ÿWPC¨* vz-ÊM‡ÝVK @Š‡Àzi‹à6¸æɾÝTK&}9óÚ¦  '0‚ñÐ`€G¹x¬Ü} ›zÝiîü¨¸U1v¦?Öç¥Ìª‰Ç¸œ$‡ÍXßU F."ÄÏ}—gÇM–Ô»¤ó²ŒX@·IB–‡ÆT(]TR†¨•ußæîÇÏ Æ/«–¬CuË­œê ¼ÌÀ¸ùèÌv©ä¡ZÆ£Î!·¶›sñƒRûsÛ¸Wß6~}zb䛿¾eÜ«u{Þ\§};aô ›•Ô(½ãN<;Š6~*’6K ¬xoè ˜9[ ŒvQPÝÜeê´Ç$É¡Ú‡ëêhJÇ0ZQö»™¿Þ™Õ$Þäæq4çµA_ÙЪ 6¯Ò„ˆ¶­/5 ” d]îìü.WwO'¯ühŽ@jŸ¸ 6 ~iH‰ÿŸ×,ÏùäYÿˆ°F™+«²½ó£ã«ªÀ©¬î†¼#—Ùã; ŠµË«úe‘œZe만Ë':aÿ^ZØh›®>9ÌX5ï>ÄÞø¦ Ð50ë ø) u!Ò–ÆhÆ.Æôƺ´€N4 g6 ¨!EE%wG%4K%_%n%n% mp%p%‡%‡%‡%‡%‡%‡%‡%‡%‡%‡%‡%‡%‡%‡%‡%‡%b%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% 0ë¥%¥%¥%¥% B&& 0¤­& D3Q' D-„' 0K±'±' ASü'ÆO( 0¤) 0D¹) A«ý)˜HP LaserJet 4000 Series PCL6ÒV,,,,ÒV0»(ÖÃ9 Z‹6Times New Roman Regular(`£ª$¡¡Ñ€.ÑÑ8€½­»»d»»d8ÑÑ ý ÑÓ  Ó(í€"  Z6Times New Roman Regular(#Ã$òòÚ  Ú0Ú  Úóó@u/Ï  ˜C:\PROGRA~1\COREL\WORDPE~1\TEMPLATE\CUSTOM~1\REVISE~1.WPTC:\Program Files\Corel\WordPerfect Office 2000\Template\Custom WP Templates\revised standard opinion.wptô\  `‹&Times New Roman îÝ ƒRxQ$ÝÓ  Óà  àòòÚ  Ú2Ú  ÚóóÔ€ô§<ò»»ÔÝ  ÝÔ_ÔThe€appellant€also€argues€that€the€trial€court€erred€by€failing€to€grant€the€motion€for€judgment€of€acquittal€whenÐ ° Ðthe€trial€court€allowed€the€appellant€to€raise€the€defense€of€entrapment€and€the€State€did€not€rebut€any€of€the€appellantððsÐ qÁ Ðtestimony.€€Specifically,€the€appellant€claims€that€his€own€testimony€shows€that€he€was€repeatedly€contacted€by€theÐ 2‚ Ðsource€to€consummate€the€drug€transaction,€that€he€had€no€intentions€of€getting€involved€in€a€drug€transaction,€and€thatÐ óC Ðthe€State€failed€to€rebut€his€testimony.€€The€State€contends€that€there€was€no€evidence€of€entrapment€because€theÐ ´ Ðappellant€was€predisposed€to€commit€the€crime€and€that€the€mere€fact€that€Detective€Watson€furnished€drugs€to€theÐ uÅ Ðappellant€by€means€of€a€sale€does€not€support€the€existence€of€entrapment€as€a€matter€of€law.€€A€motion€for€judgmentÐ 6 † Ðof€acquittal€requires€that€the€trial€court€determine€the€sufficiency€of€the€evidence.€Tenn.€R.€Ô_ÔCrimÔ_Ô.€P.€29(a).€€For€the€sameÐ ÷ G Ðreasons€we€conclude€that€the€evidence€was€sufficient€to€support€the€appellantððs€conviction,€we€also€conclude€that€the€trialÐ ¸  Ðcourt€did€not€err€when€it€failed€to€grant€the€motion€for€judgment€of€acquittal€on€grounds€of€entrapment. kÝ ƒRxQ$ÝÓ  Óà  àòòÚ  Ú1Ú  ÚóóÔ€ô§<ò»»ÔÝ  ÝÔ_ÔDetective€Watson€defined€a€source€as€ð ðsomeone€who€provides€you€with€information.ðð€€He€distinguished€aÐ ° Ðsource€from€an€ð ðinformantðð€because€the€informant€is€normally€a€person€used€to€ð ðmake€purchases.ðð€€ ÈÝ ƒRxQ$ÝÓ  Óà  àòòÚ  Ú3Ú  ÚóóÔ€ô§<ò»»ÔÝ  ÝÔ_ÔIncidentally,€this€Court€has€held€that€the€failure€of€the€State€to€comply€with€the€procedural€requirements€of€RuleÐ ° Ð609€was€harmless€error€when€the€appellant€was€unprejudiced€by€the€lack€of€notice.€€òòSeeóó,€òòe.g.óó,€òòState€v.€Barnardóó,€899Ð qÁ ÐS.W.2d€617,€622€(Tenn.€Ô_ÔCrimÔ_Ô.€App.€1994);€òòState€v.€Andre€D.€Ô_ÔKimbroughÔ_Ôóó,€No.€M2001„02149„CCA„R3„CD,€2002€WLÐ 2‚ Ð31694496,€at€*5€(Tenn.€Ô_ÔCrimÔ_Ô.€App.€at€Nashville,€Dec.€3,€2002);€òòState€v.€Dean€Ô_ÔByardÔ_Ôóó,€No.€M2000„01410„CCA„R3„CD,Ð óC Ð2001€WL€1502658,€at€*5€(Tenn.€Ô_ÔCrimÔ_Ô.€App.€at€Nashville,€Nov.€27,€2001);€òòState€v.€Antonio€Ô_ÔKendrickÔ_Ôóó,€No.€02„C„01„9604„Ð ´ ÐCR00121,€1997€WL€686266,€at€*3€(Tenn.€Ô_ÔCrimÔ_Ô.€App.€at€Jackson,€Nov.€5,€1997)€(perm.€to€appeal€denied€Jul.€13,€1998);Ð uÅ ÐòòState€v.€James€Edward€Frenchóó,€No.€03C01„9503„CR„00096,€1996€WL€138289,€at€*7€(Tenn.€Ô_ÔCrimÔ_Ô.€App.€at€Knoxville,Ð 6 † ÐMar.€28,€1996)€(perm.€to€appeal€denied€Oct.€28,€1996);€òòBurl€Ô_ÔLakinsÔ_Ôóó,€1991€WL€84947,€at€*3.€€Level 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5‚Level 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5„Level 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5…Level 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5 ªÝ ƒRxQ$ÝÓ  Óà  àòòÚ  Ú5Ú  ÚóóÔ€ô§<ò»»ÔÝ  ÝÔ_ÔAlthough€the€Ô_ÔpresentenceÔ_Ô€report€does€not€appear€in€the€record€on€appeal,€we€note€that€the€mitigating€factorsÐ ° Ðrelied€on€by€the€appellant€relate€primarily€to€the€present€offense€rather€than€prior€offenses€or€information€that€wouldÐ qÁ Ðnormally€be€included€in€a€Ô_ÔpresentenceÔ_Ô€report.€€Therefore,€we€conclude€that€the€absence€of€the€Ô_ÔpresentenceÔ_Ô€report€in€theÐ 2‚ Ðrecord€is€irrelevant€to€our€review€of€this€issue.€€ ]Ý ƒRxQ$ÝÓ  Óà  àòòÚ  Ú6Ú  ÚóóÔ€ô§<ò»»ÔÝ  ÝÔ_ÔThe€appellant€did€cite€and€quote€in€its€entirety,€Tennessee€Code€Annotated€section€40„36„106,€the€statuteÐ ° Ðoutlining€the€procedure€for€awarding€alternative€sentencing€to€an€otherwise€eligible€defendant.€€ žÝ ƒRxQ$ÝÓ  Óà  àòòÚ  Ú4Ú  ÚóóÔ€ô§<ò»»ÔÝ  ÝÔ_Ô2002€Tennessee€Public€Acts,€Chapter€849,€section€2(c),€which€became€effective€after€the€appellantððs€trial€inÐ ° Ðthis€matter€added€subsection€(1)€to€Tennessee€Code€Annotated€section€40„35„114,€relating€to€acts€of€terrorism,€andÐ qÁ ÐÔ_ÔredesignatedÔ_Ô€former€subsections€(1)€to€(22)€as€(2)€to€(23).€€Therefore,€the€appellants€complaint€as€to€the€trial€courtððsÐ 2‚ Ðapplication€of€enhancement€factor€(13)€corresponds€to€the€Ô_ÔredesignatedÔ_Ô€subsection€of€(14).€€However,€because€theÐ óC Ðapplication€of€the€enhancement€factor€in€this€case€occurred€prior€to€the€addition€of€the€new€subsection€(1),€we€will€referÐ ´ Ðto€the€enhancement€factor€by€its€old€designation.lk.3|xÿU‹ÿÀÀÀ Ñ | Ñ- ù-(|G2xQ$¤¤Ý ƒ£ª!ÝÑ€.ÑÑ8€˜é»»dd8ÑÑ ý ÑÓ  ÓÝ  Ýà  àòòÚ  Ú0Ú  ÚóóÔ€ô§<ò»»Ô d(|3?#$££Ý ƒ£ª!ÝÑ€.ÑÑ8€˜é»»dd8ÑÑ ý ÑÓ  ÓÝ  ÝVVVV'ÿÿdxd)!ÈÈÈÈdxdx( ±þ$’’ò òFigure€Ú  Ú1Ú  Úó ó^_X`YEþÿ<<CÿÿƒLevel 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5(|3?#$¢¢Ý ƒ£ª!ÝÑ€.ÑÑ8€˜é»»dd8ÑÑ ý ÑÓ  ÓÝ  Ý($$””ò òÚ  Ú1Ú  Úó óX[Z&OLE 2.0 Box <=8ÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿCÿÿ HKKKKÝ ƒ£ª!ÝÑ€.ÑÑ8€˜é»»ddÈ8ÑÑ ý ÑÓ  ÓÝ  ÝÔ_ÔÑ  ÑÑ  ÑÔ€¼˜é»»»ÔÑ8€×WXXdé»»d8ÑрߚÑà@hhìàÔ‡îvN˜éÔIN€THE€COURT€OF€CRIMINAL€APPEALS€OF€TENNESSEEˆÐ ° Ðà@gg$ìàAT€NASHVILLEÔ#†¼˜é»îîvN#ԈРÓ# ÐÓ  Óà @ àà @` àAugust€13,€2003€SessionÐ öF ÐÔ‡X×WX»¼˜éÔÌò òÔ#†¼˜é»XX×W&#ÔSTATE€OF€TENNESSEEòòóó€v.€FRED€ELLIOT€HUNTERòòóóÔ‡X×WX»¼˜éÔó óÐ ï? ÐÌà@@½½ìàò òDirect€Appeal€from€the€Criminal€Court€for€Davidson€CountyÐ é 9 Ðà@@øøìàNo.€2001„A„562€€€€€€Seth€Norman,€JudgeÐ Ó # ÐÌÌà@@ìì*ìàßA€V) °°` d€÷E<` AßÐ ‘á  ÐÌà@@TTìàNo.€M2002„02128„CCA„R3„CD€„€Filed€December€8,€Ô_Ô2003Ô_ÔÐ ŠÚ  ÐÌßA€V) °°` dE<]` AßÐ ^®  Ðó óÌÓ  ÓÔ‡X'XXX×WÔThe€appellant,€Fred€Elliot€Hunter,€was€convicted€by€a€jury€of€conspiracy€to€possess€with€the€intentÐ V¦  Ðto€deliver€three€hundred€(300)€grams€or€more€of€a€substance€containing€cocaine,€a€Class€A€felony.€Ð ? ÐThe€appellant€was€sentenced€to€twenty„one€(21)€years€as€a€Range€I€Standard€Offender€and€€finedÐ (x Ð$2,000.