ÿWPCTZ …# VU:a %› 0"`¡w@ 4A U 0¤d 0D 0JL 0T– 0^ê 0hH 0r° 0|" 0†ž 0$ 1u´ 0d) BU@*ªB)ÔDCý AM@,˜¹yQ 0@Ê D3 1=2n8 Ø~ë<iÓ¥ Ýx"œU$‡ñ&ïx)ig,gÐ/²72sé3\5Ö{7hQ95¹:!î>%@\4ACBœÓC‡oG$öHÉLsãNv~VQvÓÔR§X AO¯XÆþX 0DÄY D/Z B7Z˜HP LaserJet 4SiHPPCL5MS,ü,,,,,ü0nLhÎ,c½¬AZ‹"Arial RegularX(8R<$¡¡Ñ°ÑÑ€°ÑÒ€°ÒÒX°Ò ˜›DœDPžDŸU že¡D¢D£Ó€Ô¡¨ 3|x¬(T(3&h$¤¤Ý ƒR ××  ×€€His€testimony€corroborated€the€testimonyÏof€Robert€Bell€and€he€provided€details€concerning€the€time€sequence€of€the€robbery.€€ÏAccording€to€Smith,€the€assailant€spent€almost€fifteen€minutes€in€the€market€duringÏwhich€time€he€held€Bell,€Bobbie,€Jr.,€and€Smith€at€gun€point€behind€the€counter.€ÏSmith€remembered€a€few€customers€entering€and€leaving€the€store€during€theÏrobbery;€however,€he€stated€that€he€did€not€notice€them€closely€because€he€wasÍfocused€on€the€assailant.× ƒ? ××  ×€€Smith€further€remembered€Bobbie,€Jr.€crying€as€theÏassailant€ordered€him€to€take€money€from€the€cash€register€and€place€it€into€a€paperÏbag.€€According€to€Smith,€the€assailant€took€the€money€and€then€began€firing€his€gun.€ÏSmith€testified€that€he€dove€on€top€of€Bobbie,€Jr.€after€he€saw€the€assailant€shoot€himÏwith€the€gun.€€€€€€€€€€€€€à àAt€trial,€Smith€identified€the€appellant€as€the€perpetrator€ofÏthe€robbery€and€murders.€€He€testified€that€the€assailant€was€a€black€male€about€5'€8"Ïand€160€pounds.€€However,€before€trial,€it€is€apparent€that€Smith€could€not€positivelyÏidentify€the€assailant.€€In€interviews€conducted€by€Officer€Patton€and€Officer€œDobson›,ÏSmith€indicated€that€he€did€not€get€a€good€look€at€the€suspect.€€Moreover,€in€a€reportÏby€Detective€Flowers,€Smith€advised€that€ð ðhe€could€not€describe€the€suspect€at€thisÏtime€but€is€willing€to€be€œreinterviewed›€at€a€later€date.ðð€€Smith€testified€at€trial€that€heÏgave€statements€to€police€officers€after€the€robbery;€however,€the€prosecution€neverÏdisclosed€those€reports€to€the€appellant.× ƒ@ ××  ×€€€€€Ìà àOn€July€6,€1980,€one€day€after€the€robbery,€Detective€William€œRobeck›Ïpresented€a€photographic€line€up€to€Smith.€€œRobeck›ððs€report€indicates€that€SmithÏpicked€photographs€five€and€six€as€matching€the€assailant,€with€photograph€numberÏfour€being€a€picture€of€the€appellant.× ƒA ××  ×€€At€trial,€Smith€testified€that€he€picked€twoÏphotographs€that€closely€fit€his€description€of€the€assailant;€however,€the€prosecutionÏnever€disclosed€Detective€œRobeck›ððs€report€to€the€appellant.€Ìà àAdditionally,€before€trial,€Smith€was€asked€to€identify€the€perpetrator€from€aÏphysical€line€up.€€Smith€testified€that€he€believed€person€number€two,€the€appellant,Ïto€be€the€assailant.€€However,€he€stated€that€he€could€not€make€a€positiveÏidentification€because€the€appellant€had€his€hair€ð ðup€in€curlsðð€at€the€line€up,€unlike€hisÏhair€style€at€the€crime€scene.€€€€€€€€€€€€€Ìà àThe€Stateððs€third€eyewitness€was€Debra€Smith,€a€customer€who€entered€theÏstore€during€the€robbery.