ÿWPC  œçÑ·KéG(q­4ßB ùÅ0QSϔУo[¾F4ýO9cñ ŸcbÂe§[¬NǼí:ÅýÑcu L‘c)t,Šþ‰Î‡_Ké /\|!árÒ"`ëüYnuBµÚ4øëóCDµµ s˜4ËÃnêp^X‚áeH/â§§T 2T;0Ôßüµm… ºb"¦UdËÆî`š û&öéïø0¦„O”¶âµú…\q1‡Ð–ã˜fiN©‡©Oí‡8[Hq+ÊsžVÍâŠˆè¥ø\6G`¢”lC×a˜¦©¥• B ‚Ñ2öîá¯kO_íØP'$J ¥¤¹e?&Hˆ]vSèÁÙHÚ@‚Àòb-ÚL—ÒÄûujÍO@x`›ò@Q·ˆ˜b¤(ò`t”PðQeØpº:¥ø†ð'~|rR°aRX`ÛÇfc2’·(넺obü<ÞäåI¼Žy9O<Ù…çl#‡x4C¸Âùx¼ËÆ·Ÿdz—Ùµô ’Ó§cfªõ½|;ïÂP¾ýÓžyD³lRju[ºVÚ`¢*ׂ¶L 0çüòõ#“žÖˆzkаmdËùm ^½&?ÒýXŽƒ>áÁÜòü°«T.*T„>‚yÕØßɇj8b#Á\ % U N# 0ˆq UHNù ^ G wS zW ÒÑ 4£ · Æ mÈ Æß Æ¥ Æk Æ11N÷ ùùEÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿb 0ë     Bôô 0¤ D3µ D-è 0K AS`Ƴ 0¤y 0D A«a˜HP LaserJet 4000 Series PCL 6ÈÈÈÈÈÈÈÈ0»(ÖÃ9 Z‹6Times New Roman Regular(`£ª$¡¡Ñ€.ÑÑ8€½­»»d»»d8ÑÑ ý ÑÓ  Ó(í€"  Z6Times New Roman Regular«²M)  ˜C:\PROGRA~1\COREL\WORDPE~1\TEMPLATE\CUSTOM~1\REVISE~1.WPTC:\Program Files\Corel\WordPerfect Office 2000\Template\Custom WP Templates\revised standard opinion.wptÖJ~'¢Ø+003|x ÿU‹ÿÀÀÀLevel 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5‚Level 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5„Level 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5…Level 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5H- ù-(|G2’/$¤¤Ý ƒ£ª!ÝÑ€.ÑÑ8€T»»dd8ÑÑ ý ÑÓ  ÓÝ  Ýà  àòòÚ  Ú0Ú  ÚóóÔ€ô%Ôò»»Ô d(|3w$££Ý ƒ£ª!ÝÑ€.ÑÑ8€T»»dd8ÑÑ ý ÑÓ  ÓÝ  ÝVVVV'ÿÿdxd)!ÈÈÈÈdxdx( ±þ$’’ò òFigure€Ú  Ú1Ú  Úó ó^_X`YEþÿ<<CÿÿƒLevel 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5(|3w$¢¢Ý ƒ£ª!ÝÑ€.ÑÑ8€T»»dd8ÑÑ ý ÑÓ  ÓÝ  Ý($$””ò òÚ  Ú1Ú  Úó óX[Z&OLE 2.0 Box <=8ÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿCÿÿ HKKKKÝ ƒ£ª!ÝÑ€.ÑÑ8€T»»ddÈ8ÑÑ ý ÑÓ  ÓÝ  ÝÔ_ÔÑ  ÑÑ  ÑÔ€¼T»»»ÔÑ8€)¼XXdæ»»d8Ñà@ttìàÔ‡îaCTÔIN€THE€COURT€OF€CRIMINAL€APPEALS€OF€TENNESSEEˆÐ ° Ðà@kk$ìàAT€NASHVILLEÔ#†¼T»îîaC #ԈРР ÐÓ  Óà @ àà @` àApril€2000€SessionÐ ð@ ÐÔ‡X)¼X»¼TÔÌò òÔ#†¼T»XX)¼#ÔSTATE€OF€TENNESSEEòòóó€v.€DONALD€Ô_ÔMARBLEYÔ_ÔòòóóÔ‡X)¼X»¼TÔó óÐ ä4 ÐÌà@@½½ìàò òDirect€Consolidated€Appeal€from€the€Circuit€Courts€for€Ð Ø ( ÐLincoln€County€and€Marshall€CountyÐ ¾  Ðà@@øøìàLincoln€County€Case€No.€S9800077;€Marshall€County€Case€No.€13600à0 @ à€€€€€Ð ¤ ô ÐCharles€Lee,€€JudgeÐ Š Ú  ÐÌÌà@@ìì*ìàßA€V) °°` d€÷E<;` AßÐ <Œ  ÐÌà@@TTìàNo.€M1999„01212„CCA„R3„CD€„€Filed€October€4,€Ô_Ô2000Ô_ÔÐ 1  ÐÌßA€V) °°` dE<ü` AßÐ ýM Ðó óÌÓ  ÓIn€November€1997,€the€Defendant,€Donald€Ô_ÔMarbleyÔ_Ô,€was€arrested€for€aggravated€robbery€in€LincolnÐ òB ÐCounty.€€Approximately€two€weeks€after€being€released€on€bond,€the€Defendant€was€arrested€inÐ Ø( ÐMarshall€County€for€attempted€aggravated€robbery€and€aggravated€assault.€€The€Defendant€wasÐ ¾ Ðfound€guilty€by€a€Lincoln€County€jury€of€aggravated€robbery€and€sentenced€to€seventeen€years€asÐ ¤ô Ða€Range€II€multiple€offender.€€The€Defendant€pleaded€guilty€to€the€Marshall€County€attemptedÐ ŠÚ Ðaggravated€robbery€charge€and€was€sentenced€to€eight€years€as€a€Range€II€multiple€offender.€€TheÐ pÀ Ðtwo€sentences€were€to€be€served€consecutively,€for€a€total€sentence€of€twenty„five€years€as€a€RangeÐ V¦ ÐII€multiple€offender.€€In€this€consolidated€appeal,€the€Defendant€raises€the€following€issues:€(1)Ð <Œ Ðwhether€the€evidence€was€sufficient€to€support€the€Defendant's€conviction€for€aggravated€robberyÐ "r Ðin€Lincoln€County;€(2)€whether€the€Lincoln€County€trial€court€erred€in€admitting€the€Defendant'sÐ X Ðprior€criminal€convictions€into€evidence;€(3)€whether€the€trial€court€properly€sentenced€the€DefendantÐ î> Ðin€both€the€Lincoln€and€Marshall€County€cases;€and€(4)€whether€the€Defendant€received€effectiveÐ Ô$ Ðassistance€of€counsel€in€the€Lincoln€County€case.Ô#†¼T»XX)¼¦#ÔÔ‡X)¼X»¼TÔ€€Finding€no€error€in€the€record,€we€affirm€theÐ º  Ðjudgments€of€the€trial€court.Ð  ð ÐÓRÓÌò òTenn.€R.€App.€P.€3€Appeal€as€of€Right;€Judgment€of€the€Circuit€Court€is€Affirmed.ó óÐ l!¼! ÐÌòòÓ  ÓRobert€W.€WedemeyerÔ#†¼T»àX)¼I #ÔÔ‡X)¼X.¼TÔ,€J.óó,€delivered€the€opinion€of€the€court,€in€which€òòJerry€L.€Smith,€óó€òòJÔ#†¼T»àX)¼¡ #ÔÔ‡X)¼X.¼TÔ.,óó€and€Ð 8#ˆ# ÐòòJohn€Everett€Williamsóó,€òòóóJ.,€joined.Ð $n$ ÐÌÔ_ÔHershellÔ_Ô€D.€Ô_ÔKogerÔ_Ô,€Ô_ÔPulaskiÔ_Ô,€Tennessee€for€the€appellant,€Donald€Ô_ÔMarbleyÔ_Ô.Ð ê%:!& ÐÌPaul€G.€Summers,€Attorney€General€and€Reporter,€Marvin€S.€Blair,€Jr.,€Assistant€Attorney€General,Ð ¶'#( ÐW.€Michael€Ô_ÔMcCownÔ_Ô,€District€Attorney€General,€Ann€L.€Filer,€Assistant€District€Attorney€General,Ð œ(ì#) Ðand€Ô_ÔWeakleyÔ_Ô€E.€Barnard,€Assistant€District€Attorney€General€for€the€appellee,€State€of€Tennessee.Ð ‚)Ò$* ÐÓ_ ÓÌÓÓà@@OO&ìàò òOPINIONó óÔ#†¼T»XX)¼4 #ÔÔ‡X)¼X»¼TÔÐ N+ž&, ÐòòóóÔ#†¼T»XX)¼š#ÔÔ‡X)¼X»¼TÔÓ  ÓÓÓà@'' ìàò òI.€Factual€Backgroundó óˆÐ -j(.ý Їà@00ìàòòòòA.€Lincoln€County€CaseóóóóˆÐ ° ÐÌà  àViewing€the€evidence€in€the€light€most€favorable€to€the€State,€the€Defendant,€DonaldÐ |Ì ÐÔ_ÔMarbleyÔ_Ô,€entered€Parsley's€Market€#3€in€Lincoln€County€around€9:00€p.m.€on€November€19,€1997Ð b² Ðto€buy€some€deli€items.€€When€Shannon€Simmons€Richardson,€the€clerk€on€duty€that€night,€told€theÐ H˜ ÐDefendant€that€the€deli€was€closed,€the€Defendant€went€outside€to€put€gas€in€his€car.€€After€fillingÐ . ~ Ðhis€car€with€gas,€the€Defendant€came€back€into€the€market€and€approached€the€counter€whereÐ  d ÐRichardson€was€standing.€€The€Defendant€opened€his€tri„fold€wallet€and€appeared€to€be€searchingÐ ú J Ðfor€money.€€Richardson€realized€that€the€Defendant€did€not€have€any€money,€so€she€told€theÐ à 0 ÐDefendant€that€he€could€pay€for€the€gas€next€time€he€was€in€town.€€Richardson€asked€for€theÐ Æ   ÐDefendant's€driver's€license€so€she€could€get€some€information€in€case€the€Defendant€needed€to€beÐ ¬ ü  Ðreminded€of€his€obligation€to€pay.€€€€Richardson€checked€to€make€sure€that€the€picture€on€the€licenseÐ ’â  Ðwas€the€person€at€the€counter€and€then€wrote€down€the€Defendant's€name,€address,€driver's€licenseÐ xÈ  Ðnumber,€and€phone€number.