑ\R AØ'\ÑÑ7ÀÉŒXXdæXXdæ7Ñà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóMichael€Smith€testified€that,€earlier€that€day,€the€appellant€had€told€him€ð ðthat€some€girl€hadÏsent€him€to€jail€and€ððI€am€going€to€get€the€bitch.ðððð€Smith€said,€although€he€was€not€certain,€heÏbelieved€the€girl€to€be€someone€named€ð ðArdelðð€or€ð ðAdel.ððÌ SÝ ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€$ÔÑ  ÑÒ  ÒÒ ° ÒÑ\R AØ'\ÑÑ#€d#ÑÑ  ÑÝ  ÝÔ€$ôÔÑ\R AØ'\ÑÑ7ÀÉŒXXdæXXdæ7Ñà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóThe€proof€at€trial€established€that€earlier€in€the€month,€Ms.€Washington,€who€wasÏacquainted€with€the€appellant,€had€refused€to€sell€the€appellant€and€a€female€companion€ð ðdope.ðð€ÏFollowing€Ms.€Washingtonððs€refusal€to€sell€drugs,€a€heated€argument€ensued.€€The€appellantÏproduced€what€appeared€to€be€a€pistol€and€stated€that€he€would€be€back.€€Shortly€thereafter,€Ms.ÏWashington€filed€a€complaint€with€the€police,€resulting€in€the€appellantððs€arrest.€€On€February€17,Ïthe€appellant,€upon€leaving€a€night€club€in€Jackson,€discovered€that€his€car€had€been€vandalized.€ÏThe€appellant€believed€the€person€responsible€was€Ms.€Washington.€€Ì iÝ ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€$ÔÑ  ÑÒ  ÒÒ ° ÒÑ\R AØ'\ÑÑ#€d#ÑÑ  ÑÝ  ÝÔ€$ôÔÑ\R AØ'\ÑÑ7ÀÉŒXXdæXXdæ7Ñà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóThe€Stateððs€position€on€this€issue€is€indicated€in€both€its€opening€statement€and€itsÏclosing€argument.€€One€such€illustration€is€noted€by€the€prosecutorððs€following€remarks:€ð ðLadiesÏand€gentlemen,€keep€in€mind€that€we€have€aggravated€assault,€and€we€also€have€attemptedÏmurder.€€We€are€really€talking€about€òòone€incidentóó,€but€we€are€talking€about€two€differentÏindividuals.ðð€€(emphasis€added).Ì •Ý ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€$ÔÑ  ÑÒ  ÒÒ ° ÒÑ\R AØ'\ÑÑ#€d#ÑÑ  ÑÝ  ÝÔ€$ôÔÑ\R AØ'\ÑÑ7ÀÉŒXXdæXXdæ7Ñà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóAs€the€supreme€court€noted€in€òòDentonóó,€938€S.W.2d€at€383,€n.€22,€ð ðthe€trial€court€shouldÏhave€instructed€the€jury€that€they€could€convict€on€only€aggravated€assault€or€attemptedÏhomicide.ððÌ æÝ ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€$ÔÑ  ÑÒ  ÒÒ ° ÒÑ\R AØ'\ÑÑ#€d#ÑÑ  ÑÝ  ÝÔ€$ôÔÑ\R AØ'\ÑÑ7ÀÉŒXXdæXXdæ7Ñà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  Úóó€"[W]hether€each€statutory€provision€requires€proof€of€an€additional€fact€which€the€otherÏdoes€not."€€òòDentonóó,€938€S.W.2d€at€379€(quoting€òòState€v.€Blackóó,€524€S.W.2d€913,€919€(Tenn.Ï1975)€(quoting€òòBlockburgeróó,€284€U.S.€at€304,€52€S.Ct.€at€182€(1932)).€€€€€€€€€€€€€Ì gÝ ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€$ÔÑ  ÑÒ  ÒÒ ° ÒÑ\R AØ'\ÑÑ#€d#ÑÑ  ÑÝ  ÝÔ€$ôÔÑ\R AØ'\ÑÑ7ÀÉŒXXdæXXdæ7Ñà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  Úóó"[T]he€test€is€whether€the€same€evidence€is€necessary€to€prove€both€offenses."€€òòDentonóó,Ï938€S.W.2d€at€380€(quoting€òòDuhacóó,€505€S.W.2d€at€241).Ì Ý ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€$ÔÑ  ÑÒ  ÒÒ ° ÒÑ\R AØ'\ÑÑ#€d#ÑÑ  ÑÝ  ÝÔ€$ôÔÑ\R AØ'\ÑÑ7ÀÉŒXXdæXXdæ7Ñà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóIn€òòState€v.€Trustyóó,€919€S.W.2d€305€(Tenn.€1996),€our€supreme€court€held€thatÏaggravated€assault€is€neither€a€lesser€grade€nor€class€of€the€offense€of€attempt€to€commit€firstÏdegree€murder.Ì xÝ ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€$ÔÑ  ÑÒ  ÒÒ ° ÒÑ\R AØ'\ÑÑ#€d#ÑÑ  ÑÝ  ÝÔ€$ôÔÑ\R AØ'\ÑÑ7ÀÉŒXXdæXXdæ7Ñà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóThis€ruling€reflects€our€previous€modification€of€the€appellantððs€conviction€for€attemptedÏfirst€degree€murder€to€the€lesser€offense€of€attempted€second€degree€murder.Ì |Ý ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€$ÔÑ  ÑÒ  ÒÒ ° ÒÑ\R AØ'\ÑÑ#€d#ÑÑ  ÑÝ  ÝÔ€$ôÔÑ\R AØ'\ÑÑ7ÀÉŒXXdæXXdæ7Ñà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóIronically,€we€note€that€challenges€to€the€reasonable€doubt€jury€instruction€in€the€pastÏhave€focused€almost€exclusively€upon€òòinclusionóó€of€the€moral€certainty€language.Ì Ý ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€$ÔÑ  ÑÒ  ÒÒ ° ÒÑ\R AØ'\ÑÑ#€d#ÑÑ  ÑÝ  ÝÔ€$ôÔÑ\R AØ'\ÑÑ7ÀÉŒXXdæXXdæ7Ñà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóInterestingly,€we€note€that€some€jurisdictions€strongly€advise€against€defining€the€termÏð ðreasonable€doubt.ðð€€òòSee,€e.g.óó,€òòUnited€States€v.€Reivesóó,€15€F.3d€42,€45€(4th€Cr.),€òòcert.€deniedóó,Ï512€U.S.€1207,€114€S.Ct.€2679€(1994);€òòLawsonóó,€507€F.2d€433;€òòCommonwealth€v.€Goforthóó,€692ÏS.W.2d€803€(Ky.€1985).Ì øÝ ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€$ÔÑ  ÑÒ  ÒÒ ° ÒÑ\R AØ'\ÑÑ#€d#ÑÑ  ÑÝ  ÝÔ€$ôÔÑ\R AØ'\ÑÑ7ÀÉŒXXdæXXdæ7Ñà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóòòSeeóó€€T.P.I.€Crim.€2.03(a)€(4th€ed.).Ì [ Ý ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€$ÔÑ  ÑÒ  ÒÒ ° ÒÑ\R AØ'\ÑÑ#€d#ÑÑ  ÑÝ  ÝÔ€$ôÔÑ\R AØ'\ÑÑ7ÀÉŒXXdæXXdæ7Ñà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóThe€most€notable€exception€between€the€Tennessee€Pattern€Instruction€and€thoseÏemployed€by€the€federal€court€is€the€Tennessee€instruction's€omission€of€the€language€"hesitateÏto€act."€€Although€the€Supreme€Court€has€indicated€a€preference€for€these€terms,€òòseeóó€€òòHollandóó,Ï348€U.S.€at€126,€75€S.Ct.€at€130;€òòaccordóó€€òòUnited€States€v.€Conleyóó,€523€F.2d€650,€655€(8th€Cir.Ï1975),€òòcert.€deniedóó,€424€U.S.€920,€96€S.Ct.€1125€(1976)€(reasonable€doubt€instruction€must€beÏcouched€in€terms€of€hesitation€to€act),€omission€of€this€language€from€an€instruction€does€notÏamount€to€reversible€error.€€òòSee,€e.g.óó,€òòUnited€States€v.€Clevelandóó,€106€F.3d€1056,€1062€(1st€Cir.Ï1997),€òòpetition€for€cert.€filedóó,€(Apr.€30,€1997);€€òòUnited€States€v.€Barrera„Gonzalesóó,€952€F.2d€1269,Ï1272€(10th€Cir.€1992);€òòUnited€States€v.€Bustilloóó,€789€F.2d€1364,€1368€(9th€Cir.€1986);.€€Moreover,€Ïthe€use€of€this€terminology€has€repeatedly€been€criticized.€€òòSee,€e.g.óó,€òòVictoróó,€511€U.S.€at€„„„.€114ÏS.Ct.€at€1252€(Ginsberg,€J.€concurring€in€part€and€concurring€in€judgment)€(commenting€that€theÏ1987€Report€to€the€Judicial€Conference€of€the€United€States€regards€the€analogy€underlying€theÏ"hesitation€to€act"€formulation€as€being€misplaced€);€òòGilday€v.€Callahanóó,€59€F.3d€257,€264€(1st€Cir.Ï1995),€òòcert.€deniedóó,€„„€U.S.€„„.€116€S.Ct.