€€The€trial€court€denied€the€appellantððs€motion€for€new€trial,€and€he€appeals,€arguing:€(1)€thatÐ a Ðthe€trial€court€erred€in€failing€to€grant€the€appellantððs€motion€for€judgment€of€acquittal;€(2)€that€theÐ úJ Ðtrial€court€erred€in€failing€to€grant€the€appellantððs€motion€to€dismiss€for€want€of€a€speedy€trial;€(3)Ð ã3 Ðthat€the€evidence€was€insufficient€to€sustain€the€conviction;€(4)€that€the€trial€court€erred€in€admittingÐ Ì Ðthe€appellantððs€manslaughter€conviction;€(5)€that€the€trial€court€erred€in€failing€to€considerÐ µ Ðappropriate€mitigating€factors€in€sentencing;€and€(6)€that€the€trial€court€failed€to€order€alternativeÐ žî Ðsentencing.€€We€affirm€the€judgment€of€the€trial€court.Ô#†X×WXXX'Ó#ÔÔ#†¼˜é»XX×W #ÔÔ‡X×WX»¼˜éÔÐ ‡× ÐÓÇÓÌò òTenn.€R.€App.€P.€3€Appeal€as€of€Right;€Judgment€of€the€Trial€Court€is€Affirmed.ó óÐ Y© ÐÌòòÓ  ÓÔ#†¼˜é»àX×W¾ #ÔÔ‡X×WX.¼˜éÔJerry€L.€Smith,€J.óó,€delivered€the€opinion€of€the€court,€in€which€òòGary€R.€Wade,€Ô_ÔP.J.Ô_Ô,óó€and€òòDavid€G.Ð ,| ÐHayes,€J.óó,€joined.Ð e ÐÌTony€L.€Maples,€Murfreesboro,€Tennessee,€for€the€appellant,€Fred€Elliot€Hunter.Ð ç 7  ÐÌÌPaul€G.€Summers,€Attorney€General€&€Reporter;€P.€Robin€Dixon,€Jr.,€Assistant€Attorney€General;Ð ¢#ò# ÐVictor€S.€Johnson,€District€Attorney€General;€and€John€Zimmerman,€Assistant€District€AttorneyÐ ‹$Û$ ÐGeneral,€for€the€appellee,€State€of€Tennessee.Ð t%Ä % ÐÓq ÓÌà@@OO&ìàò òOPINIONó óÔ#†¼˜é»XX×W  #ÔÔ‡X×WX»¼˜éÔÐ F'–"' ÐÌòòóóÔ#†¼˜é»XX×Wm #ÔÔ‡X×WX»¼˜éÔÓ  ÓòòÔ‡X'XXX×WÔà@ÃÃ!ìàFactual€BackgroundˆÐ )i$) ÐÌóóà  àAt€the€time€the€offense€occurred,€Al€Watson,€a€detective€with€the€Ô_ÔLavergneÔ_Ô€PoliceÐ ë*;&+ Ðâ âDepartment,€performed€reverse€drug€operations€on€a€routine€basis.€€As€part€of€each€reverse€drugÐ Ô+$',ýY ÐÔ_Ôoperation,€Detective€Watson€employed€a€ð ðsourceðð׃ ×Ý ƒ#ÃÝòòÚ  Ú1Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý×  ×€to€identify€people€interested€in€buying€drugs.€Ð ° Ðâ âOnce€the€source€identified€the€interested€party€and€gave€them€Detective€Watsonððs€contactÐ ™é Ðinformation,€€Detective€Watson€attempted€to€set€up€a€deal€in€which€the€interested€party€purchasedÐ ‚Ò Ðdrugs€from€him€or€another€officer.€€The€sources€used€by€the€Lavergne€Police€Department€wereÐ k» Ðinstructed€not€to€carry€weapons,€possess€or€use€drugs,€coerce€people,€or€become€involved€in€criminalÐ T¤ Ðactivity.€€Sources€were€generally€paid€a€percentage€based€upon€the€quantity€of€drugs€purchased€inÐ =  Ðany€deal€that€was€consummated€as€a€result€of€the€information€they€provided€to€the€Lavergne€PoliceÐ & v ÐDepartment.€€€€Ð  _ ÐÌà  àIn€September€of€1999€Detective€Watson€was€contacted€by€one€of€his€sources€withÐ á 1  Ðinformation€about€a€person€who€might€be€interested€in€purchasing€some€cocaine.€€Detective€WatsonÐ Ê   Ðhad€never€used€this€particular€source€as€an€informant.€€The€source€told€Detective€Watson€that€theÐ ³  Ðpotential€buyerððs€name€was€ð ðFreddieðð€and€that€he€worked€at€a€body€shop€on€Trinity€Lane.€€DetectiveÐ œì  ÐWatson€instructed€the€source€to€give€ð ðFreddieðð€his€phone€number.€€Ð …Õ  ÐÌà  àSometime€soon€thereafter,€the€source€approached€the€appellant€at€his€place€of€employment,Ð W§  ÐHandy€Man€Body€Shop,€and€informed€him€that€if€he€was€interested,€he€knew€someone€who€hadÐ @ Ðcocaine€available€for€purchase.€€The€source€provided€the€appellant€with€Detective€WatsonððsÐ )y Ðtelephone€number.€€Ð b ÐÌà  àDetective€Watson€contacted€the€Metro€Police€Department€to€inform€them€of€the€potentialÐ ä4 Ðdrug€transaction€because€the€shop€was€located€within€Metroððs€jurisdiction.€€Metro€agreed€to€workÐ Í Ðwith€Detective€Watson.€€Metro€Detective€Gene€Donegon€informed€Detective€Watson€that€the€ownerÐ ¶ Ðof€the€shop,€Jackie€Riggsbee,€was€recently€arrested€for€purchasing€a€large€quantity€of€pain€killers.€Ð Ÿï ÐIncident€to€the€arrest,€Metro€also€recovered€a€half€kilogram€of€cocaine€from€Mr.€RiggsbeeððsÐ ˆØ Ðresidence.€€Ð qÁ Ðà  àÌà  àDetective€Watson€called€the€appellant€at€the€shop.€€The€appellant€told€Detective€Watson€thatÐ C“ Ðhe€did€not€like€to€talk€on€the€phone,€so€the€two€arranged€to€meet€at€the€shop€in€September€of€1999.€Ð ,| ÐDetective€Watson€testified€that€he€made€arrangements€to€wear€a€ð ðbody€wireðð€to€the€meeting.€€TheÐ e Ðwire€was€monitored€by€the€Metro€Police€Department.€€The€appellant€ð ðbasically€checked€[DetectiveÐ þN ÐWatson]€outðð€and€alluded€to€the€fact€that€his€ð ðbossðð€still€had€some€cocaine€left€and€did€not€need€anyÐ ç 7 Ðat€that€time.€€Mr.€Riggsbee€was€at€the€shop€when€Detective€Watson€met€with€the€appellant.€€Ð Ð!   ÐÌà  àDetective€Watson€and€the€appellant€talked€a€few€times€on€the€phone€during€September€andÐ ¢#ò" Ðearly€October.€€Sometime€in€October,€Detective€Watson€had€surgery€and€was€on€leave€from€work.€Ð ‹$Û# ÐDuring€this€time,€he€was€given€a€new€cell€phone€and€new€phone€number.€€Detective€Watson€did€notÐ t%Ä $ Ðprovide€the€appellant€with€his€new€phone€number€until€January€of€2000,€after€the€source€informedÐ ]&­!% ÐDetective€Watson€that€the€appellant€was€looking€for€him.€€Detective€Watson€instructed€the€sourceÐ F'–"& Ðto€give€the€appellant€the€new€phone€number;€he€monitored€the€phone€call€between€the€source€andÐ /(#' Ðthe€appellant.Ð )h$( Їà  àThe€appellant€called€Detective€Watson€sometime€in€mid„January.€€Detective€Watson€testifiedÐ ° Ðthat€the€appellant€wanted€a€price€quote€for€four€or€five€kilograms€of€cocaine.€€The€appellant€testifiedÐ ™é Ðthat€he€thought€he€was€to€meet€Detective€Watson€at€four€or€five€oððclock€to€purchase€one€kilogramÐ ‚Ò Ðof€cocaine,€not€four€to€five€kilograms€of€cocaine.€€Detective€Watson€told€the€appellant€that€he€wouldÐ k» Ðcall€him€back€in€twenty€minutes€with€a€price€for€the€cocaine.€€Detective€Watson€informed€theÐ T¤ Ðappellant€that€the€cocaine€would€sell€for€about€$20,000€a€kilogram€and€that€it€would€take€a€few€daysÐ =  Ðto€pick€up€the€drugs.€€Detective€Watson€testified€that€he€delayed€the€transaction€a€few€days€in€orderÐ & v Ðto€give€the€appellant€a€chance€to€back€out€of€the€deal.€€He€called€the€appellant€back€later€and€raisedÐ  _ Ðthe€price€of€the€cocaine€to€$20,500€a€kilogram.€€The€appellant€agreed€to€the€deal,€casuallyÐ ø H Ðmentioning€his€ð ðboss€manðð€during€the€conversation€with€Detective€Watson,€and€the€two€planned€toÐ á 1  Ðmeet€at€the€McDonaldððs€Restaurant€on€Trinity€Lane€in€Nashville€on€January€20,€2000.€Ð Ê   ÐÌà  àDetective€Watson€met€the€appellant€at€the€McDonaldððs€Restaurant.€€He€had€five€kilogramsÐ œì  Ðof€cocaine€in€his€trunk€for€the€sale.