Ô#†¼T»XX)¼÷#ÔÔ‡X)¼X»¼TÔÐ ^®  ÐÔ% € ÔÔ#†¼T»XX)¼#ÔÔ‡X)¼X»¼TÔÌà  àThe€Defendant€then€said€that€he€might€have€enough€change€to€buy€a€bag€of€chips.€Ð *z  ÐRichardson€took€the€Defendant's€money€for€the€chips€and€put€it€in€the€cash€register.€€However,€beforeÐ ` ÐRichardson€was€able€to€shut€the€register€drawer,€the€Defendant€pulled€a€knife€from€his€pocket€andÐ öF Ðlunged€over€the€counter€at€Richardson.€€The€Defendant€grabbed€some€money€from€the€open€registerÐ Ü, Ðdrawer€while€Richardson€attempted€to€activate€the€silent€alarm.€€Richardson€then€fled€to€a€beer€coolerÐ Â Ðon€the€other€side€of€the€market€to€hide.Ð ¨ø ÐÌà  àSoon€thereafter,€Johnny€Church,€a€local€businessman,€walked€into€the€market€and€realizedÐ tÄ Ðthat€something€was€amiss.€€Church€testified€that€the€cash€register€was€on€its€side€and€that€there€wasÐ Zª Ðgum€and€candy€strewn€all€over€the€floor.€€Church€found€Richardson€hiding€in€the€beer€cooler.€Ð @ ÐChurch€testified€that€Richardson€was€very€upset.€€Richardson€and€Church€then€called€the€police€toÐ &v Ðreport€the€robbery.€€Corporal€George€Ô_ÔJettÔ_Ô€of€the€Fayetteville€Police€Department€responded€to€the€call.€Ð  \ ÐAt€the€time€he€got€the€dispatch,€Ô_ÔJettÔ_Ô€had€just€arrived€at€the€far€end€of€the€parking€lot€of€Parsley'sÐ òB ÐMarket€to€do€a€routine€check€of€the€local€businesses.Ð Ø( ÐÌà  àRichardson€gave€the€police€a€description€of€the€robber,€as€well€as€a€description€of€the€robber'sÐ ¤ô Ðcar,€knife,€and€wallet.€€Richardson€also€gave€the€police€the€sheet€of€paper€with€the€Defendant's€name,Ð Š Ú Ðaddress,€and€phone€number€on€it.€€That€portion€of€the€sheet€of€paper€that€contained€the€DefendantððsÐ p!À  Ðdriverððs€license€number€had€been€torn€off.€€€€Ð V"¦! ÐÌà  àAccording€to€the€Defendant's€wife,€in€the€weeks€prior€to€the€robbery,€she€and€the€DefendantÐ "$r# Ðhad€been€attending€an€eight„week€adoption€class€in€Fayetteville.€€Every€Thursday€the€Defendant,€hisÐ %X $ Ðwife,€and€Diane€Fields€would€stop€at€Parsley's€Market€on€their€way€home€to€Columbia€from€theÐ î%>!% Ðadoption€class.€€They€would€usually€arrive€at€the€market€around€9:00€p.m.€€Approximately€a€weekÐ Ô&$"& Ðbefore€the€last€adoption€class,€and€also€approximately€a€week€before€the€robbery,€the€Defendant€andÐ º' #' Ðhis€wife€began€having€some€"problems,"€so€the€Defendant€left€home€alone€driving€the€couple's€goldÐ  (ð#( ÐSaturn€automobile.€€Ms.€Ô_ÔMarbleyÔ_Ô€claims€to€have€seen€the€Saturn€at€approximately€3:30€a.m.€on€theÐ †)Ö$) Ðmorning€of€November€19,€1997€in€Columbia.€€She€testified€that€two€young€men€were€in€the€car,€butÐ l*¼%* Ðshe€did€not€see€the€Defendant.€€Ms.€Ô_ÔMarbleyÔ_Ô€reported€the€car€stolen€approximately€thirty€minutesÐ R+¢&+ Ðbefore€the€Parsley€Market€robbery.€€Ô#†¼T»XX)¼ƒ#ÔÔ‡X)¼X»¼TÔÐ 8,ˆ', Їà  àThe€Defendant€testified€that€he€had€a€ð ðfew€hundred€dollarsðð€with€him€when€he€left€home,Ð ° Ðwhich€he€ended€up€spending€on€crack€cocaine€in€Columbia,€Tennessee.€€The€Defendant€testified€thatÐ –æ Ðhe€was€on€a€crack€cocaine€"binge"€during€the€week€before€the€robbery€and€would€frequently€loan€theÐ |Ì Ðgold€Saturn€out€to€people€in€exchange€for€drugs.€€He€also€testified€that€he€was€in€Columbia,Ð b² ÐTennessee€at€the€time€of€the€Parsley€Market€robbery.Ð H˜ ÐÌà  àIn€response€to€Ms.€Ô_ÔMarbleyÔ_Ô's€stolen€car€report,€Detective€Roy€Ô_ÔSellarsÔ_Ô€of€the€Columbia€PoliceÐ  d ÐDepartment€seized€the€Ô_ÔMarbleysÔ_Ôðð€gold€Saturn€on€November€20,€1997,€the€day€after€the€robbery.€€AtÐ ú J Ðthe€time€it€was€seized,€the€car€was€in€the€possession€of€two€young€men€who€claimed€that€theÐ à 0 Ð"registered€owner"€had€loaned€them€the€car€in€exchange€for€money.€€The€two€men€informed€policeÐ Æ   Ðwhere€they€could€find€the€Defendant.Ð ¬ ü  ÐÌà  àThe€police€found€the€Defendant€at€a€known€"crack€house"€in€Columbia.€€After€taking€a€boxÐ xÈ  Ðcutter€and€a€knife€from€the€Defendant€for€officer€safety,€the€police€escorted€the€Defendant€to€theÐ ^®  ÐColumbia€Police€Department€to€identify€the€gold€Saturn€and€to€corroborate€the€stories€of€the€menÐ D”  Ðwho€had€been€driving€the€car.€€At€the€police€station,€the€Defendant€surrendered€his€wallet€and€driver'sÐ *z  Ðlicense.€€The€Defendant€was€then€questioned€in€connection€with€the€Parsley€Market€robbery.€€In€aÐ ` Ðlater€interview€with€Detective€Mike€Ô_ÔHopsonÔ_Ô€of€the€Fayetteville€Police€Department,€the€DefendantÐ öF Ðadmitted€that€the€wallet,€driverððs€license€and€knife€taken€from€him€by€the€Columbia€PoliceÐ Ü, ÐDepartment€were€his€and€had€never€been€out€of€his€possession.€€The€Defendant€was€arrested€forÐ Â Ðrobbery€on€November€27,€1997€and€released€on€bond€two€days€later.€€A€Lincoln€County€jury€foundÐ ¨ø Ðthe€Defendant€guilty€of€aggravated€robbery.Ð ŽÞ Ðò òó óÌòòÓ  ÓòòB.€Marshall€County€CaseóóóóÐ Zª ÐÓP-ÓòòóóÌà  àApproximately€two€weeks€after€the€Parsley€Market€robbery,€the€Defendant€attempted€to€robÐ &v ÐSandra€Ô_ÔLombardoÔ_Ô€in€a€Wal„Mart€parking€lot.€€At€the€time€of€the€offense,€the€Defendant€was€on€bondÐ  \ Ðfor€the€Parsley€Market€robbery.€€Ô_ÔLombardoÔ_Ô€and€two€other€witnesses€were€able€to€identify€theÐ òB ÐDefendant€from€a€police€photo€lineup.€€Ð Ø( ÐÌà  àThe€Defendant€was€indicted€in€Marshall€County€for€attempted€aggravated€robbery€againstÐ ¤ô ÐÔ_ÔLombardoÔ_Ô,€as€well€as€aggravated€assault€against€two€other€women.€€The€Defendant€entered€into€aÐ Š Ú Ðplea€agreement€whereby€he€pleaded€guilty€to€attempted€aggravated€robbery€against€Ô_ÔLombardoÔ_Ô,€andÐ p!À  Ðthe€two€aggravated€assault€charges€were€dropped.ò òó óÐ V"¦! ÐÌÔ#†¼T»XX)¼ø##ÔÔ‡X)¼X»¼TÔà@’’ìàòòòòC.€Consolidated€SentencingóóóóˆÐ "$r# ÐÔ#†¼T»XX)¼1#ÔÔ‡X)¼X»¼TÔÌÔ#†¼T»XX)¼ 2#ÔÔ‡X)¼X»¼TÔà  àThe€Defendant€was€sentenced€for€his€Lincoln€County€conviction€and€his€Marshall€CountyÐ î%>!% Ðconviction€at€the€same€sentencing€hearing.