€1269€(1996)€("hesitate€to€act"€language€is€unhelpful);ÏòòVargasóó,€86€F.3d€at€1274;€òòUnited€States€v.€Reeseóó,€33€F.3d€166,€172€(2nd€Cir.€1994),€òòcert.€deniedóó,Ï513€U.S.€1092,€115€S.Ct.€756€(1995);€òòUnited€States€v.€O'Brienóó,€972€F.2d€12,€15€(1st€Cir.€1992)Ï("hesitation€to€act"€language€trivializes€burden€of€proof);€òòUnited€States€v.€Nooneóó,€913€F.2d€20,€28„29€(1st€Cir.€1990),€òòcert.€deniedóó,€500€U.S.€906,€111€S.Ct.€1686€(1991)).€€Thus,€failure€to€includeÏ"hesitation€to€act"€language€in€the€Tennessee€Pattern€Instruction€is€not€error.Ì ÚÝ ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€$ÔÑ  ÑÒ  ÒÒ ° ÒÑ\R AØ'\ÑÑ#€d#ÑÑ  ÑÝ  ÝÔ€$ôÔÑ\R AØ'\ÑÑ7ÀÉŒXXdæXXdæ7Ñà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóBefore€imposing€sentences,€the€trial€court€found€that€the€appropriate€sentencing€rangeÏwas€within€range€I€for€the€attempted€homicide€offenses,€but€range€II€for€the€aggravated€assaultsÏand€weapons€charge.€€The€appellant€does€not€challenge€this€classification€on€appeal.ÌPtPtHHÚ(ÿáÿâùFG(üHHØ(d'`Styl{WP}01•ÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃà Ãà Ãà Ãà Ãà ÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÐ ÐÐHHÐÐ  ÐÐ2ÐÐÿÿ¸æ$ÿÐÐHHÐÐÐÐÐÐÐÐ  ÐÐ ÐÐ ÐÑÑÑGenevaÑÑ ÑÑ € ÑÑ<Px–ÈÑÒÒÒ443!#4ÒÒ$ *$ÒÒ$*$ÒÒ ÿKK ÒÒ  Geneva ÒÒ  Geneva ÒÓ.,ÓÓÓÓ6ÓÓ ÓßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßÑGenevaÑÑ ÑÒ  ion-F Geneva ÒÒ  ion-F Geneva ÒÝ ƒ!ÝÔ . ÔÔ€$ÔÑ  ÑÒ  ÒÒ ° ÒÑ\R AØ'\ÑÑ#€Xd#ÑÑ#€Xd#ÑÑ  ÑÝ  ÝÒ 4 ÒÒ ° Òò òÒ 4 ÒÒ „ Ò›Þ ÞÌà@ àIN€THE€COURT€OF€CRIMINAL€APPEALS€OF€TENNESSEEÌà@ àAT€JACKSON̜ـ*ÙßR€'(&A1-j|’y` e `€€@ÿRß›à@ àAUGUST€SESSION,€1997ÌÌÌÌÌSTATE€OF€TENNESSEE,à àà à)Ìà àà àà àà àà à)à àNo.€02C01„9703„CC„00126Ìà àAppelleeà àà àà à)Ìà àà àà àà àà à)à àMADISON€COUNTYÌvs.à àà àà àà àà à)Ìà àà àà àà àà à)à àHon.€FRANKLIN€MURCHISON,ÏJudgeÌMELVIN€EDWARD€HENNING,à à)Ìà àà àà àà àà à)à à(Attempted€First€Degree€Murder;Ìà àAppellantà àà àà à)à àAttempted€Second€DegreeÏMurder;Ìó óà àà àà àà àà àà àò òAggravated€Assault€„€2€counts;ó óÌà àà àà àà àà àà àò òPossession€of€a€deadly€weaponÌà àà àà àà àà àà àduring€commission€of€a€felony)Ìà àó óÌÌòòFor€the€Appellantóó:à àà àà àà àòòFor€the€Appelleeóó:ÌÌò òC.€MICHAEL€ROBBINSó óà àà àà àò òJOHN€KNOX€WALKUPó óÌ202€S.€Maple,€Suite€Cà àà àà àAttorney€General€and€ReporterÌCovington,€TN€€38019à àÌÌON€APPEALà àà àà àà àà àò òELIZABETH€T.€RYANó óÌà àà àà àà àà àà àAssistant€AttorneyÏGeneralà àò òGEORGE€MORTON€GOOGEó óà àà àCriminal€Justice€DivisionÌDistrict€Public€Defenderà àà àà à450€James€Robertson€ParkwayÌ227€W.€Baltimore€Streetà àà àà àNashville,€TN€37243„0493à àà àJackson,€TN€€38301à àà àÌà àà àà àà àà àà àÌAT€TRIALà àà àà àà àà àò òJAMES€G.€(JERRY)€WOODALLà àó óÌà àà àà àà àà àà àDistrict€Attorney€GeneralÌÌà àà àà àà àà àà àò òDONALD€H.€ALLENó óÌà àà àà àà àà àà àAsst.€District€Attorney€GeneralÌà àà àà àà àà àà àP.€O.€Box€2825Ìà àà àà àà àà àà àJackson,€TN€€38302ÌÌÌÌÌOPINION€FILED:€€òò€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€óóÌÌÌAFFIRMED€IN€PART;€MODIFIED€AND€REMANDED€IN€PART;€REVERSED€ANDÏVACATED€IN€PARTÌÌÌò òDavid€G.€Hayesó óÌJudgeÇÓÓà@ àòòò òOPINIONóóó óÌÌà àThe€appellant,€Melvin€Edward€Henning,€appeals€his€Madison€County€juryÏconvictions€for€the€crimes€of€attempted€first€degree€murder,€attempted€secondÏdegree€murder,€two€counts€of€aggravated€assault,€and€possession€of€a€deadlyÏweapon€during€the€commission€of€a€felony.× ƒ) ××  ×€€€Following€the€€sentencingÏhearing,€the€trial€court€sentenced€the€appellant,€as€a€range€I€offender,€to€twenty„four€years€for€attempted€first€degree€murder€and€to€eleven€years€for€attemptedÏsecond€degree€murder;€and,€as€a€range€II€offender,€to€nine€years€for€eachÏaggravated€assault€conviction€and€to€three€years€for€the€weapons€conviction.€ÏThe€trial€court€further€ordered€that€the€two€attempted€homicide€convictions€runÏconsecutively€to€each€other€but€concurrent€with€all€remaining€sentences,€for€aÏtotal€effective€sentence€of€thirty„five€years€in€the€Tennessee€Department€ofÏCorrection.€€On€appeal,€the€appellant€raises€the€following€issues:ÌÓÓà8 àI.€€Whether€the€evidence€is€sufficient€to€support€the€appellant's€twoÏattempted€homicide€convictions;ÌÌà8 àII.€€Whether€the€appellant's€convictions€for€aggravated€assaultÏviolate€constitutional€protections€provided€by€òòState€v.€Anthonyóó,€817ÏS.W.2d€299€(Tenn.€1991).ÌÌà8 àIII.€€Whether€the€trial€court€properly€charged€the€jury€on€reasonableÏdoubt;ÌÌà8 àIV.€€Whether€the€trial€court€failed€to€apply€applicable€mitigatingÍfactors€in€determining€the€length€of€the€appellant's€sentences;€andÌÌà8 àV.€€Whether€the€trial€court€properly€ordered€the€appellant'sÏattempted€homicide€convictions€to€run€consecutively.ÌÌÓÓÌà àAfter€a€thorough€review€of€the€record€before€us,€we€affirm€the€appellant'sÏconviction€for€attempted€second€degree€murder.€€However,€we€find€the€evidenceÏinsufficient€to€support€the€conviction€for€attempted€first€degree€murder,€and,Ïaccordingly,€modify€the€judgment€to€reflect€a€conviction€for€attempted€secondÏdegree€murder€and€remand€to€the€trial€court€for€resentencing.€€Moreover,€weÏconclude,€as€conceded€by€the€State€in€part,€that€the€appellantððs€two€convictionsÏfor€aggravated€assault€violate€principles€of€double€jeopardy€and,€therefore,€mustÏbe€vacated€and€dismissed.ÌÌÌà0 àà àà@ àò òBackgroundó óÌà àÌà àOn€February€18,€1995,€the€appellant,€accompanied€by€his€cousin,ÏMichael€Smith,€drove€to€the€residence€of€Adel€Washington,€located€at€236€CircleÏDrive,€Jackson.€€Smith€had€agreed€to€accompany€the€appellant,€believing€thatÏthey€were€going€to€visit€the€appellantððs€sick€mother.× ƒ/ ××  ×€€€€Immediately€prior€toÍarriving€at€the€Washington€residence,€the€appellant€made€a€stop€at€theÏresidence€of€Ann€Smith€and€inquired€as€to€the€whereabouts€of€the€WashingtonÏchildren.€€Learning€that€they€were€with€Ms.€Smith,€the€appellant€replied,€ð ðthatððsÏall€I€need€to€knowðð€and€proceeded€to€the€Washington€residence.× ƒ0 ××  ×€€After€arrivingÏat€the€Circle€Drive€address,€the€appellant€got€out€of€his€car€and€walked€to€theÏfront€door.€€At€this€point,€the€appellant€was€unaware€that€Ms.€Washington€wasÏnot€at€home€and€that€the€only€occupant€was€her€live„in„boyfriend,€Keith€Fason,Ïwho€was€unknown€to€the€appellant.€€The€appellant€pounded€on€the€door€andÏdemanded€that€the€door€be€opened.