€€Ms.€Smith€testified€that€she€went€to€Bellððs€market€on€July€5,Ï1980€between€9:30€p.m.€and€9:50€p.m.€to€pick€up€a€cold€beverage.€€When€she€arrivedÏat€the€market,€she€noticed€a€man€standing€in€a€phone€booth€and€a€cab€parked€outÏfront€with€the€driver€waiting€in€the€front€seat.€€Upon€entering€the€store,€she€observedÏRobert€Bell,€Bobbie,€Jr.,€Louis€Smith,€and€the€appellant€standing€behind€the€counter.€ÏShe€testified€that€she€knew€the€appellant€from€having€seen€him€on€prior€occasions€inÍanother€convenient€store.€€She€further€stated€that€she€had€visited€in€the€appellantððsÏhome€in€the€past€and€had€gone€to€high€school€with€the€appellantððs€older€brother.Ìà àAccording€to€Ms.€Smithððs€testimony,€she€knew€that€a€robbery€was€in€progressÏwhen€she€payed€for€her€beverage€at€the€check„out€counter.€€She€stated€that€althoughÏshe€did€not€see€the€appellantððs€gun,€she€noticed€Bobbie,€Jr.€crying€as€he€handed€herÏthe€change€from€her€purchase.€€She€further€testified€that€she€immediately€left€theÏstore€and€returned€to€her€boyfriendððs€house€without€calling€the€police.€€Besides€tellingÏher€sister€about€the€robbery,€she€did€not€communicate€her€knowledge€of€the€incidentÏuntil€police€contacted€her€on€July€15,€1980.€€She€explained€at€trial€that€she€kept€quietÏbecause€she€knew€the€appellant€and€she€did€not€want€to€get€involved.€€Ìà àDuring€cross„examination,€Ms.€Smith€expressed€difficulty€in€identifying€LouisÏSmith€as€the€fourth€man€in€the€market.€€She€admitted€that€she€originally€thought€thatÏSmith€was€the€appellantððs€accomplice€in€the€robbery.€€She€stated€that€sheÏremembered€seeing€Smith€behind€the€counter€with€the€appellant;€however,€sheÏidentified€Smith€as€a€black€male.€€The€appellantððs€counsel€reminded€her€of€her€earlierÏtestimony€during€direct€examination€in€which€she€stated€that€Smith€was€Caucasian.Ìà àOne€of€the€Stateððs€key€witnesses€at€trial€was€Victor€Davis,€a€close€friend€of€theÏappellant.€€Davis€was€originally€listed€as€an€alibi€witness€for€the€defense.€€However,Ïat€trial,€Davis€testified€for€the€prosecution€concerning€his€activities€with€the€appellantÏleading€up€to€the€events€at€Bellððs€Market.€€Davis€testified€that€he€and€the€appellantÍhad€gone€to€Franklin,€Tennessee€during€the€afternoon€on€July€5,€1980.€€While€inÏFranklin,€the€two€men€picked€up€chicken€at€a€local€œKFC›€and€spent€time€gambling€at€aÏhangout€near€the€Franklin€high€school.€€Davis€testified€that€they€went€back€to€the€œKFC›Ïaround€9:00€p.m.€that€evening,€but€the€restaurant€was€already€closed.€€While€sitting€inÏthe€œKFC›€parking€lot,€the€appellant€told€Davis€that€he€would€have€robbed€theÏrestaurant€if€it€had€been€open.€€Davis€stated€that€he€noticed€the€appellant€carrying€aÏdark€.38€caliber€pistol€during€their€time€in€Franklin.€€He€also€remembered€that€theÏappellant€was€wearing€a€black€shirt€and€denim€jeans.