€€The€Defendant€was€sentenced€as€a€Range€II€multipleÐ Ô&$"& Ðoffender€to€eight€years€for€the€attempted€aggravated€robbery€conviction€in€Marshall€County,€and€heÐ º' #' Ðwas€sentenced€as€a€Range€II€multiple€offender€to€seventeen€years€for€the€aggravated€robberyÐ  (ð#( Ðconviction€in€Lincoln€County.€€The€sentences€were€to€be€served€consecutively.Ô#†¼T»XX)¼c2#ÔÔ‡X)¼X»¼TÔÐ †)Ö$) ÐÔ#†¼T»XX)¼Â4#ÔÔ‡X)¼X»¼TÔÌÔ#†¼T»XX)¼5#ÔÔ‡X)¼X»¼TÔà  àThe€Defendant€now€appeals€his€convictions,€raising€the€following€issues:€(1)€that€theÐ R+¢&+ Ðevidence€was€insufficient€to€support€the€Defendant's€conviction€for€aggravated€robbery€in€LincolnÐ 8,ˆ', ÐCounty,€(2)€that€the€Lincoln€County€trial€court€erred€in€admitting€the€Defendant's€prior€criminalÐ ° Ðconvictions€into€evidence,€(3)€that€the€trial€court€improperly€sentenced€the€Defendant€in€both€theÐ –æ ÐLincoln€and€Marshall€County€cases,€and€(4)€that€the€Defendant€received€ineffective€assistance€ofÐ |Ì Ðcounsel€in€the€Lincoln€County€case.€€Ô#†¼T»XX)¼\5#ÔÔ‡X)¼X»¼TÔÐ b² ÐÌà@$ìàò òII.€Analysisó óˆÐ . ~ Ðà@ìì*ìàˆÌà@00ìàòòòòA.€Lincoln€County€CaseóóóóˆÐ ú J ÐÌò òÓ  Óòòó óóóòò1.€Sufficiency€of€the€EvidenceóóÐ Æ   ÐÓâ8ÓÌà  àThe€Defendant€argues€that€the€evidence€presented€in€the€Lincoln€County€case€was€insufficientÐ ’â  Ðto€support€his€conviction€for€aggravated€robbery.€€Specifically,€the€Defendant€argues€that€he€was€"set€Ð xÈ  Ðup"€by€the€clerk€on€duty€at€Parsley's€Market€when€it€was€robbed.€€In€this€case,€there€was€ampleÐ ^®  Ðevidence€for€a€rational€jury€to€determine€beyond€a€reasonable€doubt€that€the€Defendant€was€guiltyÐ D”  Ðof€aggravated€robbery.€€Ð *z  ÐÌà  àTennessee€Code€Annotated€ðð€39„13„401€defines€robbery€as€"the€intentional€or€knowing€theftÐ öF Ðof€property€from€the€person€of€another€by€violence€or€putting€the€person€in€fear."€€Tenn.€Code€Ann.Ð Ü, Ððð€39„13„401(a).€€Aggravated€robbery€is€"robbery€as€defined€in€ðð€39„13„401€.€.€.€[Ô_Ôa]ccomplishedÔ_Ô€withÐ Â Ða€deadly€weapon€or€by€display€of€any€article€used€or€fashioned€to€lead€the€victim€to€reasonablyÐ ¨ø Ðbelieve€it€to€be€a€deadly€weapon€.€.€.€."€€òòId.óó€ðð€39„13„402(a)(1).Ð ŽÞ ÐÌÔ‡X)¼XXX)¼Ôà  àWhen€an€accused€challenges€the€sufficiency€of€the€evidence,€an€appellate€courtððs€standardÐ Zª Ðof€review€is€whether,€after€considering€the€evidence€in€the€light€most€favorable€to€the€prosecution,Ð @ Ðany€rational€trier€of€fact€could€have€found€the€essential€elements€of€the€crime€beyond€a€reasonableÐ &v Ðdoubt.€€òòJackson€v.€Virginiaóó,€443€U.S.€307,€324€(1979);€òòState€v.€Duncanóó,€698€S.W.2d€63,€67€(Tenn.Ð  \ Ð1985);€Tenn.€R.€App.€P.€13(e).€€This€rule€applies€to€findings€of€guilt€based€upon€direct€evidence,Ð òB Ðcircumstantial€evidence,€or€a€combination€of€both€direct€and€circumstantial€evidence.€€òòState€v.Ð Ø( ÐDykesóó,€803€S.W.2d€250,€253€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.€1990).Ð ¾ ÐÌà  àIn€determining€the€sufficiency€of€the€evidence,€this€Court€should€not€re„weigh€or€re„evaluateÐ Š Ú Ðthe€evidence.€€òòState€v.€Matthewsóó,€805€S.W.2d€776,€779€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.€1990).€€Nor€may€thisÐ p!À  ÐCourt€substitute€its€inferences€for€those€drawn€by€the€trier€of€fact€from€the€evidence.€€òòÔ_ÔLiakasÔ_Ô€v.€Stateóó,Ð V"¦! Ð286€S.W.2d€856,€859€(Tenn.€1956);€òòState€v.€Ô_ÔBuggsÔ_Ôóó,€995€S.W.2d€102,€105€(Tenn.€1999).€€QuestionsÐ <#Œ" Ðconcerning€the€credibility€of€the€witnesses,€the€weight€and€value€of€the€evidence,€as€well€as€allÐ "$r# Ðfactual€issues€raised€by€the€evidence€are€resolved€by€the€trier€of€fact.€€òòÔ_ÔLiakasÔ_Ôóó,€286€S.W.2d€at€859.òòóó€Ð %X $ ÐòòóóOn€the€contrary,€this€Court€must€afford€the€State€of€Tennessee€the€strongest€legitimate€view€of€theÐ î%>!% Ðevidence€contained€in€the€record,€as€well€as€all€reasonable€inferences€which€may€be€drawn€from€theÐ Ô&$"& Ðevidence.€€òòState€v.€Evansóó,€838€S.W.2d€185,€191€(Tenn.€1992).€€Because€a€verdict€of€guilt€against€aÐ º' #' Ðdefendant€removes€the€presumption€of€innocence€and€raises€a€presumption€of€guilt,€the€convictedÐ  (ð#( Ðcriminal€defendant€bears€the€burden€of€showing€that€the€evidence€was€legally€insufficient€to€sustainÐ †)Ö$) Ða€guilty€verdict.€€òòId.óó€Ô#†X)¼XXX)¼¹=#ÔÐ l*¼%* Ðâ âÐ R+¢&+ Ðà  àThe€evidence€presented€at€trial€was€certainly€sufficient€for€a€reasonable€jury€to€find€theÐ ° Ðâ âDefendant€guilty€of€aggravated€robbery€beyond€a€reasonable€doubt.€€In€addition€to€her€two€in„courtÐ –æ Ðidentifications,€the€clerk€on€duty€at€the€time€of€the€robbery€not€only€identified€the€Defendant€fromÐ |Ì Ða€police€photo€lineup,€but€she€also€was€able€to€identify€the€Defendant's€wallet,€driver's€license,€andÐ b² Ðknife.€€The€clerk€had€written€down€the€Defendant's€name,€address,€and€phone€number€on€a€piece€ofÐ H˜ Ðpaper€before€the€robbery.Ô#†¼T»XX)¼8#ÔÔ‡X)¼X»¼TÔ€€The€clerk€testified€that€the€Defendant€came€at€her€with€the€knife€duringÐ . ~ Ðthe€robbery€and€that€she€thought€that€she€would€be€hurt€or€killed.€€Additionally,€the€DefendantÐ  d Ðadmitted€that€the€items€that€the€clerk€identified€from€the€robbery€had€never€been€out€of€hisÐ ú J Ðpossession.€€Finally,€the€Defendant's€gold€Saturn€automobile€fit€the€description€that€the€clerk€hadÐ à 0 Ðgiven€the€police€on€the€night€of€the€robbery.€Ð Æ   ÐÌò òÓ  Óòòó óóóòò2.€Admission€of€Prior€Criminal€Convictions€for€ImpeachmentóóÐ ’â  ÐÓåKÓà  àà ` àÌà  àThe€Defendant€argues€that€the€Lincoln€County€trial€court€erred€in€allowing€two€of€theÐ ^®  ÐDefendant's€prior€criminal€convictions€into€evidence€to€impeach€his€credibility.€€The€State€hadÐ D”  Ðinitially€proposed€that€five€prior€criminal€convictions€be€admitted€into€evidence€to€impeach€theÐ *z  ÐDefendantððs€credibility.€€After€considering€each€conviction€and€balancing€the€probative€value€againstÐ ` Ðthe€prejudicial€impact€of€each€prior€conviction,€the€trial€court€allowed€the€State€to€introduce€theÐ öF ÐDefendantððs€September€25,€1990€conviction€for€conspiracy€to€distribute€cocaine€and€the€DefendantððsÐ Ü, ÐJanuary€30,€1985€conviction€for€receiving€stolen€property.