€€Upon€receiving€no€reply,€the€appellantÏfired€two€shots€at€the€door.€€At€this€point,€Smith€asked€the€appellant€what€wasÏgoing€on€and€the€appellant€ÌÌÌturned€and€shot€his€cousin€in€the€chest.€€Hearing€the€gunshots,€Fason€ran€to€aÏwindow€on€the€other€end€of€the€house€where€he€observed€the€appellantÏassisting€the€wounded€Smith€back€to€the€passenger€side€of€the€car.€€Fason,Ïwhile€watching€the€appellant€though€the€window,€called€the€police€to€report€theÏshooting.€€€As€Fason€watched€the€appellant€from€the€window,€he€observed€theÍappellant€look€into€the€window€where€Fason€was€standing,€raise€his€arm€andÏfire€one€shot.€€The€bullet€passed€through€the€window€and€struck€a€glass€jar.€ÏFasonððs€arm€was€cut€by€a€piece€of€the€shattered€glass.€ÌÌà àThe€appellant€returned€to€his€car€and€left€the€scene.€€In€the€car,€theÏappellant€informed€his€wounded€cousin€that€"I€ain't€taking€you€to€the€doctor."€€HeÏproceeded€to€drive€around€until€he€saw€Donald€Morrow€on€East€Chester€Street.€ÏHe€stopped€the€car,€threw€the€bleeding€and€semi„conscious€Smith€out€of€the€carÏonto€the€street,€and€instructed€Morrow€to€"Take€[Smith]€[expletive€deleted]€to€theÏhospital€before€he€dies."€ÌÌà àJackson€Police€Officer€Monty€Belew€was€dispatched€to€the€JacksonÏMadison€County€General€Hospital€at€5:38€p.m.,€because€a€gunshot€victim€wasÏfound€in€the€parking€lot.€€At€the€hospital,€Belew€learned€that€the€victim€wasÏMichael€Smith.€€Smith,€while€being€prepared€for€surgery,€stated€that€he€hadÏbeen€shot€by€the€appellant€and€provided€descriptions€of€both€the€appellant€andÏhis€vehicle.€ÌÌà àLaw€enforcement€officers€located€the€appellant€at€his€mother's€home€atÏ125€Otis€Street.€€Officer€Kathy€Dent€repeatedly€instructed€the€appellant€to€"putÏhis€hands€up"€and€"get€on€his€knees."€€The€appellant€ignored€the€instructionsÏand€exclaimed€"I€have€a€gun€in€my€pocket."€€A€struggle€ensued.€€After€subduingÍthe€appellant,€the€officers€recovered€a€loaded.380€handgun€on€the€appellant'sÏperson.ÌÌà àBased€upon€this€evidence,€the€jury€returned€a€verdict€finding€theÏappellant€guilty€of€the€attempted€first€degree€murder€of€Keith€Fason,€aggravatedÏassault€of€Keith€Fason,€the€attempted€second€degree€murder€of€Michael€Smith,Ïaggravated€assault€of€Michael€Smith,€possession€of€a€deadly€weapon€duringÏthe€commission€of€a€felony,€and€resisting€arrest.ÌÌÌà@ àò òI.€€Sufficiency€of€the€Evidenceó óÌÌà àThe€appellant€contends€that€the€evidence€is€insufficient€for€a€rational€trierÏof€fact€to€find€him€guilty,€beyond€a€reasonable€doubt,€of€both€attempted€firstÏdegree€murder€and€attempted€second€degree€murder.€€Once€a€jury€returns€aÏguilty€verdict,€the€presumption€of€innocence,€with€which€a€defendant€is€initiallyÏcloaked,€is€removed€and€is€replaced€with€one€of€guilt,€so€that€on€appeal€aÏconvicted€defendant€has€the€burden€of€demonstrating€that€the€evidence€isÏinsufficient.€€òòState€v.€Tuggleóó,€639€S.W.2d€913,€914€(Tenn.€1982).€€In€determiningÏthe€sufficiency€of€the€evidence,€this€court€does€not€reweigh€or€reevaluate€theÏevidence€which€is€reviewed€in€the€light€most€favorable€to€the€State.€€òòState€v.ÏHarrisóó,€839€S.W.2d€54,€75€(Tenn.€1992);€òòState€v.€Cabbageóó,€571€S.W.2d€832,Í835€(Tenn.€1978).€€Moreover,€the€credibility€of€witnesses,€the€weight€given€toÏtestimony,€and€the€reconciliation€of€conflicts€in€the€testimony€are€all€mattersÏentrusted€exclusively€to€the€jury€as€the€triers€of€fact,€whose€determination€thisÏcourt€will€not€disturb€on€appeal.€€òòState€v.€Oodyóó,€823€S.W.2d€554,€558€(Tenn.ÏCrim.€App.€1991).€It€is€the€appellate€court's€duty€to€affirm€the€conviction€if€theÏevidence,€viewed€under€these€standards,€was€sufficient€for€any€rational€trier€of€ÌÌÌfact€to€have€found€the€essential€elements€of€the€offenses€beyond€a€reasonableÏdoubt.€€òòJackson€v.€Virginiaóó,€443€U.S.€307,€317,€99€S.Ct.€2781,€2789€(1979);ÏòòState€v.€Cazesóó,€875€S.W.2d€253,€259€(Tenn.€1994);€Tenn.€R.€App.€P.€13(e).ÌÌà@ àòòA.€€Attempted€First€Degree€Murderà àÌóóà àFirst,€the€appellant€contends€that€he€did€not€have€the€culpable€mentalÏstate€necessary€to€support€the€offense€of€attempted€first€degree€murder.€€InÏsupport€of€this€claim,€the€appellant€argues€that,€not€only€did€he€lack€theÏnecessary€intent€to€kill€Keith€Fason,€but€also€that€he€was€unaware€that€theÏhouse€was€occupied€at€the€time€of€the€shooting.€€In€order€to€convict€theÏappellant€of€attempted€first€degree€murder€in€this€case,€the€State€was€requiredÏto€prove€that€the€appellant,€acting€with€the€kind€of€culpability€otherwise€requiredÏfor€the€offense:ÌÓÓÌà8 à(2)€€Act[ed]€with€intent€to€cause€a€result€that€is€an€element€of€theÏoffense,€and€believes€the€conduct€will€cause€the€result€withoutÏfurther€conduct€on€the€person's€part;€€ÌÌTenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€39„12„101(a)€(1991);€and€that€the€result€intended€was€theÌÌÓÓ(1)€intentional,€premeditated€and€deliberate€killing€of€another.€€Tenn.€Code€Ann.Ïðð€39„13„202(a)(1)€(1994€Supp.).ÌÌà àIn€the€light€most€favorable€to€the€State,€the€evidence€shows€that€theÏappellant€intentionally€fired€his€weapon€at€Washington's€house.€€The€frightenedÏFason€ran€to€another€room€where€he€telephoned€for€help,€during€which€time€heÏobserved€the€appellant€assist€his€wounded€companion€to€the€car.€€WhileÏwatching€the€appellant€return€to€the€driver's€side€of€his€vehicle,€Fason€noticedÏthe€appellant€peering€through€the€window,€behind€which€Fason€was€standing.€ÏFason€testified€that€the€appellant€was€able€to€see€him€standing€in€the€window.€ÏRather€than€return€to€his€vehicle,€the€appellant€made€the€conscious€decision€toÏaim€his€weapon€and€then€fire€his€weapon€into€this€window.€€ÌÌà àThe€State€bears€the€burden€of€proving,€beyond€a€reasonable€doubt,€theÏseparate€and€distinct€elements€of€premeditation€and€deliberation.€€òòSeeóó€€Tenn.ÏCode€Ann.€ðð€39„11„201(1)€(1991).€€As€proof€of€premeditation€and€deliberation,Ïthe€State€argues€that€the€appellant€made€eye€contact€with€Fason,€who€wasÏstanding€in€the€window,€and€rather€than€leaving€the€scene,€consciously€made€aÍdecision€to€raise€his€arm€and€fire€into€the€window.€€Premeditation€necessitatesÏ"the€exercise€of€reflection€and€judgment,"€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€39„13„201(b)(2)Ï(1991),€"includ[ing]€instances€of€homicide€committed€by€poison€or€lying€in€wait,"Ïand€"requiring€"a€previously€formed€design€or€intent€to€kill."