€€Detective€Watson€showed€the€cocaine€to€the€appellant€and€gaveÐ …Õ  Ðhim€a€knife€to€test€it.€€The€appellant€tested€the€cocaine€and€told€Detective€Watson€that€he€had€to€goÐ n¾  Ðback€to€the€shop€to€get€the€money.€€Detective€Watson€gave€the€appellant€fifteen€minutes€to€returnÐ W§  Ðwith€the€money.€€Ð @ ÐÌà  àDetective€Mike€Clark€with€the€Metro€Police€Department€observed€the€appellant€leaving€theÐ b Ðrestaurant.€€He€followed€the€appellant€to€the€body€shop€and€back€to€the€restaurant.€€He€noticed€thatÐ ûK Ðtwo€cars€left€the€shop€and€headed€back€toward€the€restaurant.€€The€second€car,€driven€by€RobertÐ ä4 ÐRichard€Spurlock,€Jr.,€parked€at€a€gas€station€facing€the€restaurant.€€Ð Í ÐÌà  àThe€appellant€returned€within€fifteen€minutes€with€a€box€containing€$20,500.€€DetectiveÐ Ÿï ÐWatson€told€the€appellant€at€that€time€that€the€deal€was€off€because€he€was€expecting€to€sell€four€toÐ ˆØ Ðfive€kilograms€to€the€appellant.€€The€appellant€told€the€Detective€that€he€had€to€have€the€cocaine.€Ð qÁ ÐAt€that€time,€Detective€Watson€received€a€call€from€the€Metro€Officers€who€were€monitoring€theÐ Zª Ðdeal.€€They€instructed€the€detective€to€go€ahead€with€the€transaction€as€planned.€€Detective€WatsonÐ C“ Ðagreed€to€sell€the€appellant€one€kilogram€of€cocaine.€€The€two€walked€to€the€trunk€of€the€vehicleÐ ,| Ðwhere€the€Detective€opened€the€trunk,€and€the€appellant€picked€up€the€bag€containing€the€cocaine.€Ð e ÐDetective€Watson€gave€the€arrest€signal€and€officers€moved€in€and€arrested€the€appellant€on€the€spot.€Ð þN ÐThe€appellantððs€co„defendant,€the€driver€of€the€second€vehicle,€was€also€arrested€following€the€drugÐ ç 7 Ðtransaction.Ð Ð!   ÐÌà  àThe€appellant€was€indicted€by€a€Davidson€County€Grand€Jury€of€conspiracy€to€possess€withÐ ¢#ò" Ðthe€intent€to€deliver€three€hundred€(300)€grams€or€more€of€a€substance€containing€cocaine€on€JulyÐ ‹$Û# Ð17,€2000.€€A€jury€trial€was€held€on€December€3„5,€2001.€Ð t%Ä $ ÐÌà  àAt€the€trial,€the€appellant€testified€that€one€of€his€long„time€friends,€Michael€Dickson,€firstÐ F'–"& Ðgave€him€Detective€Watsonððs€telephone€number€after€offering€to€sell€him€stolen€Corvettes€andÐ /(#' ÐVCRs.€€The€appellant€stated€that€Mr.€Dickson€first€tried€to€persuade€Mr.€Riggsbee€to€purchaseÐ )h$( Ðcocaine.€€The€appellant€admitted€that€he€asked€Mr.€Riggsbee€if€he€was€interested€in€the€possibleÐ *Q%) Ðcocaine€purchase.€€Ð ê*:&* ÐÐ Ó+#'+ Ðà  àThe€appellant€testified€that€he€agreed€to€meet€with€Detective€Watson€only€to€ð ðblow€offðð€Mr.Ð ° ÐDickson.€€€At€the€meeting€in€September,€he€told€Mr.€Dickson€that€Mr.€Riggsbee€did€not€need€anyÐ ™é Ðcocaine€at€that€time.€€The€appellant€testified€that€Mr.€Dickson€repeatedly€came€to€the€shop.€€He€alsoÐ ‚Ò Ðstated€that€it€was€never€his€intention€to€get€involved€in€a€drug€transaction.€€However,€he€owed€Mr.Ð k» ÐRiggsbee€money€for€legal€fees€and€testified€that€Mr.€Riggsbee€wanted€him€to€be€the€middleman€inÐ T¤ Ðthe€drug€deal€as€a€way€of€repaying€him.€€The€appellant€stated€that€he€became€involved€in€the€drugÐ =  Ðtransaction€to€make€Mr.€Dickson€happy€and€get€Mr.€Riggsbee€off€his€back.€€The€appellant€alsoÐ & v Ðadmitted€that€he€used€and€tasted€cocaine€on€several€occasions€in€the€past.€€Ð  _ ÐÌà  àAfter€hearing€the€testimony€at€trial,€the€jury€returned€a€verdict€of€guilty€on€the€charge€ofÐ á 1  Ðconspiracy€to€possess€with€the€intent€to€deliver€three€hundred€(300)€grams€or€more€of€a€substanceÐ Ê   Ðcontaining€cocaine.€€A€sentencing€hearing€took€place€on€May€8,€2002,€and€the€trial€court€sentencedÐ ³  Ðthe€appellant€to€twenty„one€(21)€years€as€a€Range€I€Standard€Offender€and€fined€the€appellantÐ œì  Ð$2,000.€€Ð …Õ  ÐÌà  àOn€appeal,€the€appellant€argues€that:€(1)€the€trial€court€erred€by€failing€to€grant€the€motionÐ W§  Ðfor€judgment€of€acquittal;€(2)€the€trial€court€erred€by€failing€to€grant€the€motion€to€dismiss€for€lackÐ @ Ðof€a€speedy€trial;€(3)€the€evidence€was€insufficient€to€sustain€the€conviction;€(4)€the€trial€court€erredÐ )y Ðby€allowing€the€appellantððs€manslaughter€conviction€to€be€used€for€impeachment;€and€(5)€the€trialÐ b Ðcourt€failed€to€consider€appropriate€mitigating€factors€and€failed€to€order€alternative€sentencing.€€TheÐ ûK ÐState€argues€that€none€of€the€appellantððs€claims€merit€relief.€€After€reviewing€the€record,€we€affirmÐ ä4 Ðthe€judgment€of€the€trial€court.Ð Í ÐÌòòÓ  ÓÌÌSpeedy€TrialóóÐ qÁ ÐÓ„8ÓÌà  àThe€appellant€first€claims€that€the€trial€court€erred€by€failing€to€grant€his€motion€to€dismissÐ C“ Ðfor€lack€of€a€speedy€trial.€€Specifically,€the€appellant€notes€that€he€was€arrested€in€January€of€2000Ð ,| Ðand€the€trial€did€not€occur€until€December€of€2001.€€He€alleges€that€he€was€prejudiced€as€a€result€ofÐ e Ðthe€delay€because€one€of€his€witnesses€died,€he€was€unable€to€meet€with€the€Parole€Board€to€obtainÐ þN Ðrelease€on€an€unrelated€charge,€and€he€lost€favorable€sentencing€alternatives.€€The€State€counters€thatÐ ç 7 Ðthere€was€no€prejudice€to€the€appellant€because€the€reason€for€the€delay€resulted€from€the€StateððsÐ Ð!   Ðattempts€to€facilitate€the€effective€prosecution€of€the€case€and€because€the€appellant€failed€toÐ ¹" ! Ðdemonstrate€that€he€was€deprived€of€his€right€to€speedy€trial.€€Thus,€the€State€argues€that€the€trialÐ ¢#ò" Ðcourtððs€decision€to€deny€the€motion€to€dismiss€should€be€affirmed.€€Ð ‹$Û# ÐÌòòóóà  àThe€United€States€and€Tennessee€Constitutions€guarantee€the€criminal€defendant€the€rightÐ ]&­!% Ðto€a€speedy€trial.€€U.S.€Const.€amend€VI;€Tenn.€Const.€art.€I,€ðð€9;€òòState€v.€Utleyóó,€956€S.W.2d€489,Ð F'–"& Ð492€(Tenn.€1997).€€The€right€to€a€speedy€trial€is€also€statutory€in€Tennessee.€€òòSeeóó€Tenn.€Code€Ann.Ð /(#' Ððð€40„14„101.€€In€addition,€the€Tennessee€Rules€of€Criminal€Procedure€provide€for€the€dismissal€ofÐ )h$( Ðan€indictment,€presentment,€information€or€criminal€complaint€ð ð[i]f€there€is€unnecessary€delay€inÐ *Q%) Ðâ âpresenting€the€charge€to€a€grand€jury€against€a€defendant€who€has€been€held€to€answer€to€the€trialÐ ê*:&* Ðcourt,€or€if€there€is€unnecessary€delay€in€bringing€a€defendant€to€trial€.€.€.€.ðð€€Tenn.€R.€Crim.€P.€48(b).Ð ° ÐÌâ âà  àThe€Tennessee€Supreme€Court€has€stated€that€ð ðformal€grand€jury€action€or€the€actualÐ ‚Ò Ðrestraints€of€an€arrest€are€requiredðð€to€trigger€speedy€trial€analysis.€€òòUtleyóó,€956€S.W.2d€at€493.€€ThisÐ k» Ðis€because€ð ðit€is€at€this€stage€of€arrest€and€grand€jury€action€that€the€significant€interests€served€byÐ T¤ Ðthe€right€to€a€speedy€trial€are€most€directly€implicated:€the€protection€against€oppressive€pre„trialÐ =  Ðincarceration€and€the€reduction€of€anxiety€and€concern€caused€by€unresolved€charges.