ÿWPCŸ 2# ÌUN× %% 0(+w@S4“§¶ 0l¾ 0D* AQn 0J¿ 0T  0^] 0h» 0r# 0|• 0† 0— 1u' 0dœ B Æ 0Dã 0@' 0Dg D/« BÚ D3÷ U>* U*h B)’ DC» AMþ K v~NvÓ̘HP LaserJet 4HPPCL5MS,ü,,,,,ü0nLàÏ(uHš Z ‹6Times New Roman RegularX($¡¡ ¥D¦§¨©Eª«D¬U­ e®Ó€¸LË$Vf>ff\3|x¹((3üÝ$¤¤Ý ƒ!ÝÝ  Ýà  àòòÚ  Ú0Ú  Úóó(#Ã$òòÚ  Ú0Ú  Úóó!"#$&Cþÿ<< Cÿÿ2 ÿÿ0Indent1Ô2ÔÔ3  Ô2" ÿÿ0Indent2à0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2, ÿÿ0Indent3à0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô26 ÿÿ0Indent4à0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2@ ÿÿ0Indent5à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2J ÿÿ0Indent6à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2T ÿÿ0Indent7à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2^ ÿÿ0Indent8à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô ÿÿ?AGMSYaioIndent0I.A.1.a.(1)(a)i)a)P ÿÿ8Mac DefaultMac DefaultÓ ` °šXÓ dƒLevel 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5(3¯$¢¢Ý ƒ!ÝÝ  Ý("ÿÿ$££Ò  ÒÒ  Ò($$””ò òÚ  Ú1Ú  Úó ó(('÷ÿ dxdüÿP Pd 'ÿÿdxd< Œ 9p`(&Times New Roman< Œ 9p`(Arial% Line 7 d,,,,7Border 1dd!#-Cþÿ << Gÿÿ ùÝ ƒ!ÝÔ€*ÔÝ  ÝÝ ƒ""ÝÝ  ÝÔ€+ÔÔ€+ÔÓ  ÓÔ YYY ÔFILEDÔ€+XÔÌÌò òJune€25,€1998ÌÌCecil€Crowson,€Jr.ÌÔ€+ôÔAppellate€Court€Clerkó óPtPtHHØ(ÿáÿâùFG(üHHØ(d'`Styl{WP}01•ÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃà Ãà Ãà Ãà Ãà ÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÐ ÐÐHHÐÐ  ÐÐ2ÐÐÿÿ¸æ$ÿÐÐHHÐÐÐÐÐÐÐÐ  ÐÐ ÐÐ ÐÑÑÑGenevaÑÑ ÑÑ € ÑÑ<Px–ÈÑÒÒÒ443!#4ÒÒ$ *$ÒÒ$*$ÒÒ ÿKK ÒÒ  Geneva ÒÒ  Geneva ÒÓ.,ÓÓÓÓ6ÓÓ ÓßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßÑGenevaÑÑ ÑÒ  ellan Geneva ÒÒ  ellan Geneva ÒÝ ƒ!ÝÔ . ÔÔ€*ÔÝ  ÝÒ ¼ ÒÒ ° ÒÙ€!ÙÓ  ÓÑ\R AØ'\ÑÔ€+Ô›œßR€./-A1-j|` Å `€€@ÿRß›Þ ÞÌIN€THE€COURT€OF€CRIMINAL€APPEALS€OF€TENNESSEEÌÌAT€KNOXVILLEÌÌMARCH€1998€SESSIONÌÌÌÌÓ  ÓSTATE€OF€TENNESSEE,à àà àà à)à àC.C.A.€03C01„9704„CC„00150Ìà àà àà àà àà àà à)€à àANDERSON€COUNTYÌà àà àà àà àà àà à)Ìà àà àAppellant,à àà àà à)à àHon.€James€B.€Scott,€JudgeÌà àà àà àà àà àà à)Ìvs.à àà àà àà àà àà à)à à(Auto€Burglary€&€Theft)Ìà àà àà àà àà àà à)à àNo.€95CR0053ÌGORDON€SCOTT€KATZ,à àà àà à)Ìà àà àà àà àà àà à)Ìà àà àAppellee.à àà àà à)ÌÌÌÌòòFOR€THE€APPELLANTóó:à àà àà àà àòòFOR€THE€APPELLEEóó:ÌÌÌJOHN€KNOX€WALKUPà àà àà àà àJ.€THOMAS€MARSHALL,€JR.ÌAttorney€General€&€Reporterà àà àà àDistrict€Public€DefenderÌÌMICHAEL€J.€FAHEY,€IIà àà àà àà àNANCY€MEYERÌAssistant€Attorney€Generalà àà àà àAssistant€Public€DefenderÌCordell€Hull€Building€„€2nd€Floorà àà àà à101€South€Main€Street€Ì425€Fifth€Avenue€Northà àà àà àà àSuite€450ÌNashville,€TN€37243à àà àà àà àClinton,€TN€37716ÌÌJAMES€N.€RAMSEYÌDistrict€Attorney€GeneralÌÌJAN€HICKSÌAssistant€District€AttorneyÌ127€Anderson€County€CourthouseÌClinton,€TN€37716Ìà àà àà àà àà àà àà àÌà àà àà àà àà àà àà àÌOPINION€FILED:_______________ÌÌÌREVERSEDÌÌÌÌCORNELIA€A.€CLARKÌSpecial€JudgeÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÓ  ÓòòOPINIONóóÌÌÓ  ÓÓÓà àThe€State€of€Tennessee€appeals€from€the€action€of€the€trial€courtÏgranting€defendantððs€motion€for€judgment€of€acquittal€after€a€jury€convicted€theÏdefendant€of€auto€burglary€and€theft€of€property€under€$500.00.