€€òòState€v.€Westóó,€844ÏS.W.2d€144,€147€(Tenn.€1992).€€Deliberation,€on€the€other€hand,€is€defined€as€aÏ"cool€purpose€.€.€.€formed€in€the€absence€of€passion."€€òòState€v.€Brownóó,€836ÏS.W.2d€530,€538€(Tenn.€1992)€(citations€and€internal€quotations€omitted).€ÏDeliberation€also€requires€"some€period€of€reflection,€during€which€the€mind€isÏfree€from€the€influence€of€excitement."€€òòIdóó.;€òòsee€alsoóó€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€39„13„201(b)(2).€ÌÌà à€Although€there€are€no€strict€standards€governing€what€constitutes€proofÏof€€premeditation€and€deliberation,€several€relevant€circumstances€are€helpful€inÏthe€inquiry,€including:€the€use€of€a€deadly€weapon€upon€an€unarmed€victim;€theÏfact€that€the€killing€was€particularly€cruel;€declarations€by€the€defendant€of€hisÏintent€to€kill;€and€the€making€of€preparations€before€the€killing€for€the€purpose€ofÏconcealing€the€crime.€€òòState€v.€Blandóó,€No.€02C01„9412„CR„00281€(Tenn.€Crim.ÏApp.€at€Jackson,€Mar.€27,€1996),€òòreh'g€deniedóó,€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.€May€1,€1996)Ï(citing€òòBrownóó,€836€S.W.2d€at€541„42).€€Additional€factors€from€which€the€juryÏmay€infer€premeditation€and€deliberation€include€planning€activities€by€theÏappellant€prior€to€the€killing,€the€appellant's€prior€relationship€with€the€victim,Ïand€the€nature€of€the€killing.€€òòIdóó.€(citing€òòState€v.€Bordisóó,€905€S.W.2d€214€(Tenn.ÍCrim.€App.),€òòperm.€to€appeal€deniedóó,€(Tenn.€1995)€(quoting€2€W.€LaFave€and€A.ÏScott,€Jr.,€òòSubstantive€Criminal€Lawóó€Sec.€7.7€(1986)));€òòGentryóó,€881€S.W.2d€at€4„5€(citation€omitted)).€€Other€than€the€appellantððs€use€of€a€deadly€weapon,€we€findÏnone€of€the€above€circumstances€present€in€the€instant€case.€€ÌÌà àWe€are€unable€to€conclude€from€the€proof€in€the€record€that€theÏappellantððs€firing€of€his€weapon€into€the€window€was€premeditated,€i.e.€as€theÏresult€of€ð ðthe€exercise€of€reflection€and€judgment€with€a€previously€formedÏdesign€or€intent€to€kill.ðð€€€In€fact,€Keith€Fason€confirmed€the€appellant's€assertionÏthat€he€and€Fason€had€never€previously€met€nor€had€the€two€men€had€any€priorÏencounters€or€dealings.€€€€Notwithstanding€our€finding€that€the€proof€isÏinsufficient€to€establish€the€attempted€òòfirstóó€degree€murder€of€Keith€Fason,€weÏacknowledge€that,€once€a€homicide€is€established,€it€is€presumed€to€be€aÏsecond€degree€murder.€€òòBrownóó,€836€S.W.2d€at€543.€€Second€degree€murder€isÏ"a€knowing€killing€of€another."€€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€39„13„210(a)(1)(1991).€ÏClearly,€under€the€facts€of€this€case,€the€appellant€acted€"knowingly"€with€anÏawareness€that€firing€a€loaded€weapon€at€the€victim€was€reasonably€certain€toÏproduce€death.€€òòSeeóó€€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€39„11„106(20)€(1991).€€Thus,€weÏconclude€that€there€is€evidence€to€support€"knowing"€conduct,€and,€therefore,€anÏattempted€second€degree€murder€conviction.€€Accordingly,€the€appellant'sÏconviction€for€attempted€first€degree€murder€is€modified€to€reflect€the€lesserÏoffense€of€attempted€second€degree€murder.€€We€remand€to€the€trial€court€forÍresentencing€for€this€offense.ÌÌà@ àòòB.€€Attempted€Second€Degree€MurderÌà àóóThe€appellant€also€challenges€the€jury's€verdict€finding€him€guilty€of€theÏattempted€second€degree€murder€of€Michael€Smith.€€òòSeeóó€€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ððÏ39„13„210(a)(1);€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€39„12„101(a).€€Specifically,€he€argues€thatÏthe€proof€failed€to€show€that€he€was€aware€that€his€conduct€was€reasonablyÏcertain€to€cause€Smith's€death.€€Rather,€he€asserts€that€the€proof€establishedÏthat€the€shooting€of€Michael€Smith€was€a€"drug€induced€and€wildly€reckless€act."ÌÌà àAgain,€once€a€homicide€is€established€it€is€presumed€to€be€secondÏdegree€murder.€€òòBrownóó,€836€S.W.2d€at€543.€€In€order€to€support€a€conviction€forÏattempted€second€degree€murder,€the€proof€must€establish€that€the€appellantÏknowingly€attempted€to€kill€Smith,€without€adequate€provocation€and€with€theÏbelief€that€his€conduct€would€result€in€Smith's€death€without€further€conduct€onÏhis€part.€€òòSeeóó€€€òòState€v.€Belleóó,€No.€03C01„9503„CR„00094€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.€atÏKnoxville,€Mar.€6,€1996),€òòperm.€to€appeal€deniedóó,€(Tenn.€Sept.€16,€1996)Ï(citation€omitted).€The€proof€at€trial€established€that,€once€the€appellant€beganÏfiring€upon€the€house,€Michael€Smith€got€out€of€the€car€and€asked€the€appellantÏwhat€he€was€doing.€€The€appellant€turned€and€shot€Smith€point€blank€in€theÏchest.€€There€is€no€proof€that€Smith€either€provoked€or€threatened€the€appellant.€ÏMoreover,€there€was€no€proof€introduced€at€trial€to€indicate€the€appellant'sÍalleged€level€of€intoxication.€€Accordingly,€the€proof€supports€the€jury's€verdictÏfinding€the€appellant€guilty,€beyond€a€reasonable€doubt,€of€attempted€secondÏdegree€murder.€€This€issue€is€without€merit.ÌÌÌà@ àò òII.€€Double€Jeopardyó óÌÌà àThe€appellant€next€argues€that,€under€òòState€v.€Anthonyóó,€817€S.W.2d€atÏ299,€due€process€dictates€that€his€convictions€for€the€aggravated€assaults€ofÏMichael€Smith€and€Keith€Fason€are€necessarily€incidental€to€his€respectiveÏconvictions€for€attempted€first€and€second€degree€murder€and€as€such,€cannotÏstand.€€We€find,€however,€that€the€factual€circumstances€present€an€issue€ofÏdouble€jeopardy€rather€than€one€of€due€process.€€òòSeeóó€òòState€v.€Dentonóó,€938ÏS.W.2d€373€(Tenn.€1996).€€Count€one€of€the€indictment€charged€the€appellantÏwith€attempted€first€degree€murder€of€Michael€Smith,€and€count€two€charged€theÏappellant€with€aggravated€assault€of€Michael€Smith.€€It€is€undisputed€that€onlyÏone€shot€was€fired€at€the€victim€Michael€Smith,€with€that€bullet€striking€the€victimÏin€his€chest.€€The€State€concedes€that€the€same€evidence€was€used€to€convictÏthe€appellant€of€both€aggravated€assault€and€attempted€second€degree€murder.€ÏAccordingly,€the€State€acknowledges€that€the€appellantððs€conviction€forÏaggravated€assault€violates€double€jeopardy€principles€and€cannot€stand.€€WeÏagree.€€We€affirm€the€appellantððs€conviction€for€attempted€second€degreeÍmurder€and€reverse€and€dismiss€the€appellantððs€conviction€for€aggravatedÏassault.