€Ð  ÐÌà  àThe€following€requirements€must€be€met€before€the€credibility€of€a€witness€may€beÐ ŽÞ Ðimpeached€with€evidence€of€prior€convictions:€€(1)€The€witness€must€be€asked€about€the€convictionÐ tÄ Ðon€cross„examination;€(2)€the€crime€must€be€punishable€by€death€or€imprisonment€in€excess€of€oneÐ Zª Ðyear,€or€the€crime€must€have€involved€dishonesty€or€false€statement;€and€(3)€if€the€witness€to€beÐ @ Ðimpeached€is€the€accused€in€a€criminal€prosecution,€the€State€must€give€the€accused€reasonableÐ &v Ðnotice€of€the€impeaching€conviction€before€trial,€and€the€court€upon€request€must€determine€that€theÐ  \ Ðconviction's€probative€value€on€credibility€outweighs€its€unfair€prejudicial€effect€on€the€substantiveÐ òB Ðissues.€€Tenn.€R.€Evid.€609(a)(1)„(3).€€In€addition,€when€the€current€prosecution€is€commenced€moreÐ Ø( Ðthan€ten€years€after€the€date€of€release€of€the€prior€conviction€sought€to€be€used€to€impeach€theÐ ¾ Ðwitness,€the€prior€conviction€may€not€be€used€to€impeach€the€witness€unless€the€accused€is€givenÐ ¤ô Ðsufficient€notice€of€the€prosecution's€intent€to€use€such€evidence€and€the€court€determines€that€theÐ Š Ú Ðprobative€value€of€the€evidence€substantially€outweighs€any€prejudicial€effect.€€Tenn.€R.€Evid.Ð p!À  Ð609(b).€€Ð V"¦! ÐÌà  àIn€determining€whether€the€probative€value€of€a€prior€conviction€on€the€issue€of€credibilityÐ "$r# Ðoutweighs€its€unfair€prejudicial€effect€on€the€substantive€issues,€a€trial€court€should€assess€theÐ %X $ Ðsimilarity€between€the€pending€prosecution€and€the€underlying€impeaching€conviction,€as€well€asÐ î%>!% Ðthe€relevance€of€the€impeaching€conviction€with€respect€to€credibility.€€òòState€v.€Farmeróó,€841€S.W.2dÐ Ô&$"& Ð837,€839€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.€1992).€€The€trial€court€must€state€its€reasons€for€finding€that€theÐ º' #' Ðprobative€value€of€the€prior€conviction€on€the€issue€of€credibility€outweighs€any€prejudicial€effectÐ  (ð#( Ðon€the€substantive€evidence.€€òòLong€v.€Stateóó,€607€S.W.2d€482,€485€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.€1980).€€The€trialÐ †)Ö$) Ðcourtððs€decision€to€allow€the€prior€convictions€under€Rule€609€will€not€be€reversed€on€appeal€unlessÐ l*¼%* Ðthe€trial€court€abused€its€discretion.€€òòState€v.€Ô_ÔBlantonÔ_Ôóó,€926€S.W.2d€953,€960€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.€1996).Ð R+¢&+ ÐÔ#†¼T»XX)¼ÃI#ÔÔ‡X)¼X»¼TÔà  àà ` àÐ 8,ˆ', Ðà  àThe€Defendant€argues€that€the€trial€court€erred€in€admitting€into€evidence€the€Defendant'sÐ ° ÐSeptember€25,€1990€conviction€for€conspiracy€to€distribute€cocaine€because€its€probative€value€wasÐ –æ Ðnot€properly€weighed€against€the€prejudicial€effect€on€the€substantive€evidence.€€The€trial€courtÐ |Ì Ðweighed€the€probative€value€of€the€prior€conviction€against€the€prejudicial€effect€of€the€substantiveÐ b² Ðevidence€and€concluded€that€the€probative€value€outweighed€any€prejudicial€effect.€€In€addition,€theÐ H˜ Ðnature€of€this€prior€conviction€was€dissimilar€enough€from€the€offense€for€which€the€Defendant€wasÐ . ~ Ðbeing€tried€that€the€likelihood€of€prejudice€was€diminished.€€On€this€issue,€we€find€no€abuse€ofÐ  d Ðdiscretion€by€the€trial€court.Ð ú J ÐÌà  àThe€Defendant€next€argues€that€the€trial€court€erred€in€admitting€into€evidence€theÐ Æ   ÐDefendant's€January€30,€1985€conviction€for€receiving€stolen€property.€€Specifically,€the€DefendantÐ ¬ ü  Ðargues€that€the€conviction€falls€outside€the€ten„year€rule,€which€states€that€evidence€of€a€priorÐ ’â  Ðconviction€is€inadmissible€if€a€period€of€more€than€ten€years€has€elapsed€between€the€date€of€releaseÐ xÈ  Ðfrom€confinement€and€commencement€of€the€current€prosecution.€€However,€this€rule€permits€Ð ^®  Ðintroduction€into€evidence€of€a€conviction€that€would€normally€fall€outside€the€ten„year€time€periodÐ D”  Ðif€the€probative€value€of€the€conviction,€supported€by€specific€facts€and€circumstances,€substantiallyÐ *z  Ðoutweighs€its€prejudicial€effect.€€Tenn.€R.€Evid.€609(b).€€The€probative€value€of€a€conviction€thatÐ ` Ðfalls€outside€the€ten„year€rule€may€substantially€outweigh€any€prejudicial€effect€where€a€defendantððsÐ öF Ðcriminal€record€shows€a€continuing€course€of€conduct€that€is€probative€of€credibility.€€òòSeeóó€òòState€v.Ð Ü, ÐÔ_ÔCaruthersóóÔ_Ô,€676€S.W.2d€935,€941€(Tenn.€1984).€€The€Defendantððs€1985€conviction,€as€the€trial€courtÐ Â Ðnoted,€is€demonstrative€of€a€continuing€course€of€criminal€activity€by€the€Defendant.€€As€for€anyÐ ¨ø Ðprejudice€to€the€Defendant,€the€prior€conviction€is€dissimilar€enough€from€the€current€offense€thatÐ ŽÞ Ðits€prejudicial€effect€is€minimal€as€compared€to€its€probative€value.€€Thus,€the€prior€conviction€wasÐ tÄ Ðadmissible€to€impeach€the€Defendant's€credibility.€€Again,€we€find€no€abuse€of€discretion€by€the€trialÐ Zª Ðcourt.Ð @ ÐÌÔ#†¼T»XX)¼ÕY#ÔÔ‡X)¼X»¼TÔà@bbìàòò3.€Ineffective€Assistance€of€CounselóóˆÐ  \ ÐÌà  àThe€Defendant€argues€that€he€received€ineffective€assistance€of€counsel€during€his€LincolnÐ Ø( ÐCounty€trial.€€Specifically,€the€Defendant€argues€that€his€counsel€during€the€Lincoln€County€trialÐ ¾ Ðfailed€in€the€following€regards:€(1)€Counsel€did€not€adequately€investigate€or€prepare€the€case€forÐ ¤ô Ðtrial,€(2)€counsel€did€not€adequately€review€the€case€with€the€Defendant€so€as€to€effectively€prepareÐ Š Ú Ðthe€case€for€trial,€(3)€counsel€failed€to€present€the€alibi€defense€of€which€the€Defendant€made€counselÐ p!À  Ðaware,€(4)€counsel€failed€to€effectively€cross„examine€the€State's€witnesses€regarding€inconsistenciesÐ V"¦! Ðin€the€proof,€and€(5)€counsel€did€not€file,€argue€or€pursue€a€motion€to€suppress€certain€evidenceÐ <#Œ" Ðpresented€at€trial.Ð "$r# ÐÔ‡X)¼XXX)¼ÔÌà  àThe€right€of€a€criminally€accused€to€representation€is€guaranteed€by€both€the€SixthÐ î%>!