€€The€judgmentÏof€the€trial€court€is€reversed.Ìà àThe€defendant,€Gordon€Scott€Katz,€and€the€victim,€Alicia€Miller,€datedÏoff€and€on€for€several€years€prior€to€September€1994.€€During€the€course€ofÏthat€stormy€relationship€defendant€€presented€the€victim€with€several€gifts€ofÏjewelry.€€A€pattern€developed€between€the€two€that€when€they€would€argue,Ïthe€defendant€would€request€and€the€victim€would€return€the€items€of€jewelry.€ÏWhen€the€parties€reconciled,€defendant€would€return€the€items€to€the€victim.€ÏOn€one€prior€occasion€the€defendant€executed€a€receipt€to€the€victimÏconfirming€her€ownership€of€the€items€in€question.€Ìà àOn€September€2,€1994,€the€victim€parked€her€car€at€the€Oak€Ridge€MallÏand€reported€to€work€as€usual€at€the€County€Seat€apparel€store.€€She€lockedÏthe€car.€€Inside€the€car€was€a€box€containing€gold€bracelets€and€earrings.€ÍLater€that€day€defendant€came€into€the€store€where€the€victim€worked€andÏbegan€an€argument.€€He€ultimately€was€required€to€leave€the€store.€€BecauseÏof€that€altercation,€when€the€victim€got€off€work€she€asked€a€security€guard€toÏaccompany€her€to€her€car.€€She€discovered€the€defendant€curled€up€in€theÏback€of€her€car.€€When€he€climbed€out,€he€had€some€gold€jewelry€in€his€hand.€ÏDefendant€had€used€a€coat€hanger€to€gain€entry€to€the€car.€€However,€theÏvictim€asked€the€security€guard€not€to€take€any€action,€and€the€defendant€wasÏpermitted€to€leave€the€area.€€He€took€some€jewelry€with€him.Ìà àLater€that€night€the€defendant€appeared€at€the€victimððs€grandparentsððÏhome,€where€she€resided.€€The€police€were€summoned€at€that€time€and€theÏdefendant€was€arrested€and€charged€with€auto€burglary€and€theft.Ìà àOn€December€1,€1995,€parties€and€counsel€submitted€a€pleaÏagreement€to€the€court.€€Under€this€agreement€the€defendant€would€haveÏplead€guilty€to€ÌÓ  Ó2ÌÓ  Ócriminal€trespass.€€The€theft€charge€would€have€been€dismissed.€€An€agreedÏsentence€recommendation€also€was€made.€€Because€this€agreement€wasÏÑ X Ñpresented€past€the€trial€courtððs€plea€deadline,€the€judge€declined€to€accept€it.ÏThe€State€then€attempted€to€enter€a€òònolleóó€òòprosequióó,€but€the€trial€judgeÏapparently€declined€to€accept€that€action€as€well.Ìà àA€jury€trial€was€conducted€December€5,€1995.€€At€the€close€of€theÏStateððs€proof€defendant€moved€for€a€judgment€of€acquittal.€€The€trial€courtÏdenied€the€motion€subject€to€renewal€at€the€close€of€the€defense€proof.€€TheÏdefendant€elected€not€to€put€on€proof.€€He€rested€and€renewed€his€motion.€ÏThe€court€took€the€motion€under€advisement€until€after€the€jury€returned€aÍverdict.€€The€jury€found€the€defendant€guilty€of€both€auto€burglary€and€theftÏunder€a€value€of€$500.00.€€Defendant€then€renewed€his€motion€for€judgmentÏof€acquittal.€€Ìà àThe€court€conducted€a€hearing€on€this€motion€on€July€19,€1996.€€OnÏOctober€11,€1996,€the€court€announced€its€ruling€granting€the€motion€forÏjudgment€of€acquittal.