ðð€€òòId.óóÐ & v ÐÌà  àUnder€òòUtleyóó€it€is€clear€that€the€appellantððs€right€to€a€speedy€trial€was€implicated€at€aÐ ø H Ðminimum€when€the€grand€jury€returned€the€indictment€in€July€of€2000.€€However,€formalÐ á 1  Ðproceedings€against€the€appellant€had€begun€in€January€of€2000€after€his€arrest,€and€the€appellantððsÐ Ê   Ðright€to€a€speedy€trial€was€triggered€at€that€time.€€The€trial€began€in€December€of€2001,€a€delay€ofÐ ³  Ðapproximately€two€years€in€bringing€the€defendant€to€trial.Ð œì  ÐÌà  àWhen€an€accused€seeks€the€dismissal€of€charges€based€upon€the€denial€of€the€constitutionalÐ n¾  Ðright€to€a€speedy€trial,€the€accused€must€establish€a€period€of€delay€that€is€ð ðpresumptivelyÐ W§  Ðprejudicial.ðð€€òòState€v.€Jeffersonóó,€938€S.W.2d€1,€12€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.€1996)€(citing€òòDoggett€v.€UnitedÐ @ ÐStatesóó,€505€U.S.€647,€651€(1992)€;€òòBarker€v.€Wingoóó,€407€U.S.€514,€530€(1972)).€€The€length€of€theÐ )y Ðdelay€is€dependent€upon€the€peculiar€circumstances€of€each€case,€and€the€delay€that€can€be€toleratedÐ b Ðfor€ð ðan€ordinary€street€crimeðð€is€generally€much€less€than€for€a€serious,€complex€felony€charge.Ð ûK ÐòòBarkeróó,€407€U.S.€at€530„31.€€A€delay€of€one€year€or€longer€marks€the€point€at€which€courts€deem€theÐ ä4 Ðdelay€unreasonable€enough€to€trigger€further€inquiry.€€òòDoggettóó,€505€U.S.€at€652€n.1;€òòUtleyóó,€956Ð Í ÐS.W.2d€at€494òòóó.€€If€this€threshold€is€crossed,€a€balancing€test€determines€the€merits€of€the€speedy€trialÐ ¶ Ðissue.€In€òòState€v.€Bishopóó,€493€S.W.2d€81,€83„85€(Tenn.€1973),€the€Tennessee€Supreme€CourtÐ Ÿï Ðrecognized€and€adopted€the€balancing€test€the€United€States€Supreme€Court€set€forth€in€òòBarkeróó€inÐ ˆØ Ðwhich€four€factors€must€be€balanced.€€The€factors€are:€(1)€the€length€of€the€delay;€(2)€the€reasons€forÐ qÁ Ðthe€delay;€(3)€the€accused's€assertion€of€the€right€to€speedy€trial;€and€(4)€the€prejudice€resulting€fromÐ Zª Ðthe€delay.€€òòÔ#†X×WXXX'ù #ÔÔ‡ X'XXX×WÔóóòòBarkeróó,òòÔ#†X×WXX X'K#ÔÔ‡X'XXX×WÔóó€407€U.S.€at€531;€òòBishopóó,€493€S.W.2d€at€83„84.Ð C“ ÐÐ Ðà  àThis€court€also€recognizes€that€findings€of€fact€by€the€trial€judge€are€presumed€correct€andÐ e Ðmay€only€be€overcome€by€a€preponderance€of€the€evidence€contrary€to€that€finding.€€Tenn.€R.€App.Ð þN ÐP.€13(d).€€The€Tennessee€Supreme€Court€has€held€that€ð ð[q]uestions€of€credibility€of€the€witnesses,Ð ç 7 Ðthe€weight€and€value€of€the€evidence,€and€resolution€of€conflicts€in€the€evidence€are€mattersÐ Ð!   Ðentrusted€to€the€trial€judge€as€the€trier€of€fact.ðð€€òòState€v.€Odomóó,€928€S.W.2d€18,€23€(Tenn.€1996).€Ð ¹" ! ÐThe€party€prevailing€at€the€trial€court€level€is€entitled€to€the€ð ðstrongest€legitimate€view€of€theÐ ¢#ò" Ðevidenceðð€as€well€as€ð ðall€reasonable€and€legitimate€inferences€that€may€be€drawn€from€thatÐ ‹$Û# Ðevidence.ðð€€òòId.óóÐ t%Ä $ ÐÓ  ÓÌÌÐ Ðòò(1)€The€Length€of€the€DelayóóÐ )h$( ÐÌÓçOÓà  àAs€noted€above,€a€delay€of€one€year€or€longer€ð ðmarks€the€point€at€which€courts€deem€theÐ ê*:&* Ðdelay€unreasonable€enough€to€trigger€the€òòBarkeróó€inquiry.ðð€€€òòDoggettóó,€505€U.S.€at€652€n.1;€òòseeóó€òòalsoóóÐ Ó+#'+ ÐòòUtleyóó,€956€S.W.2d€at€494.€€The€delay€in€this€case€was€over€one€year€and,€therefore,€meets€theÐ ° Ðthreshold€for€consideration€of€the€other€factors.€€We€find€that€this€factor€weighs€in€the€appellantððs€Ð ™é Ðfavor.Ð ‚Ò ÐòòÓ  ÓÌ(2)€The€Reason€for€the€DelayóóÐ T¤ ÐÌÓkRÓà  àReasons€for€the€delay€of€prosecution€fall€within€four€categories:€(1)€intentional€delay€to€gainÐ & v Ða€tactical€advantage€over€the€defense€or€delay€designed€to€harass€the€defendant;€(2)€bureaucraticÐ  _ Ðindifference€or€negligence;€(3)€delay€necessary€to€the€fair€and€effective€prosecution€of€the€case;€andÐ ø H Ð(4)€delay€caused,€or€acquiesced€in€by€the€defense.€€òòState€v.€Woodóó,€924€S.W.2d€342,€346„47€(Tenn.Ð á 1  Ð1996).€€Ð Ê   ÐÌà  àIn€this€case,€the€appellant€claims€that€the€delay€was€ð ðdue€to€the€prosecutionððs€attempt€toÐ œì  Ðattain€[sic]€a€tactical€advantage€by€bettering€their€position€to€compel€cooperation€by€a€co„defendantððÐ …Õ  Ðand€ð ðbureaucratic€indifference.ðð€€The€State€filed€a€motion€to€continue€the€case€on€March€9,€2001,Ð n¾  Ðbecause€the€co„defendant,€Mr.€Riggsbee,€as€part€of€a€guilty€plea,€agreed€to€testify€against€theÐ W§  Ðappellant.€€Mr.€Riggsbee€evidently€falsely€represented€facts€to€the€prosecutor€and,€as€a€result,€aÐ @ Ðsuperseding€indictment€was€filed€on€March€23,€2001,€listing€Mr.€Riggsbee€as€a€co„defendant.€€TheÐ )y ÐState€argues€that€their€actions€which€contributed€to€the€delay€were€based€on€their€attempts€toÐ b Ðeffectively€prosecute€the€case.€€We€agree.€€ð ðThe€third€type€of€delay€is,€by€definition,€justifiable€andÐ ûK Ðis€not€weighed€against€either€party.ðð€€òòWoodóó,€924€S.W.2d€at€347.Ð ä4 ÐÌÓ  Óòò(3)€The€Accused€Assertion€of€the€Right€to€a€Speedy€TrialóóÐ ¶ ÐÌÓòXÓà  àThe€Tennessee€and€United€States€Supreme€Court€have€both€recognized€that€ð ðan€accused€whoÐ ˆØ Ðis€unaware€that€charges€are€pending€against€him€or€her,€as€is€often€the€case€where€an€indictment€hasÐ qÁ Ðbeen€sealed€and€not€served,€cannot€be€penalized€for€his€or€her€failure€to€assert€the€speedy€trial€right.ððÐ Zª ÐòòWoodóó,€924€S€.W.2d€at€351€n.13€(Tenn.€1996)€(citing€òòDoggettóó,€505€U.S.€at€652„54).€€Ð C“ ÐÌà  àBoth€parties€herein€agree€that€the€appellant€asserted€his€right€to€a€speedy€trial.€€However,€theÐ e Ðappellant€was€aware€of€the€charges€and€the€indictment€and€did€not€file€a€motion€to€dismiss€theÐ þN Ðindictment€until€August€10,€2001,€some€nineteen€(19)€months€after€his€arrest€and€only€four€monthsÐ ç 7 Ðprior€to€trial.€€The€appellant€claims€on€appeal€that€he€asserted€his€right€to€a€speedy€trial€€ð ðas€early€asÐ Ð!   ÐJuly€of€the€year€2000€when€he€filed€a€motion€to€dismiss€the€charges€for€failure€of€the€State€toÐ ¹" ! Ðproceed€in€a€timely€fashion.ðð€€The€technical€record,€however,€does€not€include€a€motion€to€dismissÐ ¢#ò" Ðprior€to€that€filed€on€August€10,€2001.€€We€find€that€the€appellant€acquiesced€in€the€delay€by€failingÐ ‹$Û# Ðto€assert€his€right€to€a€speedy€trial€until€some€nineteen€(19)€months€after€the€indictment€was€issued.€Ð t%Ä $ ÐThis€factor€must€weigh€in€favor€of€the€State.€€Ð ]&­!% Ðà@ìì*ìàˆÌòòÓ  Ó(4)€Prejudice€óóÐ /(#' ÐÓw_ÓÌà  àThe€final€factor€to€be€reviewed€in€determining€whether€a€defendantððs€right€to€a€speedy€trialÐ *Q%) Ðhas€been€violated€is€whether€the€defendant€has€been€prejudiced€due€to€the€delay.