% ÐAmendment€to€the€United€States€Constitution€and€Article€I,€Section€9€of€the€Tennessee€Constitution.€Ð Ô&$"& ÐòòState€v.€Burnsóó,€6€S.W.3d€453,€461€(Tenn.€1999);€òòBaxter€v.€Roseóó€523€S.W.2d€930,€936€(Tenn.€1975).€Ð º' #' ÐThis€right€to€representation€includes€the€right€to€ð ðreasonably€effectiveðð€assistance.€€òòBurnsóó,€6€S.W.3dÐ  (ð#( Ðat€461.€€The€Tennessee€Supreme€Court€has€held€that€the€issue€of€ineffective€assistance€of€counsel€isÐ †)Ö$) Ða€mixed€question€of€law€and€fact,€and,€as€such,€is€subject€to€òòdeóó€òònovoóó€review.€€òòId.óóÐ l*¼%* Ðâ âÐ R+¢&+ Ðà  àIn€reviewing€a€claim€of€ineffective€assistance€of€counsel,€this€Court€must€determine€whetherÐ ° Ðâ âthe€advice€given€or€services€rendered€by€the€attorney€are€within€the€range€of€competence€demandedÐ –æ Ðof€attorneys€in€criminal€cases.€€òòBaxter€v.€Roseóó,€523€S.W.2d€930,€936€(Tenn.€1975).€€To€prevail€onÐ |Ì Ða€claim€of€ineffective€assistance€of€counsel,€a€petitioner€must€show€that€ð ðcounselððs€representationÐ b² Ðfell€below€an€objective€standard€of€reasonableness,ðð€òòÔ_ÔStricklandÔ_Ô€v.€Washingtonóó,€466€U.S.€668,€688Ð H˜ Ð(1984),€and€that€this€performance€prejudiced€the€defense,€resulting€in€a€failure€to€produce€a€reliableÐ . ~ Ðresult.€€òòId.óó€at€687òòóó;€òòCooper€v.€Stateóó,€849€S.W.2d€744,€747€(Tenn.€1993).€€To€satisfy€the€requirementÐ  d Ðof€prejudice,€a€petitioner€must€show€a€reasonable€probability€that,€but€for€counselððs€unreasonableÐ ú J Ðerror,€the€fact€finder€would€have€had€reasonable€doubt€regarding€the€petitionerððs€guilt.€€òòÔ_ÔStricklandÔ_Ôóó,Ð à 0 Ð466€U.S.€at€695.€€This€reasonable€probability€must€be€ð ðsufficient€to€undermine€confidence€in€theÐ Æ   Ðoutcome.ðð€€òòId.óó€at€694;€òòseeóó€òòalsoóó€òòHarris€v.€Stateóó,€875€S.W.2d€662,€665€(Tenn.€1994).Ð ¬ ü  ÐÌà  àWhen€evaluating€an€ineffective€assistance€of€counsel€claim,€the€reviewing€court€should€judgeÐ xÈ  Ðthe€attorneyððs€performance€within€the€context€of€the€case€as€a€whole,€taking€into€account€all€relevantÐ ^®  Ðcircumstances.€€òòÔ_ÔStricklandÔ_Ôóó,€466€U.S.€at€690òòóó;€òòState€v.€Mitchellóó,€753€S.W.2d€148,€149€(Tenn.€Crim.Ð D”  ÐApp.€1988).€€The€reviewing€court€must€evaluate€the€questionable€conduct€from€the€attorneyððsÐ *z  Ðperspective€at€the€time.€€òòÔ_ÔStricklandÔ_Ôóó,€466€U.S.€at€690;€òòCooperóó,€849€S.W.2d€at€746;€òòÔ_ÔHellardÔ_Ô€v.€Stateóó,Ð ` Ð629€S.W.2d€4,€9€(Tenn.€1982).€€€In€doing€so,€the€reviewing€court€must€be€highly€deferential€andÐ öF Ðð ðshould€indulge€a€strong€presumption€that€counselððs€conduct€falls€within€the€wide€range€ofÐ Ü, Ðreasonable€professional€assistance.ðð€€òòBurnsóó,€6€S.W.3d€at€462.€€Counsel€should€not€be€deemed€to€haveÐ Â Ðbeen€ineffective€merely€because€a€different€procedure€or€strategy€might€have€produced€a€differentÐ ¨ø Ðresult.€€òòWilliams€v.€Stateóó,€599€S.W.2d€276,€280€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.€1980).à  àÐ ŽÞ ÐÔ#†X)¼XXX)¼ûh#ÔÌà  àThe€Defendant€argues€that€counsel€in€the€Lincoln€County€case€did€not€adequately€investigateÐ Zª Ðor€prepare€the€case€for€trial.€€Specifically,€the€Defendant€contends€that€counsel€did€not€"significantly"Ð @ Ðdiscuss€the€trial€strategy€with€him€until€October€9,€1997,€six€days€prior€to€trial.€€However,€theÐ &v ÐDefendant€testified€that€he€met€with€counsel€on€at€least€one€prior€occasion€to€discuss€a€potential€alibiÐ  \ Ðdefense.€€Moreover,€an€investigator€working€with€counsel€at€the€Public€Defender's€office€testifiedÐ òB Ðthat€he€interviewed€the€Defendant€on€several€occasions€and€that€the€resulting€information€was€givenÐ Ø( Ðto€counsel.€€The€Defendant€has€failed€to€show€that€counsel's€trial€preparation€was€inadequate.€€EvenÐ ¾ Ðassuming€that€counsel's€preparation€was€lacking,€the€Defendant€has€also€failed€to€show€any€prejudiceÐ ¤ô Ðto€his€case.€€Ð Š Ú ÐÌà  àThe€Defendant€argues€that€counsel€in€the€Lincoln€County€case€failed€to€present€an€alibiÐ V"¦! Ðdefense€as€the€Defendant€requested.€€However,€the€evidence€presented€at€the€hearing€on€the€motionÐ <#Œ" Ðfor€new€trial€showed€that€counsel€and€his€investigator€looked€into€the€possibility€of€an€alibi€defense,Ð "$r# Ðbut€were€unable€to€locate€the€"crack€house"€where€the€Defendant€had€been€staying.€€This€was€dueÐ %X $ Ðin€part€to€the€Defendant's€own€inability€to€provide€counsel€with€the€location€of€the€house€or€theÐ î%>!% Ðnames€of€potential€witnesses.€€In€fact,€the€Defendant's€new€attorney€stated€at€the€hearing€on€theÐ Ô&$"& Ðmotion€for€new€trial€that€he€also€had€a€great€deal€of€difficulty€in€finding€witnesses€to€substantiate€theÐ º' #' ÐDefendant's€alibi.€€The€only€witness€that€the€Defendant's€new€counsel€was€able€to€locate€for€theÐ  (ð#( Ðmotion€for€new€trial,€Burma€Ô_ÔStovallÔ_Ô€Collins,€a.k.a.€"Scooter,ðð€was€unable€to€verify€the€Defendant'sÐ †)Ö$) Ðwhereabouts€on€the€night€of€the€robbery€and€merely€testified€that€the€Defendant€had€stayed€at€herÐ l*¼%* Ðhouse€for€awhile€while€the€Defendant€and€his€wife€were€having€problems.€€We€find€that€counselÐ R+¢&+ Ðprovided€effective€assistance€regarding€the€Defendant's€potential€alibi€defense.€€Moreover,€theÐ 8,ˆ', ÐDefendant€has€failed€to€show€how€any€potential€witnesses,€such€as€Collins,€would€have€changed€theÐ ° Ðoutcome€of€his€case.Ð –æ ÐÌà  àThe€Defendant€argues€that€counsel€failed€to€effectively€cross„examine€the€State's€witnessesÐ b² Ðregarding€inconsistencies€in€the€proof.€€òòóóAbsent€a€showing€that€the€trial€attorney€was€uninformedÐ H˜ Ðbecause€of€inadequate€preparation,€cross„examination€of€witnesses€is€a€strategic€and€tactical€decisionÐ . ~ Ðwhich€is€not€to€be€measured€by€hindsight.€€òòState€v.€Ô_ÔKerleyÔ_Ôóó,€820€S.W.2d€753,€756€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.Ð  d Ð1991);€òòÔ_ÔHellardÔ_Ô€v.€Stateóó,€629€S.W.2d€4,€9€(Tenn.€1982).