Ìà àDavis€testified€that€he€was€having€car€trouble€on€July€5,€but€that€he€and€theÏappellant€returned€to€Nashville€before€10:00€p.m.€€Davis€estimated€that€the€return€tripÏfrom€Franklin€took€them€about€forty„five€minutes.€€When€the€two€arrived€in€Nashville,ÏDavis€dropped€the€appellant€off€a€few€blocks€from€Bellððs€Market.€€Davis€testified€thatÏas€the€appellant€was€exiting€the€car,€he€told€Davis€that€ð ðhe€was€going€to€rob€Bob€BellððÏand€ð ðwas€going€to€try€not€to€leave€no€witnesses.ðð€€Ìà àDavis€testified€that€he€did€not€see€the€appellant€again€until€about€five€minutesÏafter€the€appellant€left€his€car.€€Davis€explained€that€he€observed€the€appellantÏwalking€in€the€direction€of€his€home€with€a€paper€bag€in€one€hand€and€a€pistol€in€theÏother.€€Davis€stopped€his€car€and€picked€up€the€pistol€which€the€appellant€had€thrownÏon€the€ground.€€The€two€men€then€proceeded€to€the€appellantððs€fatherððs€house,Íarriving€€shortly€after€10:00€p.m.× ƒB ××  ×€€Davis€testified€that,€during€their€visit,€the€appellantÏcounted€about€two€hundred€($200)€dollars€from€the€paper€bag€and€gave€forty€dollarsÏ($40)€of€the€money€to€Davis.€€While€handling€the€money,€the€appellant€told€his€fatherÏthat€he€had€been€gambling€in€Franklin,€Tennessee.€€The€appellant€then€called€hisÏgirlfriend€on€the€telephone€before€leaving€with€Davis€to€pick€up€some€beer.€€DavisÏtestified€that€the€appellant€made€only€one€comment€that€evening€concerning€hisÏinvolvement€in€the€robbery.€€As€Davis€and€the€appellant€were€leaving€his€fatherððsÏhome,€the€appellant€told€Davis€that€ð ðhe€didnððt€mean€to€shoot€that€boy.ðð€€€€€€€€€€€€€Ìà àDuring€cross„examination,€the€appellantððs€counsel€attempted€to€impeachÏDavisðð€testimony€by€emphasizing€that€Davis€was€originally€a€witness€for€theÏdefense.× ƒC ××  ×€€Davis€admitted€that€he€had€never€disclosed€the€incriminating€factsÏagainst€the€appellant€until€after€his€arrest€on€the€Saturday€before€trial.× ƒD ××  ×€€HeÏexplained€that€he€initially€withheld€the€information€because€he€did€not€want€to€getÍinvolved€in€the€case€against€the€appellant.× ƒE ××  ×€€He€also€expressed€fear€that€he€wouldÏbe€considered€an€accomplice€to€the€crimes€at€Bellððs€Market.€€Thus,€he€testified€that€heÏdid€not€come€forward€with€complete€information€about€the€case€until€the€StateÏpromised€him€immunity€for€his€testimony.€€€€€Ìà àThe€appellant€argues€that€he€could€have€impeached€both€Robert€Bell€andÏLouis€Smith€if€the€prosecution€had€properly€disclosed€the€exculpatory€evidenceÏcontained€in€exhibits€one€through€seven.× ƒF ××  ×€€We€agree€that€the€suppressed€evidenceÏwould€have€strengthened€the€appellantððs€ability€to€cross„examine€those€twoÏeyewitnesses.€€However,€after€considering€that€evidence€collectively€with€the€record,Ïwe€have€complete€confidence€in€the€verdict.€€Ìà àThe€record€reflects€that€three€eyewitnesses€separately€identified€the€appellantÏas€the€perpetrator€of€the€crimes.