€€òòWoodóó,€924€S.W.2dÐ ê*:&* Ðat€348;€òòBishopóó,€493€S.W.2d€at€84.€€This€final€factor€is€also€the€most€important€of€the€four€balancingÐ Ó+#'+ Ðfactors.€òòWoodóó,€924€S.W.2d€at€348.€€In€determining€this€remaining€factor,€we€focus€on€(1)€any€undueÐ ° Ðand€oppressive€incarceration,€(2)€the€anxiety€accompanying€a€public€accusation,€and€(3)€anyÐ ™é Ðimpairment€of€the€defendantððs€ability€to€prepare€his€defense.€€òòBishopóó,€493€S.W.2d€at€85;€òòState€v.Ð ‚Ò ÐKolbóó,€755€S.W.2d€472,€475€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.€1988).€€In€applying€the€third€of€these€considerations,Ð k» Ðthe€impairment€of€defense,€the€Tennessee€Supreme€Court€and€the€United€States€Supreme€Court€haveÐ T¤ Ðacknowledged:€Ð =  ÐÐ Ðà8  à[I]mpairment€of€oneððs€defense€is€the€most€difficult€form€of€speedy€trial€prejudice€toÐ  _ Ðprove€because€timeððs€erosion€of€exculpatory€evidence€and€testimony€can€rarely€beÐ ø H Ðshown€.€.€.€.€€[E]xcessive€delay€presumptively€compromises€the€reliability€of€a€trialÐ á 1  Ðin€ways€that€neither€party€can€prove€or,€for€that€matter,€identify.€While€suchÐ Ê   Ðpresumptive€prejudice€cannot€alone€carry€a€Sixth€Amendment€claim€without€regardÐ ³  Ðto€the€other€òòBarkeróó€criteria,€it€is€part€of€the€mix€of€relevant€facts,€and€its€importanceÐ œì  Ðincreases€with€the€length€of€the€delay.€Ð…Õ Ð Ð  ÐÌòòWoodóó,€924€S.W.2d€at€348€(citing€òòDoggettóó,€505€U.S.€at€655)€(citations€omitted).€€Ð W§  ÐÌà  àIn€this€case,€the€appellant€contends€that€he€was€prejudiced€by€the€delay€because€he€wasÐ )y Ðunable€to€adequately€assist€in€his€defense,€lost€favorable€sentencing€options,€and€was€unable€to€meetÐ b Ðwith€his€parole€officer.€€The€appellant€argues€that€he€was€the€most€qualified€person€to€assist€in€hisÐ ûK Ðdefense€and€because€he€was€incarcerated,€it€was€impossible€for€him€to€ð ðremember€the€whereaboutsÐ ä4 Ðof€witnesses€and€to€discuss€the€occurrence€leading€up€to€the€events€which€gave€rise€to€theseÐ Í Ðcharges.ðð€€It€is€unclear€from€the€appellantððs€argument€how€the€appellantððs€ability€to€prepare€a€properÐ ¶ Ðdefense€was€prejudiced,€merely€due€to€his€incarceration.€€Furthermore,€it€is€unclear€how€theÐ Ÿï Ðappellant€was€prejudiced€by€not€being€allowed€to€meet€with€his€parole€officer€in€a€totally€unrelatedÐ ˆØ Ðcase.€€Even€though€the€appellant€argues€that€he€could€have€received€a€sentence€that€ð ðwas€at€leastÐ qÁ Ðpartially€concurrent€to€the€one€he€was€serving,ðð€it€is€unclear€how€the€appellant€lost€favorableÐ Zª Ðsentencing€options.€€€We€conclude€that€the€appellant€herein€has€not€demonstrated€that€he€wasÐ C“ Ðprejudiced€by€the€delay€and€that€overall€the€òòBarkeróó€factors€weigh€in€favor€of€the€State.€€Thus,€theÐ ,| Ðtrial€court€properly€denied€the€motion€to€dismiss€for€lack€of€a€speedy€trial.€€òòÐ e ÐÓ  ÓÌSufficiency€of€the€EvidenceóóÐ ç 7 ÐÌÓ  Óà  àWhen€a€defendant€challenges€the€sufficiency€of€the€evidence,€this€Court€is€obliged€to€reviewÐ ¹" ! Ðthat€claim€according€to€certain€well-settled€principles.€€A€verdict€of€guilty,€rendered€by€a€jury€andÐ ¢#ò" Ðð ðapproved€by€the€trial€judge,€accredits€the€testimony€of€theðð€Stateððs€witnesses€and€resolves€allÐ ‹$Û# Ðconflicts€in€the€testimony€in€favor€of€the€State.€€€òòState€v.€Cazesóó,€875€S.W.2d€253,€259€(Tenn.€1994);€Ð t%Ä $ ÐòòState€v.€Harrisóó,€839€S.W.2d€54,€75€(Tenn.€1992).€€Thus,€although€the€accused€is€originally€cloakedÐ ]&­!% Ðwith€a€presumption€of€innocence,€the€jury€verdict€of€guilty€removes€this€presumption€ð ðand€replacesÐ F'–"& Ðit€with€one€of€guilt.ðð€€òòState€v.€Tuggleóó,€639€S.W.2d€913,€914€(Tenn.€1982).€€Hence,€on€appeal,€theÐ /(#' Ðburden€of€proof€rests€with€the€defendant€to€demonstrate€the€insufficiency€of€the€convicting€evidence.€Ð )h$( ÐòòId.óó€€The€relevant€question€the€reviewing€court€must€answer€is€whether€any€rational€trier€of€fact€couldÐ *Q%) Ðhave€found€the€accused€guilty€of€every€element€of€the€offense€beyond€a€reasonable€doubt.€€òòSeeóó€Tenn.Ð ê*:&* ÐR.€App.€P.€13(e);€òòHarrisóó,€839€S.W.2d€at€75.€€In€making€this€decision,€we€are€to€accord€the€State€ð ðtheÐ Ó+#'+ ÐÑßšÑâ âÑ |XÑâ âÑ  Ñstrongest€legitimate€view€of€the€evidence€as€well€as€all€reasonable€and€legitimate€inferences€that€mayÐ ° Ðbe€drawn€therefrom.ðð€€òòSeeóó€òòTuggleóó,€639€S.W.2d€at€914.€€As€such,€this€Court€is€precluded€from€re„Ð ™é Ðweighing€or€reconsidering€the€evidence€when€evaluating€the€convicting€proof.€€òòState€v.€Morganóó,€929Ð ‚Ò ÐS.W.2d€380,€383€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.€1996);€òòState€v.€Matthewsóó,€805€S.W.2d€776,€779€(Tenn.€Crim.Ð k» ÐApp.€1990).€€Moreover,€we€may€not€substitute€our€own€ð ðinferences€for€those€drawn€by€the€trier€ofÐ T¤ Ðfact€from€circumstantial€evidence.ðð€€òòMatthewsóó,€805€S.W.2d€at€779.Ð =  ÐÌà  àIn€the€case€herein,€the€appellant€was€charged€with€conspiracy€to€deliver€over€three€hundredÐ  _ Ð(300)€grams€of€cocaine.€€The€appellant€challenges€the€sufficiency€of€the€evidence€on€appeal.€Ð ø H ÐSpecifically,€the€appellant€argues€that€the€evidence€is€insufficient€to€substantiate€a€finding€of€guiltÐ á 1  Ðbecause€ð ðthe€State€failed€to€prove€each€and€every€element€of€the€charged€offensesðð€and€thus€failedÐ Ê   Ðto€meet€its€burden.€€The€State€argues€that€based€on€the€evidence€a€jury€could€reasonably€concludeÐ ³  Ðthat€the€appellant€committed€the€offense.Ð œì  ÐÌà  àTo€convict€the€appellant€of€conspiracy€to€deliver€cocaine,€the€State€was€required€to€prove€thatÐ n¾  Ðthe€appellant€conspired€to€knowingly€possess€a€controlled€substance€with€intent€to€deliver€theÐ W§  Ðcontrolled€substance.€€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€39„17„417(a)(4).€€The€offense€of€conspiracy€is€committedÐ @ Ðwhen€ð ðtwo€(2)€or€more€people,€each€having€the€culpable€mental€state€required€for€the€offense€whichÐ )y Ðis€the€object€of€the€conspiracy€and€each€acting€for€the€purpose€of€promoting€or€facilitatingÐ b Ðcommission€of€an€offense,€agree€that€one€(1)€or€more€of€them€will€engage€in€conduct€whichÐ ûK Ðconstitutes€such€offense.ðð€€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€39„12„103.€€€€Ð ä4 ÐÌà  àThe€proof€introduced€at€trial,€including€the€testimony€of€the€appellant,€established€that€theÐ ¶ Ðappellant€owed€Mr.€Riggsbee€money€and€agreed€to€be€the€middleman€in€the€drug€deal€as€a€way€ofÐ Ÿï Ðrepaying€him.€€During€conversations€with€Detective€Watson,€the€appellant€referred€to€his€ð ðbossðð€orÐ ˆØ Ðð ðboss€man,ðð€which€Detective€Watson€assumed€to€be€Mr.€Riggsbee,€the€owner€of€the€shop.