€€Aside€from€the€Defendant's€own€testimony,Ð ú J Ðno€evidence€was€presented€that€counsel€was€not€adequately€prepared€for€trial.€€Further,€there€was€noÐ à 0 Ðproof€that€the€Defendant€was€prejudiced€by€the€alleged€inadequate€cross„examination€of€witnesses.€Ð Æ   ÐÌà  àThe€Defendant€argues€that€counsel€in€the€Lincoln€County€case€provided€ineffective€assistanceÐ ’â  Ðby€failing€to€file€a€motion€to€suppress€certain€evidence€presented€at€trial,€including€the€Defendant'sÐ xÈ  Ðdriver's€license,€a€wallet€and€a€knife.€€It€is€the€Defendant's€contention€that€these€items€were€obtainedÐ ^®  Ðas€the€result€of€an€illegal€search€and€seizure€and€thus€should€have€been€excluded€as€evidence.€€TheÐ D”  ÐState€concedes€that€the€Defendant€was€seized€within€the€meaning€of€the€Fourth€Amendment;Ð *z  Ðhowever,€the€State€argues€that€it€was€a€probable€cause€arrest€and€that€the€evidence€was€admissible.€Ð ` ÐBecause€we€find€that€the€evidence€obtained€from€the€Defendant€was€the€result€of€a€lawful€arrest,Ð öF Ðcounsel's€failure€to€file€a€motion€to€suppress€does€not€amount€to€ineffective€assistance€of€counsel.€Ð Ü, ÐÌà  àThe€evidence€presented€at€trial€was€admissible€because€it€was€the€result€of€a€lawful€arrest€ofÐ ¨ø Ðthe€Defendant€by€the€Columbia€Police€Department.€€The€Defendant€was€taken€into€custody€onÐ ŽÞ ÐNovember€20,€1997€in€connection€with€the€discovery€of€the€Defendant's€reported€stolen€vehicle.€€OnÐ tÄ ÐNovember€19,€1997,€just€thirty€minutes€before€the€robbery€at€Parsley's€Market,€the€Defendant's€wifeÐ Zª Ðreported€the€couple's€gold€Saturn€missing.€€When€the€car€was€found,€it€was€in€the€possession€of€twoÐ @ Ðyoung€men€who€claimed€that€the€owner€had€loaned€them€the€car.€€€Although€the€two€men€did€notÐ &v Ðknow€the€name€of€the€man€that€had€loaned€them€the€vehicle,€they€were€able€to€give€police€theÐ  \ Ðlocation€where€the€man€could€be€found.€€€The€address€that€the€police€were€given€was€a€known€ð ðcrackÐ òB Ðhouseðð€in€Columbia.€€Unclear€as€to€the€identity€of€the€person€that€had€loaned€the€two€men€the€car,Ð Ø( Ðthe€police€were€still€proceeding€as€if€the€car€were€stolen.€€This€information€gave€the€Columbia€PoliceÐ ¾ ÐDepartment€probable€cause€to€arrest€the€Defendant.€€Officers€who€arrested€the€DefendantÐ ¤ô Ðimmediately€took€the€Defendant's€knife€for€safety€purposes.€€The€Defendant's€wallet€and€driver'sÐ Š Ú Ðlicense€were€taken€from€him€once€he€arrived€at€the€Columbia€Police€Department.€€Ð p!À  ÐÌà  àA€police€officer€may€make€a€Ô_ÔwarrantlessÔ_Ô€arrest€when€the€officer€has€reasonable€cause€toÐ <#Œ" Ðbelieve€that€the€person€being€arrested€committed€a€felony.€€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€40„7„103(3).€Ð "$r# ÐAlthough€probable€cause€must€be€more€than€mere€suspicion,€it€need€not€be€a€certainty.€€òòState€v.€Ô_ÔTaysÔ_Ôóó,Ð %X $ Ð836€S.W.2d€596,€598„99€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.€1992).€€òòóóProbable€cause€consists€of€information€thatÐ î%>!% Ðwould€lead€a€reasonable€man€to€believe€that€the€person€arrested€was€guilty€of€the€felony.€€òòId.óó€at€599.€Ð Ô&$"& ÐÌà  àThe€officer€in€this€case€had€reasonable€cause€to€believe€that€the€Defendant€had€stolen€aÐ  (ð#( Ðvehicle.€€Moreover,€the€car€that€was€recovered€had€potentially€been€involved€in€the€robbery€atÐ †)Ö$) ÐParsley's€Market€in€Lincoln€County.€€As€such,€police€were€justified€in€making€the€arrest.€€BecauseÐ l*¼%* Ðâ âthe€arrest€was€lawful,€the€evidence€that€was€taken€from€the€Defendant€was€lawfully€taken€andÐ R+¢&+ Ðproperly€admitted€at€trial.€€Defense€counsel€was€not€deficient€for€failing€to€move€to€suppressÐ ° Ðevidence€when€counsel€had€no€legal€or€factual€basis€for€pursuing€such€a€motion.Ð –æ Ðâ âÌà@ýýìàòòòòB.€Sentencing€Issues€Regarding€Lincoln€County€and€Marshall€County€CasesóóóóˆÐ b² ÐÔ#†¼T»XX)¼e#ÔÔ‡X)¼X»¼TÔÌ€à  àThe€Defendant€argues€that€the€trial€court€improperly€sentenced€the€Defendant€in€both€theÐ . ~ ÐLincoln€County€and€Marshall€County€cases.€€Specifically,€the€Defendant€argues€that€the€trial€courtÐ  d Ðimproperly€applied€and€weighed€certain€enhancement€factors€and€failed€to€apply€appropriateÐ ú J Ðmitigating€factors.€€We€disagree.Ð à 0 ÐÌÔ‡X)¼XXX)¼Ôà  àWhen€an€accused€challenges€the€length,€range,€or€manner€of€service€of€a€sentence,€theÐ ¬ ü  Ðreviewing€court€must€conduct€a€òòde€novoóó€review€of€the€sentence€with€a€presumption€that€theÐ ’â  Ðdeterminations€made€by€the€trial€court€are€correct.€€òòóóTenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€40„35„401(d).€€ThisÐ xÈ  Ðpresumption,€however,€ð ðis€conditioned€upon€the€affirmative€showing€in€the€record€that€the€trial€courtÐ ^®  Ðconsidered€the€sentencing€principles€and€all€relevant€facts€and€circumstances.ðð€€òòState€v.€Ashbyóó,€823Ð D”  ÐS.W.2d€166,€169€(Tenn.€1991).€€In€the€event€that€the€record€fails€to€show€such€consideration,€theÐ *z  Ðreview€of€the€sentence€is€purely€òòde€novoóó.€€òòState€v.€Sheltonóó,€854€S.W.2d€116,€123€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.Ð ` Ð1992).Ð öF ÐÌà  àIn€making€its€sentencing€determination,€the€trial€court,€at€the€conclusion€of€the€sentencingÐ Â Ðhearing,€determines€the€range€of€sentence€and€then€determines€the€specific€sentence€and€the€proprietyÐ ¨ø Ðof€sentencing€alternatives€by€considering€(1)€the€evidence,€if€any,€received€at€the€trial€and€theÐ ŽÞ Ðsentencing€hearing,€(2)€the€presentence€report,€(3)€the€principles€of€sentencing€and€arguments€as€toÐ tÄ Ðsentencing€alternatives,€(4)€the€nature€and€characteristics€of€the€criminal€conduct€involved,€(5)Ð Zª Ðevidence€and€information€offered€by€the€parties€on€the€enhancement€and€mitigating€factors,€(6)€anyÐ @ Ðstatement€the€defendant€wishes€to€make€in€the€defendant's€own€behalf€about€sentencing,€and€(7)€theÐ &v Ðpotential€for€rehabilitation€or€treatment.€òòóó€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðððð€40„35„210(a),€(b),€„103(5);€òòState€v.Ð  \ ÐWilliamsóó,€920€S.W.2d€247,€258€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.€1995).Ð òB ÐÌà  àThe€presumptive€sentence€to€be€imposed€by€the€trial€court€for€a€Class€B,€C,€D€or€E€felonyÔ#†X)¼XXX)¼p–#ÔÔ‡X)¼XXX)¼Ô€isÐ ¾ Ðthe€minimum€within€the€applicable€range€unless€there€are€enhancement€or€mitigating€factors€present.€Ð ¤ô ÐTenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€40„35„210(c).€€If€there€are€enhancement€or€mitigating€factors€for€a€Class€B,€C,Ð Š Ú ÐD€or€E€felony,€the€court€must€start€at€the€minimum€sentence€in€the€range,€enhance€the€sentence€asÐ p!À  Ðappropriate€for€the€enhancement€factors,€and€then€reduce€the€sentence€within€the€range€as€appropriateÐ V"¦! Ðfor€the€mitigating€factors.€òòId.óó€ðð€40„35„210(d),€(e).€€The€weight€to€be€given€each€factor€is€left€to€theÐ <#Œ" Ðdiscretion€of€the€trial€judge.€€òòState€v.€Sheltonóó,€854€S.W.2d€116,€123€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.€1992).€Ð "$r# ÐHowever,€the€sentence€must€be€adequately€supported€by€the€record€and€comply€with€the€purposesÐ %X $ Ðand€principles€of€the€1989€Sentencing€Reform€Act.€€òòState€v.€Mossóó,€727€S.W.2d€229,€237€(Tenn.Ð î%>!% Ð1986).Ð Ô&$"& ÐÌà  àWhen€imposing€a€sentence,€the€trial€court€must€make€specific€findings€of€fact€on€the€recordÐ  (ð#( Ðsupporting€the€sentence.€€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€40„35„209(c).€€The€record€should€also€include€anyÐ †)Ö$) Ðenhancement€or€mitigating€factors€applied€by€the€trial€court.€€òòId.óó€ðð€40„35„210(f).€€Thus,€if€the€trialÐ l*¼%* Ðcourt€wishes€to€enhance€a€sentence,€the€court€must€state€its€reasons€on€the€record.€€The€purpose€ofÐ R+¢&+ Ðrecording€the€courtððs€reasoning€is€to€guarantee€the€preparation€of€a€proper€record€for€appellateÐ 8,ˆ', Ðreview.€€òòState€v.€Ervinóó,€939€S.W.2d€581,€584€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.€1996).€€Ô#†X)¼XXX)¼­ž#ÔÔ‡X)¼XXX)¼ÔBecause€the€record€in€thisÐ ° Ðcase€indicates€that€the€trial€court€adequately€considered€the€enhancement€and€mitigating€factors€asÐ –æ Ðwell€as€the€underlying€facts,€our€review€is€òòdeóó€òònovoóó€with€a€presumption€of€correctness.Ô#†X)¼XXX)¼Ÿ¥#ÔÔ‡X)¼XXX)¼ÔÐ |Ì ÐÔ#†X)¼XXX)¼ê¦#ÔÔ‡X)¼XXX)¼ÔÌà  àIf€our€review€reflects€that€the€trial€court€followed€the€statutory€sentencing€procedure,€that€theÐ H˜ Ðcourt€imposed€a€lawful€sentence€after€having€given€due€consideration€and€proper€weight€to€theÐ . ~ Ðfactors€and€principles€set€out€under€the€sentencing€law,€and€that€the€trial€courtððs€findings€of€fact€areÐ  d Ðadequately€supported€by€the€record,€then€we€may€not€modify€the€sentence€"even€if€we€would€haveÐ ú J Ðpreferred€a€different€result."€€òòState€v.€Fletcheróó,€805€S.W.2d€785,€789€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.€1991).€€Ô#†X)¼XXX)¼A§#ÔÔ‡X)¼XXX)¼ÔTheÐ à 0 Ðdefendant€bears€the€burden€of€showing€the€impropriety€of€the€sentence€imposed.€€òòAshbyóó,€823€S.W.2dÐ Æ   Ðat€169.òòóóÐ ¬ ü  ÐÔ#†X)¼XXX)¼Ò©#ÔÔ#†¼T»XX)¼¹”#ÔÔ‡X)¼X»¼TÔòòóóÌà  àIn€sentencing€the€Defendant,€the€trial€court€applied€the€following€enhancement€factors€in€bothÐ xÈ  Ðthe€Lincoln€and€Marshall€County€cases:€Ð ^®  Ðà8  àà ` à(1)€The€defendant€has€a€previous€history€of€criminal€convictions€or€criminalÐ D”  Ðbehavior€in€addition€to€those€necessary€to€establish€the€appropriate€range;€Ð*z Ð Ð  Ðà8  à.€.€.Ð`Ð Ð  Ðà8  àà ` à(8)€the€defendant€has€a€previous€history€of€unwillingness€to€comply€with€theÐ öF Ðconditions€of€a€sentence€involving€release€in€the€community;€[and]ÐÜ,Ð Ð  Ðà8  à.€.€.ÐÂÐ Ð  Ðà8  àà ` à(11)€the€felony€resulted€in€death€or€bodily€injury€or€involved€the€threat€ofÐ ¨ø Ðdeath€or€bodily€injury€to€another€person,€and€the€defendant€has€previously€beenÐ ŽÞ Ðconvicted€of€a€felony€that€resulted€in€death€or€bodily€injury€.€.€.€.ÐtÄÐ Ð  ÐTenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€40„35„114(1),€(8),€(11).Ð Zª ÐÌà  àThe€following€additional€enhancement€factors€were€also€applied€in€the€Marshall€County€case:€Ð &v Ð(9)€"The€defendant€possessed€or€employed€a€firearm,€explosive€device€or€other€deadly€weaponÐ  \ Ðduring€the€commission€of€the€offense";€(13)€the€felony€was€committed€while€on€bail,€if€the€defendantÐ òB Ðis€ultimately€convicted€of€such€prior€felony;€and€(16)€"[t]he€crime€was€committed€underÐ Ø( Ðcircumstances€under€which€the€potential€for€bodily€injury€to€a€victim€was€great."€€òòId.óó€ðð€40„35„114(9),Ð ¾ Ð(13)(A),€(16).€€Ð ¤ô ÐÌà  àThe€following€additional€enhancement€factor€was€applied€to€the€Lincoln€County€case:€(13)Ð p!À  Ðthe€felony€was€committed€while€on€parole.€€òòId.óó€ðð€40„35„114(13)(B).€Ð V"¦! ÐÌà  àA€total€of€six€enhancement€factors€were€applied€in€the€Marshall€County€case,€and€a€total€ofÐ "$r# Ðfour€enhancement€factors€were€applied€in€the€Lincoln€County€case.€€No€mitigating€factors€wereÐ %X $ Ðapplied€in€either€case.à ¸ àÐ î%>!% ÐÌà  àThe€Defendant€argues€that€Tennessee€Code€Annotated€ðð€40„35„114(16)€should€not€have€beenÐ º' #' Ðapplied€in€the€Marshall€County€case€because€itòòóó€constituted€a€double€enhancement.€€That€provisionÐ  (ð#( Ðis€applicable€where€the€crime€is€committed€under€circumstances€under€which€the€potential€for€bodilyÐ †)Ö$) Ðinjury€to€a€victim€was€great.€€The€State€concedes€that€Tennessee€Code€Annotated€ðð€40„35„114(16)Ð l*¼%* Ðwas€misapplied€in€this€case.€€We€agree.Ô#†¼T»XX)¼íª#ÔÔ‡X)¼X»¼TÔà À àÐ R+¢&+ ÐÐ 8,ˆ', Ðà  àThe€Tennessee€Criminal€Sentencing€Reform€Act€of€1989€provides€that€an€enhancement€factorÐ ° Ðmay€be€applied€to€increase€the€defendant's€sentence€within€the€appropriate€range€if€the€factor€is€notÐ –æ Ðan€"essential€element"€of€the€offense.€€òòId.óó€ðð€40-35-114.€€"The€test€for€determining€if€an€enhancementÐ |Ì Ðfactor€is€an€essential€element€of€an€offense€is€whether€the€same€proof€necessary€to€establish€theÐ b² Ðenhancement€factor€would€also€establish€an€element€of€the€offense."