€€The€State€appeals€this€decision€as€of€right.Ìà àA€motion€for€judgment€of€acquittal€raises€a€question€of€law€for€the€trialÏcourtððs€determination.€€òòState€v.€Hallóó,€656€S.W.€2d€60,€61€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.),Ïperm.€app.€denied€(Tenn.€1983).€€In€resolving€this€question,€the€trial€courtððsÏonly€concern€is€the€legal€sufficiency€of€the€evidence.€€òòIdóó.€€The€trial€court€is€notÏpermitted€to€weigh€the€evidence€in€reaching€its€determination.€€òòIdóó;€òòseeóó€òòalsoóóÏòòState€v.€Adamsóó,€916€S.W.€2d€471,€473€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.€1995).€€InÏdetermining€whether€the€evidence€is€sufficient€to€sustain€a€conviction€post„trial,€the€trial€court€must€consider€the€evidence€in€the€light€most€favorable€toÏthe€State€of€Tennessee.€€òòState€v.€Thompsonóó,€549€S.W.€2d€943,€946€(Tenn.Ï1977);€òòState€v.€Stoweóó,€634€S.W.€2d€674,€675€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.€1982).€€TheÏtrial€court€must€afford€the€State€all€reasonable€and€legitimate€inferences€thatÏmay€be€drawn€from€the€evidence€adduced€in€favor€of€the€Stateððs€theory.€ÏòòThompsonóó,€549€S.W.€2d€at€946;€òòStoweóó,€634€S.W.€2d€at€675.€ÌÓ  Ó3ÌÓ  ÓÌà àAn€appellate€court€must€apply€the€same€standard€when€resolvingÏissues€predicated€upon€the€grant€of€a€motion€for€judgment€of€acquittal.€€òòStateÏv.€Adamsóó,€916€S.W.€2d€471,€473€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.€1995).€€If€there€is€anyÏdispute€as€to€material€determinative€evidence€or€any€doubt€as€to€theÍconclusion€to€be€drawn€from€the€evidence€of€the€State,€the€motion€forÏjudgment€of€acquittal€should€be€overruled.€€òòState€v.€Hallóó,€656€S.W.€2d€60,€61Ï(Tenn.€Crim.€App.€1983).Ìà àThe€indictment€in€this€case€charged€the€defendant€with€theft€as€follows:ÌÓ  ÓòòCOUNT€2óóÌÓ  ÓÓÓà àGordon€Scott€Katz€heretofore,€to€wit,€on€or€about€the€2nd€day€ofÏSeptember,€1994€before€the€finding€of€this€indictment,€in€the€CountyÏaforesaid,€did€then€and€there€unlawfully€and€knowingly€obtain€property,€to€wit:Ïtwo€bracelets€and€three€pairs€of€earrings,€valued€at€less€than€$500.00,€ofÏAlicia€Miller,€without€her€effective€consent,€with€intent€to€deprive€the€said€AliciaÏMiller€thereof,€in€violation€of€TCA€39„14„103.ÌÓÓÌBefore€an€accused€can€€be€convicted€of€theft€under€a€value€of€$500.00€theÏState€of€Tennessee€must€prove€beyond€a€reasonable€doubt€that€(1)€heÏknowingly€obtained€property€owned€by€the€victim,€(2)€he€did€not€have€theÏownerððs€effective€consent,€(3)€he€€intended€to€deprive€the€owner€of€theÏproperty,€and€(4)€the€value€of€the€property€did€not€exceed€$500.00.€€ReviewingÏthe€evidence€in€the€light€most€favorable€to€the€State,€it€is€clear€that€theÏdefendant€knowingly€entered€the€victimððs€automobile€and€took€propertyÏbelonging€to€her€without€her€prior€knowledge€or€effective€consent.€€Certain€ofÏthe€jewelry€items€were€never€recovered,€so€the€victim€has€permanently€beenÏdeprived€of€them.