€€Specifically,€Robert€Bell€and€Debra€Smith€bothÏrecognized€the€appellant€from€past€experiences€and€knew€without€a€doubt€that€heÍwas€the€assailant€in€Bellððs€Market.€€Although€Bellððs€and€Louis€Smithððs€pre„trialÏdescriptions€of€the€assailant€were€flawed,€their€testimony€at€trial€was€strengthened€byÏVictor€Davis,€who€placed€the€appellant€at€Bellððs€Market€during€the€time€of€the€robbery.€ÏWe€find€that€the€appellant€had€full€opportunity€to€impeach€the€testimony€of€DavisÏwithout€disclosure€of€the€òòBradyóó€evidence.€€However,€Davisðð€testimony€concerning€theÏevents€before€and€after€the€robbery€was€uncontroverted.€€Ìà àIn€light€of€Davisðð€testimony€and€the€testimony€of€the€corroboratingÏeyewitnesses,€we€have€confidence€in€the€verdict€even€though€the€prosecutionÏwithheld€exculpatory€evidence.€€We,€therefore,€find€no€reasonable€probability€that€theÏresults€of€the€case€would€have€been€different€if€the€State€had€disclosed€that€evidenceÏto€the€appellant.€Ì€€€€€€à@ àò òII.ó óÌà àThe€appellant€next€contends€that€the€trial€court€erred€in€failing€to€set€aside€hisÏconvictions€because€the€jury€instructions€at€trial€did€not€properly€define€theÏð ðreasonable€doubtðð€standard.€€He€specifically€argues€that€the€phrases€ð ðmoralÏcertaintyðð€and€ð ðlet€the€mind€rest€easilyðð€in€the€instructions€allowed€the€jury€to€convictÏhim€on€a€lower€standard€of€proof€in€violation€of€the€decisions€in€òòCage€v.€Louisianaóó× ƒG ××  ×Íand€òòVictor€v.€Nebraskaóó.× ƒH ××  ×€€This€issue€is€without€merit.€€€Ìà àIn€this€case,€the€trial€judge€instructed€the€jury€on€reasonable€doubt€as€follows:ÌÓÓà8 àà àReasonable€doubt€is€that€doubt€engendered€by€an€investigationÏof€all€the€proof€in€the€case€and€an€inability,€after€such€investigation,€to€letÏthe€mind€rest€easily€as€to€the€certainty€of€guilt.€€Reasonable€doubt€doesÏnot€mean€a€captious,€possible,€or€imaginary€doubt.€€Absolute€certaintyÏof€guilty€is€not€demanded€by€the€law€to€convict€of€any€criminal€charge,Ïbut€moral€certainty€is€required€as€to€every€proposition€of€proof€requisiteÏto€constitute€the€offense.à à€€€€€€ÌÌÓÓThe€appellant€concedes€that€this€Court€has€previously€upheld€the€constitutionality€ofÏsimilar€jury€instructions.× ƒI ××  ×€€However,€he€requests€this€Court€to€re„examine€theÏð ðreasonable€doubtðð€issue€in€light€of€òòœRickman›€v.€Duttonóó.× ƒJ ××  ×€Ìà àWe€initially€find€that€the€appellantððs€claim€is€time„barred€by€the€three€yearÏstatute€of€limitations€in€Tennessee€Code€Annotated€section€40„30„102€(repealedÏ1995).× ƒK ××  ×€€The€appellant€first€raised€the€ð ðreasonable€doubtðð€issue€in€his€second€post„conviction€petition€filed€in€February€1995,€under€the€pre„1995€Post€ConvictionÏProcedure€Act.€€Accordingly,€almost€five€years€elapsed€between€the€United€StatesÏSupreme€Courtððs€ruling€in€òòCageóó€and€the€appellantððs€second€post„conviction€petition.