€€òòState€v.€Binghamóó,€910€S.W.2dÐ H˜ Ð448,€452€(Tenn.€Crim.€App.€1995).Ð . ~ ÐÌà  àEnhancement€factor€(16)€requires€that€the€risk€or€potential€injury€be€"to€a€victim."€€Tenn.Ð ú J ÐCode€Ann.€ðð€40„35„114(16).€€This€Court€has€held€"victim"€to€mean€a€victim€of€the€charged€offenseÐ à 0 Ðrather€than€a€potential€victim,€a€victim€of€some€collateral€injury,€or€a€victim€of€some€unchargedÐ Æ   Ðoffense.€€€òòSeeóó€òòState€v.€Charles€Justin€Osborneóó,€No.€01C01„9806„CC„00246,€1999€WL€298220,€at€*3Ð ¬ ü  Ð(Tenn.€Crim.€App.,€Nashville,€May€12,€1999);€òòState€v.€Binghamóó,€910€S.W.2d€448,€452€(Tenn.€Crim.Ð ’â  ÐApp.€1995);€òòState€v.€Joseph€Oscar€Price,€IIIóó,€No.€01C01„9810„CR„00421,€1999€WL€1063414,€at€*5Ð xÈ  Ð(Tenn.€Crim.€App.,€Nashville,€Nov.€24,€1999).€€€Ð ^®  ÐÌà  àIn€applying€enhancement€factor€(16)€in€this€case,€the€trial€court€focused€on€the€potential€harmÐ *z  Ðto€other€people€in€the€parking€lot€when€the€incident€occurred.€€However,€enhancement€factor€(16)Ð ` Ðmay€not€be€used€on€the€basis€of€risk€to€others.€€Because€we€are€unable€to€consider€the€potential€harmÐ öF Ðto€those€other€than€the€victim€of€the€convicted€offense,€the€proof€necessary€to€establish€enhancementÐ Ü, Ðfactor€(16)€in€this€case€would€also€establish€an€essential€element€of€attempted€aggravated€robberyÐ Â Ðand€violate€Tennessee€Code€Annotated€ðð€40„35„114.€€Therefore,€we€conclude€that€the€trial€courtÐ ¨ø Ðerred€when€it€applied€factor€(16).Ð ŽÞ ÐÌà  àThe€Defendant€next€argues€that€the€trial€court€erred€in€applying€factor€(11)€to€enhance€bothÐ Zª Ðof€his€sentences.€€We€disagree.€€This€factor€applies€when€"the€felony€resulted€in€death€or€bodilyÐ @ Ðinjury€or€involved€the€threat€of€death€or€bodily€injury€to€another€person€and€the€defendant€has€beenÐ &v Ðpreviously€convicted€of€a€felony€that€resulted€in€death€or€bodily€injury."€€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€40„35„Ð  \ Ð114(11).€€€The€focus€of€this€provision€is€the€offender's€continuing€pattern€of€violent€criminal€acts.€Ð òB ÐIt€is€clear€that€factor€(11)€applies€in€this€case.€€€At€the€time€of€the€sentencing€in€this€case,€theÐ Ø( ÐDefendant€had€previously€been€convicted€of€a€felony€that€resulted€in€bodily€injury,€and€the€offensesÐ ¾ Ðfor€which€he€was€being€sentenced€involved€the€threat€of€death€or€bodily€injury.€€This€Court€hasÐ ¤ô Ðpreviously€held€that€factor€(11)€may€be€applied€to€the€charge€of€especially€aggravated€robbery.€€òòSeeóóÐ Š Ú ÐòòState€v.€Dustin€Dwayne€Davisóó,€No.€03C01„9712„CR„00543,€1999€WL€135054,€at€*10€(Tenn.€Crim.Ð p!À  ÐApp.,€Knoxville,€Mar.€15,€1999).€€We€conclude€that€factor€(11)€would€also€apply€to€the€lesserÐ V"¦! Ðincluded€offenses€of€aggravated€robbery€and€attempted€aggravated€robbery.€€Therefore,€we€concludeÐ <#Œ" Ðthat€the€trial€court€properly€applied€enhancement€factor€(11)€in€both€the€Lincoln€County€and€MarshallÐ "$r# ÐCounty€cases.Ð %X $ ÐÌà  àThe€Defendant€also€argues€that€the€trial€court€erred€by€not€considering€any€mitigating€factorsÐ Ô&$"& Ðin€either€case.€€The€Defendant€sought€to€have€the€following€mitigating€factors€considered€by€the€trialÐ º' #' Ðcourt:€(2)€that€"[t]he€defendant€acted€under€strong€provocation"€and€(11)€that€"[t]he€defendant,Ð  (ð#( Ðalthough€guilty€of€a€crime,€committed€the€offense€under€such€unusual€circumstances€that€it€isÐ †)Ö$) Ðunlikely€that€a€sustained€intent€to€violate€the€law€motivated€the€criminal€conduct."€€Tenn.€Code€Ann.Ð l*¼%* Ððð€40„35„113(2),€(11).€€The€Defendant€argues€that€he€was€not€in€control€of€his€actions€when€heÐ R+¢&+ Ðcommitted€the€crimes€because€he€was€under€the€influence€of€cocaine€and€alcohol.€€However,€theÐ 8,ˆ', Ðprolonged€voluntary€use€of€intoxicants€will€not€mitigate€criminal€conduct€committed€while€underÐ ° Ðthe€influence.€€Ð –æ ÐÌà  àIn€light€of€the€Defendant's€extended€criminal€history€and€admitted€drug€use,€the€Defendant'sÐ b² Ðclaim€that€Tennessee€Code€Annotated€ðð40„35„113(11)€should€apply€is€without€merit.€€The€DefendantÐ H˜ Ðadmitted€that€most€of€the€crimes€that€he€had€committed€in€the€past€were€done€while€under€theÐ . ~ Ðinfluence€of€drugs€and€alcohol;€therefore,€we€find€it€hard€to€believe€that€the€present€offense€wasÐ  d Ðcommitted€under€such€unusual€circumstances€that€it€is€unlikely€that€a€sustained€intent€to€violate€theÐ ú J Ðlaw€motivated€the€criminal€conduct.€òòóó€òòSeeóó€òòid.óóÐ à 0 ÐÌà  àThe€Defendant's€argument€that€he€acted€under€strong€provocation€is€also€without€merit.€€òòSeeóóÐ ¬ ü  ÐTenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€40„35„113(2).€€The€Defendant's€voluntary€use€of€intoxicants€is€not€the€type€ofÐ ’â  Ðprovocation€that€was€intended€by€the€statute.€€Thus,€we€find€that€the€trial€court€properly€ruled€thatÐ xÈ  Ðmitigating€factor€(11)€did€not€apply€in€this€case.Ð ^®  ÐÌÔ‡X)¼XXX)¼Ôà  àFinally,€the€Defendant€argues€that€the€trial€court€did€not€properly€weigh€the€enhancement€andÐ *z  Ðmitigating€factors€in€determining€the€appropriate€sentence.€€Ô#†X)¼XXX)¼ÅÍ#ÔThere€is€no€evidence€in€this€case€that€theÐ ` Ðtrial€judge€abused€his€discretion€in€weighing€the€applicable€enhancing€and€mitigating€factors€toÐ öF Ðsentence€the€Defendant.€€òòSeeóó€òòSheltonóó,€854€S.W.2d€at€123.€€Ô‡X)¼XXX)¼ÔEven€absent€the€application€ofÐ Ü, Ðenhancement€factor€(16),€the€remaining€enhancement€factors€and€lack€of€mitigating€factors€more€thanÐ Â Ðjustify€the€Defendant's€sentence.€Ô#†X)¼XXX)¼¼Ï#Ô€€Ô#†¼T»XX)¼¶#ÔÔ‡X)¼X»¼TÔÐ ¨ø ÐÔ#†¼T»XX)¼ðÐ#Ôò òó óÔ‡X)¼X»¼TÔòòó󀀀РŽÞ ÐÌà  àAccordingly,€the€judgment€of€the€trial€court€is€AFFIRMED.Ð Zª ÐÌÌà  àà ` àà ¸ àà  àà h àà À àà  à___________________________________€Ð  \ Ðà  àà ` àà ¸ àà  àà h àà À àà  àROBERT€W.€WEDEMEYER,€JUDGEÔ#†¼T»XX)¼MÑ#ÔÔ€X)¼X»¼TÔÐ òB ÐÌÌÌà  àà ` àà ¸ àà  àà h àà À àà  à