€€òòSee,€e.g.óó,€òòDentonóó,€938€S.W.2d€at€382;€òòState€v.€Hallóó,€No.€02C01„9607„CC„00211€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.€at€Jackson,€Jan.€28,€1997);€òòState€v.€Adamsóó,€No.Ï02C01„9512„CC„00376€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.€at€Jackson,€Jan.€3,€1997),€òòperm.€toÏappeal€deniedóó,€(Tenn.€June€2,€1997).ÌÌà àCount€three€of€the€indictment€charged€the€appellant€with€attempted€firstÏdegree€murder€of€Keith€Fason€and€count€four€charged€the€appellant€withÏaggravated€assault€of€Keith€Fason.€€With€reference€to€these€convictions,Ïhowever,€the€State,€on€appeal,€argues€that€the€proof€supports€the€commission€ofÏseparate€and€distinct€offenses.€€Specifically,€the€State€now€argues€that€theÏaggravated€assault€was€established€by€the€appellantððs€act€of€shooting€at€theÏfront€door.€€In€support€of€the€attempted€second€degree€murder€conviction,€theÏState€relies€upon€the€gunshot€fired€by€the€appellant€through€the€window.€ÏContrary€to€the€contemporaneous€argument€now€advanced€by€the€State,€theÏrecord,€at€the€trial€level,€reveals€that€the€State,€in€its€argument€to€the€jury,€reliedÏupon€the€shot€fired€through€the€window€to€support€both€convictions.× ƒ1 ××  ×€€Indeed,Ïthe€record€reflects€that€the€clear€intent€of€the€State€was€to€proceed€as€to€bothÍvictims€upon€charges€of€aggravated€assault€as€an€alternative€course€ofÏprosecution€should€the€evidence€fail€to€support€convictions€for€attemptedÏhomicide.€€Moreover,€the€trial€judge€òòrepeatedlyóó€noted€that€the€appellant€shouldÏnot€have€convictions€for€ð ðboth€attempted€homicides€and€also€the€aggravatedÏassaults,€but€[conceded€that€he€did€not]€know€procedurally€how€to€handle€it.ðð× ƒ2 ××  ×ÌÌà àIn€òòDentonóó,€938€S.W.2d€at€373,€our€supreme€court€extended€doubleÏjeopardy€protection€under€the€Tennessee€Constitution€beyond€that€provided€byÏthe€federal€constitution.€€òòHallóó,€No.€02C01„9607„CC„00211.€€Specifically,€theÏcourt,€going€beyond€òòBlockburger€v.€United€Statesóó,€284€U.S.€299,€304,€52€S.Ct.Ï180,€182€(1932),€promulgated€the€following€analysis€to€determine€whether€theÏpunishment€for€multiple€convictions€for€a€single€criminal€action€violatesÏprinciples€of€double€jeopardy:ÌÓÓà8 àI.€€a€òòBlockburgeróó€analysis€of€the€statutory€offenses;× ƒ3 ××  ×ÌÌà8 àII.€an€analysis,€guided€by€the€principles€of€òòDuhac€v.€Stateóó,€505ÏS.W.2d€237€(Tenn.€1973),€of€the€evidence€used€to€prove€theÏoffenses;× ƒ4 ××  ×ÌÌà8 àIII.€€a€consideration€of€whether€there€were€multiple€victims€orÏdiscrete€acts;€andÌÌÌÌà8 àIV.€a€comparison€of€the€purposes€of€the€respective€statutes.ÌÌÓÓòòDentonóó,€938€S.W.2d.Ìà àòòÌóóà àClearly,€under€a€òòBlockburgeróó€analysis,€the€offenses€of€attempted€firstÏdegree€murder€and€aggravated€assault€(1)€are€separate€and€distinct€statutoryÏoffenses,€(2)€neither€offense€is€included€in€the€other,× ƒ5 ××  ×€(3)€both€require€proof€ofÏdifferent€elements,€(4)€each€require€proof€of€additional€facts€not€required€by€theÏother,€and€(5)€the€legislative€intent€suggests€that€two€separate€offenses€wereÏintended.€€òòDentonóó,€938€S.W.2d€at€379€(quoting€òòState€v.€Blackóó,€524€S.W.2d€913,Ï919€(Tenn.€1975)€(quoting€òòBlockburgeróó,€284€U.S.€at€304,€52€S.Ct.€at€182Ï(1932)).ÌÌà àHaving€survived€òòBlockburgeróó,€we€next€focus€upon€whether€the€evidenceÏused€to€support€both€aggravated€assault€and€attempted€first€degree€murderÏconvictions€is€the€same.€€Based€upon€our€previous€review€of€the€Stateððs€positionÏat€trial,€the€trial€courtððs€pronouncements€of€its€position€relative€thereto,€and€theÍproof€in€the€record,€we€conclude€that€ð ðthe€same€evidence€[was]€necessary€toÏprove€both€offenses.ðð€€òòDentonóó,€938€S.W.2d€at€380€(quoting€òòDuhacóó,€505€S.W.2dÏat€241).€€Accordingly,€we€conclude€that€the€appellantððs€convictions€for€theÏattempted€second€degree€murder€and€aggravated€assault€of€Keith€Fason€areÏthe€ð ðsameðð€for€double€jeopardy€purposes.€€Thus,€only€one€conviction€can€beÏsustained.€€We€affirm€the€appellantððs€conviction€for€the€attempted€secondÏdegree€murder€of€Keith€Fason.× ƒ6 ××  ×€€The€conviction€for€aggravated€assault€isÏreversed,€the€accompanying€sentence€is€vacated,€and€this€count€of€theÏindictment€is€dismissed.ÌÌà àParenthetically,€we€note€that,€even€if€we€had€accepted€the€StateððsÏargument,€the€appellantððs€act€of€shooting€at€the€front€door€would€not€haveÏsupported€a€conviction€for€aggravated€assault€under€a€sufficiency€of€evidenceÏanalysis.€€Our€supreme€court€has€recently€held€that€a€conviction€for€aggravatedÏassault€cannot€stand€absent€evidence€that€the€accused€knew€that€the€houseÏwas€occupied€during€the€initial€shooting€as€the€proof€cannot€establish€that€theÏaccused€intentionally€or€knowingly€caused€a€victim€to€fear€imminent€bodilyÏinjury.€€òòSeeóó€òòState€v.€Wilsonóó,€924€S.W.2d€648,€650€(Tenn.€1996).€€The€proof€isÏclear€in€this€case€that€the€appellant€was€unaware€of€Fasonððs€presence€in€theÏhouse€at€the€time€of€the€initial€shooting€into€the€front€door.€€Apparently,€in€view€ofÍthis€ruling,€the€State€argues€that€the€facts€support€a€ð ðrecklessðð€aggravatedÏassault€as€defined€by€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€39„13„102(a)(2)(B).€€However,€theÏpredicate€assault€for€this€offense€requires€the€infliction€of€ð ðbodily€injury€toÏanother.ðð€€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€39„13„101(a)(1).€€Because€no€bodily€injuryÏresulted€from€the€initial€shooting€by€the€appellant,€this€offense€is€inapplicable.òòÌóóÌÌà@ àò òIII.€€Reasonable€Doubt€Instructionó óÌÌà àNext,€the€appellant€contends€that€the€trial€court€committed€error€by€failingÏto€include€language€instructing€the€jury€that€the€State€has€the€burden€of€provingÏa€defendant's€guilt€to€a€moral€certainty.× ƒ7 ××  ×€€Specifically,€he€complains€that€theÏinstruction€provided€by€the€trial€court€"emphasize[d]€the€level€of€uncertaintyÏwhich€the€standard€of€proof€beyond€reasonable€doubt€would€permit."€AlthoughÏwe€agree€with€the€State€that€the€appellant€has€waived€this€issue€for€failure€toÏrequest€a€particular€jury€instruction€and€failure€to€object€to€the€instruction€given,Ïwe€elect€to€proceed€upon€the€merits€of€this€claim.€€òòSeeóó€€Tenn.€R.€App.€P.€36(a).€ÏòòSee€alsoóó€€òòState€v.€Haynesóó,€720€S.W.2d€76,€85€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.€1986).