€€While€some€dispute€exists€about€the€total€value€of€theÏvarious€pieces€of€jewelry,€the€state€is€not€contending€that€defendant€should€beÏconvicted€of€any€higher€grade€of€theft.ÌÓÓà àThe€indictment€in€this€case€charged€the€defendant€with€auto€burglaryÏas€follows:Ó  ÓòòCOUNT€1óóÌÓ  Óà àGordon€Scott€Katz€heretofore,€to€wit,€on€or€about€the€2nd€day€of€ÌSeptember,€1994€before€the€finding€of€this€indictment,€in€the€CountyÏaforesaid,Ìdid€then€and€there€unlawfully€enter€the€automobile€of€Alicia€Miller,€without€herÌeffective€consent,€with€intent€to€commit€a€felony€to€wit:€theft,€all€in€violation€ofÌTCA€39„14„402.ÌÌÓÓÌÓ  Ó4ÌÓ  ÓBefore€this€defendant€can€be€convicted€of€auto€burglary,€the€State€ofÏTennessee€must€prove€beyond€a€reasonable€doubt€that€(1)€he€entered€an€Ìautomobile,€(2)€withðð€the€intent€to€commit€a€felony,€to€wit:€theft,ðð€(3)€without€theÏeffective€consent€of€the€owner,€and€(4)€that€he€acted€either€intentionally,Ì€knowingly,€or€recklessly.€€à àThe€primary€issues€as€to€this€count€turn€on€whetherÏ(1)€the€victim€was€the€ð ðownerðð€of€the€vehicle,€(2)€the€defendant€had€the€victimððsÏeffective€consent€when€he€entered€her€car€and€took€her€property,€and/or€(3)Ïhe€intended€to€commit€a€felony€theft.Ìà àDefendant€contends€that€a€conviction€for€auto€burglary€cannot€beÏsustained€because€the€vehicle€in€question€belonged€not€to€the€victim,€AliciaÏMiller,€but€to€her€mother.€€The€victim€testified€that€although€her€mother€was€theÏtitle€owner€of€the€vehicle€in€question,€she€ð ðused€it€all€the€timeðð€with€herÏmotherððs€permission.€€She€actually€testified€ð ðItððs€my€vehicle.ðð€Her€motherÏagreed€that€her€daughter€used€the€car€ð ðpretty€much€all€the€time.ðð€Tenn.€CodeÏAnn.€ðð39„14„401€(3)€defines€ð ðownerðð€to€mean€a€ð ðperson€in€lawful€possessionÏof€property,€whether€the€possession€is€actual€or€constructive.ðð€€In€this€caseÏAlicia€Miller€clearly€falls€within€that€definition€of€ð ðownerðð.€€This€issue€is€withoutÏmerit.Ìà àDefendant€next€contends€that€the€proof€is€insufficient€that€he€committedÏthe€burglary€with€ð ðintent€to€commit€a€felony,€to€wit:€theftðð.€€He€ultimately€wasÏcharged€only€with€the€misdemeanor€offense€of€theft€under€$500.00€and€theÏevidence€admitted€at€trial€supported€a€valuation€below€$500.00.€€CriminalÏintent€is€a€matter€to€be€determined€by€the€jury€after€a€consideration€of€all€theÍfacts€and€circumstances.€€òòState€v.€Hollandóó,€860€S.W.€2d€53,€59€(Tenn.€Crim.ÏApp.€1993).€€The€jury€ultimately€found€that€defendant€committed€a€theft€afterÏentering€the€automobile.€€The€only€distinction€between€felony€theft€andÏmisdemeanor€theft€is€the€value€of€the€property€taken.€€Here€the€jury€apparentlyÏconcluded€that€the€defendant€did€enter€the€car€for€the€purpose€of€committing€a€Ïtheft€of€property€valued€over€$500.00.€€There€were€items€and€pieces€of€jewelry€ÌÓ  Ó5ÌÓ  ÓÌÌÑ X Ñavailable€there€in€addition€to€the€ones€that€were€taken.€€The€fact€that€the€actualÏamount€of€property€with€which€the€defendant€left€may€have€been€valued€at€Ìless€than€$500.00€does€not€affect€the€juryððs€right€to€make€this€determination.