€€TheÐ qÁ Ðappellant€himself€testified€that€he€agreed€to€purchase€a€kilogram€of€cocaine€from€Detective€WatsonÐ Zª Ðat€the€McDonaldððs€restaurant,€that€after€testing€the€cocaine€he€went€to€the€shop€to€get€the€money€andÐ C“ Ðtell€Mr.€Riggsbee€that€the€cocaine€was€ð ðgoodðð€and€that€he€took€$20,500€back€to€the€McDonaldððsÐ ,| Ðrestaurant€to€give€to€Detective€Watson€in€exchange€for€the€cocaine.€€We€conclude€that€there€wasÐ e Ðsufficient€evidence€to€support€the€conviction.׃ ×Ý ƒ#ÃÝòòÚ  Ú2Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý×  ×€€Ð þN ÐÌòòÓ  ÓAdmissibility€of€Manslaughter€ConvictionóóÐ Ð!   ÐÐ ¹" ! ÐÓìÓà  àDuring€the€trial€and€immediately€prior€to€the€appellantððs€testimony,€counsel€for€the€appellantÐ ° Ðmade€a€motion€to€exclude€evidence€of€the€appellantððs€conviction€for€voluntary€manslaughter€on€theÐ ™é Ðbasis€of€Rule€403€of€the€Tennessee€Rules€of€Evidence€because€the€prejudicial€impact€of€the€evidenceÐ ‚Ò Ðoutweighed€the€probative€value.€€Initially,€the€trial€court€agreed€to€take€the€matter€under€advisementÐ k» Ðuntil€cross„examination.€€On€direct€examination,€counsel€for€the€appellant€asked€the€appellantÐ T¤ Ðwhether€he€had€ð ðever€been€convicted€of€a€drug€offense.ðð€€The€appellant€answered€that€he€had€not.€Ð =  ÐPrior€to€cross„examination,€counsel€for€the€State€requested€a€jury„out€hearing€where€he€argued€thatÐ & v Ðcounsel€for€the€appellant€had€ð ðopened€the€doorðð€to€evidence€of€the€appellantððs€character€and€that€asÐ  _ Ða€result,€he€should€be€able€to€utilize€evidence€of€the€appellantððs€conviction€for€voluntaryÐ ø H Ðmanslaughter€to€impeach€the€appellantððs€credibility.€€The€trial€judge€determined€at€that€time€that€theÐ á 1  Ðconviction€was€inadmissible€based€on€Rule€403€of€the€Tennessee€Rules€of€Evidence.€€Then,€theÐ Ê   Ðfollowing€exchange€took€place€between€counsel€for€the€State€and€the€appellant€during€cross„Ð ³  Ðexamination:Ð œì  Ðà8  àÐ Ð Ð  Ðà8  àCounsel:€€No,€no,€no.€€Listen€to€my€questions.€€I€asked€you,€have€you€ever€seenÐ n¾  Ðcocaine€and€you€said,€yes,€on€tv.€€And€now€you€say€yes,€in€real€life€I€have?ÐW§ Ð Ð  Ðà8  àAppellant:€Yes,€sir,€in€real€life€I€have.€€Ð@Ð Ð  Ðà8  àCounsel:€Okay.€€But€why€did€you€tell€me€just€a€minute€ago€„€„€Why€did€you€dodgeÐ )y Ðthe€question€by€saying€on€tv?ÐbÐ Ð  Ðà8  àAppellant:€My€mind€is€spinning€too€fast.ÐûKÐ Ð  Ðà8  àCounsel:€Well,€letððs€slow€it€down.Ðä4Ð Ð  Ðà8  àAppellant:€Okay.ÐÍÐ Ð  Ðà8  àCounsel:€What€is€making€your€mind€spin€so€fast€here€today?жРР Ðà8  àAppellant:€I€donððt€know,€Iððm€not€used€to€this€sir.ПïÐ Ð  Ðà8  àCounsel:€Iððm€sorry?ЈØÐ Ð  Ðà8  àAppellant:€Iððm€not€used€to€this.ÐqÁÐ Ð  Ðà8  àCounsel:€Well,€not€used€to€what,€sir?ÐZªÐ Ð  Ðà8  àAppellant:€Being€in€a€courtroom€and€being€examined?ÐC“Ð Ð  ÐÌà  àAt€that€time,€the€trial€court€òòsuaóó€òòsponteóó€asked€the€jury€to€exit€the€courtroom.€€The€trial€judge€Ð e Ðpointed€out€that€the€appellant€had€been€in€court€at€least€thirteen€times€and€then€ruled€that€counsel€forÐ þN Ðthe€State€could€question€the€appellant€about€the€manslaughter€conviction,€in€effect€determining€theÐ ç 7 Ðconviction€admissible.€€Counsel€for€the€State€proceeded€to€question€the€appellant€briefly€about€theÐ Ð!   Ðexistence€of€the€manslaughter€conviction€once€the€jury€returned€to€the€courtroom.€€Ð ¹" ! ÐÌà  àOn€appeal,€the€appellant€argues€that€ð ðthe€trial€court€erred€in€allowing€the€evidence€inÐ ‹$Û# Ðcontravention€of€Rule€403€of€the€Tennessee€Rules€of€Evidenceðð€and€ð ðsuch€error€cannot€be€said€toÐ t%Ä $ Ðbe€harmless€beyond€a€reasonable€doubt.ðð€€The€State€counters€that€the€trial€court€did€not€err€inÐ ]&­!% Ðallowing€the€evidence€of€the€prior€conviction€for€purposes€of€impeachment.€€In€the€alternative,€theÐ F'–"& ÐState€argues€that€even€if€the€trial€court€erred€by€allowing€the€conviction€to€come€into€evidence,€theÐ /(#' Ðerror€was€harmless.€€Ð )h$( ÐÌà  àPursuant€to€Rule€609€of€the€Tennessee€Rules€of€Evidence,€the€credibility€of€the€defendantÐ ê*:&* Ðmay€be€attacked€by€presenting€evidence€of€prior€convictions€if€certain€conditions€are€met.€€First,€ifÐ Ó+#'+ Ðthe€witness€to€be€impeached€is€the€accused,€the€State€must€give€notice€prior€to€trial€of€its€intent€toÐ ° Ðutilize€the€conviction€for€impeachment€purposes€and€upon€request,€the€court€must€determine€theÐ ™é Ðadmissibility€of€an€eligible€conviction€by€deciding€whether€the€probative€value€of€a€prior€convictionÐ ‚Ò Ðon€the€issue€of€credibility€outweighs€its€unfair€prejudicial€effect€on€the€substantive€issues.€€Tenn.€R.Ð k» ÐEvid.€609(a)(3).€€The€convictions€must€be€punishable€by€death€or€imprisonment€over€one€year€orÐ T¤ Ðmust€involve€a€crime€of€dishonesty€or€a€false€statement.€€Tenn.€R.€Evid.€609(a)(2).€€Also,€theÐ =  Ðimpeaching€convictionððs€probative€value€on€credibility€must€outweigh€its€unfair€prejudice.€€Tenn.Ð & v ÐR.€Evid.€609(a)(3).€€A€trial€court€should€consider€the€similarity€between€the€crime€in€question€andÐ  _ Ðthe€underlying€impeaching€conviction,€as€well€as€the€relevance€of€the€impeaching€conviction€withÐ ø H Ðrespect€to€credibility.€€òòState€v.€Farmeróó,€841€S.W.2d€837,€839€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.€1992).€€If€ð ðthe€priorÐ á 1  Ðconviction€and€instant€offense€are€similar€in€nature€the€possible€prejudicial€effect€increases€greatlyÐ Ê   Ðand€should€be€more€carefully€scrutinized.ðð€€òòLong€v.€Stateóó,€607€S.W.2d€482,€486€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.Ð ³  Ð1980).€€A€trial€courtððs€ruling€under€Rule€609€will€not€be€reversed€absent€an€abuse€of€discretion.€€òòSeeóóÐ œì  ÐòòJohnson€v.€Stateóó,€596€S.W.2d€97,€104€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.€1979).€€Ð …Õ  ÐÌà  àFurthermore,€Tennessee€Rule€of€Evidence€404(a),€which€addresses€the€admissibility€ofÐ W§  Ðcharacter€evidence,€provides:Ð @ ÐÐ Ðà8  à(a)€.€.€.€Evidence€of€a€personððs€character€or€a€trait€of€character€is€not€admissible€forÐ b Ðthe€purpose€of€proving€action€in€conformity€with€the€character€or€trait€on€a€particularÐ ûK Ðoccasion,€except:€Ð ä4 Ð(1)€.€.€.€Evidence€of€a€pertinent€character€trait€offered€by€the€accused€or€by€theÐ Í Ðprosecution€to€rebut€the€same.€Ð¶Ð Ð  ÐÐ ÐTenn.€R.€Evid.€404(a)(1).€€The€treatise€òòTennessee€Law€of€Evidenceóó€elaborates€on€this€exception€toÐ ˆØ Ðthe€general€ban€on€character€evidence€of€the€accused,€explaining€that€Rule€404(a)(1)€embodies€aÐ qÁ Ðvery€important€exception€to€this€general€bar€on€the€admissibility€of€character€evidence€of€theÐ Zª Ðaccused.€€Neil€P.€Cohen,€et€al.,€òòTennessee€Law€of€Evidenceóó€ðð€4.04(4)(a)€(4th€ed.€2000).€€ThisÐ C“ Ðexception€allows€admission€of€character€evidence€when€the€accused€ð ðopens€the€doorðð€by€introducingÐ ,| Ðevidence€to€prove€a€ð ðpertinentðð€character€trait,€inevitably€to€demonstrate€his€or€her€own€goodÐ e Ðcharacter.€òò€Id.óó€€However,€the€accused€is€only€allowed€to€introduce€evidence€of€a€ð ðpertinentðð€characterÐ þN Ðtrait,€meaning€a€character€trait€at€issue€in€the€trial.€€òòId.óó€ðð€4.04(4)(b).€€For€example,€the€accusedððsÐ ç 7 Ðcharacter€for€honesty€would€be€a€pertinent€character€trait€if€he€or€she€were€charged€withÐ Ð!   Ðembezzlement.€€òòId.óó€€Once€the€accused€introduces€evidence€of€his€or€her€own€good€character,€the€stateÐ ¹" ! Ðmay€also€address€the€issue€of€the€accusedððs€character€in€order€to€prevent€the€trier€of€fact€fromÐ ¢#ò" Ðreceiving€a€one„sided€view€of€the€defendantððs€character.€€òòId.óó€ðð€4.04(4)(a).€€Furthermore,€theÐ ‹$Û# Ðdefendantððs€proof€under€Rule€404(a)(1)€is€limited€to€reputation€and€opinion€evidence€only.€òòId.óó€ððÐ t%Ä $ Ð4.04(4)(c).€€However,€under€Rule€405(a),€the€state€may€introduce€evidence€of€specific€instances€ofÐ ]&­!% Ðconduct€when€cross„examining€a€defense€witness€in€response€to€the€presentation€by€the€accused€ofÐ F'–"& Ðthis€reputation€or€opinion€character€evidence.€€òòId.óóÐ /(#' ÐÌà  àIn€this€case,€the€appellant€does€not€actually€contend€that€the€procedural€requirements€of€theÐ *Q%) ÐTennessee€Rule€of€Evidence€609€were€unfulfilled.€€Although€we€acknowledge€that€the€State€failedÐ ê*:&* Ðto€satisfy€the€actual€notice€requirement€of€Rule€609(a)(3),€we€find€this€issue€waived€by€theÐ Ó+#'+ Ðappellantððs€failure€to€raise€it€in€a€motion€for€new€trial.€€Tenn.€R.€App.€P.€3(e).€€òòSeeóó€also€òòState€v.€BurlÐ ° ÐLakinsóó,€No.€32,€1991€WL€84947,€at€*3€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.€at€Knoxville,€May€24,€1991).׃ ×Ý ƒ#ÃÝòòÚ  Ú3Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý×  ×€€Thus,€atÐ ™é Ðthis€point€our€task€is€only€to€determine€whether€the€trial€courtððs€decision€to€admit€the€evidence€ofÐ ‚Ò Ðthe€appellantððs€manslaughter€conviction€was€proper€under€Tennessee€Rule€of€Evidence€609€and€theÐ k» Ðð ðopen€doorðð€doctrine€discussed€above.€€Ð T¤ ÐÌà  àIn€beginning€our€analysis€we€note€initially€that€generally,€the€decision€as€to€whether€to€admitÐ & v Ðevidence€in€a€trial€is€left€to€the€discretion€of€the€trial€court.€€òòState€v.€Hutchinsonóó,€898€S.W.2d€161,Ð  _ Ð172€(Tenn.€1994).€€Ð ø H ÐÌà  àIn€the€instant€case,€in€response€to€a€question€posed€by€defense€counsel€during€directÐ Ê   Ðexamination,€the€appellant€testified€that€he€had€never€been€convicted€of€a€drug€offense.€€On€cross„Ð ³  Ðexamination,€the€appellant€claimed€that€he€was€ð ðnot€used€toðð€being€cross„examined.€€Accordingly,Ð œì  Ðthrough€this€testimony,€we€find€that€the€appellant€opened€the€door€to€the€issue€of€pertinent€characterÐ …Õ  Ðtraits,€i.e.,€that€he€was€a€good€citizen€and€that€his€inconsistent€answers€on€cross„examination€wereÐ n¾  Ðdue€to€his€unfamiliarity€with€the€criminal€justice€system.€€The€trial€court€ruled€that€the€convictionÐ W§  Ðcould€be€used€to€impeach€the€appellantððs€testimony€only€after€the€appellant€opened€this€door.€€TheÐ @ Ðtrial€court€considered€the€arguments€of€counsel€on€two€separate€occasions€and€weighed€the€probativeÐ )y Ðvalue€and€prejudicial€impact€of€the€conviction.€€Under€these€circumstances,€we€cannot€conclude€thatÐ b Ðthe€trial€court€abused€its€discretion.€€This€issue€is€without€merit.€€Ð ûK ÐÌòòÓ  ÓFailure€to€Consider€Mitigating€FactorsóóÐ Í ÐÓ&«ÓÌà  àThe€appellant€challenges€the€trial€courtððs€failure€to€consider€certain€mitigating€factors€whichÐ Ÿï Ðhe€alleged€were€appropriate€in€determining€the€appellantððs€sentence.€€Specifically,€the€appellantÐ ˆØ Ðargues€that€the€trial€courtððs€failure€to€consider€these€mitigating€factors€ð ðconstitutes€error€and€theÐ qÁ Ðappellantððs€sentence€should€be€modified€accordingly.ðð€€The€State€argues€that€the€trial€courtÐ Zª Ðconsidered€the€mitigating€factors€and€found€that€they€did€not€apply.€€Ð C“ ÐÌà  àð ðWhen€reviewing€sentencing€issues€.€.€.€,€the€appellate€court€shall€conduct€a€de€novo€reviewÐ e Ðon€the€record€of€such€issues.€€Such€review€shall€be€conducted€with€a€presumption€that€theÐ þN Ðdeterminations€made€by€the€court€from€which€the€appeal€is€taken€are€correct.ðð€€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ððÐ ç 7 Ð40-35-401(d).€€ð ðHowever,€the€presumption€of€correctness€which€accompanies€the€trial€courtððs€actionÐ Ð!   Ðis€conditioned€upon€the€affirmative€showing€in€the€record€that€the€trial€court€considered€theÐ ¹" ! Ðsentencing€principles€and€all€relevant€facts€and€circumstances.ðð€€òòState€v.€Ashbyóó,€823€S.W.2d€166,Ð ¢#ò" Ð169€(Tenn.€1991).€€In€conducting€our€review,€we€must€consider€the€defendantððs€potential€forÐ ‹$Û# Ðrehabilitation,€the€trial€and€sentencing€hearing€evidence,€the€pre„sentence€report,€the€sentencingÐ ° Ðprinciples,€sentencing€alternative€arguments,€the€nature€and€character€of€the€offense,€the€enhancingÐ ™é Ðand€mitigating€factors,€and€the€defendantððs€statements.€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðððð€40-35-103(5),€-210(b);€Ð ‚Ò ÐòòAshbyóó,€823€S.W.2d€at€169.òòóó€We€are€to€also€recognize€that€the€defendant€bears€ð ðthe€burden€ofÐ k» Ðdemonstrating€that€the€sentence€is€improper.ðð€òòAshbyóó,€823€S.W.2d€at€169.Ð T¤ ÐÌà  àTurning€more€specifically€to€the€facts€of€this€case,€the€defendant€was€convicted€of€conspiracyÐ & v Ðto€possess€with€intent€to€deliver€three€hundred€(300)€grams€or€more€of€a€substance€containingÐ  _ Ðcocaine.€€ò òó óSince€this€is€an€A€felony,€the€starting€point€for€sentencing€determinations€is€the€middle€ofÐ ø H Ðthe€range.€òòSeeóó€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€40-35-210(c).€It€is€undisputed€that€the€appellant€was€a€Range€IÐ á 1  Ðoffender;€thus,€twenty€years€is€the€mid„point€against€which€the€trial€court€must€balance€anyÐ Ê   Ðmitigating€and€enhancement€factors.Ð ³  ÐÌà  àIn€balancing€these€concerns,€a€trial€court€should€start€at€the€presumptive€sentence,€enhanceÐ …Õ  Ðthe€sentence€within€the€range€for€existing€enhancement€factors,€and€then€reduce€the€sentence€withinÐ n¾  Ðthe€range€for€existing€mitigating€factors.€€Tenn.€Code€€Ann.€ðð€40-35-210(e).€€No€particular€weightÐ W§  Ðfor€each€factor€is€prescribed€by€the€statute.€òòSeeóó€òòState€v.€Santiagoóó,€914€S.W.2d€116,€125€(Tenn.€Crim.Ð @ ÐApp.€1995).