€€Ìà àWe€find€that€since€the€Supreme€Courtððs€decision€in€òòCageóó,€there€has€been€noÏsubsequent€constitutional€rule€on€ð ðreasonable€doubtðð€jury€instructions€to€warrant€anÏexception€to€the€three„year€statute€of€limitations.€€òòSeeóó€òòBurford€v.€Stateóó,€845€S.W.2dÏ204,€208„210€(Tenn.€1992).€€The€appellantððs€reliance€on€òòVictor€v.€Nebraskaóó€andÏòòœRickman›€v.€Duttonóó€does€not€affect€our€decision.€€Ìà àIn€òòVictoróó,€the€United€States€Supreme€Court€readdressed€the€use€of€the€ð ðmoralÏcertaintyðð€phrase€in€jury€instructions.€€The€Court€reasoned€that€the€phrase€ð ðmoralÏcertaintyðð€may€have€lost€its€historical€meaning€and€that€modern€juries€might€interpretÏð ðmoral€certaintyðð€to€mean€something€less€than€the€high€level€of€determinationÏconstitutionally€required€in€criminal€cases.€€However,€the€Court€in€òòVictoróó€did€notÏespouse€a€new€constitutional€rule€concerning€the€use€of€ð ðmoral€certaintyðð€€in€juryÏinstructions.€€Instead,€the€Court€merely€expressed€criticism€regarding€the€continuedÏuse€of€the€ð ðmoral€certaintyðð€phrase.Ìà àThe€appellant€also€relies€on€òòœRickman›€v.€Duttonóó,€a€decision€from€the€UnitedÏStates€District€Court€for€the€Middle€District€of€Tennessee.€€In€òòœRickman›óó,€the€districtÏcourt€held€that€a€jury€instruction€containing€the€phrases€ð ðmoral€certaintyðð€and€ð ðmindÍrest€easilyðð€suggested€to€a€reasonable€juror€a€lower€burden€of€proof€than€is€requiredÏby€constitution.€€òòSeeóó€864€œF.Supp›.€at€709.€€Although€we€acknowledge€that€the€districtÏcourtððs€ruling€in€òòœRickman›óó€pertained€to€a€jury€instruction€similar€to€the€one€in€theÏappellantððs€case,€we€are€not€bound€by€decisions€of€the€district€court.× ƒL ××  ×€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€Ìà àMoreover,€this€Court€and€the€Tennessee€Supreme€court€have€specificallyÏaddressed€and€upheld€the€constitutionality€of€jury€instructions€similar€to€the€one€inÏthis€case.× ƒM ××  ×€€We,€therefore,€conclude€that,€even€if€the€appellantððs€claim€were€not€timeÏbarred,€his€contention€is€without€merit.€€The€reasonable€doubt€instruction€given€at€theÏappellantððs€trial€properly€reflected€the€standard€of€proof€required€by€the€state€andÏfederal€constitutions.Ìœ›à@ àò òIII.ó óà àà àà àà àà àÌà àThe€appellant€next€contends€that€the€trial€court€erred€in€failing€to€set€aside€hisÏtwo€convictions€of€first€degree€murder€because€the€jury€instructions€at€trial€improperlyÏmerged€the€ð ðpremeditationðð€and€ð ðdeliberationðð€elements€of€first€degree€murder.€€HeÏargues€that€the€merger€of€those€elements€in€the€jury€charge€violated€his€constitutionalÍrights€as€set€forth€in€òòState€v.€Brownóó,€836€S.W.2d€530€(Tenn.€1992).€Ìà àThis€issue€is€without€merit.ÌÓÓÓÓà àThe€jury€instruction€on€the€elements€of€first€degree€murder€included€theÏfollowing€in€pertinent€part:ÌÓÓà8 àà à(4)€that€the€killing€was€premeditated.€€This€means€that€the€intentÏto€kill€must€have€been€formed€previous€to€the€act€itself.€€Such€intent€toÏdesign€to€kill€may€be€conceived€and€deliberately€formed€in€an€instant.€€ItÏis€not€necessary€that€the€purpose€of€œkill[ing›]€pre„exist€in€the€mind€of€theÏaccused€for€any€definite€period€of€time.€€It€is€sufficient€that€it€precededÏthe€act,€however,€short€the€interval.€ÌÌÓÓThe€appellant€contends€that€the€rule€in€òòState€v.€Brownóó€should€apply€retroactively€to€Ìthe€jury€instruction€given€at€his€trial€in€1982.€€Ìà àIn€òòBrownóó,€the€Tennessee€Supreme€Court€held€that€courts€should€abandon€theÏuse€of€jury€instructions€which€dictate€that€ð ðpremeditation€can€be€formed€in€an€instant.ððÏòòSeeóó€òòidóó.€at€543.€€The€Court€reasoned€that€such€an€instruction€on€premeditation€mightÏcause€juror€confusion€since€the€jury€must€also€be€instructed€on€deliberation.€€As€theÏCourt€acknowledged,€the€element€of€deliberation€cannot€be€formed€in€an€instant,€butÏrequires€some€interval€of€time.€€€€€€€Ìà àWe€agree€with€the€appellant€that€if€applied€retroactively,€the€rule€from€òòBrownóóÏwould€entitle€him€to€relief€on€his€first„degree€murder€instruction.€€However,€this€CourtÏhas€previously€held€that€òòBrownóó€did€not€create€a€new€constitutional€ground€for€relief€inÍpost„conviction€proceedings.× ƒN ××  ×€€To€the€contrary,€in€previous€cases,€this€Court€hasÏruled€that€ð ðthe€mere€fact€that€such€an€instruction€has€been€abandoned€as€confusingÏdoes€not€necessarily€mean€that€its€previous€use€equated€with€a€due€process€violationÏrendering€a€first€degree€murder€conviction€void.ðð× ƒO ××  ×€€The€rule€in€òòBrownóó€is€to€be€appliedÏprospectively,€not€retroactively.Ìà àWe,€therefore,€conclude€that€the€appellant€is€not€entitled€to€relief€based€uponÏhis€first„degree€murder€instruction.€Ìà@ àò òIV.ó ó€à à€Ìà àThe€appellant€next€contends€that€the€cumulative€effect€of€the€claims€in€hisÏsecond€post„conviction€petition,€when€viewed€collectively€with€the€claims€asserted€inÏhis€first€petition,€calls€for€a€new€trial.€€This€issue€is€without€merit.Ìà àIn€the€appellantððs€first€post„conviction€petition,€he€raised€thirty€two€grounds€forÏrelief.€€The€trial€court,€as€affirmed€by€our€supreme€court,€denied€relief€on€all€grounds.€ÏIn€his€second€petition,€the€appellant€raised€four€new€grounds€for€post„convictionÍrelief.€€The€trial€court€determined€that€the€issues€raised€in€that€petition€were€withoutÏmerit;€and€on€appeal,€we€are€affirming€the€judgment€of€the€trial€court.€€Therefore,€weÏfind€no€cumulative€effect€or€error€sufficient€to€warrant€a€new€trial.Ìà àBased€on€the€foregoing,€the€judgment€of€the€trial€court€is€affirmed.€€UnlessÏotherwise€stayed€by€a€court€of€competent€jurisdiction,€the€appellantððs€sentences€ofÏdeath€shall€be€carried€out€on€March€5,€1998.€ÌÌà àÌÓÓÓšÓà àà àà àà àà àà àà à____________________________€Ìà àà àà àà àà àà àà àWILLIAM€M.€BARKER,€JUDGEÌÌÌÌÌÌÌCONCUR:ÌÌÌ___________________________ÌJOHN€H.€œPEAY›,€JUDGEÌÌÌ___________________________ÌÓÓJERRY€L.€SMITH,€JUDGEà àÌÌ