€€ÏEven€if€other€reasonable€inferences€could€be€drawn€from€the€surroundingÏfacts€and€circumstances,€this€would€not€be€a€proper€inquiry€for€this€court.€€TheÏadoption€or€exclusion€of€potential€inferences€based€on€the€circumstantialÏevidence€is€a€question€within€the€juryððs€prerogative.€òòState€v.€Bolingóó,€840€S.W.Ï2d€944,€947€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.€1992).€€This€issue€is€without€merit.Ìà àDefendant€also€contends€that€he€had€the€effective€consent€of€the€victimÏto€enter€her€car€and€take€her€jewelry.€€Effective€consent€is€ð ðassent€in€fact,Ïwhether€express€or€apparent€.€.€.€ð ð€€This€case€represents€one€of€those€all„too„familiar€fact€scenarios€where€romantic€entanglements€overcome€judgment.€ÏThe€evidence€in€this€case€turns€mostly€on€the€testimony€of€the€alleged€victim,ÏAlicia€Miller,€and€the€original€investigating€police€officer,€Dan€Freytag.€€CertainÌfacts€are€undisputed.€€The€defendant€and€victim€had€an€encounter€at€theÏvictimððs€place€of€employment€several€hours€before€the€alleged€burglary€tookÏplace.€€A€disagreement€of€some€kind€ensued,€and€the€defendant€wasÏrequested€to€leave€the€premises.€€Thereafter,€without€the€òòprioróó€knowledge€orÍconsent€of€the€victim,€he€used€a€coat€hanger€to€gain€access€to€her€vehicle,Ïsecreted€himself€in€the€vehicle,€and€took€into€his€possession€certain€items€ofÏher€jewelry€that€were€in€the€vehicle.€€The€victim€was€concerned€enough€aboutÏthe€prior€incident€that€she€asked€a€security€guard€to€accompany€her€to€her€carÏwhen€she€finished€work€several€hours€later.€€When€the€victim€and€guardÏdiscovered€the€defendant€in€her€car,€the€victim€was€concerned€about€hisÏpresence€and€the€smell€of€alcohol€that€surrounded€him,€but€she€did€not€wishÏto€press€charges.€€At€that€time,€however,€she€had€not€become€aware€of€theÏuse€of€the€coat€hanger€or€that€he€had€taken€the€jewelry€items€with€him€whenÏhe€left€the€car.€€Several€hours€later€the€defendant€appeared€at€the€victimððsÏgrandparentsðð€home€and€another€altercation€ensued.€€While€the€victimÏtestified€that€even€at€this€point€she€did€not€seek€the€assistance€of€the€police,Ïnor€want€the€defendant€prosecuted,€Officer€Freytag€testified€unequivocally€thatÏthe€victim€did€want€the€victim€arrested.€€He€also€testified€that€she€called€him€ÌÓ  Ó6ÌÓ  Ónumerous€times€after€that€to€inquire€about€the€status€of€the€case,€and€that€sheÏindicated€each€time€her€desire€that€he€be€prosecuted.€€The€victim€testified€thatÏshe€did€not€recall€ever€asking€that€the€defendant€be€prosecuted.€€SheÏacknowledged€that€she€had€€dated€the€defendant€again€since€the€originalÏevents€in€question.€€As€of€the€day€of€trial,€she€stated€that€she€did€not€wish€himÏto€be€convicted€of€any€offense.€€Ìà àThe€jury€had€the€right€to€accept€Officer€Freytagððs€testimony€that€it€wasÏthe€victim€herself€who€initially€requested€that€defendant€be€arrested,€and€thatÏshe€persisted€in€that€desire€for€some€period€of€time.