€The€weight€given€to€each€factor€is€left€to€the€discretion€of€the€trial€court€as€long€as€itÐ )y Ðcomports€with€the€sentencing€principles€and€purposes€of€our€code€and€as€long€as€its€findings€areÐ b Ðsupported€by€the€record.€€òòId.óóÐ ûK ÐÌà  àThe€appellant€argues€that€the€trial€court€should€have€considered€the€following€mitigatingÐ Í Ðfactors€enumerated€in€Tennessee€Code€Annotated€section€40„35„113:€(1)€the€criminal€conduct€of€theÐ ¶ Ðappellant€neither€caused€nor€threatened€serious€bodily€injury;€(2)€substantial€grounds€existed€tendingÐ Ÿï Ðto€excuse€or€justify€the€appellantððs€criminal€conduct,€though€failing€to€establish€a€defense;€(3)€theÐ ˆØ Ðappellant€played€a€minor€role€in€the€commission€of€the€offense;€(4)€the€appellant€was€motivated€byÐ qÁ Ða€desire€to€provide€necessities€for€his€family€or€himself;€and€(5)€the€appellant,€although€guilty€of€theÐ Zª Ðcrime,€committed€the€offense€under€such€unusual€circumstances€that€it€is€unlikely€that€a€sustainedÐ C“ Ðintent€to€violate€the€law€motivated€his€conduct.€€€€Ð ,| ÐÌà  àIn€imposing€the€appellantððs€sentence€on€the€charge€of€conspiracy€to€possess€with€intent€toÐ þN Ðdeliver€three€hundred€(300)€grams€or€more€of€a€substance€containing€cocaine,€the€trial€court€foundÐ ç 7 Ðthat€the€only€enhancement€factor€to€apply€was€Tennessee€Code€Annotated€section€40„35„114(13)Ð Ð!   Ð(2000),׃×Ý ƒ#ÃÝòòÚ  Ú4Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý×  ×€as€there€was€ð ðno€question€that€.€.€.€[the€appellant]€was€on€bond€for€an€offense€at€the€time€thisÐ ¹" ! Ðoffense€was€committed.ðð€€The€trial€court€sentenced€the€appellant€to€a€presumptive€sentence€of€twentyÐ ¢#ò" Ðyears€for€the€charge€of€conspiracy€to€possess€with€intent€to€deliver€three€hundred€(300)€grams€orÐ ‹$Û# Ðmore€of€a€substance€containing€cocaine€and€enhanced€that€sentence€to€twenty„one€years€afterÐ t%Ä $ Ðapplying€the€applicable€enhancement€factor.€€The€trial€court€stated€that€it€looked€at€all€of€theÐ ° Ðmitigating€factors€presented€by€the€appellant€and€found€they€did€not€apply.€€Ð ™é ÐÌà  àThe€appellant€now€claims€that€the€trial€court€erroneously€failed€to€consider€the€followingÐ k» Ðmitigating€factors:€(1)€the€criminal€conduct€of€the€appellant€neither€caused€nor€threatened€seriousÐ T¤ Ðbodily€injury;€(2)€substantial€grounds€existed€tending€to€excuse€or€justify€the€appellantððs€criminalÐ =  Ðconduct,€though€failing€to€establish€a€defense;€(3)€the€appellant€played€a€minor€role€in€theÐ & v Ðcommission€of€the€offense;€(4)€the€appellant€was€motivated€by€a€desire€to€provide€necessities€for€hisÐ  _ Ðfamily€or€himself;€and€(5)€the€appellant,€although€guilty€of€the€crime,€committed€the€offense€underÐ ø H Ðsuch€unusual€circumstances€that€it€is€unlikely€that€a€sustained€intent€to€violate€the€law€motivated€hisÐ á 1  Ðconduct.€€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€40„35„113.€€Ð Ê   ÐÌà  àIn€our€view,€these€factors€were€not€shown€by€the€appellant€to€be€applicable.€€The€facts€do€notÐ œì  Ðsuggest€that€the€appellant€played€a€minor€role€in€the€commission€of€the€offense.€€òòSeeóó€Tenn.€CodeÐ …Õ  ÐAnn.€ðð€40„35„113(4).€€He€was€the€one€who€set€up€the€deal€with€Detective€Watson€and€brought€theÐ n¾  Ðmoney€to€the€McDonaldððs€Restaurant€to€complete€the€transaction.€€The€appellant€was€the€onlyÐ W§  Ðperson€who€conversed€directly€with€Detective€Watson€about€the€drug€transaction.€€The€appellantÐ @ Ðadmitted€that€he€freely€got€involved€in€the€drug€deal€to€pay€back€a€debt€to€his€boss,€Mr.€Riggsbee.€Ð )y ÐThe€appellant€claims€that€he€was€motivated€by€a€desire€to€provide€necessities€for€himself€and€thatÐ b Ðsubstantial€grounds€existed€tending€to€excuse€or€justify€his€criminal€conduct;€he€asserted€that€heÐ ûK Ðbecame€involved€in€the€drug€deal€in€order€to€repay€Mr.€Riggsbee€for€the€money€he€borrowed€forÐ ä4 Ðlegal€fees€and€that€he€was€scared€of€Mr.€Riggsbee.€€òòSeeóó€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðððð€40„35„113(3)€&€„Ð Í Ð113(7).€€However,€the€appellant€admitted€that€he€voluntarily€became€involved€in€the€transaction.€Ð ¶ ÐThe€appellant€also€claims€that€he€committed€the€offense€under€the€unusual€circumstances€ofÐ Ÿï Ðentrapment,€but€we€have€determined€that€the€trial€court€properly€denied€the€motion€for€judgment€ofÐ ˆØ Ðacquittal€based€on€entrapment,€because€the€evidence€did€not€substantiate€such€a€claim.€€òòSeeóó€Tenn.Ð qÁ ÐCode€Ann.€ðð€40„35„113(11).€€Finally,€the€appellant€claims€that€his€criminal€conduct€neitherÐ Zª Ðthreatened€nor€caused€serious€bodily€injury.€€òòSeeóó€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€40„35„113(1).€€While€we€agreeÐ C“ Ðthat€the€appellantððs€conduct€did€not€cause€serious€bodily€injury€and€probably€did€not€threaten€bodilyÐ ,| Ðinjury,€we€find€this€mitigating€factor€would€be€entitled€to€only€marginal€consideration.€€òòSeeóó€Tenn.Ð e ÐCode€Ann.€ðð€40„35„113(1).€€Thus,€the€appellantððs€argument€that€trial€courtððs€refusal€to€mitigate€theÐ þN Ðappellantððs€sentence€was€error€is€unpersuasive.€€We€conclude€that€the€imposition€of€a€twenty„oneÐ ç 7 Ðyear€sentence€by€the€trial€court€was€proper€in€this€instance.׃×Ý ƒ#ÃÝòòÚ  Ú5Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý×  ×€€Ð Ð!   ÐÌÓ  ÓòòFailure€to€Consider€Alternative€Sentencingóó€Ð ¢#ò" ÐÌÓ×ÎÓà  àFinally,€without€argument€or€citation€to€the€record,€the€appellant€argues€that€ð ðhe€is€aÐ t%Ä $ Ðâ âfavorable€candidate€for€alternative€sentencing€to€a€Community€Corrections€programðð€and€that€ð ðtheÐ ]&­!% Ðtrial€judge€failed€to€consider€alternative€sentencing.ðð׃×Ý ƒ#ÃÝòòÚ  Ú6Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý×  ×€€The€appellant€was€convicted€of€conspiracyÐ ° Ðâ âto€€possess€with€the€intent€to€deliver€three€hundred€(300)€grams€or€more€of€a€substance€containingÐ ™é Ðcocaine,€which€is€a€Class€A€felony.€€The€appellant€is€not€presumed€eligible€for€alternative€sentencingÐ ‚Ò Ðbecause€he€was€convicted€of€a€Class€A€felony,€òòseeóó€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€40„35„102(6),€and€furthermoreÐ k» Ðhas€waived€this€issue€for€failure€to€include€citations€to€the€record€or€argument€pursuant€to€TennesseeÐ T¤ ÐCourt€of€Criminal€Appeals€Rule€10(b).Ð =  ÐÌòòÓ  ÓConclusionóó€Ð  _ ÐÌÓ;ÓÓà  àAfter€a€thorough€review€of€the€record€before€this€court,€we€conclude€that€there€is€noÐ á 1  Ðreversible€error€and€accordingly,€the€judgment€of€the€trial€court€is€affirmed.€€Ð Ê   йÓ  ÓÌÌÓ  ÓÔ#†X×WXXX'òK#ÔÔ#†¼˜é»XX×WË #ÔÔ€X×WX»¼˜éÔÌà  àà ` àà ¸ àà  àà h àà À àà  à___________________________________€Ð W§  Ðà  àà ` àà ¸ àà  àà h àà À àà  àJERRY€L.€SMITH,€JUDGE