€ÌÌà àIn€state€criminal€trials,€the€Due€Process€Clause€of€the€FourteenthÍAmendment€protects€the€accused€from€conviction€unless€the€prosecutionÏpersuades€the€fact„finder€"beyond€a€reasonable€doubt"€of€the€facts€necessary€toÏestablish€each€element€of€the€offense€charged.€€òòSullivan€v.€Louisianaóó,€508€U.S.Ï275,€278,€113€S.Ct.€2078,€2080„81€(1993)€(citations€omitted);€òòIn€re€Winshipóó,€397ÏU.S.€358,€364,€90€S.Ct.€1068,€1072„73€(1970);€òòsee€alsoóó€€òòJackson€v.€Virginiaóó,Ï443€U.S.€at€320€n.€14,€99€S.Ct.€at€2790€n.14.€€The€"beyond€a€reasonable€doubtÏstandard"€provides€concrete€substance€for€the€presumption€of€innocence;€"thatÏbedrock€axiomatic€and€elementary€principle€whose€enforcement€lies€at€theÏfoundation€of€the€administration€of€our€criminal€law."€€òòWinshipóó,€397€U.S.€at€364,Ï90€S.Ct.€at€1072;€òòsee€alsoóó€€òòVictor€v.€Nebraskaóó,€511€U.S.€1,€5,€114€S.Ct.€1239,Ï1243€(1994).€€However,€the€Constitution€does€not€require€courts€to€defineÏreasonable€doubt€for€the€jury,€or,€if€they€elect€to€define€reasonable€doubt€to€useÏany€particular€formula€or€words.€€òòSeeóó€€òòHolland€v.€United€Statesóó,€348€U.S.€121,Ï140,€75€S.Ct.€127,€138€(1954);€òòsee€alsoóó€€òòVictoróó,€511€U.S.€at€5,€114€S.Ct.€at€1243.€ÏIndeed,€the€Court€noted€that€"attempts€to€explain€the€term€"reasonable€doubt"€doÏnot€usually€result€in€making€it€any€clearer€to€the€minds€of€the€jury."× ƒ8 ××  ×€€òòHollandóó,Ï348€U.S.€at€140,€75€S.Ct.€at€138;€òòsee€alsoóó€€òòUnited€States€v.€Headspeathóó,€852ÏF.2d€753,€755€(4th€Cir.€1988);€òòUnited€States€v.€Olmsteadóó,€832€F.2d€642,€645€(1stÏCir.€1987),€òòcert.€deniedóó,€486€U.S.€1009,€108€S.Ct.€1739€(1988)€("reasonableÍdoubt€is€a€fundamental€concept€that€does€not€easily€lend€itself€to€refinement€orÏdefinement");€òòUnited€States€v.€Lawsonóó,€507€F.2d€433,€443€(7th€Cir.€1974),€òòcert.Ïdeniedóó,€420€U.S.€1004,€95€S.Ct.€1446€(1975)€òòoverruled€on€other€grounds€byóóÏòòUnited€States€v.€Hollingeróó,€553€F.2d€535€(7th€Cir.€1977).€€€ÌÌà àNonetheless,€a€jury€instruction€that€permits€conviction€on€a€lesserÏstandard€„„€by€shifting€the€burden€of€proof€from€the€prosecution€to€the€defendant,Ïor€by€suggesting€that€a€higher€degree€of€doubt€than€'reasonable€doubt'€isÏnecessary€for€acquittal€is€constitutionally€deficient€and€grounds€for€reversal.€ÏòòSullivanóó,€508€U.S.€at€280,€113€S.Ct.€at€2080„2082.€òòAccordóó€€òòLanigan€v.€Maloneyóó,Ï853€F.2d€40,€48€(1st€Cir.€1988),€òòcert.€deniedóó,€488€U.S.€1007,€109€S.Ct.€788Ï(1989)€(although€the€court€need€not€define€reasonable€doubt,€any€definitionÏgiven€must€not€reduce€the€government's€burden€of€proof).€€In€determiningÏwhether€the€instruction€is€constitutionally€deficient,€the€reviewing€court€mustÏexamine€the€òòcharge€as€a€wholeóó€and€consider€how€reasonable€jurors€could€haveÏunderstood€the€charge€as€correctly€conveying€the€concept€of€reasonable€doubt.€ÏòòVictoróó,€511€U.S.€at€6,€114€S.Ct.€at€1243;€€òòCage€v.€Louisianaóó,€498€U.S.€39,€41,Ï111€S.Ct.€328,€329€(1990)€(òòper€curiumóó)€(citation€omitted);€€òòCupp€v.€Naughtenóó,Ï414€U.S.€141,€146„147,€94€S.Ct.€396,€400„01€(1973).€€Accordingly,€an€assertedÏerror€in€a€reasonable€doubt€instruction€may€be€innocuous€or€inconsequentialÏwhen€viewed€in€the€context€of€the€charge€as€a€whole.€€òòSeeóó€€òòVargas€v.€Keaneóó,€86ÏF.3d€1273,€1277€(2nd€Cir.),€òòcert.€deniedóó,€„„€U.S.€„„,€117€S.Ct.€240€(1996).ÌÌà àIn€the€present€case,€the€trial€court€instructed€the€jury:ÌÓÓà8 àThe€law€presumes€that€the€defendant€is€innocent€of€the€chargeÏagainst€him.€€This€presumption€remains€with€the€defendant€thoughtÏevery€stage€of€the€trial,€and€it€is€not€overcome€unless€from€all€of€theÏevidence€in€the€case,€you€are€convinced€beyond€a€reasonableÏdoubt€that€the€defendant€is€guilty.€€ÌÌà8 àThe€State€has€the€burden€of€proving€the€guilt€of€the€defendantÏbeyond€a€reasonable€doubt,€and€this€burden€never€shifts,€butÏremains€on€the€State€throughout€the€trial€of€the€case.€€TheÏdefendant€is€not€required€to€prove€his€innocence.ÌÌà8 àòòA€reasonable€doubt€is€a€doubt€based€upon€reason€and€commonÏsense€after€careful€and€impartial€consideration€of€all€of€theÏevidence€in€the€case.€€It€is€not€necessary€that€the€defendant's€guiltÏbe€proved€beyond€all€possible€doubt,€as€absolute€certainty€of€guiltÏis€not€demanded€by€law€to€convict€of€any€criminal€charge.€€AÏreasonable€doubt€is€just€that€„€„€a€doubt€that€is€reasonable€after€anÏexamination€of€all€of€the€facts€in€the€case.€€If€you€find€that€the€StateÏhas€not€proven€every€element€of€the€offense€beyond€a€reasonableÏdoubt,€then€you€should€find€the€defendant€not€guiltyóó.[× ƒ9 ××  ×]ÌÌà8 àThe€State€must€prove€beyond€a€reasonable€doubt€all€the€elementsÏof€the€crime€charged.€.€.ÌÌÓÓ(Emphasis€added€to€challenged€portion€of€instruction).€€ÌÌà àAgain,€the€appellant€claims€that€the€instruction€defining€"reasonableÏdoubt"€is€constitutionally€deficient.€€In€support€of€his€argument,€the€appellantÏadopts€the€position€of€one€panel€of€this€court.€€òòSeeóó€€òòState€v.€Dentonóó,€No.€02C01„9409„CR„00186€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.€at€Jackson,€Aug.€2,€1996).€€The€reviewingÍpanel,€in€òòDentonóó,€expressed€concerned€that€the€pattern€instruction,€2.03(a),Ïdoes€not€adequately€convey€the€evidentiary€certainty€required€under€theÏreasonable€doubt€standard.€€€òòDentonóó,€No.€02C01„9409„CR„00186.€€Specifically,Ïthe€panel€quoted€two€excerpts€from€the€instruction,€i.e.,€"a€doubt€based€uponÏreason€and€common€sense€after€careful€and€impartial€consideration€of€all€theÏevidence"€and€"absolute€certainty€of€the€defendant's€guilt€is€not€necessary€toÏconvict€him."€ÌÌà àTennessee€Pattern€Instruction€2.03(a)€tracks€virtually€identical€languageÏof€pattern€reasonable€doubt€instructions€approved€by€a€majority€of€the€federalÏcircuits.× ƒ: ××  ×€€òòSee,€e.g.óó,€€€òòUnited€States€v.€Velasquezóó,€980€F.2d€1275,€1278€(9th€Cir.€ÌÌÌ1992),€òòcert.€deniedóó,€508€U.S.€979,€113€S.Ct.€2979€(1993);€òòUnited€States€v.ÏCampbellóó,€874€F.2d€838,€841€(1st€Cir.€1989);€òòUnited€States€v.€Hallóó,€854€F.2dÏ1036,€1039€(7th€Cir.€1988);€òòUnited€States€v.€Kirbyóó,€838€F.2d€189,€191„192€(6thÏCir.€1988);€òòUnited€States€v.€Colonóó,€835€F.2d€27,€31„32€(2nd€Cir.€1987),€òòcert.Ïdeniedóó,€485€U.S.€980,€108€S.Ct.€1279€(1988);€€òòUnited€States€v.€Dilgóó,€700€F.2dÏ620€(11th€Cir.€1983);€òòUnited€States€v.€Alonzoóó,€681€F.2d€997,€1002€(5th€Cir.),Ïòòcert.€deniedóó,€459€U.S.€1021,€103€S.Ct.€386€(1982);€òòUnited€States€v.€Robertsonóó,Ï588€F.2d€575,€579€(8th€Cir.€1978),€òòcert.€deniedóó,€441€U.S.€945,€99€S.Ct.€2166Ï(1979).€Moreover,€the€questioned€language€"based€upon€reason€and€commonÏsense"€and€"absolute€certainty€is€not€required"€has€repeatedly€been€upheld€asÏpassing€constitutional€muster.€€òòSee,€e.g.óó,€òòUnited€States€v.€Kimeóó,€99€F.3d€870Ï(8th€Cir.€1996),€òòcert.€deniedóó,€„„€U.S.€„„,€117€S.Ct.€1015€(1997);€òòUnited€States€v.ÏMilleróó,€84€F.3d€1244€(10th€Cir.),€òòcert.€deniedóó,€„„€U.S.€„„,€117€S.Ct.€443€(1996)Ïòòoverruled€on€other€grounds€byóó€òòUnited€States€v.€Hollandóó,€116€F.3d€1353€(10thÏCir.€1997);€òòUnited€States€v.€Campbellóó,€61€F.3d€976,€980„981€(1st€Cir.€1995),Ïòòcert.€deniedóó,€„„€U.S.€„„.€116€S.Ct.€1556€(1996);€òòHallóó,€854€F.2d€at€1038„1039;ÏòòUnited€States€v.€Rahmóó,€993€F.2d€1405,€1412€(9th€Cir.€1993).€ÌÌà àWe€do€not€find€that€the€instruction€taken€separately€renders€theÏreasonable€doubt€instruction€constitutionally€deficient.€€Additionally,€consideringÏthis€language€in€the€context€of€the€full€charge,€we€find€no€reasonable€likelihoodÍthat€the€jury€understood€the€instruction€to€permit€conviction€after€anything€but€aÏprocess€of€careful€deliberation€or€upon€less€than€proof€beyond€a€reasonableÏdoubt.€€This€issue€is€without€merit.€€€€€€€ÌÌÌà@ àò òIV.€€Sentencingó óÌÌà àIn€his€final€challenge,€the€appellant€avers€that€the€trial€court€erred€byÏimposing€excessive€sentences€and€by€ordering€his€convictions€for€attemptedÏhomicide€to€run€consecutively.€€Initially,€we€note€that,€in€view€of€our€previousÏrulings€in€this€opinion,€our€review€extends€only€to€his€convictions€for€attemptedÏsecond€degree€murder€of€Michael€Smith€and€possession€of€a€deadly€weaponÏduring€the€commission€of€a€felony.ÌÌà àReview,€by€this€court,€of€the€length,€range,€or€manner€of€service€of€aÏsentence€is€òòde€novoóó€with€a€presumption€that€the€determination€made€by€the€trialÏcourt€is€correct.€€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€40„35„401(d)€(1990).€€This€presumptionÏonly€applies,€however,€if€the€record€demonstrates€that€the€trial€court€properlyÏconsidered€relevant€sentencing€principles.€€òòState€v.€Ashbyóó,€823€S.W.2d€166,Ï169€(Tenn.€1991).€€In€the€case€before€us,€the€trial€court€considered€relevantÏsentencing€principles;€thus,€the€presumption€applies.€Moreover,€this€court€mayÏonly€modify€a€sentence€if€the€sentence€is€excessive€or€the€manner€of€service€isÍinappropriate.€€òòState€v.€Russellóó,€773€S.W.2d€913,€915€(Tenn.€1989).€€On€appeal,Ïthe€appellant€bears€the€burden€of€showing€that€the€sentence€imposed€wasÏimproper.€€Sentencing€Commission€Comments,€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€40„35„401(d).ÌÌà àThe€proof€at€the€sentencing€hearing€revealed€that€the€appellant€is€a€forty„two€year€old€father€of€two€children,€a€ninth€grade€drop€out,€and€a€chronic€ÌÌÌÌsubstance€abuser.€€He€receives€disability€benefits€for€a€back€problem€and€wasÏunemployed€prior€to€the€present€offenses.€€His€prior€criminal€record€consists€of€aÏconviction€for€the€unlawful€use€of€a€weapon€in€Illinois€in€1993;€a€1982€convictionÏfor€escape;€a€1977€conviction€for€armed€robbery;€and€1973€convictions€for€autoÏtheft€and€grand€larceny.€€ÌÌà àMichael€Smith,€the€only€witness€at€the€sentencing€hearing,€testified€thatÏhe€is€the€appellant's€cousin€and€is€also€a€victim€of€the€instant€offenses.€€HeÏstated€that€the€appellant€shot€him€one€inch€from€his€heart.€€As€a€consequence€ofÏthe€shooting,€Smith€was€hospitalized€for€one€month,€consisting€of€nine€days€inÏthe€Intensive€Care€Unit.€€Smith€underwent€two€surgeries€due€to€the€injuriesÏreceived€to€"his€kidney,€spleen,€liver,€heart,€and€lungs€.€.€.€."€€As€a€result€of€thisÍincident,€Smith€asserted€that€"I€am€destroyed€for€the€rest€of€my€life."ÌÌà@ àòòA.€€Length€of€SentencesóóÌà à€In€determining€the€appropriate€sentence€for€the€attempted€secondÏdegree€murder€of€Michael€Smith,€the€trial€court€found€the€followingÏenhancement€factors€applicable:€(1)€the€defendant€has€a€previous€history€ofÏcriminal€convictions€or€behavior,€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€40„35„114(1)€(1995ÏSupp.);€(6)€that€the€personal€injuries€inflicted€were€particularly€great,€Tenn.ÏCode€Ann.€ðð€40„35„114(6);€and€(9)€the€defendant€possessed€a€firearm€duringÏthe€commission€of€the€offense,€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€40„35„114(9).€€Regarding€theÏweapons€charge,€the€trial€court€applied€enhancement€factor€(1)€that€theÏdefendant€has€a€previous€history€of€criminal€convictions€and€behavior.€€Tenn.ÏCode€Ann.€ðð€40„35„114(1).€€The€trial€court€concluded€that€no€mitigating€factorsÏwere€applicable.€€Accordingly,€the€court€imposed€a€sentence€of€eleven€years€forÏthe€attempted€second€degree€murder€conviction€and€three€years€for€theÏpossession€of€a€weapon€during€a€felony€conviction.× ƒ; ××  ×€€ÌÌà àThe€appellant€does€not€dispute€the€applicability€of€the€enhancementÏfactors€utilized€by€the€trial€court;€rather€he€contests€the€trial€court's€refusal€to€findÍas€mitigating€factors€(1)€the€appellant's€long€history€of€substance€abuse€and€(2)Ïthat€the€appellant€aided€Smith€by€ensuring€treatment€for€his€injury.€€WeÏconclude€that€the€trial€court€properly€rejected€these€proffered€mitigating€factors.€ÏAs€the€appellant€concedes,€the€1989€Code€expressly€excludes€the€voluntaryÏuse€of€intoxicants€as€a€"mental€or€physical€condition€that€significantly€reduce[s]Ï[a€defendant's]€culpability."€€òòSeeóó€€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€40„35„113(8)€(1990).€ÏNonetheless,€he€argues€that€this€factor€should€be€considered€in€light€of€the€factÏthat€"the€shooting€.€.€.would€not€have€occurred€apart€from€the€influence€of€theÏdrugs."€€In€other€words,€the€appellant€concedes€that€his€drug€abuse€should€notÏreduce€his€culpability€as€to€his€guilt€of€the€crimes,€but€should€be€considered€"inÏfashioning€an€appropriate€sentence."€€Again,€the€1989€òòSentencingóó€Reform€ActÏexcludes€involuntary€intoxication€as€a€mitigating€factor€in€òòsentencingóó.€€Tenn.ÏCode€Ann.€ðð€40„35„113(8).€€Moreover,€the€appellant€has€failed€to€present€anyÏevidence€that€he€was,€in€fact,€intoxicated€at€the€time€the€offenses€wereÏcommitted.€€This€contention€is€without€merit.ÌÌà àThe€appellant€also€argues€that€his€efforts€to€assist€the€injured€SmithÏshould€be€considered€in€mitigation€of€his€punishment.€€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€40„35„113(13).€€The€proof€does€not€support€this€assertion.€€Indeed,€the€testimony€atÏthe€sentencing€hearing€revealed€that€the€appellant€refused€to€transport€theÏvictim€to€the€hospital.€€Fortunately€for€Smith,€the€appellant€met€Donald€MorrowÏon€the€street.€€It€was€only€by€this€chance€encounter€that€medical€attention€forÍSmith€was€foreseeable,€but€only€after€the€appellant€pushed€the€victim€out€of€hisÏvehicle€and€onto€the€street.€€This€factor€was€properly€rejected€by€the€trial€court.ÌÌà àUpon€òòde€novoóó€€review,€we€agree€with€the€trial€court€that€no€mitigatingÏfactors€are€applicable€to€the€instant€offenses.€€Moreover,€we€conclude€that€theÏproof€supports€the€trial€court's€application€of€three€enhancement€factors€to€theÏoffense€of€attempted€second€degree€murder€of€Michael€Smith€and€oneÏenhancement€factor€to€the€weapons€charge.€€When€there€are€enhancementÏfactors€and€no€mitigating€factors,€the€trial€court€may€set€the€sentence€above€theÏminimum€within€the€applicable€sentencing€range,€but€still€within€the€range.€ÏTenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€40„35„210(d).€€The€appellant€was€convicted€as€a€range€IÏoffender€of€a€class€B€felony,€and€as€a€range€II€offender€of€a€class€E€felony.€€Thus,Ïthe€sentence€range€for€the€appellant€is€eight€to€twelve€years€for€the€attemptedÏsecond€degree€murder€conviction,€and€two€to€four€years€for€the€weaponÏconviction.€€òòSeeóó€€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€40„35„112(a)(2);€„112(b)(5).€€The€courtÏimposed€sentences€of€eleven€years€and€three€years€for€the€respectiveÏconvictions.€€We€find€the€length€of€these€sentences€to€be€justified€and€notÏexcessive€under€the€guidelines€of€the€1989€Sentencing€Act.€€This€issue€isÏwithout€merit.€ÌÌò òà@ àòòó óB.€€Consecutive€SentencesóóÌà àIf€a€defendant€is€convicted€of€more€than€one€criminal€offense,€the€courtÍmay€order€the€sentences€to€run€consecutively.€€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€40„35„115(1990).€€In€the€present€case,€the€trial€court€ordered€that€the€two€attemptedÏhomicide€convictions€run€consecutively€based€upon€the€appellant'sÏclassification€as€a€dangerous€offender€and€the€appellant's€extensive€criminalÏbackground.€€The€appellant€contests€the€trial€court's€classification€of€him€as€aÏ"dangerous€offender,"€arguing€the€lack€of€aggravating€circumstances€to€supportÏthis€status.€€Because€we€have€modified€the€appellant's€conviction€fromÏattempted€first€degree€murder€to€attempted€second€degree€murder€andÏremanded€this€conviction€to€the€trial€court€for€resentencing,€we€are€precludedÏfrom€reviewing€whether€the€aggregate€sentence€imposed€is€reasonably€relatedÏto€the€severity€of€the€offenses€and€is€necessary€to€protect€the€public€from€furtherÏcriminal€acts€of€the€appellant.€€òòSeeóó€€òòState€v.€Wilkersonóó,€905€S.W.2d€933,€938Ï(Tenn.€1995).€€The€determination€of€this€issue€remains€with€the€trial€court€onÏremand.€€However,€we€are€able€to€evaluate€the€appellantððs€classification€as€aÏð ðdangerous€offender.ððÌÌà àIn€òòGray€v.€Stateóó,€538€S.W.2d€391,€393€(Tenn.€1976),€our€supreme€courtÏheld€that€"[a]€defendant€may€be€classified€as€a€dangerous€offender€òòif€the€crimesÏfor€which€he€is€convictedóó€indicate€that€he€has€little€or€no€regard€for€human€life,Ïand€no€hesitation€about€committing€a€crime€in€which€the€risk€to€human€life€isÏhigh."€(Emphasis€added).€€òòSee€alsoóó€€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€40„35„115(b)(4);òòÏWilkersonóó,€905€S.W.2d€at€937.€€If€a€court€decides€to€impose€consecutiveÍsentences€based€upon€the€inherently€dangerous€nature€of€the€instant€offenses,Ïthe€court€should€base€its€decision€upon€the€presence€of€aggravatingÏcircumstances€and€not€merely€on€the€fact€that€two€or€more€dangerous€crimesÏwere€committed.€€òòGrayóó,€538€S.W.2d€at€393.€€In€the€present€case,€the€appellantÏarmed€himself€with€a€loaded€.380€handgun,€drove€to€236€Circle€Drive€to€"getÏeven"€with€Ms.€Washington€for€having€him€arrested,€and€proceeded€to€wantonlyÏfire€the€weapon€at€the€house.€€During€this€episode,€two€victims€were€injured,€i.e.,ÏMr.€Smith€suffering€a€direct€gunshot€wound€to€the€chest,€and€Mr.€FasonÏreceiving€injuries€from€flying€debris.€€Immediately€after€the€shooting,€theÏappellant€refused€to€seek€medical€attention€for€the€semi„conscious€Smith.€TheÏproof€before€us€clearly€establishes€that€the€appellant€had€no€hesitation€aboutÏcommitting€a€crime€when€the€risk€to€human€life€was€œhigh€and€that€the€appellantÏhas€little€or€no€regard€for€human€life.€€Accordingly,€the€trial€court's€classificationÏof€the€appellant€as€a€dangerous€offender€is€warranted.ÌÌÌà@ àò òV.€€Conclusionó óÌÌà àAfter€a€thorough€review€of€the€record€and€the€applicable€law,€weÏconclude€that€the€evidence€is€insufficient€to€support€a€conviction€for€theÏattempted€first€degree€murder€of€Keith€Fason.€€We€reverse€the€appellant'sÏconviction€for€attempted€first€degree€murder,€modify€the€judgment€to€reflect€aÍconviction€for€attempted€murder€in€the€second€degree,€and€remand€to€the€trialÏcourt€for€resentencing.€€Additionally,€in€accordance€with€the€principlesÏannounced€in€òòState€v.€Dentonóó,€938€S.W.2d€at€373,€we€dismiss€the€appellant'sÏconvictions€for€aggravated€assault€and€vacate€the€accompanying€sentences.€ÏWe€affirm€the€appellant's€remaining€convictions€for€attempted€second€degreeÏmurder€of€Michael€Smith€and€possession€of€a€deadly€weapon.€€Moreover,€weÏaffirm€the€length€of€the€sentences€imposed€for€these€convictions€and€the€trialÏcourtððs€finding€that€the€appellant€is€a€dangerous€offender.€€Accordingly,€weÏremand€this€cause€to€the€trial€court€for€entry€of€judgments€of€convictionÏconsistent€with€this€opinion€and€for€re„sentencing€regarding€the€modifiedÏconviction€for€the€attempted€second€degree€murder€of€Keith€Fason€and€forÏdetermination€of€whether€consecutive€sentencing€is€appropriate.ÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÓÓÌÌÌÌÌà àà àà àà àà àà à________________________________Ìà àà àà àà àà àà àDAVID€G.€HAYES,€JudgeÌÌÌÌCONCUR:ÌÌÌÌ_______________________________ÌJERRY€L.€SMITH,€JudgeÌÌÌÌ_______________________________ÌTHOMAS€T.€WOODALL,€JudgeÌÌ