€€He€said€she€called€himÏeight€or€ten€times€to€check€on€the€case,€even€asking€to€have€the€defendantÏarrested€again.€The€proof€of€her€lack€of€consent€is€sufficient€to€support€theÏjuryððs€conviction€of€both€offenses€in€this€case.€€Ìà àDefendant€also€contends€that€the€absence€of€a€transcript€of€the€hearingÏon€the€motion€for€judgment€of€acquittal€requires€this€court€to€presume€that€theÌ€ruling€of€the€trial€court€was€correct.€€It€is€the€duty€of€the€appellant€to€prepare€aÏrecord€which€ð ðconveys€a€fair,€accurate,€and€complete€account€of€whatÏtranspired€in€the€trial€court€with€the€respect€the€issues€which€form€the€basis€ofÏhis€appeal.ðð€€Tenn.€R.€App.€P.€24(b);€òòState€v.€Ballardóó,€855€S.W.€2d€557,€560Ï(Tenn.€1993)(citation€omitted).€€An€appellate€court€is€precluded€fromÏconsidering€the€merits€of€an€issue€where€relevant€material€is€absent€from€theÏrecord.€òòIdóó.€€However,€nothing€that€transpired€in€oral€argument€at€the€hearingÏon€July€19€is€determinative€of€the€issues€concerning€sufficiency€of€theÏevidence€presented€at€trial.€€Therefore,€this€defect€is€not€fatal€to€the€stateððsÏcase.€€Ìà àThe€judgment€of€the€trial€court€is€reversed.€€This€case€is€remanded€forÏfurther€proceedings€in€accordance€with€this€opinion.€€ò òÓÓà àà àà àà à€€€€€à àà àà àà àà àà à€€€Ïà àà àà àà àà àà àà àà àà àà àà àà àà àà àà àà àà àà àà àà àà àà àà àà àà àà àà àà àà àà àà àà à__________________________Ìó óà àà àà àà àà àCORNELIA€A.€CLARKÌà àà àà àà àà àSPECIAL€JUDGEÌCONCUR:ÌÌ____________________________ÌJOHN€H.€PEAYÌJUDGEÌÌ____________________________ÌPAUL€G.€SUMMERSÌJUDGEò òÌÓ  Óó ó7ò òÌIN€THE€COURT€OF€CRIMINAL€APPEALS€OF€TENNESSEEÌÌAT€KNOXVILLEÌÌMARCH€1998€SESSIONÌÌÌÌÌÓ  Óó óSTATE€OF€TENNESSEE,à àà àà à)à àC.C.A.€03C01„9704„CC„00150Ìà àà àà àà àà àà à)€à àANDERSON€COUNTYÌà àà àà àà àà àà à)Ìà àà àAppellant,à àà àà à)à àHon.€James€B.€Scott,€JudgeÌà àà àà àà àà àà à)Ìvs.à àà àà àà àà àà à)à à(Auto€Burglary€&€Theft)Ìà àà àà àà àà àà à)à àNo.€95CR0053ÌGORDON€SCOTT€KATZ,à àà àà à)Ìà àà àà àà àà àà à)Ìà àà àAppellee.à àà àà à)Ìò òÌó óÔ€*ÔÌÌÌÓ  Óò òòòÔ€+ÔJUDGMENTÌÓ  ÓÌÌó óà àóóCame€the€appellant,€the€State€of€Tennessee€and€also€came€theÏattorney€on€behalf€of€Gordon€Scott€Katz,€and€this€case€was€heard€on€theÏrecord€on€appeal€from€the€Criminal€Court€of€Anderson€County;€and€uponÏconsideration€thereof,€this€court€is€of€the€opinion€that€there€is€reversible€errorÏin€the€judgment€of€the€trial€court.ÌÌà àOur€opinion€is€hereby€incorporated€in€this€judgment€as€if€set€outÏverbatim.ÌÌà àIt€is,€therefore,€ordered€and€adjudged€by€this€court€that€the€judgment€ofÏthe€trial€court€is€REVERSED,€and€the€case€is€remanded€to€the€Criminal€CourtÏof€Anderson€County€for€further€proceedings€in€accordance€with€this€opinion.ÌÌà àCosts€of€this€appeal€will€be€paid€by€the€State€of€Tennessee.ÌÌà àà àà àà àà àà àò òPER€CURIAMó óÌÌà àà àà àà àà àà àJohn€H.€Peay,€JudgeÌà àà àà àà àà àà àPaul€G.€Summers,€JudgeÌà àà àà àà àà àà àCornelia€A.€Clark,€Special€Judge€€€€òòÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌóó